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311
On ProfitMaximizing Envyfree Pricing
"... We study the problem of pricing items for sale to consumers so as to maximize the seller’s revenue. We assume that for each consumer, we know the maximum amount he would be willing to pay for each bundle of items, and want to find pricings of the items with corresponding allocations that maximize se ..."
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Cited by 122 (12 self)
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seller profit and at the same time are envyfree, which is a natural fairness criterion requiring that consumers are maximally happy with the outcome they receive given the pricing. We study this problem for two important classes of inputs: unit demand consumers, who want to buy at most one item from
Abstract On ProfitMaximizing Envyfree Pricing
"... We study the problem of pricing items for sale to consumers so as to maximize the seller’s revenue. We assume that for each consumer, we know the maximum amount he would be willing to pay for each bundle of items, and want to find pricings of the items with corresponding allocations that maximize se ..."
Abstract
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seller profit and at the same time are envyfree, which is a natural fairness criterion requiring that consumers are maximally happy with the outcome they receive given the pricing. We study this problem for two important classes of inputs: unit demand consumers, who want to buy at most one item from
MultiDimensional EnvyFree Scheduling Mechanisms
"... We study fairness design scenarios in which each bidder follows the global goal of the mechanism designer only if the resulted allocation would be fair from his own point of view. More formally, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envyfree bundle prices. We f ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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We study fairness design scenarios in which each bidder follows the global goal of the mechanism designer only if the resulted allocation would be fair from his own point of view. More formally, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envyfree bundle prices. We
Envyfree and efficient minimal rights: recursive noenvy∗
"... In economics the main efficiency criterion is that of Paretooptimality. For problems of distributing a social endowment a central notion of fairness is noenvy (each agent should receive a bundle at least as good, according to her own preferences, as any of the other agent’s bundle). For most econ ..."
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In economics the main efficiency criterion is that of Paretooptimality. For problems of distributing a social endowment a central notion of fairness is noenvy (each agent should receive a bundle at least as good, according to her own preferences, as any of the other agent’s bundle). For most
Revenue Maximizing Envyfree Multiunit Auctions with Budgets
"... We study envyfree (EF) mechanisms for multiunit auctions with budgeted agents that approximately maximize revenue. In an EF auction, prices are set so that every bidder receives a bundle that maximizes her utility amongst all bundles; We show that the problem of revenuemaximizing EF auctions is N ..."
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We study envyfree (EF) mechanisms for multiunit auctions with budgeted agents that approximately maximize revenue. In an EF auction, prices are set so that every bidder receives a bundle that maximizes her utility amongst all bundles; We show that the problem of revenuemaximizing EF auctions
Fair division under ordinal preferences: Computing envyfree allocations of indivisible goods
 In Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
, 2010
"... Abstract We study the problem of fairly dividing a set of goods amongst a group of agents, when those agents have preferences that are ordinal relations over alternative bundles of goods (rather than utility functions) and when our knowledge of those preferences is incomplete. The incompleteness of ..."
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Cited by 5 (1 self)
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the algorithmic problem of deciding whether there exists an allocation that is possibly (or necessarily) envyfree, given the incomplete preference information available, if in addition some mild economic efficiency criteria need to be satisfied. We provide simple characterisations, giving rise to simple
UvADARE (Digital Academic Repository) Fair Division under Ordinal Preferences: Computing EnvyFree Allocations of Indivisible Goods
"... Fair division under ordinal preferences: computing envyfree allocations of indivisible goods Bouveret, S.; Endriss, U.; Lang, J. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other th ..."
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than of bundles). In this context, we consider the algorithmic problem of deciding whether there exists an allocation that is possibly (or necessarily) envyfree, given the incomplete preference information available, if in addition some mild economic efficiency criteria need to be satisfied. We
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
, 2000
"... Combinatorial auctions, which allow agents to bid directly for bundles of resources, are necessary for optimal auctionbased solutions to resource allocation problems with agents that have nonadditive values for resources, such as distributed scheduling and task assignment problems. We introduc ..."
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Cited by 191 (25 self)
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Combinatorial auctions, which allow agents to bid directly for bundles of resources, are necessary for optimal auctionbased solutions to resource allocation problems with agents that have nonadditive values for resources, such as distributed scheduling and task assignment problems. We
Conformal Almost Symplectic NLinear Connections in the Bundle of
 Accelerations,Proc. of the Fourth International Workshop on Differential Geometry and Its Applications, Braşov
, 1999
"... The aim of this paper1 is to find the transformation for the coefficients of an Nlinear connection on E = Osc2M, by a transformation of nonlinear connections, to define in the bundle of accelerations the general conformal almost symplectic Nlinear connection notion and to determine the set of all ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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The aim of this paper1 is to find the transformation for the coefficients of an Nlinear connection on E = Osc2M, by a transformation of nonlinear connections, to define in the bundle of accelerations the general conformal almost symplectic Nlinear connection notion and to determine the set
ALMOST FLAT BUNDLES AND ALMOST FLAT STRUCTURES
"... Abstract. In this paper we discuss some geometric aspects concerning almost flat bundles, notion introduced by Connes, Gromov and Moscovici [2]. Using a natural construction of [1], we present here a simple description of such bundles. For this we modify the notion of almost flat structure on bundle ..."
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on bundles over smooth manifolds and extend this notion to bundles over arbitrary CWspaces using quasiconnections [3]. Connes, Gromov and Moscovici [2] showed that for any almost flat bundle α over the manifold M, the index of the signature operator with values in α is a homotopy equivalence invariant of M
Results 1  10
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311