This article presents a framework for emotiolllJl intelligenCl!, a set of skills hypothesized to contribute to the accurate appraisal and expression of emotion in oneself and in others, the effective regulation of emotion in self and others, and the use of feelings to motivate, plan, and achieve

Virtual reality (VR) is typically defined in terms of technological hardware. This paper attempts to cast a new, variable-based definition of virtual reality that can be used to classify virtual reality in relation to other media. The defintion of virtual reality is based on concepts of "presence" and "telepresence," which refer to the sense of being in an environment, generated by natural or mediated means, respectively. Two technological dimensions that contribute to telepresence, vividness and interactivity, are discussed. A variety of media are classified according to these dimensions. Suggestions are made for the application of the new definition of virtual reality within the field of communication research.

Computing devices and applications are now used beyond the desktop, in diverse environments, and this trend toward ubiquitous computing is accelerating. One challenge that remains in this emerging research field is the ability to enhance the behavior of any application by informing it of the context of its use. By context, we refer to any information that characterizes a situation related to the interaction between humans, applications and the surrounding environment. Context-aware applications promise richer and easier interaction, but the current state of research in this field is still far removed from that vision. This is due to three main problems: (1) the notion of context is still ill defined; (2) there is a lack of conceptual models and methods to help drive the design of context-aware applications; and (3) no tools are available to jump-start the development of context-aware applications. In this paper, we address these three problems in turn. We first define context, identify categories of contextual information, and characterize context-aware application behavior. Though the full impact of context-aware computing requires understanding very subtle and high-level notions of context, we are focusing our efforts on the pieces of context that can be inferred automatically from sensors in a physical environment. We then present a conceptual framework that separates the acquisition and representation of context from the delivery and reaction to context by a contextaware application. We have built a toolkit, the Context Toolkit, that instantiates this conceptual framework and supports the rapid development of a rich space of context-aware applications. We illustrate the usefulness of the conceptual framework by describing a number of contextaware applications that h...

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Trust is a judgement of unquestionable utility — as humans we use it every day of our lives. However, trust has suffered from an imperfect understanding, a plethora of definitions, and informal use in the literature and in everyday life. It is common to say “I trust you, ” but what does that mean? This thesis provides a clarification of trust. We present a formalism for trust which provides us with a tool for precise discussion. The formalism is implementable: it can be embedded in an artificial agent, enabling the agent to make trust-based decisions. Its applicability in the domain of Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) is raised. The thesis presents a testbed populated by simple trusting agents which substantiates the utility of the formalism. The formalism provides a step in the direction of a proper understanding and definition of human trust. A contribution of the thesis is its detailed exploration of the possibilities of future work in the area. Summary 1. Overview This thesis presents an overview of trust as a social phenomenon and discusses it formally. It argues that trust is: • A means for understanding and adapting to the complexity of the environment. • A means of providing added robustness to independent agents. • A useful judgement in the light of experience of the behaviour of others. • Applicable to inanimate others. The thesis argues these points from the point of view of artificial agents. Trust in an artificial agent is a means of providing an additional tool for the consideration of other agents and the environment in which it exists. Moreover, a formalisation of trust enables the embedding of the concept into an artificial agent. This has been done, and is documented in the thesis. 2. Exposition There are places in the thesis where it is necessary to give a broad outline before going deeper. In consequence it may seem that the subject is not receiving a thorough treatment, or that too much is being discussed at one time! (This is particularly apparent in the first and second chapters.) To present a thorough understanding of trust, we have proceeded breadth first in the introductory chapters. Chapter 3 expands, depth first, presenting critical views of established researchers.

This paper describes the Structure-Mapping Engine (SME), a program for studying analogical processing. SME has been built to explore Gentner's Structure-mapping theory of analogy, and provides a "tool kit" for constructing matching algorithms consistent with this theory. Its flexibility enhances cognitive simulation studies by simplifying experimentation. Furthermore, SME is very efficient, making it a useful component in machine learning systems as well. We review the Structure-mapping theory and describe the design of the engine. We analyze the complexity of the algorithm, and demonstrate that most of the steps are polynomial, typically bounded by O (N 2 ). Next we demonstrate some examples of its operation taken from our cognitive simulation studies and work in machine learning. Finally, we compare SME to other analogy programs and discuss several areas for future work. This paper appeared in Artificial Intelligence, 41, 1989, pp 1-63. For more information, please contact forbu...

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Since the beginning of the century, feedback interventions (FIs) produced negative—but largely ignored—effects on performance. A meta-analysis (607 effect sizes; 23,663 observations) suggests that FIs improved performance on average (d =.41) but that over '/3 of the FIs decreased perfor-mance. This finding cannot be explained by sampling error, feedback sign, or existing theories. The authors proposed a preliminary FI theory (FIT) and tested it with moderator analyses. The central assumption of FIT is that FIs change the locus of attention among 3 general and hierarchically organized levels of control: task learning, task motivation, and meta-tasks (including self-related) processes. The results suggest that FI effectiveness decreases as attention moves up the hierarchy closer to the self and away from the task. These findings are further moderated by task characteristics that are still poorly understood. To relate feedback directly to behavior is very confusing. Results are contradictory and seldom straight-forward. (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979, p. 368) The effects of manipulation of KR [knowledge of results] on motor learning...reveal... some violent contradictions to earlier beliefs about KR, and some glaring absences in our knowledge. (Salmoni, Schmidt, & Walter, 1984, p. 378). Feedback does not uniformly improve performance. (Balcazar,

Five studies tested two general hypotheses: Individuals differ in their use of emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal and suppression, and these individual differences have implications for affect, well-being, and social relationships. Study 1 presents new measures of the habitual use