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296
COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA in Finite Games
, 1996
"... We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for nitenperson games. Classical path following methods, such as the LemkeHowson algorithm for two person games, and Scarftype fixed point algorithms for nperson games provide globally convergent metho ..."
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Cited by 147 (1 self)
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We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for nitenperson games. Classical path following methods, such as the LemkeHowson algorithm for two person games, and Scarftype fixed point algorithms for nperson games provide globally convergent
Sequential estimation of dynamic discrete games
 Econometrica
"... This paper studies the estimation of dynamic discrete games of incomplete information. Two main econometric issues appear in the estimation of these models: the indeterminacy problem associated with the existence of multiple equilibria and the computational burden in the solution of the game. We ..."
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Cited by 98 (13 self)
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This paper studies the estimation of dynamic discrete games of incomplete information. Two main econometric issues appear in the estimation of these models: the indeterminacy problem associated with the existence of multiple equilibria and the computational burden in the solution of the game. We
Computation of Equilibria in Noncooperative Games
 IN PROC. WORKSHOP FOR COMPUTABLE ECONOMICS
, 2000
"... This paper presents algorithms for finding equilibria of mixed strategy in multistage noncooperative games of incomplete information (like probabilistic blindfold chess, where at every opportunity a player can perform different moves with some probability). These algorithms accept input games in ..."
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Cited by 6 (1 self)
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sequential equilibria strategies (except for the special case of single stage games). The computational aspects of passage from a recursive presentation of a game to its extensive form are also discussed. For nontrivial inputs the concatenation of this procedure with the equilibrium computation is time
Empirical Aspects of Plurality Election Equilibria
"... Social choice functions aggregate the different preferences of agents, choosing from a set of alternatives. Most research on manipulation of voting methods studies (1) limited solution concepts, (2) limited preferences, or (3) scenarios with a few manipulators that have a common goal. In contrast, w ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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computation for large games. Although plurality has exponentially many purestrategy Nash equilibria, we demonstrate how a simple equilibrium refinement—assuming that agents very weakly prefer to vote truthfully— dramatically reduces this set. We also use symmetric BayesNash equilibria to in
Computing Nash equilibria: Approximation and smoothed complexity
 In Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
, 2006
"... By proving that the problem of computing a 1/n Θ(1)approximate Nash equilibrium remains PPADcomplete, we show that the BIMATRIX game is not likely to have a fully polynomialtime approximation scheme. In other words, no algorithm with time polynomial in n and 1/ǫ can compute an ǫapproximate Nash ..."
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Cited by 85 (11 self)
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By proving that the problem of computing a 1/n Θ(1)approximate Nash equilibrium remains PPADcomplete, we show that the BIMATRIX game is not likely to have a fully polynomialtime approximation scheme. In other words, no algorithm with time polynomial in n and 1/ǫ can compute an ǫapproximate Nash
Discretized multinomial distributions and Nash equilibria in anonymous games
 In Proc. 49th Symp. Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
, 2008
"... We show that there is a polynomialtime approximation scheme for computing Nash equilibria in anonymous games with any fixed number of strategies (a very broad and important class of games), extending the twostrategy result of [16]. The approximation guarantee follows from a probabilistic result of ..."
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Cited by 20 (4 self)
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We show that there is a polynomialtime approximation scheme for computing Nash equilibria in anonymous games with any fixed number of strategies (a very broad and important class of games), extending the twostrategy result of [16]. The approximation guarantee follows from a probabilistic result
Preference Games and . . .
, 2009
"... We study the complexity of computing equilibria in two classes of network games based on flows fractional BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) games and fractional BBC (Bounded Budget Connection) games. BGP is the glue that holds the Internet together and hence its stability, i.e. the equilibria of fracti ..."
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is that there are no fully polynomialtime approximation schemes (unless PPAD is in FP) for computing equilibria in both fractional BGP games and fractional BBC games. We obtain this result by proving the hardness for a new and surprisingly simple game, the preference game, which is reducible to both fractional BGP and BBC
Multiple equilibria in a Dynamic Mating Game with Discrete Types and Similarity Preferences
, 2006
"... We consider the dynamic decentralised non atomic mating game n over n periods, initially presented by Alpern and Reyniers (1999). We are dealing especially with the two period mutual choice game 2(m), where individuals can have m types. In the Alpern and Reyniers game, two populations are randomly m ..."
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for determining all the possible equilibria in the discretetype game. Finally we comment on the e¤ectiveness and stability of the equilibrium strategies in the game 2(m). 1 key words: mating game, mutual mate choice, similarity preferences 1
Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Robust Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing and Multiparty Computation
 In Proc. 25th PODC
, 2006
"... We study kresilient Nash equilibria, joint strategies where no member of a coalition C of size up to k can do better, even if the whole coalition defects. We show that such kresilient Nash equilibria exist for secret sharing and multiparty computation, provided that players prefer to get the infor ..."
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Cited by 124 (14 self)
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We study kresilient Nash equilibria, joint strategies where no member of a coalition C of size up to k can do better, even if the whole coalition defects. We show that such kresilient Nash equilibria exist for secret sharing and multiparty computation, provided that players prefer to get
On the Equilibria of Alternating Move Games
 In Proceedings of the ACMSIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
, 2010
"... We consider computational aspects of alternating move games, repeated games in which players take actions at alternating time steps rather than playing simultaneously. We show that alternating move games are more tractable than simultaneous move games: we give an FPTAS for computing an ɛapproximate ..."
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Cited by 10 (2 self)
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We consider computational aspects of alternating move games, repeated games in which players take actions at alternating time steps rather than playing simultaneously. We show that alternating move games are more tractable than simultaneous move games: we give an FPTAS for computing an ɛ
Results 1  10
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296