Results 1 - 10 of 31

ARMor: Fully Verified Software Fault Isolation

by Lu Zhao, Bjorn De Sutter, Guodong Li, John Regehr
"... We have designed and implemented ARMor, a system that uses software fault isolation (SFI) to sandbox application code running on small embedded processors. Sandboxing can be used to protect components such as the RTOS and critical control loops from other, less-trusted components. ARMorguaranteesmem ..."
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We have designed and implemented ARMor, a system that uses software fault isolation (SFI) to sandbox application code running on small embedded processors. Sandboxing can be used to protect components such as the RTOS and critical control loops from other, less-trusted components

Native Client: A Sandbox for Portable, Untrusted x86 Native Code

by Bennet Yee, David Sehr, Gregory Dardyk, J. Bradley Chen, Robert Muth, Tavis Ormandy, Shiki Okasaka, Neha Narula, Nicholas Fullagar - IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2007 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY , 2009
"... This paper describes the design, implementation and evaluation of Native Client, a sandbox for untrusted x86 native code. Native Client aims to give browser-based applications the computational performance of native applications without compromising safety. Native Client uses software fault isolatio ..."
Abstract - Cited by 196 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper describes the design, implementation and evaluation of Native Client, a sandbox for untrusted x86 native code. Native Client aims to give browser-based applications the computational performance of native applications without compromising safety. Native Client uses software fault

Efficient, verifiable binary sandboxing for a CISC architecture

by Stephen Mccamant - MIT Compter Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab, May 2005. (also MIT LCS TR #988
"... Executing untrusted code while preserving security requires enforcement of memory and control-flow safety policies: untrusted code must be prevented from modifying memory or executing code except as explicitly allowed. Software-based fault isolation (SFI) or “sandboxing” enforces those policies by r ..."
Abstract - Cited by 9 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Executing untrusted code while preserving security requires enforcement of memory and control-flow safety policies: untrusted code must be prevented from modifying memory or executing code except as explicitly allowed. Software-based fault isolation (SFI) or “sandboxing” enforces those policies

Portable Software Fault Isolation

by Joshua A. Kroll, Gordon Stewart
"... Abstract—We present a new technique for architecture portable software fault isolation (SFI), together with a prototype implementation in the Coq proof assistant. Unlike traditional SFI, which relies on analysis of assembly-level programs, we analyze and rewrite programs in a compiler intermediate l ..."
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Abstract—We present a new technique for architecture portable software fault isolation (SFI), together with a prototype implementation in the Coq proof assistant. Unlike traditional SFI, which relies on analysis of assembly-level programs, we analyze and rewrite programs in a compiler intermediate

The TIL/ML Compiler: Performance and Safety through Types

by Greg Morrisett, David Tarditi, Perry Cheng, Chris Stone, P. Cheng, Peter Lee, C. Stone, Robert Harper, P. Lee - In Workshop on Compiler Support for Systems Software , 1996
"... Systems code requires both high performance and reliability. Usually, these two goals are at odds with each other. For example, to prevent kernel data structures from being over-written or read, either accidentally or maliciously, conventional systems use hardware-enforced protection or software fau ..."
Abstract - Cited by 33 (6 self) - Add to MetaCart
fault isolation (SFI). Unfortunately, both of these techniques exact a cost at run time: Hardware protection requires expensive context switches and data copying to communicate with the kernel or other processes, whereas SFI requires run-time checks for loads, stores and jumps. Furthermore

Splendid isolation: A slice abstraction for software-defined networks

by Stephen Gutz, Alec Story, Nate Foster - in ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Software Defined Networking , 2012
"... The correct operation of many networks depends on keeping certain kinds of traffic isolated from others, but achieving isolation in networks today is far from straightforward. To achieve isolation, programmers typically resort to lowlevel mechanisms such as Virtual LANs, or they interpose complicate ..."
Abstract - Cited by 23 (7 self) - Add to MetaCart
precisely, develop algorithms for compiling slices, and illustrate their use on examples. In addition, we describe a prototype implementation and a tool for automatically verifying formal isolation properties.

ABSTRACT Harbor: Software-based Memory Protection For Sensor Nodes

by unknown authors
"... Many sensor nodes contain resource constrained microcontrollers where user level applications, operating system components, and device drivers share a single address space with no form of hardware memory protection. Programming errors in one application can easily corrupt the state of the operating ..."
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computed control flow instructions. Cross domain calls perform low-overhead control transfers between domains. Checks are introduced by rewriting an application’s compiled binary. The sandboxed result is verified on the sensor node before it is admitted for execution. Harbor’s fault isolation properties

Monitor Integrity Protection with Space Efficiency and Separate Compilation ABSTRACT

by Ben Niu
"... Low-level inlined reference monitors weave monitor code into a program for security. To ensure that monitor code cannot be bypassed by branching instructions, some form of control-flow integrity must be guaranteed. Past approaches to protecting monitor code either have high space overhead or do not ..."
Abstract - Cited by 12 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
is designed to support inlined reference monitors. As a case study, we have implemented MIP-based Software-based Fault Isolation (SFI) on both x86-32 and x86-64. The evaluation shows that MIP-based SFI has competitive performance with other SFI implementations, while enjoying low space overhead.

April, 2013Deliberative Reasoning in Software Health Management

by Nagabhushan Mahadevan, Abhishek Dubey, Daniel Balasubramanian, Gabor Karsai, Nagabhushan Mahadevan, Abhishek Dubey, Daniel Balasubramanian, Gabor Karsai
"... Abstract. Rising software complexity in aerospace systems makes them very difficult to analyze and prepare for all possible fault scenarios at design-time. Therefore, classical run-time fault-tolerance techniques, such as self-checking pairs and triple modular redundancy are used. However, several r ..."
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recent incidents have made it clear that existing software fault tolerance techniques alone are not sufficient. To improve system dependability, simpler, yet formally specified and verified run-time monitoring, diagnosis, and fault mitigation are needed. Such architectures are already in use for managing

Increasing the Trustworthiness of Commodity Hardware Through Software

by Kevin Elphinstone, Yanyan Shen
"... Abstract—Advances in formal software verification has produced an operating system that is guaranteed mathematically to be correct and enforce access isolation. Such an operating system could potentially consolidate safety and security critical software on a single device where previously multiple d ..."
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Abstract—Advances in formal software verification has produced an operating system that is guaranteed mathematically to be correct and enforce access isolation. Such an operating system could potentially consolidate safety and security critical software on a single device where previously multiple
Results 1 - 10 of 31