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338
Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games
, 2008
"... We consider the problem of computing εapproximate Nash equilibria in network congestion games. The general problem is known to be PLScomplete for every ε> 0, but the reductions are based on artificial and steep delay functions with the property that already two players using the same resource ..."
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We consider the problem of computing εapproximate Nash equilibria in network congestion games. The general problem is known to be PLScomplete for every ε> 0, but the reductions are based on artificial and steep delay functions with the property that already two players using the same resource
The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria
, 2004
"... We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general. ..."
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Cited by 169 (6 self)
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We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general
Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games
 IN PROC. 18TH EUROPEAN SYMPOSIUM ON ALGORITHMS (ESA
, 2010
"... Bottleneck congestion games properly model the properties of many realworld network routing applications. They are known to possess strong equilibria – a strengthening of Nash equilibrium to resilience against coalitional deviations. In this paper, westudy the computational complexity of pure Nash ..."
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Cited by 5 (2 self)
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Bottleneck congestion games properly model the properties of many realworld network routing applications. They are known to possess strong equilibria – a strengthening of Nash equilibrium to resilience against coalitional deviations. In this paper, westudy the computational complexity of pure Nash
Inapproximability of pure Nash equilibria
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 40TH ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING (STOC
, 2008
"... Purestrategy Nash equilibria are a natural and convincing solution concept for multiplayer games with the finite improvement property, i.e., any sequence of improvement steps by individual players is finite and any maximal such sequence terminates in a Nash equilibrium. By far the most literature a ..."
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Cited by 32 (2 self)
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the finite improvement property is guaranteed by an exact potential function. The complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in congestion games was recently shown to be PLScomplete. In this paper, we therefore study the complexity of computing approximate equilibria in congestion games. An αapproximate
The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria In Maxcongestion Games
, 2008
"... We study Network MaxCongestion Games (NMC games, for short), a class of network games where each player tries to minimize themost congested edge along the path he uses as strategy. We focus our study on the complexity of computing a pure Nash equilibria in this kind of games. We show that, for sing ..."
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We study Network MaxCongestion Games (NMC games, for short), a class of network games where each player tries to minimize themost congested edge along the path he uses as strategy. We focus our study on the complexity of computing a pure Nash equilibria in this kind of games. We show that
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
, 2005
"... We present a short geometric proof of the price of anarchy and price of stability results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing. This novel proof also facilitates two types of new results: On the one hand, we give pseudoapproximation results that depend on t ..."
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Cited by 26 (4 self)
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networks. Our results actually hold in the more general context of congestion games, which provide the framework in which we describe this work.
Graphical Models for Game Theory
, 2001
"... We introduce a compact graphtheoretic representation for multiparty game theory. Our main result is a provably correct and efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in onestage games represented by trees or sparse graphs. ..."
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Cited by 286 (23 self)
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We introduce a compact graphtheoretic representation for multiparty game theory. Our main result is a provably correct and efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in onestage games represented by trees or sparse graphs.
Nash Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in Congestion Games
, 2009
"... Communication infrastructures and markets are maintained and used by millions of entities each of them facing a private objective. The vast number of participants in conjunction with their individual goals to choose the best alternative gave rise to study such scenarios in the framework of game theo ..."
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theory as it is rather unrealistic to assume that a centrally computed solution can be implemented. In this thesis, we follow this line of research and study congestion games as introduced by Rosenthal in 1973 and several modifications of his original approach. Congestion games model scenarios in which a
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
, 2002
"... In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models sel sh routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribu ..."
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Cited by 120 (27 self)
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In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models sel sh routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability
Results 1  10
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338