This survey brings together a collection of epistemic logics and discusses their approaches in alleviating the logical omniscience problem. Of particular note is the logic of implicit and explicit belief. Explicit belief refers to information actively held by an agent, while implicit belief refers

Logics are powerful tools with which to reason about the behaviour of AI agents. A particular logic may provide an agent with an internal language with which it can represent and reason about the world, and act based upon its internal manipulation of this language. We can also use logics to reason

We consider the logical omniscience problem of epistemic logic. We argue that the problem is due to the way in which knowledge and belief are captured in Hintikka's possible worlds semantics. We describe an alternative approach in which propositions are sets of worlds, and knowledge and belief

of nonmonotonic reasoning and try to isolate properties that could help us map the field of nonmonotonic reasoning by reference to positive properties. We concentrate on a number of families of nonmonotonic consequence relations, defined in the style of Gentzen [13]. Both proof-theoretic and semantic points

.Intell Syst 1997, 12, 57]81 a collection of epistemic logics were reviewed and critiqued. This sequel paper provides evidence for the claim that a unifying framework for various existing epistemic logics can be de®ned. Of particular interest is the logic of implicit and explicit belief, the logic

Logical omniscience is a well known problem which makes traditional modal logics of knowledge, belief and intentions somewhat unrealistic from the point of view of modelling the behaviour of a resource bounded agent. We propose two logics which take into account `deliberation time' but use

Beyond “knowing that”: a research program A logic of (one type of)“knowing how ” Conclusions and future work References

BAN logic is an epistemic logic for verification of cryptographic protocols. A number of semantics have been proposed for BAN logic, but none of them capture the intended meaning of the epistemic modality in a satisfactory way. This is due to the so-called logical omniscience problem: Agents

this article, we will use examples and puzzles to give some flavor of the field and to demonstrate that the notion "it is known that" is meaningful and interesting for researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence and game theory

Contents 1 Introduction 3 1.1 Standard Epistemic Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.2 Logical Omniscience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3 A Framework for Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4 Resource Bounded Agents