### Table 3: Unique Correlated Equilibria

"... In PAGE 15: ... The European tax-based approach (ET) is the more restrictive for the trading sectors in Germany and the United Kingdom but not in Italy and the other EU countries. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 DEU UK ITA REU Emissions quo tas (M tC) GF DT HE ET Figure 4: Emission Allowances by Region Under Different Allocation Rules Table3 shows that the games have a unique correlated equilibrium, and that the equilibria are always different from the competitive equilibrium solutions, where the dif- ferent regions would play the same DT strategy. Germany, which is the main supplier of emission allowances, tends to rely on the domestic tax-based approach (DT) but the other regions, which are permits buyers, have an incentive to depart from this approach to... ..."

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### Table 3: Unique Correlated Equilibria

"... In PAGE 11: ...20 40 60 80 100 120 140 DEU UK ITA REU Emissions quo tas (M tC) GF DT HE ET Figure 4: Emission Allowances by Region Under Different Allocation Rules Table3 shows that the games have a unique correlated equilibrium, and that the equilibria are always different from the competitive equilibrium solutions, where the dif- ferent regions would play the same DT strategy. Germany, which is the main supplier of emission allowances, tends to rely on the domestic tax-based approach (DT) but the other regions, which are permits buyers, have an incentive to depart from this approach to maximize their own payoffs.... ..."

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### Table 1: Characteristics of Equilibria of the Games

"... In PAGE 4: ... By #5Cgood quot; outcomes, we shall mean outcomes in which as many as possible of these features are present. In Table1 we show the extent to which these features are presentin the equilibria of the three games we consider. Payo#0B e#0Eciency is de#0Cned as the sum of row and column player payo#0Bs, normalized so that the maximum possible jointpayo#0B in a given game has an e#0Eciency of one and the minimum possible jointpayo#0B has an e#0Eciency of zero.... In PAGE 16: ... The round#7Bby#7Bround observed relative frequencies of cooperation are shown in Figure 2. Also shown are the average frequency of cooperation, at the far rightofeachbox, and the frequency of cooperation in each Nash equilibrium, as a horizontal line marked by an #5Cx quot; #28see also Table1 #29. Consistent with many repeated Prisoner apos;s Dilemma experiments, cooperation decreases over time #28toward the equilibrium level of zero#29 in all three PD cells.... ..."

### Table 2: Nash Equilibria of the Games

2004

"... In PAGE 9: ... Eight two-person games were used. Table 1 gives a listing of the games, and Table2 provides a listing of the set of all Nash Equilibria for each game. We used only the experiments corresponding to full information repeated games.... ..."

### Table 1: Price of anarchy of pure equilibria for linear latencies (left) and polynomial latencies of degree p (right).

in The

"... In PAGE 2: ... We also study both symmetric and asymmetric games. Our results (both lower and upper bounds) are summarized in the left part of Table1 . For the case of asymmetric games, the values hold also for network congestion games.... ..."

### TABLE IX CONFIGURATION OF THE PSO PARAMETERS FOR COMPUTING NASH EQUILIBRIA OF THE BATTLE OF SEXES GAME

### Table 1: Characteristics of Nash Equilibria of the Games

"... In PAGE 12: ... (Note that about half the subjects played the games in the sequence shown in Figure 2, while the rest played the games in the reverse sequence.) Also shown are the 10{round average frequency of cooperation, at the far rightofeachbox, and the frequency of cooperation in each Nash equilibrium, as a horizontal line marked by an \x quot; (see also Table1 ). The round{by{ round frequencies of coordination and payo e ciency are not shown, but follow similar patterns.... ..."

### Table 2. The equilibria of the six games considered.

### Table 5: Payoffs in Correlated Equilibria versus Cooperative Equilibria

"... In PAGE 16: ... How- ever, because of market imperfections, the global welfare might be improved by adjusting the sectoral allocation of emission allowances [4] [5]. Table5 shows that the outcomes of the non-cooperative equilibria are globally lower than what the players would obtain by playing the cooperative solution. There is no strict dominance of the correlated equilibria by the cooperative solutions with equal weight.... ..."

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### Table 5: Payoffs in Correlated Equilibria versus Cooperative Equilibria

"... In PAGE 12: ... How- ever, because of market imperfections, the global welfare might be improved by adjusting the sectoral allocation of emission allowances [4] [5]. Table5 shows that the outcomes of the non-cooperative equilibria are globally lower than what the players would obtain by playing the cooperative solution. There is no strict dominance of the correlated equilibria by the cooperative solutions with equal weight.... ..."

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