Results 1  10
of
54
Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games
, 2008
"... We consider the problem of computing εapproximate Nash equilibria in network congestion games. The general problem is known to be PLScomplete for every ε> 0, but the reductions are based on artificial and steep delay functions with the property that already two players using the same resource ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
We consider the problem of computing εapproximate Nash equilibria in network congestion games. The general problem is known to be PLScomplete for every ε> 0, but the reductions are based on artificial and steep delay functions with the property that already two players using the same resource
The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria
, 2004
"... We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 169 (6 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general
Inapproximability of pure Nash equilibria
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 40TH ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING (STOC
, 2008
"... Purestrategy Nash equilibria are a natural and convincing solution concept for multiplayer games with the finite improvement property, i.e., any sequence of improvement steps by individual players is finite and any maximal such sequence terminates in a Nash equilibrium. By far the most literature a ..."
Abstract

Cited by 32 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
the finite improvement property is guaranteed by an exact potential function. The complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in congestion games was recently shown to be PLScomplete. In this paper, we therefore study the complexity of computing approximate equilibria in congestion games. An αapproximate
The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria In Maxcongestion Games
, 2008
"... We study Network MaxCongestion Games (NMC games, for short), a class of network games where each player tries to minimize themost congested edge along the path he uses as strategy. We focus our study on the complexity of computing a pure Nash equilibria in this kind of games. We show that, for sing ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
We study Network MaxCongestion Games (NMC games, for short), a class of network games where each player tries to minimize themost congested edge along the path he uses as strategy. We focus our study on the complexity of computing a pure Nash equilibria in this kind of games. We show that
Strong nash equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property
 Internet and Network Economics
, 2009
"... Abstract. We introduce a class of finite strategic games with the property that every deviation of a coalition of players that is profitable to each of its members strictly decreases the lexicographical order of a certain function defined on the set of strategy profiles. We call this property the Le ..."
Abstract

Cited by 13 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
the Lexicographical Improvement Property (LIP) and show that it implies the existence of a generalized strong ordinal potential function. We use this characterization to derive existence, efficiency and fairness properties of strong Nash equilibria. We then study a class of games that generalizes congestion games
The Complexity of Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games
"... Abstract. We study Congestion Games with nonincreasing cost functions (Cost Sharing Games) from a complexity perspective and resolve their computational hardness, which has been an open question. Specifically we prove that when the cost functions have the form f(x) = cr/x (Fair Cost Allocation) th ..."
Abstract

Cited by 3 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
) then it is PLScomplete to compute a Pure Nash Equilibrium even in the case where strategies of the players are paths on a directed network. For cost functions of the form f(x) = cr(x)/x, where cr(x) is a nondecreasing concave function we also prove PLScompleteness in undirected networks. Thus we extend
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
, 2005
"... We present a short geometric proof of the price of anarchy and price of stability results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing. This novel proof also facilitates two types of new results: On the one hand, we give pseudoapproximation results that depend on t ..."
Abstract

Cited by 26 (4 self)
 Add to MetaCart
on the class of allowable cost functions. On the other hand, we offer improved bounds on the inefficiency of Nash equilibria for situations in which the equilibrium travel times are within reasonable limits of the freeflow travel times, a scenario that captures empirical observations in vehicular traffic
Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games
 IN PROC. 18TH EUROPEAN SYMPOSIUM ON ALGORITHMS (ESA
, 2010
"... Bottleneck congestion games properly model the properties of many realworld network routing applications. They are known to possess strong equilibria – a strengthening of Nash equilibrium to resilience against coalitional deviations. In this paper, westudy the computational complexity of pure Nash ..."
Abstract

Cited by 5 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Bottleneck congestion games properly model the properties of many realworld network routing applications. They are known to possess strong equilibria – a strengthening of Nash equilibrium to resilience against coalitional deviations. In this paper, westudy the computational complexity of pure Nash
On the characterization and computation of Nash equilibria on parallel networks with horizontal queues
 in Proceedings of the IEEE 51st Annual Conference on Decision and Control
, 2012
"... AbstractWe study inefficiencies in parallel networks with horizontal queues due to the selfish behavior of players, by comparing social optima to Nash equilibria. The article expands studies on routing games which traditionally model congestion with latency functions that increase with the flow on ..."
Abstract

Cited by 4 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
AbstractWe study inefficiencies in parallel networks with horizontal queues due to the selfish behavior of players, by comparing social optima to Nash equilibria. The article expands studies on routing games which traditionally model congestion with latency functions that increase with the flow
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria (Extended Abstract)
 STOC'04
, 2004
"... We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general. We ..."
Abstract

Cited by 2 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general. We
Results 1  10
of
54