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296
Existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have otherregarding preferences
, 2009
"... In standard political economy models voters are ‘selfinterested’, i.e., care only about ‘own’utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have ‘otherregarding preferences’, i.e., in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payo¤s relative to others. We ext ..."
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, we show, quite generally, that under FehrSchmidt preferences voters will care for others when voting over redistribution but choose labour supply so as to maximize own utility. Second, we prove that a Condorcet winner exists when voters have FehrSchmidt preferences in the special case when the own
The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Heterogeneity
, 2010
"... Abstract. We consider a committee, board, group or jury that faces a binary collective decision under uncertainty. Each member holds some private information and all members agree about what decision should be taken in each state of nature. However, the state is unknown and members may differ in the ..."
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in their valuations of the two types of mistake that may occur, and/or in the prior they hold about the true state of the world. We generalize existing results with respect to such preference and belief heterogeneity, and provide, in a unified framework, necessary and sufficient conditions for informative voting
Updated June 2008Existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have
, 2008
"... otherregarding preferences ..."
Downsian competition in the absence of a Condorcet winner Jesper Roine∗
, 2003
"... This paper studies twoparty electoral competition in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing platforms and observe each other’s choices, altering one’s policy platform so as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where ..."
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This paper studies twoparty electoral competition in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing platforms and observe each other’s choices, altering one’s policy platform so as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where it is sure to loose. If there is any cost to changing platform, the prediction is that the game ends in the first period with the parties converging on whatever platform the incumbent chooses. If, however, there is a slight chance of a small mistake, the incumbent does best in choosing a local equilibrium platform. This suggests that local equilibrium policies can be the predicted outcome even if the voting process is not myopic in any way.
Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
 Economics Letters
, 2000
"... Abstract In an election, an alternative is said to be a strong Condorcet winner when more than 50% of the voters rank this alternative first in their preference orders. The strong Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is defined as the probability of electing the strong Condorcet winner, given that ..."
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Abstract In an election, an alternative is said to be a strong Condorcet winner when more than 50% of the voters rank this alternative first in their preference orders. The strong Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is defined as the probability of electing the strong Condorcet winner, given
Possible and Necessary Winners of Partial Tournaments
"... We study the problem of computing possible and necessary winners for partially specified weighted and unweighted tournaments. This problem arises naturally in elections with incompletely specified votes, partially completed sports competitions, and more generally in any scenario where the outcome of ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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We study the problem of computing possible and necessary winners for partially specified weighted and unweighted tournaments. This problem arises naturally in elections with incompletely specified votes, partially completed sports competitions, and more generally in any scenario where the outcome
Winner determination in sequential majority voting
 In Proceedings of the ECAI2006 Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling
, 2007
"... Preferences can be aggregated using a voting rule. Each agent gives their preference orderings over a set of candidates, and a voting rule is used to compute the winner. We consider voting rules which perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons between two candidates, where the result of each is comp ..."
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Cited by 45 (14 self)
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is computed by a majority vote. The winner thus depends on the chosen sequence of comparisons, which can be represented by a binary tree. There are candidates that will win in some trees (called possible winners) or in all trees (called Condorcet winners). While it is easy to find the possible and Condorcet
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The dependent case
, 2008
"... We provide an extension of the Condorcet Theorem. Our model includes both the NitzanParoush framework of “unequal competencies ” and Ladha’s model of “correlated voting by the jurors”. We assume that the jurors behave “informatively”, that is, they do not make a strategic use of their information i ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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We provide an extension of the Condorcet Theorem. Our model includes both the NitzanParoush framework of “unequal competencies ” and Ladha’s model of “correlated voting by the jurors”. We assume that the jurors behave “informatively”, that is, they do not make a strategic use of their information
2Condorcet Efficiency: A Preference for Indifference
"... The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. The st ..."
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The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists
Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting*
, 2005
"... An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly. Intertemporal voting simpli…es the strategic issues and the agenda setting is as unrestricted as possible. The possibility of cycl ..."
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Cited by 12 (0 self)
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of the equilibrium concept to admit probabilistic voting allows a general existence result to be proved. The analysis leads to the development of a dominant state which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner.
Results 11  20
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296