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115
Collusion in Atomic Splittable Routing Games
"... We investigate how collusion affects the social cost in atomic splittable routing games. Suppose that players form coalitions and each coalition behaves as if it were a single player controlling all the flows of its participants. It may be tempting to conjecture that the social cost would be lower ..."
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We investigate how collusion affects the social cost in atomic splittable routing games. Suppose that players form coalitions and each coalition behaves as if it were a single player controlling all the flows of its participants. It may be tempting to conjecture that the social cost would
Fast Convergence of Routing Games with Splittable Flows
"... Abstract. In this paper we investigate the splittable routing game in a seriesparallel network with two selfish players. Every player wishes to route optimally, i.e. at minimum cost, an individual flow demand from the source to the destination, giving rise to a noncooperative game. We allow a playe ..."
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Abstract. In this paper we investigate the splittable routing game in a seriesparallel network with two selfish players. Every player wishes to route optimally, i.e. at minimum cost, an individual flow demand from the source to the destination, giving rise to a noncooperative game. We allow a
Fast Convergence of Routing Games with Splittable Flows
, 2008
"... In this paper we investigate the splittable routing game in a seriesparallel network with two selfish players. Every player wishes to route optimally, i.e. at minimum cost, an individual flow demand from the source to the destination, giving rise to a noncooperative game. We allow a player to spli ..."
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In this paper we investigate the splittable routing game in a seriesparallel network with two selfish players. Every player wishes to route optimally, i.e. at minimum cost, an individual flow demand from the source to the destination, giving rise to a noncooperative game. We allow a player
Competitive Routing in MultiUser Communication Networks
 IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
, 1993
"... We consider a communication network shared by several selfish users. Each user seeks to optimize its own performance by controlling the routing of its given flow demand, giving rise to a noncooperative game. We investigate the Nash equilibrium of such systems. For a twonode multiplelinks system, ..."
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Cited by 219 (23 self)
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We consider a communication network shared by several selfish users. Each user seeks to optimize its own performance by controlling the routing of its given flow demand, giving rise to a noncooperative game. We investigate the Nash equilibrium of such systems. For a twonode multiplelinks system
Local Smoothness and the Price of Anarchy in Atomic Splittable Congestion Games
"... We resolve the worstcase price of anarchy (POA) of atomic splittable congestion games. Prior to this work, no tight bounds on the POA in such games were known, even for the simplest nontrivial special case of affine cost functions. We make two distinct contributions. On the upperbound side, we def ..."
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Cited by 20 (3 self)
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We resolve the worstcase price of anarchy (POA) of atomic splittable congestion games. Prior to this work, no tight bounds on the POA in such games were known, even for the simplest nontrivial special case of affine cost functions. We make two distinct contributions. On the upperbound side, we
The price of routing unsplittable flow
 In Proc. 37th Symp. Theory of Computing (STOC
, 2005
"... The essence of the routing problem in real networks is that the traffic demand from a source to destination must be satisfied by choosing a single path between source and destination. The splittable version of this problem is when demand can be satisfied by many paths, namely a flow from source to d ..."
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Cited by 140 (3 self)
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The essence of the routing problem in real networks is that the traffic demand from a source to destination must be satisfied by choosing a single path between source and destination. The splittable version of this problem is when demand can be satisfied by many paths, namely a flow from source
Routing (Un) Splittable Flow in Games with PlayerSpecific Linear Latency Functions
 In Proceedings of the 33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP’06), LNCS 4051
, 2006
"... Abstract. In this work we study weighted network congestion games with playerspecific latency functions where selfish players wish to route their traffic through a shared network. We consider both the case of splittable and unsplittable traffic. Our main findings are as follows: – For routing games ..."
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Cited by 19 (1 self)
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Abstract. In this work we study weighted network congestion games with playerspecific latency functions where selfish players wish to route their traffic through a shared network. We consider both the case of splittable and unsplittable traffic. Our main findings are as follows: – For routing
Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow
 In Proc. of the 6th Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA), volume 5426 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2008
"... We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmetric load balancing games and show that the price of anarchy is bounded from above by m, where m denotes the number of coal ..."
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Cited by 13 (1 self)
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We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmetric load balancing games and show that the price of anarchy is bounded from above by m, where m denotes the number
Wardrop equilibria and price of stability for bottleneck games with splittable traffic
 In Proceedings of the Second Annual Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE
, 2006
"... Abstract. We look at the scenario of having to route a continuous rate of traffic from a source node to a sink node in a network, where the objective is to maximize throughput. This is of interest, e.g., for providers of streaming content in communication networks. The overall path latency, which wa ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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was relevant in other noncooperative network routing games such as the classic Wardrop model, is of lesser concern here. To that end, we define bottleneck games with splittable traffic where the throughput on a path is inversely proportional to the maximum latency of an edge on that very path—the bottleneck
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
, 2002
"... In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models sel sh routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribu ..."
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Cited by 120 (27 self)
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In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models sel sh routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability
Results 1  10
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