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Table 7. Processing quota share holdings as a percent of the processing quota share pool. pqs
2007
"... In PAGE 4: ...able 6. Overages by fishery (2005-2006 and 2006-2007). .........................................................................9 Table7 .... ..."
Table 1. Catcher vessel owner quota share holdings as a percent of the catcher vessel owner share pool. q
2007
"... In PAGE 15: ...December 2007 Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Crab FMP, Amendment 27 xv List of Figures amp; Tables Table1 . Catcher vessel owner quota share holdings as a percent of the catcher vessel owner share pool.... In PAGE 21: ... Catcher vessel QS carry regional designations, which apply to annual allocations of Class A IFQ. The distribution of catcher vessel QS holdings varies substantially across fisheries (see Table1 and Table 2). The regional distribution of shares differs with historic landing patterns, which arose from the geographic distribution of fishing grounds and processing activities.... In PAGE 30: ... Overall, the increase in demand for crab products is expected to result in either stable or rising prices for golden king crab in the coming year (Sackton, 2007b). First wholesale prices for red and golden king crab show a notable decline in 2005, the first year of the rationalization program ( Table1 1). The price drop is not evident in for C.... In PAGE 31: ...December 2007 Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Crab FMP, Amendment 27 16 released (see Table1 2). In addition, activity on floating processors may be associated with a particular community, but is not attributed to community in these records.... In PAGE 36: ... In either case, the effect of the current 30 percent cap is that processing in a fishery (or region) cannot be consolidated into a single facility through custom processing arrangements. (see Table1 3). In the absence of the cap, in fisheries without regional landing requirements, all processing in the fishery could be consolidated into a single facility.... In PAGE 36: ... In fisheries with regional landing requirements processing could be consolidated into a single plant in the region. The amount of the cap in pounds varies across fisheries with TACs and allocations to catcher processors, which reduce the allocation of IPQ in the fishery (see Table1 4). Fisheries and Regions: Custom processing will be exempt from use caps in the following regions and fisheries: The North region of the Bering Sea C.... In PAGE 43: ... In drawing this conclusion, IPQ holders point to the extended period over which deliveries are made under the rationalization program. In the first two years of the program, North deliveries in the fishery were made over a period of in excess of four months (see Table1 5). Based on the current TAC and IPQ cap (without the exemption) and the number of days between the first and last landing in the first two years of the program, a processor in the North region would receive on average between 50,000 and 65,000 pounds per day.... ..."
Table 7. Processing quota share holdings as a percent of the processing quota share pool. pq
2007
"... In PAGE 15: ...able 6. Percentage of IFQ harvested operation type, share type, and region (2006-2007)......................... 9 Table7 .... In PAGE 25: ...December 2007 Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Crab FMP, Amendment 27 10 Processing QS holdings are substantially more concentrated than either catcher vessel owner or catch vessel crew QS holdings (see Table7 ). Since processing share caps limit both holdings and processing of landings, share holdings may constrain some processors from engaging in custom processing arrangements.... ..."
Table 2-4. The guaranteed-throughput service level.
"... In PAGE 4: ... These are used by several types of users: tasks (of computation), communi- cation connections (of communication), and buffers for intermediate results or for communication (of storage). In the example there are four independent factors complicating the perfor- mance analysis, as shown in Table2 -1: unpredictable resource usage, variable resource performance, users sharing resources, and (inter)dependence of mul- tiple resources. We discuss each in turn below.... In PAGE 12: ...2 The Advantages of Using Services We will now describe how services are used to ease each of the four ob- stacles to building predictable SOCs, identified in Section 2.1: unpredictable resource usage, variable resource behaviour, shared resources, usage of multi- ple dependent resources ( Table2 -1). Table 2-2 outlines how services address each case; a fuller description is given below.... In PAGE 17: ... These service levels have different characteristics and intended uses. The BE service level exhibits several of the problems listed in Table2 -1, whereas the GT service level does not. However, as argued in Goossens et al.... In PAGE 18: ... We first describe what the BE service level consists of, and how it is im- plemented. Then we list which of the problems of Table2 -1 are present, and finally motivate the reasons for offering BE service level. BE connections implement uncorrupted, lossless, ordered data transport (trans- action completion is a result of absence of data loss).... In PAGE 18: ... In- put queuing causes interdependencies between different connections (called head-of-line blocking), and worm-hole routing causes interdependencies be- tween arbiters of different routers. As listed in Table2... In PAGE 19: ... We first describe what the GT service level consists of, and how it is imple- mented. Then we list how the problems of Table2 -1 are addressed. The GT service level adds minimum throughput, and maximum latency and jitter bounds to the BE service level.... In PAGE 20: ..., 2005). As listed in Table2 -4, this solves re- source sharing and interdependent resources that plagued the BE service level. When a GT connection is requested, the required throughput, latency, and jitter must be specified, to reserve communication resources (essentially, buffers and slots in the TDMA tables), in contrast to a BE connection.... In PAGE 21: ... CONCLUSIONS In this chapter we described and analysed the problem of performance verifi- cation of SOCs. We identified four reasons why building SOCs with predictable performance is difficult ( Table2 -1): unpredictable resource usage, variable resource performance, resource sharing, and interdependent resources. We in- troduced the concept of a service, aiming to address these problems, and de- scribed its advantages over ad-hoc approaches.... ..."
Table 9 show the breakdown of the results of running the call-processing client program with database audit at a fixed error rate of one error every 20 seconds. The error rate used mimics a burst of transient errors affecting the database. The results show that structural audit and static data audit are both very effective in detecting and removing errors and that both achieve 100% coverage. Dynamic data audit, on the other hand, has a lower coverage and is able to detect and remove a total of 79% (45% + 34%) of all errors in dynamic fields through range check and referential integrity check. Fourteen percent of errors escape because the application process uses the erroneous data before the audit can detect them. More frequent invocation of audit is needed to reduce the number of error that escape due to timing. Four percent of the errors escaped detection because of the lack of enforceable rules available to dynamic data audit. Suitable constraints need to be added to the database to improve audit coverage in this category. Audit
"... In PAGE 41: ... Table9 : Breakdown of Inserted and Detected Errors 11 CONCLUSIONS In the past three decades, fault-tolerant computing has matured into a broad discipline encompassing many aspects of computer systems design. Requirements for high reliability and high availability are the major factors driving the interest in fault tolerance.... ..."
Table 3-1 may be used to determine the degree of assurance required based on confidentiality requirements for the particular system.
"... In PAGE 34: ...peration of the system (e.g., DoD funding for the Defense Message System (DMS) (not the entire DoD budget), Federal Government funding for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) auditing system (not the entire IRS budget). After completing Tables 3-1 through 3-4, the CA should total the weighing factors (w) and use Table3 -5 to determine the degrees of assurance for availability, confidentiality, accountability, and integrity. The amount of emphasis placed on each of these factors depends on the system criticality, the environmental requirements, and the system and functional requirements.... In PAGE 36: ... xxvi integrity services: C Access control C Checklist C Digital signatures C Recovery mechanisms C Nonvolatile memory C Deterrence C Configuration control C Secure maintenance of components C Inspection of hardware/firmware/software (to include diagnostic routines) C Comparison with known correct components C Administrative procedures C Physical security Table3 -2 may be used to determine the degree of assurance required based on integrity requirements for the particular system [11]. Consequences of Loss of Integrity Integrity Weighing Factors Loss of credibility from integrity failure (system or data) very likely (w=5) likely (w=3) n/a (W=0) Loss of life from integrity failure (system or data) very likely (w=10) likely (w=5) n/a (w=0) Civil penalties/fines for integrity failure gt;=$10,000 per incident (w=5) lt;$10,000 per incident (w=3) n/a (w=0) Financial loss from integrity failure gt;20% of operating budget per incident (w=5) gt;=50% and lt;=20% of operating budget per incident (w=3) lt;5% of operating budget per incident (w=l) n/a (w=0) TABLE 3-2 Integrity Metric ... In PAGE 37: ...g., frequency hopping) C Facilities hardening C Modularity C Operations security Table3 -3 may be used to determine the degree of assurance required based on availability requirements for the particular system [11]. Consequences of Loss of Availability Availability Weighing Factors Loss of credibility from system failure very likely (w=5) likely (w=3) n/a (W=0) Loss of life from system failure very likely (w=10) likely (w=5) n/a (w=0) Financial loss from system failure gt;20% of operating budget per incident (w=5) gt;=50% and lt;=20% of operating budget per incident (w=3) lt;5% of operating budget per incident (w=l) n/a (w=0) Disruption of critical service1 very likely (w=4) likely (w=3) n/a (w=0) Civil penalties/fines for loss of availability gt;=$10,000 per incident lt;$10,000 per incident n/a ... In PAGE 38: ... Accountability validates and documents that an entity attempted to initiate a process or system even that an event or process was initiated, who sent a message, that a message was sent, who received a message, and that the message was received. The following is a non-comprehensive list of mechanisms that may be used to provide accountability services: C Identification and Authentication C Physical access controls C Trusted Computing Base (TCB) C Anti-spoof C Passwords and digital signatures C Cryptography C Event auditing Table3 -4 may be used to determine the degree of assurance required based on accountability requirements for the particular system. Consequences of Loss of Accountability Accountability Weighing Factors Civil penalties/fines for loss of accountability gt;=$10,000 per incident (w=5) lt;$10,000 per incident (w=3) n/a (w=0) Loss of life from accountability failure very likely (w=10) likely (w=5) n/a (w=0) Loss of credibility from accountability failure very likely (w=5) likely (w=3) n/a (w=0) Financial loss from accountability failure gt;20% of operating budget per incident gt;=50% and lt;=20% of operating budget per incident lt;5% of operating budget per incident ... In PAGE 39: ....1.4.2 Assurance Ranges The assurance ranges are the result of analyzing the results from Tables 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4. After completing Tables 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4 and summing the weights (w=#) for each assurance category, the CA may use Table3 -5 to determine the degrees of assurance for each category. When using Table 3-5, the CA, with the assistance of the User Representative, PM, and Accreditor, may choose to raise any of the degrees of assurance required.... In PAGE 39: ... After completing Tables 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4 and summing the weights (w=#) for each assurance category, the CA may use Table 3-5 to determine the degrees of assurance for each category. When using Table3 -5, the CA, with the assistance of the User Representative, PM, and Accreditor, may choose to raise any of the degrees of assurance required. For example, if the weight factor for availability is 16 (medium), but if the system fails there could be severe risk of loss of life, the CA may choose to raise the degree of assurance for availability to high.... In PAGE 39: ... These degrees of assurance are also used in Chapter 4 to assist the CA in determining the level of effort for the specified tasks. Assurance Categories Assurance Ranges High Medium Low Confidentiality (from Table3 -1) w gt; 18 w gt;= 6 and lt;= 18 w lt; 6 Integrity w gt; 14 w gt;= 4 and lt;= 14 w lt; 4 Availability (from Table 3-3) w gt; 17 w gt;= 5 and lt;= 17 w lt; 5 Accountability (from Table 3-4) w gt; 14 w gt;= 4 and lt;=14 w lt; 4 TABLE 3-5 Assurance Ranges 3.... In PAGE 39: ... These degrees of assurance are also used in Chapter 4 to assist the CA in determining the level of effort for the specified tasks. Assurance Categories Assurance Ranges High Medium Low Confidentiality (from Table 3-1) w gt; 18 w gt;= 6 and lt;= 18 w lt; 6 Integrity w gt; 14 w gt;= 4 and lt;= 14 w lt; 4 Availability (from Table3 -3) w gt; 17 w gt;= 5 and lt;= 17 w lt; 5 Accountability (from Table 3-4) w gt; 14 w gt;= 4 and lt;=14 w lt; 4 TABLE 3-5 Assurance Ranges 3.... In PAGE 39: ... These degrees of assurance are also used in Chapter 4 to assist the CA in determining the level of effort for the specified tasks. Assurance Categories Assurance Ranges High Medium Low Confidentiality (from Table 3-1) w gt; 18 w gt;= 6 and lt;= 18 w lt; 6 Integrity w gt; 14 w gt;= 4 and lt;= 14 w lt; 4 Availability (from Table 3-3) w gt; 17 w gt;= 5 and lt;= 17 w lt; 5 Accountability (from Table3 -4) w gt; 14 w gt;= 4 and lt;=14 w lt; 4 TABLE 3-5 Assurance Ranges 3.... In PAGE 40: ... xxx During this activity, Table3 -6 is used to determine the type of certification to perform. Using the degrees of assurance and the type of certification, tailoring of the system analysis can begin.... In PAGE 53: ... If some of the specified tasks cannot be performed, this limitation should be reported as a risk and the Accreditor should determine if the risk of not performing the task is or is not acceptable. By using Table 4-1 and the type of certification listed in Table3 -6, the minimum tasks for each type of certification can be determined. Several of the tasks specified in Table 4-1 are applicable to more than one type of certification.... In PAGE 55: ... Vulnerability Analysis X X X TABLE 4-1 INFOSEC Analysis Tasks 1. Only applicable if degree of assurance for confidentiality is high ( Table3 -5) 2. Not applicable if there is no TEMPEST requirement 3.... In PAGE 55: ...1.2 Conduct INFOSEC Analysis This task in the System Analysis Activity involves understanding the actions, objectives, and steps to be performed for each INFOSEC discipline based on the degrees of assurance determined from Table3 -5. An analysis of each discipline is conducted, focusing on the degrees of assurance, but considering the secondary factors to ensure the appropriate level of resources are applied to each discipline.... In PAGE 55: ...iscipline. The analysis of each discipline is also based on the type of certification required (i.e., Type 1, 2, 3 or 4). After selecting the type of certification from Table3 -6, documents required and steps to be performed will vary. The analysis to be conducted will also vary.... ..."
Table 2: Audit Tools
"... In PAGE 7: ... The tools used in the audit were a check-list about site conditions, flow chart, process charts, documentatiob of processes through photographs and video tape, and also some additional indicators related to each specific process (for example, plastering thickness). A brief description of the data collection tools used by the companies and by the research team is respectively presented in Table 1 and Table2 bellow. Table 1: Monitoring Tools Tool Purpose Who is in charge Production chart Measure the output of each activity during the week or within the production cycle Trainee Resource usage chart Monitor the usage of materials and the amount of man- hour spent in the process in each the control cycle (weekly basis) Foreman or trainee Inventory files Monitor the physical quantity of inventories in each cycle (weekly basis).... ..."
Table 2. Technologies for achieving Security Requirements Security Requirement Technique Used Authorization Passwords, Access Control List (ACL), Firewall Authentication Shared Secret, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Digital signatures, Digital certificates Privacy (Partially by) Encryptions, Mechanisms to hide locations and Routing protocols used Data Confidentiality Encryption
"... In PAGE 4: ...3). Table2 shows examples of some of these technologies. These technologies could be applied to achieve the objectives of the security requirements in the relations from (1) to (7).... ..."
Table 1. Data sets used in recent publications.
"... In PAGE 2: ... Clustering [5, 10, 16], active learning [21, 22], decision trees [10, 22], graphical models [20], and learnable ap- proximate string distances [2, 3, 8, 17, 23,24] are some of the techniques used. In these publications various data sets (some publicly available, others pro- prietary or even confidential) were used in experimental studies, as shown in Table1 . This variety makes it difficult to validate the presented results and to compare new deduplication and linkage algorithms with each other.... ..."
Table 1: Simulated Storage Service Characteristics.
"... In PAGE 9: ... The experiments in this section explore this. We assume a storage service characterized by the parameters in Table1 ; these values are inspired by what is reported for GFS [11]. The assumption about network bandwidth is based on reserving for data recovery at most half the bandwidth in a 100 Mbit/second network; the time to copy the 150 Gi- gabytes stored on one server is now 6 hours and 40 minutes.... ..."
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