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46,871
Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games
, 2008
"... We consider the problem of computing εapproximate Nash equilibria in network congestion games. The general problem is known to be PLScomplete for every ε> 0, but the reductions are based on artificial and steep delay functions with the property that already two players using the same resource ..."
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We consider the problem of computing εapproximate Nash equilibria in network congestion games. The general problem is known to be PLScomplete for every ε> 0, but the reductions are based on artificial and steep delay functions with the property that already two players using the same resource
Worstcase equilibria
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
, 1999
"... In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a ver ..."
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Cited by 851 (17 self)
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In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a
The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria
, 2004
"... We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general. ..."
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Cited by 172 (6 self)
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We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 556 (1 self)
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: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
Learning Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games ∗
"... We study the repeated congestion game, in which multiple populations of players share resources, and make, at each iteration, a decentralized decision on which resources to utilize. We investigate the following question: given a model of how individual players update their strategies, does the resul ..."
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the resulting dynamics of strategy profiles converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the oneshot game? We consider in particular a model in which players update their strategies using algorithms with sublinear discounted regret. We show that the resulting sequence of strategy profiles converges to the set
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
, 2006
"... We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability of n ..."
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Cited by 324 (23 self)
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We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability
How bad is selfish routing?
 JOURNAL OF THE ACM
, 2002
"... We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route t ..."
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Cited by 678 (27 self)
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We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route
Approximate Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games
, 2014
"... We study from an algorithmic viewpoint anonymous games [Mil96, Blo99, Blo05, Kal05]. In these games a large population of players shares the same strategy set and, while players may have different payoff functions, the payoff of each depends on her own choice of strategy and the number of the other ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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players playing each strategy (not the identity of these players). We show that, the intractability results of [DGP09a] and [Das11] for general games notwithstanding, approximate mixed Nash equilibria in anonymous games can be computed in polynomial time, for any desired quality of the approximation
ERC  A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition
 FORTHCOMING AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 1999
"... We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, explains behavior in a wide variety of laboratory games. Included are games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum, twoperio ..."
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Cited by 699 (21 self)
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We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, explains behavior in a wide variety of laboratory games. Included are games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum, two
Results 1  10
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46,871