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Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
 Bell Journal of Economics
"... prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, noncommercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtai ..."
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Cited by 684 (3 self)
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prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, noncommercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
The Foundation of a Generic Theorem Prover
 Journal of Automated Reasoning
, 1989
"... Isabelle [28, 30] is an interactive theorem prover that supports a variety of logics. It represents rules as propositions (not as functions) and builds proofs by combining rules. These operations constitute a metalogic (or `logical framework') in which the objectlogics are formalized. Isabell ..."
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Cited by 471 (49 self)
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Isabelle [28, 30] is an interactive theorem prover that supports a variety of logics. It represents rules as propositions (not as functions) and builds proofs by combining rules. These operations constitute a metalogic (or `logical framework') in which the objectlogics are formalized
StrategyProofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions
 J. Econ. Theory
, 1975
"... Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategyproof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I pro ..."
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Cited by 542 (0 self)
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prove three theorems. First, every strategyproof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper’s strategyproofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow’s rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, nonnegative response, and citizens ’ sovereignty conditions for social
A Separator Theorem for Planar Graphs
, 1977
"... Let G be any nvertex planar graph. We prove that the vertices of G can be partitioned into three sets A, B, C such that no edge joins a vertex in A with a vertex in B, neither A nor B contains more than 2n/3 vertices, and C contains no more than 2& & vertices. We exhibit an algorithm which ..."
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Cited by 465 (1 self)
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Let G be any nvertex planar graph. We prove that the vertices of G can be partitioned into three sets A, B, C such that no edge joins a vertex in A with a vertex in B, neither A nor B contains more than 2n/3 vertices, and C contains no more than 2& & vertices. We exhibit an algorithm which
A Syntactic Approach to Type Soundness
 INFORMATION AND COMPUTATION
, 1992
"... We present a new approach to proving type soundness for Hindley/Milnerstyle polymorphic type systems. The keys to our approach are (1) an adaptation of subject reduction theorems from combinatory logic to programming languages, and (2) the use of rewriting techniques for the specification of the la ..."
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Cited by 634 (25 self)
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We present a new approach to proving type soundness for Hindley/Milnerstyle polymorphic type systems. The keys to our approach are (1) an adaptation of subject reduction theorems from combinatory logic to programming languages, and (2) the use of rewriting techniques for the specification
The Semantics Of Constraint Logic Programs
 JOURNAL OF LOGIC PROGRAMMING
, 1996
"... This paper presents for the first time the semantic foundations of CLP in a selfcontained and complete package. The main contributions are threefold. First, we extend the original conference paper by presenting definitions and basic semantic constructs from first principles, giving new and comp ..."
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Cited by 872 (14 self)
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and complete proofs for the main lemmas. Importantly, we clarify which theorems depend on conditions such as solution compactness, satisfaction completeness and independence of constraints. Second, we generalize the original results to allow for incompleteness of the constraint solver. This is important
Functions from a set to a set
 Journal of Formalized Mathematics
, 1989
"... function from a set X into a set Y, denoted by “Function of X,Y ”, the set of all functions from a set X into a set Y, denoted by Funcs(X,Y), and the permutation of a set (mode Permutation of X, where X is a set). Theorems and schemes included in the article are reformulations of the theorems of [1] ..."
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Cited by 1094 (23 self)
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function from a set X into a set Y, denoted by “Function of X,Y ”, the set of all functions from a set X into a set Y, denoted by Funcs(X,Y), and the permutation of a set (mode Permutation of X, where X is a set). Theorems and schemes included in the article are reformulations of the theorems of [1
Singularity Detection And Processing With Wavelets
 IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
, 1992
"... Most of a signal information is often found in irregular structures and transient phenomena. We review the mathematical characterization of singularities with Lipschitz exponents. The main theorems that estimate local Lipschitz exponents of functions, from the evolution across scales of their wavele ..."
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Cited by 590 (13 self)
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Most of a signal information is often found in irregular structures and transient phenomena. We review the mathematical characterization of singularities with Lipschitz exponents. The main theorems that estimate local Lipschitz exponents of functions, from the evolution across scales
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS
, 1999
"... This paper provides an elementary, nontechnical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthco ..."
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Cited by 528 (4 self)
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.), forthcoming.) We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address riskaversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multiunit auctions, double auctions, royalties
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