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Cryptanalysis of the RSA-CEGD protocol

by Juan M. E. Tapiador, Almudena Alcaide, Julio C. Hern, Arturo Ribagorda , 812
"... Recently, Nenadić et al. (2004) proposed the RSA-CEGD protocol for certified delivery of e-goods. This is a relatively complex scheme based on verifiable and recoverable encrypted signatures (VRES) to guarantee properties such as strong fairness and non-repudiation, among others. In this paper, we d ..."
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Recently, Nenadić et al. (2004) proposed the RSA-CEGD protocol for certified delivery of e-goods. This is a relatively complex scheme based on verifiable and recoverable encrypted signatures (VRES) to guarantee properties such as strong fairness and non-repudiation, among others. In this paper, we

A Formal Analysis of Fairness and Non-repudiation in the RSA-CEGD Protocol

by Almudena Alcaide, Juan M. Estévez-tapiador, Antonio Izquierdo, Jose ́ M. Sierra
"... Abstract. Recently, Nenadic ́ et al. (2004) proposed the RSA-CEGD protocol for certified delivery of e-goods. This is a relatively complex scheme based on verifiable and recoverable encrypted signatures (VRES) to guarantee properties such as strong fairness and non-repudiation, among others. In this ..."
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Abstract. Recently, Nenadic ́ et al. (2004) proposed the RSA-CEGD protocol for certified delivery of e-goods. This is a relatively complex scheme based on verifiable and recoverable encrypted signatures (VRES) to guarantee properties such as strong fairness and non-repudiation, among others

On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for Faults

by Dan Boneh, Richard A. Demillo, Richard J. Lipton , 1997
"... We present a theoretical model for breaking various cryptographic schemes by taking advantage of random hardware faults. We show how to attack certain implementations of RSA and Rabin signatures. An implementation of RSA based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem can be broken using a single erroneous s ..."
Abstract - Cited by 405 (6 self) - Add to MetaCart
. Schnorr's protocol can also be broken, but a larger number of erroneous executions is needed. Keywords: Hardware faults, Cryptanalysis, RSA, Fiat-Shamir, Schnorr, Public key systems, Identification protocols. 1 Introduction Direct attacks on the famous RSA cryptosystem seem to require that one factor

Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of GSM Encrypted Communication

by Elad Barkan, Eli Biham, Nathan Keller - Advances in Cryptology, proceedings of CRYPTO 2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2729
"... Abstract. In this paper we present a very practical ciphertext-only cryptanalysis of GSM encrypted communication, and various active attacks on the GSM protocols. These attacks can even break into GSM networks that use “unbreakable ” ciphers. We describe a ciphertext-only attack on A5/2 that require ..."
Abstract - Cited by 104 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. In this paper we present a very practical ciphertext-only cryptanalysis of GSM encrypted communication, and various active attacks on the GSM protocols. These attacks can even break into GSM networks that use “unbreakable ” ciphers. We describe a ciphertext-only attack on A5

Cryptanalysis of Ciphers and Protocols

by Elad Pinhas Barkan, Pinhas Barkan
"... The research thesis was done under the supervision of Prof. Eli Biham in the Faculty of Computer Science. It is my privilege to thank Eli Biham for his insightful support that made this work possible, and for bringing me up as a scientist and researcher. I especially acknowledge Eli for his respect ..."
Abstract - Cited by 3 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
The research thesis was done under the supervision of Prof. Eli Biham in the Faculty of Computer Science. It is my privilege to thank Eli Biham for his insightful support that made this work possible, and for bringing me up as a scientist and researcher. I especially acknowledge Eli for his respect and trust, and for providing me with a very high degree of independence. Eli found the golden path among education, rigorousness, and care. His unique ability to quickly communicate anything in a personal (and sometimes playful) way always leaves me with a smile on my face. I am thankful to Adi Shamir for our fruitful collaboration, for being highly available around the clock (and around the globe), and for his patience and his wisdom. I acknowledge Nathan Keller for his wonderful and helpful curiosity, and for being an amazing brainmaker. It is a pleasure to thank my colleagues at the Technion, Orr Dunkelman and Rafi Chen, for fruitful discussions and for the wonderful time we had together. I feel that no words can express my deep gratitude to my loving family, which

Cryptanalysis of an Authentication Protocol

by Bogdan Groza, Dorina Petrica
"... Authentication protocols have applications in many fields. The security of authentication protocols is commonly based on cryptographic primitives. Constructing secure authentication protocols is not an easy challenge and there is a large number of authentication protocols that prove to be insecure. ..."
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Authentication protocols have applications in many fields. The security of authentication protocols is commonly based on cryptographic primitives. Constructing secure authentication protocols is not an easy challenge and there is a large number of authentication protocols that prove to be insecure

Cryptanalysis on the RFID ACTION Protocol

by H. M. Sun, S. M. Chen, K. H. Wang
"... Abstract — There are increasing concerns on the security of RFID usages. Recently, Lu et al. presented ACTION, a privacy preservative authentication protocol for RFID. It is claimed that it achieves high level of security even if a large number of tags is compromised. However, we found that this pro ..."
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Abstract — There are increasing concerns on the security of RFID usages. Recently, Lu et al. presented ACTION, a privacy preservative authentication protocol for RFID. It is claimed that it achieves high level of security even if a large number of tags is compromised. However, we found

Cryptanalysis and Enhancement of Authentication Protocols

by Çetin Kaya Koç, Minho Kim , 2006
"... Abstract approved: ..."
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Abstract approved:

Cryptanalysis of the Dragonfly Key Exchange Protocol

by Dylan Clarke, Feng Hao , 2013
"... Dragonfly is a password authenticated key exchange protocol that has been submitted to the Internet Engineering Task Force as a candidate standard for general internet use. We analyzed the security of this protocol and devised an attack that is capable of extracting both the session key and password ..."
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Dragonfly is a password authenticated key exchange protocol that has been submitted to the Internet Engineering Task Force as a candidate standard for general internet use. We analyzed the security of this protocol and devised an attack that is capable of extracting both the session key

Cryptanalysis of Two RFID Authentication Protocols

by Tianjie Cao, Peng Shen , 2008
"... Radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies have many advantages in applications such as object tracking and monitoring, ticketing, supply-chain management, contactless payment systems. However, the RFID system may bring about various security and privacy problems. In this paper we present ou ..."
Abstract - Cited by 3 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
our security analysis of the LAK protocol and the CWH protocol. First, we show that the LAK protocol cannot resist replay attacks, and therefore an adversary can impersonate a legal tag. Next, we present a full-disclosure attack on the CWH protocol. By sending malicious queries to a tag and collecting
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