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Approximate Nash Equilibria for Multiplayer Games
"... We consider games of complete information with r ≥ 2 players, and study approximate Nash equilibria in the additive and multiplicative sense, where the number of pure strategies of the players is n. We establish a lower bound of r−1 ln n−2 ln ln n−ln r on the size of the support of strategy profil ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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We consider games of complete information with r ≥ 2 players, and study approximate Nash equilibria in the additive and multiplicative sense, where the number of pure strategies of the players is n. We establish a lower bound of r−1 ln n−2 ln ln n−ln r on the size of the support of strategy
Worstcase equilibria
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
, 1999
"... In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a ver ..."
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Cited by 851 (17 self)
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In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a
The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria
, 2004
"... We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general. ..."
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Cited by 172 (6 self)
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We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 556 (1 self)
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: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
 NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
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Cited by 634 (27 self)
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existence. For a logit specification of the error structure, we show that as the error goes to zero, QRE approaches a subset of Nash equilibria and also implies a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria in generic games. We fit the model to a variety of experimental data sets by using maximum
Computing Equilibria in MultiPlayer Games
 In Proceedings of the Annual ACMSIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA
, 2004
"... We initiate the systematic study of algorithmic issues involved in finding equilibria (Nash and correlated) in games with a large number of players; such games, in order to be computationally meaningful, must be presented in some succinct, gamespecific way. We develop a general framework for obta ..."
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Cited by 54 (4 self)
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We initiate the systematic study of algorithmic issues involved in finding equilibria (Nash and correlated) in games with a large number of players; such games, in order to be computationally meaningful, must be presented in some succinct, gamespecific way. We develop a general framework
Computing correlated equilibria in MultiPlayer Games
 STOC'05
, 2005
"... We develop a polynomialtime algorithm for finding correlated equilibria (a wellstudied notion of rationality due to Aumann that generalizes the Nash equilibrium) in a broad class of succinctly representable multiplayer games, encompassing essentially all known kinds, including all graphical games, ..."
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Cited by 95 (6 self)
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We develop a polynomialtime algorithm for finding correlated equilibria (a wellstudied notion of rationality due to Aumann that generalizes the Nash equilibrium) in a broad class of succinctly representable multiplayer games, encompassing essentially all known kinds, including all graphical games
ETRCompleteness for Decision Versions of MultiPlayer (Symmetric) Nash Equilibria?
"... Abstract. As a result of some important works [19,6,3,10,5], the complexity of 2player Nash equilibrium is by now well understood, even when equilibria with special properties are desired and when the game is symmetric. However, for multiplayer games, when equilibria with special properties are ..."
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Abstract. As a result of some important works [19,6,3,10,5], the complexity of 2player Nash equilibrium is by now well understood, even when equilibria with special properties are desired and when the game is symmetric. However, for multiplayer games, when equilibria with special properties
Results 1  10
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114,008