that these techniques can also defeat malicious measurements injected by attackers. In this paper, we present a new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids. We show that an attacker can exploit the configuration of a power system to launch such attacks

In this paper, we study stealthy false-data attacks against state estimators in power networks. The focus is on applications in SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems where measurement data is corrupted by a malicious attacker. We introduce two security indices for the state

At present, computer networks constitute the core component of information technology infrastructures in areas such as power grids, financial data systems and emergency communication systems. Protection of these networks from malicious intrusions is critical to the economy and security of our

Abstract—In this paper, we study stealthy false-data attacks against state estimators in power networks. The focus is on applications in SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems where measurement data is corrupted by a malicious attacker. We introduce two security indices

. Therefore security of the estimator becomes an important issue. The estimators are currently located in control centers, and large numbers of measurements are sent over unencrypted communication channels to the centers. We here study stealthy false-data attacks against these estimators. We define a security

the decisions on defensive measures are made taking into account resource constraints represented by cost values. Thus, security games provide a framework for choosing the best response strategies against attackers in order to minimize potential risks. The framework developed is also useful to analyse different

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A MANET is an autonomous system of mobile nodes. The system may operate in isolation, or may have gateways and interface with a fixed network. Its nodes are equipped with wireless transmitters/receivers using antennas which may be omni directional (broadcast), highly-directional (point

protection against attacks based on the injection of fake data. Using a real-world WSN deployment and a realistic implementation of an attacker, we analyze this protection scheme and demonstrate that neither position change, transmission power manipulation, nor complete knowledge of wireless parameters can

Abstract not found