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18
Public Goods Provision ∗
"... This paper characterizes the utility possibility frontier resulting in a model of private voluntary provision of a public good. It is shown that exante lotteries over resource distributions among the agents can be Pareto improving. A corollary is that an equal distribution of resources among the ag ..."
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This paper characterizes the utility possibility frontier resulting in a model of private voluntary provision of a public good. It is shown that exante lotteries over resource distributions among the agents can be Pareto improving. A corollary is that an equal distribution of resources among
A Theory of School Choice Lotteries
, 2010
"... A new centralized mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools in district schoolchoice programs. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others, over the mechanisms it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framewor ..."
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framework for investigating schoolchoice matching problems and two exante notions of fairness in lottery design, strong exante stability and exante stability. This framework generalizes known onetomany twosided and onesided matching models. We show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy
A Theory of SchoolChoice Lotteries
"... We introduce a new notion of exante stability (or fairness) that would be desirable for a schoolchoice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be stable based solely on the probabilities that each student will be assigned to different schools, i.e., the assignment must ..."
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We introduce a new notion of exante stability (or fairness) that would be desirable for a schoolchoice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be stable based solely on the probabilities that each student will be assigned to different schools, i.e., the assignment
Preference for Randomization ∗ Ambiguity Aversion and Inequality Aversion
, 2010
"... In Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) domain, there are two types of mixtures. One is an ex–ante mixture, or a lottery on acts. The other is an ex–post mixture, or a state– wise mixture of acts. These two mixtures have been assumed to be indifferent under the Reversal of Order axiom. However, we argue tha ..."
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In Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) domain, there are two types of mixtures. One is an ex–ante mixture, or a lottery on acts. The other is an ex–post mixture, or a state– wise mixture of acts. These two mixtures have been assumed to be indifferent under the Reversal of Order axiom. However, we argue
On Portfolio Choice with Savoring and Disappointment
, 2013
"... We revisit the model proposed by Gollier and Muermann (see Gollier, C. and A. Muermann, 2010, Optimal choice and beliefs with exante savoring and expost disappointment, Management Sci., 56, 12721284, hereafter GM). In GM, for a given lottery, agents form anticipated expected payoffs and the set ..."
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We revisit the model proposed by Gollier and Muermann (see Gollier, C. and A. Muermann, 2010, Optimal choice and beliefs with exante savoring and expost disappointment, Management Sci., 56, 12721284, hereafter GM). In GM, for a given lottery, agents form anticipated expected payoffs
Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
, 2003
"... Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A direct revelation mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes — also interpreted as timeshares. Under such dichotomous preferences, the probability that the lottery outcome be a good one is a canonical utility representation. The utilitarian ..."
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; or if this lower bound is the fraction of good outcomes to feasible outcomes. We conjecture that no exante efficient and strategyproof mechanism guarantees a strictly positive utility to all agents at all profiles, and prove a weaker version of this conjecture. 1
Cardinal Bayesian Allocation Mechanisms without Transfers
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 2012
"... In allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers, random allocation mechanisms can be designed in order to elicit information on preference intensities. I study the nontransfer allocation of two exante identical objects under Bayesian incentive compatibility, with symmetric agents and independ ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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and independent private valuations. I
nd the exante utilitarianoptimal mechanism, in which the probability of receiving a speci
ed object is used as "numeraire " to purchase probability units of the other object. I characterize this mechanism as an appropriate combination of lotteries, auctions
The Allocation of Indivisible Objects via Rounding
"... The problem of allocating indivisible objects arises in the allocation of courses, spectrum licenses, landing slots at airports and assigning students to schools. This paper proposes a technique for making such allocations that is based on rounding a fractional allocation. Under the assumption that ..."
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that no agent wants to consume more than k items, the rounding technique can be interpreted as giving agents lotteries over approximately feasible integral allocations that preserve the exante efficiency and fairness and asymptotically strategyproof properties of the initial fractional allocation
Outline Risk Ambiguity References
, 2008
"... • The decision maker knows all possible outcomes and the associated probabilities of realization. However, ex ante she does not know which outcome will be realized. • Risky lotteries are easily tractable but rare in real life. • Examples: • Games of hazard (betting on dice, roulette, etc.). • (Specu ..."
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• The decision maker knows all possible outcomes and the associated probabilities of realization. However, ex ante she does not know which outcome will be realized. • Risky lotteries are easily tractable but rare in real life. • Examples: • Games of hazard (betting on dice, roulette, etc
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems
 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
, 2012
"... Abstract: The most widely used economic models of social preferences are specified only for certain outcomes. There are two obvious methods of extending them to lotteries. If we do so by expected utility theory, so that the independence axiom is satisfied, our results imply that the resulting prefer ..."
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preferences do not exhibit ex ante fairness. If we do so by replacing certain outcomes with their expected utilities for each individual, so that individual risk preferences are preserved, then ex ante fairness may be preserved, but neither the independence axiom nor ex post fairness is satisfied.
Results 1  10
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