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132
Cooperative Prisoners and Aggressive Chickens: Evolution of Strategies and . . .
, 2002
"... By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in the prisoners ’ dilemma and in the chicken game. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in preference composition. With complete information cooperation in th ..."
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Cited by 5 (2 self)
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By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in the prisoners ’ dilemma and in the chicken game. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in preference composition. With complete information cooperation
COORDINATION ON EGALITARIAN NETWORKS FROM ASYMMETRIC RELATIONS IN A SOCIAL GAME OF CHICKEN
, 2013
"... We present a model of social interaction in which actors choose their partners and play the Chicken Game with them. In contrast to most previous models of the coevolution of games and networks, we assume that the actors can employ different actions against dif-ferent partners. This allows us to deri ..."
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Cited by 2 (2 self)
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We present a model of social interaction in which actors choose their partners and play the Chicken Game with them. In contrast to most previous models of the coevolution of games and networks, we assume that the actors can employ different actions against dif-ferent partners. This allows us
Chicken in Prison: Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
, 2006
"... The present paper introduces the notion of weakly belief-free equilibria for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This is a tractable class which subsumes, as a special case, the belief-free equilibria, which have played a major role in the existing literature (Ely and Valimaki (2002) a ..."
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in the space of reduced games. The example embeds the chicken game, as the reduced games, in the repeated prisoners ’ dilemma with private monitoring.
The Effect of Between-Group Communication on Conflict Resolution in the Assurance and Chicken Team Games
"... We studied conflict resolution in two types of intergroup conflicts modeled as team games, a game of Assurance where the groups ’ incentive to compete is purely fear, and a game of Chicken where the groups ’ incentive to compete is purely greed. The games were operationalized as competitions between ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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We studied conflict resolution in two types of intergroup conflicts modeled as team games, a game of Assurance where the groups ’ incentive to compete is purely fear, and a game of Chicken where the groups ’ incentive to compete is purely greed. The games were operationalized as competitions
Financial Statement Audits,a Game of Chicken?
, 2002
"... ABSTRACT. This paper uses the intuition from the game of chicken to model client-auditor financial reporting and audit effort strategies. Within an ethical context, our model is concerned with the client misreporting and its detection by the auditor. The paper uses a welfare game (similar to the ga ..."
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ABSTRACT. This paper uses the intuition from the game of chicken to model client-auditor financial reporting and audit effort strategies. Within an ethical context, our model is concerned with the client misreporting and its detection by the auditor. The paper uses a welfare game (similar
DESERTING OFFSPRING Parental Investment as a Game of Chicken
"... Abstract. We model mates ’ interdependent parental investment decisions as a game of Chicken. An individual is better off (in terms of reproductive success) deserting one’s offspring to start a new union if one’s mate stays to raise the offspring, but better off not deserting if one’s mate would in ..."
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Abstract. We model mates ’ interdependent parental investment decisions as a game of Chicken. An individual is better off (in terms of reproductive success) deserting one’s offspring to start a new union if one’s mate stays to raise the offspring, but better off not deserting if one’s mate would
in a Game of Chicken. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin*,
, 2010
"... ISSN: 1955-611XCooperation, the power of a single word. Some experimental evidence on wording and gender effects ..."
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ISSN: 1955-611XCooperation, the power of a single word. Some experimental evidence on wording and gender effects
Correlated Equilibria in Succinct Games BCTCS 2006 Swansea 06/04/2006
"... • strategic form (normal form) • utility matrix for pure strategiesRepresentation of Games • strategic form (normal form) • utility matrix for pure strategies • example: chicken game stop go stop 4,4 1,5 go 5,1 0,0Correlated Equilibrium [AUMANN 1974, 1987] • distribution over strategy profilesCorrel ..."
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• strategic form (normal form) • utility matrix for pure strategiesRepresentation of Games • strategic form (normal form) • utility matrix for pure strategies • example: chicken game stop go stop 4,4 1,5 go 5,1 0,0Correlated Equilibrium [AUMANN 1974, 1987] • distribution over strategy profiles
Testing the focal point theory of legal compliance: The effect of third-party expression in an experimental hawk/dove game
- Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
"... Economic theories of legal compliance emphasize legal sanctions, whereas psychological and sociological theories stress the perceived legitimacy of law. Without disputing the importance of either mechanism, we test a third way that law affects behavior, an expressive theory that claims law influence ..."
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Cited by 23 (4 self)
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influences behavior by creating a focal point around which individuals coordinate. We investigated how various forms of third-party “cheap talk ” influence the behavior of subjects in a Hawk/Dove or Chicken game. Despite the players’ conflicting interests, we found that messages highlighting an equilibrium
Results 11 - 20
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132