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Table 6 Profitability and ownership concentration
"... In PAGE 21: ... 3.3 Results Ownership concentration and profitability Regression results from estimating model (1) and its variants are shown in Table6 . Columns 1 and 5 contain the estimates for the quoted firms only.... In PAGE 21: ... Absolute firm size has a negative impact, whereas firm growth, a higher equity share (lower leverage) and higher market concentration positively affect ROA and ROE. Table6... ..."
Table 14 Ownership concentration and legal frameworks Concentration of
"... In PAGE 35: ... Insufficient institutional reforms may be due to concentrated corporate ownershipOne reason for limited institutional reforms may be the continued concentration of corporate control in the hands of a few families, and the strong political connections that these families have. In East Asian countries where control is most concentrated, the judicial system tends to be less efficient, the rule of law is weaker, and corruption seems more pervasive ( Table14 ). This implies that institutional reform may be more limited in East Asian countries where wealth is highly concentrated.... ..."
Table 5 Changes in ownership concentration and ROA
"... In PAGE 17: ... Ownership concentration increased in seven cases and decreased in eight cases. Table5 summarizes, details can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix.... In PAGE 17: ...ecreased in eight cases. Table 5 summarizes, details can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Table5 about here 3.2 Hypotheses and regression models Using regression analysis we test the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) hypothesis of no systematic relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance.... ..."
Table 12 Trust, stock market participation and ownership concentration around the world
2007
"... In PAGE 30: ... 6.4 Cross-country results Table12 reports the results. In the first three columns the dependent variable is the percentage of the stock market capitalization that is closely held.... ..."
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Table II: Ownership concentration in all listed firms, Spain and UK (1990)
Table 2: Ownership Concentration at Critical Levels of Shareholder Control for KLSE Publicly Listed Companies, 1998
"... In PAGE 7: ...6 Table2 : Ownership Concentration at Critical Levels of Shareholder Control for Publicly Listed Companies in the KLSE (1998) shows the number of companies whose five largest shareholders held various levels of ownership: majority ownership, two-thirds and 80 per cent of outstanding shares. Analysis of shareholdings of public listed companies is based on board categories - namely, main board companies and second board companies.... ..."
Table 2 describes ownership concentration over the period 1988-1993. The mean across
"... In PAGE 28: ...26 Table2 : Descriptive statistics of ownership and control Panel A : Evolution of ownership percentages and control distribution across shareholders. Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Mean Largest shareholder % Ownership 18.... ..."
Table 1 Concentration, Ownership, and Number of Firms in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry
1999
"... In PAGE 4: ... The facts of financial consolidation Tables 1-5 re port aggregate statistics on trends in financial consolidation. As shown in Table1 , th e number o f U.S.... ..."
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of ownership and control
"... In PAGE 16: ... [Insert table 2 about here.] Table2 describes ownership concentration over the period 1988-1993. The mean across time for the largest shareholding amounts to 16.... ..."
Table V - Disclosure, Liability standards, and Public enforcement Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross-section of countries. The dependent variables are: (1) External market capitalization; (2) Log of domestic firms per capita; (3) Value of IPOs; (4) Block premium; (5) Access to equity; (6) Ownership concentration; and (7) the Stock-market- volume-to-GDP ratio. All regressions include Disclosure requirements, Liability standards, Public enforcement, Anti-director rights, Efficiency of the judiciary, and Log of GDP per capita. All variables are described in Table I. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
2006
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