"... In PAGE 4: ... Dead states in one discussed controller version have been found very fast by the stubborn set reduction method. Table1 compiles some details on the size of the analyzed nets and the analysis efforts done. Please note especially the impressive reduction effect inherent to the stubborn set method.... ..."

"... In PAGE 4: ... Dead states in one discussed controller version (arm version 2) have been found very fast by the stubborn set reduction method. Table1 compiles some details on the size of the analyzed nets and the analysis efforts done. Please note especially the impressive reduction effect inherent in the stubborn set method.... ..."

"... In PAGE 9: ... Dead states caused by one controller version (arm version 2) have been found very fast by construc- tion of the (surprisingly small) stubborn set reduced reachability graph. Table1 summarises some of the steps carried out for the analysis of the cooperation model. For comparison, we also tried to apply OBDD-based methods.... ..."

"... In PAGE 7: ...able 8: Dependence of scaling law exponent on agent loyalty .............................................76 Table9 : Dependence of scaling law exponent on stickiness of effort adjustment, various b .... ..."

"... In PAGE 18: ... We will come back to this issue in the final example we study. In the first (I) line of Table2 we indicate the welfare losses that result in the non-cooperative ( J Nash ) and cooperative ( J NB ) cases, and the bargaining weights ( NB y ) in the cooperative decision making on monetary and fiscal policies. [Insert Table 2 here] By definition, policy coordination reduces the welfare losses as externalities from individual policies are internalized in the cooperative case and not ignored as in the non-cooperative case.... In PAGE 18: ...odest. We will come back to this issue in the final example we study. In the first (I) line of Table 2 we indicate the welfare losses that result in the non-cooperative ( J Nash ) and cooperative ( J NB ) cases, and the bargaining weights ( NB y ) in the cooperative decision making on monetary and fiscal policies. [Insert Table2 here] By definition, policy coordination reduces the welfare losses as externalities from individual policies are internalized in the cooperative case and not ignored as in the non-cooperative case. Obviously, in this symmetric case the bargaining weights in the individual countries are equal.... In PAGE 19: ...2 = 0.8. [Insert Figure 4 here] In that case, the labor market in country 2 reacts much stronger to unemployment than in country 1. Wages, unemployment, prices and output adjust much more slowly in country 1 resulting in a considerable difference in welfare losses between both countries, according to the fourth (IV) line of Table2 . Competitiveness of country 1 remains negative over the entire adjustment cycle.... In PAGE 20: ... This considerable difference in relative preferences also implies that cooperation has limited effects in this example: the more similar of course players are in their preferences, the greater becomes the scope for effective policy cooperation. Compared to the Classical regimes of Figure 1-4, the bargaining weight of the ECB has considerably increased to the disadvantage of the fiscal authorities, as indicated in the fifth (V) line of Table2 . Note also the larger welfare losses in the Keynesian unemployment regime compared to the Classical unemployment regime.... In PAGE 21: ... This reduces the adjustment burden for the fiscal policymakers. Consequently, the welfare losses given in line (VI) of Table2 are considerably lower (compared with the base case of the Keynesian regime in line (V)) both for the fiscal authorities who face a smaller adjustment effort and even for the ECB who has less instrument costs as it is more costly to implement a sharp monetary contraction. The new bargaining weights imply that the more flexible fiscal players gain influence in the cooperative decision making problem.... ..."

"... In PAGE 12: ...66 GHz Pentium 4), and therefore the execution time is biased by the parallelism inherent in the simulation, which loads the single processor with a considerable computational overhead. In Table 1, we show the best results obtained in terms of RMSD and energy without cooperation, while in Table2 cooperation was active. The energy considered here is the one presented in Section 4; the contributions of cooperative computational fields are not considered.... ..."

"... In PAGE 12: ...66 GHz Pentium 4), and therefore the execution time is biased by the parallelism inherent in the simulation, which loads the single processor with a considerable computational overhead. In Table 1, we show the best results obtained in terms of RMSD and energy without cooperation, while in Table2 cooperation was active. The energy considered here is the one presented in Section 4; the contributions of cooperative computational fields are not considered.... ..."

"... In PAGE 7: ... A summary of the mutual characteristics of the Single Assessment Process and a multi-agent system is given in Table 1. Table1 Mutual Characteristics of the Single Assessment Process and a multi-agent system Single Assessment Process Agent-Based System Professionals Software Agents Cooperate Cooperate Expertise Expertise Distribution Distribution In the eSAP system, the software agents will act on behalf of professionals. Each professional will have his/her own software ... In PAGE 70: ... A number of organisations and individuals play a part in these activi- ties. They can be grouped effectively into groups of actors, as shown in Table1 . The interactions between these actors can then be shown in the form of Use Case diagrams.... ..."