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Migration in Afghanistan
A Country Profile 2011

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Abstract
This thesis is built up according to the IOM migration profile and aims to give a comprehensive overview of the migration situation in Afghanistan. For this purpose, the thesis is divided into five parts from A to E. Whereas part A provides an overview of the migration trends characterizing Afghanistan, Part B describes the main factors driving in- and out migration. Part C focuses on the impacts Afghan migrants have on the socio-economic development of their home country and part D aims to provide an overview of domestic legislation and actors involved in migration management. The last part (D) summarizes the main findings and presents some key recommendations for policy makers to improve the current migration management in Afghanistan.

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Executive summary

Characterized by civil war under the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the Taliban regime in the mid 1990s, Afghanistan has been an emigration country for several decades. Since the beginning of 2002 however, when Afghanistan was marked by a new government, the country has experienced the highest return migration wave in history. Between 2002 and 2010, with over 20% of the Afghan population has returned. Although this return movement was reflecting the confidence in the new Afghan Government, the mass influx of returnees brought also many challenges. The Government is until today, lacking capacities and legitimacy to effectively rule the country. Moreover, corruption, poverty, absence of employment, lack of education and health care, land disputes and the continuing fighting's between the Taliban and international forces make it difficult to build up a new nation state. On a daily basis, citizens are displaced from their homes due to war. Of those who have returned to Afghanistan, hundred thousands have been displaced a second time within the country. High poverty, lack of education and a long history of drug trafficking make it almost impossible to tackle human trafficking businesses in Afghanistan. Labor migration within the country and across the borders to Pakistan and Iran have become one of the many survival strategies Afghans have adapted. Those who can afford it, try to get smuggled to western countries in Europe, North-America or Australia. The risks of smuggling are high with many smuggled migrants ending up in forced labor. However, migrants' prospective of finding labor and a better life abroad outweigh the risk implied in such journeys. Remittances sent home to Afghanistan are urgently needed and make survival for the poorest possible. Yet, hardening migration policies toward Afghan refugees make regular migration more and more difficult. Afghan migrants are often subjects to widely harassments and discrimination, not only in neighboring states but also and especially in the west. However, despite all these facts the Afghan Government is making efforts in terms of migration policy development, regional cooperation and commitment to the international community.

On all these issues it is touched up on in this thesis. Furthermore, to understand the context in which migration issues (from labor migration to human trafficking) take place, many other historical, political, socio-economic as well as geographical aspects are described in detail. This allows an in depth analyzes and gives the opportunity to provide realistic and sustainable recommendation on how to improve the situation of migration management in Afghanistan.

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Acronym List

ACCORD	Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation
AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
ANDMA	Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
AREU	Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit
CBS	Central Bureau voor de Statistiek
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIM	Center for International Migration
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia
EVAW	Elimination of Violence Against Women
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
HRRAC	Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internal Displaced Persons
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IFAD	International Fund for Agriculture and Development
IHRC	Islamic Human Rights Commission
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IntEnt	International Entrepreneurship
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JEMB	Joint Electoral Management Body
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MoE	Ministry of Economics
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Movcon	Movement and Control Passenger Management Unit
MHUD	Ministry of Housing and Urban Development
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MoLSAMD	*Ministry of* Labour,Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
MoRR	Ministry of Refugee and Repatriation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MUDH	Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
MGSoG	Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization

NRVA	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
NWFP	North Western Frontier Province
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PoR	Proof of Registration
RCOs	Refugee Community Organizations
TRR	Total Recognition Rate
U.A.E.	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan
UNDOC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Agency for Human Settlement
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nation Children's Emergency Fund
UNIFEM	Fonds de dévelopement des Nations unies pour la femme"
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
VoT	Victim of Trafficking
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	World Food Program

Foreword

This thesis takes place in form of a migration profile[1], which has been prepared by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Over 32 migration profiles have been prepared by the IOM in different parts of the world, including Eastern Europe, the Black Sea region, South America, and Africa. Migration profiles were proposed for the first time by the European Commission in the "Communication on Migration and Development" in 2005 (COM, 2005). These profiles were originally developed to support poverty reduction strategies. In order to make all profiles comparable, a basic template was established to standardize the information that has been gathered on issues related to migration. The template allowed comparing profiles between countries thus, giving a clear and precise overview of the migration situation in the country. A structured template has also the advantage of giving a more solid background for policy makers and other stakeholders who deal with the phenomenon of migration. The template has been adapted since its first introduction in 2005. Whereas the original template focused mainly on stocks and flows of migration, the new template, introduced in 2009, also considers areas that potentially have an impact on migration such as such as labor market conditions, human capital, education, Diaspora engagement and policy development.

Following the structure of the IOM migration template, this thesis will contribute to a larger research project that is currently done by the IS Academy at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, in the Netherlands. The projects aim is to investigate the impact migration has on the development of home and receiving countries (MGSoG, 2010). The goal of this migration profile as such, is to contribute to policy development and greater policy coherence in Afghanistan and the international community.

[1] For more information on *migration profiles* please visit http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/migration-research/migration-profiles/cache/offonce/

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan

Source: World Maps 2011

Table 1: Afghanistan – Basic Facts and Figures

Region	South-central Asia
Surface area (square kilometers)	652 090
Capital	Kabul
Population in 2010 (estimates in millions)	29,117
Median Age of population (years)	16.9
Life expectancy at birth for males and females (years)	45.5
Population density in 2010 (per square kilometer)	45
Gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010 (est. in billions)	US$29
Human Development Index (HDI) Rank (2010)	155 of 169
Net Migration Rate (2005-2010)	7.5 migrants/ 1,000 population

Source: UNSD 2008; IOM 2010; CIA 2011

1. Introduction

Migration has always been a part of Afghanistan, particularly along the routes to its neighboring countries Iran and Pakistan. Since the mid 1970s however, when the Soviet invaded the country, millions of people fled Afghanistan and hundreds of thousands have been displaced from their homes (AREU, 2006). Since 2002, over five million Afghans have returned and as many as one in three people can be considered a returnee. However, besides those who have returned over three million remain in exile, most of them residing in Pakistan and Iran (UNHCR, 2011abc).

Migration movements between Afghanistan and its neighboring countries are diverse and difficult to categorize. Those who cross the borders have often several reasons to do so. As a result, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between those who migrate for socio-economic reasons and those who flee the risk of violence and environmental hazards. Studies have shown that on one single day, over ten thousand of Afghans pass through a single border crossing point on the Afghan-Pakistan border. These migrants might be considered as labor migrants, refugees or, if they do not posses any legal documents, they might be considered as irregular[2] migrants. In either way, the main push and pull factors that lead to migration in the end make it increasingly difficult to match migrants to existing legal categories that would give them the rights and international protection they urgently need. In addition, these uncontrolled population movements between Afghanistan and neighboring countries undermine the exercise of state sovereignty and further destabilize already insecure and dangerous border zones. There is clear evidence that extremists and traffickers of people, drugs and arms are among those crossing the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in both directions (Khoser, 2009).

Although there is clear evidence that Afghanistan has made progress in the development of infrastructure, health and education, security remains a major problem. Of those five million who have returned to Afghanistan the majority was not able to return to their original home. This is, as home areas are still under attack or so called “land grabbing” has taken place, meaning that during the owners absence land or other property has been taken over illegally by powerful individuals. Consequently, returnees find themselves often in a stage of

[2]According to the IOM, an *irregular migrant* or *irregular migration* is ‘the movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. From the perspective of destination countries it is illegal entry, stay or work in a country, meaning that the migrant does not have the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations to enter, reside or work in a given country. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfill the administrative requirements for leaving the country (IOM, 2004).

second displacement, trying to find shelter and employment elsewhere in the country. The (re)integration of these returnees remains a major problem. In addition, the group of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the country has grown to almost 400,000 people. The main needs expressed by returnees and IDPs are for livelihoods support, shelter and land. Access to land and rights for returnees and IDPs is hampered by criminality, corruption, insecurity and the Afghan Governments' inability to extend rule of law to all parts of the country (UNHCR, 2011a).

Afghanistan's living standards are still among the lowest in the world. A large part of its population lives in extreme poverty and suffers from shortages in housing, clean water and no access to healthcare and employment (Poppelwell, 2007). Although increasing, the literacy rate for the total population is low (CIA, 2011). Public transportation and the supply of electricity and water remain unreliable. The economy has shown strong growth in construction, trade and agriculture, but unemployment and under-employment levels are high (UNHCR, 2008a). While the international community remains committed to Afghanistan's development and tries to help safeguarding the rights and well-being of migrants, refugees and IDPs, the Afghan Government has still a long way to go (CIA, 2011).

Using the template of the IOM migration profile, this thesis is built up as follows; The first part (Part A) of the thesis aims to give an overview of current migration trends characterizing Afghanistan. Part B describes the main factors driving in- and out-migration thereby, analyzing the development of Afghanistan, its labor market conditions and political issues such as governance and security. Part C focuses on the impact of migration on demographic changes and economic prosperity in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the integration of Afghan (return) migrants is highlighted. Part D provides an overview of the migration policy framework, touching up on key domestic legislation, key players involved in the migration management and existing programs and policies related to migration. The last part, (Part E) summarizes the main findings on Afghanistan's development and migration situation and furthermore, presents key recommendation to policy makers on how to better improve migration statistics and migration management.

1.1 Afghanistan basic facts and figures

This section will give an overview of all important aspects that have to be considered when analyzing the Afghan migration situation. Therefore, the section starts with the geographical, cultural and economic background of Afghanistan and goes on with the more complex and diverse migration history of the country.

- **Geographical and political characteristics**

With an area of 652,230 sq. km, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is about the size of the U.S. state Texas and shares its largest borders with Pakistan in the south and east, and Iran in the west. Other countries bordering Afghanistan are Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. The capital of Afghanistan is Kabul. With regard to infrastructure, a so called "ring road" has recently been finished, connecting the largest cities in the country: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. The landscape is mainly characterized by mountains and desserts. With a dry climate, the population has to deal with cold, harsh winters and hot summers. Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, divided into 34 provinces which again are divided into 364 districts. The number of districts however is fluctuating due to the emergence of new districts created by splitting or merging parts of others. The current president is Hamid Karzai, who has been elected for the first time in 2004 and was re-elected in 2009 (U.S. Department of State, 2010a).

- **Population & health**

Population estimates from 2009 indicate that roughly 30 million people live in the country. The capital accommodates about three million citizens yet unofficial estimates expect the real number to be much higher. A wide variety of ethnic groups can be found in Afghanistan. Over 42% of the population is Pashtun and 27% is Tajik. Other smaller groups include the Hazaras and the Uzbek (9%). The Hazaras are largely Shia Muslims, and thus a minority in a country of Sunni Muslims. Besides their ethnicity, their Asian features – narrow eyes, flat noses and broad cheeks – also separates them from other ethnic groupings. Another group that is often mentioned with respect to the Afghan populating are the *Kuchi* people. The Kuchi (meaning "nomad" in the Dari/Persian language) are Pashtuns from the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. For centuries the Kuchi have migrated across the country in a search of seasonable pastures and milder weather. They were the main traders in Afghanistan, connecting South Asia with the Middle East. As a result, the Kuchi represent a social rather than ethnic grouping. Nowadays however, only a few thousands still follow their traditional

livelihood of nomadic herding with most Kuchi having settled down in rural or urban areas (Minority Rights Group International, 2011).

The official languages of Afghanistan are Dari and Pashtu. Whereas Dari is the most common language practiced by Afghans, Pashtu is mostly used in the east and south of the country. Many other minor languages such as Balochi and Pashai exist throughout the country. Afghanistan is a Muslim state, with 80% of Afghans being Sunni Muslims, and 19% Shia Muslims (U.S. Department of State, 2010a). The country has one of the highest mortality rates in the world with one in five children dying before the age of five. The main causes of death in children under five are Diarrhoea (26%) and Pneumonia (24%). On national average, only 14% of births are attended by skilled health personnel. In 2010, only 40% of the rural and 80% of the urban population used improved water drinking sources. The average of using improves sanitation facilities was about 30% for the rural population and about 60% for the urban population (WHO, 2011). Consequently, the health status of the Afghan population is relatively poor with men and women having only a life expectancy at birth at 45 years (CIA, 2011).

- **Economy**

In 2020, the GDP of Afghanistan was about US$29 billion and therefore relatively low. Over 36% of the population is not able to afford basic goods such as water, food or adequate shelter (NRVA, 2007/08). Although the country is rich of resources such as natural gas, coal, petroleum, copper, chromites or talc, the country has not been able to utilize these resources. Afghanistan has experienced many economic downturns in the last decades with almost complete destruction in 1979 when the Soviet invaded the country. However, since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the economy slowly started to recover and experienced a growth of 12% in 2007. Nonetheless, estimation for unemployment rate remains between 30%-40% (CIA, 2011).

With over 80% of Afghans depending on the agriculture for survival, this sector is the most important one in Afghanistan's economy (USDA, 2010). In 2007, 93% of the world's opium was cultivated in Afghanistan. The number of farmers cultivating poppy has declined in the last years however, the relative high price of poppy on the market compared to other crops and its easy cultivation processes, make it more favorable than wheat cultivation. (USAID, 2009). Besides poppy, Afghanistan produces corn, rice, wheat, vegetables, fruits and nuts. Important industrial crops are tobacco, cotton, sugar beets and castor beans. However, due to a lack of machines, chemical fertilizer and harsh seasonal weather agricultural

production in Afghanistan is hard and difficult. As a result, the country is heavily dependent on foreign aid and trade with neighboring countries (CIA, 2011).

1.2 Afghanistan migration background

- **Migration before 1979**

Records show, that Afghans have been migrating to Iran or Pakistan centuries ago (Stigter, 2006). Already in the 1850s, thousands of Hazara households migrated to Iran to flee natural disasters and other crises. Between 1880 and 1903, another 15000 Afghan families are known to have settled in the area of Torbat-e Jam, in the east of Mashad, Iran. Hazaras in Iran belonged to an official recognized tribal group in Iran, called "Khawari" (Abbasi-Shavazi et al, 2005). Afghanistan has already been a poor income country in its earlier years, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, industrialization remained negligible and insufficient employment opportunities were present. As a result, the oil boom in 1973 attracted many Afghan labor migrants to Pakistan, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries (Kronenfeld, 2008). Especially in Pakistan, many Pashtun laborers were increasingly migrating to the oil-rich Gulf States, leaving many jobs vacant and thereby giving Afghans an increasing chance to find employment in Pakistan (International Crisis Group, 2009). In addition, relatively high wages in Iran and rising government taxes in Afghanistan at that time were decisive factors for Afghans to seek for work abroad. Therefore, just before the start of the Soviet occupation several hundred thousand Afghan migrant workers were present in Iran (Stigter, 2006). During the oil boom, Afghans migrated to Iran and Pakistan legally and were welcomed by both governments who benefited from the cheap labor force. Especially in Iran, Afghans worked on building sites, in brick factories and on farms for much lower wages than their Iranian counterparts (Ashrafi & Moghissi, 2002).

- **First migration wave - Soviet Invasion- 1979**

The first large-scale exodus of Afghan migrants was the result of the Soviet invasion in 1979, which was followed by approximately ten years of fighting between the Soviet forces and the mujahedeen, prompting regular outflows during that period of time (Stigter, 2006). Geographical proximity, as well as religious, cultural and linguistic affinities, made Pakistan and Iran clear choices for Afghans who fled their country (Ashrafi & Moghissi, 2002). The majority of refugees originated from rural areas who tried to escape bombing and combat (Monsutti, 2006). During 1979 and 1989 about 2.6 million Afghans crossed the border to Iran. At that time, the Iranian government welcomed their Afghan neighbors and handed out "blue

cards" which provided Afghan refugees in Iran access to education, healthcare, food and the permission to do low-wage labor. Afghans in Iran at that time were called *mohajerin* which means "involuntary religious migrant" and it was seen as the duty of Iranian citizens to provide help to their religious "brothers and sisters". Of the 2.6 million Afghans that came to Iran during the Soviet occupation, only 2.5 % lived in refugee camps whereas most Afghans settled in poor neighborhoods around Iranian cities (Abbasi-Shavazi et al, 2005). The Soviet occupation in 1979 triggered also a mass movement of Afghans over the Pakistan border. Over 1.5 million of Afghans are known to have crossed the border to Pakistan between 1979 and 1980. This large number can mainly be explained by the strong cross-border ties among Pashtun tribes in the south and east of Afghanistan that have fled naturally to their tribesman across the border in Pakistan. Most Afghans in these areas also shared their Sunni faith with the majority of Pakistanis across the border. However, also a number of Shia Hazaras followed the routes to Pakistan, which were established decades earlier by labor migrants from Hazarajat to Quetta and Karachi, which both are cities with sizeable Shia populations (UNHCR, 2005). Between 1981 and 1985, another bulge of Afghans arrived in Pakistan, when the Afghan war was very intense and the Afghan countryside was becoming depopulated. Figure 2 shows that between 1980 and 1985 the net migration rate of Afghanistan per 1000 population during the Soviet occupation was as high as -52.1/1000 populations. A third influx of Afghans occurred in Pakistan in 1990, when the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which was followed by a stepped-up mujahedeen drive to oust the government they left behind (UNHCR, 2005). In contrast to Iran, most Afghans in Pakistan lived in refugee camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. These camps became military bases from which the radical Islamist parties, which were opposed to the Soviet occupation, could mount incursions into Afghanistan. These camps were also the reason, why the Pakistan Government received relatively high humanitarian aid by the international community, who wanted to see an Islamist government in Kabul over which it could exercise control, compared to the Iranian government. By the end of the 1980s, there were around three million Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan (Turton & Marsden, 2002). As a result, in 1990, Afghans constituted among the largest group of displaced persons in the world ca. six million, accounting for nearly half of the total under the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The majority of these refugees were from rural areas who tried to escaped bombing and combat (Monsutti, 2006).

Figure 2: Net migration rate per 1,000 populations 1965-2035



Source: United Nations Statistics Division 2008

- **Second migration wave – Taliban regime**

The second major migration wave out of Afghanistan was a consequence of the mujahedeen victory in 1992, when Kabul fell. At this time, especially the urban and educated middle class fled Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan (Stigter, 2006). In contrast to the first migration wave following the Soviet occupation in 1979, the Governments of Pakistan and Iran had begun to harden their attitudes to the continued presence of Afghans in their countries. Already in 1989, with the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan slipped off the agenda of Western foreign policy concerns and donor governments began to lose interest in supporting a large population of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. A voluntary repatriation program in Pakistan was launched in 1990, based upon the "encashment" of refugee ration books, and by 1995 all food rations to refugee camps (or "refugee villages") in Pakistan had been stopped. Iran started in 1992 its first repatriation program with Tripartite[3] Commission, comprising Afghanistan, Iran and the UNHCR. By 1993, Iran issued only temporary registration cards to undocumented or newly arrived Afghans, labeling them as "panahandegan" which granted them a much lower status than it was the case with refugees of the first migration wave in 1979 (Turton & Marsden, 2002). Between 1992 and 1995, over 1.3 million Afghans have returned from Iran to

[3] An agreement is *tripartite* if three parties are involved. The name *tripartit"* provides no indication of what the parties involved have agreed on. In this case, the three parties refer to: Iran, Afghanistan and UNHCR.

Afghanistan voluntarily, with net migration as high as 42.6/1000 populations between 1990 and 1995 (Figure 2/pp.18). However, with the rise of the oppressive Taliban regime starting in 1994, major movements of Afghans to Iran and Pakistan began once again and continued until 2000 (Monsutti, 2006). Between 1991 and 2000 over 300,000 Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan. These events also explain the negative net migration of -3.8/1000 populations in Figure 2. At the same time, the UNHCR changed its policy in Pakistan, and cessation of food aid to Afghan refugees took place, driving many refugees into the cities to look for work (UNHCR, 2005). In 1995, Iran decided to seal its border to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and issued only *laissez-passer*[4] documents for one-way travel out of Iran either for repatriation or for resettlement By the end of the decade, both governments had ceased to grant refugee status, on a prima facie basis, to new arrivals from Afghanistan, the great majority of whom they regarded as economic migrants rather than refugees. In 1998-1999 Iranian authorities had already started to withdraw education and healthcare supplies to Afghan refugees and engaged in campaigns of deporting up to 190,000 undocumented Afghans to their home country (Turton & Marsden, 2002).

- **Third migration wave –end of Taliban regime - 2001**

The last major exodus was the result of U.S. led bombing campaign and the fighting between the Taliban and the coalition forces in 2001. These refugee outflows were marked by regular cross-border movements because of economic, social and political reasons as well as regular return, with a major repatriation operation instance taking place in 1992 and over 1.5 million going back to Afghanistan (Stigter, 2006).

The 9-11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have put Afghanistan back into the international limelight (Turton & Marsden, 2002). However, despite these events the Iranian and Pakistani Government continued to implement policies that discouraged Afghan refugees to stay on in their countries. In example, Iran increased the cost of living for Afghans and implemented policies that prohibited Iranian employers to hire Afghan workers. Pakistan on the other hand closed many refugee camps that hosted thousands of Afghans in border areas. Until today, in Iran and Pakistan deportations continue to take place although to a much larger extent in Iran than in Pakistan (Stigter, 2006).

In 2002 (March/April), UNHCR started its assisted voluntary return program for Afghan migrants in Iran and Pakistan (Lumpp, Shimozawa & Stromberg, 2004). By the end of September 2002, more than 1.5 million had returned from Pakistan and more than 220,000

[4] *Laissez-passer* comes from the French and means: let pass

had returned from Iran (Turton & Marsden, 2002). The numbers of Afghans returning to urban areas (Kabul, Jalalabad, Kunduz) was much higher than anticipated (Lumpp, Shimozawa & Stromberg, 2004). Although the official number of returnees might be accurate, this number refers only to those who received assistance by UNHCR but not of those who repatriated in total and settled down in Afghanistan. The provision of UNHCR assistance to returnees, especially the cash grant to cover transport costs, resulted in an unknown number of "recyclers" signing up for repatriation and then returning to the country of asylum after having collected the assistance package. This was particularly prevalent among returnees from Pakistan, many of whom had relatively short distances to travel back to Afghanistan. The eastern and central provinces of Nangarhar and Kabul were the destination of 60% of those who had returned by the end of August. Furthermore, many of those who returned to these two provinces may actually have been seasonal migrants who had no intention of staying in Afghanistan beyond the summer. Consequently, the real figure of returnees may be much lower than officially recorded by UNHCR (Turton & Marsden, 2002).

Between 2002 and 2005, Afghanistan observed an unexpected large wave of repatriation: with the assistance of UNHCR, 2.7 million refugees returned from Pakistan and more than 800,000 from Iran. During the same period (2002-2005), the number of spontaneous returns[5] (known to UNHCR) amounted to almost 300,000 from Pakistan and about 570,000 from Iran. This level of repatriation shows a degree of confidence in the renascent state, but also reflects expectations created by donor pledges to rebuild the country, and the deterioration of living conditions in the places of refuge (UNHCR, 2008a).

The changes in the Afghan government after 2011 and the worsening economic condition in neighboring countries Iran and Pakistan, have further contributed to a change in attitude towards refugees from Afghanistan. The high numbers of Afghan returnees represented for various stakeholders (i.e. Pakistan, Iran, UNHCR and the donor community) a reduction in the burden of hosting and supporting a large refugee population. However, given the context in which these large return movements took place, it is questionable how sustainable return migration of Afghan refugees is. Moreover, channels of pre-established transnational networks exist between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and are likely to further exist in the future (Monsutti, 2006). In addition, security, and lack of economic opportunities (employment) and social services (health and education) continue to impose considerable

[5] *Spontaneous return* is defined in the IOM (2004) glossary on migration as: "An individual or group who initiate and proceed with their migration plans without any outside assistance. Spontaneous migration is usually caused by push-pull factors and is characterized by the lack of State assistance or any other type of international or national assistance"

barriers to Afghan returnees and their reintegration. This can also be seen in the number of returnees, that after years of exceptionally high returns, have slowly but continuously declined since 2005 (Figure 2/pp.18). At the same time, the volume of migration linked to seasonal labor and trade is growing (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008).

Today, some 1.7 million registered Afghans remain in Pakistan and about one million in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The profile of these Afghans is rather different from those refugees who have returned since the fall of the Taliban regime. The great majority of these individuals remaining in Pakistan and Iran have been in exile for more than 20 years. Furthermore, almost half of the registered Afghan population in Iran and Pakistan was born in exile. After two decades in these countries, the decision to return constitutes a major undertaking. Most returnees depend on their relatives and other social networks for their social and economic reintegration. However, most of the poorer families do not have these resources and thus, depend on the assistance provided by local and international organizations, particularly with regard to water and shelter in their country of origin (UNHCR, 2008a).

PART A: Migration Trends

This part of the migration profile aims at providing an overview of the migration trends in and out of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the characteristics such as age and gender of Afghan migrants in particular countries are highlighted. In order to analyze the size and characteristics adequately, data has been collected on core indicators such as annual immigration flows, net migration volume, stock of refugees, number of return migrants, short term migrants and number of victims of trafficking. Data on non-core indicators include among others numbers of Afghan short-term migrants, migrants nationalized abroad, people with dual citizenship and the projected Afghan population in 2050.

2.1 Migration to Afghanistan

- **Stock of foreign migrants to Afghanistan**

In 1960, the total stock of immigrants in Afghanistan was 46,500 and increased to 57,700 in 1990. In 2005 the number further rose to 86,500 in 2005 and 90,900 in 2010. Between 1960 and 2005, the share of female migrants was constant at 43.6%. Of all immigrants residing in Afghanistan between 2000 and 2002, 4.82% originated from Asia; 0.25% came from Oceania; and 0.20% from Europe. Only 0.17% originated from North America and 0.14% from Africa (UNDP, 2009a).

When talking about immigrant flows to Afghanistan and the total stock of foreigners residing in the country, also military and development staff should to be taken into account. The majority of foreign troops in Afghanistan are under the command of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which as of 4 March 2011 had a total strength of 132,203 individuals (NATO, 2011). There are an additional 36,000 US troops who are not part of ISAF, serving in the east of Afghanistan – on the border with Pakistan – under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (BBC, 2009). In April 2010, the UN published that a total of 1,575 international staff members were working in UN civilian duty stations in Afghanistan, including headquarters, regional commissions, tribunals, field offices and peacekeeping mission (UN, 2010). The number of UN Afghan staff members is much higher around 4,500 (Rubin, 2009).

Trying to find specific information on foreigners residing in Afghanistan by country of destination is difficult to obtain. This is as information is either not available or seen as confidential. Weather this has to do with the increased deteriorating security situation (also or particularly for government organizations and international NGO staff) cannot be said. However, contacting several organizations, the information could be retrieved that a total of 342 German nationals had registered with the German Embassy in Kabul in June, 2011. Due to data privacy the Embassy could not give any further information (Personal Email Contact Germany Embassy – Kabul, 2011).

It should be taken into account that also second generation Afghans, who have been born abroad and “returned” to Afghanistan, can be considered immigrants. This is as they have never lived in the country before and thus, are rather strangers to Afghanistan than “return migrants”. This however, is subject to interpretation and no official numbers exist of Afghan return migrants who have been born abroad. Nonetheless, demographic data on return migrants is available and shows in Table 2 that a majority of migrants who returned to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2009 has been under age 17. Keeping in mind that most

Afghan families left their home country before 2002, a high number of the children aged <11 in Table 2 (ca. 1.9 million) is likely to have been born abroad and thus, can be referred to as (foreign born) immigrants. However, as no data on the length of stay of return migrants in the country of asylum exist, no accurate number on foreign born return migrants/immigrants can be given (UNHCR, 2009a).

Table 2: Age distribution of Afghan returnees 2002-2009 (by sex)

Age	Male	Female	Total
0-4	399,182	388,516	787,698
5-11	588,014	542,446	1,130,460
12-17	307,858	271,554	579,412
18-59	914,124	806,683	1,720,807
60+	78,985	54,813	133,798
Total	2,288,163	2,064,012	4,352,175
Total in %	52%	47%	100%

Source: UNHCR 2009a

- **Annual emigrant flows towards Afghanistan (as reported by sending countries)**

Information on Afghan voluntary[6] and forced return migration to Afghanistan can be found in section 2.5. Data on emigration flows towards Afghanistan (as reported by sending countries) is scarce. This is, among others, as national migration statistics often include only the top destination countries of out-migrants. Furthermore, some countries report emigration flows only toward a particular region such as Asia, Africa or Europe. As a result, it is not clear how high annual emigrant flows towards Afghanistan are. Nonetheless, for some countries information could be retrieved as shown in the following paragraphs.

Netherlands

In the 1990s, the number of Afghan migrants leaving the Netherlands and travelling to Afghanistan has been relatively small, with a total of 31 emigrants migrating from the Netherlands to Afghanistan between 1995 and 2000 (Table 3). After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the number increased, reaching a peak in 2005 with 135 emigrants migrating from the Netherlands to Afghanistan (CBS, 2011). Despite the fact that Afghanistan was represented by a new government in 2002, the increase of people migrating from the Netherlands to Afghanistan since 2002/03 can also be explained by the tripartite agreements on voluntary migration between Afghanistan, UNHCR and the Netherlands in 2003 (Kuschminder & Dora,

[6] voluntary return migration assisted by UNHCR

2009). The decrease of Afghan emigrants from the Netherlands in 2007 and 2008 might be related to the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan since 2005.

Table 3: Emigration from the Netherlands to Afghanistan 1995-2009

1995	**3**	**2003**	**61**
1996	**1**	**2004**	**78**
1997	**10**	**2005**	**135**
1998	**4**	**2006**	**123**
1999	**4**	**2007**	**112**
2000	**9**	**2008**	**117**
2001	**7**	**2009**	**113**
2002	**33**		

Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2011

Australia

The Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship publishes data on out-migrants and their future destination. As can be seen in Table 4, the overall number of departures towards Afghanistan is relatively low with the highest of 36 Australian born individuals moving to Afghanistan in 2009/10. In the same year, a total of 19 overseas- and 11 Afghan born individuals migrated permanently to Afghanistan (Australian Government, 2009/2010).

Table 4: Permanent departures from Australia (by birth place) to Afghanistan (by country of future residence)

Country of birth	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10
Australian born	3	2	12	9	9	9	18	36
Overseas born	8	6	8	7	12	8	16	19
Afghan. Born								11

Source: Australian Government, 2009/2010

2.2 Migration out of Afghanistan

- **Stock of Afghan migrants abroad and time of arrival in the country of destination**

Pakistan

According to UNHCR, most Afghans outside their home country can be found in Pakistan. In 2011, Over 1.7 million Afghans have been registered with UNHCR in Pakistan (UNHCR, 2011b). The actual number of Afghans in Pakistan however, is expected to be much higher. This is among others, due to UNHCR's registration procedures[7] and the number of Afghans who have a Pakistan validity card. Moreover, considering the harshening attitude of the Pakistan Government toward Afghan migrants, many unauthorized Afghans residing in the

[7] As it was precondition to register as a family unit, especially the elderly, children and disabled often could not make it to registration centers (International Crisis Group, 2009)

country are not reporting to official organizations such as UNHCR, since they would be deported if their presence was officially recorded (International Crisis Group, 2009).

The clearest quantitative and qualitative demographic data that exists on Afghans residing in Pakistan is the 2005 census. This census was undertaken in all provinces in Pakistan and registered a total of 3,049,368 Afghans who were residing in Pakistan in 2005. This number included all Afghans who arrived in Pakistan after 1 December 1979. However, any person who produced a Pakistan validity card or obtained a Pakistan Identity Card (NIC) was not covered in the exercise. The data collection of the 2005 census revealed that Afghans in Pakistan were mainly found in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) 61% (1,878,170), Balochistan 25.2% (769,268), Sindh 4.5% (135,734), Punjab 6.8% (45,259), Islamabad 1.5% (45,259) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) 0.4% (13,079). Of these, a total of 48.1% of all Afghans resided in five districts in Pakistan namely: Peshawar (20.1%), Quetta (11.1%), Nowshera (7.6%), Pishin (5.1%) and Karachi (4.3%). The remaining Afghan migrants were spread through the others 120 districts/agencies of Pakistan (Government of Pakistan & UNHCR, 2005).

It should be noted that of all Afghans registered in the 2005 Census, 1.29 million (42.3%) were at that time residing in camps and 1.75 million (57.7%) living outside of camps in urban and rural areas (Government of Pakistan & UNHCR, 2005). Since many refugee camps along the Afghanistan Pakistan border have closed in the last years, the picture of Afghans residing in Pakistan is likely to have changed. Most likely, that many refugees have either repatriated or resettled in the urban areas of Pakistan (IRIN, 2008).

With respect to time of arrival, the largest number of Afghan refugees coming to Pakistan was when the Soviet invasion triggered mass movement over the border in 1979. Table 5 shows, that over one million Afghans sought shelter and security in Pakistan (Government of Pakistan & UNHCR, 2005). After the Soviet invasion, another bulk of Afghans appears in 1985, when the war was very intense and the Afghan countryside was becoming depopulated. A third influx occurred in 1990, when the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was followed by a stepped-up mujahedeen drive to oust the government they left behind. The number of minorities to arrive rose over time, especially in the late 1990s when the Pashtun-dominated Taliban were persecuting other ethnic groups such as the Hazaras (Government of Pakistan & UNHCR, 2005). Until today, large migration flows between Afghanistan and Pakistan exist. However, in contrast to refugee flows during Soviet invasion and the Taliban regime when entire families crossed the border to Pakistan, the current

migration flows mainly consist of single men who cross the border (only temporarily) for economic or social reasons (More on cross border migration see section 2.7).

Table 5: Migrant inflow of Afghans to Pakistan from 1979 to 2005

Year of arrival	IND	IND in %
1979	491,151	16%
1980	1,060,212	35%
1981	164,345	5%
1982	175,202	6%
1983	157,208	5%
1984	84,053	3%
1985	310,040	10%
1986	52,573	2%
1987	57,065	2%
1988	35,588	1%
1989	35,425	1%
1990	78,039	3%
1991	19,769	0.6%
1992	34,048	1.1%
1993	34,124	1.1%
1994	16,398	2%
1995	61,398	2%
1996	23,089	0.8%
1997	31,355	1.0%
1998	30,345	1.0%
1999	26,935	0.9%
2000	21,812	0.7%
2001	14,266	0.5%
2002	10,965	0.4%
2003	9,128	0.3%
2004	9,834	0.3%
2005	4,998	0.2%
Total in 2005	**3,049,268**	**100%**

Source: Government of Pakistan & UNHCR 2005

Iran

In 2011, UNHCR registered over one million Afghans in Iran (1.021.600 in 2010) (UNHCR, 2011c). However, the Iranian Government estimates a further 1.5-2 million illegal Afghans are residing in the country of which 340,000 to 480,000 are expected to live in Tehran province alone. These Afghans are primarily single men originating from areas in Afghanistan were unemployment is high. While most Afghan migrants come to Iran for a short stay of one or two years, many move backwards and forwards between the two countries over longer

periods of time[8] (Koepke, 2011). In contrast to Pakistan, most Afghan refugees who entered Iran in the early 1980s were free to live anywhere and thus, mainly concentrated in the margins of major urban centers rather than refugee camps. This factor is also the reason why registering and obtaining accurate statistics about Afghan refugees in Iran is difficult and time consuming (Ashrafi & Moghissi, 2002). However, according to the Iran 2006 census, a total of 1.2 million of Afghan migrants (by nationality) were living in Iran. Of these Afghans, the majority (72%) resided in urban areas in Iran whereas less than 3% were living in refugee camps. Additionally, one-third of migrants resided in Tehran (32.7%), Khorasan Ravazi (13.3%), Isfahan (11.7%), Sistan & Baluchistan (9.3%), and the rest were living in other provinces spread throughout the country (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011). In 2011, the picture has not changed since the majority of the Afghan population still lives in urban areas among Iranians though in primarily Afghan-dominated neighborhoods (Koepke, 2011).

The largest migration wave of Afghans coming to Iran occurred during the Soviet occupation. A massive influx of 2.9 million Afghans entered Iran between 1980 and 1989. Based on estimates by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the movements of Afghans into Iran increased constantly and reached a peak of three million in 1991. After that, the number has been slowly declining (Abbasi-Shavazi & Glazebrook, 2006). A study by Wickramasekara et al (2006)[9] found that the duration of residence of Afghans in Iran who were born in Afghanistan was 15 years, with over 70% of the study population having been resident in the country for more than 10 years. This may not be representative of the overall Afghan population that currently remains in Iran however; it does indicate that many of the households that were surveyed in the study and who still reside in Iran are long term migrants who have no intention of returning back home in the medium term (Wickramasekara et al, 2006). Of those Afghans who have returned to their home country with the assistance of UNHCR (between April 2002 – February 2006), 58% had lived in Iran for less than 10 years, 20% had lived in Iran for 10-19 years, and 22% had lived in Iran for more than 20 years (Abbasi-Shavazi & Glazebrook, 2006).

Russia & States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries

It is not clear how many Afghans currently reside in Russia however, estimates are as high as 150,000 with the majority of Afghans (30%) living in Moscow alone. The composition of the Afghan diaspora in Moscow is diverse. According to Afghan diaspora statistics, over 100

[8] More on short- and long-term migration in section 2.8

[9] The study by Wickramasekara 2006 covered 1,505 Afghan households = 8,430 individuals

former ministers and governor-generals, 200 army generals, 100 professional journalists, 400 Ph.D.-holders in different fields and several thousands of other minor specialists are residing in the capital of Russia (Kenneth, 2001)

With respect to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries sources indicated that at least 53,000 Afghan workers using Pakistani passports have been hired in the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) in 2010. The Afghan Government (informally) indicates that more than 100,000 Afghan labor migrants are likely to be working in the GCC countries. Most of these Afghans hold (often fake) a Pakistani passport (Overfeld & Zumot, 2010). As in the case of Iran, it is likely that the majority of Afghan workers in the GCC states are young single men who travel for work related reasons between their home country and the GCC states back and forth. However, since no data exist on the length of stay of Afghans in the GCC countries, this statement cannot be proven.

U.S.

In 2006, the American Community Survey registered that 65,972 people from Afghanistan were present in the country. It should be noted that other sources in the U.S. estimate the number of Afghans in the country to be as high as 300,000 (Embassy of Afghanistan Washington D.C., 2006). However, of the 65,972 Afghan registered in the American Community Survey in 2006, the majority (53.2%) entered the U.S. before 1990 and almost equal proportion of 18.5% arrived in between 1990-1999. A total of 18.5% arrived in the U.S. in 2000 or later. The numbers indicate that most Afghans fled to the U.S. during Soviet invasion of 1979 (U.S. Census Bureau 2006). The study by Oeppen (2009)[10], on Afghans living in the San Francisco Bay Area in California, has shown that only 50% of the study sample that had arrived in the U.S., in the time span of 1985-1995, listed Afghanistan as their last place of residence. The interviewees indicated that many fled through Pakistan on their escape route, before continuing their journey to Europe or North America (Oeppen, 2009). In terms of residence, the data available indicates that Afghans are mainly found in the San Francisco Bay Area (40,000), Northern Virginia (20,000) and in other areas such as throughout Southern California (10,000). Smaller communities are also flourishing in New York, Georgia, Oregon, and Texas (Embassy of Afghanistan Washington D.C., 2006). The

[10] The study by Oeppen (2009) explores the Afghan refugee adaptation to life in the Afghan diaspora and how it relates to engagement with the country of origin. The study sample includes 49 Afghans living in the San Francisco Bay Area, California. Of these interviewees 21 were female and 28 male. The sample is not representative of Afghans living in the US, as these Afghans belong to the Afghan elite, which means they are financially stable, highly educated and possess a relative high amount of linguistic and cultural resources.

reasons for Afghans to settle in these areas are manifold. Participants in the study by Oeppen (2009) described that the first Afghan refugees arriving in the U.S. were placed in cities across the country as part of a resettlement work of American charities such. Other Afghan refugees went to areas where they or relatives had been before (as part of study exchange programs between Afghanistan and the U.S.). New York and other areas in Virginia were important locations for Afghans who had been politically engaged in their home country and who wanted to continue to support their political stance in Afghanistan (Oeppen, 2009).

Canada

The Canada 2001 Census reported a total of 25,230 Afghans in the country whereas the most updated census of 2006 counted a total of 48,090 people that were of Afghan ethnic origin. The number of 2006 however includes single and multiple ethnic origin responses. Counting only single ethnic responses the number decreases to 41,590 Afghans living in Canada, in 2006 (Canada Census, 2006). The former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham mentioned that the Afghan diaspora living in Canada might be as large as 80,000 people (Afghanistan News Center, 2003). Despite knowing the exact number of Afghans in Canada, there is consensus that most Afghans are concentrated in the southwestern region of Ontario and the Greater Toronto Area. In the 2001 Census, 13,645 Afghans were reported to be living in Toronto alone. Other significant communities resided in Montreal Que. (2,905),Vancouver BC (2,545), Calgary Alta. (1,275), Ottawa Hull Ont. (1,130), Hamilton Ont., Kitchener Ont., Edmonton Alta. and Guelph Ont. (approx. 400-500) (Canada Census, 2001). In terms of arrival time it can be said that the majority of Afghans came to Canada between 1996 and 2006. Before 1991, a total of 4,165 Afghans were counted, whereas the number increased to 16,315 for the time span 1991-2000. The highest figures of Afghan migrants coming to Canada were registered between 1996-2000 (10,960 individuals) and 2001-2006 (17,845 individuals) (Canada Census, 2006).

Germany

In Europe, the largest Afghan communities can be found in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. According to the data of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, approximately 100,000 Afghan migrants have settled in Germany. This figure includes all people of Afghan origin also those who have gained Germany citizenship during time. However, since the latter category is no longer registered with the Foreign Central Registry (Ausländerzentralregister (AZR)), the official number of Afghans (by nationality) was 48,752 in 2009. Besides citizenship acquisition, the decrease might be due to return

migration and deportation (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009). In 2004, the majority of Afghans in Germany was living in urban areas, more specifically in the area of Hamburg (14,469), Hessen (13,921) and North Rhine-Westphalia (9,414) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006). Figure 3 illustrates that only few Afghans were residing in the Germany before 1979 (mainly students or businessmen) but increasing rapidly after 1979. This first wave of Afghan migrants coming to Germany consisted mainly of members of the educated elite including students and teachers. In 2000, a total of 72,199 Afghan citizens were known to be living in Germany (Baraulina et al, 2007).

Figure 3: The development of the Afghan population in Germany 1967-2004



Source: Baraulina et al, 2007

Table 6 shows that most Afghans in Germany (ca. 48,000) can be considered permanent migrants. In 2009, the medium stay was 10.9 years, with 15.2% of the total Afghan population having stayed in Germany between 10-15 years (Statistisches Bundeasamt, 2009).

Table 6: Length of stay of Afghans in Germany

Total population in thousands	**48,8**
under 1 year	4,1%
1-4 years	3,6%
4-6 years	2,7%
6-8 years	3,9%
8-10 years	7,8%
10-15 years	15,2%
15-20 years	7,8%
20-25 years	2,4%
25-30 years	2,9%
30 years or more	0,2%
Medium stay	10,9 years

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2009

Netherlands

In 2011, the Central Bureau vor de Statistiek reported 40,064 Afghans to be residing in the Netherlands. This number however, includes 31,823 first generation Afghans and 8,241 Afghans from the second generation (Central Bureau for Statistics, 2011). In terms of migration inflow, prior to the early-to-mid 1990s, migration from Afghanistan to the Netherlands was almost nonexistent and information available prior to this time concentrates exclusively on asylum application. Figure 4 shows that larger inflows of migrants in the Netherlands were observed in the mid 1990s when Afghans filing for asylum in the Netherlands started to increase, with the greatest numbers filed in at the end of the 1990s and begin of 2000. (Siegel et al, 2010). As a consequence, the Afghan population in the Netherlands increased steadily until 2003/04. The slowing grow of the Afghan population after this time is likely due to the fall of Taliban in 2001 and the therewith associated high return migration of Afghans toward their home country.

Figure 4: Development of the Afghan population in the Netherlands 1996-



2011

Source: CBS 2011

When it comes to area of residence, the Afghan Diaspora has moved within the Netherlands over time. Whereas in the 1980s most Afghans lived in the Northern provinces, where they resided in asylum accommodation, the geographic dispersion had changed by 2000 when Amsterdam, Rotterdam, den Haag, Arnhem, and Eindhoven reported to accommodate the greatest concentrations of Afghan individuals in the country (Siegel et al, 2010).

UK

There have been several migration waves of Afghans to the UK. The first began in the 1980s, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. It is estimated that the number of Afghans were considerably lower compared to other immigrant communities in the UK at that time. The second wave began in the 1990s after the collapse of the communist regime and the beginning of the civil war. The third wave occurred at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000 when the Taliban regime was strong and eventually collapsed in 2001 (IOM, 2007)

However, in contrast to Germany and the Netherlands, it is difficult to find the exact number of Afghans living in the UK. Updated data is not available yet as the UK government is currently undertaking the 2011 census. The UK Census from 2001 estimated that a total of 14,481 Afghans were living in the country. However, due to a large increase in asylum application and refugees entering the country after 2001, the actual number of Afghans living

in the UK is likely to be much higher. It should also be mentioned that dependents who have been born in refugee camps in Pakistan or in other countries often do not report Afghanistan as their country of birth. In contrary to the Census 2001, a mapping exercise by the IOM in 2006, estimated the Afghan populations at 20,000 in London alone (Change Institute, 2009). Moreover, in 2009 the Office for National Statistics reported that the total number of Afghans in the UK might be as high as 56,000 (Office for National Statistics, 2009). Other sources, (i.e. the Afghan Association in London) put the number of Afghans in the UK around 70,000 in 2010. Considering that between 2006 and 2007 a total of 46,000 births of Afghan individuals in the UK were recorded, the estimate of 70.000 Afghans in the UK may be realistically. However, it should also be noted that the number of Afghan born individuals between 2004 and 2006 has been consistently under 17,000 (Office for National Statistics, 2010a), thus impeaching the credibility of the high fertility rate between 2006 and 2007. Differences may be explained, at least in part, by different recording methods used in the UK after 2006 (Home Office, 2008). Although it is not very clear of how many Afghans actually live in the UK, there is a consensus that London is the city that accommodates most of the Afghan migrants, approximately 70-80% (Figure 5) (Change Institute, 2009). Outside the capital, Afghan populations are relatively small; Birmingham (550), Bradford (150), Coventry (230), Derby, Kent, Leicester, Manchester (150), Northampton, Slugh, Walsall, and Wolverhampton (120) (Change Institute 2009).

Figure 5: Population density of Afghans living in the UK



Source: BBC, 2010

Data on the length of stay of Afghans in the UK is difficult to estimate. However, considering the increase of asylum applications of Afghans in 2001, the Office for National Statistics estimates that a large majority of Afghans living in the UK entered the country after this time, indicating that most Afghans have had a relatively short residence in the UK (Office for National Statistics, 2010). More information on Afghan asylum claims in the UK can be found in section 2.3.

Other Countries

Many other EU countries accommodate large Afghan Diasporas, although to a much smaller extent than Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The international migration database of the OECD shows that the stock of the Afghan born population in 2008 was relatively high in Sweden (11,446), Denmark (9,717) and Norway (7,596). The concept of foreign born population in the OECD database may include persons born abroad who retained the nationality of their country of origin but also second and third generations born in the host country (OECD, 2011). Looking outside Europe, larger communities of Afghans can be found in Australia. According to the Australian 2006 Census, 16,751 Afghan born people were residing in the country (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007). In contrast, the OECD data base publishes a figure of 22,919 Afghan born people to be living in Australia, in 2008 (OECD, 2011). With respect to the Afghan communities in Greece and Turkey (both countries are often only used as transit countries for migrants to enter Europe) estimates of the Afghan community is vague. In both countries however, a larger number of Afghans is expected to reside (mostly irregular migrants), whether these are only short term or long term migrants cannot be said (IOM, 2008c). In 2007 however, the World Bank estimated the number of Afghans residing in Turkey to be as high as 10,164 (World Bank, 2007). The following Table (Table 7) gives an overview of the Afghan Diaspora in a particular country at a specific time and additionally, indicates the percentage of the Afghan Diaspora as a percentage of the population residing at that time in Afghanistan.

Table 7: Stock of Afghan migrants abroad

Country	Total	Year	Source	As a % of population in Afghanistan[11]
Australia	22,919	2008	OECD 2011	0.07%
Ajzerbijan	7,500	2008	IOM (2008d) Migration Profile Ajzerbijan	0.02%
Belgium	794	2007	University of Sussex (DRC Database/Version 2)[12]	0.0%
Canada	48,090	2006	Canada Census 2006	0.2%
Chile	19	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Columbia	1	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Cyprus	5	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Czech Republic	211	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Denmark	9,717	2008	OECD 2011	0.03%
Dominican Republic	3	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Ecuador	22	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Finland	2,154	2008	OECD 2011	0%
France	2,864	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Germany	48,752	2009	Statistisches Bundesamt 2009	0.16%
Greece	290	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Hungary	602	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
India	8,823	2005	World Bank, 2007	0.03%
Iran	1.021,600	2010	UNHCR 2011	3.5%
Ireland	155	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Italy	2,198	2008	OECD 2011*(by nationality)*	0%
Japan	277	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Lithuania	28	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Luxembourg	1	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Mauritania	1	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Mexico	12	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Netherlands	38,664	2010	Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2010	0.13%
New Zealand	2,145	2006	OECD 2011	0%
Nicaragua	24	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Norway	7,596	2008	OECD 2011	0.02%
Pakistan	1.7 mil	2011	UNHCR 2011	5.8%
Peru	7	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Philippines	837	2005	World Bank 2007	0%

[11] *Note:* Estimated resident population in Afghanistan in 2000: 20.536 million, in 2005:24.507 million and in 2010: 29.117 million (UNDP, 2010).

[12] In the global data base of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty (Migration DRC), the data are generated by disaggregating the information on migrant stock in each destination country or economy as given in its census. The reference period is the 2000 round of population censuses. The Migration DRC database extends the basic stock data on international migration that is published by the UN (University of Sussex, 2003).

Poland	140	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Portugal	2	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Russia	100,000 – 150,000	2001	Migration Policy Institute	0.48% –0.73%
Saudi Arabia	15.957	2005	World Bank 2007	0.06%
Slovak Republic	77	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Spain	335	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Sweden	11,446	2008	OECD 2011	0.046%
Switzerland	2,092	2005	World Bank 2007	0%
Tajikistan	20,000	2008-2009	Migration Policy Institute 2006	0.06%
Turkey	10,164	2005	World Bank 2007	0.04%
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)	53,000-100,000	2009	East West Institute 2011	0.18%-0.34%
UK	14,481	2001	UK Census 2001	0.06%
U.S.	65,972	2006	American Community survey 2006	0.26%
Venezuela, RB	9	2005	World Bank 2007	0%

- **Net migration**

The net migration rate indicates the contribution of migration to the overall level of population change[13] (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Looking at the net migration rate of Afghanistan per 1000 population during the Soviet occupation from 1979-1989 (Table 8), it can be seen that a high amount of Afghans people were leaving the country, with a negative net emigration rate at -52.1/1000 population between 1980 and 1985. After withdrawal of Soviet troops many Afghans returned, observing a net positive immigration rate at 42.6/1000 population between 1990 and 1995. However, at times when Taliban was strongest, during 1995 and 2000, more people left Afghanistan than those who returned, showing a negative net emigration rate of -3.8/1000 population. With the fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001 and the implementation of UNHCR's voluntary repatriation scheme, high numbers of Afghans have returned to their home country, showing a positive net immigration for the time span 2000-2005 and 2005-2010 (Table 8). Net migration rate is expected to further decrease to 2.3/1000 population for the time period 2015-2020. In 2020 it is expected that return migration has come to an end and that more people will emigrate rather than immigrate with a

[13] The annual net migration rate is the difference between the number of persons entering and leaving Afghanistan in a specific year per 1,000 persons. An excess of persons entering Afghanistan is referred to as net immigration (i.e. 5 migrants/1000 populations). On the other side, an excess of persons leaving the country is referred to as net emigration (i.e. -8 migrants/1000 populations) (CIA World Factbook, 2011)

negative net migration at -0.1/1000 population in the time period 2020-2030. However, these numbers are projections and should therefore be interpreted with caution.

Table 8: Afghanistan: Net migration rate per 1,000 population 1950-2050

Period	Net migration (per year) both sexes combined(thousands)	Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)
1960-1965	0	0.0
1965-1970	0	0.0
1970-1975	0	0.0
1975-1980	-223	-16.4
1980-1985	-684	-52.1
1985-1990	-291	-23.4
1990-1995	653	42.6
1995-2000	-74	-3.8
2000-2005	161	7.2
2005-2010	200	7.5
2010-2015	172	5.4
2015-2020	86	2.3
2020-2025	-4	-0.1
2025-2030	-4	-0.1
2030-2035	-4	-0.1

Source: United Nation Statistics Division, 2008

2.3 Afghan refugees and asylum seekers

- **In Afghanistan**

As of January 2011, UNHCR reports that the figure of refugees in Afghanistan was at 6,434. At the same time, a total of 30 asylees were known to be in the country (UNHCR, 2011a). The country of origin of these refugees and asylees in not known however, it is likely that they originate from neighbouring countries.

- **Outside Afghanistan**

Between 1994 and 2004, about 238,000 Afghans applied for asylum in Europe. Of these, some 50,000 were seeking refuge in Germany, followed by the Netherlands (15%) and the UK (15%). Other important destinations included Austria (13%), Hungary (6%) and Denmark (5%). Between 2000 and 2004, the UK and Austria were among the top receiving European countries of asylum applications filed by Afghan nationals (Change Institute, 2009). In 2009, over 38,900 Afghans claimed asylum worldwide and over 27,200 Afghans claimed asylum in industrialized countries (mainly European countries, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the Republic of Korea). In the same year, Norway and the UK were the

main destination countries of Afghan asylum-seekers with 3,900 and 3,500 claims respectively registered. In relative terms, Indonesia experienced a high increase in asylum applications, some 80% of applicants in Indonesia originated from Afghanistan. Moreover, the global level of Total Recognition Rate (TRR) for Afghanistan was 50%, which is relatively high (UNHCR, 2010). In 2010, the number of Afghan asylum-seekers in industrialized countries decreased by 9% compared to the previous year. The vast majority (22,939) was registered in Europe of which Germany and Sweden became the new main destination countries for Afghans, with 5,900 and 2,400 claims respectively. According to UNHCR the drop in asylum is, in part, due to tighter immigration controls in destination countries. However, according to UNHCR, Afghanistan still produced 7% of the world's total number of asylum-seekers. Worsening insecurity, poor socio-economic opportunities at home and a growing sense of anxiety about the future of their home country are the main push factors for Afghan asylum-seekers and migrants to seek refugee abroad (UNHCR, 2011d). Figure 6 shows Afghan asylum claims lodged in industrialized countries from 2001 to 2010.

Figure 6: Afghan asylum claims lodged in industrialized countries 2001-2010



Source: UNHCR, 2011d

Pakistan

Due to the fact that Pakistan is until today not a signatory to the UN's 1951 Refugee Convention or its subsequent protocols, Afghans crossing the border to Pakistan after 1979

were not considered as asylum seekers or refugees but rather seen as "involuntary religious migrants". In this regard, it was seen as the duty of Pakistan, who shares long historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan, to provide shelter and security to Afghans fleeing war and persecution in their home country (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2009).

In 1993, the UNHCR started registering the stock of the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan. However, due to complicated registration procedures and fraud, the actual number of refugees residing in Pakistan (each annual year) was likely to be much higher than shown in Table 9. For example in 2001, UNHCR registered over 2.1 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan whereas estimates put the actual number of Afghan refugees residing in the country at 3.3 million (Table 9). From 2003 onwards, UNHCR registered also asylum applications of Afghans which until 2011 have almost decreased by 50%. Since 2007, UNHCR also categorizes people of concern or people in a refugee like situation. This category is descriptive in nature and includes Afghans who are outside their home country and face protection risks similar to those of refugees however, due to practical reasons no refugee status has been ascertained to these individuals (UNHCR, 2011b).

Table 9: Stock of Afghan refugees and asylum applicants in Pakistan 1993-2011 (est.)

Year	Refugee population end of year	Asylum applicants during the year	Pop. Of concern/ people in a refugee like situation
1993	1,467,876		
1994	1,053,000		
1995	1,200,000		
1996	1,200,000		
1997	1,200,000		
1998	1,200,000		
1999	1,200,000		
2000	2,000,000		
2001	2,197,821 (est. 3.3 million)		
2002	1,226,569		
2003	1,123,647	4,992	
2004	1,290,408	2,380	
2005	1,084,208	1,450	
2006	1,044,000	2,100	
2007	888,400	2,500	1,145,800
2008	764,900	2,500	1,015,200
2009	758,600	2,200	981,300
2011 (Jan.)	7,02,000	2,600	1,075,400

Source: UNHCR 1999, UNHCR 2000a, UNHCR 2001, UNHCR2002a, UNHCR 2002b, UNHCR 2003-2004a, UNHCR 2005ab, UNHCR2006a, UNHCR 2007-2009b. UNHCR 2011b

Iran

Although Iran is a signatory of the UN's 1951 Refugee Convention, Afghans coming to Iran after 1979 were, as in the case of Pakistan, considered 'involuntary religious migrants' rather than asylum seekers or refugees. Until today, the Iranian Government mainly refers to Afghans crossing the border as labor migrants. As in the case of Pakistan, UNHCR started registering Afghan refugees in Iran from 1993 onwards. At this time, over 1.8 million Afghan refugees resided in the country (Table 10) (UNHCR, 2000d). Most of these refugees had come to Iran immediately after the Soviet invasion. Also here, the actual number of Afghans in the country is likely to be much higher than UNHCR records show in Table 10. Registering Afghans was made generally difficult, as most Afghans who fled in 1979, did not settle down in refugee camps as it was the case in Pakistan, but rather spread throughout the country and settled down in mainly urban areas. The decrease in number of Afghan refugees from 2002 to 2003 is likely due to UNHCR's voluntary repatriation scheme but also due to Iran's relative strict policies and deportation efforts of Afghan refugees. Data on asylum applications of Afghans in Iran has been registered by UNHCR from 2006 onwards. Whereas the number remains relatively low in 2006 (500 applications) the number is expected to increase to 2000 application by the end of 2011 (UNHCR, 2011c).

Table 10: Afghan refugees in Iran from 1993 to 2011

Year	**Refugees population end of mid-year**	Asylum applicants during the year
1993	1,850,000	
1994	1,623,331	
1995	1,429,038	
1996	1,414,659	
1997	1,411,759	
1998	1,400,722	
1999	1,325,724	
2000	1,482,000	
2001	1,482,000	
2002	1,104,909	
2003	834,699	
2004	952,802	
2005	920,248	
2006	914,300	500
2007	906,100	1,000
2008	935,600	1,600
2009	1,022,500	1,700
2010 (March)	1,021,600	
2011 (Jan.)	1,022,5000	2000

Source: UNHCR 2000d, UNHCR 2002c, UNHCR2003b, UNHCR 2004b , UNHCR 2005c, UNHCR 2006b, UNHCR 2007-2008c, UNHCR 2011c

Russia

Afghans constitute the largest number of asylum seekers in Russia. Most Afghans entered Russia in the 1980s, when those associated with the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan left the country to escape the hostile new government. With rise of the Taliban in the 1990s, the number of Afghan asylum seekers increased. Current migration flows to Russia largely reflect the political instability and human rights violations in Afghans are facing in their home country (UNHCR, 2007e). As in the case of Turkey, Russia is often used as a transit country for Afghan migrants to reach Western Europe (Kenneth, 2001). Table 11 shows that the Afghan population with granted refugee and asylum status in the country is relatively low, with the highest number of refugees and asylees in 2010 and 1998. The figures do fluctuate erratically, for example when the number of Afghan asylees increased sharply from 240 to 2,100 in 2006 and 2007 respectively. One year later, the number of Afghan asylees dropped to 800 (UNHCR, 2006-2010). Due to lack of information it cannot be said whether this is due to different recording methods or actual increasing/decreasing migration flows of Afghan asylum seekers.

Since 1992, the Russian Federation has been a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The implementation of this commitment however, shows severe shortcomings. This is, as asylum seekers often face long waiting times when applications are being processed. Furthermore, asylum seekers have to deal with relatively high administrative fees and a lack of official documents that would protect against forced repatriation. Moreover, Afghans who entered Russia through neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are often blocked from refugee determination procedures under the 'safe third country rule' meaning; that they could have found refuge in the first country they entered from Afghanistan (UNHCR, 2007e).

Table 11: Afghan refugees and asylum in Russia 1996-2011

	1996	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Refugees	121	234	376	513	512	491	1,493	1,541
Asylees	4,592	1,184	3,447	1,458	1,088	1,300	618	500

	2004	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**
Refugees	1,488	1,294	1,200	1,300	2,400	2,100	2,500	1,500
Asylees	638	674	240	2,100	800	600	1,300	1,000

Source: UNHCR 2005e, UNHCR 2006-2010, UNHCR 2011e

In contrast to millions of Afghans who have returned to their home country since the fall of the Taliban, only 548 Afghans have returned home from Russia. Reasons are among others

that some Afghans who supported the Soviet-backed regime would be in danger if they would return. In addition, many Afghans have lost contact with relatives and now lack the necessary social support network. Those who were born or educated in the Soviet Union adapted to the new western life style and thus, know little of the Afghan culture and traditions. As a consequence, many are unable to return to Afghanistan and simultaneously denied refugee status in Russia. In this context, many Afghan asylum seekers see resettlement as their only hope. Between 2000 and 2006, more than 2,000 Afghans were resettled from Russia– mainly to Canada and the United States. However, it should be noted that resettlement countries normally do not accept former members of law enforcement bodies (UNHCR, 2007e). The topic of integration and second generation Afghans is further analyzed in Part C section 4.3.

Tajikistan

In 2006, estimates of Afghans in Tajikistan were as high as 20,000 (Migration Policy Institute, 2006). In 1994, Tajikistan passed its first refugee law which was in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol. During this time, however, very few Afghans asylum seekers were in the country (Table 12). In the begin of 2000, when armed conflict in Afghanistan increased over 100,000 Afghans were displaced in the Kunduz Province. Of these many tried to flee to the mountainous Tajik area near the Afghan border. It is known that over 10,000 Afghans tried to seek refuge in Tajikistan. However, these Afghans were denied access denied access by Russian military forces that patrolled the area because of regional instability. As a consequence, over ten thousand Afghans were stranded on two sand bars in the Pyandzh River between military forces on the Tajik border and the Taliban on the Afghan border (Table 12).

In 2002, Tajikistan passed a new refugees law (replacing the 1994 law) which did not comply with the 1951 UN Convention. The new law prohibits the free movements of refugees within Tajikistan. Whereas it was mainly ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks from the north of Afghanistan who sought refuge in Tajikistan in the past, the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan forces more Afghans from provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar and Kabul to flee to Tajikistan. Although no data were published on Afghan refugees in Tajikistan for the year 2004, it was estimated there were approximately 2,500 refugees in the country (Table 12). According to UNHCR, 1,500 of these refugees were planned to be permanently resettled in Canada (1,250 refugees) and the United States (250) by early 2006. In 2008, over 1,300 Afghans were seeking asylum in Tajikistan. This number had almost doubled in the first five

months of 2009. Reasons for the new influx were among others the new attacks and fights over the border in Pakistan (BBC, 2009).

Table 12: Afghan refugee population in Tajikistan

Year	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	20001	20002	2004	2005	2008
Total nr. refugees	695	620	1161	2164	3622	4531	15354*	15336*	3427	2500	1,018	1,300

**Includes those Afghans trapped in the Pyandzh River*

Source: Migration Policy Institute 2006 & BBC 2009

Canada

Available data Afghan refugees in Canada shows, that refugee population steadily increased between 1995 and 2004, with over 15,000 Afghan refugees residing in Canada by the end of 2004 (Table 13). In terms of new applications, the largest inflow of Afghan asylum seekers occurred during the Taliban regime in 1999, with 511 Afghan asylees entering the country. The number decreased to 151 Afghan asylum seekers in 2003 and increased again to 488 in 2008 (OECD, 2011). This decrease in asylum application after 2001 can be explained with high return migration rates of Afghans after fall of the Taliban. The increase of Afghan asylees is likely due to the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. Table 13 gives an overview of Afghan asylum seekers and total stock of refugees in Canada.

Table 13: Afghan asylum seekers and refugee population in Canada

Year	**Inflow of new asylum seekers**	**Stock of refugees**
1995		4,575
1996		5,056
1997		6,046
1998		6,754
1999	511	7,922
2000	488	9,115
2001	463	11,374
2002	204	12,957
2003	151	14,616
2004	154	15,242
2005	264	15,535
2006	268	
2007	308	
2008	488	

Source: UNHCR 2004c, OECD 2011

U.S.

Between 1999 and 2009, Afghan refugee arrival in the U.S. was highest with 2,930 in 2001 (Table 14). The number decreased steadily to 349 new refugee arrivals in 2009 (Homeland Security, 2009). However, to estimate the stock of Afghan refugees in the country before 1999, it is relevant to look at data on Afghan refugees and asylees granted lawful U.S. permanent residence status. As can be seen in the third and forth column of Table 14, between 1981-1990 over 22,946 refugees and asylees were granted a permanent residence status. The figures indicate that a large part of Afghan refugees arrived in the U.S. shortly after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979 (Homeland Security, 2010).

Table 14: Afghan refugees and asylees in the U.S.

Year	**Afghan refugee arrivals in the U.S.** (by nationality)	**Time-span**	**Refugees and asylees granted lawful U.S. permanent residence** (by country of birth)
1999	365	**1971-1980**	542
2000	1,709	**1981-1990**	22,946
2001	2,930	**1991-2000**	9,725
2002	1,683	**2002**	1,004
2003	1,453	**2003**	716
2004	959		
2005	902		
2006	651		
2007	441		
2008	567		
2009	349		

Source: U.S.: Homeland Security 2010

Germany

In 1995, the total number of asylum application in Germany was 127,937 of which 5.9% were made by Afghanistan nationals. In 2000 and 2005 the figure decreased to 78,564 and 28,914 of which 6.8% and 2.5% were made by Afghans nationals, respectively. In 2009 the total amount of asylum applications in Germany remained relatively low with 27,649 claims however, Afghans made up 12.2% of the total thus, ranking second just behind Iraq who made up 23.6% of all applications (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009). In 2010, the number of Afghans claiming asylum in Germany were even higher than at in beginning of 2000, with over 5,900 applications. Table 15 shows that during the Taliban regime asylum application in Germany were relatively high and decreased rapidly after international forces started to

invade the country. However, due to the worsening security situation in Afghanistna, asylum applications have increased again in 2009 and 2010 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010).

Table 15: Number of Afghan asylum applications in Germany from 1995 to 2009 (1st application)

1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
7,515	5,663	4,735	3,768	4,458	5,380	5,837	2,772

2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
1,473	918	711	531	338	657	3,375	5,905

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2009, Statistisches Bundesamt 2010

Netherlands

According to the Centraal Bureau voor de Statiestik (CBS; Central Bureau for Statistics), applications of Afghans filing for asylum in the Netherlands stood at place 10 in 1980; this number remained relatively steady until 1985, when the number jumped to 140. The following year over 450 Afghan nationals filed asylum application in the Netherlands (Siegel et al, 2010). Throughout the 1990s the number of Afghan asylum application in the Netherlands continued to increase, with the greatest numbers field in 1998 (7,120), 1999 (4,400), and 2000 (5,030). Much lower asylum claims have been recorded when return migration to Afghanistan was high, with 490 and 520 claims in 2003 and 2007 respectively (Leun van der, 2008). It may be important to note that prior to 2007, first and subsequent requests for asylum were not distinguished. However, Table 16 shows that in 2009 the number of total asylum requests increased from 700 (2008) to 1400 asylum applications in 2009. A total of 1,590 asylum applications were recorded in 2010 (Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2011).

Table 16: Number of Asylum requests from Afghanistan citizens in the Netherlands

2007	**520**
2008	**700**
2009	**1,400**
2010	**1,590**
2011(1st quarter)	**440**
2011 (2nd quarter)	**590**

Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2011

UK

Since the beginning of 2000, Afghan asylum applications in the UK have been high (Change Institute, 2009). Figure 7 shows that the highest number of asylum application filed by

Afghan asylum seekers took place in 2001 with almost 9,000 applications (8,920). The peak in 2001 relates to the invasion of Afghanistan by international forces. Between 2001 and 2004 the number of asylum claims by Afghan nationals fell by 80% (Change Institute, 2009). In 2005, asylum application by Afghans was at 1,775 and increased to 2,660 in the following year (OECD, 2011). As a result, Afghanistan was among the top ten nationalities applying for asylum in the UK, making 10% of the total in 2006 (Change Institute, 2009). In 2008, the number of Afghans claiming asylum further increased to 3,725 and 3,540 in 2009 (OECD, 2011).

Figure 7: Annual number of asylum applications to the UK from Afghanistan 1988-2009



Source: Data from 1988-1998: Change Institute 2009; data from 1999-2009 OECD, 2011

Australia

In 2001, Australia recorded a total of 2,100 Afghan asylees in the country. Due to the fall of the Taliban and high return migration, the number dropped to 53 in 2002. Also in the following years, the number of Afghan asylum seekers in Australia remained relatively low. In 2009 however, the number began to rise again reaching over 940. In 2011, Chris Brown, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship in Australia mentioned, that since 2008, over 4,300

Afghans had arrived in the country by boat and claimed asylum. Over half of these were in detention and of those 732 had received a negative assessment (Pearce, 2011). In contrast to other countries, most Afghans who come to Australia arrive by boat. The majority of these arrivals are non-Pashtun young men, who were driven from their homes and families by concerted pressure applied by the Taliban, acting in concert with people smuggling networks and elements of the Pakistani state. The migration route for Afghans to Australia is difficult and dangerous. Many Afghans were first getting trucked to Karachi, flown to Indonesia, and then transported by boat to Australian islands and reefs close to the Indonesian archipelago (Maley, 2000). The subject of migration routes and the therewith associated risks is picked up again in section 3.3.

Table 17 gives an overview of the inflow of Afghan asylum seekers in selected OECD countries.

Table 17: Inflows of Afghan asylum seekers in OECD countries (by nationality)

Country	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Australia		1,326	2,161	53	54	116	32	21	20	52	940
Austria		4,205	12,955	6,651	2,357	757	923	699	761	1,382	2,237
Belgium		861	504	326	329	287	253	365	696	879	1,659
Canada		488	463	204	151	152	264	268	308	488	445
Chile	0	0	5	2	12	1	0	0	0	0	
Czech Republic		1,121	356	27	50	15	7	1	20	36	4
Denmark	534	3,732	3,749	1,186	664	285	173	122	138	418	1,049
Estonia		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
Finland	24	31	25	27	51	166	237	97	96	249	445
France	167	244	270	260	353	164	135	82	184	263	688
Germany	4,458	5,380	5,837	2,772	1,473	918	711	531	338	657	3,375
Greece	116	446	1,459	1,238	561	382	458	1,087	1,556	2,287	1,510
Hungary	2238	2185	4311	2348	469	38	22	13	35	116	1,194
Ireland	13	7	27	7	24	106	142	88	78	79	68
Italy	99	524	299	137	70	84	76	177	663	1732	711
Japan	35	21	78	6	3	0	2	3	12	4	5
Korea	..	..	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	8
Luxembourg	6	14	9	0	2	6	3	8	3	4	13
Mexico		5	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	4400	5055	3614	1067	492	688	902	932	143	395	1281
New Zealand	0	0	17	4	4	0	1	0	3	2	2
Norway	172	326	603	786	2050	1059	466	224	234	1363	3,871
Poland	555	299	415	595	251	57	6	11	9	4	14
Portugal	4	19	7	0	0	0	0	0	7	1	0
Slovak Republic	654	624	4315	1669	627	393	109	41	67	72	51
Slovenia		247	66	7	2	5	6	2	12	10	11
Spain	28	43	73	18	12	14	10	7	15	50	42

Sweden	351	374	593	527	811	903	435	594	609	784	1,694
Switzerland	363	433	530	237	218	207	238	233	307	405	751
Turkey	133	81	431	47	77	341	364	261	705	2642	1,009
UK	3975	5555	8920	8065	2590	1605	1775	2660	2815	3725	3,540
United States	232	218	274	141	52	72	45	66	91	79	101

Source: OECD, 2011

2.4 Characteristics of Afghans abroad

Pakistan

In 2005 over 3 million Afghans resided in Pakistan. Of these, 51% were males and 49% females. Assuming an annual 3% growth rate, the findings of the 2005 Census provide a realistic image of the Afghan population in Pakistan over the last two decades. The number of Afghan families in the country was 548,105 with an average family size of 5.6 members per family unit. Regarding age, a total of 592,740 were under five years and over 2.4 million individuals were five years or older. This means, that a total of 19.4% of all Afghans residing in the country were children under the age of five years. This figure indicates that a high proportion of Afghans population has been born abroad. For other age groups the figures look as follows: In the 0-4 age range a total of 475,186 (15.6%) individuals were counted. In the 5-17 age range a total of 1,237,851 (40.6%) were present and in the age range 18-59 a total of 1,230,582 (40.4%) were registered. Over 105,000 (3.5%) fell in the oldest age group 60 and over. In every age group men outnumbered females (Government of Pakistan & UNHCR, 2005). With regard to ethnicity; Pashtuns formed the overwhelming majority of Afghans in all areas of Pakistan with 81.5% in 2005. The total numbers in 2005 looked as follows: Pashtuns (2,485,120), Tajik (221,725), Uzbek (71,526, Hazara (39,454), Turkmen (60,733), Baloch (52,009), other (118,701) (Government of Pakistan & UNHCR, 2005). It should be noted, that at the time when the Census was held, the majority of Afghans (83% which equals 2,517,558) had no intention to return back to Afghanistan while only 17.4% of Afghans responded that they wanted to return to their home country in 2005. Main reasons for not intending to return to Afghanistan were, among others, the lack of shelter and livelihood in the home country. Also the lack of security in Afghanistan was mentioned, although to a much lesser extent (Government of Pakistan & UNHCR, 2005). Given the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan since the mid 2000s, the reasons for not returning to Afghanistan may have changed again.

Iran

In 2005, the total number of registered Afghans living in Iran was, according to Iranian statistics (Amayesh census[14]), a little over one million (1,021,323). Of these, 54.7% were males and 45.3% females (Abbasi-Shavazi et al, 2009). In terms of ethnicity, data collected

[14] Amayesh is a census, to identify Afghans in Iran, which is periodically held by the Ministry of Interior

by BAFIA[15] indicate that the majority of Afghans living in Iran were ethnic Shia Hazara (40.47%) Sunni Tajik (22.07%), Sunni Pashtuns (8.8%), Sunni Baluch (3.1%) and Sunni Uzbek (2.5%) (Koepke, 2011). A study by UNHCR and ILO in 2006 confirms this ethnic composition and adds that the average household size of Afghan families in Iran was 5.6 persons which is higher than the average for Iran with 4.1 persons (Wickramasekara et al, 2006). This relative high number of household size indicates that Afghans in Iran have a high fertility rate (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011), which consequently leads to a relativly young population of Afghans in Iran. The median age of Afghans in Iran is 17.6 for the female population and 17.4 for the male population. Figure 8 shows the age distribution of the Afghan (III) and Iranian population (I) in 2005 and illustrates how the Afghan population has adapted to the living conditions in Iran (II) thereby, converging to a similar age structure as shown by the Iranian population (Wickramasekara et al, 2006).

Figure 8: Age Pyramids of the Iranian Population in 2005 (I), Afghans in Iran (II) and the Afghan Population in 2005 (III)



Source: Wickramasekara et al 2006

The study by UNHCR and ILO also revealed that 40% of the surveyed households were in the age range of 0-14 and 58% are in the 15-64 age range. This indicates, that more than half (53%) of the sampled Afghan population was born in Iran and hence, can be considered second generation (Wickramasekara et al, 2006). Comparing the results of the Afghan survey done by ILO & UNHCR, the Amayesh data and the population census of 1995 (Table 18) it can be seen that the findings are relatively similar. Exception however is the first age group,

[15] BAFIA stands for: Iran's Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs

where the Amayesh data of 2005 varies significantly from the other two surveys. This difference may be due to a different sample procedure.

Table 18: Age structure of Afghan refugees in Iran

Age group	Afghan survey by ILO & UNHCR (2005)	BAFIA – Amayesh data (2005)	Population census (1995)
0-4	11.30%	3.70%	10.30%
5-17	37.00%	42.21%	37.00%
18-59	47.90%	50.98%	50.40%
60+	3.380%	3.08%	2.30%
Total	8,430	743,856	60.055,000

Source: Wickramasekara et al, 2006

U.S.

Of the estimated 65,972 Afghans living in the US in 2006, 49.2% were males and 50.8% females. In contrast to Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan the median age of Afghans in the U.S. is much higher and lies at 29.7 years (The U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). Table 19 shows that of the 65,972 Afghans counted in 2006 a total of 5,409 individuals were under five years of age. A total of 15,305 individuals fell into the 5-17 age group and 18,560 individuals were between 18 and 34 years of age. The majority however, was found in the age group of 35-64 with a total of 23,142 individuals. Those Afghans who belonged to the oldest age group (65 or over) made up a total of 3,512 individuals. Overall, 44,384 were foreign born whereas 21,588 were native born, meaning the latter one can be considered as second generation. The ethnic composition and religious affiliations of the Afghan population in the U.S. is diverse. Pashtun and Tajik ethnicities are among the majority alongside minority communities such as Uzbeks, Hazaras, Afghan Jews and Afghan Hindus (Afghan Embassy in Washington D.C., 2006).

Table 19: Afghans in the U.S. by age group in 2006

Under 5 Years	5,409
5 – 17 years	15,305
18 to 34 years	18,560
35 to 64 years	23,142
65 years and over	3,512
Median age	29.7
Total	65,972

Source: US Census 2006

Canada

Of the 48,090 Afghans that were counted in the 2006 Census, 24,255 were males and 23,835 females (Canada Census, 2006). Some of these individuals however belong to the second and some even to the third generation. Table 20 shows the age distribution of Afghans in Canada by first, second and third generation. As in the case of the U.S., the majority of Afghans living in Canada is relatively young, with the majority falling in the age rage 15-34 (Canada Census, 2006).

Table 20: Age-distribution of Afghan 1st, 2nd and 3rd generation in Canada 2006

Age-group	Total Generation status	1st generation	2nd generation	3rd generation or more
15-24	10,540	9,650	725	75
15-34	7,865	7,690	160	20
35-44	6,660	6,505	90	65
45-54	4,790	4,730	25	50
55-64	2,195	2,175	20	0
65-74	880	870	0	0
75- over	395	380	15	10

Source: Canada Census 2006

With regard to migrants' age and time of arrival in Canada, the 2006 Census reveals that a total of 3,575 Afghans have been under five years when arriving in Canada. Over 9,600 were between 5-14 years and over 8,900 between 15-24 years. Those who came to Canada between the ages of 25 and 44 years made up 11,960 individuals whereas 4,180 individuals belonged to the oldest category 45 years and over. This shows that the majority of Afghans arriving in Canada has been relatively young, between 5 and 24 years (Canada Census, 2006).

Germany

In December 2004, according to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, a total of 57,933 Afghan citizens lived in Germany. Of these, a total of 50,457 were born abroad and 7,476 were born in Germany. Whereas in 2001, 39,766 males and 31,896 females were present the number decreased to 38,193 males and 30,823 females in 2002. One year later, a total of 36,179 males and 29,651 females were registered. In 2004, the number had further decreased to 31,321 males and 26,612 females. While all age groups are represented, 60% of all Afghans living in Germany were under the age of 30 in 2004. The demographic data on Afghan citizens in Germany looks as shown in Figure 9. The data only relates to those with Afghan citizenship (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006).

Figure 9: Afghan Citizens in Germany by Age Group in 2004



Source: Baraulina et al, 2007

Netherlands

In 2011, the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek reported that a total of 40,064 Afghans were living in the Netherlands. Of the total, 21,482 were males and 18,582 females (Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2011). The Afghan population in the Netherlands is relatively young: In 2003, the majority (90%) of Afghans in the Netherlands was under age 44 and more than half (55%) was under 25 years of age. Sources indicate that around 30% of all children with Afghan background were born in the Netherlands (Siegel et al, 2010). According to the Central Bureau voor de Statiestiek in 2011, the age distribution among male and female Afghans in the Netherlands from 1996 to 2010 looks as shown in Table 21.

Table 21: Afghans in the Netherlands by age range from 1996 to 2010

Year	Total ages	0-20	20 to 65	65 years or older
1996	4,916	2,303	2,543	70
1998	11,551	5,476	5,911	164
2000	21,468	10,166	10,963	339
2002	31,167	14,379	16,285	503
2004	36,043	16,187	19,173	683
2006	37,246	16,237	20,213	196
2008	37,370	15,481	20,996	893
2010	38,664	14,937	22,696	1,031

Source: Central Brueau for Statistics, 2011

UK

In 2009, the Afghan population in the UK comprised over 35,000 (est.) males and 20,000 (est.) females. This relative high share of males in the Afghan Diaspora in the UK is also confirmed by other studies. Especially in the London area many young Afghan men are known to be residing (Oeppen, 2009). It is estimated that the majority of Afghan born residents in the UK falls in the age range 30-34 years. Figures for other age ranges do not exist or are relatively unreliable due to lack of data and relatively small sample sizes. However, the Migration Statistics Unit in the UK (2010) estimated that the age distribution of Afghans living in the UK is likely to look as shown in Figure 10. It can be seen that the majority of Afghans is in their working age, between 16 and 44 years (Jones, 2010).

Figure 11: Age groups of Afghan born nationals in the UK



Source: Jones, 2010

Most Afghans in the UK speak Pashto and Dari (Minority Rights Group International, 2009). According to the respondents of the study undertaken by the Change Institute in 2009[16], the majority of Afghans were Pashtun, followed by smaller numbers of Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara. However, it is also likely that many other smaller ethnic groups are present in the country (i.e. Turkmen) (Change Institute, 2009).

[16] Study by Change Institute (2009) on Muslim/Afghan communities in the UK included (among others) 12 Afghan participants. Of these, five were women and seven were men. Their occupations included Refugee Community Organization (RCO) managers/coordinators (7), student (2), interpreter, journalist and writer. Three were in the age range 20-29 years, four in the range 30-39, four in the range 40-49 and one was over 60 years old.

2.5 Return migration

While Afghanistan's population was dispersed among 72 different countries the majority (96%) of these displaced Afghans resided in Pakistan and Iran (UNHCR, 2007a). Since 2002, more than 5.6 million Afghans (20% of Afghanistan's total population) are known to have returned to their home country with the assistance of UNHCR[17] (AREU, 2008a). It should be noted that many other organizations, including IOM, have likewise facilitated the voluntary return of Afghan migrants, although to a much smaller extent. In total IOM assisted 7,600 Afghans worldwide with their return to Afghanistan, of whom 2,500 received individually tailored reintegration assistance packages (IOM, 2011). Sources indicate that the number of Afghans returning from Pakistan has almost doubled from 2009 to 2010. Whereas a total of 54,000 Afghans had returned from Pakistan by end of 2009, the number was at 104,000 for the time-span March-October, 2010. Returnees cited economic factors and the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan as the main reason to return. In 2010, Pakistan had been hit by an ongoing militant insurgency and experienced the worst flood in history (UNHCR, 2011a). As in the case of Pakistan, the number of Afghans returning from Iran has increased in 2010. Despite the worsening situation in Afghanistan, Afghan refugees in Iran can no longer afford to live in the country. This is, as the Iranian government has started to cut off subsides for food, fuel and other commodities for Iranian and Afghan families alike. Thus, Afghan refugees are lining up at the Dagharoun border point in Iran in order to return back to their home country (UNHCR, 2011c). Table 22 gives an overview of the number of Afghans who returned with the help of UNHCR in the time span 2002-January 2009 (UNHCR, 2009a).

Table 22: Afghan Return Refugees received assistance from UNHCR since the beginning of 2002 till end of January 2009

Overview	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**Total**
Pakistan	1,565,066	332,183	383,321	449,391	133,338	357,635	274,200	0	3,495,134
Iran	259,792	142,280	277,151	63,559	5,264	7,054	3,656	80	858,836
Other	9,679	1,176	650	1,140	1202	721	628	42	15,238
Total	1,834,537	457,639	761,122	514,090	139,804	365,410	278,484	122	4,369,208

Source: UNHCR 2009a

Of the 4,369,208 Afghans that have returned with UNHCR's voluntary repatriation program between 2002 and 2009, 52% were males and 47% females. The following table (Table 23) shows the percentage of male and females who have returned, and indicates that the balance is

[17] UNHCR repatriation assistance package for Afghan refugees in 2002 included among others: a cash grant of US$100, six bags of wheat and a plastic sheet. In 2011 UNHCR has increased its cash grant by 50% to an average of US$150/per person depending on traveling distance to their destination.

dominated by male in all age ranges. A total of 224,151 more males than females have returned between 2002-begin 2009 (UNHCR, 2009a).

Table 23: Returned males and females with UNHCR – since Mar 02 – end Jan 09

Age-group	Male	Female	Total
0-4	9.1 %	8.9%	25%
5-11	13%	12%	18%
12-17	7%	6%	39%
18-59	21%	18%	3%
60+	2%	1%	0%
Total	2,288,163 (52%)	2,064,012 (47%)	4,369,208 (100%)

Source: UNHCR 2009

Pakistan (Place of residence during exile)

Table 24 shows that the majority of Afghan returnees from Pakistan had mainly settled down in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (59%), Punjab (17%) and Balochistan (15%). This is not surprising, considering the close distance of these provinces to Afghanistan and the high numbers of refugee camps (over 150) that had been built up at the Afghan-Pakistan border in the North-West Frontier Province at the end of 2001 (Appendix 1). Overall, 49% females (1,717,015) and 51% males (1,779,119) have returned from Pakistan with UNHCR in the time span 2002 to 2008 (UNHCR, 2009a).

Table 24: Assisted Return by Province of Asylum: Pakistan
Departure date: Pakistan: 03 Mar 02-31 Oct 08

Province	Families	Males	Females	Individuals
Balochistan	92,608	273,162	262,462	15%
Punjab	106,559	310,116	292,214	17%
Jammu & Kashmir	1,247	3,649	3,428	0%
N.W.F.P.	355,607	1,039,218	1,018,020	59%
Sind	55,027	152,151	139,156	8%
Unknow	232	823	735	0%
Total	611,280	1,779,119	1,717,015	100%

Source: UNHCR 2009a

Iran

With respect to place of residence of Afghan returnees during their exile in Iran (between 2002 and 2009), over 50% had settled down in the provinces of Tehran (36%), Sistan and Baluchistan (SVB) (17%) and Esfahan (10%). Other provinces relative high in returnees

include Fars, Kerman, Khorasan, Qom and Hormozgan. Overall, more males (59%) than females returned home (41%) (UNHCR, 2009a).

Table 25: Afghan returned refugees from Iran (by province and gender)
Departure Date: Iran 09 Apr 02-31 Jan 09

Province (Iran)	Individuals	Individuals in %	Families	Males	Females
AS	166	0%	33	93	73
Bushehr	5,796	1%	759	3,937	1,859
Esfahan	87,108	10%	12.971	55,888	31,220
Fars	61,599	7%	8,943	40,464	21,135
Gilan	1,032	0%	180	630	402
Golestan	11,265	1%	2,031	5,892	5,373
Hamadan	75	0%	17	43	32
Hormozgan	21,989	3%	3,775	11,714	10,275
Kerman	48,035	6%	8,048	28,186	19,849
Khorasan	61,838	7%	12,166	35,639	26,199
Khuzestan	8,440	1%	1,339	5,082	3,358
KvB	894	0%	164	524	370
Lorestan	98	0%	19	57	41
Markazi	13,493	2%	2,290	8,067	5,426
Mazandaran	5,296	1%	927	2,988	2,308
Qazvin	7,263	1%	1,253	4,184	3,079
Qom	31,334	4%	5,909	17,780	13,554
Semnan	7,566	1%	1,354	4,336	3,230
SvB	145,533	17%	26,774	75,877	69,656
Tehran	311,526	36%	49,066	190,973	120,553
Yazd	26,182	3%	3,805	16,552	9,630
Unknown	2,308	0%	402	1,176	1,132
Total	**858,836**	**100%**	**142,225**	**510,082**	**348,754**

Source: UNHCR, 2009a

The following table (Table 26) gives an overview of UNHCR assisted Afghan returnees by country of asylum. Empty fields indicate that either no data was collected on Afghan return migrants or the data was not accessible for a particular year. The value 0 represents when no Afghan migrants have returned home (UNHCR, 2009a).

Table 26: Assisted Return with UNHCR by Country of Asylum: All countries 2002-2009

Country of Asylum	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Pakistan	1,565,066	332,183	383,321	449,391	133,338	357,635	274,200		3,495,134
Iran	259,792	142,380	377,151	63,559	5,264	7,054	3,656	80	858,836
Tajikistan	9,064	324	65	18	51	27	15		9,564
Great Britain		88	19	354	532	387	347	40	1,758
India	129	223	77	58	68	25	7		587
Turkmenistan	283	45	169	9		1	3		510
Germany			5	197	172	46	32		452
Netherlands			7	206	162	25	14		414
Russia		165	139	24	12	49	31		420
Uzbekistan		142	69				21		325
Greece				11	69	39	56		175
Norway				28	47	28	12	2	117
Kyrgyzstsan	68	16		2	6	9	13		114
Azerbaijan	19	44	3	22	1		0		89
Kazakstan		25	19	22	11		0		77
Denmark				65	5	4	1		75
Ukraine	1	41	7	7	6	6	1		70
Belarus		13	24		15	12	0		64
Austria			12	25	22	2	8		69
France	20	15		7	4	4	2		52
Indonesia			1	4	5	13	24		47
Belgium				11	6	6	15		38
Brazil		13		1			0		14
Sweden				6		11	19		36
Swaziland			1	6	4	1	0		12
Australia			4	4		4	1		13
Georgia	2			9			0		11
Turkey				1	10		0		11
Finland				1	2	6	0		9

Swiss				7		0	0		7
Bulgaria		7					9		7
Mexico		1	6				0		7
Syria		7					0		7
Malaysia		5				1	0		6
Switzerland						8	4		12
Italy				2		1	2		5
USA				3			0		3
Hungary							3		3
Cambodia		2					0		2
Iraq					1		0		1
Poland						1	0		1
Ireland						1	0		1
Unknown			23	30					53
Total	**1,834,537**	**475,639**	**761,122**	**514,090**	**139,804**	**365,410**	**278,484**	**122**	**4,369,208**

Source: UNHCR 2009a

- **Forcible[18] and Spontaneous[19] Return**

Besides voluntary repatriation with UNHCR assistance, many Afghans also returned spontaneously to their home country however, many were also forced to return by deportation and other means. UNHCR registered, that from 2002 to 2009, over 300,000 Afghans returned spontaneously from Pakistan (Table 27). In the same time 6,901 forcible returns have been registered (UNHCR, 2009). In comparison, the numbers of spontaneous as well as forcible returns from Iran have been relative high. Overall, one million Afghans have returned from Iran spontaneously and a little more than one million was deported between 2002 and 2009 (Table 28) (UNHCR, 2009a). In a report by Koepke (2011), about Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, the author stated that the average daily number of Afghans being deported from Iran was between 2,000 in 2007 and 785 in 2010. An equal number of Afghans is estimated to (re)enter Iran illegally on a daily basis, in the hope of finding employment (Koepke, 2011). The issue of border crossing and circular migration is further researched in section 2.7 & 2.8.

Table 27: Pakistan - Forcible and Spontaneous return of Afghan refugees

Year	Spontaneous (Pakistan)	Forcible (Pakistan)
2002	194,127	4,680
2003	45,125	503
2004	41,103	52
2005	11,597	112
2006	9,681	284
2007	7,541	209
2008	7,897	781
2009	7,99	280
2002-2009	317,870	6,901

Table 28: Iran - Forcible and Spontaneous return of Afghan refugees

Year	Spontaneous (Iran)	Forcible (Iran)
2002	117,364	42,360
2003	124,615	53,897
2004	74,967	79,410
2005	225,815	95,845
2006	238,384	146,387
2007	155,721	363,369
2008	74,773	406,524
2009	3,227	35,707
2002-2009	1,014,875	1,223,499
2010 (Jan-Dec.)		286,662

Source: UNHCR, 2009a

[18] *Forcible return:* The compulsory return of an individual to the country of origin, transit or third country, on the basis of an administrative or judicial act (IOM, 2004).

[19] *Spontaneous return*: An individual or group who initiate and proceed with their migration plans without any outside assistance (IOM, 2004).

Table 29 shows the number of forcible return of Afghans from other countries besides Iran and Pakistan. Relative high numbers have been recorded in the UK, Norway and Germany. To a lesser extent, deportations of Afghan migrants have taken place in Netherlands, Sweden, France and Denmark (UNHCR, 2009a). Since 2011, Australia has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Afghanistan and UNHCR. The MoU gives Australia for the first time the permission to deport Afghan asylum seekers whose bids for asylum fail (UNHCR Tripartite, 2011h). Since the agreement has be valid for only a short period, figures on forced return migration of Afghans from Australia, are not available yet. The issue of deportation of Afghan migrants is highly criticized since governments cannot assure the safe and sustainable return of Afghan asylum seekers to their home country. More information on migration policy and agreements between Afghanistan and other parties can be found in Part B, section 3.3.

Table 29: Forcible Return of Afghans from other countries

Country	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Albania				2	1		
Australia	-	-	-	-	1	-	
Belgium	-	-	-	1	1	2	
Bulgaria				116			
Denmark	2	7	14	9	9	6	
France	-	-	35	10	3	-	
Germany	-	5	102	101	31	5	
Ireland	-	-	-	1		-	
Netherlands	-	4	26	41	5	6	3
Norway	-	-	-	70	134	52	3
Portugal	-	-	-	1		-	
Poland	-	-	-	48	1	-	
Serbia and Montenegro		47					
Slovakia					28		
Sweden	-	-	2	1	6	52	2
Switzerland	-	-	-	1			
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	1	-	
UK	232	349	467	434	543	432	23
Czech Rep.	-	-	-	-	-	1	
USA	-	-	6	4			98[20]

Source: UNHCR, 2009a, ICMPD 2005, ICMPD 2008

- **Aliens apprehended inland and border violations**

The increasing conflicts in Afghanistan have caused an increasing number of Afghans to attempt illegal emigration to countries of the EU. In 2006, the International Centre for

[20] The number refers to Afghan Aliens returned by region and country of nationality (Source: Home Land Security 2010)

Migration and Policy Development[21] (ICMPD) reported, that a total of 3,795 Afghans have been apprehended (related to border violations) in Central and Eastern European countries. In 2007, the number of Afghan apprehensions in this geographical area increased to 6,711, indicating a 77% change to the previous year (ICMPD, 2008).

In Turkey, Afghans are one of the biggest irregular migrant groups. As a result, the number of apprehended Afghans in Turkey (including illegal entry, exit or presence and breach of visa and residence permit) increased steadily from 24 cases in 1995 to over 9,000 in 2001. The number decreased slowly to 3,000 in 2005 but increased again to over 6,000 in 2007. These up and down-turns can be explained by a shifting security situation in Afghanistan which improved shortly after 2001 but worsened again in the mid 2000s thus, more Afghan migrants were likely to seek shelter in Turkey when Afghanistan's situation deteriorated (Kaya, 2008).

With regard to Greece, data on apprehended Afghans indicates that in 2000 over 150 Afghan individuals were subject to an apprehension expulsion decision and therefore, removed from the country. The number tripled in 2001 and rose again to over 1,800 cases in 2002. The number dropped to ca. 1,000 apprehensions in 2003 but reached its peak in 2005, with over 1,900 Afghans being subject to apprehension. In contrast to falling numbers of apprehensions after 2001 in Turkey, Greece experienced a large increase. This may be explained by different recording methods or strategies to detect irregular migration. Moreover, it can also be explained by the fact that Greece has become one of the most important industrialized countries of destination for asylum seekers in the last decade. Yet, the recognition rates in Greece remain one of the lowest in Europe, reaching only one% of positive decisions (IOM, 2008a).

With regard to Afghans in Hungary, over 2,686 cases of border violations by Afghan nationals have been reported in 2002. In the same year, over 900 Afghans migrants were refused residence in the country by Hungarian asylum authorities. In 2003, the number of border violations as well as residence refusals decreased to 725 and 385 respectively (Futo, 2008). In Bulgaria the number of border violations by Afghan nationals was as high as 585 in 2005 and 480 in 2005. The figures decreased to 119 in 2006 and 40 in 2007. Other countries that reported border violations were Slovakia (11 in 2006 and 57 in 2007) and Serbia and Montenegro (85 in 2004). Additionally, although to a much smaller extent (<11), border violations by Afghan nationals were recorded in Romania, Azerbaijan, Lithuania and

[21] Since 2000, the International Centre for Migration and Policy Development (ICMPD) publishes on an annual basis a report on illegal migration and human smuggling and trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe. The publication includes data of border management and border apprehension from 22 States

Macedonia for the year 2004/2005 (ICMPD, 2006). Records of Germany show, that the numbers of Afghans nationals that are apprehended inland due to unauthorized entry have been relatively high in 2000, when a total of 3,231 cases have been reported. The number however dropped to 2,075 and 1,083 cases in 2001 and 2002 respectively. In 2003, the number had further decreased to 610 and 176 apprehensions in 2006 (Cyrus, 2008).

- **Destination of Afghan returnees assisted by UNHCR**

Table 30 shows the destination of (UNHCR assisted) returnees when arriving in Afghanistan. However, it is not known whether returnees also originated from these places. As can be seen a high percentage of Afghans returned to Kabul (26%) and Nangahar (20%). In some cases, women made up a very low percentage of returnees, as in the case of the provinces Wardak and Ghor where women only represent 8% and 10% of returnees, respectively (UNHCR, 2009a).

Table 30: Assisted returnees by destination in Afghanistan 2002-2009[22]

Region	Province	Males		Females		Individuals	
N	Badakhshan	10,570	(77%)	3,072	(23%)	13,642	(0%)
N	Baghlan	118,505	(52%)	107,890	(48%)	226,395	(5%)
N	Balkh	20,359	(53%)	51,537	(47%)	110,461	(3%)
N	Faryab	43,537	(65%)	23,245	(35%)	66,782	(2%)
N	Jawzjan	60,982	(52%)	56,020	(48%)	116,984	(3%)
N	Kunduz	131,486	(51%)	123,885	(49%)	255,371	(6%)
N	Samangan	9,414	(53%)	8,489	(47%)	17,903	(0%)
N	Sari pul	19,289	(57%)	14,767	(43%)	34,056	(1%)
N	Takhar	40,152	(57%)	30,759	(43%)	70,911	(2%)
N-Total		**492,805**	**(54%)**	**419,664**	**(46%)**	**912,469**	**(21%)**
S	Hilmand	36,339	(51%)	34,261	(49%)	70,600	(2%)
S	Kandahar	75,668	(51%)	73,025	(49%)	148,693	(2%)
S	Uruzgan	7,186	(54%)	6,111	(46%)	13,297	(0%)
S	Zabul	8,082	(52%)	7,379	(48%)	15,461	(0%)
S-Total		**127,275**	**(51%)**	**129,776**	**(49%)**	**248,051**	**(6%)**
SE	Khost	36,788	(50%)	36,752	(50%)	73,540	(2%)
SE	Patkika	4,560	(54%)	3,897	(46%)	8,457	(0%)
SE	Paktya	43,712	(50%)	44,001	(50%)	87,713	(2%)
SE-Total		**85,060**	**(50%)**	**84,650**	**(50%)**	**169,710**	**(4%)**
E	Kunar	46,782	(51%)	45,495	(49%)	92,277	(2%)
E	Laghman	60,487	(52%)	55,888	(48%)	116,375	(3%)
E	Nangarhar	433,985	(51%)	422,949	(49%)	856,934	(20%)
E	Nuristan	280	(51%)	265	(49%)	545	(0%)
E-Total		**541,534**	**(51%)**	**524,597**	**(49%)**	**1,066,131**	**(24%)**
W	Baghdis	6,328	(65%)	22,288	(35%)	9,716	(0%)

[22] . Complementary to this table, Appendix 4 shows 'IDPs Assisted Return by Provinces of Origin – Jan 2002 to end Dec 2008'

W	Farah	37,954	(52%)	34,707	(48%)	72,661	(2%)
W	Ghor	7,911	(90%)	847	(10%)	8,758	(0%)
W	Hirat	82,437	(57%)	62,373	(43%)	144,810	(3%)
W	Nimroz	15,250	(51%)	14,614	(49%)	29,864	(1%)
W-Total		**149,880**	**(56%)**	**115,929**	**(44%)**	**265,809**	**(6%)**
C	Ghazni	92,288	(56%)	72,555	(44%)	164,843	(4%)
C	Kabul	593,941	(51%)	561,459	(49%)	1,155,400	(26%)
C	Kapisa	24,667	(59%)	17,311	(41%)	41,978	(1%)
C	Logar	51,093	(52%)	46,874	(48%)	97,967	(2%)
C	Panjshir	7,803	(54%)	6,516	(46%)	14,319	(0%)
C	Parwan	77,281	(54%)	66,090	(46%)	143,371	(3%)
C	Wardak	14,705	(62%)	9,128	(8%)	23,833	(1%)
C-Total		**861,778**	**(52%)**	**779,933**	**(48%)**	**1,641,711**	**(38%)**
C.H	Bamyan	13,108	(57%)	9,712	(43%)	22,820	(1%)
C.H	Day Kundi	12,099	(70%)	5,260	(30%)	17,359	(0%)
C.H	Ghor (Lal Wa Sarjangal)	1,332	(61%)	864	(39%)	2,196	(0%)
C.H	Wardak (Bishsud I&II)	3,778	(56%)	2,961	(44%)	6,739	(0%)
C.H-Total		**30,317**	**(62%)**	**18,707**	**(38%)**	**49,114**	**(1%)**
Unknown		8,583	(53%)	7,630	(47%)	16,213	(0%)
Total		**2,297,232**	**(53%)**	**2,071,976**	**(47%)**	**4,369,208**	**(100%)**

Source: UNHCR, 2009a

- **Ethnicity of Afghan Returnees**

UNHCR reports that of those Afghans who returned to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2009, Pashtuns made up of 58% of returnees, Tajik 24%, Hazara 8%, Uzbek 4%, Turkman 2% and other 3% (UNHCR, 2009a)[23]. In contrast to UNHCR figures, a case study by AREU in 2005 states, that the majority of Afghans who have returned were mainly Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras hence, ethnic non-Pashtuns. A possible reason for this difference is that while in magnitude Pashtuns may constitute the largest ethnic group to repatriate, this is not true in terms of proportions – i.e. the proportion of Pashtun Afghans that have repatriated is much less than the proportion of non-Pashtuns that have returned and therefore less visible. In addition, UNHCR reports that the largest flow of Pashtuns into Afghanistan is from FATA/NWFP, suggesting that not many of those Pashtuns settled in Karachi may have repatriated (AREU, 2005).

2.6 Trafficking in persons

The issue of human trafficking remains complex in Afghanistan. This is, as the country shares borders with six other countries and most parts of the border are difficult to control. The

[23] An overview of 'Afghans return by province of destination – Ethnicity' can be found in Appendix 2

absence of modern border management and a weakening of law and order further hamper the control of illegal border crossings. The long history of poppy production in Afghanistan and the therewith long experience of smuggling of narcotics across the border have likewise contributed to well established networks to cross-border trafficking operations. Moreover, various human rights violations such as forced marriage, child marriage, child abuse and domestic violence are contributing to the creation of an environment fostering or tolerating trafficking in persons in Afghanistan. Although, people are aware of the occurrence of human trafficking the concepts, of *human trafficking*, *smuggling* and *kidnapping*, are widely confused by the Afghan population (IOM, 2008b).

The majority of victims (mostly children) are trafficked within Afghanistan's borders. However, transnational trafficking is also present with Pakistan and Iran being major destination countries. Children are mainly trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution, forced labour in brick kilns, carpet-making factories and domestic service. Afghan women and girls are subjected to forced prostitution, forced marriages and involuntary domestic servitude in neighbouring countries and possibly India. However, many women are also trafficked into Afghanistan for the same purposes, mainly from Iran, Tajikistan, Uganda and China. International security contractors are likely to be involved in these sex trafficking businesses. It is also not uncommon that brothels and prostitution rings are run by foreigners, sometimes with links to larger criminal networks. Afghan men are subjected to forced labour and debt bondage in the agriculture and construction sectors in Iran, Pakistan, Greece, the Gulf States, and possibly Southeast Asian countries. An increasing number of individuals also migrate willingly to Afghanistan under false promises of employment and high salaries. These migrants then often find themselves subjected to forced labour once they arrive in their country of destination. This was also the case of male migrants from Sri Lanka, Nepal and India who migrated willingly to Afghanistan in 2009/2010 (Department of State, 2010c).

No exact data on the scope of human trafficking in Afghanistan is available. However, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has done a field study on this issue to provide an in-depth analysis of the trafficking phenomenon in, from and to Afghanistan[24] (IOM, 2008b).

The data of the survey revealed that victims of trafficking (VoTs) were predominantly young adults (45%) between 18 and 24 years, followed by minor victims (35%) under the age

[24] The field study by IOM (2008) took place in 2007, and research data was collected mainly from expert interviews and a field study in Kabul and nine border provinces; Khost, Nangarhar, Heart, Balkh, Faryab, Kunduz, Badakhshan, Kandahar and Fahar. The study interviewed 220 community informants, 20 victims of trafficking, 43 victims of kidnapping and 19 smuggled migrants. The non-personal data of 115 victims of trafficking (VoTs) referred to and assisted by IOM between 2006 and 2007 has also been includes in the analysis

of 18, while four of the respondents were in the age group of 25 years or above. The majority of victims was male (IOM, 2008b). All VoTs were Afghan nationals who originated from Herat (10), Faryab (7), Kabul (2) and Nangharhar (1) provinces. Consequently most of the respondents were ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks. In terms of educational background, only two (10%) of the respondents had completed primary school education up to 6th grade whereas the rest was totally or nearly illiterate (IOM, 2008b).

People fall victim to trafficking through various means such as coercion, deceit and abuse of power. In the study of IOM, 16 respondents (80%) answered that they followed the traffickers based on false promise and the remaining four (20%) said that they were taken by force. Younger victims were more vulnerable to forcible trafficking. Among the seven child respondent VoTs, four (57%) were taken by force while all 13 adult victims (that were trafficked to Iran) mentioned that Baluchi tribes living on both sides of the Afghan-Iranian border were involved in the transportation process. The data is indicative of weak border management as well as established human trafficking networks, particularly along the Afghan borders with Iran and Pakistan. Out of the 20 respondent VoT cases, the highest was the cases of forced labor (16 persons or 80%), followed by sexual exploitation (4 persons or 20%). Most victims were promised higher wages, ranging between USD$250-US$500 for construction work or other low-skilled labor. Overall, less educated people were more prone to falling victim to trafficking. Most of the cases identified as trafficking victims, were cross-border trafficking (15 cases or 75%). A total of 11 victims were trafficked to Iran, while four were trafficked to Pakistan. All victims of cross-border trafficking interviewed during the survey used unofficial land border crossing points without any valid travel documents. When crossing the border, 11 out of 15 persons (73%) walked while the remaining four used vehicles (IOM, 2008b).

IOM-assisted Victims of Trafficking (VoTs)

The study also included the data of 115 victims of trafficking (VoTs) referred to and assisted by IOM between 2006 and 2007. These victims present a completely different picture with 83 victims 25 years of age or above, six victims between 18-24 years and 16 victims below 18. The great majority of these victims (94%) was female. Most of the IOM-assisted VoTs concern non-Afghan nationals, mostly Chinese (79%), Iranian (6%) and Pakistanis (3%). A total of 12% were Afghan nationals from 19 different provinces including Kabul, Kapisa, Kunduz, Ghazni, Kunar, Nangahar, Lagman, Panjsher, Wardak and Peshawar in Pakistan.

All Chinese victims were female who reported that they were taken by false promise to Afghanistan. A further 11 persons also said they were taken by false promises and 13 persons

stated they were taken by force. The high percentage among Chinese victims to be taken by false promises can be explained by the fact that almost all Chinese victims (88 out of 91) came to Afghanistan by air which cannot be easily achieved without the victim's cooperation. The remaining three victims stated to have crossed the land border at Torkham from Pakistan. All other non-Chinese victims were trafficked by land. In terms of cross-border trafficking (102 out of 115 cases) all cases were trafficked to Afghanistan. Only one out of 13 victims was trafficked abroad to Iran. Nearly all Chinese victims (90 out of 91) were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation, while among the Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani victims, 15 persons (62%) were trafficked for sexual exploitation and nine (38%) were trafficked for forced labor (IOM, 2008b).

Given the complex environment in which human trafficking appears in the country, the low number of respondents in the IOM study is not surprising. It is almost taboo to openly discuss the trafficking of women, children or prostitution. Moreover, females trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution, are currently criminalized and imprisoned in Afghanistan (IOM, 2008b). Whether the act is voluntary or forced, the shame factor is significant enough that families will not report if member has been trafficked for sexual servitude, in order to avoid stigmatization by the community (IOM, 2008b). Besides publications by the IOM, other sources report that only 29% of cases of sexual abuse are being reported in Afghanistan and that less than 24% of those being reported receive penalty (IRIN, 2007a).

- **Other forms of trafficking in persons**

Child soldiers

It has been observed in Afghanistan that pro-government military forces are recruiting children as foot soldiers and sexually abuse them. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has confirmed this information. The fact that the pro-government militias is violating human rights is even more worrying as they do not fall in the formal and legal disciplinary structures in which the army or the police operate(IRIN, 2011a). According to different sources, it has been observed that children are often emplyoed by the Taliban and other insurgent groups as suicide bombers (Bell, 2007).

Bacha Bazi

Since 2011, some warlords, military commanders and wealthy business men have brought back and old practice named *bacha bazi* meaning *boy play* (Frontline, 2010). It has been observed that boys are bought from family members by wealthy businessmen who then dress the boys in women's clothes and train them to sing and dance for the entertainment of

themselves and their friends. The *bacha bazis* are also introduced to the commercial sex industry, usually by being raped by the men who bought or trained and sold for sex to friends or colleagues (Change.org, 2011). Research indicates that the practice is not limited to a particular area in Afghanistan. However, some sources say that pedophilia is most common in the southern provinces of Afghanistan, with that half the Pashtun tribal members in Kandahar and other southern towns being *bacha baz* (the term for an older man with a boy lover). (Brinkley, 2010).

Forced & child marriage

In contrast to arranged marriages, forced marriages are strictly prohibited under international human rights law. In theory, forced marriages are also prohibited under Afghan law. However, in practice it is difficult to distinguish between forced and arranged marriages, with the latter being almost the exclusive form of marriage in Afghanistan. Research indicates that over 80% of marriages in Afghanistan are arranged of which the majority might fall under forced marriage. The issue of forced marriages is interlinked with child marriages. Official authorities in Kabul and provinces capitals stated that early marriages mainly prevalent in rural parts of Afghanistan, where poverty is high. However, the lack of data is an obstacle in understanding the scope of the problem (Amnesty International, 2005). According to the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), over 57% of Afghan marriages are child marriages, meaning that the partner is under age of 16 (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

In terms of arranged and forced marriages, a third practice is commong in Afghanistan know as *baad*. This practice concerns families who give away their daughters to settle disputes. The practice allows communities or families to settle crimes such as murder or thievery, to restore peace and order between the conflicting parties. The United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanitan (UNAMA) found that giving away girls to settle disputes, took place in all communities throughout the country, especially in conflicted areas were state legitimacy and the rule of law were low (i.e. as Tagab and Alasay district in Kapisa, Uzbin in Sarobi district of Kabul province) (UNAMA & OHCHR, 2010)

2.7 Border migration

Although Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, the Durand Line[25] between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains the most dangerous area. In 1893, the British demarcated the Afghan-Pakistan border and signed it into a treaty which was to stay in force for the follwing 100 years After that period the disputed land (today FATA & parts of NWFP in Pakistan) was officially to be returned to Afghanistan. In 1993, when the treaty expired, Pakistan requested Afghanistan to renew the treaty. Afghanistan however refused to do so and claimed its territory back. Until today, Afghanistan claims FTATA and NWFP to be its territory whereas Pakistan recognized the Duran Line as the official border. Since 2001 the conflict has intensified and incidents of violence having increased on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border (Bajoria, 2009).

In terms of cross border flows between Pakistan and Afghanistan, research was done by Altai Consulting and UNHCR in 2007. Data on migrants crossing the Afghan-Pakistan border was collected on two crossing points namely Torkham (East) and Spin Boldak/Chaman (South) (Figure 11). The research was based on random selection of cross-border migrants (in and out of Afghanistan and Pakistan). To better research the nature of cross border flows, das collected during late summer and fall. A total of 2,023 interviews took place at both cross border points. In order to get further inside into real cross border movements, a counting exercise, lasting 7 days, took place in September 2008 (Altai Consulting & UNHCR 2009).

[25] The Durand Line is named after the foreign secretary of the colonial government of India, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, who demarcated the frontier between British India and Afghanistan in 1893. For more information on the Durand Line and its history see Bajoria 2009.

Figure 11: Official cross border points between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Source: Altai Consulting & UNHCR 2009

The responsibility at the Torkham border has the Afghan border police and passport office that officially control the entry and exit of all individuals, Afghan nationals and internationals. Data on population movements are collected on a regular basis and sent back to the Ministry of Interior headquarters in Kabul. Table 31 shows the numbers of population movements obtained from official authorities and from the counting exercise undertaken by Altai Consulting and UNHCR staff in the week of September 11-17, 2008. As can be seen, the comparison highlights the very irregular nature of the entry and exit of individuals at Torkham. For example, whereas official records state that a total of 150 people were crossing Torkham border on 11 September 2008, the counting exercise by UNHCR revealed that the true number was as high as 12,934 on the same day. High differences between official records and those collected by Altai Consulting & UNHCR were also observed on other days of data collection (Table 31). Consequently, it can be concluded that the border police and passport office at the Afghan-Pakistan border is not able to adequately control the nature and size of actual cross-border movements (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009).

Table 31: Comparison of legal vs. irregular entry and exit at the Torkham border, September 2008

Date	Entry		Exit	
	Official Nos.	Actual Nos.	Official Nos	Actual Nos.
11/09/2008	150	(AM only) 12934	138	(AM only) 23934
12/09/2008	75	(AM only) 12507	64	(AM only) 18993
13/09/2008	194	(AM only) 16080	54	(AM only) 21889
14/09/2008	91	(PM only) 5454	78	(PM only) 8392
15/09/2008	77	(PM only) 10588	112	(PM only) 12384
16/09/2008	141	(PM only) 10220	70	(PM only) 11953

Source: Altai Consulting & UNHCR 2009

The areas that border on the Pakistan side include the NWFP, FATA and Balochistan. On the Afghan side, nine provinces border Pakistan; Badakhshan, Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Khost, Paktika, Zabol and Kandahar. Two of these, Nangarhar and Kandahar, are among the five most populated provinces of the country with a population of 1,182,000 and 886,000 people respectively. In these two provinces the border crossing points of Torkham and Spin Boldak are found. However, beside Torkha and Spin-Bodalk hundreds of unofficial crossing points exist. Since the border runs through Pashtun and Baluchi tribes who live on both sides of the border, most people consider the border as fluid or non-existent. Many respondents of the study stated that not actually know where the border is located (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009).

Data from the UNHCR border counting team is presented in Figure 12. The figure shows the evaluation (over 18 months in 2007 and 2008) of the outgoing and incoming flows of individuals at the Torkham border. The data reveals that seasonal variants seem to paly a role in population flows over the Afghan-Pakistan border. As can been seen, a higher number of people is leaving the country during the months of spring and summer than it is the case for incoming flows during the fall and winter season. Overall, higher numbers of cross-border movements were observed at the time of the New Year[26] in Afghanistan and during the months of summer. These results are in line with the climate conditions in this area, favoring migration during spring and summer as opposed to the fall or winter season (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009).

[26] Nowruz: marks the first day of spring and is the name of the New Year in Iranian calendars. It is usually celebrated on March 21 or the previous/following day depending on where it is observed.

Figure 12: The scope of cross-border movement at Torkham (2007-2008)



Source: Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009

The study by Altai Consulting and UNHCR (2009) also revealed that a far greater number of people cross the Torkham border, in both directions, than the Spin Boldak border. In September 2008 over 382,518 individuals (on average) crossed the border at Torkham in one week compared to 181,292 at Spin Boldak. In November 2008, the average weekly flow was slightly higher, with 401,209 individuals crossing the Torkham border and 224,480 at Spin Boldak. The difference might be, at least in part, due to a lower population density, higher insecurity in the southern regions, the lower presence of Afghan refugees in the southern end of the border, and the smaller volume of trade through Spin Boldak than through Torkham (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009).

As already mentioned, seasonal weather conditions have a significant impact on cross border migration to Pakistan. A higher number of individuals crossed the border to Pakistan during the months approaching the winter. This is explained by the fact that the hot summer months tend to bring Afghans back home and the tough winter days draw them back to Pakistan, mirroring the climate conditions in both countries. This form of migration may also be labeled short-term or circular migration, which is further analyzed in the next section. The data revealed that, at both border crossing points, the majority of migrants were single adult males. In contrast, as can be seen in figure 13 and 14, families made up only a small margin of the total population flows. It should be mentioned that of 2,000 interviewees over 81% traveled without any type of documentation, be it passport, valid visa or ID document. This

again shows the lack of official regulation, facilitating cross-border movements (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009).

Figure 13: Torkahm cross border flows



Source: Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009

Figure 14: Spin Boldak cross border flows



Source: Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009

- **Forms of migration**

Many different migration categories exist. The most common forms used are short and long-term migration. In the IOM migration template a short-term migrant is defined as *a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least 3 months but less than a year (12 months), except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage* (IOM, 2011b). A long-term migrant on the other hand is defined as *a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence*. Whereas the first definition focuses on a specific time span and an economic perspective, the latter defines long-term migration only by its length of stay (IOM, 2011b). This is problematic since migrants often travel for several reasons. To make things more complicated, a new form of migration, namely circular migration, is commonly used among migration scholars. The IOM defines circular migration *as the fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or long-term movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labor needs of countries of origin and destination.* As in the case of short-term migration, this definition focuses on an economic perspective however, it is not reduced to a specific time-period as in the case of long-term migration. Consequently, circular migration can be long- and short-term (IOM, 2011b). Often mentioned in relation to circular migration is seasonal migration. A seasonal migrants worker is defined as someone *whose work by its character is dependent on seasonal conditions and is performed only during part of the year* (IOM, 2004). Again, this definition focuses on economic reasons and leaves out other purposes of migration.

Of the 2,000 cross-border migrants of the study by Altai consulting and UNHCR (2009), almost 82% described a cyclical movement and total of 35.8% reported to go back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan every 3 months[27]. Consequently, if all these migrants travelled for economic reasons they might be labeled short-term or circular or migrants. In case they traveled for economic reasons only at a specific time during the year, they might also be seasonal migrants. In case none of these migrants (although very unlikely) traveled for economic reasons, it is questionable whether these migrants fall in any of the

[27] A study by AREU (2004) on cross-border migration confirmed that Afghans often travel back and forth between their home country and neighboring states. The study revealed that out of 194 respondents, more than 30% of migrants to Iran and 42% of migrants to Pakistan had been in these countries before (Stigter, 2004).

above mentioned categories at all. In any case, it shows how complicated but also dangerous it can be to reduce migrants to only a few characteristics. This is as the right labeling provides in certain cases (i.e. for refugees or economic migrants) specific protection and rights. The following section gives a further inside into the phenomenon of short- and long-term migration well as seasonal and labor migration to and from Afghanistan.

2.8 Short- and long-term migration

- **Short term migration**

Available data on short-term migration to and from Afghanistan as defined by the IOM is lacking. Yet, the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment[28] (NRVA) survey of 2007/08 collected information on seasonal migration. In the NRVA 07/08[29], a seasonal migrant is defined as *someone who during the past 12 months spent at least one month away from the household for seasonal work*. It should be noted that this definition focuses on migrants who spent time away from home and further abroad but also includes migrants who remained in Afghanistan.

The NRVA 2007/08 revealed that of all households interviewed, 14% was involved in seasonal work. This means, that 14% of all Afghan households across the country had someone in their family who (in the last 12 months) spent at least one month away from home, either within the country or further abroad. With regard to specific categories (Kuchi, urban and rual) 22% of the Kuchi households were involved in seasonal work whereas only 5% of urban households reported to have a seasonal worker in the family. This relative high number of Kuchis involved in seasonal work is not surprising, considering the nomad lifestyle of this specific group. A total of 16% of rural households was likewise involved in seasonal work. The western region but also some provinces in the northwest, east and northeast had above average involvement in seasonal migration with Ghor (66%) in and Faryab (82%) standing out particularly (NRVA, 2007/08).

The survey revealed that seasonal work was more often carried out by those who attended at most primary school, while those with at least a secondary education tend to be somewhat less involved. An exception was observed among urban residents where highly

[28] The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) Afghanistan is the only comprehensive nation-wide multi-purpose household survey in Afghanistan. The NRVA enables a large amount of cross-section analysis and forms the basis of many policy developments in the country.

[29]The NRVA 2007/08 is the third of three successive rounds of surveys, following NRVA 2003 and 2005. The NRVA 07/08 was produced by the Afghan government with European Union funding and in collaboration with aid agencies. The survey collected data on 20,576 households in Afghanistan across 395 districts and 34 provinces in the time span of August 2007 – August 2008.

educated individuals reported to be more frequently involved in seasonal work (NRVA, 2007/08).

With respect to area of destination it was observed that urban seasonal workers mostly migrated abroad or to another urban area within the same province. In contrast, rural seasonal workers were more diverse, with about half staying in a rural area within the same province or migrating to an urban area in another province. With regard to the Kuchi population, migration was mainly all rural, in the same province or further away within the country (NRVA, 2007/08). On average, the overall duration was slightly over four months however, for urban seasonal workers it was longer between 5-6 months. Over 250,000 Afghan households reported having a member who migrated abroad in the recent years (NRVA, 2007/08). The following section gives further inside into destination countries of Afghan short- and long-term migrants.

- **Long- term migration**

The NRVA 2007/08 has collected data on in-migrants and out migrants. An in-migrant refers to *someone who during the past 5 years lived outside the current area of residence for at least 3 consecutive months. In many cases this in-migrant is a return-migrant that is someone who lived in the current area of residence before*. The term in-migrant includes individuals who migrated from elsewhere within Afghanistan or from abroad. As this migrant has been away for at least 3 months, he/ she can also be labeled as a long-term migrant. In this case however, the term in-migrant will be used. In contrast, an out-migrant *is anyone aged 15 years or older who was a household member one year ago but has moved away and is no longer considered a member of the household.* It should be noted, that out-migration is likely to be under-estimated in the NRVA, to the extent that complete households have moved away and thus were not available for an interview (NRVA, 2007/08).

The results show, that of Afghanistan's 3.4 million households, a sizeable proportion (13%) has household members who were living elsewhere sometime during the five years preceding the survey. These household members were either internal or international migrants. This overall percentage however, hides significant variation between the different Afghan groups analyzed. For instance, Table 33 shows that over 28% of Kuchi households reported of having long-term migrants whereas only 10% of urban and 13% of rural households reported of having a family member who migrated. The results however show that rural households are more migratory than urban households. The survey also revealed that

especially in the western region – bordering Iran- households tend to be quite migratory (NRVA, 2007/08).

Table 33: Afghan households, by migration status during past five years, and by current residence

Residence	Without any migrant		With migrant(s)		All households	
	Thousands	Percentages	Thousands	Percentages	Thousands	Percentages
Urban	616	90%	66	10%	682	100%
Rural	2,235	87%	328	13%	2,563	100%
Kuchi	139	72%	54	28%	193	100%
National	2,990	87%	448	13%	3,438	100%

Source: NRVA 2007/08

- **Origin and destination of migrants**

Table 34 shows, that neighboring Iran is the most important destination for Afghan out-migrants. The geographical distance and similarities in culture and language are likely the main pull factors that explain Iran's popularity as a destination country for Afghan citizens. Pakistan on the contrary, remains an important country of origin, however it seems less important as a destination country for out-migrants. This might be related to the recent more strict position of the Government of Pakistan to Afghan citizens in the country. On the other hand, countries on the Arabian Peninsula have become important destinations for out-migrants (NRVA, 2007/08).

Table 34: Place of origin of in-migrants and place of destination of out-migrants NRVA 2007/08

Place of origin/Destination	In-migrants		Out-migrants	
	Thousands	Percentages	Thousands	Percentages
Same province, urban	77	11%	19	6%
Same province, rural	79	11%	28	9%
Other province, urban	119	16%	22	7%
Other province, rural	118	16%	6	2%
Pakistan	102	14%	17	5%
Iran	228	31%	175	56%
Arabian Peninsula	2	0%	32	10%
Other country	5	1%	15	5%
Total	730	100%	315	100%

Source:NRVA 2007/08

With regard to country of destination and length of stay of Afghan migrants, information can also be found in the NRVA 2005. Due to the fact that the NRVA 2005 used different migration categories and methodology procedures than the NRVA 2007/08, data between

these two surveys cannot be compared. However, the results of the NRVA 2005 indicate that Afghans who migrated to Pakistan and Iran did so seasonally with 75% and 47% respectively. In contrast, the majority of Afghans migrating to Europe did so permanently with an estimated 11,198 households (74%) (NRVA, 2005).

- **Demographic characteristics of out-migrants**

In the NRVA 2007/08 almost all international out-migrants were men (Figure 15). Only exception was found in rural-to-rural migration were women (55%) were dominant (probably because of marriage). In the Kuchi population men and women equally migrate (both 50%). Out-migrants are considerably younger than the general population. The data showed that almost half of the male out-migrants and six out of ten women out-migrants were under age 25 (NRVA, 2007/08).

Figure 15: Percentage of male out-migrants, by type of move



Source: NRVA, 2007/08

2.9 Labor migration[30]

[30] In the NRVA 2007/08: A *labor out-migrant* is defined as a person who has moved away from the present household during the past year in order to go and look for work elsewhere. A *(returning) labor in-migrant* is defined as someone who has moved to the current place of residence some time during the past 5 years and whose original reason for moving away was work-related.

Widespread poverty and lack of income-generating opportunities drive many Afghans to go and look for works elsewhere. It is therefore not surprising that work is the most important reason for Afghans to migrate (More on labor and rural-urban migration in Part B, section 3.1). The NRVA 2007/08 revealed that Afghans who have moved elsewhere during the past five years, over 53% (239,000) of Afghans households with in-migrants include labor migrants. As for general in-migration, the western region stands out, with above average returning labor migrants. Labor migration is an almost exclusive male phenomenon with 94% of labor in-migrants being men, compared to 77% percent of all in-migrants. Almost three out of four labor in-migrants did not attend school, exception were migrants from urban who often had primary or secondary education (NRVA 2007/08).

Table 35 shows that Iran was by far the most important origin of Afghan labor in-migrants and it was also the destination of almost two in every three labor out-migrants. Clearly, labor-migration is a strategy employed by many, and it is all the more feasible for households in the region neighboring Iran. Mean duration of residence abroad was 16 months, with most returning labor migrants (61%) staying abroad between 6-23 months (Table 35) (NRVA, 2007/08).

Table 35: Place of origin of labor in-migrants and place of destination of labor out-migrants

Place of origin/ Destination	**In-migrants**		**Out-migrants**	
Same province, urban	16,000	4%	7,000	3%
Same province, rural	21,000	5%	7,000	3%
Other province, urban	85,000	19%	16,000	7%
Other province, rural	76,000	17%	3,000	1%
Pakistan	34,000	8%	11,000	4%
Iran	205,000	46%	169,000	67%
Arabian Peninsula	2,000	0%	31,000	12%
Other country	2,000	0%	31,000	12%
Total	443,000	100%	254	100%

Source: NRVA 2007/08

- **Demographic characteristics of labor migrants**

Table 36 shows that more labor out-migrants (49%) were concentrated in the age group 15-24 in comparison to labor in-migrants (29%). The small group of female labor migrants stands out. For one thing, they tend to be quite older than the total group of female in-migrants (which is dominated by marriage migration): more than 30% of female labor out-migrants are

40 years or older, and in that they differ not only from the female out-migrants in general (12% age 40 or older), but also from male out-migrants over 40 (9%) (NRVA, 2007/08).

Table 36: Age distribution of labor migrants, by sex (in percentages)

Age	Male		Female	
	In-migrants	**Out-migrants**	**In-migrants**	**Out-migrants**
15-24	29%	49%	28%	35%
25-39	50%	42%	42%	33%
40+	21%	9%	31%	32%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: NRVA 2007/08

2.10 Afghan citizens nationalized abroad

Pakistan

In 2008, the Pakistan State Minister for Interior stated, that citizenship had been granted in accordance with the provisions of Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 and Naturalization Act 1926. Overall, a total of 110 Afghans from Afghanistan had been given Pakistan citizenship in 2008. The number decreased to a total of 7 people in 2009 and 9 people in 2010 (PakistanToday, 2010). Considering the large number of Afghan refugees who remained in Pakistan for decades, the number of Afghans gaining Pakistani citizenship is very low. Article 14 of the 1951 Pakistani citizenship act stipulates that Pakistan does not recognize dual citizenship. Nonetheless, Pakistan has dual citizenship agreements with i.e. UK, Canada and Australia. In this regard it should also be mentioned that it is not clear whether the Government of Afghanistan recognizes dual citizenship[31] (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1994). However, at current date, the Pakistan Citizenship Act allows a foreigner girl marrying a Pakistani man to get Pakistani citizenship but not vice versa. Meaning, if an Afghan men marries a Pakistani women, he will not gain Pakistani citizenship. This is as the status of a man higher valued as the status of a woman (PakistanLaw, 2008).

It should be noted that until 2007, when the first registration took place and Afghan refugees in Pakistan were provided with Proof of Registration cards (PoR-cards), refugees had lived in Pakistan without any legal document for 28 years (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2009). This gave rise to a lot of legal problems as Afghans in Pakistan could be stopped, searched and arrested under the Foreigners Registration Act. In 2010, Pakistan Governments has extended the validity of registration cards (PoR) for 1.7 million Afghans, allowing them to stay three years in Pakistan (UNHCR, 2011). Nonetheless, many Afghans

[31] More information on Citizenship Law in Afghanistan and the therewith associated issues in Part B, section 5.1

regularly experience, extortion and detention at the hand of the Pakistan police (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2009). There are suggestions that according to Pakistani citizenship laws and international practice, Afghans should be eligible to be Pakistani citizens after seven years of stay in Pakistan, while others claim that any child born on Pakistani soil should be entitled to citizenship (Khattak et al, 2006).

Iran

As in the case of Pakistan, only very few Afghans managed to obtain Iranian citizenship during the last decades. In general, the Iranian parliament has rejected the idea of granting citizenship to the Afghan spouses of Iranian women. However, it has authorized the issuing of permanent residence permits to these Afghan nationals under specific conditions (Ashrafi & Moghissi, 2002). According to Article 2 of Iranian's Civil Code, anyone born to an Iranian father, no matter if born in Iran or abroad is considered an Iranian citizen. No reference has, however been made to the mother's citizenship. Meanwhile, this is pointed out in Paragraph 6 of Article 976, according to which, once a woman of foreign citizenship gets married to an Iranian man, she will automatically be considered an Iranian citizen. Therefore, it won't make much difference in Iran whether the mother is an Iranian or a foreigner. In either case the father's citizenship serves as a decisive factor in the rule of descent blood (Shahrzad, 2002). In contrast to Pakistan, Iran is signatory of the UN's 1951 Refugee Convention however; very few Afghans have actually been granted the status of refugees and given the right of settlement in Iran. Even those who arrived as refugees in the early 1980s have only been granted temporary stay permits. In contrast to this, a study by UNHCR & ILO (2009) has shown that out of the study sample of 4,295 Afghans residing in Iran, 93% claimed to have obtained some permit document to stay in Iran as foreigners. However, as no verification of responses took place during the study, the actual situation may be different as many Afghans would not admit to stay in Iran irregular. Of the total sample, only 276 persons admitted to be without valid resident permits (Wickramasekara et al, 2006).

U.S. & Canada

Every child that is born within the United States, regardless of their parent's race, citizenship, or place of States obtains automatically citizenship. Data on Afghan migrants who naturalized or gained US citizenship in the United States is available from 1994 to 2009. Table 27 shows that the number of Afghans who have naturalized in the U.S. has remained relatively stable over the years, with an exception in 1996, when a total of 4,141 Afghans obtained U.S. citizenship (Homeland Security 2004 & 2009). The 2006 census revealed that out 65,972

Afghans who were counted at that time a total of 29,672 persons had been naturalized U.S. citizens. Of these 48.5% were male and 51.5% female (U.S. Census, 2006). Interviewees in the study by Oeppen (2009) mentioned that family reunification was the main reason for applying for citizenship. This is, as legal permanent residents in the U.S. can only sponsor the immigration of their spouse or unmarried children, whilst U.S. citizens are allowed to sponsor married children, siblings and parents. This also explains why family reunification has been the major source of Afghan immigration to the U.S. since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanstian (Oeppen, 2009).

Table 37: Afghans naturalized in the U.S. (gaining U.S. citizenship) 1994-2009

Year	**1994**	**1995**	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**
Nr. of naturalizations	1,995	2,031	4,141	1,839	1,736	2,752	2,832	1,938

Year	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**
Nr. of naturalizations	1,424	1,235	1,323	1,464	2,018	2,013	2,650	2,588

Source: Homeland Security 2004 & 2009

With respect to Canada, of the 48,090 Afghans counted in the 2006 Census, 31,065 were Canadian citizens while 27,030 were holding Canadian citizenship only. A total of 4,035 individuals of Afghan origin had dual citizenship, meaning they were holding Canadian citizenship and a citizenship of at least one other country. A total of 17,030 people of Afghan ethnic origin in Canada were not Canadian citizens in 2006 (Canada Census, 2006).

Germany

Afghan migrants in Germany possess differing forms of residence status. In 2005, about 40% had Germany citizenship. Between 1981 and 2004, a total of 37,456 people were naturalized. In comparison to other migrants in Germany, the number of cases of naturalization among the inhabitants of Afghan origin is relatively high. In 2006, of those Afghans without a German passport, 80% possessed a more or less stable residence status and over 16% had the German "Duldung Status" (which is a statutory temporary suspension of deportation) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006). Figure 16 shows the number of Afghans in Germany that were naturalized between 1981 and 2003.

Figure 16: Acquisition of citizenship by Afghans in Germany 1981 to 2003



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2006, Germany; 1997-1999 without Hamburg)

Netherlands

Within the total Afghan population in the Netherlands – that is, among all Afghan-born individuals who reside in the Netherlands, not just refugees – the total number of naturalizations is highly reflective of overall immigration trends. Figure 17 shows that the number of citizenship acquisition was relatively low in 1996 (360) and 1997 (217) but increased drastically to over 1,800 citizenship acquisitions in 1999. The low numbers in 1997 and 1997 may be due to the small number of Afghans residing in the country for the required number of years (CBS, 2011). After 1999, the numbers fell constantly (excetion 2003) and reached about 600 in 2010. With regard to double nationality, in 2000 a total of 3,870 Dutch citizens had Afghan as their second nationality. In 2005, the number increased to 8,413 and reached total of 11,151 in 2010 (CBS, 2011).

Sources indicate, that between 1996 and 2003, approximately 60% of all Afghans who had naturalized did so independently, while 40% did so as part of a family naturalization process (mede-naturalisatie) by which minors under the age of 16 acquire the nationality simultaneously with their parents. A small number of individuals had also acquired Dutch nationality via adoption or expedited option procedures (Siegel et al, 2010).

Figure 17: Acquisition of citizenship by Afghans in the Netherlands 1996-2009



Source: CBS 2011

UK

The fast increase of Afghan asylum seekers to the UK is reflected in the sharp increase in UK naturalization (Change Institute, 2009). Figure 18 shows that the first peak of citizenship acquisition in 2005 aligns to the high inflow of Afghan asylum seekers to the UK in 2001. This is as foreigners in the UK can get naturalized after three years if (among other requirements) they are the spouse of an UK citizen. It takes double the time (six years) if the person is not married to British citizens (UK Immigration, 2011). In 2008, Afghan born residents were the 6th highest nationality to be granted British citizenship in the UK with a total of 5,540 Afghans gaining UK citizenship. This was a reduction of 48% from 2007 when 10,555 Afghans were granted citizenship, the highest number of citizenships ever given to Afghan nationals (Home Office, 2008 & 2009). In 2009, Afghans were the 11th highest nationality to be granted British citizenship with at total of 5,010 which was a slight decrease to the previous year (Home Office, 2010). Of all citizenship acquisitions granted to Afghan nationals in the EU-27 in 2009, the UK granted 42%, Germany 29.8%, Sweden 9.9% and

Denmark 6.7%. Overall, 11,900 Afghans were granted citizenship from an EU-27 Member State, in 2009 (Sartori, 2011).

Figure 18: Acquisition of citizenship by Afghans in the UK 1995-2010



Source: Data for 1995-2006: Change Institute 2009, data for 2007-2010: Home Office 2008, 2009 & 2010

India

The Indian Express reported in 2006, that a Sikh woman was the first Afghan refugee who gained Indian Citizenship (Trakroo, 2006). In the same year, over 9,700 Afghan refugees were known to be residing in New Delhi, India. The majority of these Afghan refugees had been living in India for over 10 years (Bose, 2005). In 2010, the Times of India reported, that a total of 1,083 Afghan nationals have been granted Indian citizenship during the last three years (i.e. from January 2007 to December 2009) (The Times of India, 2010). However, many more Afghan refugees (over 3,000) had expressed an interest to gain Indian citizenship. Yet, long waiting times and complicated application procedures make application difficult (Takroo, 2006). For example, the eligibility criteria to gain Indian citizenship includes that a foreigner must be married to an Indian citizen for a minimum of seven years or must have lived in the country for at least 12 years. Moreover, the length of stay must be supported by documentation – a residence permit issued by the Indian government. This in itself is already

difficult to achieve since many Afghan refugees entered the country without permission. A recent increase in application fees from 2,100 rupees (US$49) to 15,000 rupees (US$347) further hampers the process of citizenship acquisition. In addition, as soon as an application for naturalization is filed, the applicant is not allowed to leave India until the end of the process. Therefore, in many families mostly women apply for citizenship whereas men do not. This strategy ensures the families option to return to home once the situation allows it. For many however, becoming an Indian citizen is a logical step that brings economic prosperity. This is as Afghan refugees in India do not have the right to work in the country and thus often have to look for work in the informal sector where conditions are worse (Bose, 2005).

2. PART B: Factors driving migration

The objective of Part B of this thesis is to describe the main push and pull factors driving in- and out-migration. As Afghanistan has been a country of high emigration and immigration attention will be paid to factors driving out-migration as well as pull factors that have contributed to high (return) migration flows. Since poverty and turmoil are one of the main factors leading to high migration movements in developing countries, data is being collected on the Afghan development situation, labor market conditions and the current political and security situation in the country.

3.1 Poverty and disparities

- **Human Development Index**

In order to analyze the development situation of Afghanistan it is relevant to first understand the components of the Human Development Index (HDI) which is a statistical instrument to measure socio and economic development of a particular country. The HDI comprises three basic dimensions of human development namely; health, education and living standards. The HDI set a maximum and a minimum for each dimension (value between 0 and 1) and then shows were each country stands in relation to these values. Figure 19 shows the different dimensions and indicators that are necessary to determine the HDI of Afghanistan (UNDP, 2011).

Figure 19: Components of the Human Development Index



Source: UNDP 2011

In 2010, Afghanistan's HDI was 0.349, which gives the country a rank of 155 out of 169 countries with comparable data. The HDI of South Asia as a region increased from 0.315 in 1980 to 0.516 today thus, placing Afghanistan below the regional average. The HDI trends tell an important story both at national and regional level and highlight the gaps in well-being and life chances of Afghan citizens (UNDP, 2010a). However, although Afghanistan's

development remains very low in comparison to other countries, the HDI trend of Afghanistan has steadily been increasing since 2005 (UNDP, 2011).

- **Education - Literacy rate and school enrolment ratio**

Data from UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey showed that the Adult literacy rate for Afghan individuals (for both sexes) aged 15 and above was 28.0% in 2000. The combined gross enrolment ratio in education (for females and males) was 50.1%. On average, the mean years of schooling for adults were 3.3 years whereas expected years of schooling for children was eight years in 2010. In addition, the total expenditure on education was 1.9% of the total GDP in 2010 (UNDP, 2010a). Data collected by the NRVA 2007/08 revealed that the net enrolment ratio in primary education was over 60% for boys and a little over 40% for girls. With regard to specific age categories, the literacy for those aged 15-24 was 52.9% for males and 23.9% for females. The literacy rate of the population aged 15 years and over was for both sexes combined 26.2% whereas the literacy rate for males was much higher than for females, 29.3% and 12.5% respectively. The net secondary enrolment ratio for boys was 21.5% and for girls 10.3%. For both sexes combined it was 16.2% in 2007/08 (NRVA, 2007/08). Overall, the NRVA indicates that the overall literacy rate of the Afghan population was 39% in 2008, indicating that a total of 39% of the Afghan population have basic reading and writing skills. This figure however does not show the differences between males and females, urban and rural populations. In comparison with other countries, together with Niger and Mali, Afghanistan ranked at the very low end in international performance. However, in comparison to the NRVA 2005 which observed a literacy of 31%, Afghanistan has made progress in the educational sector (NRVA 2007/08).

- **GDP – GDP per capita & real GDP**

In 2009, the average per capita monthly expenditure of nine million Afghans was less than US$66 cents a day. Moreover, in 2010 the World Bank reported that in 2007/08, 36% of the population lived under the poverty line of Afs[32] 1,255 (about US$25) per person per months (World Bank, 2010).

The estimates for GDP per capita by the CIA were US$800 in 2008 and US$1,000 for 2009 and 2010 (CIA, 2011). However, estimates by UNDP[33] show higher values for Afghanistan with GDP per capita at US$ 1,103 in 2008, US$1,332 in 2009 and US$1,419 in

[32] Afghani is the currency of Afghanistan (sign: Afs, code:AFN) In 2011 a total of 1,000 Afs = 21,58 US$

[33] It should be noted that the estimates by UNDP in 2009 and 2010 are based on the growth rate of GDP per capita (in PPP US$) from IMF (2010) World Economic Outlook, April 2010 (UNDP, 2010).

2010. The true values are likely to lie somewhere between these estimates of both organisations (UNDP, 2010).

In terms of real GDP, World Bank's estimates were at US$6.81 billion in 2005 and at US$11.76 billion in 2008 (The World Bank Group, 2010). Estimates of the CIA World Factbook differ, stating that in 2008 the total GDP (purchasing power parity) was at US$22.34 billion in 2008 and US$27.38 in 2009. For 2010, the estimates are as high as US$29.81 billion (CIA, 2011).

Since 2001, Afghanistan's economy has growing, with high improvements in the agricultural and service sector. In 2009/2010 the country experienced a GDP growth of 22.5%. However, in the same year, official exports collapsed but could be counterbalanced by high donor inflows. Results for the same year showed a performance better than expected in the core budget: a 10% containment of operational expenditure and a 16% surge in revenue. In contrast to these improvements, the budget for development reached only 28% of the previous year. Furthermore, several Afghan banks (including Afghanistan's largest private financial institution) nearly collapsed because of mismanagement and questionable lending practices. As a consequence, more control and monitoring of the banking sector is needed over the coming years (World Bank, 2010).

- **Corruption**

Although, Afghanistan's economy is improving, corruption and security issues in the country challenge any larger economic projects (Ghani, 2009). Transparency International defines corruption as *the abuse of public position for private gain*. In 2010, Afghanistan was placed 176 out of 178 on the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2010). In Afghanistan, corruption is the direct result of a long history of conflict and erosion of state institution. Besides direct financial costs of corruption there are high costs and time devoted to corrupt practices by government officials, private businesses, and the public. Moreover, the high level of corruption (or the perception of it as in the Corruption Perception Index) discourages or distorts private investors who are essential to the reconstruction of the country. Most important however, are the negative impacts of corruption on the state's credibility and legitimacy[34] (UNODOC, 2007). In 2008, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODOC) UNODOC[35] collected data on corruption in Afghansitan. The study showed that corruption practices were a high burden on Afghan families and individual citizens. The data

[34] More information on the topic of state legitimacy can be found in section 3.3.

[35]The survey was conducted in 2008, with a sample population of 7,600 individuals. In the study, the issue of grand corruption by highly placed officials not included (UNDOC, 2009).

indicated that one in two Afghans over 20 years of age had paid bribes in the last 12 months preceding the survey. The average amount of bribes paid was about US$160, with the rural paying 20% more than the urban. Moreover, respondents felt that corruption had increased in the past five years. Interviewees stated that most bribes had to be paid to the police, courts and customs. The total bribes in the retail sector alone are estimated at US$2.5 billion. In this regard, every second Afghan resident believed that international organizations and NGOs were corrupt and only in the country for their own profit (World Bank, 2010). The role of NGOs and other (international) organization in Afghanistan is further researched in Part C, section 5.2.

- **Inflation**

In 2001, after more than two decades of conflict, the Afghanistan economy was completely devastated. There were four version of the same currency (Afghani) in circulation simultaneously and the national currency was experiencing hyper inflation exceeding 495-600%. For years, the Central Bank's sole function was to print money to finance ever-burgeoning budget deficits. Those who suffer most are the poor who lack the skills to cope against the negative effects of inflation. Furthermore, price stability is a precondition for achieving high and sustainable rates of economic growth which boosts incomes across all segments of society (Central Bank of Afghanistan, 2009).

Inflation is measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI *reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly* (IMF, 2011). Estimates by the IMF on inflation for Afghanistan were at 13.03% in 2007 and increased to 26.75% in 2008. Inflation decreased drastically to -12.2% in 2009 and reached 0.45% in 2010 (IMF, 2011). In contrast, the Afghan Central Bank reported inflation to be between 4-8% in 2007, and reaching a peak of 43.2% in May 2008 (Central Bank of Afghanistan, 2009). The Central Bank also states that inflation in Afghanistan is mainly imported and caused by higher global commodity prices; the opium trade, donor assistance flows and to some extent remittances. Furthermore, the implementation of monetary policy in the country is challenged by sizeable inflows of foreign capital (especially donor funds) in the context of shallow financial markets (Central Bank of Afghanistan, 2009).

At date, the Afghani has remained stable at about 52 AF to the dollar since September 2008 and is increasingly accepted by the population. Nonetheless, the Afghan economy

remains fragile; vulnerable to shocks (i.e. natural disasters) and external commodity price shocks (Central Bank of Afghanistan, 2009).

- **Proportion of population below national poverty line**

The Afghan national average poverty line is 1,255 Afs (US$27,09) per person per months, representing the typical cost of attaining 2,100 calories per person per day and of meeting some basic non-food needs. The NRVA 07/08 observed that the poverty is high in all provinces of Afghasntian. However, differences in poverty incidence with regard to residence and regions exist. As can be seen in Figure 20, the poverty in the rural population is close to the national average (36%), whereas the incidence in the urban population is relatively low (29%). The highest poverty incidence was observed among the Kuchi population with over 50%. The lowest rate was observed in the Southwest (23%) and the highest in the East and West-Central (45%) (NRVA, 2007/08).

With respect to depth of poverty, the data reveals that there is on average an 8% gap between the poverty line and consumption levels (treating the non-poor as having a gap of zero). This figure is much higher the poverty depths of neighbouring countries such as Pakistan (4.4.), Iran (0.5) or Tajikistan (5.1). Alternatively, when focusing on the population of poor people, the ration of the poverty gap to the headcount index reveals that the average consumption level for poor people is 22% below the poverty line. The sum of all differences between the Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) poverty line and the consumption level of poor people provides a measure of the total consumption shortfall. In terms of 2007 prices (quarter 1) this gap is about 28.4 billion Afs. (ca. 570 million USD) (NRVA, 2007/08).

Figure 20: Poverty headcount rate, by residence and major region



Source: NRVA, 2007/08

- **Poverty gap ratio**

The NRVA 2007/2008 reveals, that the poverty gap ratio (or poverty gap index) across Afghan residential groups reveals the same pattern as that of the headcount rate for Afghan urban and rural areas: the rural figure is almost identical to the national rate (8%) and the urban rate is lower (6%). Because the poverty gap is lower in urban areas. Yet, in the same proportion to the headcount rate, the urban poor are on average just as poor as the rural poor. In contrast, the poverty gap for the Kuchi population is relatively higher at 14%, which indicates that the Kuchi not only suffer from a higher prevalence of poverty, but the Kuchi poor are on average also poorer compared to other groups (Table 38) (NRVA, 2007/08).

Table 38: Poverty measures in Afghanistan

Poverty measure	Urban	Rural	Kuchi	National
Poverty head count rate	29.1	36.4	54.3	36.0
Poverty gap index (ratio)	6.2	7.9	14.0	7.9
Squared poverty gap index	2.0	2.6	5.2	2.6

Source: NRVA 2007/08

The analysis of poverty throughout the year reflects variations associated with seasonality, as well as the food price crisis in the first half of 2008 (NRVA, 2007/08). Figure 21 illustrates, how the poverty rate in Afghanistan climbs steadily follows a 12-month cycle, beginning in fall – (during harvest time) when poverty is lowest and then, gradually increasing through winter and spring to summer, when poverty highest (World Bank, 2010. However, it should be noted that food prices had increased dramatically during the first half of 2008. For

example, wheat flour price in Afghanistan rose with a country-wide average of 58% between January 2007 and January 2008. The observed trends are combined of both factors described. More research should be done to disentangle the two intervening effects of seasonality and food price crisis (NRVA, 2007/08).

Figure 21: Poverty headcount rate, by season



Source: NRVA 2007/08

Figure 27 illustrates which provinces in Afghanistan are mostly affected by poverty. As can be seen, particularly the provinces of Badakhshan, Balkh and those in the south around Kabul suffer from high poverty incidence.

Figure 22: Province-level poverty rates



Source: NRVA, 2007/08

- **Share of poorest quintile in national consumption**

The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of consumption among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents absolute equality with everybody consuming the same amount; a value of 100 represents absolute inequality, where all consumption is concentrated in one person. Overall inequality in Afghanistan, represented by the national Gini index of 29, is low and also lower than for neighbouring countries in South and West Asia. There is however, differentiation across regions in the sense that in several south-western regions inequality is very low. It can be noted that the regions Southwest and West-Central link high equality with particularly widespread poverty (Figure 23) (NRVA, 2007/08).

Figure 23: Gini Index, by residence and region, and for selected countries



Source: NRVA 2007/08

The distribution of per-capita real consumption expenditure shows that the richest quintile has a share in total consumption expenditure of 39%, more than four times higher than that of the poorest quintile (Table 39). The share of poorest quintile in national consumption is 9%. However, the shares of the two quintiles below the richest do not much deviate from the 20% that would be implied by equality. This indicated that the inequality importantly originates in a relative wealthy top quintile and that the other successive quintiles only moderately differ from one to another. In fact the per capita expenditure of the middle quintile is close to the poverty line, suggesting that a significant proportion of the non-poor can be considered vulnerable to falling under the poverty line (NRVA, 2007/08).

Table 39: Mean per-capita monthly real consumption expenditure and share in consumption, by: *(a) Population quintile (b) Poverty status*

Poverty variable	Population Share	Per-capita expenditure	Consumption share	Cumulative share
a. Poverty line				
Poorest	20	758	9%	9%
Second Poorest	20	1,100	13%	22%
Middle	20	1,416	17%	39%
Second richest	20	1,858	22%	61%
Richest	20	3,231	39%	100%

b. Poverty status				
Poor	36	950	20%	20%
Non Poor	64	2,079	80%	100%

Source: NRVA, 2007/08

- **Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector**

The share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector was 8.0% during the NRVA survey implementation in 2007/08. This indicator is a measure of gender equality and women's empowerment, as well as the degree to which labour markets are open to women in industry and service sectors, which affects not only equal employment opportunity for women but also economic efficiency through flexibility of the labour market and, therefore, the economy's ability to adapt and change. A higher share in paid employment could secure for women better income, economic security and well-being. In Afghanistan, women remain at a disadvantage in securing paid jobs. Their overall share in wage employment is even significantly below the average for Southern Asia (17%), the region with the lowers share in the world (NRVA, 2007/08).

- **Urbanization in Afghanistan**

It has been observed that the Afghan urban population has grown rapidly in the past decade. Urbanisation has been largely prompted by refugees and internally displaced persons returning to the cities. Although it is not known whether Afghan returnees to Afghan cities also originated from these areas it is estimated that returnees have taken advantage of the perceived benefits and livelihoods opportunities offered by urban life. In 2005, around 70% of urban citizens lived in only six cities: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. Consequently, the Afghan government is facing high pressure in terms of urban governance and urban management (Beall & Esser, 2005). Of all cities in Afghanistan Kabul remains the biggest with an estimated population of about three million in 2005. According to some sources, growth rate of Kabul were as 17% in recent years. Currently the city continues to grow annually by 5% (Kantor, 2008). In 2009, the total number of people residing in Kabul was estimated at 3.57 million. Table 40 shows the increase of the urban and rural population in Afghanistan from 1950 to present and possible projections of the population until 2050 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009).

Table 40: Afghan Urban and Rural Population from 1950 to 2050

Area	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050

Rural pop in mil.	7,679	8,848	10.534	11.760	10.304	16.388	22,537	29.134	34.353	37.788	39.189
Urban pop. in thousands	473	769	1.306	2.186	2,277	4.148	6.581	10.450	16.296	24.508	34.749
% Urban	5.8	8.0	11.0	15.7	18.1	20.2	22.6	26.4	32.2	39.3	47.0

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009

- **Internal (rural-urban) migration**

A study by Opel in 2005, examined 997 individuals in three cities of Afghanistan (Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad). The study aimed to gain a better understanding of rural to urban labour migration in Afghanistan. The study observed that lack of emplyoment in rural areas is one of the major causes of rural-urban migration. Overall, 42% of the respondents mentioned that both lack of opportunities in their home villages and the perceived better opportunities available in the cities were the major factors in their decision to migrate, while 38% of the respondents mentioned the lack of rural employment opportunities alone as the major cause of their decision to migrate. Similar findings were observed in other recent studies. The study also revealed that migration flow towards the cities is rapidly increasing (Opel, 2005).

Although the findings in the NRVA 2007/08 confirm that employment is one of the major push and pull factors for migration, rural-urban migration was almost not present in the NRVA 2007/08 (only 3%), instead the phenomenon of urban-rural migration was more frequent (14%). Most migrants in the NRVA stated that they moved intra-provincial due to security issues. More specifically, for short-distance urban migrants, marriage was an important reason to migrate, while for those heading to urban areas, education played a major role. However, regardless of the findings in the NRVA 2007/08 rural-to-urban migration is the most important type of move in developing countries and also other research seems to indicate its importance in Afghanistan (i.e. see AREU 2005).

With regard to length of stay, the NRVA 2005 revealed that households who had a migrant, the average length of stay of the migrant in the city was 2.8 years, the longest in Herat City (3.43 years) and the shortest in Jalalabad City (1.39). For Kabul, the average stay was 2.2 years[36] (NRVA, 2005).

[36] Look also the study of Ghobadi, N., Koetll, J. & Renos Vakis (2005): Moving out of Poverty: Migration Insights from Rural Afgahnistan Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation

3.2 Labor market conditions

- **Level of income**

Based on GDP and population figures in the UNDP Human Development Report 2007, the annual average wage for an Afghan worker was around US$375 in 2007 (UK Parliament, 2007). With regard to Afghans working in the agricultural sector poppy cultivation is a lucrative business. In 2010, the average farm-gate price of dry opium at harvest time was US$169 per kg - a 164% increase over 2009, when the price was US$64 per kg. Despite the drop in production, the gross income per hectare of opium cultivated increased by 36% to US$ 4,900. Although a study revealed that many farmers would like to stop poppy cultivation, the average annual income of opium-growing households in 2009 was 17% higher than for households that had stopped opium cultivation (UNODC, 2010). Since 93% of the Afghan population depends on agriculture for survivals, poppy cultivation does not seem like much of a choice.

In contrast to the majority of the Afghan population who is involved in the agricultural sector, other income groups also face low salaries. For example, prosecutors are known to earn US$60 per month and judges US$100. This low salary among judicial authorities is a major factor that contributes to corruption and undermines public trust in the justice system (UNDP, 2009). Moreover, Afghans with an education and the skills greatest in demand such as university professors and physicians make about US$100 a month working (Younossi, 2006). Although these figures vary with time and place of employment (rural, urban), they demonstrate that working in Afghanistan is not very attractive for university graduates and even less for Afghans in exile. As a consequence, many Afghans search for work outside their home country where salaries are often higher and working conditions better. The issue of attracting Afghans in exile to return and to work in Afghanistan is further discussed in the next sections on pp.108.

- **Differences in the level of income/salary within Afghanistan and other countries**

Iran & Pakistan

The average daily wages for Pakistan are US$4 and for Iran US$9. However, it should be noted that general cost of living is lower in Pakistan than in Iran (Stigter, 2004). Nonetheless, possible employment opportunities and much higher salaries in Iran and Pakistan are contributing to high migration flows between Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries (as could be seen in section 2.7-2.9 on cross-border flows and circular migration). A study by ILO on Afghans living in Iran showed that the average weekly income of Afghan male

employees was 33,400 tomans[37] (US$31,54) compared to 10,600 tomans for females (US$10,01) in 2005/06. Afghans usually received lower wages than their Iranian counterparts. The average wage of Iranian workers (per month) was US$195 compared to US$172 for Afghan workers, indicating a difference of about 13%. The highest wages for both workers was in the industrial sector. In services, the wages ranged from US$148 (Afghan) to US$162 (Iranian). The total wages (including extra payments) ranged from US$182 (for Afghans) to US$224 (Iranians). In both cases, Iranian enjoyed a 10-23% wage differential. Although it has been noted the education level of Iranian employees (especially women employees) was much higher than that of Afghan employees, this only explains one part of the wage differentials between native and Afghan workers (Wickramasekara et al, 2006). In addition, the Pakistan Census (2005) of Afghans living in Pakistan showed that a majority of Afghan households (53%) reported to be living on daily wages, meaning that most households had no regular income but had to search for work every day anew (The Government of Pakistan & UNHCR, 2005). A study by AREU in 2001/02 researched the livelihood strategies of Afghans in Karachi (Pakistan). The study made clear that the average household monthly income of Afghan households in urban Sindh was nearly three-fifth higher (11,116 rupees) than for Pakistan (7,167 rupees) as a whole. The urban Sindh household income was even 80% higher than in comparison with rural North West Frontier Province (6,334 rupees) (AREU, 2005). Another study by AREU researched livelihood strategies of Afghans in Peshawar (Pakistan), showing that families had a monthly income ranging from US$50 – US$400. These income differences were reflective of the qualitative complexity and income ranges found in the Peshawar economy in general (AREU, 2006a) and are likely to also appear among other Afghan communities living in Pakistan.

Canada, U.S & Netherlands

In 2005, the average wage for the Afghan population in Canada (15 years and over) was for both sexes combined US$18,299 per year. On average, men received a higher salary per year than women, with an annual average wage of US$20,961 and US$14,789 respectively. The annual average income for men was US$19,292 for men and US$14,668 for women (Canada Census, 2006). The annual per capita income of Afghan workers (both sexes combined) in the U.S. was US$17,362 whereas it was US$25,267 for the total population in the country (American Community Survey, 2006).

[37] The rial (code: IRR) is the currency of Iran. It is subdivided into 100 dinar but, because of the very low current value of the rial, no fraction of the rial is used in accounting. Therefore, Iranians commonly express amounts of money and prices of goods in "tomans." 1 Toman = 10 Rials

With respect to the Netherlands, Afghans have the lowest household income among all immigration groups in the country. In 2003, around two-thirds of all Afghan households received less than €900 per month, and very few earned more than 1,300€ (Siegel, 2010).

- **Labor force volume**

Due to the very large share of children, less than half of the Afghan population is in the official working age of 16 years and over. Within this working-age population of over 12 million people (12.057 million), 6.148 million were male and 5,909 female (NRVA, 2007/08) in 2007/08. Table 41 shows the national labor force by sex and age distribution (in thousands).

Table 41: Labour force in Afghanistan by age group

Age	Male	Female	Both sexes
16-17	536	492	1,028
18-24	1,482	1,388	2,869
25-39	1,965	2,146	4,112
40-64	1,726	1,641	3,367
65+	439	242	680
Total	6,148	5,909	12,057

Source: NRVA 2007/08

It should be noted that within the working-age population of over 12 million people, approximately four million people were inactive and eight million actively engaged in the labour market, either by working or by looking for work. Of those actively engaged in the labour market, 5.3 million were males and 2.8 million females. The labour force participation rate is a key indicator in the analysis of the human resources available for the production of goods and services and for the projections of labour supply. Comparison of labour force participation for both sexes combined show high rates in rural areas (71%) and among the Kuchi population (78%). This is typical for less developed economies where wage earning opportunities are few and most people are engaged in labour-intensive agriculture activities. In urban areas, the overall labour force participation is significantly lower (49%), indicating opportunities other than employment, such as school attendance and perhaps less necessity to work due to lower poverty. The overall labour force participation rate of 67% in Afghanistan conceals large differences by sex and age. Although generally labour force participation is lower for females than for males, in the Afghan economy the gender gap is large. Less than half (47%) of the working-age females is currently active on the labour market, against 86% of males. The gap is relatively small in the rural Kuchi population (respectively 24 and 28 %) due to female engagement in agricultural and pastoral activities. However, in urban areas it is

as large as 60% because of a very low female labour force participation of 21% (NRVA, 2007/08).

- **Labor force growth rate per 1,000 population**

The rise in labour supply has been dramatic. According to the ILO, the labour force in Afghanistan has increased 19% from approximately 7.5 million in 2002 to approximately 9 million in 2006 (UNDP, 2009). The NRVA survey has shown that labour force has increased to a further 12 million in 2007/08 (NRVA, 2007/08). Overall, Afghanistan has a surplus of labour and a lack of available and secure employment, which is discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.

- **Unemployment**

In the NRVA 2005, the unemployment rate was approximately 9.6% whereas in the NRVA 2007/08 the unemployment[38] rate for males was 6.9% and for females 7.4%. For both sexes combined the unemployment rate in Afghanistan was 7.1% in 2007/08. This relative low number of unemployment rate however disguises high underemployment, poverty and low production. In developing countries who usually lack social protection schemes, many individuals simply cannot afford to be unemployed. Consequently, many must resort to dangerous, unproductive, low-paid jobs, often in the informal sector and for the few hours employment is available. In this context, a low unemployment rate in Afghanistan reflects a poorly performing labour market with Afghans being too poor to be unemployed (NRVA, 2007/08). In contrast to the NRVA 2007/08 other sources (such as the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs) estimate that Afghanistan's unemployment rate is as high as 33%. The Human Rights Field Monitoring data suggest a much lower unemployment rate of 24% among both urban and rural males. The unemployment rate for females is estimated to be as high as 54% in urban areas and 62% in rural areas (UNDP, 2009b). The differences in unemployment rate are likely due to (at least in part) different sampling procedures and definitions of used to define unemployment in Afghanistan.

- **Informal economy**

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) states, that *the informal economy is seen as comprised of all forms of informal employment that is, employment without formal*

[38] Note: No agreed exact definition of employment and unemployment exists in the statistical system of Afghanistan. In accordance to ILO recommendations, and the analysis used in the NRVA 2007/08, all working-age persons who are engaged in economic activities are classified as being employed. This also includes people who work only few (sometimes only one) hours a week (NRVA, 2007/08).

contracts (i.e. covered by labor legislation), worker benefits or social protection –both inside and outside informal enterprises. However, the fact that workers in the informal economy usually work without contracts and often have no right to workers benefits or social protection does mean their work is illegal. The majority of Afghan workers is forced to work under conditions that violate the most basic standards of dignity, safety and health. There are Afghans who earn a high salary in the informal economy as entrepreneurs however, these are rare exceptions. In most cases the informal economy is characterized low productivity, erratic and unpredictable salaries and highly dependent on seasonable variations. Informal workers are generally under-employed rather than unemployed, working significantly fewer days a year than they would like because of a lack of work opportunities. The fact that they work without regulation or protection also means that these individuals are subject to harassment and extortion. In 2010, Afghanistan's informal economy constitutes 80-90% of the country's total economic activity (Wright, 2010). In the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the Afghan Government recognized that the poorest workers are *concentrated primarily in the informal sectors, which pays very low salaries and leaves them without job protection* (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008b) A report by the Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC) in 2010 showed that over 59% of workers interviewed said that their work was irregular and 79% said they would like more hours per day in paid work. A total of 73% of informal workers said their work was seasonal and 40% of construction and agricultural workers in the sample were without work for seven to eight months in the last year. Another 36% were without work for five to six months in the last year. Over 88% of informal worker households reported, that they had to by food on credit during the last 12 months as their income derived from informal work failed to cover basic household expenses (Wright, 2010). Linking these high unemployment and underemployment rates to a workforce of over 12 million people, it becomes clear why out-migration and cross-border flows between Afghanistan and its neighbouring states are very high. However, despite a lack of employment for the majority of Afghans (who is illiterate,) the country has a high demand in high skilled labour which is further discussed in the next paragraph.

- **Skill shortages**

Afghanistan's demand for high skilled labour is needed at almost every level (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006). The country faces many challenges in the health care and educational sector. Persistent gaps in demand and supply of science and technology trained manpower are likewise present. Moreover, there is a high demand of skilled labour in the

communications infrastructure. Professionals are needed to rebuild damaged and inadequate potable water, irrigation and flood control systems. In many areas people experience a shortage of electricity and have to earn their livelihood with obsolete agriculture practices. New technologies are urgently needed to contribute to undue pressure on the country's limited arable land. As a consequence, Afghanistan's development challenges are enormous and solutions will require strong visionary and innovative leadership, well-coordinated science and technology structures, and an effective human resource strategy. There is consensus that improving the quality of the higher education system is central to the economic improvement of Afghanistan. This is as higher education will provide the high-level person power the country needs so urgently. Higher Education is one of the eight pillars of the Afghan National Development Strategy[39] (ANDS) (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2011). At current state, talented Afghans who graduated secondary or tertiary school are leaving the country and only few are returning from abroad. Main push factors for high skilled Afghans to leave the country are among others, insurgent attacks and threats across the country. Moreover, low salaries and widespread criminal activities are not a very attractive perspective for young people to stay in the country. Therefore, most of the students asked at Kabul University replied that they want to emigrate as soon as they are finished with their study. Afghans with an education and the skills in greatest demand (such as physicians, teachers or university professors) know that they can earn far more and live far better elsewhere (Younossi, 2006). Since it is almost impossible for a state to hold people in a country (whether they are needed or not) the Afghan state and international organization have reached out to skilled and educated Afghans living in the diaspora.

- **Return programs for qualified Afghans**

International organizations such as the IOM and World bank actively encourage and support Afghans abroad to return to their home country and fill skills gaps in the Afghan Government and public services, invest in the private sector and assist with the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan (Oeppen, 2009). To date, a total of 846 Afghan experts living abroad, have returned to Afghanistan from 32 countries under IOM's assistance (IOM, 2011). From the Netherlands alone (from 2002-2011) IOM assisted a total of 153 Afghans to return and help local Afghan institutions in their capacity building (Personal Email contact with IOM The Hague, 2011). Many other organisations likewise aim at sending skilled migrants home[40]. For

[39] The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) is discussed in more detail in Part D, section5.3

[40] It should be noted that IOM, IntEnt or CIM do not offer return programs explicitly for Afghans, but focus also on other migrants populations from i.e. Morocco, Ghana, Ethiopia etc.)

example, IntEnt (Internationalisation of Entrepreneurship) in the Netherlands or CIM (Centre for International Migration) in Germany created returning programs for highly skilled Afghans who wish to return home after having worked or studied in the Netherlands or Germany. The organisations offer individualised advisory services to plan the experts return home and furthermore support the migrants own business idea or forwards suitable job vacancies and local contacts in the country of destination. Depending on the skills, additional payments to top up the local salary in the home country are made and financial assistance to cover travel and transport expenses are arranged (CIM, 2010). For example, the IntEnt Foundation focuses explicitly on migrant entrepreneurs who wish to set up a business in their country of origin. In 2010, for the first time, six Afghan migrants participated in the program. All participants aimed to open their own business in Kabul, among others an architect who wanted to open his own architecture bureau and a physician who aimed to build his own healthcare centre. All Afghans had a starting capital; the bulk of finance however was retrieved either from financial institutions or family and friends. With regard to age and gender, all participants were male and relatively young with five participants between 23 and 29 and participant in his mid40s (IntEnt, 2011).

- **Labor permits issued to Afghans abroad**

As already mentioned, a high share Afghans in neighbouring countries is without any valid documents. This is also confirmed by the study of ILO & UNHCR on cross border migration, where most Afghans passed the border without any passports or working permits. With regard to neighbouring states, in 2008 the Iranian Ministry of Labour introduced for the first time work permits for refugees. Especially male refugees between 16 and 60 years were encouraged to apply. The Iranian government claimed that 300,000 of such work permits were issued. However, if Afghan refugees sought to find employment in Iran's labour market, they were required to purchase short-term work permits at a cost of circa US$70. In March 2009, the Iranian government increased the cost of a new permit to US$500 or US$300 for a permit renewal. Given this high increase in cost and the work permit's short validity (up to 3 months), the majority of Afghan refugees working in Iran have opted to work without valid permits. At current point, while the Iranian government is still finalising its labour policies, authorities seem to be tolerating refugees' expired work permits (Koepke, 2011).

3.3 Governance and security

- **Number of changes in government**

The first major change in governance structure in the 20th century was in 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from Britain and Amanullah declared himself King of the country. In 1933, Zair Shah became King and reigned for the next four decades. The second change appeared during Soviet Invasion when former secret police chief Najibullahr was installed as president and the "Najibullah Government" obtained authority (1986–1992) of the country. The third major change took place in 1996 when the Taliban emerged and became nationally and internationally (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) recognized with Burhanuddin Rabbani as president. The fourth and last change in government took place in 2001, when international forces invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban regime. An interim government was appointed, headed by Hamid Karzai who was declared winner of the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections in Afghanistan (BBC, 2011). These severe political changes and the therewith associated conflicts in the country have eroded Afghanistan's political system. Moreover, the current government in Afghanistan is facing huge challenges to build rebuild its credibility and state legitimacy among the population.

- **Legitimacy of the State**

Legitimacy can be defined as *the recognised authority to hold and exercise power*. State legitimacy is conferred both by the population living under the authority of the state and by other nation states, especially through bodies such as the United Nations. The legitimacy of a state depends on the expectations of its population, in terms of what they believe a state ought to do and whether they believe it is performing adequately. As such, state building is about the social contract between the government and the people and the degree to which people think the government will meet their expectations. Applying this interpretation of state legitimacy to Afghanistan it can be said that linkages between the Afghan state and the people remain quite weak. However, people's expectations of the Afghan state have generally increased over the past decade, in part because of the regime change and international intervention (Parkinson, 2010). A study by the Asia Foundation (2010) showed that the satisfaction rate of Afghans towards their government was relatively high in 2010. When respondents were asked on how they felt about the way the national government eas carrying out its responsibilities, 73% gave a positive assessment, including 17% who said that the government was doing a very good job and 56% who said it was doing quite a good job. The study also observed that overall satisfaction with the performance of the national government had been rising since 2008 from 67% to 71% in 2009. The satisfaction had further increased to 73% in 2010. However, the numbers have yet to reach the highest satisfaction figure which

was 80% in 2007 (Tariq, Ayoubi & Haqbeen, 2010). In spite of these figures, it should not be forgotten that presidential and provincial elections in Afghanistan have been perceived with mistrust and criticism. This is as severe irregularities during voting and counting procedures were observed. Moreover, inadequate candidate vetting mechanisms and voter intimidations had marred many people's perception of the legitimacy of the Afghan government (The Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, 2007). In addition, the Afghan National Police (ANP) is widely perceived by the public as a coercive instrument of state control rather than an institution that is committed to the protection of the Afghan citizen. The ANPs failure to provide security undermines the state's legitimacy. As a result, many Afghans are forced to rely on strongmen or warlords for protection (International Crisis Group, 2009).

- **Areas not under the control of the Government**

In 2010, the United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO continued to support the Afghan Security Forces (ANSF) in the provision of security throughout the country (Appendix 3). Overall, the security situation in the country has decreased in the last years. Figure 24 shows the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan in March and October 2010. In October, just as in March, nearly all of southern Afghanistan (the focus of the coalition's military offensives) remained areas of *very high risk*, with no noted improvements. At the same time, the green belt of *low risk* districts in northern, central and western Afghanistan shrivelled. The October map upgraded to *high risk* 16 previously more secure districts in Badghis, Sar-e-Pul, Balkh, Parwan, Baghlan, Samangan, Faryab, Laghman and Takhar provinces; only two previously *high risk* districts, one in Kunduz and one in Herat province, received a safer rating (Afghan Central, 2010). According to preliminary statistics compiled by the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, the number of insurgent-initiated attacks rose by 66% in 2010 from the previous year (Afghan Central, 2010). In November 2010, 11 additional districts were designated as high risk and an additional three were rated as very high risk to the United Nations operations. These included not only areas contiguous with districts that have long been the focus of the insurgency in the south, but increasingly included areas in the north of Afghanistan (United Nation General Assembly Security Council, 2011).

Figure 24: Deterioration in Afghanistan – UN Map Evidence 2010



Source: Afghan Central, 2010

On Monday 21 March 2011, the Afghan President Hamid Karzai said, that his security forces will soon take charge of security in seven areas around the nation, marking the first step toward the goal of having Afghan police and soldiers protecting the entire nation by the end of 2014. More specifically, Karzai said that the provincial capitals of Lashkar Gah in southern Afghanistan, Herat in the west, Mazer-e-Sharif in the north and Mehterlam in the east are slated for transition from NATO-led forces to Afghan soldiers and police beginning in July 2011(Riechmann, 2011).

- **Human rights in Afghanistan**

Progress on the implementation of Human Rights in Afghanistan is limited. Ruled by the Afghan President, Afghanistan was not been included in the Human Rights Violators Index for the last years (Asian Centre for Human Rights, 2008). The public and the media have limited resources to discuss openly human rights issues and to call public authorities and other power brokers to account. According to some sources, human rights issues in Afghanistan are contradicting local traditions and are thus, a luxury the country cannot afford (United Nation General Assembly Council, 2008). The worsening security situation in the country has substantially slowed down the implementation of human rights including the right to life and safety, freedom of movement, access to education and health. Illegal and arbitrary detention is widespread across the country and in many cases suspects are not given defense councils or are tortured to force confessions. There are frequent reports of arbitrary denial of justice in disputes over housing, land and property rights. Moreover, the freedom of expression is

threatened, with continuing reports of arbitrary arrests, detention and intimidation of journalists (OHCHR, 2011).

In 2011, it has become public that the Afghan government has to investigate thousands of allegations of human right violations and criminal activities. Moreover, over 40 politicians were accused of serious human right abuses, including murder, kidnapping, extortion and intimidation of journalists, while serving in the Afghan parliament. The human rights organization Amnesty International requested the Afghan government to further investigate human right violations by high officials without recourse to parliamentary immunity (Amnesty International, 2011).

Implementation of Human Rights

In 2010, UNAMA in cooperation with UNHCR published a report on harmful traditional practices[41] and the implementation of the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women. The aim of the report was to advocate with Government representatives, civil society and other stake holders to stop harmful practices in the country and improve protection mechanisms for the most vulnerable (UNAMA & OHCHR, 2011). The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), in coordination with the Ministry of Interior and the European Union Police, developed and published a training manual for the prevention of violence against women. The Afghanistan Police Academy has now integrated this into the training curriculum. Moreover, in January 2011, the Afghan Government circulated a draft regulation on women's protection centers, which called for full Government control over shelters for women. These shelters are a critical service for women and girls facing violence and abuse in Afghanistan. Although, the regulation represents progress towards acknowledging the importance of women's discrimination in the country, it also includes passages that are of serious concern to women's and human rights organization. Therefore, several human rights organizations among others, the Criminal Law Reform Working Group[42], have proposed revisions to the draft regulation (United Nation General Security Assembly, 2011).

In 2010, UNAMA and international donors worked with the Afghan government to create a funding mechanism in the State budget for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). The mechanism aims to safeguard the Commission's financial and operational independence. In December 2010, the Ministry of Finance announced that the

[41] Harmful practices include among others; forced and child marriage, exchange of girls to settle disputes, exchange marriages, so called "honour" killings (UNAMA & UNHCR, 2011).

[42] The Reform Working Group was established by the Ministry of Justice to facilitate comments by Afghan and international experts on draft criminal laws and regulations and includes representatives of the Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (United Nation General Security Assembly, 2011).

Government had allocated over US$one million to the Commission, subject to parliamentary approval of the 2011/2012 budget (United Nation General Security Assembly, 2011).

In the beginning of 2011, the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs signed an action plan that prohibits the recruitment of underage individuals into the Afghan national security forces, including the army, police, intelligence services and other local services. Moreover, the Afghan government committed to further investigate the issue of human rights abuses against children (i.e. maimings, killings and sexual violence) by local and national security forces. In the same year, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) implemented the United Nations Afghanistan disability support program. The program is supported by the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Social Affairs. Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled and the Ministry of Education and Health. The aim of the program is to assist the Afghan Government in developing its capacity and required structures to increase access to and implementation of disability services throughout Afghanistan (United Nation General Security Assembly, 2011).

- **Human rights violations of Afghans abroad**

Besides human right violations of Afghans in their home country, human rights violations of Afghan refugees abroad also continue to be a matter of concern. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) stressed that the forced repatriation[43] of Afghan refugees from various countries and a cessation of their refugee status was in contrast to international refugee protection standards. Sources of human rights violations of Afghan refugees include inter alia, the harassment of refugees by police and other authorities (mainly in Iran and Pakistan), the issue of the reunification of refugees with their families in Australia, the status of Afghan asylum seekers on the Pacific island of Nauru, as well as the alleged beating and torture of Afghan refugees by police in Greece. Torture by authorities seems also widespread in some Central Asian countries and Russia where hundreds of Afghan refugees were beaten by police and mafia bands. In 2003, hundreds of Afghans were known to be in custody in Asian, European and Gulf states. In the same year, more than 45% of the Afghans imprisoned in Pakistan were children and women, who had fallen victim of drug mafias mainly due to issues related to poverty (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2004)

[43] See section 2.5 on forced repatriation of Afghan refugees

- **Rule of law**[44]

Overall, the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme court are lacking capacity and resources to process the amount of legislation that awaits drafting, scrutiny and review. Moreover, the lack of infrastructure and the absence of qualified staff further hamper any improvements. Although the Afghan government has established a National Legal Training Centre for future employees in the judicial or prosecutorial services, the deteriorating security situation in the country and widespread corruption make it difficult to employ qualified justice personnel. In addition, low salaries likewise contribute to conditions that are conductive to corruption. In this regard, lack of transparency and the absence of effective and fair mechanisms for investigating ethical-code violations result in insufficient accountability, undermining public trust in the judicial system (United Nation General Assembly Security Council, 2008). Although the Afghan Constitution lies down that every Afghan citizen has the right to courts and legal aid, the majority of the population (particularly women and children) have no resources to make use of this right. With most Afghans being illiterate, many simply do not know about their rights or how to make use of them. According to the Ministry of Justice, over 20% of children in custodial institutions are accused of offences that are not crimes under Afghan law (i.e. running away from home) (United Nation General Assembly Security Council, 2008). Furthermore, official data indicates that the Central Prison Department was housing a total of 18,970 sentenced prisoners in the beginning of 2011. Of these prisoners 597 were women and 281 children. The population in Afghan prisons has dramatically increased over the last years and poses a strain on the already overcrowded system that was designed for a maximum of 10,000 prisoners (United Nation General Assembly Security Council, 2011). A study by UNICEF and AIHRC (on 22 provincial juvenile facilities in Afghanistan) revealed that only 24% of juveniles had contact with a lawyer during detention, 56% reported that their statement was not given voluntarily and only 9% were given advice of their rights upon arrest (United Nation General Assembly Security Council, 2008).

However, despite these facts, there have been improvements in infrastructure development for the legal system, with an increasing number of private lawyers working in the country. In 2007, a new advocates law permitted the establishment of an independent bar association with over 400 registered attorneys. The law enacted that the full authority of legal aid lies with the Ministry of Justice not as before with the Supreme Court. As a result, the

[44] Since 2008, the 'World Justice Project' publishes the *Rule of Law Index*. However, as in case of the Human Rights Index, Afghanistan is not included. For more information see http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/

Ministry of Justice gained higher confidence and increasing support from the international community and other important stakeholders. In the same year Afghanistan developed the National Justice Sector Strategy and the National Justice Programme which both aim to strengthen Afghan's capacity to deliver: (i) legal services with integrity and accountability, (ii) public access to courts and legal aid and (iii) public awareness of legal rights and processes (United Nation General Assembly Security Council, 2008).

- **Recognition of migrants rights (Afghanistan)**

On 2 September 2005, Afghanistan has signed the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 2005d). Furthermore, under the seventh pillar of Afghanistan's National Development Strategy (ANDS) the Afghan Government focuses on refugees, returnees and internal displaced persons. The aim of the seventh Pillar is to facilitate the planned and voluntary return of refugees and IDPs and the reintegration of returnees and IDPs into society. The planned and voluntary return of refugees and IDPs is expected to contribute to economic growth, the reduction of poverty and the strengthening of security and stability of the country and the region (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008b). Furthermore, the Afghan government made clear that wants to facilitate regional cooperation and bilateral agreements with those countries, where the number of the Afghan diaspora is high. However, despite these efforts, only few policies have actually been implemented since 2008 and those who have been put into practice are often hampered by security issues and corruption across the country.

- **Bilateral agreements facilitating immigration**

Despite changes in Afghanistan's political situation after the fall of the Taliban, the population continued to flee in late 2001 in search for better economic opportunities. The UK, Germany and many other EU countries remained the primary destinations of choice. As a result, western countries were asked to turn away Afghan asylum seekers and instead to assist in their repatriation. In the mid-2002 Afghanistan signed tripartite agreements[45] with UNHCR and EU countries. All agreements or MoUs, lay down the scope, the objective and the modalities of repatriation. Moreover, the UNHCR's role in the return is clearly defined. Tripartite agreements also exist with neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Iran and are reviewed and renewed on a regular basis (i.e. in 2009 Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR signed an agreement to extend the stay of Afghan refugees in Pakistan until the end of 2012).

[45] An agreement is *tripartite* if three parties are involved, so the name "tripartite" provides no indication of what the parties involved have agreed on.

All agreements that were entered into were in compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol (Poppelwell, 2007). The following table (Table 42) gives an overview of tripartite and bilateral Agreements that are related to migration in and out of Afghanistan[46].

Table 42: Tripartite and bilateral Agreements between Afghanistan and other states/ institutions involved in Afghan return migration

Tripartite Agreements on the return of Afghan refugees		Parties	Implemented
1	Agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Governing the Repatriation of Afghan Citizens in Pakistan	Afghanistan Pakistan UNHCR	March 2002
2	Joint Programme between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and UNHCR for Voluntary Repatriation of Afghan Refugees and Displaced Persons	Afghanistan Iran UNHCR	1992 /April 2002
3	Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding[47] between the Government of the Netherlands, the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Afghanistan Netherlands UNHCR	March 2003
4	Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (the MoU) between the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan, the Government of Denmark and the United High Commissioner for Refugees	Afghanistan Denmark UNHCR	October 2004
5	Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (the MoU) between the Government of Norway, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Afghanistan Norway UNHCR	August 2005
6	Tripartite Agreement between the Government of the French Republic, the Government of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Afghanistan France UNHCR	September 2002
7	Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (the MoU) between the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (the UK Government), the Transitional Islamic Administration of the Transitional State of Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Afghanistan UK UNHCR	October 2002
8	Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (the MoU) between the Government of Australia, the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Afghanistan Australia UNHCR	January 2011

[46] More information on bilateral agreements can be found in Part D, section 5.1

[47] A *memorandum of understanding* is an agreement between two parties in the form of a legal document. It is not fully binding in the way that a contract is. In comparison to a treaty, a MoU has many practical advantages as it can be kept confidential, and put into effect in a timelier manner. In addition, a memorandum of understanding can be modified without lengthy negotiations.

9	Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Afghanistan Sweden UNHCR	December 2007
Bilateral agreements/ dialogue			
1	Bilateral Agreements that regulates the flow of Afghan labourers in Qatar	Afghanistan Qatar	April 2008
2	Afghanistan and Iran continued their dialogue on bilateral cooperation, particularly in relation to counter-narcotics efforts, migrant workers and railway building	Afghanistan Iran	2011
3	Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Directions of Bilateral Cooperation. The declaration lays out that both countries agree to encourage people to people exchanges and contacts especially between academia, think tanks, media and civil society	Afghanistan Pakistan	2009
Other			
	IOM's Return of Qualified Afghans Programme (RQA)		
	CIM (Center for International Migration)		
	IntEnt (Internationalisation of Entrepreneurship)		

Source: UNHCR 2011c, UNHCR Tripartite 2011a-i, Overfeld & Zumot 2010, U.S. Deparmtent of State 2010b

- **Number of internally displaced people (IDPs) due to conflicts**

After decades of war, armed conflict has been the main cause of displacement for Afghan residents. Some flee preventively, that is, to escape improvised explosive devices, attacks or night raids. Others flee in order to escape various armed actors whose practices of intimidation and harassment include extortion, forced recruitment and the feeding and caring for wounded combatants (Rothing, 2011).

After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, over 1.2 million Afghans were internally displaced due to an increase in armed conflict. As a result of an improving security situation, a high number of these IDPs were able to return shortly after 2002. In 2008, UNHCR identified 235,833 IDPs in the country, of which the bulk (166,153 persons) was displaced as a result of conflict in the prior to and after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and as a result of drought of the 1990s. These IDPs were largely living in camp-like settlements in the south (119,958), the west (29,690) and the southeast (12,341) of Afghanistan (UNHCR, 2008d). Conflict-induced displacement has been on the rise in 2010, and continued in begin of 2011. There are currently an estimated 400,000 IDPs in Afghanistan, of which an estimated 100,000 are displaced as a result of conflict. Of IDPs, over 100,000 are assisted by UNHCR which coordinates protection and assistance responses, including the facilitation of voluntary return

wherever possible. To better understand urban displacement and respond to the protection needs of internally displaced persons, UNHCR, in cooperation with the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and other line ministries, is currently undertaking protection profiling in informal settlements in Kabul (United Nation General Security Assembly, 2011).

Returning IDPs and refugees often face the problem that their land or property has be occupied by local warlords, their relatives or others individuals. As a consequence, between 20%-30% of refugee returnees have been forced into secondary internal displacement over the past five years. Other reasons such as human rights abuses perpetrated by the Taliban have likewise caused displacements, particularly in the southeast, south and central regions. According to sources, the Taliban has also target members of minority Shi'a groups. Nonetheless, most of the documented mass displacements occurred in the context of offensives by international forces in their struggle to growing insurgency (Rothing, 2011).

- **Immigration routes and means of transport of migrants and victims of trafficking**

With regard to the study by IOM (2008) on human trafficking in Afghanistan, respondents reported that they were trafficked to Iran and Pakistan using unofficial land border crossing points without any valid travel documents. When crossing the border, 11 out of 15 persons walked while the remaining four used vehicles. Most of those victims who were trafficked to Iran mentioned that Baluchi tribes on both sides of the Afghan-Iranian border were involved in the trafficking process. The study reflects that border controls at the Afghan border are scarce and confirms the existence of human trafficking networks along the Afghan border to Pakistan and Iran. Of the victims who were trafficked into Afghanistan from China (from the east coast, including Shanghai, Lianoning, Fujian, Heilongjiang and Jilin) most victims came to Afghanistan by air. Other victims crossed the land border at Torkham from Pakistan (IOM, 2008b).

The study by Altai Consulting & UNHCR on cross-border movements between Afghanistan and Pakistan observed that on any given day hundreds of smugglers were waiting with their cars or motorbikes at the Spin Boldak crossing point. The main task of these mugglers was to provide transportation for travellers form the town of Spin Boldak to the main border point. However, considering the lack of control at the border and the short distances most migrants had to travel, many did not make use of smugglers but rather crossed the border by themselves (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009).

However, in case Afghans have to reach countries that are further abroad, such as Australia, Afghans often depend on smugglers who coordinate and transport the migrant. In March 2011, the Indonesian police arrested 43 Afghans who were trying to reach Australia illegally. The group of Afghan migrants had flown from Afghanistan to Jakarta and travelled by bus to Madura Island to go there on board (Sunday Times, 2011). The problems and difficulties Afghan migrant on these complicated and dangerous routes face are among others that they do not end up where they intended to. Sources indicate that it often lies in the hand of smugglers to which country refugees are smuggled to. The few that make it to their final destinations of their choice often face discrimination, harassment and tedious bureaucratic immigration procedures. In some cases, they are refused the right to enter or come ashore, as it was the case of hundreds of Afghans who were shipped from Malaysia to Australia who were refuges to enter later re-routed to an island in the Pacific Ocean (Kenneth, 2007).

In January 2011, the Italian police reported that they had arrested 26 suspected members of a gang that smuggled hundreds of Afghans into Europe. Interviewees reported that up to 200 Afghans (including 40 minors) were brought to Europe every month by the gang. The immigrants came mainly from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and were brought to Italy through staging points in Iraq, Iran and Greece. The journey from Greece to Italy was by ship and final destination points in Europe included Belgium, Germany and Sweden. Smuggled Afghans reported that they paid between €3,000 and €3,500 (US$3,900 and US$4,600) to be smuggled from Afghanistan to Italy (EUbusiness, 2011).

- **Natural disasters**

Afghanistan is a land-locked country with a high prevalence of natural hazards such as earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, sandstorms and floods (Afghanistan National Disaster Management, 2008).

Earthquakes

In Afghanistan, the frequency of earthquakes is very high. This is as the country is located in a zone of high-seismic activity. Both, Northern Afghanistan and Pakistan are frequently hit by earthquakes, especially in the Hindu Kush area where the Eurasian and Indian tectonic plates collide. Due to the very low population density in the Hindu Kush region, hundreds of smaller earthquakes go unrecorded. However, sources indicate that at least twice a year, Afghanistan is hit by earthquakes of the magnitude 5-6 on the Richter scale. These earthquakes often cause thousands of people to leave their homes and move somewhere else in the region. This was also the case in 1996 in the west of the country when an earthquake caused damage to houses and mosques and forced over 500 families to leave their homes. Two years later, an

earthquake in the region of Rustaq damaged over 50,000 homes and killed 5,000 individuals. In 1999, an earthquake affected almost 20,000 families of which many had to leave their homes and seek for shelter somewhere else in the region. Two earthquakes of a significant magnitude were observed in the Hindu Kush region in 2002. The earthquake killed over 25 people and left over 10,000 people homeless. In April 2004, a powerful earthquake measuring 6.6 on the Richter was recorded along Afghanistan's north-east border with Pakistan. The population of Jurm District and Yangaan district in Badakhshan were affected. The quake was also felt in the city of Kabul and other areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Poppelwell, 2007). During 2006 nd 2009 several earthquakes of the magnitude 5-6 were occurred in the Hindu Kush region (CNN, 2008). In April 2009, two earthquakes of the magnitude 5.5 and 5.1 rocked Nangarhar province, 90 kilometres of Kabul. At least 19 people were killed and 20 wounded (Aljazeera, 2009). In April 2010, an earthquake with the magnitude of 5.3 hit Samangan province, about halfway between Kabul and the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. The earthquake killed at least seven people and injured 30. Overall, accurate information on the number of displacements is difficult to obtain as records and communications in Afghanistan's remote areas are sparse and casualty reports take time to reach authorities (FoxNews, 2010).

Floods and Landslides

Afghanistan has a long history of flooding that caused displacement and damage to infrastructure. For example in 1993, when flooding in the Hindu Kush area caused many deaths and lead to displacement and loss of household assets. In the same year, mudslides in Kabul destroyed houses and left 1,000 people homeless. In 1995 and 1997 floods leading to landslides occurred in the mountains of Badakhshan and in the northern region of Afghanistan. In spring of 2002, the west, north, north-east and central highlands of Afghanistan experienced high levels of rain in a short period of time resulting in flash floods and mudslides more than 2,000 households. The heavy rain fall caused crop damage, loss of housing and livestock. As a consequence, many affected households moved to urban areas or sent a family member to seek for employment. In March 2007, severe flooding occurred in various parts of the country, including Uruzgan, Badghis, Helmand, Nimroz, Daikundi and Herat provinces. An avalanche hit the province of Ghor, where 40 families were reported to be affected (Poppelwell, 2007). In 2010, major devastation floods have hit north-west Pakistan and Afghanistan. At least one million people were affected by the floods, and up to 27,000 were stranded. This caused also many Afghans living in Pakistan to return to their home country since they had lost all their property and livestock in Pakistan (Emergency

Appeal, 2010). In 2011, IRIN reported that Flash floods have killed many people in Afghanistan and destroyed thousands of houses particularly in Parwan, Herat, Wardak and Daykundi (IRIN, 2011b).

Drought

In the past decades, Afghanistan has experienced severe droughts of which some affected the whole country whereas others were restricted to certain areas. In 1970s, the area of Ghor was affected by a drought that lasted for three years. However, due to Government interventions, the affected population was not displaces and able to recover from the shock. However, 30 years later, parts of Afghanistan – notably Herat, Farah, Balkh, Samangan and Faryab – experienced four years of severe drought. The drought affected 2-3 million people and to a lesser extent 8-12 million. Due to the absence of government help and support by the international community, entire villages had to move to camps in the areas of Herat, Mazar and Kandahar. In 2000a and 2001, when the drought was most severe over half a million people had been displaced from their homes and was known to be living in camps around Herat. As a consequence of the drought, about 40% of the rural population was displaced in the country in 2006 (Poppelwell, 2007). The drought had mainly affected people in the north, west and central regions of Afghanistan. Many farmers from the north-western province Badghis tried to reach the Kunduz region where they hoped to get water from the Amu Darya River. By the end of 2006, most rain-fed crops (estimated to constitute 85% of the cultivated land) had failed. Additionally, many water sources had dried up and livestock mortality had increased. According to some sources, the drought had affected over 2 million Afghans in 2007 (Poppeelwell, 2007). One year later, the United States Department of Agriculture reported that the year had led to the worst drought conditions in the past 10 years (United States Department of Agriculture, 2008). Combined with high food prices, millions were without enough to eat (AlertNet, 2010). In February 2011, AlterNet reported that Afghanistan could face another serious drought during the year as low rainfall in the wet season had been measured. Figure 25 shows the areas that were mostly affected by the drought in2007/08.

Figure 25: Afghanistan – Percent of normal rain fall in 2007/08



Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 2008

While it is not yet clear how climate change will directly affect Afghanistan, sources indicate that climate change could potentially disrupt agricultural development by exacerbating drought (i.e. a decline in surface or subsurface water resources, such as rivers, lakes, reservoirs and ground water) and increase the severity and frequency of heat waves (Rogers, 2010). Due to uncoordinated management and excessive extraction of water for agriculture purposes, the water level of the Helmand River has already drastically declined (UNDP, 2010).

3. PART C: Impacts of migration

Part C of this thesis highlights the impact of migration on the socio-economic and human development in Afghanistan. Additionally, the impact of migration on Afghan return migrants and the Afghan diaspora is analyzed in more detail. Among others data has been collect on; demographic changes, economic prosperity and the integration of Afghan (return) migrants in and outside Afghanistan.

4.1 Demographic changes

- **Projected Afghan Population**

The United Nation Population Division Statistics Department publishes data on population growth in the coming decades. As can be seen in Table 43, the Afghan population is expected to grow fast in the coming decades. Whereas the current population is estimated to be around 29 million, the Afghan population is likely to have doubled by 2040 (UNSD, 2008). It is also expected that men further outweigh women in the population in the future, with estimated

three million more males in 2050 than females (UNSD, 2010). Figure 43 also shows only in the time span from 1980 to 1990, when millions of Afghans fled to other countries, the Afghan population has not increased. However, the current growth and increase in the Afghan population for the coming years is likely due to high fertility rather than migration movements.

Table 43: Afghan resident population volume in thousands (by sex) from 1950-2050

Sex	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Male	4220	4986	6143	7237	6527	10639	15079	20489	26206	30076	38210
Female	3932	4630	5696	6709	6054	9896	14038	19095	24443	32219	35728
Total	8151	9616	11840	13946	12580	20536	29117	39585	50649	62296	73938

Source: United Nation Statistics Division 2010

Table 44 shows that the population growth rate of the Afghan population is in accordance with political events. The growth rate has been negative during Soviet invasion (-2.52) but stabilized at the end of the 1980s. However, population growth decreased again during Taliban era between 1995 and 2000. The current population growth rate of 3.54% is likely to have reached its strongest point and estimates show that the Afghan population will further grow in the future, however to a slower extent that it is currently the case.

Table 44: Afghanistan Population growth rate (%) and population change per year (thousands) 1950-2050

Period	Population growth rate	Population change per year	Period	Population growth rate	Population change per year
1950-1955	1.54	131	**2000-2005**	3.54	794
1955-1960	1.76	162	**2005-2010**	3.45	922
1960-1965	1.97	199	**2010-2015**	3.25	1062
1965-1970	2.19	246	**2015-2020**	2.90	1068
1970-1975	2.37	298	**2020-2025**	2.55	1077
1975-1980	0.91	123	**2025-2030**	2.38	1136

1980-1985	-2.52	-331	**2030-2035**	2.17	1161
1985-1990	0.46	57	**2035-2040**	1.97	1168
1990-1995	7.26	1101	**2040-2045**	1.79	1169
1995-2000	2.54	490	**2045-2050**	1.63	1160

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009

- **Population age distribution**

The Afghan population is very young with over currently over 45% of the population falling in the age range of 0-14 years (Table 45). The population aged 15-59 is increasing in strength and made up half of the Afghan population in 2010. The oldest age group, including people aged 60 and above, will increase in the coming years however; this is not related to migration patterns but rather to improved living standards and developments in the healthcare, education and economic sector. After all the elderly population will remain small making only 5.9% of the total population in 2050.

Table 45: Afghan population by age distribution

Age Group	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
0-14	3476	4142	5198	6294	5805	9656	13360	17333	21009	23253	24386
(%)	42.6	43.1	43.9	45.1	46.1	47.0	45.9	43.8	41.5	37.3	33.0
15-59	4307	5064	6160	7097	6285	10103	14650	20741	27551	36053	45153
(%)	52.8	52.7	52.0	50.9	50.0	49.2	50.3	52.4	54.4	57.9	61.1
60 +	368	411	482	554	490	777	1108	1511	2089	2989	4399
(%)	4.5	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.8	4.1	4.8	5.9

Source: United Nation Statistics Division 2010

- **Ageing factor of population (number of persons aged 60 years and over per 100 inhabitants) (by sex and rural/urban)**

As can be seen in Table 46, the number of individuals aged 65+ in Afghanistan is relatively low with both, males and females making up only a total of 3% of the Afghan population in 2007/08. The highest number of the elderly could be found among male individuals residing in urban areas (4%). In all other categories (rural, Kuchi and national) males aged 65 and over make up 3% of the total population. The data in Table 46 also shows that women aged 65+ make up a constant of 2% of the population in all categories. Besides the fact that men outnumber women in the population, the higher number of elderly men in urban areas might be explained by a higher migration rate among male migrants to urban areas (NRVA, 2007/08).

Table 46: Population by residence, sex and by age (65+) in 2007/08

Age 65+	Urban		Rural		Kuchi		National		Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
In thousands	102	57	313	175	26	17	12,787	12,173	24,960
As % of total pop.	4%	2%	3%	2%	3%	2%	3%	2%	3%

Source: NRVA 2007/08

- **Urban population as percentage of total population**

As already mentioned, it is especially the urban population that is rapidly increasing in Afghanistan. Table 47 shows that in 1950, the urban population made up 5.8% of the total population in Afghanistan. The number has increased to 22.6% in 2010 and is expected to further increase to 47.0% in 2050. This means, that almost half of Afghans expected population (ca. 35 million people) is likely to be living in urban settlements by 2050. This phenomenon is common in developing countries, where high rural-urban migration occurs. Although the NRVA 2007/08 has found a low frequency of rural to urban migration, figures of UNHCR and other studies have shown that the majority of Afghan returnees (between 2002 -2009) had settled on their return in urban areas, mainly Kabul (Table 30/pp.66). Therefore, it can be concluded that high urbanization rate in Afghanistan is, at least in part, due to migration movements.

Table 47: Afghan urban population as % of total population

Area	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Urban pop of total pop.	5.8 %	8.0 %	11.0 %	15.7 %	18.1 %	20.2 %	22.6 %	26.4 %	32.2 %	39.3 %	47.0 %

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009

4.2 Economic prosperity

- **Remittances to Afghanistan**

The World Bank reports that Afghanistan and some other countries (i.e., Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe) do not report data on remittances in the IMF Balance of Payments statistics (World Bank 2011). However, although not being reported, remittances to Afghanistan exist and play a key in the survival of Afghan families and the Afghan economy (Kapur, 2003). The World Bank estimates that 15% of rural households in Afghanistan receive remittances from abroad, covering around 20% of family's daily expenditure (World

Bank, 2004). Remittances are also going to Afghans in the near diaspora. For example, the Collective for Social Science Research (2005) suggests that 40% of Afghans living in the area of Hayatabad in Peshawar, Pakistan are reliant on remittances from abroad (Oeppen, 2009). A 2007 report released by the International Fund for Agricultural Development estimated remittances to Afghanistan in 2006 at US$2.5 billion making 29.6% of the total GDP in Afghanistan at that time. This number however, includes formal and informal remittance channels (World Bank, 2005a).

The hawala system

In Afghanistan the mistrust towards the banking system is very high. This is as the majority of the Afghan population is illiterate and the finance sector very weak. In 2009, only 17 commercial banks existed, mostly in Kabul area. As a result, most Afghans, particularly those in rural areas, have no access to bank accounts. Most Afghans therefore, use informal networks such as the *hawala* system, which serve as the primary means of money transfer in the country. When Afghan migrants and refugees in Iran, Pakistan or other neighbor countries wish to send their savings back to their families in Afghanistan they usually entrust their money to a businessman (usually someone from a close circle or own tribe) who specialized in remittances known locally as a *hawaladar* (Schaeffer, 2008) (for more information on the hawala system read Monsutti 2004, Monsutti 2006, Schaeffer, 2008, Hanifi, 2006).

Re mittances from Iran

In 1995, Alessandro Monsutti reported that over 600 million Afghanis (about US$140,000 at the time on the black market) were sent every day from Quetta (Pakistan) to the district of Jaghori (Afghanistan) (Schaeffer, 2008). A UN report published in December 2008 referring to UNHCR and ILO sources came to the conclusion that Afghan remittances from Iran to Afghanistan amounted to US$500 million annually which was equivalent to 6% of Afghanistan's GDP at that time (Overfeld & Zumot, 2010). Other studies by AREU confirm these results, adding that Afghan young single men in Iran are sending 70% to 80% of their income as remittances (Stigter, 2005) which amounts to about US$500-1,300 per person per year (Abbasi-Shavazi & Glazebrook, 2006; Stigter, 2006).

Remittances from the US & Canada

The Afghanistan Investment and Support Agency (2004) estimated that on average, an Afghan person in the U.S. or Canada sends remittances of US$1,500 per person per year. The Agency stated that the total amount of remittances sent from the U.S. and Canada to Afghanistan might be as high approximately US$75 million per year, most of which is

transferred via the hawala system. The study by Hanifi (2006)[48] observed that a one single hawaladar in Virginia can have a customer base of 2,000-3,000 people. In a typical non-holiday month, the *hawaladar* dealt with about 450 customers. The hawaladar handled about US$110,000-120,000 per month of which US$60,000-70,000 went to Afghanistan and US$50,000-55,000 to Pakistan. Transfers reached approximately US$1.3 million and US$1.4 million annually, to Pakistan and Afghanistan respectively. The study indicated that Afghans living in Virginia, USA send on average US$250/month to Afghanistan and Pakistan, with amounts increasing in the month of Ramadan (Hanifi, 2006). The majority of clients in the U.S. were repeat customers with variable periodicities and volumes of transfer activities. During the course of the study, the hawaladar's clientele included only Afghans however, also non-Afghans, in particular European and American employees of aid and development agencies and non-government organization working in Afghanistan, often used the hawala system (Hanifi, 2006). This was also confirmed during the study by Maimbo (2003) who found that shortly after the fall of the Taliban, NGOs alone channelled at least US$200 million in emergency relief and development funding through the hawala system (Maimbo, 2003). However, remittances do not flow one sided. Hanifi (2006) found that high amounts of remittances are also flowing out of Afghanistan. So did the hawaladar in the study by Hanifi (2006) report, that he also moved money out of Afghanistan, approximately US$100,000 per month (April) 2005. This amount was more than his customers had sent in remittances to the country. In the study, the hawaldar also estimated that about US$1 billion leaves Afghanistan per month with part of the money coming from the opium economy (Hanifi, 2006)

Remittances from the Netherlands & Germany

With respect to the Netherlands, total workers' remittances leaving the country were at €798 million in 2006 (DNB, 2009). Of that amount, remittances to Afghanistan accounted for merely €79,409. That number remained within a consistent range over the next two years. In 2007, workers' remittances out of the Netherlands amounted to €663 million while remittances to Afghanistan were at €79,487. In 2008, the total outflow of workers' remittances was over €711 of which €79,664 went to Afghanistan (Siegel, et al, 2010). In the study by Siegel et al (2010) on Afghan migrants in the Netherlands, respondents mentioned that the amount of money sent varied with seasons and other periodic events. For example,

[48] The study by Hanifi (2006) explores the impact of social and material remittances on Afghanistan's development. In the study data on remittance flows was primarily provided by an Afghan money transfer agent or hawaladar in Virginia, U.S. who allowed the investigator liberal access to his clientele and business records from November 2004-2005.

during Ramadan or winter season in Afghanistan, migrants sent more money to their relative or friends. The study also showed that the amount of remittances sent varied between €100 and €300. Most Afghans in the Netherlands sent remittances between one and four times per year (Siegel et al, 2010).

According to the study by Vadean (2007) over €22 million in worker's remittances have been sent from Germany to Afghanistan in 2004. However, this figure includes cash self-carriers by foreign workers on their trips to their home countries and moreover, is based on the number of employed and unemployed foreign nationals who are subject to the social insurance contribution system (IMF, 2005 & German Federal Bank, 2006). Consequently, estimates of remittance outflows may not reflect the actual volume of remittances sent. This is as cash carriers are only to be declared to the customs for amounts exceeding €15,000. Moreover, some migrants are not covered under the social security system and thus, do not show up in the statistics. In addition, all Afghans who gained German citizenship in the last decades (about 40% of the residents of Afghan origin) are likewise not included in the estimations (Vadean, 2007). In the same study it was observed that almost all Afghan households that were interviewed during the research, sent remittances to their families in Afghanistan. Interviewees stated that mainly poor families were receiving remittances, in most cases for daily consumption. Only in some cases remittances were sent for purposes of treatment or marriage. In general, Afghans in Germany sent relative small amounts of remittances, on average 200 €/month (Vadean, 2007).

Remittances- purpose and impact

A study by the World Bank estimated that over 31% of all Afghan households received remittances from Iran or Pakistan, mainly from family members or friends. Across all expenditure quintiles, remittances amounted to around US$34 per capita with recipients receiving more in each successively higher quintile (the lowest quintile received US$19 and the highest US$47) (World Bank, 2005). In addition, around 15% of Afghanistan's rural population is estimated to receive remittances, which accounts for 20% of the population's total expenditures. At the lowest expenditure quintile, only 10% of all households received remittances, but the remittances amount to 30% of the total expenditure. Households within the lower quintiles were more likely to receive remittances from Iran and Pakistan while higher-expenditure households were more likely to receive money from further abroad (World Bank, 2005a). Moreover, data indicates that the link between poverty alleviation and increased migration is a positive one. Research by the World Bank has shown that *an average 10% increase in the number of international migrants in a country's population can lead to a*

1.6% decline in per capita poverty and, a 10% increase in the share of remittances in a country's GDP can lead to a 1.2% decline in poverty (IOM, 2008e).

Based on the data conducted in the NRVA 2005, the study by Ahmed (2010) analyzed the levels of vulnerability of Afghan households. The study revealed that, in terms of income generating activities, about 25% of Afghan households that relied on agricultural wage labor and 18% of households engaged in livestock activities were most vulnerable. In contrast, only 10% of Afghans who relied on remittances as a generating income activity experienced vulnerability. This is not surprising, since agriculture and livestock are very vulnerable to shocks such as natural disasters whereas remittances are usually independent from these events. However, the study also revealed that Afghan households who derive their income from formal employment, opium activities or small businesses had the lowest incidence of vulnerability (Ahmed, 2010).

In the case of Afghanistan, most of the remittances send back home to their families or friends are mostly spent on basic needs such as food, clothes and medicines. However, in the study by Stigter (2004) a relative high amount of male migrants saved their money for the purpose of mahr, which is the amount of money to be paid by the groom to the bride, at the time of marriage. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that the vast majority of savings or remittances will cover basic needs of family members staying back home in Afghanistan (Stigter, 2004). This was also confirmed in the study by Siegel et al (2010) where Afghan respondents living in the Netherlands reported that the main purpose of the money sent was to contribute to daily consumption. Other reasons for sending remittances includes: paying for educational costs, construction or maintenance of a dwelling or repayment of a loan and covering health care expenditures (Siegel et al, 2010). The same can be said for the study by Hanifi (2006) where 86% of cash remittances transferred were primarily for ordinary sustenance (Hanifi, 2006).

With regard to Afghans in the UK, there seems to be a difference between young men who are abroad on their own, and those Afghans who are abroad as part of a family group. This was the case in the study by Oeppen (20009) on Afghans living in the London area. Young men on their own usually had significant financial responsibilities for their relatives in Afghanistan, and their primary migration project was to support their family back home. With respect to Afghans living in the Bay Area, California interviewees mentioned a feeling of guilt as the main reason for sending remittances. Guilt in the sense that many Afghans felt they were abandoning their home country and the fact that they were living safely in California whilst those in Afghanistan appeared to be suffering (Oeppen, 2009).

The positive impacts of remittances seem to be clear. Remittances are a valuable source of foreign exchange to Afghanistan and potentially an important addition to the gross domestic product at the macro-economic level. Moreover, remittances can alleviate the immediate effects of poverty in Afghan households and the local community. They are also an investment strategy for Afghans, paying for the education and to build businesses (IOM, 2008e). However, remittances have also a negative side. In her study Oeppen (2009) describes that those who sent remittances to Afghanistan felt that there was a danger of dependency from remittance recipients. Furthermore, the Afghan Central Bank stated that remittances, at least in part, contributed to inflation in the country (Central Bank of Afghanistan, 2009). In addition, remittances seem mostly important for the survival of the family but less important for reconstruction or development of the country. In the report of Maimbo (2003) the author highlights the fact that the hawala system has severe weaknesses including its as anonymity and lack of record keepings. This, so the author, makes the system vulnerable to those who seek to launder the proceeds of criminal activities such as terrorist financing (Maimbo, 2003; IOM, 2008e). Maimbo (2003) further argues that special regulations and supervision techniques are needed that do not sacrifice the hawala's most valuable attributes such as cost-effectiveness, convenience and regional reach. Moreover, he suggests that the Afghan Central Bank should consider its relationship with the hawala dealers and how it could be brought into closer compliance with international regularity and supervisory standards.

- **Formal means of transfer and costs of remitting**

Formal transfer schemes such as banking systems normally provide the least risky, but also the most expensive way of sending remittances, with charges typically ranging between 10%-15% of the principal transferred. The funds-transfer sector is dominated by dedicated money-transfer firms, of which Western Union (which commands an estimated 15 per cent of the global remittances business) is the giant (over 300 000 agents in more than 200 countries (The World Bank Group, 2011). In comparison to MoneyGram, Western Union had 40 agents in Kabul and 60 others spread across Afghanistan, in 2009. In contrast, Money Gram had only 13; eight in Kabul and five across the major cities in Afghanistan. Changes in both the American market and the establishment of financial services in Afghanistan have made Western Union more attractive and competitive. This is as fees have reduced relatively, the network has today a wider reach in Afghanistan and recipients are now paid in dollar more quickly. Moreover, Companies such as Western Union charge a flat-fee for transferring money, which may be a disincentive to those sending small amounts of money but for those

who send on average around US$200, a fee of US$10 is only five%, equivalent or only slightly higher (but quicker) than hawala charges (Oeppen, 2009): Table 48 gives an example of how much it costs, on average, to send money from a particular country to Afghanistan with Western Union and other banks.

Table 48: Overview of remittance sending costs (i.e. Western Union)

Sending Country	Receiving Country	Bank	Amount send	Costs for sending
Netherlands	Afghanistan	ABN Amro, SNS Bank, Rabobank, ING Bank, Money Gram	100€	18 – 55€
		Western Union	100 € 200 €	17€ 20,50 €
Australia	Afghanistan	Western Union	100 AU$ 200 AU$	22AU$ 25AU$
US	Afghanistan	Western Union	100US$ 200US$	10 US$
Canada	Afghanistan	Western Union	100 CN$ 200 CN$	12 CN$ 14 CN$
UK	Afghanistan	Western Union	100£ 200£	6,90£ 8,90£
Germany	Afghanistan	Western Union	100€ 200€	10€ 14€

Source: for Netherlands: Siegel et al, for Western Union: Western Union 2011a-f,

Remittances sent via mobile device

In 2006, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) reported, that a new way of remittance transfer had been implemented in Afghanistan, using mobile phones to transfer money from person A to person B (IFAD, 2006). In Afghanistan, the new service is called M-Paisa. Especially for people without access to a bank account the service is very convenient and allows among others money transfers and bill payments. Due to the fact that M-Paisa is associated with the largest telecommunication company in Afghanistan (Roshan), whose networks are present in the rural areas the country, also people in far out reach areas can to receive money transfers (Siegel et al, 2010). This new way of transferring remittances using mobile phone technology is becoming a cheaper means of transferring money than using the banking system (IFAD, 2006). The number of mobile phone users in the country is steadily increasing, whereas in 2002 only 0.11 mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants were recorded, the number increased to 42.62 per 100 inhabitants in 2009 (International Telecommunications Union, 2011).

- **Employment and unemployment rate of Afghans abroad**

UK

Spence (2005) found, that Afghans were a migrant group with extremely poor socio economic outcomes; they suffered from exclusion from the UK labor market. Other sources indicate that unemployment among Afghans in the UK is at 24% of the economically active population, compared to 6% of the total number of economically active people in London as a whole (Oeppen, 2009). In further research Afghans reported that they felt discriminated against the job market (Jones, 2010). The study by Change institute (2009) (interviewing a total of 205 Afghans in the UK) showed that the majority of respondents mentioned many socio-economic related issues. Particularly, the lack of English language skills was a major obstacle for not gaining access to the employment market. The study also revealed that many Afghans in the UK are found in low-paid jobs which often involve long working hours and shift working. Moreover, low skilled jobs such as taxi drivers or employment in catering/restaurant trades were mostly common. Some respondents raised the issue of foreign qualification recognition and expressed frustration that their own, or their friends/family members qualification had not been recognized by British institutions. Many interviewees stated that they had experienced a loss of social, economic and professional status since their arrival in the UK. This was especially the case for men who reported to work now in lower-class employment. There is no data on the prevalence of this kind of downward mobility yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that the phenomenon of low skilled labor among Afghan migrants in the UK is widespread (Change Institute, 2009).

Netherlands

Figure 26 illustrates the percentage of the Afghan working population aged 15-60 by year of arrival. Afghans arriving before 1998 are not included in the figure. However, the data shows that employment rate for Afghans in the Netherlands increased each year. Only exception is seen in 2004 when employment decreased for the older cohorts and in 2005, in which the 1998 cohort saw a decline in employment. Other sources indicate that Afghans in the 30 to 50 year age range have the weakest position on the Dutch job market. This is largely due to limited transferability of skills and qualifications between Afghanistan and the Netherlands. Moreover, Afghans aged 30-50 face more difficulties in training or re-educating themselves. While practical knowledge required for technical field is the most easily transferable, there are a number of problems for Afghans in the Netherlands in securing a job in this field due to lack of coordination in certifications and limited previous job experience in the Netherlands (Siegel et al, 2010).

Figure 26: Employment Rate of Afghans in the Netherlands (%) 1999 to 2005



Source: Siegel et al, 2010

Germany

The socio-economic characteristics and the residence status of the Afghan immigrants in Germany reflect to a large extent migration inflows of Afghan refugees to Germany. Those Afghans who arrived before or around 1979 belonged to the educational elite and thus were better educated and integrated in Germany. Many of these arrivals have a consolidated resident status (overall 13% of the residents of Afghan origin) or German citizenship. In contrast, of those Afghans who entered Germany after 1979 still have less consolidated resident status (30% of the total residents of Afghan origin have a temporary visa and 7% an exceptional leave to remain). This is mainly due to the prohibitive German immigration and asylum policy that kept immigrants out of the labor market for many years. As in the case of the UK and the Nehterlands, Afghans have difficulties of having their diplomas and qualifications recognized in Germany. Data collected throughout the study by Vadean (2007) revealed that 78.4% of the interviewees had not received any further training or work experience in the profession learned. Thus, as in the case of the UK, the majority of Afghans in Germany is forced to work in the low skilled sector and experienced a social decline in comparison to what they have learned or worked as before they arrived in Germany (Vadean, 2007).

Canada

In the Census of 2006, the Afghan labor force (>15 years of age and over) was as strong as 33,235 individuals of which 16,725 were males and 16,510 females. Of the total, 18,895 were

in the labor force and 16,465 were employed with 10,385 males and 6,080 females. Employment rate therefore was as high as 62.1% for males and 36.8 for females. Employment rate for both sexes combines was 49.5% in 2006. Looking at the unemployment rate, a total of 12.9% Afghans in Canada were unemployed with an unemployment rate of 10.6% for males and 16.5% for females. Of those Afghans who were employed, most could be found in the following sectors; sales and service (7,660), trades and transport (2,555), business-finance and administrative (1,930), management occupations (1,405) (Canada Census, 2006).

- **Competition with national labor force**

Iran & Pakistan

Afghans in Iran are a very competitive labor force willing to put up with the very low wages and are reputed to be hard workers (Overfeld & Zumot, 2010). A study by AREU (2006) showed that the main reasons of Iranian employers to hire Afghan labor are among others: high sense of responsibility and dedication, ready for difficult and hazardous jobs, lower wages compared to Iranian, undefined regulations for Afghans, difficulty with employing national workers and the absence of non-wage payment to Afghans. According to the Iranian Deputy Minister of Interior, approximately two million documented and undocumented Afghans were employed in the labor market in Iran, in 2010. According to a study by ILO & UNHCR, Afghans of working age in Iran account for only 1.8% of the total active labor force in 2006. Since their influx to Iran, Afghan refugees have been permitted to work in those sectors of the Iranian labor market which could not easily be filled by Iranian workers; many Afghans therefore work in the informal sector under hazardous conditions (Koepke, 2011). In the 2005 Pakistan Census, undertaken by UNHCR and the Government of Pakistan, 53% (292,045) of respondents reported to be living off daily wages. However, the number may be much higher, considering that 19.2% (105,249) reported being self-employed, which may include Afghans living off casual labor. Only 8.1 % (44,510) of the respondents said, they were employed (Government of Pakistan & UNHCR, 2005). In both, Pakistan and Iran, Afghans are held responsible, at least partly, for the rapid and often anarchic urbanization of provincial capitals, and the economic down flow by accepting lower wages and competing with the local poor for jobs (International Crisis Group, 2009).

GCC States

It is estimated that at least 53,000 Afghan workers using Pakistani passports have been hired in the UAE. According to the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) the number might be as high

as 100,000 Afghan labor migrants currently working in GCC countries. As mentioned in the beginning, most Afghans working the GCC states posses Pakistani passports and visas. However, the total number of Pakistanis living and working in the GCC is estimated at 1.67 million. This indicates, that over 100,000 Afghans have to compete with over 1.5 million Pakistani in the same region. According to some sources a further four million jobs are created in the region, mainly in the construction sector. Although these low skilled jobs are mainly interesting for labor form abroad (mainly Asian migrants), increasing unemployment among the GCC population increases the pressure on Afghan and Pakistan migrants alike. The authorities of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait are already discussing the issue and proposed a policy that prioritizes nationals over foreigners to secure employment of their own citizens. However, such a policy mainly concerns high skilled positions in the GCC area. As in the case of Iran, the willingness of Afghan labor migrants to work for lower wages than their Pakistani or GCC counterparts and to accept much lower living standards remain a strong incentive for employers to hire less costly migrant laborers in the lower skilled sector. However, given the increasing pressure from neighboring states on Afghan economic migrants to Iran and Pakistan, there is an increasing need to find job opportunities further abroad. Consequently, Afghan migrant laborers in the GCC might be perceived as a growing competition and a potential risk to Pakistan's economy. However, if managed properly (i.e. country-based quota systems), increased Afghan labor migration to GCC states could contribute to economic stability in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Overfeld & Zumot, 2010).

- **Brain drain**

The skill flow out of Afghanistan appeared mainly in the 1980s and 1990s, during Soviet intervention when it was the Afghan elite (professors, teachers and students) who migrated to Europe and North America. In the NRVA 2007/08 data on the educational attainment of migrants was collected. As far as comparison was possible, there was almost no difference present in education between the resident population and those migrants who left Afghanistan. As a result, the NRVA 2007/08 has found no evidence of a brain drain moreover, international migrants do not seem to be higher educated than internal migrants (NRVA, 2007/08). Nonetheless, it is clear that Afghanistan is in need of high skilled labor, particularly in the education and health care sector. In 2000, the World Bank cited the skilled emigration rate to be 13.2% and the emigration rate of physicians to be 9.1% (World Bank, 2009). In 2005 the World Health Organization stated that there were a total of 5,970 physicians and

14,930 nurses and midwives in Afghanistan (WHO, 2009). That is roughly one physician per 5,000 people in Afghanistan. The low salaries of physicians (ca US$100 per month) makes it even more difficult to attract physicians to come or stay in Afghanistan (Kuschminder & Dora, 2009). Table 49 gives an overview of the annual physician emigration rate from 1991 to 2004, showing that although the emigration rate of physicians has decreased over time, from 0.11 in 1991 to 0.08 in 2004, the total number of physicians leaving the country has steadily increased from 302 in 1991 to over 500 in 2004 (Bhargava, Docquier & Moullan, 2010*).*

Table 49: Panel Data Set on Physician Emigration from Afghanistan 1991-2004

Year	Rate of physician emigration	Total number of physician emigrants	Number of physicians in Afghanistan	Number of physicians per 1000 people in Afghanistan
1991	0,11312	302,0	2367,8	0,13000
1992	0,11137	326,6	2606,3	0,13800
1993	0,10989	347,6	2815,5	0,14280
1994	0,11060	360,8	2901,3	0,14000
1995	0,12245	392,6	2813,7	0,13000
1996	0,13507	422,8	2707,7	0,12000
1997	0,13953	418,9	2583,3	0,11000
1998	0,11952	430,7	3172,7	0,13000
1999	0,10461	443,8	3798,9	0,15000
2000	0,09137	448,7	4461,9	0,17000
2001	0,08149	447,9	5048,8	0,18584
2002	0,08325	474,0	5219,9	0,18584
2003	0,08272	386,2	5391,0	0,18584
2004	0,08368	507,9	5562,0	0,18585

Source: Bhargava, Docquier & Moullan 2010

With respect to an increasing number of physicians leaving Afghanistan, it is relevant to know the destination countries of Afghan physicians. Table 51 shows that most Afghan physicians are migrating to western countries were employment conditions are good and salaries high. The highest inflow of Afghan physicians however, can be found in the U.S. and Germany (Table 50). These inflows may also be related to existing Afghan Diasporas in these countries, making it for new arrivals easier to access information and integrate into society.

Table 50: Number of physician emigrants by country of destination 1991-2004

Year	AUS	CAN	DEN	FRA	GER	ITA	NOR	SWE	SWI	UK	USA
1991	4,80	1,00	1,79	1,00	135,10	4,20	7,50	6,03	6,58	10,00	124,00
1992	5,88	1,00	1,69	1,00	145,60	4,26	7,50	8,56	6,16	11.00	124,00
1993	6,96	1,00	1,57	1,00	155,40	4,33	7,50	11,09	5,74	12,00	141,00
1994	8,04	1,00	4,39	1,00	157,50	4,39	7,50	13,62	5,32	12,00	146,00

1995	9,12	5,00	4,07	1,00	169,40	4,46	7,50	16,15	4,90	13,00	158,00
1996	10,20	6,00	3,86	1,00	194,60	4,52	7,50	18,68	4,48	12,00	160,00
1997	11,64	4,00	3,68	1,00	186,20	4,59	7,50	21,22	4,06	12,00	163,00
1998	13,08	4,00	3,57	3,00	181,30	4,66	7,50	23,75	3,64	13,00	173,00
1999	14,52	7,00	3,47	6,00	182,70	4,73	7,50	26,28	3,22	17,00	171,00
2000	15.96	6,00	5,72	6,00	171,50	4,80	8,11	28,81	2,80	21,00	178,00
2001	17,40	7,00	5,69	6,00	164,50	4,87	8,32	31,34	2,80	24,00	176,00
2002	18,27	8,00	6,68	7,00	179,90	4,95	8,56	33,87	2,80	25,00	179,00
2003	19,00	9,00	15,31	8,00	169,40	5,02	8,75	36,40	2,80	30,00	181,00
2004	19,57	10,00	22,66	9,00	169,40	5,10	9,00	36,40	2,80	37,00	184,00

Source: Bhargava, Docquier & Moullan 2010

4.3 Integration of Afghan migrants

- **Afghan students**

Kabul University established in 1929 was one of the oldest institutions in Afghanistan. Before the war, Kabul University comprised over 15 faculties with over 74 departments. Sources indicate that the university is in its rebuilding phase but not able to work up to its full potential. Nonetheless, about 25 universities are working in Afghanistan with over 100,000 students enrolled. However, as already mention, most graduates are unlikely to stay in Afghanistan and help in the reconstruction process of the country. Main reasons mentioned were unattractive labour market conditions and the lack of security in the country. Therefore, the Afghan government is strongly supporting exchange programs with other universities abroad (i.e. India – Afghanistan) and promotes collaborative partnerships between secondary schools in i.e. Afghanistan and California, U.S. ("The Global Connections and Exchange (GCE)" program in Afghanistan) (U.S. Department of State, 2010).

Due to large Afghan communities in the U.S., Canada and other European States many Afghan Students Association (i.e. ASA4UK, ASA) have evolved in these countries. These Afghan student associations aim to provide a social and academic platform for Afghan students in the country and offer their assistance with regard to education, employment opportunities and integration (Afghan Students, 2011). Many new networks are evolving in other countries such as India, where Afghan students often make use of community platforms such as facebook to get into contact with other or spread the word that a new Afghan student association has been built up (Facebook, 2011).

In addition to exchange programs, many countries provide scholarships for those students who cannot afford to pay tuition fees by themselves. Some of these scholarships are also directly addressed to Afghan students who want to pursue higher education outside their home country. In 2009, Pakistan announced that it will offer 1,000 scholarships to Afghan

students to study in the country. The scholarships will be offered in almost all disciplines with a particular focus on engineering, medicine and agriculture as desired by the Afghan delegation. Other important areas include pharmacy, computer science, social sciences, business education and language studies. The countries also agreed to collaborate on faculty development and student exchange, joint research programs, distance education and institutional linkage programs (University World News, 2009). Other scholarships are running in Pakistan such as the "Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative (DAFI)", which has been running in Pakistan for over 20 years. In 2006, more than 900 Afghan refugees in Pakistan have benefited from this program since it started in 1992 and the number is likely to have increased since then (UNHCR, 2006h). Many other countries also give out scholarships particularly to Afghan students to strengthen and enhance the development efforts by Afghan Government and improve basic services and provide economic opportunities to Afghan citizens. In this regard, the Australian Development Scholarships (ADS) program for Afghanistan supports "Australia's development assistance program to Afghanistan" by targeting human resource gaps within the Afghan Government in selected priority Ministries. These scholarships likewise contribute to the strong people-to-people relationships between these two countries. As a result, a minimum of 20 scholarships are offered each year for masters-level degrees and postgraduate diplomas to employees of Afghan Ministries supported by the AusAID Development Assistance Facility for Afghanistan (DAFA) (Australian Government, 2011).

It is difficult to estimate the total amount of Afghans in tertiary education abroad. However, in case of Canada, the Canadian census collected data on Afghan students in secondary and tertiary education. The data shows that a total of 11,355 Afghans residing in Canada held a postsecondary certificate, diploma or degree. A total of 4,360 received this inside Canda (mostly Ontario), whereas over 7,000 Afghans responded to have received a degree outside the country, mainly Pakistan (1,075), India (275), US (175), UK (110), Germany (60), Philippines (45), Poland (25) and France (25). A total of 5,265 Afghans received a diploma or degree somewhere else. The main field of study in which postsecondary qualifications were achieved were (a) architecture, engineering and related technologies (2,395) (b) business, management and public administration (1,655) (c) health, parks, recreation and fitness (1,535), and (d) social and behavioural sciences and law (1,495). Other fields that ranked relatively high were education, humanities and mathematics, computer and information sciences (Canada Census, 2006).

- **HIV/Aids as entry criteria**

The scope of HIV infected people or those having AIDS in Afghanistan is not known. Official numbers of HIV/AIDS cases in Afghanistan have been low in the last years and the issue of HIV/Aids has not been researched in the NRVA 2007/08 household survey. In the NRVA of 2005 however, 50 cases of HIV were recorded in the country. This low number however, might not be representative of the actual situation, considering that neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Iran have had a much higher incidence of cases (74,000 and 14,000 respectively) (NRVA 2005). In both Pakistan and Iran as well as in Afghanistan, underreporting of HIV/AIDS is very likely due to social stigma attached to the infection (World Bank, 2005b). Moreover, knowing that many Afghan refugees and labour migrants travel back and forth between these countries every day, more attention should be paid to this issue.

Some countries nowadays require that foreigners undertake a HIV test prior to entry. This information is usually required as part of a medical exam for long-term visitors, i.e. students and workers. So far, there is no information available that indicates that visitors or long term migrants coming to Afghanistan have to undertake such a test. However, other countries require HIV tests prior to arrival or within a particular time span after arrival. For instance Iran, anybody staying longer than three months has to produce an HIV test certificate. In the U.A.E. applicants for work or resident permits likewise have to undergo HIV testing, except those who are under age 18. Other countries such as Australia and Canada require an HIV test for all applicants (15 years of age or older) who want to enter the country for permanent residence or longer than six months. In Australia, children under 15 years of age must be tested if being adopted or having a history of blood transfusion. In India, all students over 18 and anyone between the ages of 18 and 70 with a visa valid for one year or more have likewise to be tested for HIV. In Germany, only in the district of Bavaria, applicants staying 180 day or longer are required to undergo HIV testing (U.S. Department of State, 2006). As for the U.S., since 4 January 2010, non-U.S. citizens will not be required anymore to undergo HIV testing as part of the required medical examination for U.S. immigration. This means that non-U.S. citizens with HIV/AIDS are equally to be granted entry as those who do not have HIV/AIDS, as long as they meet other entry criteria (Mobility International USA, 2011). The UK does not require any proof or certificate however, anyone who appears unwell may be tested. A positive test result may cause applicants to be denied entry into the UK (U.S. Department of State, 2006).

- **Racism or xenophobia incidents registered in media or by police**

When talking about xenophobia and Afghanistan, the term Islamophobia plays a significant role. The recent history of the term Islamophobia begins in the United Kingdom somewhere around the late 1980s/early 1990s, when the term began to be used to signal rejection of and discrimination against the resident Muslim population in the West (Lopez, 2011). Islamophobia mainly refers to fear of and hostility towards Islam and Muslims. Although the term does in no means refer to Afghanistan or Afghans, it automatically affects a large majority of the Afghan population who belongs to the Muslim faith. Consequently, Islamophobia leads to discrimination against Muslims, exclusion from mainstream political or social process, stereotyping and finally hate crimes. Since 9-11, Islamophobia as a term and as a phenomenon gained new attention in the media and the society (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2011).

The EU has established the 'European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) to provide the Community and its Member States with information and data on racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-Semititsm at the EU level. In 2002, the EUMC warned from widespread anecdotal evidence of a rise in Islamophobic violence. In 2002, the Islamic Human Rights Commission recorded a total of 674 cases, including instances of abuse, discrimination, harassment and violence. Many cases involved discrimination of and violence against Muslim women, such as pulling of scarves or throwing alcohol at them. The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHCR) noted that women and children had been particularly targeted and many victims had little confidence in the police (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 2004). One of the most troubling incidents to be called Islamaophobia occurred in Arizona, U.S. on 16 September 2001, when a Muslim was killed in a deliberate hate crime explained only by his supposedly 'Muslim-like' appearance (Love, 2009). Islamophobia and discrimination can have severe implications for the integration of (Afghan) migrants in their host country, which is further discussed in the following sections.

- **Anti-discrimination policies**

Many countries around the world have implemented anti-discrimination laws that aim to give people equal rights in terms of i.e. age, gender, ethnicity and employment. The following table (Table 51) gives a short overview of laws that have been implemented to prevent discrimination.

Table 51: Anti-discrimination laws implemented by particular countries

Country	Anti-discrimination law	Date

Australia	• Racial Discrimination Act 1975 • Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001	1975 2002
Belgium	• Belgian Anti-Racism Law on the Punishment of Certain Acts inspired by Racism or Xenophobia (1981)	1981
European Union	• Directive 2000/43/EC (implements the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin)	1999
Germany	• General Equal Treatment Act of 2006 (implements the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin)	2006
India	• The Case Disabilities Removal Act, 1850 (this law abolished all laws that affect the rights of persons who convert to another religion or case)	1850
Russia	• Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia (this law, among others, proclaims the free development of national minorities and the ethnographical groups populating the territory of Russia. Moreover, the law abolishes all national or religious privileges and restrictions.	1917
UK	• Race Relations Act 1968 (this acts made it illegal to refuse housing, employment or public services to a person on the grounds of color, race, ethnic or national origins) • Race Relations Act 1965 (the act outlawed discrimination on the grounds of color, race or ethnic or national origins, in public places.	1968 1965
U.S.	• Civil Rights Act 1968. The act expanded on previous acts and prohibited discrimination concerning the sale, rental, and financing of housing based on race, religion, national origin, and since 1974, gender; since 1988, the act protects people with disabilities and families with children. It also provided protection for civil rights workers.	1968

- **Anti-discrimination polices in Afghanistan**

Since the fall of the Taliban, a new constitution has been adopted by the Afghan Government. The Afghan constitution states in chapter two article one (Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens), that *any kind of discrimination and privilege between the citizens of Afghanistan are prohibited* and that *the citizens of Afghanistan - whether man or woman- have equal rights and duties before the law* (Afghanistan Online, 2011). In theory, women are allowed to

return back to work and do not longer have to wear the burqa. Furthermore, many positions in the government have been appointed women who officially represent women rights across the country. However, despite all these changes the repression of women is still prevalent particularly in rural areas where many families prohibit their female members to work or participate in public life. As already mentioned, forced and child marriage are widely spread and harmful practices such as baad or honour killings continue across the country (UNAMA & OHCHR, 2010). In 2009, the GoA has passed a legislation that regulates the family life of Shia Muslims. Among others, the law states that Shia husbands must provide food and financial assistance to their Shia wives. However, the husband has the authority to withhold financial support if his wife refuses to *submit to her husband reasonable sexual enjoyment*. Consequently, the husband is allowed to refuse food and money to his wife if she dies to have them sex with him. In Afghanistan, were most women are iliterate and depend on their husbands for survival, the article could be used to justify a husband starving a wife who refuses to have sex with him. The law shows that in terms of gender equality and anti-discrimination the country still has a long way to go (CBC News, 2009). The abuse of human rights and the high presence of violation against women and children is also one of the reasons why many Afghans living in Iran, Pakistan and further abroad do not intent to return to their home country. During decades of exile, many Afghans have adapted to their new lifestyle and do not want to miss their freedom or give up their *westernized* behavior. This is especially the case for Afghans who have lived in Iran or the U.S. for over 20 years (see Oeppen 2009).

- **Integration of (second generation) Afghans**

Pakistan

Although one cannot speak of Islamophobia, Afghan refugees in Pakistan have experienced racism and discrimination over the past decades. The refugees were welcomed during the civil war when Pakistan supported the Mujahidin and the Taliban against the Soviet invasion (Rostami-Povey, 2007). At that time, Afghan refugees lived in cities, towns and over 80 refugee camps and villages in the NWFP. Karachi, the largest city and capital of the province Sindh, hosted one of the biggest concentrations of Afghan refugee population in Pakistan (over one million) (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2009). When the first refugees in Pakistan arrived, the education system in Pakistan was mainly private and only a minority of Afghans could afford the private system. Therefore, the majority of Afghans received education by UNICEF and different Pakistani and Afghan NGOs (Rostami-Povey, 2007).

Since 1998, the Government of Pakistan began restricting the Afghan movement of Afhgans in the country and from 2001 onwards, it began to impose regulations on them (Rostami-Povey, 2007). The Pakistan Government increasingly perceived Afghans as an economic burden rather than religious migrants. The country hardened its state policy giving Pakistani police the authority to arrest, intimidate, beat and deport Afghan refugees. In many parts of the country, Afghans live in a constant fear that they will be harassed and picked up by the police. Arrests made without a warrant, and those arrested have no recourse to a judicial process because complaints to the police would mean risking more harassment (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2009).

These events have also been confirmed by the study of AREU (2005), who researched the livelihood strategies of Afghans in Karachi. The study revealed that many people of Afghan origin – as well as their descendents – remain vulnerable to victimisation due to their uncertain legal status in Pakistan. Pakistan citizens as well as Afghan interviewees stated that Afghans have to pay higher bribes to the police than their Pakistani counterparts. Some Pakistanis see this as an "unfair" advantage to the Afghans, in the sense that the police are more responsive to the latter due to the expectation of higher payments (AREU, 2005).

Another study by AREU in 2006 showed that Afghans living in Peshawar, a city close to the Afghan border, are not legally entitled to purchase land and immovable property. Nonetheless, Afghan interviewees who were asked about vulnerability to landlord abuse due to their 'foreigner' status mentioned that they were protected against exploitation by their own business and social networks. The study also showed that livelihood strategies and economic conditions of Afghans in Peshawar are very diverse. Afghan families in the lower socio-economic class earned their daily income by begging whereas very wealthy Afghan families had their own business and networks over several countries. In general it seemed that Afghans living in Peshawar had open access to the labour markets. Consequently Afghans were found in the same working sectors as their Pakistani counterparts as workers, employers or self-employers. Only in some niche sectors such as carpet making, predominantly Afghans were working. The study also observed that there have been major transformations in the economic profile of Afghan refugees and migrants after their arrival in Pakistan –away from agricultural and rural activities and towards non-agricultural sectors including construction, transport, trade and other service sectors (AREU, 2006a)

Another study of Afghans living in Quetta, the largest city in the province of Balochistan, observed that Afghans can be found in all socio-economic classes and different working sectors as their host society. Afghans were working in construction and trade

business and could be found in white collar positions. However, the majority of Afghans was working in low skilled jobs, such as rag picking and domestic work. The data revealed that there seemed to be a relation between ethnicity and type of employment. This was especially the case for Baloch Afghans who were least educated and thus often worked in low skilled jobs. Other ethnicities such as Uzbeks and Turkmen often worked in the carpet weaving sector whereas Pashtun Afghans earned their daily income with cross-border trade and smuggling. Similar to Pashtun Afghans, Hazaras in Quetta were better off with many Hazaras working in the formal and public sector. This is, as Hazaras had invested actively in their education in comparison to other Afghan ethnicities. With regard to intermarriage between ethnicities, all respondents preferred marriages within their own tribes and communities. Although all participants mentioned that they had some political voice on the local level when talking to tribal elders, they felt this was not the case in terms of interaction with local communities. Many perceived that tolerance for Afghans in Quetta had decreased over time. This was also the case for second generation Afghans with respondents mentioning that they often did not feel integrated into society and that sometimes being Afghan was a disadvantage. As in the case of Karachi, Afghans living in Quetta reported police harassment as a major problem. Without valid documents, Afghans could be arrested and threatened with deportation or high fines. In most cases however, the interviewees mentioned that they paid bribes to the police so they would not be arrested. It was likewise observed, that a link between harassment and the socio economic status of the victim existed. This was the case for Afghans of Afghans of Jungle Bagh and Ghausabad who experienced more discrimination and harassments than the wealthier and politically connected residents of Hazara Town. Moreover, respondents stated that those Afghan refugees (particularly Afghan Pashtungs) who left Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, were more vulnerable to police harassments than Afghan refugees who left the country already in the 1980s. This is among others, as new arrivals are believed to have contacts to the Taliban and thus did not seek refuge in the 1990s when the Taliban was strong (AREU, 2006b).

Iran

As in the case of Pakistan, Iran followed an “open door” refugee policy after Soviet invasion in 1979. That is to say, Iran granted refugee status to Afghans on a prima facie basis. It should not be forgotten that Soviet invasion coincided with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. In the context of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the term mohajerin was defined as “religious migrants”. In the 1980s, most Afghans were given residence and work permits in

Iran. Afghans at that time had free access to basic services such as education, health care and various state food subsidies. In 1993 however, Iran's policy changed. Afghan refugees seeking protection and shelter after that time were not seen as religious migrants but rather as immigrants. The labelling was important as it gave Afghan refugees a certain status and the access to basic services. Moreover, arrivals after 1993 received only temporary registration cards. These cards were meant to prevent new Afghans from illegal entry into Iran ((Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011). While handing out registration cards for new Afghan arrivals, the Iranian government started to withdraw subsidies to Afghans on the ground that the economic burden of the refugee population in the country was no longer bearable. More specifically, the Iranian Government stated that it paid up to US$10 million per day for Afghan refugees without receiving financial assistance from the international community (Rostami-Povey, 2007). Similar to Pakistani law, foreigners in Iran were not entitled to own property in the form of land and buildings (immovable property) but were entitled to own other forms of belongings like cars and furniture (moveable property). Only among the older generation some Afghans were able to save and purchase property. However, as in the case of Pakistan, most sales had to take place in the name of their Iranian friends or they paid bribes to the police and other official authorities. Since the Iranian Government cut down subsidies to Afghans form the mid 1990s onwards, the second and third generation of Afghans in Iran were not entitled to receive free education and thus were mainly educated through Madarese Khodgardan (Afghan's self-run schools) (Rostami-Povey, 2007). It should be noted that since the fall of the Taliban, Iran has further hardened it policy toward Afghan refugees in the country. As a result, between 2002 and 2007 Iran deported more than one million Afghans back to their home country. Moreover, in 2006, the Iranian government decided to institute a "no-go area" policy, partially or entirely restricting foreigners' access to 22 provinces. This further complicated Afghans' stay in Iran (Human Crisis Group, 2009).

A study on first and second generation Afghans living in Iran by Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi (2011) showed, that second generation Afghans have a significantly higher literacy rate than those of the first generation (Table 52[49]). However, although the education levels among second generation Afghans was higher, many had to drop out of school and start working in order to support their families. In addition, the educational level of Afghan children in Iran is lower than that of Iranian children. Main reasons are, besides a low socio-economic status of Afghan families, cultural and ethnic factors and the lack of employment for high skilled workers in the country (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011).

[49] The level of education is based on the 10% census sample data of the Afghan population in Iran

Table 52: Educational status of Afghans in Iran by generation and gender, 2006 census

Age Group	Gender	Generation of Afghan migrants/ Refugees	Current Schooling (%)	Literacy Rate (%)	Educational Levels (%)			
					Primary	Lower Secondary	Upper Secondary & Diploma	Higher Education
6-14	Male	First	55.9	68.1	84.0	15.5	0.5	-
		Second	64.7	73.6	78.5	20.5	1.0	-
	Female	First	55.3	68.0	84.7	14.9	0.4	-
		Second	60.2	70.9	81.0	17.8	1.2	-
15-29	Male	First	4.6	49.7	60.7	26.5	11.3	1.5
		Second	18.4	81.3	31.4	38.4	27.5	2.7
	Female	First	6.9	44.6	65.6	23.0	10.7	0.7
		Second	20.9	79.9	36.6	29.8	30.5	3.1
30+	Male	First	1.6	42.5	60.9	20.8	12.2	6.1
		Second	1.7	59.1	40.4	24.7	21.2	13.8
	Female	First	0.7	21.1	76.7	13.7	7.3	2.3
		Second	1.3	43.3	54.3	20.3	15.9	9.5

Source: Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011

The study also revealed that Afghan women form the second generation were more economically active than Afghan women from the first generation. (Table 53[50]). Possible reasons are the higher attainment of education among women and moreover, cultural changes and traditions among Afghan families in Iran. This is as emancipation is Iran is much more developed than it is the case in Afghanistan therefore, some Afghan families may have changed their opinion towards women being economically active (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011). In contrast to females, Afghan men from the second generation were less economically active than those in the first generation. The situation may be explained by Iranian employment policies that hamper the free access of foreigner to the Iranian labour market. For example, according to Iran's Employment Law, foreign nationals cannot be employed in government jobs in Iran. However, most second generation Afghans are employed in urban areas and work in low skilled jobs. Yet, registered Afghans are only allowed work in designated trades (and only in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs) when the number Afghans in each workplace does not exceed a certain limit. This policy in combination with low education and a high unemployment rate are severely hampers Afghans access to the Iranian labour market and moreover, prevents Afghans to be employed in high skilled jobs (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011).

[50] Job levels are based on the 10% census sample data of Afghan population in Iran

Table 53: Occupational Status of Afghans in Iran by generation and gender (2006 Census)

Age Group	Gender	Generation	Activity Rate (%)	Un-employment Rate (%)	Em-ployment Rate (%)	Un-Skilled	Lower	Middle	Higher
15-29	Male	First	93.2	2.4	97.6	50.3	19.6	29.3	0.8
		Second	74.8	8.7	91.3	43.9	17.1	37.6	1.4
	Female	First	6.8	12.2	87.8	34.3	14.3	50.2	1.2
		Second	10.3	25.4	74.6	28.6	10.9	52.5	8.0
30+	Male	First	90.7	2.3	97.7	50.8	19.5	28.4	1.3
		Second	85.8	4.8	95.2	30.8	29.4	30.5	9.3
	Female	First	7.4	2.5	97.5	36.3	22.1	40.8	0.8
		Second	10.0	6.4	93.6	19.6	14.4	42.3	23.7

Source: Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011

The study also researched how well Afghans living in Iran thought to have integrated into the Iranian society. The study showed that the majority of the second-generation Afghans (42%) felt strongly connected to Afghanistan whereas only 21% of the second generation identified with Iranian society. A slightly higher proportion (26%) of second generation Afghans identified with both, the Iranian and Afghan society sand a total of 11% stated that they did not identify with either of the before mentioned countries (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011).

The same study showed that most second-generation Afghans used *integration*[51] as the primary adaption strategy to Iranian society. This orientation was particularly observed among older youth who had a higher societal satisfaction and a secondary education. In contrast, the pattern of *separation*[52] was seen among 22% of respondents, particularly among from the lower social class who had a lower education, were irregular in the country and who experienced discrimination in Iran. In contrast, *assimilation*[53] was found among 17.1% of interviewees, mainly females and individuals with a higher social and legal status and those without any experience of discrimination. Over 14% of individuals however fell into the category of *marginalization*[54]. It was observed that the original goal of these individuals was often assimilation, but this goal was thwarted by the experience of prejudice and discrimination (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011).

UK

[51] *Integration* in the sense, that Afghan individuals keep some of their ethno-cultural values and contact with their ethnic groups and at the same time, accept various dimensions of the host society's culture.

[52] *Separation* in the sense, that individuals keep origin values and cultural traditions and maintain their contact with their ethnic community and reject the value of behavioral models of the host society.

[53] *Assimilation* here means that individuals show more attachments towards Iranian values, and have distanced themselves from their own ethnic groups and cultures.

[54] The *marginalization* pattern is prevalent among individuals who have, on the one hand, lost their connection with the culture and ethnic groups of their origin, and on the other hand, have not been attracted to the culture of the host society.

With regard to Islamophobia, data is collected by The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), which is responsible for prosecuting criminal cases by the police in England and Wales (CPS, 2011). In 2003, the CPS had received 4,201 cases of racially aggravated crime. The Home Office published data that showed that in 2002-2003 there were 32,100 searchers under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 21,990 more than in previous year and more than 30,000 above 1999-2000 levels. Resulting from the 32,000 searches just 380 people were arrested. Therefore, the data indicates that Islamophobic behaviour is also present among the British police. It should also be mentioned that there were 731 Muslims in British prisons in 1991 however, the number increased to 6095 in 2003. Moreover, almost nine% of all prisoners in the UK were Muslims, compared with three% of Muslims in the general population (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 2004).

The study by Change institute observed that, in terms of integration, the biggest issues Afghans in the UK face are intergenerational differences within Afghan families. This is as many first generation Afghans feel that their children have too fast westernized and do not value anymore Afghan tradition or values. In addition, elderly Afghans do not feel to receive the necessary respect they deserve from the younger generation. In contrast, younger Afghans often feel misunderstood by their parents and try to communicate what it feels like to grow up in a western society. With regard to gender roles, many women from the second generation mentioned that they felt pressured to behave in a certain way and thus, found it difficult to integrate into western society while being expected by their parents to practice the traditions of the Afghan society. Many female respondents mentioned that language barriers and the lack of childcare support were major obstacles to engage in community activities. This often resulted in isolation and not being able to attend language classes that could have improved their English skills. Some women also mentioned that they were not allowed to attend English classes whereas others, mainly illiterate Afghans, found it too difficult to learn a new language. Given all these pressures and constraints, it is difficult for most women to play an active role in the public life of the community. Although some women managed to become actively engaged in the Afghan and wider community, they were seldom found in higher positions. Some interviewees also mentioned that is difficult for women to make use of Refugee Organizations, due to the male dominance in these organizations. Consequently, women who have problems or matters that might be considered as ‘dishonorable’, such as domestic violence or separation/divorce are not brought up. Despite this information, most Afghans felt that the problem of gender inequality had slightly improved over the last years.

This is as the younger generation is growing up in the UK and adapts to the western lifestyle in which gender roles are not that distinctive (Change Institute, 2010).

Besides clashing opinions about gender roles in the Afghan society, there seems to be high distrust between Afghan communities in terms of political history. For example, those Afghans who entered the UK in the 1980s probably fled the Communists regime and supported the mujahedeen. In contrast, a high proportion of Afghans in the UK is likely to have supported the Communist but left later the country to flee the civil war. Considering that most Afghans have settled down in the London area, the chance increases that these two groups become neighbors. The difference in political ideology often leads to distrust between people and hampers a feeling of connectivity or belonging to the Afghan community. Furthermore, respondents mentioned that these ideological differences in combination with different ethnical characteristics have often been used by political factions to support their ethnic constituency against other groups. Consequently, the Afghan community in the UK is not a closed entity that is represented by some representatives but rather a complex formation of many different groups, factions and leaders that often stand in direct conflict to each other. This fact probably explains why the political voice of the Afghan community in the UK is relatively low. Without having the resources to unite and clearly advocate their interests in the country, the UK Government focus on other migrants groups that are larger and better organized i.e. Asian minorities (Change Institute, 2009).

The study also revealed that many Afghans suffer from depression and post-traumatic stress, as a direct result of the war in Afghanistan and the obstacles they experienced upon their arrival in the UK. This is especially the case for the first generation, which partly grew up in Afghanistan or has spent many years in the country. This generation is most vulnerable to depression and a life of isolation in the UK, since many of them have the feeling to be living in two worlds, not knowing to which culture or society they belong to. However, due to the lack of research on the health status of Afghan living in the UK, it cannot be said how widespread the phenomenon is (Change Institute, 2009).

As already mentioned, language barriers and the lack of resources to participate in training classes are one of the major obstacles that stand in the way of Afghans' integration into the wider UK society. Moreover, differences in ethnicity, culture and lifestyle patterns limit the ability of Afghans (particularly women and older Afghans) to engage actively in everyday life. Some mentioned that it is the Afghan community who should make the first step towards British society to build up relationships. Although all respondents were in favor of improving integration of Afghans in the UK, it seemed that there were intergenerational

differences of what the word meant. Whereas the younger generation thought that integration was mainly something positive, older Afghans feared that integration also meant to give up their tradition, values and language. Some also mentioned that they felt discriminated in the UK and that UK citizens had a rather negative perception about Afghanistan. These feelings were based on negative media coverage that had increased since 2001. There was a general demand of interviewees to better inform UK society of the Afghan community and distribute a different picture of the country than it has been the case so far (Change Institute, 2010).

As already became clear, the Afghan society in the UK quite divided by political, ethnic and linguistic differences. As a result, there are a large number of Refugee Community Organizations (RCOs) catering for different groups. The main function of RCOs in the UK is to inform and advice Afghans in times of need. Therefore, the services offered by RCOs often range from advice about English classes, to immigration housing, education and employment.

Moreover, the organizations function as a bridge between Afghans communities and the UK society. Therefore, RCOs organize many cultural events such as concerts, sport trips or the Afghan New year celebrations. The aim of these events is to raise awareness about the Afghan society and give interested individuals the chance to create new relationships, extend their networks or simply exchange information. At the time of the study, there were 25 Afghan RCSOs in the UK (Change Institute, 2010).

Reference was made by some respondents to problems within the community that prevent it from establishing a significant political voice. These centre on the lack of co-operation between the different political, ethnic and/or linguistic groupings, and on the issue of leadership. Most respondents felt that even if a strong umbrella organization was to exist, it would be impossible to find one leader who could represent so many competing interests.

In terms of level of employment, many Afghans stated that they experienced problems with the recognition of their qualification. In addition, the lack of training opportunities (with high level English) made it likewise difficult for Afghans in the UK to access the labor market and find adequate employment in high skilled jobs. As a result, many Afghans are forced to work in the service sector as taxi drivers or delivering pizzas. Moreover, the study revealed that some Afghans did not want to take up jobs as they thought they would lose welfare benefits. This dependency on social welfares has been mentioned before and was also found among Afghans in their home countries who relied heavily on remittances from their relatives abroad and therefore, were not willing or afraid to take up employment. However, with regard to the UK, in many cases Afghans working in the informal sector were simply not informed about their rights and employment opportunities in the formal sector. All respondents of the

study by Change Institute (2009) mentioned that were was a high demand for training opportunities, ranging from practical skills (i.e. how to establish a business) to soft skills (i.e. time management). As mentioned before, second generation Afghans have it easier to integrate into UK society. However, many had concerns that the younger generation was not given the opportunity to make full use of basic services i.e. education. Many Afghan students do not pursue higher education after the age 16 or 18. This is as the pressure of Afghan children increases with age to financially support their family and thus, start working as early as possible. Moreover, the absence of role models for younger Afghans in the UK makes it even more difficult for children to communicate the importance of education to their parents (Change Institute, 2009).

U.S.

The study by Oeppen (2009) revealed that in terms of network structure between Afghan organizations in the US, there is a lack of trust and rivalry. Especially among fund raising organizations, there seems to be territorialism over projects. This may be due to the size of the Afghan population in the Bay Area, where family reunifications have increase over time and made it less necessary to engage in social interactions purely based on geographical background, as pre-existing social networks are available. The study by Oeppen (2009) also observed that the lack of cooperation between organizations in the Bay Area, led to replication of projects in Afghanistan, and a lack of learning from the experiences of previous projects. In terms of integration, before 2001 Afghans in the US had some political support from the U.S. government and mainstream population. However, after the terrorist attacks and the invasion of international forces into Afghanistan, many Afghans felt that they were object of negative attention from the mainstream media and society. Nonetheless, the event of 9-11 were also a catalyst for a renewed interest in supporting humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan. Events in Afghanistan refocused the attentions of Afghans who were focusing on their lives in the U.S. towards their country of origin. The joint interest led to some cooperative projects that included Afghans and non-Afghans, such as the Afghan Friends Network, an organization that enables individuals and organization in the U.S. and Afghanistan to communicate, exchange knowledge and network. Whilst the majority of Afghans living in the Bay Area appeared to have socially integrated in the U.S. culture, some mentioned that they were mentally still in their home country. This was particularly the case for the elderly, who were raised in Afghanistan and still had strong memories about their home country. However, all respondents mentioned that they had gone through processes of integration in the U.S., and that their expectations for the future, particularly in the context of decreasing possibility of

return to Afghanistan, had changed. Over time, respondents have supported and sponsored other family members to leave Afghanistan, which in turn had altered the nature of their transnational relationships with Afghanistan from being largely based on kinship ties to those shaped by other factors, including feelings of guilt at leaving Afghanistan and the desire to keep a connection alive, either through the participation in fundraising projects or sending remittances to more distant family or people in Afghanistan (Oeppen, 2009):

It should also be mentioned that those respondents who returned to their home country for a short visit, often came back with feelings of guilt and sadness. This is, as on their visit they witnessed the high poverty and unemployment in Afghanistan. Many of those who came back to the U.S .after their visit in Afghanistan mentioned to be depressed and some developed psychosomatic back pains and headaches, as well as obsessive compulsive behavior. Overall, return visits to Afghanistan seemed to be easier for younger Afghan-Americans who unlike their parents did not remember the "golden age" of their home country but have (if any) only bad memories of the Soviet invasion and the jihad. For all who had been on a return visit, the experience had been difficult and upsetting but it had also positive impacts. Many reported to appreciate more their life in the U.S., particularly the security, technology and infrastructure. Of all respondents who visited Afghanistan to see how the country had evolved in the last decades, none had intention to return to Afghanistan for the long-term (Oeppen, 2009).

In terms of inter- ethnic marriage, only three of the respondents in the study by Oeppen (2009) were married to non-Afghans. Moreover, the majority of interviewees wanted their children to marry other Afghans. In terms of perception, a large number of interviewees commented that prior to 11-9 many within the mainstream U.S. population did not appear to know anything about Afghanistan or Afghans. This also holds true for Afghans in the UK, who bemoaned the lack of a positive Afghan presence in popular media, as they felt media representations of Afghans, where they existed, tended to focus on women in burkas, poverty and terrorism. Whilst late 2001 presented many challenges for Afghans, it was also an opportunity to raise awareness about Afghan-Americans and the situation in Afghanistan. the Afghan community in the Bay Area is not homogenous and internal divisions on the basis of ethnicity and political belief are apparent, although not as significant as they are in the UK. There are also differences of opinion around how Afghan-Americans in the Bay Area should be represented; for example, as Muslims, as Afghans, as refugees or as immigrants. In addition, disputes arise about who should do the representing, particularly between those who were men of power in Afghanistan and those who have become more influential in the

American context, in particular young professionals and some women. However, looking at all aspects such as financial stability, acquisition of citizenship and perception of belonging, it can be said that the Afghan elite in the San Francisco Bay Area, California has integrated well into the society (Oeppen, 2009).

Netherlands

Research indicates that Afghans in the Netherlands have experienced a loss in status as it was observed in the study by the Change Institute (2009). This is especially true for Afghans who have a relative high education in their country of origin. In comparison, Afghans who have a lower education status in their country of origin seem to benefit from the education system in the Netherlands. This phenomenon has impacted Afghan family patterns in the country and lead to tension within families. Moreover, research has shown that Afghans in the Netherlands have a common interest in guarding their family members' reputation among other Afghans living in the country. In general, Afghan seem to mistrust their compatriots and try to avoid close relationships, exceptions however are social-cultural events. In contrast, Afghans facilitate their contact with relatives in the Netherlands or further abroad. To strengthen these social ties, intra-familial marriages often occur. As in the case of the UK, many Afghans in the Netherlands are forced to work in the low skilled sector. This is as diploma recognitions in the Netherlands is problematic and Afghans often face cultural and language barriers on their arrival. As a result, many Afghans living in the Netherlands belong to the lower socio-economic class. However, despite a low socio-economic status, they still manage to save money and send remittances to their family members in Afghanistan or somewhere else. According to the study by Muller (2010) it seems that transnationalism and integration of Afghans in the Netherlands are closely linked to each other (Muller, 2010).

- **Re-integration of Afghans in Afghanistan**

Since, 2002, UNHCR recorded that more than 5.6 million Afghans –around 20% of Afghanistan's overall population – had returned from Pakistan and Iran. The majority of those who returned had been in refuge during the previous seven years, while many for those who are still staying in Pakistan and Iran are likely to be living in these countries for decades (Saito, 2009). However, for second-generation Afghan refugees, who "return home" the term does not necessarily mean to really "return" as a majority of these second-generation Afghans

have had little or no experience of living in Afghanistan (Saito, 2007). The trend of Afghans returning home has slowed down in the last years. However, what is unclear from the repatriation trends above is the proportion of returnees, who eventually settle in Afghanistan for the long term and those who decide to migrate again. A study by AREU (2007) showed that half of the interviewed returnee respondents in Afghanistan had hopes or expectation of leaving the country again in either the short or long term; they cited a wide range of reasons informed by a variety of emotional responses to the reintegration process (Saito, 2008). In many cases Afghans find their land or homes either destroyed or occupied by others in the context of a weak Afghan economy which led to the impoverishment of much of the Afghan population. Another study by AREU observed that those returnees who are found in the less educated and low-income category, are struggling with material survival and physical insecurity. However, the more educated respondents, particularly women, tend to face greater social and emotional contradictions during the reintegration process, as they strive for long-term resettlement in Afghanistan (Saito, 2007).

A study carried out by Altai Consulting in 2006, interviewed over 600 return households from Pakistan and Iran, across three provinces: 250 in Kabul, 175 in Heart, and 175 in Nangarhar. Over 65% of the interviews were conducted in urban areas and 35% in rural areas. On an overall level (social, professional or personal), 30% of returnees felt they were in a better situation while 22% believed they were in a similar situations as before exile. However, a total of 48% mentioned that they were worse off than before. The research revealed that although Afghans returned to their home country with higher skills they were struggling with their economic situation in Afghanistan. Moreover, the data indicated that some exile countries are more important for returnee economic integration than others. For example, while western countries (particularly Europe and Canada) were seen as booster for integration, neighboring states such as Iran and Pakistan were perceived as maintaining or worsen returnees socio economic status in Afghanistan (Altai Consulting, 2006). The study also researched how returnee employees perceived themselves in terms of economic performances and job classifications. The results showed that a total of 78% of returnees tend to see themselves as being quite low on the job classification scale. Dominant jobs are as labor workers in construction and manufacturing, as well as in specific craft-related or technical jobs like metalworkers, weavers, tailors, shoe makers or drivers. Most returnees did not consider jobs in a higher classification as available to them, i.e. a manager's position. (Altai Consulting, 2005).

The demand of returnees on what kind of program could help to improve their situation was clear: Over 75% indicated that they wished to receive some training in finance to create their own business, 34% indicated to receive vocational training and 32% would appreciate employment services. Other services such as training in English, computer courses or management courses were likewise mentioned (Altai Consulting, 2005).

PART D: Migration Policy Framework

Part D provides an overview of the key domestic legislation in Afghanistan, including immigration and nationality law and their current implementation status. Moreover, the role of important key actors such as Government ministries and NGOs involved in migration

management are analyzed in detail and linked to existing programs and efforts of the Afghan Government, to mainstream migration into national development plans.

5.1 Overview of national key domestic legislation

- **Nationality/ Citizenship Law**

It is not clear which citizenship law is currently in use in Afghanistan. In 2008, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada published information that the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) Secretariat in Afghanistan is using citizenship legislation that was

passed in 1936 according to the Gregorian calendar. The Office of the UNHCR confirms this information (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2008). In contrast, a report produced by the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) indicates that the Taliban-era citizenship legislation, passed in 2000, is still valid (UNHCR, 2000b). Other resources indicate that laws governing dual citizenship had recently changed to allow for a dual citizenship (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2008). Yet, in November 2009, a news report on Instablogs showed that the debate of dual nationality had not yet been clarified, leaving the question of which citizenship law is currently valid in Afghanistan, unanswered (Instablogs, 2009).

- **Visa regulations**

All foreign nationals planning to enter Afghanistan are required to possess a passport with a validity period of six months minimum since the date of visa issuance. Depending on the purpose of stay (i.e. leisure, studies, mass media, business, permanent residency, investment, religious activity) all individuals traveling to Afghanistan have to apply for a visa. This is done at the Afghan Embassy or Consulate located at the applicant's country of residence. The authorities responsible for foreigner arrivals in Afghanistan are the Afghan Department of Immigration and Ministry of Foreign Affairs that ensure that all visitors present the necessary travel documents upon arrival and stay only within the indicated period in their visas. Moreover, immigration officers assess the foreigner's real purposes of stay and foreigner ability to be financially self-sufficient during his/her the stay in Afghanistan (Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

In addition to the above mentioned responsibilities, the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs has the authority to deport or detain any foreigners that do not comply with the rules of immigration. In this regard, immigration officers at the airport can refuse foreign nationals entry to the country if individuals pose a threat to Afghanistan's national security. Moreover, persons who are mentally incapacitated or have serious health problems may be quarantined, and if cleared, will be allowed entry into Afghanistan (Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

Afghanistan Visa Types

Waiting times and documents to be filled out depend on the country in which the Afghan visa is being issued. However, regardless of the country and overseas mission, applicants must complete at least one visa application form, hand in two recent passport size photos, hold a valid passport for at least 6 months, possess a letter of introduction from an employer/sponsor

stating the purpose and duration of the trip and pay the visa processing fee. In some cases, applicants also have to undergo an interview and proof that they are able to cover financial expenses during their stay in the country (Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). Depending on the purpose of travel and reason to stay in Afghanistan, the following visas and permits can be obtained (Table 54).

Table 54: Visa Types - Afghanistan

Visa Type	Requirements
Tourist Visa	In case foreign nationals are interested to travel to Afghanistan individually or in groups for the purpose of visiting the country or their relatives, they must obtain a tourist visa, which has to be obtained prior to travel to the country and can be obtained at an Afghan Consulate or Embassy worldwide. A tourist visa is usually valid for one month (30 days) however; it can be extended once by the Ministry of Interior with the agreements of the Afghan Tourism Organization. *Note* Foreigners are advised to go to their respective embassies in Kabul, the Afghan Tourist Organization and Afghan Police Department to register upon arrival. This is required for holders of tourist visas.
Transit Visa	A transit visa is issued by the Afghan Mission aboard to those foreign nationals who pass through Afghanistan to a third country. The validity of this type of visa is 72 hours for air passengers and six days for those who travel by land.
Service Visa	This visa is issued by the Afghan Missions abroad to the foreign nationals who hold service or special passports.
Double Entry Visa	This is issued to foreigners who already have a visa but intend to enter Afghanistan more than once. The validity period can also be extended through the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan Tourism Organization.
Business Visa	This is issued to individuals who intend to enter the country for the purpose of business transaction, commercial, contracts, investment, meetings, discussion, seminars and other work-related activities with Afghanistan-based organizations or companies. Applicants will need to provide a letter confirming the purpose of the visit, business references in Afghanistan and the name of the sponsor company from the country of origin. Single or multiple entries may be provided depending on the specific purpose.

Visa for Diplomats	This type of visa is for holders of diplomatic passports who intend to travel to Afghanistan. The diplomatic visa can be obtained by the Afghan Mission abroad. However, applicants must contact the Section of Diplomatic passport and Diplomatic Visa of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly through their mission in Kabul.
Student Visa	A student visa is issued by the Afghan Missions abroad to the foreign students who intend to study in Afghanistan. The relevant university/ academic institution must contact the "Cultural Relations Department of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs" directly.
Exit Visa	An exit visa is issued to the foreign nationals who have entered the country with an entry work permit visa. The validity of this type of visa is one to six days; in some circumstasnces this can be extended.
Work Permit	A work permit is issued to foreign nationals who have a pre-made employment contract with any Afghanistan-based organization or company. Sufficient evidence of relations, transfer, position or employment with the organization is required. Should the applicant be bound to stay for a long period of time in Afghanistan, dependents may also be given residence permits. Application may be done together with the applicant's or independently. *Note* Mass media personnel and private individuals who plan to take photos and cinematographic films are required to obtain written permission from the Press Department, Tourist Bureau and Ministry of Information and Culture before beginning any activity.
Resident Permit	A residence permit is granted to individuals who intend to stay in Afghanistan indefinitely, provided that the qualifications and application are approved by the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A formal application form should be filled out and submitted to the said ministries.

Source: Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006

Visa Fees

The amount of visa fees depends on the type of visa and the time in the application is being processed. However, on average the fee for a single-entry visa, valid for a one month stay is US$100 if being processed within 24 hours, US$70 if being processed within three days and US$50 if being processed within 2 weeks. The fee for a long term, single entry visas that is

being processed within one or two days and is valid for a maximum of 3 three months in is US$140. In case the visa has expired, the holder of the passport will be fined US$2 for each day during the first month of the delay and a total of US$5 for each day during the second month of the delay. If the delay is more than two months the holder must pay the fine and additionally, will be deported (Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

Passport system in Afghanistan

Although the Afghan passport system has improved since 2011, the system has still major weaknesses. This is as passports can only be obtained in the main urban areas such as Kabul city. Moreover, waiting times and procedures of applications are too lengthy and expensive. It is a common understanding that bribe systems allow for the facilitation of the process and a quicker receipt of an official passport. The delays can therefore vary from a few days to a few months, depending on the bribe. As a result, a black market has thrived for the sale of formal passports and fake passports. A formal passport costs approximately US$240 on the black market, and a fake passport about US$120. Faced with such high prices, Afghans travelling through Pakistan prefer to do so without any formal passport, as it is less costly and part of the routine (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009).

- **Trafficking law**

In terms of trafficking, Afghanistan does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Besides the continued referral of identified trafficking victims to care facilities, an undeveloped judicial and prosecutorial system and weak coordination remain severe obstacles to effectively punishing trafficking offenses (IRIN, 2011g). As a result, Afghanistan has been placed on the Tier 2 Watch List. Meaning, that Afghanistan belongs to the countries whose government 'does not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards, but is making significant efforts to bring its policy into compliance with those standards' (U.S. Department of State, 2010c). However, additionally to the lack of proper legislation, widespread corruption practices and weak border management make it easy for criminals to traffic humans through local and international borders undisturbed (IRIN, 2007b).

Prosecution

The Afghan law on *Countering Abduction and Human Trafficking* (2008) is the legal document of the Afghan government that lies out penalties for sex trafficking for labor trafficking. In general the document states that penalties for sex trafficking are life imprisonment and for labor trafficking eight to 15 years in prison. However, one year later

another Afghan law has been passed on the *Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW).* This law supersedes other Afghan laws and consequently can be used to decrease the penalties outlined in the Afghan trafficking law. More specifically, the EVAW law states that the penalty for an offender who subjects a victim to forced labor is short-term imprisonment with a maximum of six months. This reduction in penalty, compared to the penalty of eight-15 years outlined in the trafficking law, is significant. Moreover, an offender who forces females into prostitution may be punished with a maximum of seven year in contrast to the penalty of life-imprisonment in the trafficking law.

In 2010, the U.S. Department published its Trafficking in Persons Report. The study researched the context in which human trafficking in Afghanistan takes place and furthermore, investigated how cases of human trafficking are handled by Afghan authorities and the judiciary. During the research a total of 24 offenders in 19 alleged cases were arrested by the Afghan Ministry of Interior. However, it could not be confirmed that all cases were related to human trafficking, this is as cases of human trafficking, smuggling and kidnapping are often mixed. Moreover, the U.S. Department could not find out whether all cases were handled under the Afghan counter trafficking law or any other law relevant. The Government of Afghanistan was not able or willing to provide further information that could have clarified the situation. In addition, the GoA did not make any efforts to prosecute government official that were known to be involved trafficking offenses. The IOM in cooperation with international stakeholders carried out training units for authorities involved in trafficking prosecution and prevention, including the Afghan police, prosecutors, judges, and other government officials. The aim of the training was to teach components that would help in identifying victims of trafficking and distinguishing trafficking from other cases such as smuggling (U.S. Department of State, 2010c).

In their report the U.S. Department (2010) pointed out that victims of trafficking are still punished for acts they may have committed as a direct result of being trafficked. In many cases victims were arrested and locked up because it became known that they became victims of forced prostitution. In other cases women were punished because they tried to escape forced marriages. Many victims responded they were raped by authorities such as the police, simply for walking on the street without their husbands or another male member of the family. It was also observed that some victims who could not find help or shelter, voluntary went to prison to seek protection from their male family members. With regard to the Government, there was no evidence that officials encouraged victims of trafficking to support investigations of their traffickers. During their research, the U.S. Department found no

evidence that the police asked the victims to assist in investigations of their traffickers. However, even though the police would have asked to identify traffickers, it is unlikely that (a) the police would have taken action and (b) the victims would have identified his/her trafficker because of the high risk involved (U.S. Department of State, 2010c).

Prevention

The Ministry of Women's Affairs Initiative to Strengthen Policy and Advocacy through Communications and Institution Building launched and partially funded a public information campaign with foreign donor support. The campaign used among others TV and radio shows to distribute information on trafficking issues in all 34 provinces of the country. Evaluation of these mechanisms confirmed that an increased awareness was present among the public after information were broadcasted. In addition to awareness rising campaigns, the Afghan National Police committed to improve its age verification procedures to prevent child soldiers from its ranks. In addition, more efforts should be put into issuing birth certificates to new born. So far, fewer than ten% of children are registered at birth, most of those who lack proper documentation are found in rural areas. At the end of 2009, the Monitoring, Reporting and Response Steering Committee established to formulate an action plan for the government's work with UN Task Forces on Trafficking and Children in Armed Conflict. However, until this date the plan has not been completed (U.S. Department of State, 2010c).

- **Bilateral agreements and international treaties**[55],

Since 2001, Afghanistan has become increasingly an active member of the international community and established diplomatic relations with countries around the world (U.S. Department of State, 2010b). As already mentioned, Afghanistan is a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol (Poppelwell, 2007). Furthermore, many tripartite agreements between Afghanistan, UNHCR, and EU countries were put in place in mid-2002, according to which the repatriation of Afghan refugees is on a "voluntary" basis. This kind of tripartite agreement also exists with Pakistan and Iran. In 2008, Afghanistan and Qatar signed a bilateral agreement to regulate the flow of Afghan laborers in Qatar and strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries. Kuwait and Afghanistan are engaged in dialogue with Afghanistan to improve and deepen bilateral relations (Overfeld & Zumot, 2010). With regard to Pakistan, both countries (Afgahnistan & Pakistan) are engaged in dialogue to resolve bilateral issues such as border security, immigration and trade (U.S. Department of State,

[55] See Table 43 on pp.116 for an overview of bilateral and tripartite agreements

2010b). In 2009, the two countries have signed the "Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Directions of Bilateral Cooperation". The declaration lays out that both countries agree to encourage "people to people exchanges" and contacts especially between academia, think tanks, media and civil society (Embassy of Pakistan, 2009). Also with its neighbour Iran, Afghanistan continues dialogue on bilateral cooperation particularly in relation to counter-narcotics efforts, migrant workers and railway building (United Nation General Assembly Security Council, 2011).

In early 2011, the Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and UNHCR renewed their tripartite agreement on voluntary return of Afghan refugees. To encourage and motivate the Afghan refugees to repatriate, the repatriation package of US$100 per person/returnee has been enhanced to US$150 per person. The Government of Pakistan has also stressed the Government of Afghanistan to allocate sufficient funds for rehabilitation of returnees in their Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to enhance that repatriation is sustainable and does not result second displacement (Islamabad Post, 2011). In the same year Afghanistan, Australia and UNHCR have signed their first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), allowing Australia to send back unsuccessful Afghan asylum seekers. In association with the MoU, the Australian Government has agreed to undertake a number of initiatives intended to build capacity in relevant Afghan Government ministries and to assist the repatriation of displaced Afghans. The largest undertaking will be to fund the upgrade of Afghanistan's passport issuing system to bring Afghan passport into line with international standards (Bowen, 2011). Moreover, in 2011, the Afghan Interior Minister signed a bilateral agreement establishing joint procedures for the Police Officer Candidate School in Siva, Turkey, along with Turkish Ambassador, for training Afghan police officers in Turkey (Nato Training Mission Afghanistan, 2011). Many other bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and i.e. neighbouring countries exist however most agreements tend to focus on economic cooperation and peace agreements rather than migration issues.

5.2 Key actors involved in migration management

- **Afghan ministries**

The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) is the main responsible organization for returnees and internal displaced persons. The ministry is supported by a Consultative Group on Refugees and IDPs which includes Government Ministries, UN agencies, NGOs and

donors. The main task of the Consultative Group is to support the Ministry of of Refugees and Repatriation in its goal to reintegrate AFghan return refugees and internally displaced persons into the society. Other government ministries involved in migration issues include the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH*)*. In 2003, the Afghan government began implementing return programs for IDPs in the south (Poppelwell, 2007). In April 2004, the MRRD implemented a new program whose major goal was to promote the return of IDPs to their original home area. As part of this plan, a Land Allocation Scheme was launched in 2005 to address the needs of landless returnees and IDPs. Priority has been given to those who have already applied for land (those that returned between 2002 and 2006) and the most vulnerable (i.e. the disabled and widowed). In 2008, over 520,000 applications have been registered, approximately 100,000 beneficiaries have been selected, and 23,000 plots have been distributed. The Government is also planning to increase the provision of social services to returnees, refugees and IDPs. At current state the Afghan government aims to further provide housing facilities, land plots, and infrastructure to returnees to encourage voluntary return (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008b).

In August 2004, the MoRR in partnership with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UNHCR set up the Employment Service Centre to facilitate the returnee population's search for work. The Centre is linked to other initiatives and potential employers. Whilst the Government is making significant steps forward in tackling the issues faced by returnees and IDPs, its ability to do so is seriously hampered by the fact that it is still highly dependent on foreign aid (Poppelwell, 2007). In its National Development Strategy 2008-2013, the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) lays out an action plan including key Government ministries that are involved in the future management and coordination of IDPs, refugees and returnees. An overview of this Action Plan gives Table 57 on page 176. The table shows clearly which policy activates or actions fall in the jurisdiction of the corresponding ministry (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008a).

- **Main International organizations involved in migration management**

UNHCR

Since the mid 1990s, UNHCR has been the main international organization involved in the management and coordination of Afghan refugees. The main responsibilities of UNHCR are among others; the voluntary return of Afghans from abroad, reintegration of Afghan returnees

and the issues of internal displacement of persons in the country. In a more practical way, UNHCR assists (return) migrants and refugees with cash grants, shelter, non-food items and livelihood interventions. Moreover, the organization devotes resources to field monitoring, evaluation, analysis of the durability of return, refugee and migratory movements, and related human rights issues. UNHCR operates through national and local partners. By doing so the organization financially supports smaller NGOs that work closely with populations of concern (UNHCR, 2011a). For the coming years, UNHCR stated that it will continue its cooperation wwith the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation and other key ministries involved in the reintegration and protection of the internally displaced. Moreover, the organization wants to facilitate its cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (mainly for water projects and community development), the Ministry of Urban Planning and Development, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (to conduct skills training and find employment for Afghan returnees), the Ministry of Women's Affairs (regarding gender issues) and the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore, UNHCR works closely together with other international organization such as ILO, the World Bank and UN organization (i.e. UNAMA, UNDP, WHO, UNICEF) (UNHCR, 2011a).

IOM

Besides its voluntary return programs for high skilled migrants, the International Organisation for Migration supporting Afghan government institutions that are involved in migration management issues. In addition, the organization provides emergency relief to vulnerable displaced families; facilitates long-term return and reintegration to and within Afghanistan and stabilizes migrant communities for sustainable development in the context of long periods of mass population displacement. As in the case of UNHCR, IOM works in close cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Education and many others that are involved in the implementation of the ANDS (IOM, 2011a). The following table (Table 55) gives a short overview of IOM programs that are currently running in Afghanistan.

Table 55: IOM Projects in Afghanistan

Field of Expertise	**Projects**
Emergency and Post-Conflict Migration Management	• Rapid Response Humanitarian Assistance • Afghan Civilian Assistance Programme • Construction of Health and Education Facilities

	• Civil Military Overivew • Support to Voter Registration • Reintegration of Afghans Returning from Iran and Pakistan
Migration and Development	• Return of Qualified Afghans
Regulating Migration and Development	• Voluntary Return and Reintegration • Counter-Trafficking
Technical Cooperation	• Passport and Visa Issuance of Capacity Building • Border Management • Support to Provincial Governance

Source: IOM 2011a

- **The role of NGOs in Afghanistan**

Since the beginning of the 1980s, NGOs have played an active role in Afghanistan. They primarily served as providers of humanitarian assistance and implementers of small scale rehabilitation and development projects. Whilst the majority of NGOs originate from Afghanistan, the largest programs are implemented by international or multinational NGOs (Poppelwell, 2007). In 2004, the Afghan government has ratified a new NGO law. The new law placed NGOs within a clear legal framework and marks a significant stride forward for enhancing the legitimacy and operating environment for NGOs in the country (United States Institute of Peace, 2007). According to the Council on Foundation (2011) there are over 1650 NGOs in Afghanistan.

In terms of performance, many NGOs in Afghanistan lack capacity and are not able to booster development. This is particularly the case in Afghan's rural areas, where capacities are very low, and projects often have to be delayed to an uncertain point in time or have to be prolonged. While there are about a dozen large Afghan NGOs that have developed significant capacity over time, most are in need of technical assistance, resources, and supporting networks. Besides the lack of resouces, NGOs in Afghanistan suffer from a substantial lack of legitimacy. This however is not surprising given how NGOs operated in the past. As already mentioned (Section 3.1/pp.94) the majority of Afghans perceived NGOs as corrupt and thinks that international organizations are only the country for their own profit. However, the new law and increased public education campaigns have helped to rebuild the image of NGOs in the last years. Yet, much work remains to be done also in terms of transparency. The increasing deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan represents another constraint to the sustained success of NGOs and other state institutions. Security conditions are not only

threatening the opportunities for international NGOs to assist in developing Afghan civil society, but are also hampering the ability of local NGOs to increase their own capacity and legitimacy. In the last years the number of attacks on NGO staff has dramatically increased. Moreover, attacks are no longer contained to the southern and eastern regions, but are now occurring also in the north and other part of the country (United States Institute of Peace, 2007).

It should be noted that only nine% of donor fund flowing into Afghanistan has gone to rebuilding the NGO community. However, the support local NGOs provide to the Afghan community and their contribution to the reconstruction process of the country is urgently needed. With increased capacity, NGOs can provide a crucial partner to build local capacity and deliver services, particularly in areas that are inaccessible to internationals. Moreover, providing assistance and support to domestic NGOs and other organization is crucial for creating a free and stable country (United States Institute of Peace, 2007).

- **The role of civil society in Afghanistan**

Besides NGOs, many other forms of organizations and community structures exist in Afghanistan. These include among others religious networks, voluntary associations, interest groups and typical Afghan community structures referred to as shuras or jigas. These Civil Society Groups (CSOs) have increasingly become important in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan and serve in many cases (i.e. international conferences) as a balance to military and political organizations (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2006).

Between 2004 and 2006, the Foundation of Culture and Civil Society (FCCS) collected data in the 34 provinces of Afghanistan to analyse and define the Civil Society in the country. During the study, over 1,119 CSOs were recorded in 33 provinces of Afghanistan (excluding Kabul province). Of these 717 were registered with at least one registration authority and 402 were not registered (FCCS, 2007). The data indicates that in 33 provinces there was a high level of local initiative particularly in the cultural education sector. The main focus of CSOs was to provide the services that were not provides by the Afghan governemnt thereby playing a crucial role in the reconstruction process of the country. While some CSOs offered activities only in one area most CSOs were engaged in several activities such as cultural and/or social activities, capacity building, service delivery, information or advice actives and advocacy or representation activities. With regard to Kabul province, during the research, a total of 567 CSOs were identified in this area. Most CSOs in Kabul were registered with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. The main activities of

these CSOs focused on cultural and social activities, service delivery, capacity building and advocacy and representation (FCCS, 2007).

Since 2011, Afghanistan has witnessed an explosion of Civil Society Organization, many of them being created only for the implementation of one project. As a consequence, many CSOs diminished as fast as they were established. The study by FCCS also found that Civil Society Organizations that were not in contact with international donors had very low budget levels. Yet, the lack of funding did not necessarily lead low level performance. The most effective organizations developed coping strategies to implement their activities with very low budgets. However, the high pressure and requirements of international donors for grants distribution has become problematic for those Civil Society Organizations that have limited capacity and efficiency. As a result, very few CSOs get the opportunity to work with international donors, increasing the risk of a monopoly by a small number of organizations. The research revealed that there was a very low distribution level of international funds to local Civil Society Organizations which resulted in serious implications for the sustainability of humanitarian projects (FCCS, 2007).

- **NGO coordination bodies**

The main NGO coordination bodies in Afghanistan include; the Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau (ANCB), the Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the Islamic Coordination Council (ICC) and the South West Afghanistan and Baluchistan Association for Coordination (SWABAC) (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2006). It should be noted that all NGOs have to register with the Ministry of Economy (MoE). Moreover, on its web page the MoE lists new and renewed international NGOs gives out information of those NGOs that have been dissolved over time (Afghan Ministry of Economy, 2008)

Although ACBAR is today locate in Afghanistan the organization has originally been established in Pakistan in 1988. This is, as international donors and aid agencies were overwhelmed with the high number of refugees in the country at that time and thus, demanded a coordinated approach to the existing situation. As for today, ACBAR represent a communication platform for NGOs, UN donors and Afghan government institutions to share best practice, exchange knowledge and discuss the efficient and effective use of donor funds for Afghan citizens (ACBAR, 2009). Just three years later than ACBAR, the Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau was established in Afghanistan. As in the case of ACBAR, the Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau coordinates the activities of it members including Government

representatives, UN agencies and other international organizations. The ANCB aims to enhance the capacity of its members (over 200 in the education, health, agriculture and human rights sector) by organizing workshops and seminars and stretching its network further out to other organizations (ANCB, 2010).

Many other coordination agencies and coordination groups exist, however rather than migration management they tend to focus on issues such as justice (i.e. Transitional Justice Coordination Group – Afghanistan) or provide frameworks in which individuals, donor agencies or governments can exchange information and share their expertise (i.e. Afghan Youth Coordination Agency –AYCA).

- **Coordination among Afghan ministries**

In its National Development Strategy (2008-2013) the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) lays out, that in order to manage and response to population movements, a cross section of government involvement is necessary. More dedicated policy, institutional, and programme arrangements that can mobilise the necessary resources and advocate for international support are required. The GoA claims that closer coordination between Afghan ministries, among others the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Urban Development, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Health and international donors, is critical to effectively manage return migration. This however, also requires improved communication of authorities on local level, i.e. between Kabul and key provinces of return migrants (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008). Furthermore, Government ministries and programs are asked to establish more systematic linkage between returnee destinations and resource allocation decisions. The ANDs also aims to make credits accessible to returnees and local populations to finance micro-finance lending and small business development. In addition, the government wants to establish training and skill development courses for young returnees. However, in order to achieve these aims programs have to properly managed and coordinated (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008a).

To ensure the coordination and progress of the ANDS, the Afghanistan Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) was established. Its main purpose is to monitor the progress of the attainment of the benchmarks contained within the Afghan Compact[56] and to problem solve when obstacles are encountered. The JCMB is vo-chaired by the Senior

[56] The Afghanistan Compact (AC) sets out detailed outcomes, benchmarks and timelines for delivery, consistent with the high level goals set by the I-ANDS. The AC was approved at the London Conference in January 2006 and endorsed by the UN Security Council (Norwegian Embassy, 2011)

Economic Advisor to the President, and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) to Afghanistan. Members include the Government of Afghanistan and international donors to Afghanistan. It meets every three months and annually publishes its progress and findings in a report. Overall, the JCMB is the key stone and chief coordination mechanism between the International Community and the Government (Norwegian Embassy, 2011).

5.3 Migration programs and recent policy developments

- **Mainstreaming migration into development plans**

Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2008-2013

As already mentioned, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, formally approved by President Hamid Karzai on April 21, 2008, is the document that outlines the Government of Afghanistan's strategies for security, governance, economic growth and poverty reduction. In general the Afghan National Development Strategy is the end product of intensive consultation between the Government of Afghanistan, NGOs, local authorities and representative of the international community (Embassy of Afghanistan-Washington D.C., 2006).

Under Pillar 7 of the ANDS (Figure 27/pp174 & Table 57/pp176), the Government of Afghanistan focuses on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons. The aim of the 7th Pillar is to facilitate the planned and voluntary return of refugees and IDPs and the reintegration of returnees and IDPs into society. Table 56 lays out the governments' expected outcomes of the ANDS under pillar seven. The strategy allows the Government to coordinate and reintegrate refugees and IDPs into society. The planned and voluntary return of refugees and IDPs is expected to contribute to economic growth, the reduction of poverty and the strengthening of security and stability of the country and the region (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008b).

Table 56: Expected outcomes of ANDS (7th Pillar)

Nr.	Objective	Target Group
1.	Save, voluntary and gradual return of refugees from Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere	Refugees/ Returnees
2.	Better and sustainable reintegration programs and interventions for returnees/ IDPs rovision of public work programs to create job opportunities together with skill development training	IDPs/ Returnees
3.	Improvement of social protection and disaster/emergency preparedness for IDPs to ensure that timely and necessary support is provided to minimize hardship and suffering	IDPs
4.	Better management of cross border movements and economic migration	Border management
5.	Preparation of plans to improve the response to internal displacement crisis	IDPs
6.	Greater attention to the protection of the vulnerable groups among refugees and IDPs, including children and women.	Vulnerable groups
7.	Facilitation of gradual return of all Afghans who wish to return voluntarily from Pakistan, Iran and other host countries through policy negotiation and coordination;	Returnees
8.	Strengthening of the Government's capacity to plan, manage and assist the reintegration of returning Afghans and IDPs,	IDPs
8.	Higher capacity of the Government to plan for and respond to international displacement	IDPs
10.	Better terms of stay and conditions for Afghans in neighboring countries The improvement of primary and secondary health care for Afghan refugees in Mashad and Zahedan, Iran. Legal aid and vocational training for Afghan refugees and support to the host communities in Pakistan	Migrants in Iran and Pakistan
11.	Progress towards the implementation of bilateral agreements on temporary labor migration and;	Labor migration
12.	Better access to land for the refugee and the IDP Population	IDPs

Source: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008b

Figure 27: Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Structure



Source: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008b

Table 57: Overall Refugee, Returnee and IDP Sector Strategic Outcomes – Action Plan Matrix

Outcomes	Policy Actions or Activities	Targets	Time Frame	Responsible Agency
Willing refugees returned	Tri-partite agreements between countries of asylum, Afghanistan and UNHCR, fully reflecting the principles of voluntary, dignified and gradual return, continue to guide the conduct of the voluntary repatriation operation	Scenario One Presented trend lines improve permitting 800,000 – 1 mill returns Scenario Two Current trends continue permitting 600,000- 800,000 returns Scenario Three Current trends deteriorate permitting 400,000 – 600,000 returns	2008-2013	MoRR, MoFA
Government's capacity strengthened	Improved internal coordination mechanisms Institutional development in the form of inter-ministerial cooperation Capacity building and technical assistance Data collection, analysis and knowledge generation Policy advice to provincial authorities, Coordination of interventions and material assistance support	Policies adjusted to make provisions for returning refugees and IDPs in national programs Budget allocations to sectors and provinces takes account of population expansion as a result of returns National initiatives addressing returnee needs and local host communities developed and enhanced in housing, area-based and community development programs Improved knowledge and planning Enhanced communications and interactions between Kabul and provinces More effective and efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance	By end-first half of 2009 By end of 2009	MoRR, MRRD, MHUD, MoLSA MoRR, ANDMA, MRRD, provincial authorities
Improved terms of stay and conditions	Research and analysis to support policy advocacy	Greater awareness of economic and social "stay" factors	By end of 2013	MoRR, MoFA

for Afghans in neighboring countries	Negotiations with neighboring countries Identification of program interventions to support policy objectives	More predictable and clearer legal status and renewable documentation Improved employment opportunities, skill development, basic literacy and numeracy, access to health care		
Bilateral agreements on temporary labor migration progressed	Research and analysis to support policy and public advocacy Negotiations with neighboring countries Identification of program interventions to support policy objectives	Reduced instances of deportations Fewer incidents of drug and contraband smuggling during irregular border crossings Increases numbers of Afghans traveling with documentation Strengthened public management capacity to develop policy and negotiate agreements	By end of 2013	MoRR, Mo1SAMD, MoFA, MoI

Source: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008

International Conference on Afghanistan, Kabul 2010

In July 2010, the Government of Afghanistan presented, at the Kabul International Conference, its 'National Development Strategy Prioritization and Implementation Plan'. The aim of the Kabul International Conference was to encourage neighboring states and other stake holders to seek a more coordinated and united approach to regional cooperation on important themes including counter-narcotic, refugees/IDPs and economic cooperation (Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 2010). In essence, the new plan of prioritized national programs, confirms the government's commitment to work towards the full implementation of the seventh pillar of the ANDS. More specifically, the GoA assured to enhance capacity building of relevant Afghan ministries in better dealing with repatriation and reintegration issues. Additionally, the government stated to improve job opportunities for Afghan returnees and moreover, provide basic needs (i.e. land, water, electricity, shelter, health-care, and general education) to IDPs and refugees. Further commitment to facilitate tripartite arrangements (regarding integration of Afghan refugees) with neighboring countries was likewise made. Moreover, the GoA acknowledged the importance of economic cooperation and therefore continues to facilitate the dialogue on labor migration between countries in the region (especially GCC countries) to better regulate labor flows and to increase receptiveness to an Afghan work force (Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 2010).

4. PART E: Conclusion

The last part (Part E) of this thesis summarizes the main findings with regard to Afghanistan's current development and migration situation and presents some key recommendations for policy maker to improve current migration management. Data gaps that have been observed during data collection and possible strategies to improve migration statistics are mentioned at the end of this chapter.

6.1 Afghanistan's development situation

- **Human Development**

In 2010, Afghanistan's HDI was 0.349, which gives the country a rank of 155 out of 169 countries with comparable data. Although there has been some progress in reconstruction and development, the country is not progressing fast enough to achieve the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2020 (CIA, 2011). Whereas in 2005 over 33% of the population lived under the cost of basic needs poverty line, the figure had increased to 36% in 2007. Approximately 6.6 million Afghans do not meet their minimum food requirements (NRVA, 2007/08). The percentage of girls attending school has increased, but remains well below that of boys. Health indicators for both women and children remain exceptionally low and female high mortality rates also reflects the poor conditions in the country. In addition, both life expectancy and adult literacy are low. Life expectancy at birth for both, females and males, was 45.5 years in 2010. In 2007/08 the NRVA survey observed that the net enrolment ratio in primary education for boys was 60.4% and for girls 42.1%. Literacy rate of those aged 15-24 was for males 52.9%, for females 23.9%. In addition, the total expenditure on education was 1.9% of the total GDP in 2010. Notably, approximately 68% of the population in Afghanistan lack sustainable access to clean water, and 50% of Afghan children under five are classified as underweight (UNDP, 2009).

- **Poverty and emplyoment**

The CIA (2011) estimated the total GDP (purchasing power parity) at US$ 29.81 billion in 2010. Estimates for GDP per capita were US$1,000 for the same year. In spite of difficulties, Afghanistan has experienced high GDP growth (22.5%) and declining prices in 2009/2010. Due to the very large share of children, less than half of the Afghan population (12 million) is in the official working age of 16 years and over. The NRVA put unemployment rate for both males and females at 7.1% in 2007/08. This relative low number of unemployment rate however, disguises substantial underemployment, poverty and low production (NRVA, 2007/08). Although rural poverty is most serious among settled populations and Kuchi nomads, the incidence of poverty and food insecurity is increasing most rapidly in urban areas. A number of recent studies have concluded that due to poor daily wages many urban workers fall into the category of the 'working poor'. Insecurity of employment leads to income irregularities and to shortages of livelihoods. Many urban poor households lack finance and are forced to take short-term loans to purchase basic needs (UNDP, 2009).

- **Human rights & rule of law**

Progress on the implementation of Human Rights in Afghanistan is limited. The public and the media have limited resources to discuss openly human rights issues and to call public authorities and other power brokers to account. According to some sources, human rights issues in Afghanistan are contradicting local traditions and are thus, a luxury the country cannot afford (United Nation General Assembly Council, 2008). The worsening security situation in the country has substantially slowed down the implementation of human rights including the right to life and safety, freedom of movement, access to education and health. Illegal and arbitrary detention is widespread across the country and in many cases suspects are not given defense councils or are tortured to force confessions. There are frequent reports of arbitrary denial of justice in disputes over housing, land and property rights. Moreover, the freedom of expression is threatened, with continuing reports of arbitrary arrests, detention and intimidation of journalists (United Nation General Assembly Security Council, 2011).

6.2 Migration management and recommendations

- **Afghan return migrants**

Due to war and conflict, Afghanistan has been for several decades an emigration country. Millions of citizens fled during Soviet invasion in the 1980s and many left the country during the 1990s to escape the Taliban regime. Since 2002 however, one may argue that Afghanistan has become an immigration country, considering the fact that almost 20% of the Afghan population (over 5 million refugees) has returned to the country. Most migrants returned home from the Islamic Republics of Pakistan and Iran. However, it should not be forgotten that the flow of immigrants mainly consists of first and second generation Afghans and less of foreign immigrants. Yet, in terms of real numbers the net migration rate (per 1,000/population) is 5.4, meaning that more people migrate into Afghanistan than emigrate (UNHCR, 2011c). Despite the success of so many return migrants, many challenges remain. Since the mid 2000s, the number of returnees has decreased significantly. This is, in part, due to factors such as increased terrorism, poverty and a difficult humanitarian situation in the country. The Government of Afghanistan (GoA) is fully committed to implement the 7th Pillar of its national development strategy (ANDS), concerning refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons. Under the ANDS the GoA aims to increase its absorption capacity to better plan and manage sustainable reintegration of return migrants. Furthermore, strengthening capacity in relevant Afghan ministries dealing with repatriation, enhancing

inter-Ministerial coordination and mobilizing additional resources, are also key points under the ANDS (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008b).

The International Crisis Group (ICG) has laid out recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan to better manage and protect return migrants and those who still remain in neighboring countries. According to the ICG, the GoA should among others, strengthen municipalities' capacity to respond better to population influxes through enhanced urban planning and infrastructure development. In addition, existing land allocation schemes and land dispute resolution initiatives should be made more transparent, thereby ensuring the neutrality of the judiciary and clarifying property rights and documentation. As the GoA already laid out in the ANDS, the capacity of the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) is limited and thus, cannot ensure long-term resettlement on its own. To improve efficiency, in each appropriate ministry a branch specifically addressing refugees and IDPs should be established. Moreover, the ICG suggests that the MoRR should turn into an inter-ministerial consultative and coordinating body. With respect to refugees still residing in Iran and Pakistan, the GoA should improve regional cooperation and enhance the protection of Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan by addressing the issue of unmanaged cross-border movements (International Crisis Group, 2009).

- **IDPs**

Recent estimates of 2011, put the number of IDPs in Afghanistan at 400,000 of whom 300,000 are being assisted by UNHCR (UNHCR, 2011a). Armed conflict is one of the main causes for internal displacement. As a consequence, to avoid an increase in IDPs, the Brookings Institution (BI) [57] and The Liaison Office (TLO) suggested that military planners should integrate the issue of displacement into their counterinsurgency strategies, guidelines and standard operating procedures (Rothing, 2011).

The main responsibility with regard to IDPs has the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Returnees (MoRR). With UNHCR's advice, the ministry has formulated many policies and implemented programs to address protracted displacement and reintegration of return migrants. However, despite these efforts the GoA has missed to develop legal instruments to prevent and respond to internal displacement and ensure that the human rights of IDPs are fully respected. Although this issue has been addressed in the Afghan National Development Strategy, the strategy does not provide a definition for an IDP in Afghanistan, nor does it

[57] The Brookings Project on Internal Displacement and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) finalized a review of Afghan laws and policies in 2010, based on national responsibility benchmarks. Entitled "Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility.

prohibit discrimination against them. In addition, the ANDS stresses only the importance of migrants that voluntary return to Afghanistan however, it does not address the issue of those Afghans who want to remain in neighboring countries. Moreover, only US$three million were allocated to providing assistance to refugees and IDPs in 2009/10 (Rothing, 2011). However, in order to meet the needs of IDPs and provide basic services such as food, water and shelter, more financial resources are needed. Most importantly, in order for (international) NGOs and other humanitarian organization to work effectively in the field, the security situation in the country has to improve. Especially in the past years, humanitarian staff has been increasingly targeted by insurgent groups making the provision of direct assistance very difficult if not impossible (Rothing, 2011).

It should be noted, that many Afghans are also displaced due to natural disasters such as earthquakes, flooding, drought, landslides and avalanches. Though it is not possible to completely avoid natural disasters, the sufferings can be minimized by creating proper awareness among the population and by developing a suitable warning system. Natural disasters cut across many boundaries, including organizational, political, geographical, professional, topical, and sociological. This means that disaster information needs to be disseminated to all stakeholders at Shura, District, Provincial and National levels, both public and private (AIMS, 2010).

- **Afghan migrant workers and circular migration**

Widespread poverty and lack of income-generating opportunities are the main push factors for Afghans to go and look for work outside their home country. So far, neighbour countries such as Iran and Pakistan have been the major destination countries for the majority of irregular and unskilled Afghan labour force. Both, Iran and Pakistan have officially stated that they want to reduce the number of unregistered Afghans in their countries. According to government officials, Iran has deported about one million Afghans in the past three years. Most of the deportees were Afghan single male migrants (Overfeld & Zumot, 2010). However, despite Iran's' efforts to decrease the number of Afghan migrants and the economic downturn the country is facing, Afghans working in the informal labour market have increased in the past years. This is, as Afghans are a very competitive labour force that is willing to work for lower wages than their Iranian counterparts. However, since Afghans are often working irregular in Iran, meaning without valid documents, they are often subject to exploitation and harassments (Overfeld & Zumot, 2010). As it has been addressed at the International Conference of Afghanistan in London in 2010, many issues concerning labor

migration could be solved through regional cooperation. The issue is particularly important as large numbers of Afghans are working in the neighboring countries and remittances from abroad are an important source of revenue. In the past, labor migration between Afghanistan and neighbors remained unregulated. Although the GoA has recognized the importance of its migrant labor force and made attempts to regulate the flow of Afghan labor migration (i.e. bilateral agreement with Qatar) more work needs to be done. Bilateral agreements with important destination countries such as Iran and Pakistan should be established to legitimize migrant workers rights, to search for work abroad and make sure they are not exploited due to missing passports and visas. Meanwhile, the establishment of organizations that guarantee and control the right of migrant workers abroad is likewise essential (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010). Overall, it is crucial that labor migration is properly managed and takes place through safe and legal channels. Therefore, establishing safe and fair recruitment processes and bilateral coordination will help to protect the rights of migrants and help tackle exploitation and human trafficking. Furthermore, providing knowledge about the migration process and possible obstacles in the destination country will also enhance integration and quicker adjustment of migrants to the labor market in the host country (Ratha, Mohapatra & Scheja, 2011).

- **Border management and control**

Many parts of Afghanistan's border are characterized by weak border control. Drug trafficking and other illicit cross-border activities are common in these areas (UNDOC, 2011). Especially the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is marked by incidents of violence (Bajoria, 2009). The main responsibility in terms of control and management has the Afghan border police and passport office that officially control the entry and exit of all individuals at the border. However, studies have shown that the current passport and visa control system is in responding to the nature and size of the movements. Regulation has so far failed and a new system and approaches need to be developed (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009).

Therefore, to better monitor and manage cross-border movements along Afghanistans' borders, the implementation of a concrete and well enforced border counting and identification system is needed. However, such a system has to consider the transnational networks of tribal populations that live in the border areas. In order to adequately manage border movements, an electronic system should be implemented. The data from this system should be used to build up a data base that can reveal changes and volumes of migration flows at different points along the Afghan border (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009). Moreover,

border officials should be monitored for their respect and implementation of their responsibilities without reliance on any form of harassment and without discrimination based on ethnic criteria. The discrimination against non-Pashtuns is to this day well known (particularly at the Afghan-Pakistan border) and accepted by government representatives and migrants alike. Therefore, a well functioning border system executed by human resources can only function if all individuals involved in the process are treated equally, regardless of race and ethnicity. This element should be integrated in the capacity building and training of officials acting on behalf of the Afghan and Pakistan governments along the border (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2009). Border control policies should also recognize that migration is primarily an economic phenomenon (Ratha, Mohapatra & Scheja, 2011). Evidence form the US-Mexico border has shown (Ratha, Mohapatra & Scheja, 2011) that cross-border movements will continue regardless of any attempts to seal it (International Crisis Group, 2009). Even more, evidence from the US-Mexico border suggests that increasing the number of border control agents increases smuggler's fees, but is unlikely to curtail the number of migrants as intended. Instead, providing legal channels for temporary migration when labor is in high demand in the destination country is more likely to enhance the benefits of migration for all parties (Ratha, Mohapatra & Scheja, 2011).

- **Trafficking in persons**

Trafficking within Afghanistan is more prevalent than transnational trafficking, and the majority of victims are children. Afghan boys and girls are mainly trafficked for the purpose of forced labour and force prostitution. In order to prevent human trafficking, law enforcement activities against trafficking using the 2008 anti-trafficking law has to be enforced. One of the most important steps is, that the GoA has to ensure that victims of trafficking are not punished for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Furthermore, the definition of human trafficking has to be clear communicated to government officials to avoid confusion of kidnapping, human trafficking, and human smuggling (U.S. Department of State, 2010c). A further problem is terms of human trafficking are the low number of organizations (including IOM) that work on trafficking issues in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Afghan government should stipulate more organizations to get involved in its national counter trafficking law and motivate the donor community to provide more resources to support such initiatives. In order to better understand the phenomenon of human trafficking, regular field research should be conducted with a particular focus on gender-based violence, criminal networks involved with illicit activities such as human trafficking and

smuggling. In addition, more attention should be paid to the psychological impact of trafficking on victims (IOM, 2008b). In its report the IOM (2008b) sets out clear recommendation for Afghan ministries to increase awareness among the Afghan population human trafficking issues and how to prevent future victims of trafficking. The recommendations are summarized and outlined in the following table (Table 58).

Table 58: Human Trafficking- Action Plan Matrix

Aim	Task	Responsible Ministry -
Increase prevention	• Conduct information campaigns on the risks of migration/trafficking to educate potential victims of trafficking • Include alls social groups in rural and urban areas • Increase capacities of journalists and train local media personnel to ensure that reports on human trafficking are covered and communicated to the public correctly • Strengthen the education system and decrease drop-out rates of students (this is as less educated individuals are more prone to fall victims of trafficking)	MoWA, MoLSAMD MoE
Enhance prosecution	• Strengthen legislation of anti-trafficking law • Develop a law enforcement database for effective investigation and prosecution • Information of cases of human trafficking must be recorded, analyzed and shared in a timely manner through a common database among relevant agencies • Information sharing mechanisms between different units of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) must be streamlined • Train border police to better identify VoTs • An increase in border patrols in needed since most VoTs are trafficked through unofficial border points • Increase awareness rising campaigns specifically targeting women, to inform victims of trafficking that they are entitled to seek assistance • Create an environment where victims and families can report cases and cooperate with law enforcement bodies to	MoJ MoI MoWA

	facilitate and investigate prosecution of trafficking cases.	
Increase Protection	• Increase the number of shelters designed for victims of trafficking and train shelter staff to address the specific psychological and medical needs of VoTs • Increase the capacity of community leaders in detecting trafficking cases • Educate communities to eliminate discrimination towards trafficked victims (particularly women) and ensure sustainable integration • In terms of transnational trafficking, promote regional cooperation with neighboring countries on issues such as border management, repatriation of victims, information sharing and extradition of perpetrators	MoWA MoLSAMD MoFA

Source: IOM 2008b

- **Remittances**

Remittances have been found to have an income stabilizing effect at both the macroeconomic level and at the household level (Ratha, Mohapatra & Scheija, 2011). While total remittances of Afghan migrants send to their home country reached nearly US$2.5 billion in 2006, Afghans in Iran alone remit an estimated US$500 million annually, equivalent to 6%of Afghanistan's GDP in 2008. However, it should also be noted that the economic relevance of Afghan labourers in their neighbouring countries is likewise significant. In the 1990s, the Afghan labour force in Iran has contributed to 4.4 % of the Iranian GNP (Overfeld & Zumot, 2010). Remittances of Afghan migrant workers can be seen as a key tool for family income generation and as a key contributing factor in national economic development. Although Afghanistan's banking sector is growing, the hawala system is likely to remain the primary mean of money transfer. This is as many Afghans abroad (i.e. Iran and Pakistan) lack proper identification papers and therefore, are not entitled to open bank accounts. In addition, the distrust in the banking system is high and many Afghans in rural areas have no access to any form of financial institution. Nonetheless, further attempts to increase financial infrastructure should be made. In 2008, Afghanistan implemented its first mobile money transfer product "M-Paisa/M-Pesa". M-Paisa is an extremely successful and efficient scheme for managing micropayments and electronic banking using SMS (Roshan, 2011). This new way of transferring remittances using mobile phone technology is becoming a cheaper means of transferring money than using the banking system and moreover, can be used by individuals

residing in rural areas. Considering that in 2009, over 12 % of Afghanistan's population used cell phones (Roshan, 2011) and that thousands of people subscribe to cell phone service each month (Brummit, 2007), the future of money transfer in Afghanistan may lie in the telecommunication system and should therefore be further expanded (Ratha, Mohapatra & Scheja, 2011). Consequently, the GoA should further leverage remittance flows for development by making them cheaper, safer and more productive for both sending and receiving countries. Yet, migration and remittances should not be viewed as a substitute for official development aid as they are private money that should not be expected to fund public projects. Also, not all poor households receive remittances and official funds are needed to address the needs of these households. Thus, the GoA and the international community should further acknowledge and facilitate the development potential of migration and remittances by increasing the awareness of the decision makers and improving data on remittances and migration; facilitating labour mobility and recruitment across borders, while allowing for safe and affordable mechanisms for sending money back home (Ratha, Mohapatra & Scheja, 2011).

- **Diaspora management and integration**

Most Afghans residing out of their home country are found in neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Iran. Other countries that are home to large Afghan communities include Europe, particularly Germany, England, Netherlands and North America (U.S. and Canada). It is estimated that over 3 million Afghans remain outside their home country. However, depending on the target group or the definition of nationality, the number of Afghans abroad might be much higher. The economic and social situation of Afghans abroad varies, depending on their time of arrival and the country they are residing in.

Iran and Pakistan share a long history with Afghanistan and have been hosting masses of Afghan refugee flows since the early 1980s. Whereas both countries have been welcoming Afghan refugees in the beginning they today see Afghan refugees as a burden to their economy and as a threat to their internal security. Depending on the place of residence and community within these two countries, Afghans have integrated well and often identify themselves as Pakistani or Iranian. However, studies have also shown that many Afghan refugees face harassment and exploitation in Iran and Pakistan. In order to better integrate Afghans in these countries, government and public perception and attitude about Afghan refugees has to change. This would include among others the change of policy, such as work permits for Afghan migrant workers and the right to citizenship especially for those Afghans who have been residing in neighbouring countries for several decades. Iran should stop mass deportations and Pakistan should become a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its

1967 Protocol. In addition, the objectives mentioned under the ANDS seventh pillar, regarding IDPs, refugees and returnees have to be put in place to better manage and safeguard the right of Afghan IDPs, migrant workers, returnees and refugees abroad.

In terms of Afghans in western countries, such as the UK and U.S. following can be said; for the first generation, a high rate of unemployment coupled with language barriers has made it difficult for people to interact effectively with the wider society and adapt to life in the West. Amongst UK-born Afghan Muslims there is greater adaption to mainstream culture and changing views about the issues such as the role of women in Afghan society than it is the case of first-generation Afghans. This is creating tensions among family members, with older people fearing the loss of their Afghan identity, and younger people looking to their parents to behave more westernized. Although this issue has not explicitly been researched among Afghan communities in other countries, it is likely that this phenomenon is widespread. In any way, support for the establishment of women's organisation is significant to the further empowerment and development of Afghan women in western societies (Change Institute, 2009). In England and the U.S. Afghan community organisations are rather weak in terms of political representation (although to a larger extent in the UK). This is mainly due to the ethnic, language and political differences in the Afghan population, which make it difficult to identify key leaders that are widely accepted across the community. As a consequence, there is a lack of representative community forums that could advocate on behalf of the community to central government and local public bodies. A direct recognition and representation of Afghans in local consultations and decision making forums is needed to improve the current situation. Furthermore, identifying and working with RCOs that could bridge the gap between local authorities and Afghan communities could also improve the situation (Change Institute, 2009). Overall, more research on the socio-economic situation of Afghan diasporas in countries that host the biggest Afghan communities (including EU countries, Russia, India etc. .) is urgently needed.

6.3 Improvement of migration statistics

- **Identification and explanation of existing data gaps**

Statistics on migration and remittances are often of poor quality, especially in developing countries. This is also the case for Afghanistan, where data on migration flows is relatively scarce and estimates on remittances and other indicators are not reliable. Consequently, poorly defined migration data or data of bad quality can negatively affect official migration statistics of population stocks and indirectly affect, demographic indicators such as fertility

and mortality rates or economic performance indicators. Especially for policy makers, it is crucial to have access to good migration data since statistics usually form the base line for policy development. However, with respect to Afghanistan data collection on Afghan remains a challenge[58].As could be observed throughout the research, migration data in Afghanistan on transit, circular or irregular migration is either not available or where available not representative of the actual situation. In example, official estimates of remittance flows to Afghanistan do not exist as the country does not report remittances in the IMF Balance of Payments statistics. In the absence of functioning state machinery and a weak banking system, existing estimates on remittances are not likely to be representative of the true volumes, since large portions of remittances are sent through unofficial channels. In addition, the study by Altai consulting and UNHCR on border migration between Afghanistan and Pakistan has shown, that official records of cross border movements are not representative of the actual volume. This is as border controls are scarce and where present lack basic knowledge and equipment (Ratha, Mohapatra & Scheja, 2011). Therefore, it is very unclear how large the actual migration flow between Afghanistan and its neighboring countries is. Furthermore, Afghanistan has no common procedures or standards on how to collect data on migrant worker, refugees or IDPs due to the lack of capacities and coherent policies and the absence of clear definitions. The lack of data on migrants coming to Afghanistan is likewise scarce. It is difficult if not impossible to access reports or data on immigrants or new air port arrivals, reported by national state authorities. This is as the information is either not accessible or no data has been collected so far. Personal email contact with state embassies in Kabul has shown that data on foreign migrants in Afghanistan is treated as confidential. Whether this is due to the deteriorating security situation in the country is not known. Moreover, studies on border migration and human trafficking gave inside into existing migration flows and pin pointed that huge migration movements are taking place. However, neither of the studies was able to depict the full scope of the phenomenon therefore, one can only guess how large actual cross-border movement or actual numbers of VoTs are. In this research, most data on migrants to and out of Afghanistan has been retrieved either from national censuses, official data bases (i.e. World Bank, UNSD) or publications by (international) organizations such as UNHCR, IOM, AREU and ILO. However, differences in data collection methods and the inclusion or exclusion of certain target groups are an obstacle in the comparison of Afghan migrant groups or migration flows.

[58] IOM migration profiles in Asia exist only for Vietnam and Republic of Korea.

In general, information on Afghan migrants residing outside Afghanistan is of better quality and better accessible. This is especially the case for Western counties. However, also here different data collection methods and changes in nationality laws make it difficult to estimate the total stock of Afghans abroad. Data on specific Afghan groups such as 'students' was difficult to retrieve. This is as national reports or censuses cluster foreign migrants often into one category as 'foreign' or 'Asian' rather than displaying the country of origin or nationality individually. Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of data on sociological and economical aspects that affect and influence the Afghan diaspora in Western societies. Less information is also available about Afghans residing in countries such as Russia, Tajikistan, India or the GCC states. In 2009, the Change Institute published a report on the Afghan community in England. The report was the first of its kind in understanding the Muslim/Afghan diaspora in England and more reports should follow. Other countries such as the U.S., Canada and Germany should likewise begin to research the importance of (Afghan) ethnic minorities in their countries. This is as the international community has committed to support the development of Afghanistan and therefore, should recognize the potential the Afghan Diaspora can contribute to this process.

- **Recommended actions/strategies to improve migration data**

Besides the objectives already mentioned under the seventh pillar of the ANDS and the above mentioned recommended actions to improve migration managed (i.e. border migration and human trafficking), the following should be considered: the GoA needs to recruit and train personnel with skills in statistics and information communication technology to enhance data gathering, entry, processing, and analysis. Salaries of staff workers have to increase, to counter-work wide corruption which makes data collection in many cases difficult if not impossible. When training migration workers, it is necessary to take into account differences in language, culture and ethnicity of both, migrants and staff workers. In addition, efforts should be made by the GoA to create and maintain links between migrants and their countries of origin and to tap into their potential by encouraging them to contribute human and financial capital to the development of their home communities. Migrants could make best use of economic opportunities at home if internal mobility is facilitated by both the source and host countries and communities. The outward transfer of remittances through money transfer organization such as Western Union is only an option for a limited number of citizens in Afghanistan. This poses a serious limitation for diaspora members in western countries, who wish to invest in the development of Afghanistan. In addition, the GoA has to improve the

pass and visa system to ensure that Afghan nationals have access to identification. However, in order to achieve this, the GoA has to reform its pass and visa system and decrease waiting times and high fees of passports and other identification. Moreover, the GoA should stress the importance of identification and labor permits in consultation processes with neighboring countries. Moreover, in the long term, the GoA should establish mechanisms to better control the outflow of Afghan students. This could be done by issuing exit visas to those who wish to leave the country, collecting information on demographics and reason of emigration. More information is also needed with regard to foreign nationals coming to Afghanistan. The GoA should expand the scope of administrative registration of foreigners collect data on sex, age and reason of (short-term) residence in the country.

Furthermore, the GoA should more intensively facilitate collaboration with international migration organization and research institutions to harmonize migration data collection or databases. The NRVA survey already collects information on migration and remittances, however a wider range of information on migration issues would benefit policy making in Afghanistan. More importantly, a database on Afghan migration information should be created. Such a database would give more inside into the reasons why people move or do not move in specific areas and thereby, contribute to more effective migration policies. The database should include detailed information on migrants, as this enhances comparability of data collected between countries.

With regard to western countries, migration data collection in these areas should also be improved. This is, as major differences exist in the concepts used for identifying migrants and their descendants which in turn is a major problem for data comparability. Therefore, national statistics should consider in their research to collect additional data on migration-related information that go beyond citizenship and country of birth. It is beneficial to present data in the most detailed breakdown to avoid incomparability between data sets. Moreover, data sets should become easier accessible to researchers to allow for better research of existing information. In addition, researchers should emphasize the collection of longitudinal data and stress the importance of oversampling of target population. These methods are important to better measure and understand the migration and discrimination issues. Finally, more time should be invested in awareness raising campaigns that stress the importance of high quality data and thereby appeal to politicians and researchers conscience to provide the desired statistical information (ICMPD, 2010).

- **How to update regularly the Afghan national migration profile**

In order to remain an effective information tool for policy making, Migration Profile reports need to be updated regularly and used for policy development. The Afghan Migration Profiel should be updated every two years. In this regard, institutions and ministries involved in migration issues should collaborate on a regular basis to share information and make better use of data in the formulation of national development policies. Subsequent revisions of the migration profile should include data from a national migration surveys (internal and international migration) and should constitute a panel. This could be done by interviewing the same households over time to ascertain dynamics. The NRVA collects information on migration and remittances and steps should be taken to widen the scope of migration data in this household survey. Moreover, data should be collect in a user-friendly manner to update the migration profile. Data on cross-border movements (also collected by neighboring countries) as well as data on new airport arrivals (collected by the Movement and Control Passenger Management Unit (Movcon)), should be in incorporated in the migration profile. In addition to the above mentioned improvements of data collection methods, the migration profile should slowly expand its capacity by incorporating more relevant migration data on a regular basis. In the long run, the Afghan migration profile can be used as an important resource of high quality migration data for policy makers and other stakeholders.

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Appendix

1. Afghanistan Emergency Situation, crossing points and new refugee location (As of 31 October 2011)



Source: UNHCR, 2009a

2. Assisted Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan – Return by Province of Destination – Ethnicity – 02 March 2009





Source UNHCR, 2009a

3. Force Disposition in Afghanistan (2008)



Source: NATO, 2009b[59]

[59] On 1 August 2010, the Netherlands has ended its military mission in Afghanistan (BBC, 2010) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10829837

4. UNHCR Afghanistan IDPs Assisted Return by Provinces of Origin – Jan 2002 to end Dec 2008

Region	Location	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2002-2008	2002-2008 in %
N	Badakhshan	647	262	133	0	0	0	0	1,042	0%
N	Baghlan	1,101	609	59	35	0	0	0	1,804	0%
N	Balkh	4,710	155	478	45	511	709	43	6,651	1%
N	Faryab	14,373	5,064	1,337	1,978	1,374	681	411	25,229	5%
N	Jawzjan	2,879	168	41	498	1,210	123	696	5,615	1%
N	Kundz	57,773	51	13	24	77	0		57,938	12%
N	Samangan	6,811	3,747	1,526	16	9	0	6	12,115	2%
N	Sari Pul	3,825	466	66	231	345	0	24	4,937	1%
N	Takhar	55,306	86	209	132	219	0	0	55,952	11%
N-Total		142,425	10,588	3,862	2,959	3,745	1,513	1,191	171,283	35%
S	Hilman	1,940	85	110	319	369	81	33	2,937	1%
S	Kandahar	2,195	34	13,875	8	808	0	87	17,007	3%
S	Uruzgan	99	181	161	0	0	0		441	0%
S	Zabul	1,011	0	23	6	777	0	66	1,883	0%
S-Total		**5,245**	**300**	**14,169**	**333**	**1,954**	**81**	**186**	**22,268**	**5%**
SE	Ghazni	2,884	6	32	86	0	0	0	3,008	1%
SE	Khost	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	0%
SE	Paktika	0	0	9	0	275	0	0	284	0%
SE	Paktya	50	86	218	350	0	0	0	704	0%
SE-Total		**2,934**	**97**	**259**	**436**	**275**	**0**	**0**	**4,001**	**1%**
E	Kunar	165	153	0	0	0	0	0	318	0%
E	Laghman	2,305	2,254	0	0	0	0	0	4,559	1%
E	Nangarhar	4,747	4,539	30	0	0	0	0	9,316	2%
E	Nuristan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
E-Total		**7,217**	**6,946**	**30**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**14,193**	**3%**
W	Badghis	57,942	19,451	1,617	1,887	1,476	313	2,138	84,824	17%
W	Farah	435	125	23	23	39	53	196	894	0%
W	Ghor	23,763	1,908	50	0	119	0		25,840	5%
W	Hirat	11,710	24,763	1,931	1,343	1,367	0	318	41,441	8%
W	Nimroz	4,107	0	0	0	10	0	0	4,117	1%
W-Total		**97,957**	**46,247**	**3,621**	**3,253**	**3,020**	**366**	**2,652**	**157,116**	**32%**

C	Kabul	40,518	9,585	627	546	0	0	15	51,291	10%
C	Kapisa	2,259	1,751	1,267	15	0	0	0	5,292	1%
C	Logar	857	1,116	1,033	900	0	0	5	3,911	1%
C	Parwan	33,844	3,653	1,436	106	12	0	0	39,051	8%
C	Wardak	1,733	250	767	32	0	0	0	2,782	1%
C-Total		**79,211**	**16,355**	**5,130**	**1,599**	**12**	**0**	**20**	**102,327**	**21%**
C.Highland		19,994	1,534	320	0	0	0	0	21,848	4%
C.Highland-Total		**19,944**	**279**	**320**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**21,848**	**4%**
Unknown		520	0	0	0	0	0	0	520	0.1%
Totals		**360,503**	**82,067**	**27,391**	**8,580**	**9,006**	**1,960**	**4,049**	**493,556**	**100%**

Source: UNHCR 2009a