of-freedom Parallel

Abstract not found

Abstract not found

) feedback from both receivers to the relay, (2) feedback from each receiver to the relay and to one of the transmitters (either corresponding or opposite), (3) feedback from one of the receivers to the relay, (4) feedback from one of the receivers to the relay and to one of the transmitters. Our results

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to give many thanks to Dr. Shengli Fu and Dr. Yan Huang as my advi-

that there exist two distinct regimes of operation that correspond to high/low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). In the measurement

Abstract — We consider minimum variance estimation within the sparse linear Gaussian model (SLGM). A sparse vector is to be estimated from a linearly transformed version embedded in Gaussian noise. Our analysis is based on the theory of reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces (RKHS). After a characterization of the RKHS associated with the SLGM, we derive a lower bound on the minimum variance achievable by estimators with a prescribed bias function, including the important special case of unbiased estimation. This bound is obtained via an orthogonal projection of the prescribed mean function onto a subspace of the RKHS associated with the SLGM. It provides an approximation to the minimum achievable variance (Barankin bound) that is tighter than any known bound. Our bound holds for an arbitrary system matrix, including the overdetermined and underdetermined cases. We specialize

circle: Jacobi algorithms for

de nationalité suisse et originaire de Zurich (ZH) et Lucerne (LU) acceptée sur proposition du jury:

Intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDSs/IPSs) heavily rely on signature databases and pattern matching (PM) techniques to identify network attacks. The engines of such systems often employ traditional PM algorithms to search for telltale patterns in network flows. The observations that real-world network traffic is largely legitimate and that telltales manifested by exploits rarely appear in network streams lead us to the proposal of Fingerprinter. This framework integrates fingerprinting and PM methods to rapidly distinguish well-behaved from malicious traffic. Fingerprinter produces concise digests or fingerprints for attack signatures during its programming phase. In its querying phase, the framework quickly identifies attack-free connections by transforming input traffic into its fingerprint space and matching its digest against those of attack signatures. If the legitimacy of a stream cannot be determined by fingerprints alone, our framework uses the Boyer–Moore algorithm to ascertain whether attack signatures appear in the stream. To reduce false matches, we resort to multiple fingerprinting techniques including Bloom–Filter and Rabin–Fingerprint. Experimentation with a prototype and a variety of traces has helped us establish that Fingerprinter significantly accelerates the attack detection process.