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Voting procedures with incomplete preferences
 in Proc. IJCAI05 Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling
, 2005
"... We extend the application of a voting procedure (usually defined on complete preference relations over candidates) when the voters ’ preferences consist of partial orders. We define possible (resp. necessary) winners for a given partial preference profile R with respect to a given voting procedure a ..."
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Cited by 95 (11 self)
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as the candidates being the winners in some (resp. all) of the complete extensions of R. We show that, although the computation of possible and necessary winners may be hard in general case, it is polynomial for the family of positional scoring procedures. We show that the possible and necessary Condorcet winners
Condorcet Winners for Public Goods
, 2005
"... In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than the ma ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than
A Note on the Query Complexity of the Condorcet Winner Problem
"... Given an unknown tournament over {1,..., n}, we show that the query complexity of the question “Is there a vertex with outdegree n − 1? ” (known as a Condorcet winner in social choice theory) is exactly 2n − ⌊log(n) ⌋ − 2. This stands in stark contrast to the evasiveness of this property in general ..."
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Cited by 5 (1 self)
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Given an unknown tournament over {1,..., n}, we show that the query complexity of the question “Is there a vertex with outdegree n − 1? ” (known as a Condorcet winner in social choice theory) is exactly 2n − ⌊log(n) ⌋ − 2. This stands in stark contrast to the evasiveness of this property
Condorcet Winner Probabilities A Statistical Perspective
, 2005
"... A Condorcet voting scheme chooses a winning candidate as one who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. We provide a review which includes the rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates and value of n odd or even ..."
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A Condorcet voting scheme chooses a winning candidate as one who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. We provide a review which includes the rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates and value of n odd
When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers
, 2007
"... We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear fontrunner F and runnerup R if and only if the F is the clear Condorcet Winner and R the Condorcet runnerup. In contrast, we show that marginsbased ..."
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We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear fontrunner F and runnerup R if and only if the F is the clear Condorcet Winner and R the Condorcet runnerup. In contrast, we show that margins
On the likelihood of Condorcet’s profiles ∗
, 2000
"... Consider a group of individuals who have to collectively choose an outcome from a finite set of feasible alternatives. A scoring or positional rule is an aggregation procedure where each voter awards a given number of points, wj, to the alternative she ranks in jth position in her preference orderin ..."
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ordering; the outcome chosen is then the alternative that receives the highest number of points. A Condorcet or majority winner is a candidate who obtains more votes than her opponents in any pairwise comparison. Condorcet [4] showed that all positional rules fail to satisfy the majority criterion
Generating random weak orders and the probability of a Condorcet winner
"... We present an algorithm for generating a random weak order of m objects in which all possible weak orders are equally likely. The form of the algorithm suggests analytic expressions for the probability of a Condorcet winner both for linear and for weak preference orders. 1. ..."
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We present an algorithm for generating a random weak order of m objects in which all possible weak orders are equally likely. The form of the algorithm suggests analytic expressions for the probability of a Condorcet winner both for linear and for weak preference orders. 1.
PREFERENCE DOMAINS AND THE MONOTONICITY OF CONDORCET EXTENSIONS†
"... ABSTRACT. An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it beats all other alternatives in a pairwise majority vote. A social choice correspondence is a Condorcet extension if it selects the Condorcet winners—and nothing else—whenever a Condorcet winner exists. It is well known that Condorcet extensions ..."
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ABSTRACT. An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it beats all other alternatives in a pairwise majority vote. A social choice correspondence is a Condorcet extension if it selects the Condorcet winners—and nothing else—whenever a Condorcet winner exists. It is well known that Condorcet extensions
Four CondorcetHare Hybrid Methods for SingleWinner Elections
"... This paper examines four singlewinner election methods, denoted here as Woodall, Benham, SmithAV, and Tideman, that all make use of both Condorcet’s pairwise comparison principle and Hare’s elimination and reallocation principle used in the alternative vote. These methods have many significant pro ..."
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This paper examines four singlewinner election methods, denoted here as Woodall, Benham, SmithAV, and Tideman, that all make use of both Condorcet’s pairwise comparison principle and Hare’s elimination and reallocation principle used in the alternative vote. These methods have many significant
Results 1  10
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296