### Table 1. The payoff matrix of the Prisoner apos;s Dilemma game, showing the scores given to player 1 and 2, respectively.

1997

"... In PAGE 5: ... If both defect they share the lowest total payoff and get P points each. If T gt; R gt; P gt; S and 2 R gt; T + S, there is a dilemma, since, in an isolated game, rational players choose to defect and then share the lowest total payoff, see Table1 . Cooperative behaviour is possible in the iterated game when the same players meet in a series of rounds.... ..."

Cited by 10

### Table 1. The payoff matrix of the Prisoner apos;s Dilemma game, showing the scores given to player 1 and 2, respectively.

1997

"... In PAGE 5: ... If both defect they share the lowest total payoff and get P points each. If T gt; R gt; P gt; S and 2 R gt; T + S, there is a dilemma, since, in an isolated game, rational players choose to defect and then share the lowest total payoff, see Table1 . Cooperative behaviour is possible in the iterated game when the same players meet in a series of rounds.... ..."

Cited by 10

### Table 1: Payo table for Bonnie in The Prisoner apos;s Dilemma

1999

"... In PAGE 6: ...ther strategies. This, however, requires some co-operation and trust among the players. It is easy to verify that the pair of strategies (SB;c; SC;c) in The Prisoner apos;s Dilemma is an equilibrium and it is the only one. In order to show this, let us consider the payo tables of the players ( Table1 and Table 2). The entry that corresponds to the strategy pair (SB;c; SC;c) is maximal in its column in the payo table of Bonnie and, at the same time, it is maximal in its row in the payo table of Clyde.... ..."

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### TABLE 1 - PAYOFFS FOR PRISONER apos;S DILEMMA Second player

2004

Cited by 7

### Table 3 SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION OF A 2X2 PRISONER apos;S DILEMMA GAME

"... In PAGE 13: ... Technically, the equilibrium in this game is not a Pareto optimum: both players would be better off it they opt for not confessing. Table3 represents symbolically the strategies and outcomes of a 2x2 ordinal game. Strategies C are for cooperation, and D for defection.... In PAGE 25: ... But because of the endogenous nature of the OCA criteria, as time goes by and the more countries interact, the higher is the welfare gain obtained from coordination and the lower the temptation to defect. Figure 1 GAME TREE REPRESENTATION If we go back to the formal representation of the Prisoner apos;s Dilemma, as in Table3 , the gain from cooperation R depends positively on the number of time the game is repeated (t). Figure 1 gives a tree representation of this game.... ..."

### Table 1: Prisoner apos;s Dilemma Payoffs to P1 / P2

2003

Cited by 3