CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Revisiting the Rotten Apples Explanation

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The Catholic Church response to its sexual abuse crisis and how the problem should be addressed parallels the "rotten apple" assertions of police deviance. The rotten apple theory, however, does not fully explain police deviance, as there are often also structural explanations. This article employs Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert's (1998) police deviance framework to characterize and understand the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal, drawing specific comparisons to the intentional use of excessive force by police. Though the analogy has limitations, there are similarities at both the individual and organizational levels, particularly because the Church has implemented accountability mechanisms similar to the police. The article concludes with a discussion of lessons the Church can learn from the police organization as they seek to prevent, control, and effectively respond to sexual abuse of children by their clergy.

Keywords: police misconduct; Catholic Church; sexual abuse

> The interaction of stubbornness, hostility, and pride has given rise to the so-called "rotten apple" theory. According to this theory, which bordered on official Department doctrine, any policeman found to be corrupt must promptly be denounced as a rotten apple in an otherwise clean barrel. It must never be admitted that his individual corruption may be symptomatic of underlying disease. . . . The rotten-apple doctrine has in many ways been a basic obstacle to meaningful reform…[and] the Commission examined and rejected the premises upon which the rotten-apple doctrine rested. (Knapp Commission, 1972, pp. 7-8)

Since 2002, the Catholic Church has come under intense scrutiny because of sexual abuse of minors by clergy. A national study of the nature and scope of child sexual abuse in the Catholic Church showed that 4,392 priests and deacons had allegations of sexual abuse against 10,667 minors during the past 50 years (John Jay College, 2004). In that same period, the Catholic Church paid more than $500 million in legal costs, settlements, and treatment for offenders and victims (John Jay College, 2004), and this cost is now more than $2 billion (Goodstein, 2007).

Child sexual abuse is often considered to be an individual problem or the result of psychological or other abnormalities in the person who commits sexual offenses (Terry, 2006). Once the extent of the abuse problem became known in the Catholic Church, the Church was criticized for its handling of priests accused of misconduct, particularly the practice of transferring priests between parishes or dioceses or allowing them to remain in ministry

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after they allegedly abused children. Although the Church leadership has condemned those who engaged in such conduct, they argued that the offenders represent a small percentage of the clergy (4%), not the institution as a whole. All dioceses in the United States are now required to provide "safe environment" training for all children, but at the same time they have instituted a zero-tolerance policy for abusers, removing those who commit such offenses.

The Catholic Church response to the sexual abuse crisis and how the problem should be addressed parallels the "rotten apple" assertions often made by police chiefs in the wake of a corruption or brutality scandal. That is, the deviance is a result of a single, rogue officer (or, in this case, priest) who operated alone without organizational knowledge or support. As the Knapp Commission quote at the beginning of the article suggests, there is little consensus among police practitioners and scholars regarding the extent to which the rotten apple theory explains police deviance. Many argue that the multifaceted nature of police deviance requires a more complex explanation. The shortcomings of the rotten apple theory are best illustrated by the numerous scandals in which the deviant behavior by police is widespread and organized (e.g., the Los Angeles Police Department [LAPD] in the early 1990s). As a result, police scholars have frequently pointed to alternative explanations for police deviance, such as opportunity and organizational structure, as well as the working environment and subculture (Knapp Commission, 1972; Sherman, 1974).

This article adopts Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert's (1998) police deviance framework as a foundation to explore parallels between intentional use of excessive force by police and sexual abuse of minors by clergy and, more specifically, to examine the Catholic Church's rotten apple explanation for the sex abuse scandal. Kappeler et al. have argued that policing is a unique occupation with special organizational features and opportunity that contribute to the existence and prevalence of police deviance. With the Kappeler et al. framework as a backdrop, this article draws parallels among the Church and police in three general areas: historical origins of deviance, potential causes of the deviant behavior, and ideas for how to control misconduct and build accountability. Like police brutality,[1] the full explanation for child sexual abuse among the Catholic clergy does not rest solely with deviant sexual interests of a few rotten apples. Instead, the profession itself plays a contributing role much in the same way that the working environment of the police plays a role in police brutality.

Police deviance is highly complex and multifaceted. It includes a diverse range of actions such as excessive use of force (i.e., brutality), corruption, and racial profiling. The seriousness of the transgression can also vary widely, from the relatively minor (accepting gratuities) to the very serious (aggravated assault and murder). In this article, we focus specifically on one form of police deviance—excessive use of force—to apply the Kappeler et al. (1998) framework to the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal. Fyfe (1986) differentiated between unnecessary force and excessive force, and the distinction is important for this article. Unnecessary force occurs when police are improperly trained, and as a result, they use more force than is required unintentionally or because of their ineptitude. Excessive force is deliberate, intentional (and malicious) use of more force than is necessary. This article focuses on excessive force by police, as defined by Fyfe (1986), because the authors believe that the theoretical parallels and implications for accountability and reform are strongest when isolating this specific form of police deviance.

Although the extension of the Kappeler et al. (1998) framework to the sex abuse scandal has limitations, the similarities at both the individual and organizational levels are compelling and raise interesting questions for the Catholic Church, particularly because the Catholic

Church has implemented accountability structures similar to the police since the outbreak of the crisis. The article concludes with a discussion of implications of such structures and highlights the opportunity for the Church to draw from lessons learned by the police as they seek to develop a mechanism to prevent, control, and effectively respond to future sexual abuse of children by their clergy.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF DEVIANCE

Both the police and the Catholic Church have struggled with deviance among those in their ranks since their early development. The discussion of historical origins of deviance in both institutions lays an important foundation for recognizing the prevalence of misconduct by police officers and priests as well as how our theoretical understanding of such behavior must extend beyond individual-level explanations.

THE PROFESSIONAL POLICE AND DEVIANCE

The development of professional policing can be traced to Sir Robert Peel's London Metropolitan Police Force, created in 1829. Peel articulated the basic theoretical foundations of modern policing, including careful selection of personnel, centralized administration, proactive patrol, prevention of crime as a central goal, impartiality, and adoption of a quasi-militaristic, bureaucratic organizational structure (Walker & Katz, 2002). Peel stressed the importance of upholding the law and instituted strict accountability measures to ensure officer compliance. Despite his efforts, instances of police deviance emerged almost immediately. Germann, Day, and Gallati (1985) noted, "During the first three years of operation, there were 5,000 dismissals and 6,000 required resignations—the largest police turnover rate in history" (p. 63).

American police departments adopted the Peel model, though they did so selectively, and important differences emerged between London and American police that led to widespread problems of police deviance in the United States (see Miller, 1977, for a comparison of London and American police). Most important, American police departments were tied to local and municipal governments and, as a result, became tremendously influenced by local politics (Miller, 1977). Walker and Katz (2002) stated, "Politics influenced every aspect of American policing in the nineteenth century. Inefficiency, corruption and lack of professionalism were the chief result" (p. 22). The first 50 years of professional policing in the United States were characterized by no personnel standards (positions were awarded through political patronage), no preservice training, no job security (elections translated into nearly wholesale turnover in police departments), no supervision, inefficient patrol, and rampant corruption and brutality (Uchida, 2005).

Historically, there were a number of efforts to reform the police, most notably the Progressives during the late 1800s and the professionalism movement led by August Vollmer in the early 20th century. The professionalism movement in the early 1900s reshaped the police into the contemporary model that is known today, with police as professional crime fighters, departments autonomous from political control with emphasis on administrative efficiency and specialization, and rigorous selection processes (Uchida, 2005). Although the professionalism movement failed to meet many of its objectives, most scholars recognize that policing improved substantially during the 20th century (Fogelson, 1977; Walker, 1977).

Nevertheless, scandals continued to plague most major police departments throughout the 20th and into the 21st century. In its report, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (1931) criticized the use of the "third degree" and condemned police for widespread brutality and misconduct. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) identified the police as contributors to many of the civil disturbances of the 1960s, focusing specifically on brutal and abusive behavior, poor training and supervision, and aggressive, impersonal patrol. In 1972, the Knapp Commission estimated that more than half of the New York City Police Department's officers had been engaged in corruption. A 1998 Human Rights Watch Report identifies 14 cities where police brutality scandals had occurred in the past 2.5 years, including Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Portland, Providence, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND DEVIANT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR

Knowledge of the sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic Church peaked in 2002. This was largely the result of the high-profile case of John Geoghan, who was accused of abusing approximately 130 children (86 of his victims received a settlement from the Boston Archdiocese). Most shocking about this case was that Church authorities knew that he had a history of abusive behavior and did not remove him from ministry. Though he was not representative of other known priests who abused children—because of the high number of children he was said to have victimized—Geoghan brought to national attention the history of problems of child sexual abuse by priests.

Deviant sexual behavior is not unique to the Catholic Church, nor is it a recent problem. The concept of "normal" sexual behavior is a socially constructed reality (Jenkins, 1998), and behavior that is defined as "deviant" has varied across religions, cultures, nations, and states. In addition, these definitions change over time, adapting to the prevailing social norms. Sexual mores were largely defined by the Catholic Church beginning in the Middle Ages, at which time homosexuality and other sexual behavior not resulting in procreation became criminalized (Mondimore, 1996). Prior to this time, many cultures, including the Greeks, Romans, and Egyptians, were known to promote homosexuality, pederasty, and the importance of the male figure in society (Breiner, 1990). Though the Church continued to have an influence on sexual mores for several hundred years, transgenerational sexual acts became socially acceptable in 16th- and 17th-century Europe. It was common for adults to touch and fondle the genitals of their prepubertal children, though the touching stopped when the children developed into adolescence (Breiner, 1990; Jenkins, 1998).

Although acts such as incest were accepted in ancient cultures, the Church declared incest an ecclesiastical offense and incestuous marriages were invalidated (Thomas, 2000). Moral offenses, such as masturbation, were brought before the Church courts throughout the beginning of the 20th century. Other types of behavior that were considered more serious—including homosexual acts, bestiality, and sexual intercourse with prepubescent children—were brought before the criminal courts and were punishable by sentences as severe as death.

Child sexual abuse has always occurred; however, it only became recognized as a problem within the Catholic Church in the 1980s—at the same time that the dynamics of child sexual abuse in society were becoming better understood. The high-profile case of Gilbert Gauthe in the 1980s first brought the problem to the forefront (see Berry, 1985), and the Church implemented policies in 1985 to address the problem of child sexual abuse by priests. Prior

to 1990, though, only 810 cases of child sexual abuse were known to dioceses nationally (John Jay College, 2004). The next pivotal year in the abuse crisis was 1993 when, after another series of high-profile abuse cases, the Church formed the Bishops' Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse and published a two-part report called *Restoring Trust* the following year (Bishops' Ad Hoc Committee, 1994). At this time, only one third of the reported cases of child sexual abuse by priests were known to the dioceses, and it was not until 2002 that a spike in reporting showed the true extent of the abuse crisis. Prior to this, it seemed as though the high-profile cases of abuse were limited to a few "rotten apples"; however, the investigation into the crisis in Boston showed that there was also a level of organizational responsibility, as some bishops were transferring known abusers between parishes (for information on the sexual abuse scandal in the Boston Archdiocese, see "The *Boston Globe* Spotlight Investigation," 2004).[2]

THE KAPPELER ET AL. FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE CHURCH SEX SCANDAL

The numerous cases of widespread and organized police brutality during the past several decades suggest that the rotten apple explanation has been more the exception than the rule. For example, Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) concluded that the Rodney King beating was indicative of an overall philosophy among the LAPD that tolerated abusive behavior. "Two or three cops can go berserk. . . . But when twenty-three others are watching and not interfering, the incident cannot be considered 'aberrant,' as Chief Gates initially suggested" (p. 8). As a result, Kappeler et al.'s (1998) framework focuses not on the individual officer but rather on the police working environment. The core elements of the framework that contribute to police brutality are broken down into two categories:

- *Opportunity structures:* power and authority, public perception, isolation, lack of supervision and discretion.
- *Organizational structures:* specialization, career mobility, subculture, and maintaining the status quo.

Theoretical discussion on the causes of sexual abuse of children by Catholic clergy is limited and focuses primarily on the deviant sexual behavior of individual offenders (the "rotten apples"). The Church has recently begun, however, to employ organizational strategies that parallel those implemented by the police to provide oversight and training about sexual abuse. It is the organizational framework and the oversight procedures that lead to a comparison with the police organization because, though they differ in several ways, the police and Catholic Church share some similar organizational principles and opportunity structures. Most people do not enter policing to specifically engage in brutality, nor do most men enter the priesthood to sexually abuse children. Instead, there are distinct aspects of the working environment shared by both professions that promote or facilitate deviance, and complete understanding of the causes of such deviant behavior requires a structural theoretical framework. As such, we argue that the Kappeler et al. framework can be applied to the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal, and the lessons learned by the police who implemented these oversight procedures should be applied to the Church. An analysis of the two categories of the framework—opportunity structure and organizational structure—help to lay out this

TABLE 1: Deviance Framework for the Police and Catholic Church

	Police	*Priests*
Opportunity structure		
Unique authority	Right to use coercive force	Right to forgive
Public perception and trust	Assumption of virtue	Assumption of virtue
Isolation	Unique occupation leads to few friends outside of occupation	Unique occupation leads to few friends outside occupation, no spouse or romantic attachments, live alone
Discretion	Work alone, must make immediate decisions individually	Oversight of Church by bishops but little oversight with daily decisions of priests
Lack of supervision	Officers mostly work without supervision on street, little to no oversight on immediate decisions	Pastors and associate pastors live alone in parish residence; parents, Church used to let children stay overnight with priests, go on vacations, etc.
Organizational structure		
Limited career mobility	Pay increase is through promotion, but promotional opportunities limited	Flat organization, only promotion to bishop, cardinal, Pope
Subculture	Secrecy, esprit de corps, danger, autonomy, us versus them mentality	Secrecy, esprit de corps
Maintaining status quo	Largely White, male, conservative organization	Exclusively male, largely White conservative organization

comparison, with the key concepts identified in Table 1. Each of the core components within each category is discussed below in terms of their application to police use of excessive force and sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clergy.

OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

Authority. The police hold unique power because of their authority, and Kappeler et al. (1998) have argued that "the special legal privileges accorded the police provide unprecedented opportunities to engage in deviance without arousing suspicion" (p. 61). The most critical element of this unique power is the authority to use force. Kappeler et al. have argued that this vast power allows police to engage in behaviors that would be considered criminal for ordinary citizens, most notably use of force, even deadly force (assault and murder for ordinary citizens; Kappeler et al., 1998; see also Brodeur, 1981). Furthermore, the ambiguity of the law allows for situational application and permits officers, if they so choose, to use the law to meet their own personal or organizational objectives (Ericson, 1981; Kappeler et al., 1998).

Although the police have the authority to use force, priests have the unique authority to forgive. Paragraphs 986-987 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church explain the role of forgiveness for sins in the Church and the need for forgiveness. When celebrating the Eucharist, parishioners pray, "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us." The concept of forgiveness is personal and spiritual, and it is the power of the priests to forgive Catholics their sins. Because they look to God to forgive, they abide by Canon law and the purpose of the Canonical Code is the renewal of Christian living—not justice, as with the criminal justice system. Although clearly simplified here for the purposes

of this article, the ability to forgive people for their sins and abide by a code in which individuals are responsible to none other than the divine founder contributes to a unique authority of priests.

Public perception. Public opinion polls have consistently found that most Americans are satisfied with the police and that attitudes have been stable over time (Marx, 1992; Tuch & Weitzer, 1997).[3] Kappeler et al. (1998) argued, "This public perception creates an intellectual bias and assumption that those charged with controlling deviance will not themselves indulge in such behavior" (p. 66). As a result, police brutality becomes much more difficult to detect because citizens assume that police will be deviance-free.

Furthermore, Manning (1997) stated that the police are actively involved in the construction of this positive self-image, taking great care to publicize some of their activities while controlling access to other areas. Examples of this construction include the rotten apple theory, which is nearly universally raised by police leadership following a scandal, the appearance of full enforcement of the law, and the reluctance to acknowledge the tremendous discretion of line officers (Kappeler et al., 1998). This socially constructed perception, which hinges on citizens giving police the benefit of the doubt, facilitates officer misconduct.

Priests have traditionally been given this same benefit of the doubt. Historically, priests have been leaders in the community, trusted to run agencies such as schools, hospitals, and orphanages. They are agents of an organization in which, by the nature of their job, they have access and develop relationships of dependence, confidence, and trust. Trust is a foundation of Catholicism, and priests are entrusted to not only lead Catholics in their spiritual quests but also to take an active role in the development of children. In abuse cases, the abuse is generally preceded by establishing a relationship and trust (John Jay College, 2004). These relationships involve the grooming of the child (enticement to allow the abuse to occur) and the violation of professional standards of boundaries and social frames that govern how organizational agents manage trust and dependent relationships. Betrayal of these social frames indicates an institutional breakdown, which is similar to sexual abuse in other organizational contexts such as therapist–client or correctional officer–inmate.

Though it is a foundation of Catholicism, the sexual abuse scandal in the Church led to decreased levels of trust of Catholic priests and the Church as a whole. A 2002 poll, taken by the *Washington Post* at the height of the sexual abuse scandal, showed that fewer than 20% of all Americans and one third of Catholics believed that the Church could solve the problem of sexual abuse and restore trust (Steinfels, 2003).

Isolation. Police officers, especially in suburban and rural areas, spend most of their shift alone (budget constraints and personnel shortages have forced most departments to abandon the two-officer patrol car). As Walker and Katz (2002, p. 331) noted, "Policing is low-visibility work." Also, many citizen encounters with police occur in isolation, reducing the likelihood that the encounter will be witnessed by others. Their broad discretion allows police officers to choose the time, location, and citizens that they will engage (Kappeler et al., 1998). As a result, officers interested in using brutal tactics can select times, locations, and victims (i.e., those engaged in crime) that reduce the chances that their abusive behavior will be reported by the victim or observed by others (Kappeler & Vaughn, 1997).

Similarly, there is a high level of isolation with priests. Priests with allegations of child sexual abuse began abusing, on average, 11 years after ordination (John Jay College, 2004). This time frame is correlated with when many priests move into the parish residence—the place where many of the abusive acts occur. When in the parish residence, priests generally live alone or with an associate pastor or pastor, allowing for the opportunity to abuse. It is worth noting that there is a higher rate of abuse among diocesan priests than religious priests (John Jay College, 2004). One reason for this may be the isolation inherent in the diocesan lifestyle compared to the lifestyle of religious priests. Religious priests live in communities, not houses with only one other priest. This reduces the isolation of religious priests and also the opportunity for them to abuse.

In addition to a high level of isolation with the job itself, priests also are unique in that they have no immediate family (spouses and children). Catholic priests are not allowed to marry (unless they are deacons, a small percentage of Catholic priests). Priests take a vow of celibacy when they enter the priesthood, and to violate this vow is a sin. These constraints on relationships are unique and are central to the isolation of the profession.

Discretion and lack of supervision. Police officers generally work alone with no direct supervision (Walker & Katz, 2002). Bahn (1984, p. 390) stated that police supervision is "sporadic, for it is impossible to maintain for long periods of time." In addition, police officers value their autonomy and may resist efforts by supervisors to infringe on that independence (Reiss, 1971; Rubinstein, 1973). Moreover, Kappeler et al. (1998) argued that poor supervision serves a number of interests for the supervisor and the department, including reduction of personal conflicts with officers, insulation from deviant activities (deniability), and protection of the supervisors' own questionable activities (i.e., challenging officers about their conduct may result in "airing" of the supervisor's past transgressions). Poor supervision contributes to the prevalence of police brutality, particularly because of the tremendous discretion afforded to police. Discretion refers to the ability to choose from alternatives when making a decision, and police exercise discretion in a wide range of circumstances, from relatively minor incidents to those involving potential loss of life (e.g., deadly force). The isolation of the job, combined with poor supervision and tremendous discretion, creates numerous opportunities for use of excessive force.

Similarly, priests have little supervision in their daily lives, which provides an opportunity to commit deviant sexual behavior (Terry & Ackerman, 2008 [this issue]). Findings from the John Jay College (2004) study indicate a situational component to the abuse that occurred. Most important, priests were able to abuse children in private locations, and approximately 41% of all abusive acts reported took place in a parish residence or cleric's home. Abuse that did not occur in the home occurred most frequently in the church (16.3%), the victim's home (12.4%), and in school (10.3%) or during a vacation (10.3%).

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Both the police department and the Catholic Church are bureaucratic institutions with common organizational elements that facilitate deviance. These features include a division of labor with specialized units and limited career mobility and the existence of a distinct subculture that is defined by social isolation and solidarity and governed by informal rules that value autonomy, secrecy, and maintaining the status quo.

Specialization and mobility. One of the goals of the police professionalism movement during the early 20th century involved specialization of tasks, with individual officers serving as experts in specific crimes (i.e., homicide unit, burglary unit, etc.). Most law enforcement agencies today are highly departmentalized with multiple areas of specialization: homicide, robbery, sex crimes, burglary, juvenile, gang, community policing, vice, narcotics, and so forth. Kappeler et al. (1998) stated that specialized units are at greater risk of engaging in deviant behavior because of greater autonomy, limited supervision, greater secrecy, more discretion, and greater access to resources with less accountability. Specialized units also tend to develop their own group identity and a stronger-than-usual sense of solidarity, which can lead to the development of goals that deviate from the larger organization's goals (Kappeler et al., 1998). There have been numerous examples of specialized units engaging in persistent brutality such as the LAPD's "Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums" (CRASH) Unit during the 1980s.

Opportunities for advancement in a police department, whether it has 10 officers or 10,000, are limited; yet the only way to secure a significant pay increase is through promotion (Walker & Katz, 2002). Structural elements of the promotion process can also serve to frustrate officers, as departments require officers to serve a number of years at a given rank before becoming eligible for promotion. For example, most departments require officers to serve from 2 to 5 years in patrol before becoming eligible for promotion (Walker & Katz, 2002). Promotions typically come at irregular intervals and are often postponed because of budgetary constraints (Walker & Katz, 2002). Last, there is little agreement on the best measures for identifying the most qualified applicants for a promotion (Walker & Katz, 2002). As frustration among police officers builds, they may be more likely to take out that frustration on citizens and suspects.

The paucity of opportunity for promotion clearly limits officers' ability to improve their salary and position in the organization (Kappeler et al., 1998). Brodeur (1981) noted that the competitiveness for promotions and the emphasis on producing numbers (i.e., arrests) may lead to overzealousness among officers. "When the means to achieve social and economic goals are structurally blocked, as they are in most police organizations, the potential for police deviance and corruption increases" (Kappeler et al., 1998, p. 76).

The Catholic Church has a unique organizational hierarchy in that it is largely decentralized. There are 195 dioceses in the United States headed by a bishop, archbishop, or cardinal. Although there is a national organization to which all bishops and cardinals in the United States belong—the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB)—and this organization is headed by a president, the bishops are not accountable to the president or this organization. Bishops and cardinals are only accountable to the Pope and the Holy See. The USCCB holds biannual meetings, and issues of concern to the church are discussed there. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify national problems within the Church when there is no person to whom the bishops must report such problems.

The sexual abuse crisis was a national problem, occurring in dioceses across the country of varying sizes and in varying locations (urban, rural). Prior to 1990, only 810 cases of sexual abuse had been reported within dioceses (many more cases of abuse had occurred, but they had not yet been reported to the dioceses; John Jay College, 2004). Some dioceses had more severe cases of abuse that had come to the attention of the public (e.g., Gilbert Gauthe in the early 1980s), but it was not possible to identify the extent of the crisis nationally without a hierarchical reporting system.

Because of the decentralized nature of the organization, there is limited mobility within the church. A priest can become a bishop (and/or an archbishop) and then a cardinal, with the only rank higher than bishop and cardinal being the pope. There are currently about 270 active bishops and 14 cardinals in the United States, with 194 of the bishops in positions of leadership in the dioceses (the remaining bishops are auxiliary bishops). Considering that there are about 44,000 Catholic priests in the United States (approximately 28,500 of these are diocesan priests), there are few opportunities for promotion for most of those in the Church.

Subculture and maintaining the status quo. Kappeler et al. (1998) noted that subcultures have distinct value systems that set them apart from the larger culture and that "the police are set apart from other occupational groups and members of society by their unique role and social status" (p. 88). The authors argue that a subculture also exists within the Catholic Church and the defining features of the two subcultures—police and Catholic priests—are quite similar.

The existence of a distinct subculture among the police is well-established. Early work by Westley (1956, 1970) defined some of the key elements of the police subculture, including an emphasis on secrecy, group solidarity, and reliance of violence. Niederhoffer (1967) stated that the police subculture is defined by cynicism and authoritarianism. Skolnick (1966) argued that the police develop a working personality shaped by the danger and authority of their work, and because of the potential for danger, police develop a "perceptual shorthand" to identify those who may represent a threat (the symbolic assailant). Skolnick further stated that isolation from the public and group solidarity (i.e., esprit de corps) are consequences of the danger and authority of their profession.

The distinct "us versus them" mentality is a common theme among the classic works on police subculture. Westley (1970) noted that police in Gary, Indiana, perceived the public to be hostile toward them and that violence was viewed as an acceptable response to citizen disrespect. Bittner (1995) later argued that the capacity to use force is the defining feature of policing that sets officers aside from the rest of the public. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) maintained that the "cops as soldiers" philosophy (soldiers in a war on crime) has deepened the "siege mentality" among police and serves as a contributor to police brutality. Reuss-Ianni (1983) described rules that guide the police subculture and shape the emphasis on secrecy, autonomy, isolation, solidarity, and bravery.

The existence of the police subculture, its defining features—us versus them mentality, social isolation, group solidarity, secrecy, and autonomy—and the informal rules that support those features contribute to the prevalence of police brutality (Kappeler et al., 1998; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Moreover, Kappeler et al. (1998) argued that police maintain the subculture and adherence to its rules through a hiring and selection process that specifically weeds out anyone who does not conform to their middle-class values and norms. "Many of the selection techniques that are used to determine the 'adequacy' of police applicants have little to do with their ability to perform the real duties associated with police work. . . . If police applicants demonstrate conformity to a middle-class lifestyle, they are more likely to be considered adequate for police service" (Kappeler et al., 1998, p. 89). As a result, policing has traditionally been an occupation for White middle-class males, and despite efforts to improve representativeness, females and minorities still only comprise about 25% to 30% of all police in the United States (Walker & Katz, 2002).

Like policing, the priesthood has a unique subculture. It is an all-male organization whose members commit to a life of celibacy. To be ordained into the priesthood, men must exhibit traits of integrity, selflessness, generosity, intelligence, virtue, and spirituality. Priests have a very different view of the social world in which we all live (Steinfels, 2003). They are celibate, have no immediate family (spouse, children), and live alone. Yet they are expected to counsel families and look after the well-being of children.

Also like the police, there is little ethnic and racial diversity in the priesthood. Most priests are White, as are a significant majority of bishops and cardinals in the United States, despite the massive growth in the Hispanic Catholic population in the United States. Although approximately 39% of U.S. Catholics are Hispanic, only 2,900 of the more than 44,000 priests are Hispanic and 25 of the nearly 300 bishops are Hispanic (USCCB, 2006). Although Bishop Wilton Gregory, president of the USCCB at the height of the sexual abuse scandal, is African American, he is 1 of only 11 African American bishops in the country.

CONTROLLING POLICE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE: LESSONS FOR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

If, indeed, Kappeler et al.'s framework can be successfully applied to the Catholic Church, then the literature on controlling police brutality can offer some important lessons for the Church as it devises a mechanism to prevent and effectively respond to sexual abuse of children by its members.

Data on the nature and scope of child sexual abuse in the Catholic Church (John Jay College, 2006) indicate the importance of organizational management to the problem of child sexual abuse by priests, using internal and external mechanisms for control. Although they may not explain the etiology of the abusive behavior, organizational factors can help to explain how the abuse was able to occur and, in some cases, continue for long periods of time. There are indications that the dioceses that took decisive action were able to limit the extent of the problem of sexual abuse by clerics. The Nature and Scope study identified three indices related to diocesan response to abuse, including that the diocese took direct action after an allegation of abuse, they filed a police report, and they responded to the request for information quickly about the nature and scope of their abuse allegations. The 26 dioceses that exhibited this behavior reported a lower-than-average number of priests with allegations (12 rather than 18), a shorter average duration of abuse per priest (3.8 years as opposed to 5.6 years), and a lower-than-average percentage of explicit sexual acts (e.g., penetration; John Jay College, 2006).

Many of the mechanisms to control sexual deviance that the Church has begun to implement are similar to those implemented by the police. These internal and external mechanisms, shown in Table 2, have been implemented in response to the abuse crisis but have only been in place for a short period of time. For this reason, it is important to understand "what works" among police efforts to control brutality.

INTERNAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

A host of different strategies within police departments have been employed to prevent and control brutality. These include careful selection and training of officers, supervision and accountability, administrative rule making, an effective internal affairs unit, early warning systems, and changing the subculture.

TABLE 2: Internal and External Mechanisms to Control Misconduct

	Police	*Priests*
Internal mechanisms		
Recruitment and selection	Proactive recruitment, and a series of rigorous steps to identify those best suited for the job	Increased focus on personality or other entry tests, priestly formation and seminary education
Supervision and accountability	Effective front-line supervision: hold sergeants accountable for their officers	Bishops accountable only to the Pope and the Holy See
Administrative guidance	Clearly articulated policies that guide behavior; violations are punished	Charter to regulate Church response to abuse
Internal affairs	Backbone of accountability: needs sufficient resources and support from chief; proactive investigations too	Implemented review boards at all dioceses, have victim liaisons
Early warning system	Data system that flags problem behavior before it escalates—nonpunitive	Currently no method for early detection of priests at risk to offend
Changing the subculture	Breakdown secrecy; reward those who provide information, punish those who withhold it; increase female and minority representation.	Should increase number of minority bishops with changing demographics of Catholic population; unlikely to change male, celibate organization
External mechanisms		
Prosecution and judicial intervention	Criminal prosecution a weak tool; judicial intervention effective if supported by chief	Few priests criminally prosecuted because of statute of limitations
Civil liability	Important tool that offers victim compensation, can deter problem behavior, and can alter police practice	More than $1 billion spent on civil litigation
Citizen oversight	Auditor system appears most effective: focus on organizational change	NRB, OCYP, VOTF, SNAP, bishops' accountability

Note. NRB = National Review Board; OCYP = Office of Child and Youth Protection.

Careful selection of personnel and training. Although it is not always possible to identify potentially brutal officers at the recruitment stage (i.e., see Mollen Commission, 1994), effective screening of applicants remains an important part of controlling use of excessive force (Walker & Katz, 2002). Recent scandals in Miami, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., have been linked to mass hirings, when departments hired hundreds of officers in a short period of time and did not conduct thorough background investigations. Careful selection of personnel can serve to weed out many of those unfit for police work. Careful recruitment must be followed up with effective training, both in the police academy and through field training programs. In a study of police officers fired by the New York Police Department (NYPD), Fyfe and Kane (2006) found that pre-employment history, education, and training are important indicators of future performance, as follows:

> Officers whose histories include records of arrest, traffic violations and failure in other jobs are more likely than other officers to be involuntarily separated from the NYPD. . . . Officers who hold associate or higher degrees are less likely than those who do not to be involuntarily separated. . . . Those who do well in the Police Academy's recruit training program are less likely than marginal recruits to be separated as unsatisfactory probationers. (p. i)

The selection and training of priests has changed considerably during the past half-century. Though all seminaries differ in their requirements, selection, and training procedures, nearly all have personality tests (e.g., Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, or MMPI) or other tests (e.g., Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, or MCMI) that aim to eliminate those individuals with identifiable problems. As in police agencies, though, it is not always possible at this stage to identify individuals who will later commit deviant behavior. Another aspect of priestly formation that has changed is the age at which males enter the seminary. For years, minor seminaries accepted adolescent boys, beginning at age 13, and they were provided with little training about sexual health and well-being. Several researchers postulate that this contributed to a retarded psychosexual development. Today, men enter college or major (tertiary) seminaries as adults for their priestly formation, and these seminaries have curricula related to understanding and maintaining sexual health (Meek, McMinn, Burnett, Mazzarella, & Voytenko, 2004).

Supervision and accountability. Effective front-line supervision is an important control of police brutality (White, 2007). If officers believe that they will be caught and punished for their transgressions, they will be less likely to engage in the misconduct. Effective front-line supervision can be fostered by holding sergeants accountable for the behavior of their subordinates (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).

Successful internal control of excessive force centers on the attitudes of the chief. The Mollen Commission (1994) stated that "commitment to integrity cannot be an abstract value. . . . It must be reflected not only in the words, but in the deeds, of the Police Commissioner" (p. 112). Darryl Gates in Los Angeles, Frank Rizzo in Philadelphia, and Harold Breier in Milwaukee demonstrate how attitudes of the chief can send a message to line staff that abusive conduct is acceptable. Alternatively, Philadelphia after Rizzo (Morton Solomon), New York after Serpico (Patrick Murphy), and Miami after Liberty City (Bobbie L. Jones and Frederick Taylor) represent cases whereby meaningful, department-wide reform has occurred because of strong leadership that sent a clear message to line officers about what would be tolerated (and more important, what would not; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).

One aspect of the priesthood that has changed little over the years is the accountability and supervisory structure. As a result of the decentralized organization of dioceses in the United States, bishops have a relatively high level of autonomy in their dioceses. Bishops are accountable to the Pope, who resides in Vatican City and has complete power over the Catholic Church. Bishops are in charge of their dioceses, and the many churches within the dioceses are overseen by pastors and associate pastors. Because of the often large geographical areas of dioceses, most pastors have a high level of autonomy within the parish. This structure allows for little oversight of bishops or pastors by supervisors.

Guidelines. Administrative rule making has been shown to effectively control police officer behavior in a number of brutality-prone areas, including arrest, hot pursuits, and deadly force (Alpert, 1997; Fyfe, 1979; Walker, 1993; White, 2001). For example, Fyfe (1979) reported that the number of police shootings in New York was cut in half following the adoption of a restrictive deadly force policy. Alpert (1997) reported that following the adoption of a restrictive policy in Miami, there was a reduction in the number of auto pursuits, the number of accidents, and the number of injuries.

In June 2002, the USCCB promulgated the Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People to address the problem of child sexual abuse by Catholic priests. This Charter created guidelines for the investigation of the problem of child sexual abuse in the Catholic Church in the United States. Through *The Charter*, the USCCB formed two entities: a group of lay Catholics who would comprise the National Review Board (NRB) and the Office of Child and Youth Protection (OCYP). The two groups would share a mandate to investigate the nature and scope of the problem of child sexual abuse in the Church, the causes of the abuse, and the procedures for responding to clergy who have been accused of abuse. The OCYP now carries out annual audits of dioceses to ensure that established guidelines are followed, such as safe environment training, dissemination of information about child sexual abuse to parishioners, and so forth.

Internal affairs units. An effective internal affairs unit represents the foundation of a successful departmental response to police brutality (Walker & Katz, 2002). Police scholars and practitioners argue that, for internal affairs units to be successful, they must have the support of the chief, have sufficient personnel and resources, and be properly trained (Goldstein, 1975; Sherman, 1978; Walker & Katz, 2002). Investigations by internal affairs units have traditionally been reactive—initiated in response to a specific complaint or information—but departments are increasingly using proactive "integrity tests" to identify problem officers (e.g., "staged" encounters when officer behavior is observed).

Once the extent of the sexual abuse crisis became clear, dioceses began to implement some forms of internal control. In particular, all dioceses have appointed victim liaisons (whose titles vary, such as Victim Assistance Coordinator, Victim's Advocate, Office of Victim Assistance, Diocesan Liaison, and so forth) and formed review boards to oversee allegations of sexual abuse. The role of the review board, which at most dioceses is composed of both lay persons and priests, is to serve as a consultative body to the bishop in overseeing the investigation of abuse.

Early warning systems. Early warning systems are information systems that collect and analyze data on problem behavior, such as citizen complaints, resisting arrest charges, disciplinary incidents, and use of force incidents (White, 2007). Most systems are not punitive; rather, they seek to identify problem officers before their behavior becomes more serious and provide them with the necessary counseling and training to change their behavior (Walker & Katz, 2002). Officers are then typically subjected to postintervention monitoring to insure that the problem behavior has ended. Research shows that early warning systems can be effective in reducing citizen complaints, use of force, and other problem behavior among targeted officers (Walker, Alpert, & Kenney, 2000).

The Catholic Church has not employed an early warning system to help identify priests who may be at risk to sexually abuse. However, this is largely because such a system would be dependent on identifying exactly what factors put a priest at risk of committing acts of sexual abuse, and it is difficult to identify such predictors. Risk factors that have been identified for offenders in the nonclergy population may not be applicable to priests (e.g., number of prior offenses, antisocial behavior and lifestyle, age, marital status; Hanson & Bussière, 1998). However, some risk factors (e.g., sexual attraction to children, history of sexual abuse, substance abuse) may be similar in both the clergy and nonclergy populations. In addition, other factors that are not applicable to the nonclergy population may be

present in the clergy population (e.g., history of boundary violations, retarded psychosexual development). Individual risk factors are currently being studied to better understand whether an early warning system can be employed.

Changing the subculture. Some police scholars argue that, to effectively control police deviance, the department must break down the secrecy that defines the subculture (the "blue curtain"). The refusal of officers to turn in or testify against their colleagues who have used excessive force represents a serious barrier to antibrutality efforts. A number of suggestions have been offered to break the code of silence, including punishing officers for withholding information or lying, rewarding officers for coming forward with information, punishing supervisors for the transgressions of their subordinates, and more generally, creating a working environment where deviance is not tolerated (Walker & Katz, 2002). The influx of women and minorities into policing can also serve to break down the police subculture, which has been dominated by a conservative, White male philosophy. In fact, Fyfe and Kane (2006, p. ii) found that as the NYPD has become more diverse, it "has become better behaved."

Although a subculture of secrecy regarding child sexual abuse by priests has clearly changed in the past few years, there are many other aspects of the subculture that either have not changed yet or will be unlikely ever to change. As the number of minorities in the Catholic Church in the United States increases, the number of bishops who are minorities should also increase. This is a goal that is not only necessary but also likely; the changing demographics of the Church are likely to bring more Hispanics into the priesthood and, eventually, to positions of leadership. Some features of the subculture are unlikely to change, however, including the lack of lay people with roles of authority in the church, a refusal to ordain women as priests, and the observance of celibacy for priests. The role of these factors in the sexual abuse crisis is unclear and is being studied further in the Causes and Context study.

EXTERNAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

Criminal law and judicial intervention. Police brutality typically involves a violation of state or federal law, and as a result, the offending officer can be prosecuted for the behavior. Officers convicted of serious offenses, such as violation of federal civil rights, assault, abuse of authority, and even murder often are sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The criminal law, however, is generally viewed as an ineffective tool in combating police deviance. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) argued, "The criminal law remains so broad and presents so many enforcement problems that it cannot serve meaningfully as the parameters for any professional's discretion" (p. 197).

Moreover, the criminal law is a reactive mechanism that plays a marginal role, at best, in preventing brutality. Arguably, the criminal law could take on a deterrent aspect if it were applied successfully on enough occasions (i.e., certainty, severity, and celerity), but this is simply not the case. Police officers are rarely prosecuted for their transgressions, and when they are, convictions are by no means guaranteed (e.g., state trial of the four officers involved in the Rodney King beating).

Judicial intervention has also served as a control on police brutality, with mixed results. There are several cases in which plaintiffs have sought injunctive relief from the courts and influenced police practices (*Rizzo v. Goode*, 1976; *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 1983). White (2003) noted that judicial intervention holds potential for influencing officer behavior, but the success of the external effort hinges on police leadership enforcing the judicially imposed rule.

A unique aspect of the child sexual abuse crisis is the delay in reporting of the abusive incidents. Although 10% of minors reported the abuse within a year of when it occurred, by 2002, 25% had reported the abuse within 10 years, 50% within 20 years, 75% within 30 years, and the rest more than 30 years after the abuse occurred (John Jay College, 2004). Most states have a statute of limitation for sexual offenses, and the reporting delay often precludes the states from pressing criminal charges. Of the 4,392 priests who had allegations of abuse, only 613 (14.1%) were reported to the police, 217 (5.4%) priests were criminally charged, and 138 (3.6%) were convicted (John Jay College, 2004). Other actions were taken against the priests with allegations, however, including a diocesan investigation, treatment, and civil litigation.

Some jurisdictions have taken steps to address the issue of delay in reporting of sexual abuse by extending the statutes of limitation for sexual offenses. Although not stated explicitly as a reaction to the abuse crisis, 7 states have recently extended their criminal statutes of limitation for sexual offenses. In addition to these states, 25 states now have no statute of limitation for sexual offenses (though 5 of these require DNA evidence). The result of the extended statute of limitations was a mass reporting of offenses. However, in most cases, only the civil, not the criminal, statute is suspended because of a constitutional concern about applying a criminal sanction ex post facto.

Civil liability. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides civil and criminal remedies for those whose constitutional rights are violated by "persons acting under color of state law." Court rulings in *Monroe v. Pape* (1961) and *Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York* (1978) led to the application of Section 1983 to police officer conduct, and importantly, the *Monell* case extended liability to the department when officers' behavior is the result of the agency's custom and practice. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993, p. 2002) stated that the *Monell* case, in particular, had led to a dramatic increase in civil litigation against police because it "opened the deep pockets of government treasuries to civil rights plaintiffs." From 1986 to 1990, the city of Los Angeles paid more than $20 million in civil litigation against police officers for excessive use of force (Independent Commission on the LAPD, 1991). Many police scholars recognize civil litigation against police not only an as effective avenue for victims to gain compensation but also as an effective tool in fostering change in police departments (i.e., through policies and training; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).

One of the most striking results of the sexual abuse crisis in the Church is the amount of money paid to victims of sexual abuse by priests. Perhaps because the criminal statute of limitations prevented many jurisdictions from seeking criminal charges against priests with abuse allegations, many victims instead sought civil compensation. The dioceses have been held vicariously liable for the abuse of children by priests, as courts have established that the organization allowed for the occurrence of harm to the minors. As a result of this litigation, the Church has paid out approximately $2 billion in civil settlements. These settlements cover the cost of victim compensation, victim treatment, priest treatment, and legal fees.

As with criminal liability, many states have extended their statutes of limitation for civil litigation in sexual abuse cases. By 2006, 31 states had extended the time in which victims could receive compensation by filing a civil suit against the Church and/or the abusive priest.

Citizen oversight. Citizen oversight of the police has experienced significant growth recently. Currently, there are approximately 100 boards in the United States, and they are found in nearly 80% of large cities (Walker, 2001). Citizen oversight boards are organized in different ways, with varying degrees of independence from the police department (Walker, 2001). The most pure version of citizen oversight (and also probably the rarest) includes an independent organization that receives and investigates complaints, has subpoena power, and makes recommendations to the police chief regarding disposition of the complaint and action to be taken against officers. Walker (2001) summarized the arguments both for and against citizen oversight of the police.

Research on the impact of citizen oversight of the police is mixed (Walker, 2001). The auditor model of citizen review holds the greatest promise, according to Walker (2005), because of its emphasis on organizational change and systemic issues and its permanence as an external oversight agency. Under this model, the oversight agency does not review individual complaints; rather, it focuses on the complaint process, police operations, and policy review (Walker, 2005). There are currently 12 police auditors in the United States, and several have had significant impact on police policy and practice (Walker, 2005).

When the USCCB created *The Charter* in 2002, they established for the first time two groups of lay Catholics with the power of review over dioceses—the NRB and the OCYP. These two groups share a mandate to investigate and review the prevalence of sexual abuse in the Church, the causes of the abuse, and the procedures for responding to clergy who have been accused of abuse. They are oversight committees, and though the bishops are not accountable to them, they can collect and report information about sexual abuse by priests. They provide reports that are disseminated to the dioceses and the Catholic community. The bishops also commissioned two studies to better understand the abuse crisis—the Nature and Scope of Child Sexual Abuse by Priests and the Causes and Context of the Crisis of Child Sexual Abuse by Priests. John Jay College, a secular institution, was commissioned for both of these studies. The Causes and Context Study is ongoing, and results should tell us more about the accountability measures implemented by the Church in response to the crisis.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This article argues that a full explanation of sexual abuse of children by Catholic priests must go beyond the sexually deviant behavior of the few "rotten apples." Rather, child sexual abuse by Catholic priests should be examined in the context of a social organization. Analysis of child sexual abuse must go beyond examination of individual offenders and victims and view the phenomenon in the universe of the organization as a breakdown of the institution, disregarded or facilitated by the underlying organizational structure in which the harm occurred. It is important to look at child sexual abuse within the Catholic Church as an individual problem enabled by the organization.

Based on the Church's sexual abuse crisis, this article sought to draw parallels among sexual abuse of minors by priests and excessive use of force by police. The basic thesis of the article argues that neither police officers nor priests enter their profession with the expressed goal of engaging in deviant behavior. Rather, there are characteristics of the professions themselves that contribute to the prevalence of each form of deviance, and importantly, policing and the priesthood have in common a significant number of those characteristics. Both have struggled with deviance throughout their history, and both share opportunity and organizational structures that facilitate deviance. These contributing structural factors are well-established in the police literature, and their identification in the priesthood is intriguing: the socially constructed and tightly controlled public perception, social isolation, group solidarity, secrecy, autonomy, lack of supervision and accountability, specialization and decentralization, limited career mobility, and the existence of distinct subculture governed by rules that protect and maintain many of these characteristics.

LIMITATIONS WITH THE ANALOGY

Despite the compelling parallels between policing and the Catholic priesthood, there are several important areas where the analogy falls short. Perhaps the most important differences in the occupations involves the danger inherently involved in policing and the authority of police to deprive people of their liberty and to use force. The seminal work on the police, particularly the police subculture, identifies danger and authority as critically important elements of police work, and as a result, they play a central role in understanding police brutality. Danger and authority are virtually nonexistent in the Catholic priesthood and play no role in understanding the prevalence of sexual abuse of children. Alternatively, there are important elements of the priesthood that define the profession and are not found in policing. The vow of celibacy, nearly complete lack of supervision, and the focus on forgiveness rather than punishment for sins separates the priesthood from other professions.

Furthermore, police deviance is far more diverse and complex than sexual abuse of minors by clergy. Deviant activities in policing range from racial profiling, taking bribes, engaging in sex with prostitutes in lieu of arrest, and brutality. Even within the topic of brutality, there is an important distinction between unnecessary force and excessive force (see Fyfe, 1986). As a result, Kappeler et al.'s (1998) framework seeks to explain a wide range of deviant activities among police; yet the authors apply the framework here to a very specific form of priest misconduct: sexual abuse of minors. Although the authors acknowledge this limitation, we place primary emphasis on one form of police deviance—intentional use of excessive force—to facilitate the extension of the Kappeler et al. framework to the Church scandal.

MOVING TOWARD SUCCESSFUL REFORM

Despite these limitations, the institutional parallels among the police and the Catholic Church are undeniable and persuasive. However, we believe that the real value of this work lies not so much in the actual comparison but rather in the recognition of a church subculture and the discussion of structural explanations for sexual abuse of children by the clergy. Such an analogy could extend beyond just the Catholic Church. It may be applicable to sexual abuse of children by teachers, sports coaches, doctors, Boy Scout leaders, and so

forth. Quite simply, we believe that the rotten apple theory is, in most cases, an inadequate explanation for both police brutality and sexual abuse of children by Catholic clergy. Just as important, the rotten apple theory eliminates any discussion of the real causes of the problem, instead limiting the focus to the vulnerabilities of the few officers or priests who gave in to temptation. In simpler terms, the foundation of effective control of deviant behavior involves a thorough understanding of the causes of that behavior. Deviance control techniques that do not address the root causes of the problem are unlikely to succeed.

John Jay College's (2004, 2006) studies demonstrate that the Catholic Church problem goes beyond just a few pedophiles who purposely sought out the priesthood. The problem is much more serious and the explanations for the behavior are more complicated than what is suggested from the rotten apple doctrine. As with police deviance, recognition of the complex causes of the behavior leads to a complex multifaceted response, including a range of internal and external control mechanisms. Some of the mechanisms are already in use, particularly criminal law and civil litigation, but clearly the Church is just beginning to develop its response to the problem, and church leaders would be well-advised to follow the lead of professional police departments who institute rigorous internal and external accountability controls.

Walker (2005) has offered a reinforcing theme to much of the discussion above. He stated that there is a new framework for police accountability, defined by many of the measures described in this article. He argued that the new accountability framework represents a fundamental shift in philosophy because of the following three important factors:

- emphasis on the organization, rather than the individual;
- the systematic collection and analysis of data; and
- the convergence of internal and external accountability.

Walker's (2005) assessment of the future of accountability is equally important for police departments and the Catholic Church.

> The rotten apple theory persists . . . because it has powerful emotional and political appeal. . . . Unfortunately, it is simplistic and ineffective. Most important, it does not address the underlying organizational and management causes of unjustified shootings and persistent use of excessive force. The new accountability thinks instead in terms of "rotten barrels," and directs its energies toward fixing the barrel. . . . The heart of the matter is how to change organizational values of a police department and to maintain that change over time. (p. 14)

Police departments that fail to adopt Walker's perspective and that continually rely on the rotten apple doctrine will not address the root causes of police brutality. The result will likely involve re-occurring police scandals over time, poor relations with the community, and costly civil litigation. Failure by the Catholic Church to fully embrace this framework will also impede their full understanding of the root causes of sexual abuse of children by priests and may lead the Church down the same path.

NOTES

1. Excessive force and police brutality are used interchangeably for the purposes of this article.

2. It should be noted that the John Jay College (2004) report showed that few priests with allegations of abuse were transferred between dioceses—143 priests had allegations of abuse in multiple dioceses—though the report did not address transfer between parishes.

3. Satisfaction levels do vary among subgroups of the population; however, with minority communities, lower-class neighborhoods and the youth express less satisfaction than others.

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