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Envyfree Pricing with General Supply Constraints for Unit Demand Consumers
 JOURNAL OF COMPOUTER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
, 2011
"... The envyfree pricing problem can be stated as finding a pricing and allocation scheme in which each consumer is allocated a set of items that maximize her utility under the pricing. The goal is to maximize seller revenue. We study the problem with general supply constraints which are given as an in ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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The envyfree pricing problem can be stated as finding a pricing and allocation scheme in which each consumer is allocated a set of items that maximize her utility under the pricing. The goal is to maximize seller revenue. We study the problem with general supply constraints which are given
Optimal envyfree pricing with metric substitutability
 In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
"... We study the envyfree pricing problem faced by a profit maximizing seller when there is metric substitutability among the items — consumer i’s value for item j is vi − ci,j, and the substitution costs, {ci,j}, form a metric. Our model is motivated from the observation that sellers often sell the sa ..."
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Cited by 18 (2 self)
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the same product at different prices in different locations, and rational consumers optimize the tradeoff between prices and substitution costs. While the general envyfree pricing problem is hard to approximate, the addition of metric substitutability constraints allows us to solve the problem exactly
Abstract On ProfitMaximizing Envyfree Pricing
"... We study the problem of pricing items for sale to consumers so as to maximize the seller’s revenue. We assume that for each consumer, we know the maximum amount he would be willing to pay for each bundle of items, and want to find pricings of the items with corresponding allocations that maximize se ..."
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seller profit and at the same time are envyfree, which is a natural fairness criterion requiring that consumers are maximally happy with the outcome they receive given the pricing. We study this problem for two important classes of inputs: unit demand consumers, who want to buy at most one item from
On MultiDimensional EnvyFree Mechanisms
"... Traditional performance analysis of approximation algorithms considers overall performance, while economic fairness analysis focuses on the individual performance each user receives. In this paper we formulate the problem of fairness design in the context of resource allocation scenarios. The fair d ..."
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design problem is the design of computationallyefficient individuallyfair mechanism to approximate a global goal. We present the first polynomialcommunication profitmaximizing combinatorial auction for general bidders in an envyfree manner. Additionally, we study the canonical makespan
Uniform budgets and the envyfree pricing problem
 In Proceedings of the 35th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
, 2008
"... We consider the unitdemand minbuying pricing problem, in which we want to compute revenue maximizing prices for a set of products P assuming that each consumer from a set of consumer samples C will purchase her cheapest affordable product once prices are fixed. We focus on the special uniformbudg ..."
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Cited by 31 (5 self)
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budget case, in which every consumer has only a single nonzero budget for some set of products. This constitutes a special case also of the unitdemand envyfree pricing problem. We show that, assuming specific hardness of the balanced bipartite independent set problem in constant degree graphs or hardness
Revenue Maximizing Envyfree Multiunit Auctions with Budgets
"... We study envyfree (EF) mechanisms for multiunit auctions with budgeted agents that approximately maximize revenue. In an EF auction, prices are set so that every bidder receives a bundle that maximizes her utility amongst all bundles; We show that the problem of revenuemaximizing EF auctions is N ..."
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We study envyfree (EF) mechanisms for multiunit auctions with budgeted agents that approximately maximize revenue. In an EF auction, prices are set so that every bidder receives a bundle that maximizes her utility amongst all bundles; We show that the problem of revenuemaximizing EF auctions
EnvyFree Pricing in Multiitem Markets
, 2010
"... In this paper, we study revenue maximizing envyfree pricing in multiitem markets: There are m indivisible items and n potential buyers where each buyer is interested in acquiring one item. The goal is to determine allocations (a matching between buyers and items) and prices of all items to maximiz ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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In this paper, we study revenue maximizing envyfree pricing in multiitem markets: There are m indivisible items and n potential buyers where each buyer is interested in acquiring one item. The goal is to determine allocations (a matching between buyers and items) and prices of all items
ABSTRACT EnvyFree Auctions for Digital Goods
"... We study auctions for a commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good. In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue even on worst case inputs. • Truthful: any bidder’s best strategy is to bid t ..."
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the maximum value they are willing to pay. • Envyfree: after the auction is run, no bidder would be happier with the outcome of another bidder (for unlimited supply auctions, this means that there is a single sale price and goods are allocated to all bidders willing to pay this price). Our main result
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, Report No. 150 (2006) Towards Hardness of EnvyFree Pricing
"... We consider the envyfree pricing problem, in which we want to compute revenue maximizing prices for a set of products P assuming that each consumer from a set of consumer samples C will buy the product maximizing her personal utility, i.e., the difference between her respective budget and the produ ..."
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We consider the envyfree pricing problem, in which we want to compute revenue maximizing prices for a set of products P assuming that each consumer from a set of consumer samples C will buy the product maximizing her personal utility, i.e., the difference between her respective budget
MultiDimensional EnvyFree Scheduling Mechanisms
"... We study fairness design scenarios in which each bidder follows the global goal of the mechanism designer only if the resulted allocation would be fair from his own point of view. More formally, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envyfree bundle prices. We f ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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We study fairness design scenarios in which each bidder follows the global goal of the mechanism designer only if the resulted allocation would be fair from his own point of view. More formally, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envyfree bundle prices. We
Results 1  10
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432,540