### Table 1: Efficiency of Two-Party Group Key Exchange Protocols

"... In PAGE 5: ... According to Adams and Lloyd [1], these protocols can be compared when we adjust the key length to obtain an equiv- alent level of cryptographic protection. Table1 summarizes... ..."

### Table 1: Analysis of Provably Secure Group Key Exchange Protocols Protocol Model(s) Assumption(s) Corr. S/D

2006

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### Table 1: Analysis of Security Models for Group Key Exchange Protocols Model IND MA FS CON Strong Corr. S/D

2006

Cited by 2

### Table 1: Analysis of Security Models for Group Key Exchange Protocols Model IND MA FS CON Strong Corr. S/D

2006

Cited by 2

### Table 1: Analysis of Security Models for Group Key Exchange Protocols Model IND MA FS CON Strong Corr. S/D

2006

Cited by 2

### Table 1: Imaginary quadratic eld key exchange comparison.

"... In PAGE 7: ...1 Imaginary Quadratic Fields In order to compare the performance of NUCOMP and NUDUPL versus com- position, we have implemented the Di e-Hellmann key exchange protocol in the class group of an imaginary quadratic order [1]. For each discriminant size given in Table1 , we performed 5000 key exchanges with both NUCOMP and com- position, using random discriminants of the given size and random exponents of the same bit-length as and bounded by pj j: Each communication partner performs two exponentiations per key exchange, so we expect each partner to perform about log2 j j NUDUPL or ideal squaring operations and half as many NUCOMP or ideal multiplication operations per key exchange. The total time for all 5000 key exchanges per communication partner and the average time for a single key exchange per partner, using composition and NUCOMP, are given in the table, as well as the ratio of the total time for all key exchanges using NU- COMP over the total time using ideal multiplication.... ..."

### Table 9: Key Material Exchange Protocols Proposed by ATM Forum

1998

"... In PAGE 35: ... {X} indicates that X is optional. With the aid of the above symbols, we summarize in Table9 the two protocols proposed in Phase I ATM Security Specification. It is stated in Phase I ATM Security Specification that the two key material exchange protocols can be implemented either in secret key (symmetric) cryptography or public key (asymmetric) cryptography.... ..."

### Table 9: Key Material Exchange Protocols Proposed by ATM Forum

"... In PAGE 35: ... fXg indicates that X is optional. With the aid of the above symbols, we summarize in Table9 the two protocols proposed in Phase I ATM Security Speci cation. It is stated in Phase I ATM Security Speci cation that the two key material exchange protocols can be implemented either in secret key (symmetric) cryptography or public key (asymmetric) cryptography.... ..."

### Table 8: Key Material Exchange Protocols Proposed by ATM Forum

"... In PAGE 19: ... fXg indicates that X is optional. With the aid of the above symbols, we summarize in Table8 the two protocols proposed in Phase I ATM Security Speci cation. Three-Way Key Material Exchange Protocol Alice (Initiator) Bob (Respondent) ) IDa; fIDbg; Ra; SecNega; fCertag ) ( IDa; IDb; SecNegb; fCertbg; fRa; Rb; fEncKa(ConfP arb)g; SigKb(hash(IDa; IDb; Ra; Rb; SecNega; SecNegb; fConfP arbg))g ( ) fIDa; IDb; Rb; fEncKb(ConfP ara)g; SigKa(hash(IDa; IDb; Rb; fConfP arag))g ) Two-Way Key Material Exchange Protocol Alice (Initiator) Bob (Respondent) ) IDa; IDb; SecOpt; fTa; Ra; fEncKb(ConfP ara)g; SigKa(Hash(IDa; IDb; Ta; Ra; SecOpt; fConfP arag))g... ..."

### Table 8: Key Material Exchange Protocols Proposed by ATM Forum

"... In PAGE 18: ... fXg indicates that X is optional. With the aid of the above symbols, we summarize in Table8 the two protocols proposed in Phase I ATM Security Speci cation.... ..."