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Distance-bounding facing both mafia and

by O Trujillo-rasua, Benjamin Martin, Gildas Avoine
"... Abstract. Contactless technologies such as RFID, NFC, and sensor net-works are vulnerable to mafia and distance frauds. Both frauds aim at passing an authentication protocol by cheating on the actual distance be-tween the prover and the verifier. To cope these security issues, distance-bounding prot ..."
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Abstract. Contactless technologies such as RFID, NFC, and sensor net-works are vulnerable to mafia and distance frauds. Both frauds aim at passing an authentication protocol by cheating on the actual distance be-tween the prover and the verifier. To cope these security issues, distance-bounding

Mafia Fraud Attack against the RČ Distance-Bounding Protocol

by Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, Cristina Onete, Serge Vaudenay
"... where the prover and verifier use simultaneous transmissions and the verifier counts the delay between sending a challenge (starting with a hidden marker) and receiving the response. Thus, the verifier is able to compute an upper bound on the distance separating it and the prover. Distance bounding ..."
Abstract - Cited by 6 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
protocols should resist to the most classical types of attacks such as distance fraud and mafia fraud. In mafia fraud, a man-in-the-middle adversary attempts to prove to a legitimate verifier that the prover is in the verifier’s proximity, even though the prover is in reality far away and does not wish

Distance Bounding in Noisy Environments

by Bart Preneel - In Proceedings of the 4th European Workshop on Security and Privacy in Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (ESAS ’07), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS 4572 , 2007
"... Abstract. Location information can be used to enhance mutual entity authentication protocols in wireless ad-hoc networks. More specifically, distance bounding protocols have been introduced by Brands and Chaum at Eurocrypt’93 to preclude distance fraud and mafia fraud attacks, in which a local imper ..."
Abstract - Cited by 36 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. Location information can be used to enhance mutual entity authentication protocols in wireless ad-hoc networks. More specifically, distance bounding protocols have been introduced by Brands and Chaum at Eurocrypt’93 to preclude distance fraud and mafia fraud attacks, in which a local

Reid et al.’s Distance Bounding Protocol and Mafia Fraud Attacks over Noisy Channels

by A. Mitrokotsa, C. Dimitrakakis, P. Peris-Lopez, J. C. Hernandez-Castro , 2010
"... Distance bounding protocols are an effective countermeasure against relay attacks including distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. Reid et al. proposed the first symmetric key distance bounding protocol against mafia and terrorist fraud attacks [1]. However, [2] claims that this i ..."
Abstract - Cited by 6 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
Distance bounding protocols are an effective countermeasure against relay attacks including distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. Reid et al. proposed the first symmetric key distance bounding protocol against mafia and terrorist fraud attacks [1]. However, [2] claims

On Modeling Terrorist Frauds Addressing Collusion in Distance Bounding Protocols

by Serge Vaudenay
"... Abstract. Quite recently, distance-bounding protocols received a lot of attention as they offer a good solution to thwart relay attacks. Their security models at still unstable, especially when considering terrorist fraud. This considers the case where a malicious prover would try to bypass the prot ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. Quite recently, distance-bounding protocols received a lot of attention as they offer a good solution to thwart relay attacks. Their security models at still unstable, especially when considering terrorist fraud. This considers the case where a malicious prover would try to bypass

Distance hijacking attacks on distance bounding protocols

by Cas Cremers , Eth Zurich , Kasper B Rasmussen , Benedikt Schmidt , Eth Zurich - In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy , 2012
"... Abstract-After several years of theoretical research on distance bounding protocols, the first implementations of such protocols have recently started to appear. These protocols are typically analyzed with respect to three types of attacks, which are historically known as Distance Fraud, Mafia Frau ..."
Abstract - Cited by 21 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract-After several years of theoretical research on distance bounding protocols, the first implementations of such protocols have recently started to appear. These protocols are typically analyzed with respect to three types of attacks, which are historically known as Distance Fraud, Mafia

Distance bounding overview

by unknown authors
"... Distance bounding overview ● Mafia fraud: an adversary tricks a verifier into thinking that a prover is near, by establishing a relay link between them ● Distance fraud: the prover itself is malicious, and tricks the verifier into thinking to be near Distance bounding overview ● A distance bounding ..."
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Distance bounding overview ● Mafia fraud: an adversary tricks a verifier into thinking that a prover is near, by establishing a relay link between them ● Distance fraud: the prover itself is malicious, and tricks the verifier into thinking to be near Distance bounding overview ● A distance bounding

Low-Power Distance Bounding

by Aanjhan Ranganathan, Boris Danev, Srdjan Capkun
"... A distance bounding system guarantees an upper bound on the physical distance between a verifier and a prover. How-ever, in contrast to a conventional wireless communication system, distance bounding systems introduce tight require-ments on the processing delay at the prover and require high distanc ..."
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security guarantees against distance, mafia and terrorist frauds. Ad-ditionally, we validate the communication and distance mea-surement characteristics of our system through simulations and experiments and show that it is well suited for short-range physical access control and payment applications. 1.

Prover Anonymous and Deniable Distance-Bounding Authentication∗

by Cristina Onete, Jean-marc Robert
"... In distance-bounding authentication protocols, a verifier confirms that a prover is (1) legitimate and (2) in the verifier’s proximity. Proximity checking is done by running time-critical exchanges between both parties. This enables the verifier to detect relay attacks (a.k.a. mafia frauds). While m ..."
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In distance-bounding authentication protocols, a verifier confirms that a prover is (1) legitimate and (2) in the verifier’s proximity. Proximity checking is done by running time-critical exchanges between both parties. This enables the verifier to detect relay attacks (a.k.a. mafia frauds). While

Shedding Light on RFID Distance Bounding Protocols and Terrorist Fraud Attacks

by Pedro Peris-lopez, Julio C. Hern, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, Juan M. E. Tapiador , 2010
"... The vast majority of RFID authentication protocols assume the proximity between readers and tags due to the limited range of the radio channel. However, in real scenarios an intruder can be located between the prover (tag) and the verifier (reader) and trick this last one into thinking that the prov ..."
Abstract - Cited by 4 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
that the prover is in close proximity. This attack is generally known as a relay attack in which scope distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist attacks are included. Distance bounding protocols represent a promising countermeasure to hinder relay attacks. Several protocols have been proposed during the last
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