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335
Adaptive Run-time Performance Optimization Through Scalable Client Request Rate Control
"... Today’s Internet-scale computing systems often run at a low average load with only occasional peak performance demands. Consequently, computing resources are often overdimensioned, leading to high costs. While load control techniques between clients and servers can help to better utilize a given sys ..."
Abstract
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from the server to the clients with (ii) decoupling strategies that allow to constrain and filter client requests directly at the client, illustrated in the area of first-price sealed-bid online auctions, and (iii) a PID (Proportional-Integral-Derivative) controller that adaptively controls the input
On Cheating in Sealed-Bid Auctions
- In Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
, 2003
"... Motivated by the rise of online auctions and their relative lack of security, this paper analyzes two forms of cheating in sealed-bid auctions. The first type of cheating we consider occurs when the seller spies on the bids of a second-price auction and then inserts a fake bid in order to increase t ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 23 (2 self)
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Motivated by the rise of online auctions and their relative lack of security, this paper analyzes two forms of cheating in sealed-bid auctions. The first type of cheating we consider occurs when the seller spies on the bids of a second-price auction and then inserts a fake bid in order to increase
ABSTRACT On Cheating in Sealed-Bid Auctions
"... Motivated by the rise of online auctions and their relative lack of security, this paper analyzes two forms of cheating in sealed-bid auctions. The first type of cheating we consider occurs when the seller spies on the bids of a second-price auction and then inserts a fake bid in order to increase t ..."
Abstract
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Motivated by the rise of online auctions and their relative lack of security, this paper analyzes two forms of cheating in sealed-bid auctions. The first type of cheating we consider occurs when the seller spies on the bids of a second-price auction and then inserts a fake bid in order to increase
Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
, 2003
"... We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the “winner’s curse” arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 105 (13 self)
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We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the “winner’s curse” arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed
Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- ARTICLE SUBMITTED TO MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
"... We investigate the effect of regret-related feedback information on bidding behavior in sealed-bid first-price auctions. Two types of regret are possible in this auction format. A winner of the auction may regret paying too much relative to the second highest bid, and a loser may regret missing an o ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 27 (4 self)
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We investigate the effect of regret-related feedback information on bidding behavior in sealed-bid first-price auctions. Two types of regret are possible in this auction format. A winner of the auction may regret paying too much relative to the second highest bid, and a loser may regret missing
A Study of First-price Sealed-bid Procurement Auctions for Divisible Items ∗
"... Abstract In this paper, we study first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions for divisible items. The auctions are divided into two cases: the auctioneer either does or does not compensate for an oversupply of the quantity purchased. The bidding behaviors of bidders are modeled, and then the optimal ..."
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Abstract In this paper, we study first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions for divisible items. The auctions are divided into two cases: the auctioneer either does or does not compensate for an oversupply of the quantity purchased. The bidding behaviors of bidders are modeled
Simulation of the behavior of bidders in first-price sealed-bid auctions
"... on communication networks ..."
New Sealed-Bid Electronic Auction with Fairness, Security and Efficiency
, 2006
"... Abstract Electronic sealed-bid auction schemes usually have a common drawback, the third party (auction host) can conspire with a malicious bidder to leak all bidding prices before the opening stage. It results in the malicious bidder wining the auction with an optimal bidding price. Recently, Liaw ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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Abstract Electronic sealed-bid auction schemes usually have a common drawback, the third party (auction host) can conspire with a malicious bidder to leak all bidding prices before the opening stage. It results in the malicious bidder wining the auction with an optimal bidding price. Recently, Liaw
Bidding in sealed-bid and English multi-attribute auctions
, 2006
"... In this paper we consider an extension of the traditional auction mechanism, the multi-attribute auction, which enables negotiation on several attributes in addition to the price of the item. In particular, we consider a procurement auction in which the buyer is the auctioneer and the sellers are th ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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are the bidders. Such domains include auctions on task allocation, services, etc. We focus on three auction protocols for the case of multi-attribute items; a variation of the first-price sealed-bid protocol termed first-score sealed-bid, a variation of the second-price sealed-bid protocol termed second
Results 1 - 10
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