performance data down to the procedure and statement level. Paradyn is based on a dynamic notion of performance instrumentation and measurement. Unmodified executable files are placed into execution and then performance instrumentation is inserted into the application program and modified during execution

. We propose Vigilante, a new end-to-end architecture to contain worms automatically that addresses these limitations. In Vigilante, hosts detect worms by instrumenting vulnerable programs to analyze infection attempts. We introduce dynamic data-flow analysis: a broad-coverage host-based algorithm

. It computes a data-flow graph using static analysis, and it instruments the program to ensure that the flow of data at runtime is allowed by the data-flow graph. We describe an efficient implementation of data-flow integrity enforcement that uses static analysis to reduce instrumentation overhead

previously instrumented for performance counters to also measure power and energy. Higher level tools that build on PAPI will automatically gain support for power and energy readings when used with the newest version of PAPI. We describe in detail the types of energy and power readings available through PAPI

preconditions (e.g., acyclicity), data (e.g., integers and strings) and concurrency. The program instrumentation enables a model checker to automatically explore dierent program heap con gurations and manipulate logical formulae on program data (using a decision procedure). We illustrate two applications

developers use to analyze the performance of their applications rely on PAPI to gain access to these performance counters. One of the critical roadblocks on the way to larger, more complex high performance systems, has been widely identified as being the energy efficiency constraints. With modern extreme

such as constraint solving for automatically generating vulnerability signatures. We have built a prototype system to test our techniques. Our experiments show that we can automatically generate a vulnerability signature using a single exploit which is of much higher quality than previous exploit-based signatures

. To make the dataflow programming paradigm applicable to large scientific problems, we have identified ways to avoid the excessive memory use inherent in standard dataflow implementations, and have implemented

is well-suited to application design for distributed and heterogeneous systems than other techniques. Traditionally in dataflow middleware, application data domains are statically partitioned and distributed among the processors using a demand-driven algorithm. Unfortunately, this task scheduling

, with two of the vulnerabilities residing in widely-used Java libraries. In fact, all but one application in our benchmark suite had at least one vulnerability.Context sensitivity, combined with improved object naming, proved instrumental in keeping the number of false positives low. Our approach yielded