our attack and are carrying it out now. This paper proposes new parameters for the McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems achieving standard levels of security against all known attacks. The new parameters take account of our improved attack; the recent introduction of list decoding for binary Goppa

in any large linear code. This new attack notably points out that McEliece cipher with its original parameters does not provide a sufficient security level. 1

scheme based on codes where signatures are produced in a straightforward manner from the decryption procedure of the scheme. The security analysis of our scheme have two main parts: 1. An extensive list of attacks using the Information Set Decoding techniques adopted for our codes; 2. An analysis

We consider routing security in wireless sensor networks. Many sensor network routing protocols have been proposed, but none of them have been designed with security as agq1( We propose securitygcur forrouting in sensor networks, show how attacks agacks ad-hoc and peer-to-peer networks can

of cryptosystems completely useless. The McEliece public-key scheme is based on the alternative security assumption that decoding unknown linear binary codes is NP-complete. In this work, we investigate the efficient implementation of the McEliece scheme on embedded systems what was – up to date – considered a

ciphertext. Actual systems are potentially at risk, including cryptographic tokens, network-based cryptosystems, and other applications where attackers can make reasonably accurate timing measurements. Techniques for preventing the attack for RSA and Diffie-Hellman are presented. Some cryptosystems will need

Abstract. This paper shows that quantum information-set-decoding attacks are much faster than non-quantum information-set-decoding attacks. 1

The McEliece cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem whose security rests on the difficult problem of decoding an unknown error-correcting code. We give two examples of attacks to the cryptosystem, as well as a brief introduction to Goppa codes. One modification to this cryptosystem proposed

Abstract. The original McEliece cryptosystem uses length-n codes over F2 with dimension ≥ n−mt efficiently correcting t errors where 2 m ≥ n. This paper presents a generalized cryptosystem that uses length-n codes over small finite fields Fq with dimension ≥ n − m(q − 1)t efficiently correcting ⌊qt

Abstract. In this paper we propose a new approach to investigate the security of the McEliece cryptosystem. We recall that this cryptosystem relies on the use of error-correcting codes. Since its invention thirty years ago, no efficient attack had been devised that managed to recover the private