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TABLE III PERCENTAGE OF BAD BLOCKS AS A FUNCTION OF THE PROBABILITY OF CHECKING.

in Cooperative Security for Network Coding File Distribution
by unknown authors

Table 1. Comparison of LOC used to check usage constraints in original Chat, Chat2, and Chat3

in
by unknown authors
"... In PAGE 5: ...Table1 lists the lines of code (LOC) of each implementation. The LOC counts for Chat2 do not include the extra coding effort requirement placed on clients.... In PAGE 5: ...The results in Table1 show that even for the simple Chat component, enforcing the usage constraints is a significant effort. Since the behaviors of Chat, Chat2, and Chat3 are identical, it is fair to state that most of the additional LOC are due to checking the usage constraints.... In PAGE 5: ... A second lips tool, the deployer, then generates additional code to integrate the lips container into a particular technology such as CORBA. In Table1 , we showed the LOC for our lips version of the Chat component, Chat3. This implementation makes use of the lips toolset to automatically generate the enforcement code.... ..."

Table 3: Execution Overhead The safeguarding code falls into two general categories. The rst type performs ad- ditional security checks and raise an exception if the check fails. Safeguarding codes for window attacks, network accesses, and URL spoo ng are included in this group. As shown in the table, the security checks against those attacks can be done with a 5% overhead. The other types keeps track of an object and provides control over it. This protects against both faulty programming and malicious attacks that loses control of the resource. Our experimental data show that such a problem may be handled with a half execution time 16

in Java Bytecode Modification and Applet Security
by Insik Shin, John C. Mitchell
"... In PAGE 16: ...Table3... ..."

Table 2. Selected Malicious Executables Malicious

in Detection of Injected, Dynamically Generated, and Obfuscated Malicious Code
by Jesse C. Rabek, Roger I. Khazan, Scott M. Lewandowski, Robert K. Cunningham 2003
"... In PAGE 5: ...yn. Code Gen. W32-Sapphire MS SQL server Worm Code Injection 4.2 Malicious code samples Table2 lists the MC samples. These consist of the viruses and worms that use dynamic code generation (polymorphism), obfuscation, and code injection.... ..."
Cited by 11

Table 2. Selected Malicious Executables Malicious

in Detection of Injected, Dynamically Generated, and Obfuscated Malicious Code
by Jesse C. Rabek, Roger I. Khazan, Scott M. Lewandowski, Robert K. Cunningham 2003
"... In PAGE 5: ...yn. Code Gen. W32-Sapphire MS SQL server Worm Code Injection 4.2 Malicious code samples Table2 lists the MC samples. These consist of the viruses and worms that use dynamic code generation (polymorphism), obfuscation, and code injection.... ..."
Cited by 11

Table 1 Examples of Malicious Code Malicious code Date Category Explanation

in focus malicious IT Attacking Malicious Code: A Report to the
by Ieee September October, Gary Mcgraw Cigital, Greg Morrisett

Table 1 Examples of Malicious Code Malicious code Date Category Explanation

in unknown title
by unknown authors

Table 4 Results of Model Checking Each Component

in Compositional Analysis of Mobile Network Protocols
by Peng Wu, Dongmei Zhang, Peng Wu, Dongmei Zhang 2005
"... In PAGE 25: ... However, the model checker can verify the deadlock freedom of its each task component. Table4 illustrates the results of model checking these components against DF . With Theorem 2.... ..."

Table 2 Results of Model Checking Each Component

in Compositional Analysis of Mobile Network Protocols
by Peng Wu, Dongmei Zhang, Peng Wu, Dongmei Zhang 2005
"... In PAGE 21: ... However, the model checker can verify the deadlock freedom of its each task component. Table2 illustrates the results of model checking these components against DF . jSj is the number of states that have been traversed during model checking.... ..."

Table 9: List of restrictive policies built for preventing malicious vulnerability exploits in new executed paths Restricted-execution instruction Restrictive policies

in Virtualization-assisted Framework for Prevention of Software Vulnerability Based Security Attacks
by Najwa Aaraj, Niraj K. Jha
"... In PAGE 11: ... At that point, signal Match is asserted and the monitor resumes execution in S2. During instrumentation of the new path, a set of highly-restrictive policies (listed in Table9 ) is enforced at run-time before any instruction completes execution. (This part of our work uses a similar concept to the one in [13]).... In PAGE 12: ...43 28.11 P8 13881 and performing various checks against behavioral model M and the list of restrictive security policies given in Table9 . For evaluation purposes, we divided the testing procedure into two scenarios: (1) application is executed with user inputs already tested in the Testing environment, (2) application is executed with user inputs not tested in the Testing environ- ment and which exercise new execution paths.... In PAGE 13: ... C. Detection and false alarm rates in the Real Environment: Behavioral models extracted in the detection mode, in addition to the restrictive security policies of Table9 , successfully halted the exploit of any code vulnerabilities in the Real environment or prevention mode. We have tested our approach in the Real environment using a set of input vectors that was used in the detection mode and another set of inputs that was not tested.... ..."
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