Results 21  30
of
296
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders.
 In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),
, 2008
"... Abstract Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial orders instead. Then, given a voting rule, a profile ..."
Abstract

Cited by 63 (11 self)
 Add to MetaCart
of partial orders, and an alternative (candidate) c, two important questions arise: first, is it still possible for c to win, and second, is c guaranteed to win? These are the possible winner and necessary winner problems, respectively. Each of these two problems is further divided into two sub
Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections
 Theory Comput. Syst
"... Abstract. In 1977 Young proposed a voting scheme that extends the Condorcet Principle based on the fewest possible number of voters whose removal yields a Condorcet winner. We prove that both the winner and the ranking problem for Young elections is complete for PNP ‖ , the class of problems solvabl ..."
Abstract

Cited by 44 (7 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. In 1977 Young proposed a voting scheme that extends the Condorcet Principle based on the fewest possible number of voters whose removal yields a Condorcet winner. We prove that both the winner and the ranking problem for Young elections is complete for PNP ‖ , the class of problems
Ranking from Stochastic Pairwise Preferences: Recovering Condorcet Winners and Tournament Solution Sets at the Top
"... We consider the problem of ranking n items from stochastically sampled pairwise preferences. It was shown recently that when the underlying pairwise preferences are acyclic, several algorithms including the Rank Centrality algorithm, the Matrix Borda algorithm, and the SVMRankAggregation algorithm ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
. For example, if a Condorcet winner exists that beats every other item, it is natural to ask that this be ranked at the top. More generally, several tournament solution concepts such as the top cycle, Copeland set, Markov set and others have been proposed in the social choice literature for choosing a
Possible and Necessary Winner Problem in Social Polls
"... Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose that an agent’s vote is influenced by the votes of their frien ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose that an agent’s vote is influenced by the votes of their friends who have already voted. Despite its simplicity, this model provides useful insights into a number of areas including social polling, sequential voting, and manipulation. We prove that the number of candidates and the network structure affect the computational complexity of computing which candidate necessarily or possibly can win in such a social poll. For social networks with bounded treewidth and a bounded number of candidates, we provide polynomial algorithms for both problems. In other cases, we prove that computing which candidates necessarily or possibly win are computationally intractable.
Relationalgebraic and Toolsupported Control of Condorcet Voting
"... Abstract. We present a relationalgebraic model of Condorcet voting and, based on it, relationalgebraic solutions of the constructive control problem via the removal of voters. We consider two winning conditions, viz. to be a Condorcet winner and to be in the (Gilles resp. upward) uncovered set. Fo ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. We present a relationalgebraic model of Condorcet voting and, based on it, relationalgebraic solutions of the constructive control problem via the removal of voters. We consider two winning conditions, viz. to be a Condorcet winner and to be in the (Gilles resp. upward) uncovered set
Condorcet VS Borda, round n+1
"... A voting rule is manipulable if it is sometimes possible for a voter to change the election’s outcome to one she prefers, by switching away from her sincere ballot – one that represents her actual preferences – to an insincere ballot. Loosely speaking, the GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem tells us that ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
) preferences over a finite set A of alternatives (aka “candidates"). In a reversal paradox a voter changes the winner to one she strictly prefers by completely reversing her sincere ranking. Such a reversed ballot is maximally insincere – for every pair of alternatives, it misstates which of the
Choosing Collectively Optimal Sets of Alternatives Based on the Condorcet Criterion
 PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTYSECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
"... In elections, an alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a setvalued relaxation of this concept, which ..."
Abstract

Cited by 6 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In elections, an alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a setvalued relaxation of this concept, which
Possible winners in noisy elections
 In Proc. IJCAI Workshop on Social Choice and Artificial Intelligence
, 2011
"... Predicting election winners (or, election possible winners) is an important topic in computational social choice. Very generally put, we consider the following setting: There is some set of candidates C and some set of voters V (with preferences over C). We either do not know which candidates will t ..."
Abstract

Cited by 4 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Predicting election winners (or, election possible winners) is an important topic in computational social choice. Very generally put, we consider the following setting: There is some set of candidates C and some set of voters V (with preferences over C). We either do not know which candidates
On the difficulty of computing the winners of a tournament
, 2006
"... In voting theory, the result of a paired comparison method as the one suggested by Condorcet can be represented by a tournament, i.e., a complete asymmetric directed graph. When there is no Condorcet winner, i.e., a candidate preferred to any other candidate by a majority of voters, it is not always ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
In voting theory, the result of a paired comparison method as the one suggested by Condorcet can be represented by a tournament, i.e., a complete asymmetric directed graph. When there is no Condorcet winner, i.e., a candidate preferred to any other candidate by a majority of voters
Analysis of voting procedures in oneseat elections: Condorcet efficiency and Borda efficiency
, 1999
"... In this paper 16 different voting procedures for oneseat elections are analysed: the rules of Borda, Condorcet, Black, Copeland, Simpson, Hare, Coombs, Baldwin, Nanson and the plurality, antiplurality, majority, approval and runoff rules. The 2 criteria we use as a measure for the validity of the ..."
Abstract

Cited by 2 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
of the voting procedures are Condorcet efficiency (the number of times a voting procedure selects the Condorcet winner) and Borda efficiency (the number of times a voting procedure selects the Borda winner). Computer simulations calculate efficiencies for the 16 voting procedures. We find that the Borda rule
Results 21  30
of
296