From Service Provision to Institutional Advocacy: The Shifting Legitimacy of Organizational Forms*

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Abstract

This article examines changes in the distribution of national women's and minority membership organizations since 1955, emphasizing the increasing legitimacy of the advocacy form of organization and the consequent replacement of service provision as the dominant mode of activity. Using data on the founding and disbanding of national women's and minority organizations since 1955, I argue that Hannan and Freeman's (1989; Hannan & Carroll 1992) theory of density-dependent legitimation and competition, and its extension to cross-effects among organizations, provides a framework for understanding the contemporary development of social change organizations. Though institutional and resource factors are important, they do not fully account for organizational vital rates. Findings indicate that increases in both service and protest organizations promoted the expansion of advocacy groups. As this middle-of-the-road strategy became more legitimate, competition became the predominant mode of interorganizational relationship. This accounts for the growth in the number of advocacy organizations after 1970, as well as the leveling off of service and protest organizations.

Since WWII, the U.S. has experienced rapid growth of a national social movement sector (McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977). This trend is mainly attributed to an "advocacy explosion" (Berry 1989) resulting from an opening of the political arena after the 1960's "cycle of protest" (Tarrow 1991; see also Jenkins 1985, 1987; Walker 1991). In many accounts, improvements in mobilization prospects were jointly won by a variety of activist groups in competition with the state. As a result, a variety of groups have jointly benefited in that they have been able to establish themselves as legitimate actors. This is, effectively, a *political* interpretation that stresses *cooperative* intermovement relationships and *competitive* movement-state interactions. However, there has been less consideration of how interorganizational pressures themselves may also shape the

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number and diversity of social movement organizations (Zald & McCarthy [1980] 1987). Recent advances in organizational ecology (Hannan & Carroll 1992; Hannan & Freeman 1989) suggest that such an *organizational* perspective may shed important light on these developments (see also Conell & Voss 1990; Langton 1987; Olzak & West 1991).

This article departs from a political approach and focuses on how organizational processes have shaped the expansion of voluntary and activist organizations in recent decades.[1] The specific purpose is to elaborate how the distribution of organizations is structured by processes of legitimation and competition among organizations pursuing different strategies for social change. Based on data pertaining to women's and minority organizational activity since 1955, I argue that there has been a shift from service provision to advocacy organizations that can be traced to the rising legitimacy of the advocacy *form* of social movement organization. Increased legitimacy is linked to organizational density dependence, meaning that variations in the number of active organizations *per se* is one mechanism influencing the development of organizational forms and populations (Hannan & Carroll 1992; Hannan & Freeman 1989). Advancing on prior research by Hannan and Freeman (1989), I emphasize density-dependent *cross-effects*: the way that the expansion of one set of organizations (such as service provision or protest) promotes or constrains the expansion of other types of action (such as advocacy). The availability of resources and political opportunities is also important in shaping the organizational landscape, especially in promoting mutualistic relationships and improving the formation and survival chances of a range of groups (Zald & McCarthy [1980] 1987).

This research poses the question: What ecological and institutional conditions influence the expansion or change in the available options for organizational activity — or, repertoires of collective action (Tilly 1978) — over time? In focusing on the development of organizational populations, organizational ecology draws attention to the factors that delimit what sorts of organizations are established and which are the most viable in light of problems of resource availability and legitimacy or public acceptance. Simply put, organizational development is linked to the legitimation of different forms of activity (Hannan & Carroll 1992). Over time, new organizations tend to be constructed with reference to a dominant structural form, since less familiar ones have a harder time procuring necessary resources; "survivors" serve as successful models to be emulated by prospective organizations. As the population develops, it is comprised of a set distribution that is primarily shaped through processes of "competitive selection," although early efforts must go into legitimacy building (Hannan & Carroll 1992; Hannan & Freeman 1989). From this perspective, environmental conditions — understood as the actions of elites, patrons, and members, for example — favor certain organizational forms over others, in particular those that are familiar and legitimate. As a result, less-"favored" groups cease activity and the "preferred" organizational traits become dominant in the organizational population, thereby shaping the prevailing distribution of organizational forms.[2]

In the empirical portion of this article I will examine whether it is useful to conceptualize the historical development of women's and minority protest,

advocacy, and service organizations in terms of underlying processes of density dependence and strategic cross-effects. These groups comprise a significant segment of formal efforts to challenge inequality in the contemporary U.S. In this broader formulation, I subsume such independent "collective campaigns" (Marwell & Oliver 1984) as the civil rights movement, the contemporary feminist movement, the more limited (and local) Chicano rights movement of the late 1960s, and more recent national organizing efforts among Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans. These organizations also comprise a variety of forms of social action, pursuing civil and economic rights and protections through protest and more moderate forms of institutional advocacy, as well as by adopting less confrontational strategies such as the provision of services. These are the main organizational options available for action, reflecting the limited set of change strategies available (McCarthy, Britt & Wolfson 1991; Tilly 1978, 1984).[3]

Institutional Standing and Density-Dependent Cross-Effects

Hannan and Freeman's (1989; see also Hannan & Carroll 1992) work on legitimacy and competition provides an analytic and methodological framework for addressing the development of organizational forms. These researchers stress the role of population size (organizational density) in promoting or constraining organizational activity, arguing that increases in density (at low levels) increase the "institutional standing" — or legitimacy — of the organizations in a population.[4] The very prevalence of an organizational form implies something about its "taken-for-grantedness": when some type of activity is uncommon, those wishing to replicate it face the added cost of securing legitimacy for the form in order to gain access to requisite resources. A quantitative increase promotes such legitimacy, since each addition to the population serves as a precedent for future activity by increasing familiarity with the form and thereby reducing the costs of organizing. Paradoxically, as the form becomes established and the number of active groups increases accordingly, competitive pressures take over and the benefits of increasing numbers decrease. This becomes detrimental to the likelihood that new organizations can be formed, or active ones maintained, since "supplies of potential organizers, members, patrons, and resources become exhausted" (Hannan & Freeman 1989:133). Combining these two processes, the empirical prediction is that density increases legitimacy at a decreasing rate and increases competition at an increasing rate; that is, there is a nonmonotonic relationship between density and organizational vital rates (i.e., organizational founding and disbanding rates; Hannan & Freeman 1989). There is substantial empirical support for this relationship, based on studies of trade unions, semiconductor firms, newspapers, and even breweries (see Hannan & Carroll 1992); Olzak and West's (1991) study of ethnic newspapers also found this pattern. Importantly, nonmonotonic density effects are generally robust even when direct measures of the sociopolitical environment are included as controls (Singh & Lumsden 1990).

Though the density-dependence argument has been subject to empirical scrutiny (and skepticism; see Zucker 1989), researchers have tended to overlook Hannan and Freeman's extension of this framework to include the concept of

cross-effects between populations: how increases in the density of one population may influence the rate of replication of a related set of organizations (Hannan & Freeman 1989). The question is whether the prevalence of one type of organization has a legitimating or competitive influence on organizations that share some segment of the organizational environment. To the extent that increases in the density of one population decrease the founding rate or increase the disbanding rate of a second population, a competitive link is inferred. Conversely, a linear and positive association between density and organizational vital rates is thought to indicate a mutualistic influence; this implies that increases in one organizational form improve the chances for the successful activity of another. As an empirical test of the cross-effect argument, Hannan and Freeman examine how the expansion of craft unions influences the founding of industrial unions and vice versa, trying to ascertain the extent of interorganizational competition and mutualism in the development of these two forms. They find that increases in each form depressed the founding rate of the other and conclude that competition characterized the association between the two types of organizations (see also Conell & Voss 1990).

An equivalent project in studying social movement and voluntary organizations is to consider how processes of density-dependence and density-dependent cross-effects may apply to the expansion of the voluntary organizational sector, particularly in terms of how the increase of organizations pursuing distinct change strategies may have joint trajectories. Although an ecological perspective might suggest that interpopulation competition is more common (Hannan & Freeman 1989), the social movement tradition suggests a more cooperative, legitimation effect across strategic boundaries. In general, social movements are conceptualized as multiorganizational efforts, with different types of organizations playing distinct supportive roles. At the sectoral level, observers of the 1960s suggest that there was a positive synergy among activist groups that contributed to the growth and legitimacy of the national movement sector (McAdam 1988; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1988). However, as Zald and McCarthy ([1980] 1987) note, "at the most general level, SMOs [social movement organizations] must compete not only with all other SMOs, but with voluntary organizations of other kinds as well as for the time, effort, loyalty, and money that citizens can give or withhold" (164). More qualitative accounts of the civil rights and women's movements (Ferree & Hess 1985; McAdam 1982, 1988; Morris 1984) also suggest that competition among similar organizations can be fierce. These two tendencies — legitimation across distinct movement boundaries and competition within them — reflect an expression of the logic behind the nonmonotonic density effects described by an ecological perspective.

Women's and Minority Organizational Expansion

When considering the development of such organizations as labor unions, SMOs, and voluntary associations, it seems plausible that organizational legitimacy is established relative to and is to some degree contingent upon the entire range of available options for organizational participation and sponsorship. The timing

of the expansion of these different forms of activity is also an important variable. In particular, the degree of institutional confrontation and change posed by each type of organizational strategy is likely to have a substantial influence on interorganizational relationships. This approach is informed by McAdam's (1982) discussion of social movement tactics. As he notes, "the myriad tactics available to insurgents communicate varying degrees of threat to other organized groups in the political environment" (57). Voluntary associations that pursue service provision, for example, are in a position to validate social and political participation more generally, since this associational form avoids direct institutional confrontation and encourages social change by indirect means. The underlying logic is that increases in the number and familiarity of more institutionally moderate organizations promote the acceptance of the constituency as a legitimate collective actor. Once baseline legitimacy is established, the field of activity becomes open for groups that directly challenge social and political institutions (such as advocacy, but protest groups may also be enhanced). In other words, there is likely a legitimation effect *across* strategic boundaries. Paradoxically, as confrontational alternatives become more established, they may compete for funding and support previously earmarked for the more moderate, precursory organizations. This represents one example of the combined influences of legitimation and competition across organizational forms: the development of service groups improves the legitimacy of the advocacy form with which they may ultimately compete for resources. Service organizations then risk competition and replacement by this newly established form in the sense that as advocacy becomes favored, service initiatives are less likely to be supported.

It is also likely that this form of relationship applies to protest and advocacy organizations: as advocacy becomes more common, this may promote the legitimacy of more directly confrontational protest activities which then try to monopolize the resources previously unavailable to them, putting themselves in conflict with advocacy groups. The expansion of protest organizations may then constrain subsequent advocacy efforts. An alternative hypothesis is that increases in protest organizations may actually promote *less* confrontational organizational forms along the lines of a "radical flank" effect discussed in terms of the funding of civil rights organizations (Haines 1984; Jenkins & Ekert 1986; McAdam 1982). This body of research has documented that the funding of more moderate civil rights organizations followed on the heels of more disruptive protest campaigns. Reframing this hypothesis in terms of the argument presented here, the radical flank thesis suggests that increases in protest may legitimate more *conventional* methods of reform since the latter represent less threat to authorities and elites (which could also hold in terms of the relationship between protest and service organizations). Figure 1 summarizes these hypothesized interorganizational relationships.

This is not to suggest that there are no other factors at play in promoting the development of voluntary and activist organizational forms. Political and legal events also shape the prevailing expectations and life expectancies of organizations (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Edelman 1990, 1992; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Singh, Tucker & Meinhard 1991). This point is made most strongly by political opportunity models in social movement research, which suggest that

FIGURE 1: Hypothesized Interorganizational Relationships[a]

Density of		Founding of	Expected Influence
service	→	advocacy	legitimation and competition (+/-)
advocacy	→	service	competitive replacement (-)
advocacy	→	protest	legitimation and competition (+/-)
protest	→	advocacy	competitive replacement (-)
or			
protest	→	advocacy	radical flank; legitimation (+)
protest	→	service	radical flank; legitimation (+)

[a] +/- denotes a positive linear density effect and a negative quadratic density effect.
- denotes a negative linear density effect.
+ denotes a positive linear density effect.

openings in the political structure improve the prospects for organizational activity by lowering the costs of resource mobilization or increasing the costs of social control (see, esp., Gamson & Meyer 1992; Tarrow 1991; Tilly 1978). More generally, governmental actions serve as a signal to activists that external actors are more or less supportive of their agendas, and organizers and external patrons may react accordingly by forming or sponsoring new groups or continuing to support already active ones (Burstein 1985; McAdam 1982; Staggenborg 1991; Walker 1991). At the same time, such institutional support may indicate that there is less *demand* for voluntary efforts since the federal government seems to be fulfilling the desired goals (see Piven & Cloward 1971 for a related discussion framed in terms of the cooptation of dissent).

In addition to institutional and ecological pressures that shape patterns of organizational development, conditions in the resource environment are also important. The early formulation of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977) emphasized the idea that the apparent "participation revolution" of the 1960s was linked to such conditions as rising societal affluence that increased the prospects for organizational activity net of the grievances of specific groups. Similarly, researchers such as Walker (1983, 1991) and Jenkins (1987) describe an "explosion" of interest groups and policy advocacy organizations in the 1970s, correlated with an increase in foundation sponsorship of social action organizations and programs serving minorities over the 1960s and 1970s. Walker (1983) also found that in a number of instances, already

established groups actually provided start-up resources to affiliated organizational efforts, highlighting the sort of mutualistic relationship posited above.

To summarize, the model I develop of the expansion of the women's and minority voluntary and activist sector since 1955 emphasizes interdependencies across strategic forms. As more conventional organizational forms become established, they open up the participatory arena for more activist forms. As each type of activity becomes a viable contender for resources, competitive pressures overtake the initial mutualistic interform relationship. At the same time, variations in aggregate resource flows and the opportunities for social action improve or constrain organizational activity.

Data and Methods

FIELD OF STUDY

This research focuses on voluntary associations in the U.S. that are open to a national membership base and concerned with the status of women and racial-ethnic minorities, with efforts made to collect information on all such organizations active between 1955 and 1985. Data were coded from the first 23 editions of the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, "National Organizations" (Gale Research Company). This directory provides descriptive information on national voluntary associations, including such background as the year the organization was formed, organizational membership, objectives, and activities. This information is provided by groups once they are located by the research staff at Gale Research Company (either through in-house review of mainstream and alternative periodicals, newsletters and "trade" journals, the use of news clipping services, asking previously located organizations for names of affiliates, or voluntary requests for inclusion). When new editions are prepared, the most recent entry is returned to the organization for updating. Organizations that have become defunct or inactive since the previous edition are listed in the index of all subsequent publications, providing a means of accounting for organizational disbandings and constructing a time series of organizational activity.

Each edition of the *Encyclopedia* was coded separately, providing an opportunity to update information on single organizations and the organizational population more generally. Data collection efforts identified a set of 1,001 national minority and women's voluntary associations that were active at some point over the thirty-year period studied; missing data limit the baseline population to 878 organizations. In general, the organizations in this study focus their activities in a variety of institutional arenas, such as politics, education, and the media. For the most part they seek proactive change, but there are also a handful of groups that can be considered reactive groups that are seeking to halt or reverse progressive change (Tilly 1978). Finally, their activities, while diverse, tend to fall into the general categories of social protest, institutional advocacy, and service or resource provision. In some cases organizations emphasize a single course of action; in others they pursue multiple strategies for social change. The analyses that follow are based on 741 organizations that pursue these dominant forms of social action singly or jointly. The remainder are cultural groups that are omitted from the present discussion.

Some examples of protest organizations (which implies using extrainstitutional means such as sit-ins, demonstrations, and boycotts) are the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Black Panthers, and Radical Women. The advocacy category implies a focus on changing policies and securing collective goods through routine institutional means such as lobbying and "watchdog" activities and includes such political organizations as NOW, the NAACP, the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, and the Asian American Voters' Coalition, as well as such groups as Black Citizens for a Fair Media and the Association of Asian American Pacific Artists. Examples of service or resource providers include traditional service groups such as the United Negro College Fund and the National Urban League, as well as the National Federation of Women's Exchanges, the Japanese American Citizens' League, and the Mexican-American Opportunity Foundation. The database also includes more politically oriented resource groups which have more activist agendas but adopt mediated means of accomplishing their objectives, such as Women's Direct Response Group, the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, and the Scholarship, Education and Defense Fund for Racial Equality (SCORE) — all of which provide resources to individuals for collective advancement or empowerment.

While the *Encyclopedia* is the most comprehensive directory of national nonprofit membership associations in print (the 1993 edition, for example, contained information on over 23,000 organizations), it is likely that very small or short-lived organizations may be underrepresented in this data base.[5] It may also be the case that particular types of organizations are not adequately represented, or are even overrepresented, due to the nature of their goals or activities. For example, advocacy organizations may be more widely known than service or cultural groups, and would therefore be more likely to be listed in the *Encyclopedia.* Likewise, advocacy groups may be more likely to claim a national membership base than, for example, service provision organizations that may have a local emphasis. This is not so much a "bias" but rather a reflection of the nature of national activities, which is the focus of this research. Another limitation is that more radical or protest-oriented groups may not be listed as reliably.

METHODS

Founding Rate

I estimate the effects of covariates on the founding rate using Poisson regression, which is appropriate for use with yearly count data (see applications in the field of economics by Cameron & Trivedi 1986; in political science, King 1989; and recent work in sociology by Hannan 1991, Hannan & Freeman 1989, and Olzak & West 1991). Relying on Cameron and Trivedi's (1984) discussion, the baseline Poisson model takes the form:

$$Pr(Y_i = y_i) = \frac{e^{-Li} L_i^{yi}}{y_i!}$$

where y_i is the number of organizational formations in year i. This is a one-parameter distribution with mean and variance of Y_i equal to L_i. To incorporate

exogenous variables $X_{ij}(j = 1, \ldots K)$, including a constant, the parameter L_i is specified to be:

$$L_i = \exp(X_i B)$$

The exponential function is used to insure that the founding rate can only take nonnegative integers.[6] This is a regression strategy that uses the number of organizational formations in each year as the dependent variable and that uses measures of environmental conditions as the independent variables. Thus, there are only 31 observations. This relatively small number presents some limitations to the number of controls that can be included in the full models.[7] The founding rate models are estimated using Limdep 5.1 (Greene 1988).

MEASURES

Organizational Founding

The year of founding is reported by the organization itself. Information as to why the officers of the association refer to this date as the year of initiation is not available, but it is likely that it represents the year in which Articles of Incorporation (or comparable state-level documentation) were first filed, indicating some degree of formalized commitment to action. Based on this information, I constructed yearly counts of the number of new organizational formations of each type of strategy; these counts are then used as the dependent variables in the analyses presented below. Organizations for which the founding date are missing are excluded when constructing yearly counts of organizational formations.

Density Effects

The main independent variables included in this analysis are lagged measures of organizational density disaggregated by strategy. These measures are calculated as the total number of organizations active at the end of the prior year, plus the total number of new entrants, minus the number of defunct associations.[8] For the purpose of constructing the density measures, entry into the population can be accomplished through the creation of a new organization (based on the reported year of birth), or, if year of birth is missing, when an organization enters the sample between one edition of the *Encyclopedia* to the next.

Organizational strategy is measured by a classification with three mutually exclusive categories based on the stated activities of the organization: (1) protest (organization uses *some* protest technique, possibly in addition to other methods of challenge), (2) institutional advocacy (group uses only advocacy techniques or pursues advocacy with some service component), and (3) service/resource provision (singly, with no protest or advocacy activities). This categorization emphasizes the degree of formal institutional challenge posed; the assumption is that this attribute is significant in determining an organization's legitimacy and "bargaining power" (Yuchtman & Seashore 1967) for requisite resources (see Minkoff 1993). The strategy variable is a time-varying covariate for each organization in the study that allows for yearly changes in organizational strategy (e.g., if a group switched from service to advocacy between 1970 and

1971 it would be counted as service in 1970 and advocacy in 1971). For each year I aggregate the number of organizations of each type of strategy that are formed, disbanded, and active, which I then use to construct the subgroup density measures. In addition to a linear term for each density measure, the predicted nonmonotonic association between population size and organizational dissolutions suggests the inclusion of a quadratic effect. Density measures are lagged one year.

Resources and Opportunities

To reference the "political opportunity structure," I include a dummy variable measuring whether the presidential administration in the previous year was Democratic (Walker 1991). I also control for the period following the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which is thought to mark an improved legal environment for women and minorities (Edelman 1990) and may legitimate organizational activity by these groups (see Staggenborg 1991 for a similar argument regarding abortion legislation). To tap the influence of the funding environment, I use a measure of total foundation and corporate philanthropic funding, lagged one year (1982 constant dollars; American Association of Fund-raising Councils 1988). Jenkins and Ekert (1986) use the latter measure as an indicator of "structural facilitation" as suggested by McCarthy and Zald (1973).

Demand for Action

A unique aspect of these organizations is that they are presumably established in response to some felt need for collective action, although until recently contemporary social movement paradigms have tended to understate the influence of grievances (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1988). Therefore, it seems useful to control for what could be considered the "demand" for organizational activity. I include a measure of the lagged amount of federal transfer payments (1982 constant dollars; *Economic Report of the President 1989*). This measure describes the general welfare conditions of the American population and is an indicator that is especially relevant to the life chances of women and minorities. In effect, it serves as a signal of governmental attention to issues of general social welfare that may prompt corresponding voluntary social action. I expect that improvements in the general welfare environment may decrease the activities of these organizations, especially for associations providing direct services since the perception may be that the government is taking sufficient responsibility in that regard. In particular, potential sponsors may be reluctant to promote new initiatives if such conditions are thought to be improving.

Results

TEMPORAL DEVELOPMENTS

Figure 2 presents the cumulative number of national protest, advocacy, service, and combined advocacy/service organizations maintained by women, African Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans between 1955 and 1985 (three-year moving averages). Consistent with other research (Berry 1989; Jenkins

1985, 1987; Walker 1991), there is a rapid expansion of organizations after 1970, particularly those pursuing advocacy activities either singly or in combination with a service component (in the analyses presented below, counts of advocacy and joint advocacy/service organization foundings and densities are combined). At about the same time, the service sector leveled off for the remainder of the study period. After 1970, then, advocacy replaced service provision as a central action strategy, at least in terms of the proportionate *decrease* in service organizations between 1955 and 1985. At the beginning of the study period service providers constituted 64% of the total number of active advocacy, service, and protest groups, while by 1985 this figure decreased to 30% of the total. Conversely, in 1955, 27% of active organizations engaged in advocacy efforts, while in 1985 this strategic form represented 68% of the total. Essentially, observers of voluntary activity prior to the late 1960s would be given the impression that service activities were the most common way of "doing business," while 20 years later the overriding finding would be that advocacy was the most legitimate organizational form. While there is flux in the number of advocacy and service organizations over the study period, there is little variation in the absolute number of national protest organizations. This reflects a rather restricted niche for this organizational form, one which is most likely tied to political constraints on this form of activity.

Overall, the major developments in this organizational sector appear to be (1) the post-1970 expansion of advocacy organizations; (2) the consequent replacement of service provision as the dominant organizational form; and (3) the relative stability of protest organizations over the three decades of this study. The framework developed in the first part of this article suggests posing the following questions about the distribution of organizations depicted in Figure 2: How is the advocacy expansion influenced by levels of service and protest organization? How is the development of the service sector influenced by advocacy and protest development? And, finally, how is the expansion of protest organizations influenced by the density of advocacy and service organizations? Taken together, the answers to these questions will provide an account of the overall development of this arena of voluntary activity.

I have suggested that Hannan and Freeman's (1989; Hannan & Carroll 1992) theory of density-dependent legitimation and competition is a useful framework for understanding such temporal developments. To recap, their central argument is that an increase in the prevalence of an organizational form — in this case, one defined on the basis of organizational strategy — is one key mechanism by which that form becomes legitimate. Regardless of the overall availability of resources for organizational action access will be circumscribed if the form is uncommon. Once the organizational type becomes established, competition intensifies in a manner that decreases the founding and survival chances of active groups. I also argue that this legitimation effect, as well as its competitive consequences, influence the expansion of other organizational forms as well. With reference to women's and minority organizations in particular, I have suggested three forms of interorganizational relationships: (1) a legitimation effect, whereby increases in less confrontational organizations improve the subsequent organizing prospects of more challenging organizational forms; (2) replacement effect, whereby once a more challenging form becomes

FIGURE 2: Women's and Minority Organizations by Strategy, 1955-1985



established it becomes the more preferred form of organization, undermining the continued expansion of its forerunner; and (3) a radical flank effect whereby increases in the most confrontational organizations channel support into more conventional forms, thereby increasing the numbers and legitimacy of these organizations. Put differently, increasing protest is seen as legitimating the advocacy form insofar as sponsors and authorities are looking for a way to defuse institutional challenges. In the next section I will examine organizational formation rates as a means of modeling such developments.

LEGITIMACY AND ORGANIZATIONAL FOUNDING RATES

Table 1 presents estimates of the bivariate correlation between internal density effects, cross-effects, and institutional and resource factors on the founding rate of protest, advocacy, and service organizations, respectively.[9] Such simple associations between single independent and dependent variables serve as a baseline from which to build multivariate models, and provide an initial level of confirmation or disconfirmation of predicted influences. I will briefly review these findings to set the context for discussing the full models.

TABLE 1: Bivariate Associations: Influence of Density Effects, Institutional Conditions, and Resource Factors on the Founding of Protest, Advocacy, and Service Organizations[a]

	Protest Founding Rate	Advocacy Founding Rate	Service Founding Rate
Protest density	*.032* *(.141)*	1.941* (.799)	.265** (.069)
Protest density^2	—	.083+ (.043)	—
Advocacy density	-.233e-2 (.176e-1)	*.026*** *(.004)*	.018** (.004)
Advocacy density^2	—	*-.467e-4*** *(.082e-4)*	-.361e-4** (.076e-4)
Service density	.176* (.081)	.201** (.044)	*.197*** *(.045)*
Service density^2	-.116e-2* (.051e-2)	-.108e-2** (.025e-2)	*-.113e-2*** *(.027e-2)*
Democratic administration (t - 1)	1.415** (.526)	-.110 (.170)	.149 (.405)
Foundation giving (t - 1)	.105 (.243)	.582** (.130)	.403** (.113)
Federal transfers (t - 1)	-.259e-2 (.236e-2)	.510e-2** (.153e-2)	.095e-2 (.138e-2)
Post-1965	-.886+ (.529)	.306** (.101)	.690* (.316)

[a] Primary density coefficients are in italics. Negative binomial estimates; standard errors are in parentheses.

+ $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

In terms of internal density effects, which are included to test Hannan and Freeman's theory of density-dependent legitimation and competition, the findings are mixed. There is no significant association between the density of protest groups and the subsequent founding rate of other protest organizations. In contrast, an increase in the density of advocacy groups does seem to improve the founding rate of advocacy organizations at a decreasing rate, suggesting that earlier efforts improve the legitimacy of this strategy, but there is a threshold at which competition becomes dominant. A similar relationship is indicated in terms of the founding rate of service organizations. More specifically, when the advocacy sector reached a density of 278 active organizations, competitive pressures became primary; the corresponding point of inflection for service organizations was 87, likely reflecting that the legitimacy of this form of activity was established much earlier.[10]

In regard to the cross-effects of densities, there is preliminary bivariate confirmation of a number of expected associations. The first set of predictions refer to the most general relationship between more and less confrontational activities. Specifically, I examine the relationship between service and advocacy, as well as service and protest. Focusing on the density terms for service organizations in columns 1 and 2 (panel C), increases in the number of active service groups are related to an increase in the founding rate of advocacy organizations at a decreasing rate (with the declining effect of legitimacy occurring when service density reaches 93). This lends some validity to the idea that at an aggregate level the earlier establishment of such organizations as the National Urban League or the Women's Educational and Industrial Union had a supportive influence on the founding of such organizations as the NAACP or the Union Women's Alliance to Gain Equality. A similar relationship is indicated for service and protest groups although at a somewhat lower level of statistical significance. When the density of service groups reaches 76, it no longer promotes new protest activity. In initial support for the idea of a subsequent replacement effect, the results presented in column 3 (panel A) show that when the density of the advocacy sector reaches 249, it begins to significantly constrain the organizing prospects of service groups. A final finding is that there is a positive association between the density of protest organizations and the founding rate of service groups, without any indication that the two forms compete with each other (panel C, column 3). The relationship between protest and advocacy groups is more complex: there is a predicted nonmonotonic relationship between the number of protest organizations and the founding rate of advocacy organizations (panel A, column 2).

The final four variables in Table 1 (panels D through G) represent the bivariate estimates of how institutional and resource conditions may be associated with the founding of protest, advocacy, and service organizations. Comparing these results across organizational forms is quite suggestive. As would be expected from a resource mobilization framework, improvements in the funding environment seem to be positively correlated with the founding rate of both advocacy and service organizations. There is apparently no strong relationship between funding availability and the founding of protest groups, a finding that corresponds to research suggesting that funding patterns favor nonprotest activity (esp. Jenkins & Ekert 1986). The measure of the demand for

action is only significant in influencing the founding of advocacy organizations, although not in the direction expected. Rather than depressing new activity, it appears that levels of federal welfare spending may promote it. One way to interpret this result is in terms of a validation effect: if the federal government indicates some commitment, this makes "the cause" more legitimate. This line of reasoning has been suggested in terms of the influence of progressive policies on social movement activity (Burstein 1985; Jenkins & Ekert 1986; McAdam 1982; Staggenborg 1991; Walker 1983).

Turning to more political or institutional factors, only protest groups seem to be more likely to be formed during Democratic presidential administrations. This suggests a more open political opportunity structure of which organizers of challenging groups take advantage, but which does not seem to make a difference for new advocacy and service groups. It may be that these organizational forms are well enough established that they are less vulnerable to shifts in the "political winds." Interestingly, however, advocacy and service groups *do* seem to benefit more from the passage of mid-1960s legislation, as the founding rate of both types are higher after that point. There is also a slight decline in the founding rate of protest groups after the late 1960s, corresponding to a general view of the period as hostile to continued mass mobilization for social change (Jenkins 1985, 1987; Walker 1991). The fact that both service and advocacy organizations appear to be more robust after 1965 is informative, especially since it could be expected that advocacy groups would also be vulnerable to the contraction of political opportunities in the 1970s and 1980s. In analyses not reported here, I also examined whether there were similar period effects across protest, advocacy, and service organization disbanding rates. At the bivariate level, the failure rate for service organizations was significantly higher after 1965 but there was no substantial variation for protest and advocacy groups. The fact that the level of service activity remained rather stable after 1970 is the result of the combined influence of both higher founding rates and failure rates. The higher failure rate of service groups after the mid-1960s is worth noting as well, since it is as likely that this more moderate form of activity would have been *more* robust as the period wore on and public and political commitment to civil rights and social change weakened (Walker 1991).

MULTIVARIATE RESULTS

The bivariate results discussed in the prior section provide preliminary confirmation of the importance of density-dependent cross-effects in the development of organizational forms. Tables 2 through 4 present the results from multivariate tests of these relationships. In each table, the first column controls for organizational density of the type of organizational founding analyzed along with environmental controls; model B and model C add density terms for each of the two alternative organizational forms separately. For example, Table 2 presents the results from an analysis of advocacy group formations. Model 2A controls for the influence of advocacy density, institutional opportunities, and resource measures; model 2B adds service cross-effects to the baseline model; and model 2C adds protest cross-effects to the baseline model.

TABLE 2: The Founding of Advocacy Organizations[a]

	Model 2A Effects of Advocacy Organization Density	Model 2B Effects of Service Organization Densities	Model 2C Effects of Protest Organization Densities
Advocacy density	0.954e-2* (0.375e-2)	-0.466e-2+ (0.243e-2)	-0.011** (0.003)
Advocacy density^2	-0.262e-4** (0.044e-4)	—	—
Service density		0.256** (0.045)	
Service density^2		-0.119e-2** (0.025e-2)	
Protest density			2.077** (0.361)
Protest density^2			-0.101** (0.016)
Democratic administration (t - 1)	0.345** (0.105)	0.159 (0.133)	0.519** (0.128)
Foundation giving (t - 1)	0.146* (0.063)	-0.265 (0.091)	-0.068 (0.095)
Federal transfers (t - 1)	0.532e-2 (0.330e-2)	-0.008e-2 (0.379e-2)	0.009* (0.004)
Post-1965	0.702* (0.277)	0.327 (0.286)	2.111** (0.254)
Constant	-0.290 (0.417)	-7.408** (1.474)	-8.499** (1.606)
Log likelihood	-98.187	-89.137	-92.912
N	31	31	31

[a] Multivariate Poisson estimates; standard errors are in parentheses.

+ $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Turning first to the development of advocacy organizations, the baseline model (model 2A) reconfirms that there is a nonmonotonic form of density-dependence for advocacy groups, meaning that initial developments promote organizational formations but that there is also a significant amount of interorganizational competition as this form of activity develops. Importantly, even when service and protest densities are added to the baseline model, this competitive form of density dependence within the advocacy sector is still observed (models 2B and 2C).[11] Turning to the effects of service and protest organizational densities themselves, it is clear that the rise in advocacy activity noted in Figure 2 is to some extent contingent upon shifting levels of activity by organizations that have distinct agendas. Examining these estimates, the relationship between the density of service organizations and the founding rate of advocacy groups is nonmonotonic as predicted (model 2B). The substantive interpretation of this pattern is that the expansion of service organizations increases the legitimacy of advocacy organizations and ultimately promotes competition between the two separate forms. There is also a link between the development of protest and advocacy forms that is apparent when looking at the founding rate of advocacy organizations in relation to the expansion of protest groups. The results in model 2C suggest that there is a significant curvilinear association between the density of protest groups and the founding of advocacy organizations. This provides more robust evidence for a radical flank effect whereby increases in more radical activism ultimately channel organizational action in more moderate directions, presumably as authorities and sponsors seek to defuse protest. As I suggested earlier, this relationship between protest and advocacy groups can also be conceptualized in legitimacy terms: increases in protest actually *legitimate* less confrontational activity as a method of social change.

In terms of environmental influences, model 2A reflects that the founding rate of advocacy is influenced by political and resource conditions. During Democratic presidential administrations, advocacy groups seem to form at a higher rate, which is also the case with increases in general levels of foundation and corporate funding. It also appears that the advocacy founding rate improves after the mid-1960s. Importantly, however, controlling for the expansion of service organizations diminishes the significant effect of the environmental controls apparent in model 2A; neither the coefficients representing presence of a Democratic administration, funding levels, nor activity in the post-1965 period are significant once controls for service density are included (model 2B). This reconfirms the importance of the earlier expansion of this more conventional form of activity on the trajectory of advocacy organization since 1955. Comparing models 2A and 2C, it is clear that controlling for the density of protest organizations provides a fuller picture of the processes under examination: it appears that levels of protest activity explain the beneficial nature of foundational support for new advocacy efforts and reveal a positive association between levels of federal social welfare provision and the founding of advocacy groups. Both results suggest the hypothesis that positive federal and foundational contributions to advocacy efforts were in response to the density of protest activity, as suggested by a radical flank thesis (Haines 1984; Jenkins & Ekert 1986) and the social control position of Piven and Cloward (1971).[12]

TABLE 3: The Founding of Service Organizations[a]

	Model 3A Effects of Service Organization Density	Model 3B Effects of Advocacy Organization Densities	Model 3C Effects of Protest Organization Densities
Service density	0.039* (0.017)	-0.052 (0.035)	0.041* (0.017)
Service density^2	—	—	—
Advocacy density		0.035** (0.012)	
Advocacy density^2		-0.573-4** (0.194e-4)	
Protest density			0.081 (0.103)
Protest density^2			—
Democratic administration (t - 1)	0.373 (0.233)	0.186 (0.244)	0.291+ (0.257)
Foundation giving (t - 1)	0.222+ (0.125)	0.437** (0.155)	0.118 (0.183)
Federal transfers (t - 1)	-0.906e-2** (0.288e-2)	-0.018e-2 (0.945e-2)	-0.908e-2** (0.292e-2)
Post-1965	-0.189 (0.448)	-0.200 (0.491)	0.113 (0.449)
Constant	-1.399* (0.716)	-0.289 (0.809)	-1.644 (0.778)
Log likelihood	-67.751	-63.293	-67.442
N	31	31	31

[a] Multivariate Poisson estimates; standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

The next set of results in this series on organizational formation refer to the founding rate of service organizations between 1955 and 1985 (Table 3). The results from the baseline model suggest that there is a mutualistic form of density-dependence within the service subsector; i.e., increased service density appears to increase the subsequent founding of service organizations with no apparent decline. This relationship may be explained, however, by the inclusion of advocacy density effects in model 3B, which indicates that the expansion of advocacy improves the founding rate of service associations at a declining rate. Once the advocacy density controls are included, the service density term is no longer statistically significant. Including these measures also highlights a positive influence of foundation funding and appears to explain a negative impact of social welfare spending. This negative relationship is itself interesting, as it only appears in the baseline model without controlling for advocacy cross-effects. This pattern of association conforms with the posited demand hypothesis: as the federal government increases tangible, financial resources to potential constituents, the demand for service-related activities decreases since the federal government is apparently meeting its obligations. At the same time, it is clear from Table 2 that such improvements also appear to have a validating influence on advocacy efforts, at least with the level of protest organization taken into consideration. Since such activities are generally geared more towards political or broader institutional change, this finding does not seem particularly contradictory. In a related vein, the multivariate models indicate no appreciable differences in the founding rate of service organizations after 1965, although the bivariate results suggest that they may have been slightly more likely to form after this period. Finally, controlling for protest density apparently does not influence the development of service organizations to any appreciable extent although there was some indication of a positive association at the bivariate level; in general, there seems to be no relationship between protest and service organizational developments (model 3C).

Turning finally to the expansion of protest organizations (Table 4), with no controls for the number of active nonprotest groups, the relationship between increases in the density of protest groups and the subsequent founding rate of other such organizations is negative and significant (model 4A). This finding suggests that interorganizational competition may shape the formation rate of protest groups. Also, simultaneously controlling for the incumbency of a Democratic administration, levels of foundation/corporate funding, levels of federal transfer payments, and the post-1965 period uncovers a number of suppressor effects. Although not significant at the bivariate level, foundation funding appears to significantly promote the founding rate of protest groups. There is also some indication that there is a difference in the founding rate of protest groups after 1965, namely a decline in new activity. The presence of a Democratic presidential administration maintains statistical significance when other controls are added, but this effect is somewhat attenuated.

Interestingly, controlling for the density of advocacy organizations changes the contours of the model (model 4B). First, there is a moderate and positive relationship between the density of advocacy organizations and the founding rate of protest organizations, consistent with a legitimation effect: as this somewhat less confrontational form of action becomes more prevalent, protest

TABLE 4: The Founding of Protest Organizations[a]

	Model 4A Effects of Protest Organization Density	Model 4B Effects of Advocacy Organization Density	Model 4C Effects of Service Organization Densities
Protest density	-0.501* (0.257)	-0.509+ (0.297)	-0.530* (0.273)
Protest density^2	—	—	—
Advocacy density		0.073+ (0.042)	
Advocacy density^2		-0.720e-4 (0.528e-4)	
Service density			0.055+ (0.057)
Service density^2			—
Democratic administration (t - 1)	1.147+ (0.691)	1.089 (0.856)	1.302+ (0.765)
Foundation giving (t - 1)	1.215* (0.495)	1.272* (0.654)	1.017+ (0.560)
Federal transfers (t - 1)	-0.262e-2 (0.473e-2)	-0.043 (0.029)	-0.010 (0.009)
Post-1965	-0.501* (0.257)	-3.920 (2.868)	-1.978 (1.591)
Constant	-2.294+ (1.428)	-2.333 (1.722)	-3.545+ (1.976)
Log likelihood	-24.065	-21.797	-23.600
N	31	31	31

[a] Multivariate Poisson estimates; standard errors are in parentheses.

+ $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

organizations seem to become more viable as well. However, there does not appear to be any significant competition between the two forms of activity along the lines of a replacement effect (which would be measured by a negative quadratic effect). Also, the variables referencing recent presidential administration and the post-1965 period decrease in significance once the advocacy cross-effect terms are included. It may be that the apparent influence of these political indicators is explained by the level of "adjacent" activity by advocacy groups. However, the positive influence of general funding availability continues to be robust, suggesting that ecological dynamics and resource availability may be more salient than political factors *per se* in the development of protest organizations in more recent decades. This is not to imply that political opportunities are inconsequential. Rather, as Figure 2 indicates, the protest organizations are relegated to a rather narrow niche. It is likely that politics is *always* a consideration, but to the extent that resources are available and competition contained, activists may be able to overcome such political constraints and form new protest groups.

The final model controls for the cross-effect of service organization density, which only moderately improves the fit of the baseline model (model 4C). While the bivariate results imply that increases in the density of service organizations improve the formation rate of protest organizations at a decreasing rate, the full model shows more of a linear legitimation influence (the second-order density terms is not significant and is omitted from the full model). Inclusion of the service density term seems to explain the statistically significant influence of foundation funding and activity levels after 1965 shown in the baseline model. This accounts for the marginally significant improvement in fit over the baseline model, but this pattern of interorganizational influence may be considered less important than the relationship between the expansion of advocacy organizations and the subsequent development of protest organizations, at least as indicated by a slightly higher improvement in the fit over the baseline model (based on a comparison of the log-likelihoods).

Discussion

One primary motivation for the empirical analysis was to consider the argument that the development of organizational forms is contingent on population processes, especially the amount of related organizational activity, of which organizational density is the most direct measure. As the number of active organizations increases, this opens up the arena for other actors since numbers improve the legitimacy of a form. Most research in organizational ecology emphasizes internal population processes, but an examination of women's and minority organizations provides an opportunity to consider how density-dependent *cross-effects* come into play in the development of various "organizational repertoires" (Clemens 1993). More substantively, my interest is to account for the replacement of service provision by advocacy as the dominant form of organizational activity after 1970 through an examination of patterns of association between the expansion of advocacy, service, and protest forms of organization. I have also taken into account institutional or resource constraints

that are arguably critical influences on the trajectories of social change organizations since 1955. In this manner I have tried to elaborate some of the mechanisms underlying the shifting distribution of organizational forms illustrated in Figure 2.

For somewhat different reasons, the trajectories of protest and service organizations acted as joint influences on the expansion of the advocacy sector. The more established form of service association does seem to favor the subsequent development of national advocacy organizations, in the process setting up this "newcomer" as a competitor for necessary resources. Somewhat paradoxically, by paving the way for more challenging efforts, the expansion of voluntary service organizations may ultimately be constrained. As noted, it appears that this organizational dynamic takes precedence over political or other institutional influences, at least insofar as these influence the founding of advocacy groups since 1955. In regard to protest groups, this pattern of influence confirms both a legitimation effect of the sort posited by organizational ecologists and a radical flank effect as suggested by research on the civil rights movement (Haines 1984; Jenkins & Ekert 1986). The overall pattern is one of channeling in that advocacy becomes the more preferred organizational form, either because it is *less* confrontational than its protest counterpart or because it is *more* confrontational than the option offered by a service or resource provision agenda.

The expansion of advocacy in turn influences the development of organizations pursuing alternative change strategies, suggesting a "replacement effect." Increases in the density of advocacy organizations promote the founding rate of service and protest organizations, but there is subsequent competition in regard to the expansion of the service sector. In effect, advocacy seems to replace this more established form by depressing the founding rate of service groups; a similar influence was suggested in terms of the competitive relationship between the density of service and the founding of advocacy organizations. Referring to Figure 2, this interpretation seems consistent with the exponential growth of advocacy organizations after 1970 and the fact that the level of service organization activity remains relatively stable thereafter, suggesting that further increases were limited by the prevalence of advocacy efforts.

Though the findings on protest groups are slightly different, they suggest that the very legitimacy that increases in advocacy grant to protest organizations sets them up as viable competitors for support. Over the long run, advocacy and protest organizations seem to be linked competitively, probably because the protest form was itself legitimated by the expansion of advocacy organizations. Thus, it appears that as protest itself becomes more common, it not only channels efforts into the more moderate advocacy form, but it also contends with advocacy for members and sponsors; i.e., its competition is a result of its own improved institutional standing.

There is one additional result that addresses the expansion of advocacy organizations relative to protest and service activities. Here I am referring to the prospects for organizational activity after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As expected from accounts of the decline of the 1960s protest movements, the founding rate of protest organizations declines after the mid-1960s. Also, as expected from accounts of the "advocacy explosion" since the 1970s (Berry 1989;

Jenkins 1987; Walker 1991), the founding rate of advocacy organizations is, on the whole, higher after 1965. What is important to note is that in the same environment where direct institutional challenge in the form of protest organization was suppressed, advocacy forms of organization seem to have garnered sufficient legitimacy to continue their activities in more constrained circumstances. This observation becomes all the more striking when we consider that the growth of advocacy organizations is not limited by a substantially higher failure rate after the mid-1960s. This implies that the expansion of this form was unconstrained after the 1960s "cycle of protest" (Tarrow 1991).[13] By the same token, there is some provisional evidence that the failure rate of service organizations *was* significantly higher in the post-1965 period, even though this form of organization would seem to have some survival advantages by virtue of its more moderate emphasis. This is an additional confirmation of the argument that advocacy replaced service provision as the dominant form of organizational activity by women and racial-ethnic minorities and that this process can be linked to the increased legitimacy of the advocacy form. These results also suggest the importance of both ecological and institutional dynamics in shaping the development of organizational forms (DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Singh, Tucker & Meinhard 1991).

Conclusion

Taken as a whole, the analyses presented in this article offer an alternative explanation of the expansion of women's and minority organizations since 1955, providing a model for understanding the growth of the national social movement and voluntary sector more generally. One of the most distinctive organizational developments is the increasing legitimacy of advocacy and replacement of service as the dominant form of activity among women and racial-ethnic minorities. This trend can be interpreted as a result of (1) earlier increases in the number of active service organizations, which legitimated the advocacy form, and (2) increases in protest organizations, which also legitimated advocacy in the sense of "channelling" (Jenkins & Ekert 1986) activities in more moderate directions. The population expansion of both national service and protest organizations promoted the expansion of advocacy organizations, with the combined effect favoring a rapid growth of the intermediate method of social change. At the same time, the improved legitimacy of advocacy set limits on both service and protest organizational activity due to the competition for resources that this engendered. The results of this research indicate that increases in the density of affiliated organizations *do* impact organizational development, at least insofar as they promote or constrain the likelihood that new organizations adopting the "preferred" form will be established. The main point is that such developments do not occur in a vacuum — neither a political nor an organizational one. The options for social action which are currently available have been shaped by such longer-term trends, ultimately determining what are considered to be legitimate modes of organizational activity.

Notes

1. References to "activist" organizations or "activism" signify organized efforts to change the existing distribution of power in society, either through conventional methods of reform or through confrontational tactics such as direct action and other forms of protest. "Voluntary" organization or activities indicates more traditional and less confrontational forms of participation, such as providing services or cultural activities to improve the group's status or to enhance intergroup relations. In this article I emphasize a distinction between protest, advocacy, and service forms of organization, which represent three of the most common options in the contemporary repertoire of organizational action (as indicated by studies of the civil rights, feminist, prochoice, and 1960s student movements, for example; see Ferree and Hess 1985; McAdam 1982, 1988; Minkoff 1993; Staggenborg 1990). Protest groups challenge elites through nonroutine means; advocacy organizations challenge elites through routine channels; and service provision associations provide direct services or benefits to the constituency, without advocating any change in policy. "Activist organizations" refer to both protest and advocacy, while service organizations are considered forms of "voluntary organization." Examples of these organizational forms are discussed later in the article.

2. While the concept of competitive selection is primarily attributed to organizational ecology, it is also implicit in Tilly's work on the shaping of repertoires of contention (1978, 1984). He (1978) introduces the concept of "selectivity by type of action" (101) to suggest that the development of repertoires reflects the amount of social control that is brought to bear on different sorts of action. The same idea applies to "selectivity by group" which refers to those who become favored members of the polity. The insight that I take from Tilly (1978:125) is that "each new entry or exit redefines the criteria of membership in a direction favorable to the characteristics of the present set of members." This then influences the distribution of different actors, in terms of interests, agendas, or elite affiliations. Over time, this tends to shift the established definitions of what are legitimate forms of activity. While Tilly's discussion refers to challengers and members of the polity, I think that it is useful to consider entries and exits of organizations in a similar manner. Clemens (1993) also points to the role of selection in shaping what she terms "organizational repertoires" but does not emphasize such processes in her account of the late nineteenth-century women's movement in the U.S.

3. While the direct beneficiaries of this range of organizational activity may appear nonoverlapping, organizational maintenance hinges on a much wider support base than the grass-roots constituency itself (McCarthy & Zald 1977). Also, despite distinct "publics" that SMOs and voluntary associations seek to mobilize, these types of organizations must also be attentive to common institutional constraints and expectations (McCarthy, Britt & Wolfson 1991). So, although women's organizations are potentially in greater competition amongst themselves for the direct support of women than they are in competition with black organizations for members (except insofar as each tries to mobilize women of color), both women's and African American organizations would seem to be in more direct competition for foundation sponsorship and other forms of public support. Also, overlapping organizational memberships are not uncommon (Zald & McCarthy [1980] 1987). From this perspective, it is plausible that at the institutional or sectoral level women's political advocacy groups may be competing with African American political groups or educational service providers, for example.

4. I use the term *legitimacy* in the manner employed by Carroll and Hannan (1989): "an organizational form is legitimate to the extent that relevant actors regard it as the 'natural' way to organize for some purpose. From this perspective, rarity of a form poses serious problems of legitimacy. When few instances of a form exist, it can hardly be the 'natural' way to achieve some collective end" (525). This definition decouples the concepts of *legality* and *legitimacy*.

5. One research editor at Gale Research Company (personal communication) estimated that it takes about 2 to 3 years to locate newly established organizations and obtain a listing for them; this lag was likely longer in the early years of the directory. As somewhat of a corrective, data were collected through 1988 and the study truncated in 1985. As well, an organization's event history trajectory begins with its year of formation and not its year of entry in the encyclopedia. In cases where the association is located some time after its founding date, the data from the

first observation is used in the first spell. See Minkoff 1991 for a discussion of data collection and management.

6. As a number of recent researchers have noted, the assumption that the conditional mean and variance of Y_t given X_t are equal fails to account for overdispersion (when the variance exceeds the mean) and can result in spuriously small standard errors of the exogenous variables (Cameron & Trivedi 1986; Hannan 1991; King 1989). A common approach has been to estimate the event count using negative binomial regression, which is a generalization of the Poisson model. Choice of the model is based on standard tests of fit for nested models (King 1989). In the analyses that follow, I present negative binomial or Poisson estimates depending on which model fits the data best.

7. A point of clarification is important here. Given the logic of this analysis, it is not possible to also control for *organizational* attributes, e.g., constituency, size, etc. Such controls are not meaningful in the founding rate models, where the unit of analysis is the year of observation and not specific organizations themselves (Hannan & Freeman 1989).

8. Organizations were considered disbanded when they were listed in the *Encyclopedia* as defunct, inactive (and they did not resume activity by the end of the study), or as "address unknown" (requests for updated information were either unanswered for at least three editions or returned by the post office). There were also 31 organizations which were found in one or more editions and were not relisted (either in the main text or the index) that I combine with the other "defunct" groups. The date of disbanding is either the year reported in the *Encyclopedia* or the year of the last edition in which the organization appears. From this information I constructed a dichotomous indicator coded 0 in each year that the organization is active, and 1 in the year it disbands. If an organization is still active at the end of the study period, this variable is coded 0 for all yearly observations for that group. I then use this variable to get yearly counts of failed organizations.

9. If second-order density terms are not significant, only the linear term is included. Zero-order coefficients are estimated using negative binomial regression, except for models of protest group formation since there was no evidence of overdispersion in this case. Multivariate results reflect Poisson regression estimates, because in no case did the negative binomial specification significantly improve the fit of the model.

10. The point of inflection for density is calculated using the bivariate results and dividing the linear beta coefficient by twice the quadratic beta coefficient ($f = -b_L/2b_Q$).

11. Adding the quadratic advocacy density term does not significantly improve the fit of the model, and it is therefore omitted from models 2B and 2C. The reported log-likelihood for model 2B is 89.14; with the second-order advocacy term included the log-likelihood is 88.88 (results not presented). Likewise, the reported log-likelihood for model 2C is 92.91; with the second-order advocacy density term it is 91.65.

12. As one reviewer has pointed out, however, more specific information on the actual shifts in funding among these groups would be necessary to confirm this hypothesis.

13. In fact, these results suggest that organizational dynamics of the sort examined in this article provide a more empirically grounded interpretation of the concept of "cycles of protest." Rather than invoking some generalized climate of insurgency it is clear that shifting levels of protest *organization* during and after the 1960s were critical influences on later developments in the social movement and voluntary sector, viz. the explosion of advocacy groups and the limits placed on service activities. My thanks to one of the reviewers for suggesting this line of interpretation.

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