### Table 2: Auction Items Item Average Final Price Number of Auctions

2004

"... In PAGE 16: ... Empirical Analysis In this section we report on our empirical study that examines the existence of arbitrage opportunities in online auctions hosted by eBay, the largest online auction house. The data was collected for a two-week time period in early 2002 for three items described in Table2 . All the items were posted as new and described identically for potential buyers.... ..."

### Table 1: Properties of three auctions for the MUBC auction problem

"... In PAGE 8: ...2, and plugging in above inequalities gives the theorem. 7 Conclusions In Table1 below, we list properties for three auctions designed for the MUBC auction problem: the asymp- totically optimal auction from [2], the profit extract partition auction in Section 4, and the masking auc- tion in Section 6. The performance of the asymptot- ically optimal auction in [2] is formulated as a bound on the tail of the distribution.... ..."

### Table 1: Properties of three auctions for the MUBC auction problem.

"... In PAGE 8: ...2, and plugging in above inequalities gives the theorem. 7 Conclusions In Table1 below, we list properties for three auctions designed for the MUBC auction problem: the asymp- totically optimal auction from [2], the profit extract partition auction in Section 4, and the masking auc- tion in Section 6. The performance of the asymptot- ically optimal auction in [2] is formulated as a bound on the tail of the distribution.... ..."

### Table 4. Profit for GD Agent in a single SPSB auctions.

"... In PAGE 6: ... We can conclude that for FPSB auctions, a GD agent competing against non-adaptive agents following the op- timal strategy learns a strategy that is not significantly different to the optimal and hence receives on aver- age a profit as high as the average obtained by the opti- mal agents. Second Price Sealed Bid The results for a single run with a GD agent in SPSB auctions is given in Table4 . Over 100 runs the mean and median GD profit was 17.... ..."

### Table 4. Profit for GD Agent in a single SPSB auctions.

"... In PAGE 6: ... We can conclude that for FPSB auctions, a GD agent competing against non-adaptive agents following the op- timal strategy learns a strategy that is not significantly different to the optimal and hence receives on aver- age a profit as high as the average obtained by the opti- mal agents. Second Price Sealed Bid The results for a single run with a GD agent in SPSB auctions is given in Table4 . Over 100 runs the mean and median GD profit was 17.... ..."

### Table 1: Summary statistics of procurement auction data Highway work auctions

2007

"... In PAGE 18: ... Among all the auctions in our dataset, we focus on highway work construction projects, for which the number of auctions is the largest. In Table1 , we present some summary statistics on the auctions used in the analysis. Note that there were six auctions with just one bidder, in which non-in nite bids were submitted.... ..."

### Table 3. Ping-pong bidding with F/R auction.

"... In PAGE 5: ... If the tar- get price fluctuates, bidders may alternatively bid to different targets without completing an auction. Table3 shows an exam- ple. Ping-pong bidding usually stops either by another bidder or by a completion of the auctions.... In PAGE 5: ... Applying an additional cost for retracting a bid mitigates the problem a little. However, as shown on Table3 , ping-pong bidding still happens with the cost of retracting a bid. If the cost of retracting a bid is too high the algorithm cannot adapt to the change in the environ- ment.... ..."

Cited by 1

### Table 1: Size of comparison classes for combinatorial auctions.

2005

"... In PAGE 20: ...Table 1: Size of comparison classes for combinatorial auctions. We can apply Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 to the sizes of the complexity classes in Table1 to get good bounds on the profit of random sampling auctions for combinatorial item pricing. In particular, using Corol- lary 2 we get that ~ O(hm2= 2) bidders are sufficient to achieve revenue close to the optimum item-pricing in the general case, and ~ O(hm= 2) bidders are sufficient for the unit-demand case.... ..."

Cited by 19

### Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Auction Data

2005

"... In PAGE 23: ...07, and a median price of $465. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table2 . Price is a continuous variable with the other variables coded as Indicator variables.... In PAGE 31: ... The standard deviation of 0.2 is consistent with the coefficient of variation in the data, from Table2 . Table 5 identifies profit maximizing prices and market share for the efficient configurations identified earlier.... ..."

### Table 3. Auction Results with Gen. B ramp

"... In PAGE 2: ... Suppose now that Generator B specifies an intertempo- ral constraint requiring that his dispatch level at Peak is no greater than his dispatch level at Off-peak. Then the auc- tion results under optimal social-cost dispatch are as given in Table3 . We note that the intertemporal constraint stipu- lated by Generator B caused an increase in social cost due to displacement of cheap energy with more expensive en- ergy, while the resulting increase in market clearing prices increased the net profits of both generators A and B.... ..."