### Table 12.1: Additive quantum numbers of the quarks. Property -Quark

1996

### Table 10: Additional Dolev-Yao conditions for asymmetric cryptography.

2005

"... In PAGE 15: ... not occurring in Psys. We write Q for the resulting process. We now have su cient control over the capabilities of the attacker that we can characterise the potential e ect of all attackers Q of type (Nf; A ; A+ Enc). We do so by de ning the formula FDY RM of type (Nf; A ; A+ Enc) for expressing the Dolev-Yao condition for LySa; it is de ned as the conjunction of the ve components in Table 3 (actually, three more components are added later on in Table10 to cope with public key encryption). The formula in Table 3 makes it clear that the attacker initially has some knowledge (5), that it may learn more by eavesdropping (1) or by decrypting messages with keys already known (2), that it may construct new encryptions using the keys known (3) and that it may actively forge new communications (4).... In PAGE 22: ... The only di er- ences occur in the rule for asymmetric decryption: the values V0, V 0 0 are actually a pair of public/private keys, required by the condition fV0; V 0 0g = fm+; m g, and the consequent check for 1 i j, that the values Vi are pointwise included in the values in #i. Finally, we extend the Dolev-Yao conditions for the asymmetric case, as shown by Table10 . Again, there are very little di erences with the symmetric case; note that we postulate a new pair of canonical names m+ ; m , and that the rule (5) in Table 3 already considers the symmetric keys and the special canonical name n .... In PAGE 39: ... Proof. Qhard is !(jk2A Qk 1 j jk2A+ Enc Qk 2 j jk2A+ Enc Qk 3 j jk2A Qk 4 j Q5 j jk2A+ Enc Qk 6 j jk2A+ Enc Qk 7 j Q8) where Qk i is obtained from the ith component of FDY RM in Table 3 for 1 i 5 and in Table10 for 6 i 8. We assume that there are variables z, z0, z1, having canonical representative z and that 1 2 A (as discussed in Section 5).... ..."

Cited by 16

### Table 9: Additional Dolev-Yao conditions for asymmetric cryptography.

2005

"... In PAGE 16: ... not occurring in Psys. We write Q for the resulting process. We now have su cient control over the capabilities of the attacker that we can characterise the potential e ect of all attackers Q of type (Nf; A ; A+ Enc). We do so by de ning the formula FDY RM of type (Nf; A ; A+ Enc) for expressing the Dolev-Yao condition for LySa; it is de ned as the conjunction of the ve components in Table 3 (actually, three more components are added later on in Table9 to cope with public key encryption).... In PAGE 26: ...shown by Table9 . Again, there are very little di erences with the symmetric case; note that we postulate a new pair of canonical names m+ ; m , and that the rule (5) in Table 3 already considers the symmetric keys and the special canonical name n .... In PAGE 42: ... Proof. Qhard is !(jk2A Qk 1 j jk2A+ Enc Qk 2 j jk2A+ Enc Qk 3 j jk2A Qk 4 j Q5 j jk2A+ Enc Qk 6 j jk2A+ Enc Qk 7 j Q8) where Qk i is obtained from the ith component of FDY RM in Table 3 for 1 i 5 and in Table9 for 6 i 8. We assume that there are variables z, z0, z1, having canonical representative z and that 1 2 A (as discussed in Section 5).... ..."

Cited by 16