In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than

A Condorcet voting scheme chooses a winning candidate as one who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. We provide a review which includes the rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates and value of n odd

Given an unknown tournament over {1,..., n}, we show that the query complexity of the question “Is there a vertex with outdegree n − 1? ” (known as a Condorcet winner in social choice theory) is exactly 2n − ⌊log(n) ⌋ − 2. This stands in stark contrast to the evasiveness of this property

We present an algorithm for generating a random weak order of m objects in which all possible weak orders are equally likely. The form of the algorithm suggests analytic expressions for the probability of a Condorcet winner both for linear and for weak preference orders. 1.

We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear font-runner F and runner-up R if and only if the F is the clear Condorcet Winner and R the Condorcet runner-up. In contrast, we show that margins

, we show, quite generally, that under Fehr-Schmidt preferences voters will care for others when voting over redistribution but choose labour supply so as to maximize own utility. Second, we prove that a Condorcet winner exists when voters have Fehr-Schmidt preferences in the special case when the own

Condorcet winner

other-regarding preferences

This paper studies two-party electoral competition in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing plat-forms and observe each other’s choices, altering one’s policy platform so as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where it is sure to loose. If there is any cost to changing platform, the prediction is that the game ends in the first period with the parties converging on what-ever platform the incumbent chooses. If, however, there is a slight chance of a small mistake, the incumbent does best in choosing a local equilibrium platform. This suggests that local equilibrium policies can be the predicted outcome even if the voting process is not myopic in any way.

. For exam-ple, if a Condorcet winner exists that beats ev-ery other item, it is natural to ask that this be ranked at the top. More generally, several tour-nament solution concepts such as the top cycle, Copeland set, Markov set and others have been proposed in the social choice literature for choos-ing a