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Optimal EnvyFree Cake Cutting
 PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTYFIFTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
, 2011
"... We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous divisible good among agents with different preferences. Previous work has shown that envyfree allocations, i.e., where each agent prefers its own allocation to any other, may not be efficient, in the sense of maximizing the total value of t ..."
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Cited by 23 (11 self)
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We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous divisible good among agents with different preferences. Previous work has shown that envyfree allocations, i.e., where each agent prefers its own allocation to any other, may not be efficient, in the sense of maximizing the total value
On the Complexity of EnvyFree Cake Cutting
, 2009
"... We study the envyfree cakecutting problem for d+1 players with d cuts, for both the oracle function model and the polynomial time function model. For the former, we derive a θ( ( 1 ǫ)d−1) time matching bound for the query complexity of d + 1 player cake cutting with Lipschitz utilities for any d& ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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We study the envyfree cakecutting problem for d+1 players with d cuts, for both the oracle function model and the polynomial time function model. For the former, we derive a θ( ( 1 ǫ)d−1) time matching bound for the query complexity of d + 1 player cake cutting with Lipschitz utilities for any d
Optimal EnvyFree . . .
, 2011
"... We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous divisible good among agents with different preferences. Previous work has shown that envyfree allocations, i.e., where each agent prefers its own allocation to any other, may not be efficient, in the sense of maximizing the total value of t ..."
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We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous divisible good among agents with different preferences. Previous work has shown that envyfree allocations, i.e., where each agent prefers its own allocation to any other, may not be efficient, in the sense of maximizing the total value
EnvyFree Division of Sellable Goods
"... We study the envyfree allocation of indivisible goods between two players. Our novel setting includes an option to sell each good for a fraction of the minimum value any player has for the good. To rigorously quantify the efficiency gain from selling, we reason about the price of envyfreeness of ..."
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We study the envyfree allocation of indivisible goods between two players. Our novel setting includes an option to sell each good for a fraction of the minimum value any player has for the good. To rigorously quantify the efficiency gain from selling, we reason about the price of envyfreeness
EnvyFree Divisions
"... Abstract. We consider the division of a single homogeneous object and transfers of money among several people who may have different valuations for the object. A division is envy free if every person believes the division he or she received is at least as valuable as the division received by each ot ..."
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Abstract. We consider the division of a single homogeneous object and transfers of money among several people who may have different valuations for the object. A division is envy free if every person believes the division he or she received is at least as valuable as the division received by each
EnvyFree Makespan Approximation
, 2009
"... We study envyfree mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan. For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envyfree polytime mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O(log m), where m is the number of machines. ..."
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Cited by 2 (2 self)
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We study envyfree mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan. For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envyfree polytime mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O(log m), where m is the number of machines
More than envyfree
 In the Working Papers of the AAAI99 Workshop on Negotiation: Settling Conflicts and Identifying Opportunities, 4449. Menlo Park
"... All intext references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately. ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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All intext references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately.
FourPerson EnvyFree Chore Division
 Mathematics Magazine
, 2002
"... this article we explore the problem of chore division, which is closely related to a classical question, due to Steinhaus [10], of how to cut a cake fairly. We focus on constructive solutions, that is, those obtained via a welldefined procedure or algorithm. Among the many notions of fairness is e ..."
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Cited by 5 (2 self)
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is envyfreeness: an envyfree cake division is a set of cuts and an allocation of the pieces that gives each person what she feels is the largest piece. It is nontrivial to find such a division, since the cake may not be homogeneous and player valuations on subsets of cake will differ, in general. Much
EnvyFree Discrete Protocols
"... Whenever we say something like Alice has a piece worth α we mean it’s worth α TO HER. The term biggest piece means most valuable to the person looking at it. This is not necessarily related to geometric size. We assume the entire cake is worth 1 to everyone. ..."
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Whenever we say something like Alice has a piece worth α we mean it’s worth α TO HER. The term biggest piece means most valuable to the person looking at it. This is not necessarily related to geometric size. We assume the entire cake is worth 1 to everyone.
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