Abstract. Atmel’s CryptoMemory devices are non-volatile memories with cryptographically secured access control. Recently, the authentication mechanism of these devices have been shown to be severely vulnerable. More precisely, to recover the secret key the published attack requires only two to six

. Atmel advertises the devices as “secure against all the most sophisticated attacks, [...] including physical attacks”. We developed a successful power analysis attack on the authentication step of CryptoMemory devices. Despite the physical security claims by Atmel we found that the devices

We consider routing security in wireless sensor networks. Many sensor network routing protocols have been proposed, but none of them have been designed with security as agq1( We propose securitygcur forrouting in sensor networks, show how attacks agacks ad-hoc and peer-to-peer networks can

Abstract. The Atmel chip families SecureMemory, CryptoMemory, and CryptoRF use a proprietary stream cipher to guarantee authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity. This paper describes the cipher in detail and points out several weaknesses. One is the fact that the three components of the cipher

non-adversarial setting, assuming a trusted environment. In this paper, we present attacks against routing in ad hoc networks, and we present the design and performance evaluation of a new secure on-demand ad hoc network routing protocol, called Ariadne. Ariadne prevents attackers or compromised nodes

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-scale network breaches to an adversary, and makes it necessary for the adversary to attack a large fraction of the network before it can achieve any significant gain

specialized language used to express a site's security policy. Event handlers can update state information, synthesize new events, record information to disk, and generate real-time notifications via syslog. We also discuss a number of attacks that attempt to subvert passive monitoring systems

This tutorial paper explores the mechanics of protecting computer-stored information from unauthorized use or modification. It concentrates on those architectural structures--whether hardware or software--that are necessary to support information protection. The paper develops in three main

We have designed and implemented the Google File Sys-tem, a scalable distributed file system for large distributed data-intensive applications. It provides fault tolerance while running on inexpensive commodity hardware, and it delivers high aggregate performance to a large number of clients. While