Psychopolitical Dimensions of the Middle East Conflict

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

NOEL KAPLOWITZ
Department of Political Science
University of California–Los Angeles

On the basis of in-depth interviews with Arab and Israeli elites, this study delineates political styles and strategies of conflict on both sides of the Middle East dispute, with the aim of understanding their interaction effects. Three conflict orientations emerged for both Arabs and Israelis. Among Arabs, two are straightforward: total rejection of Israel and unambiguous acceptance. All the acceptors are peripheral in their Arab identity or unusual in their contact with Israel. Through analysis of latent as well as manifest attitudes, a third, more intriguing orientation of "latent acceptance but manifest rejection" also emerges. Among Israelis, the three orientations consist of annexationism (of the occupied territories), hard bargaining, and conciliation. Although there is potential convergence between the crucial Arab "latents" and the important Israeli "hard bargainers," their political styles and conflict strategies serve to lock the proponents of these orientations into highly competitive, intractable conflict. Exploration of the psychological needs, cultural processes, and political dynamics which give rise to these positions, together with attitudes on the issues, suggest several policies that might be effective in redirecting the process toward cooperative conflict resolution, about which all parties would feel some sense of gain.

The purpose of this article is to illustrate the utility of psychopolitical approaches to international relations. By "psychopolitical," I mean the analysis of psychological, social-psychological, and cultural variables as they affect political attitudes and behavior. Among these, I include national self-images, culturally influenced requirements for self-esteem, perceptions of other nations, beliefs about appropriate and effective ways

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to thank the National Institute of Mental Health, the Social Science Research Council, and the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University for supporting the research upon which this article is based. I

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 20 No. 2, June 1976
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of behaving in conflict situations, attitudes toward specific issues in conflict, and expectations for the future. I focus in this article on two particular aspects of such analysis. The first entails the synthesis of conflict orientations from attitudes toward issues and beliefs about effective means for resolving them. Here the aim is to assess the reciprocal effects of orientations on both sides of a dispute and to understand how such interaction can help lock the parties into intractable conflict. The second concerns the exploration of latent as well as manifest attitudes in order to point to ways out of such seemingly insoluble conflicts.[1] Psychopolitical approaches are suggested as complements to the analysis of more traditionally considered variables, such as power capabilities and international systems factors.

Morton Deutsch (1964, 1965, 1973), in his work on conflict and its resolution, emphasizes that the crucial distinction for students of this subject is not between conflict and cooperation, but between the relatively competitive versus cooperative contexts within which conflicts of interest occur. Such conflicts arise continuously between parties to any relationship—interpersonal, intergroup, or international. They differ with respect to how they are approached and resolved. Cooperative processes are characterized by actions which aim at mutually satisfying outcomes. In such a relationship, one may have the power to "win" a series of arguments over particular conflicts of interest. But if the other party is greatly dissatisfied, the first does not feel that he has achieved his aims. Cooperative conflict resolution occurs when issues are resolved such that all parties feel at least somewhat satisfied.

Conflicts which take place in competitive contexts are marked by actions which aim at maximizing one's own gains regardless of losses to the other. They occur when goals are perceived such that one cannot gain unless the other loses, or that one party's loss is automatically another's

1. The application of concepts, theories, and methods from psychology and related fields to international relations has, until now, focused mainly upon perceptions of the enemy and, to a lesser extent, personality factors. Much of the effort has consisted of research guidelines and suggestions. For examples and reviews, see Kelman (1965) and Kelman and Bloom (1973).

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am especially grateful to Professors William T. R. Fox and Donald Puchala of the Political Science Department and Professor Morton Deutsch of the Social Psychology Department at Columbia for their advice, help, and encouragement. I also wish to thank Professor Alexander George of Stanford University for his very thorough and helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Final responsibility for the analysis and conclusions is, of course, mine.

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gain (Deutsch, 1973: 20-22). Mutually satisfying outcomes are difficult or impossible to envision. This is the hallmark of competitive conflict. Competitive resolution denotes either a sense of gain for one party and loss for the other or mutual dissatisfaction.

Deutsch (1973: 29-30) suggests several differences between the two kinds of processes regarding open and honest versus misleading communication, sensitivity to similarities versus differences, trusting versus suspicious attitudes, the accordance of some degree of legitimacy to each other's interests versus attributions of total malignancy, and beliefs about the need for collaborative versus unilateral problem-solving. According to these criteria, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been one of the most competitive in international relations. There has been very little research on the determinants of such conflict and the requirements for its redirection (Deutsch, 1973; Smead, 1972). This article reflects an effort in this regard.

METHODOLOGY

There have been several works on the relationship between psychological or political culture variables and foreign policy within a single nation or on one side of a conflict (Almond, 1950; Leites, 1953, De Rivera, 1968; Brecher, 1972: part II). However, there have been few thorough, empirical, and cross-national studies of attitudes, images, and perceptions on both sides of a dispute, i.e., of *inter*national conflict. The present study is based primarily on data gathered in several hundred hours of depth-interviewing with 50 Arabs and 28 Israelis during 1970-1971. They consisted, for the most part, of people who had come to the United States for graduate work. Interviews were guided by a questionnaire, largely open-ended, designed to elicit not only opinions on particular issues, but also to encourage the freest possible play of associations and images on the Arab world, Israel, and the conflict between them.[2] The purpose of this study was to utilize intensive interviews for insight into attitudes and images which underlie political behavior, rather than to conduct a large sample survey more appropriate for statistical analysis

2. The free association form for some of the questions was adopted from the interview schedule used by Harold Isaacs (1962) which he kindly provided when I first undertook the research on which this article is based. The questions used to gather the data for this article may be found in Kaplowitz (1973).

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(Lane: 1962, 1970). Additional sources of data included official positions of Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinian organizations, speeches by Arab and Israeli leaders, and secondary works on the Middle East conflict.

The Respondents

The primary aim in selecting respondents was to provide a wide spectrum of Arab and Israeli opinion for analysis. Six different conflict orientations and two additional possibilities emerged. I chose the most feasible and accessible group of respondents whose attitudes would be most likely to reflect those of decision-makers. They are useful sources for several reasons. First, almost all lived most of their lives in Israel or the Arab world and are products of basic and political socialization. They therefore reflect some general societal values and cultural orientations (Kelman, 1965: 588-589). Second, they comprise part of the "attentive public" which is relatively well-informed and articulate in matters of foreign policy (Almond, 1950: 136-139; Rosenau, 1961: 39-41). Third, they are part of a group from which, in time, many educators, civil servants, professionals, and perhaps policy-makers will derive (Halpern, 1963: 56, 73; Suleiman, 1973: 483; Shaath, 1975: 14). Fourth, policy-makers, like the respondents for this study, are more aware of the attitudes in the outside world than is the average person in the street or the university student in the Arab world and Israel.

In selecting Arab respondents, Egyptians and Palestinians were emphasized, as I considered them to be the most important Arab actors. The ratio of Muslims to Christians was 2:1. Suleiman (1973), in his random survey of Arabs in the United States, obtained a Muslim-Christian ratio of 3:1. Of our Arab respondents, 27 were in the New York area, 15 at a large Midwestern university, 4 in Philadelphia, and 4 on the West Bank. The latter were interviewed during a short trip to the area in the summer of 1971. Each of the three Arab conflict orientations we delineate was found among respondents in the Midwest as well as on the East Coast. The representation of various conflict orientations was little affected by the presence of minorities (see Table 1).

I did not randomly find supporters of the annexationist position among Israeli students. I therefore contacted representatives of Revisionist and Religious Zionist movements who would be expected to reflect such views. In Israel, during the summer of 1971, I also interviewed two student leaders of the Herut Party, which is annexationist and is the core of the

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Likud Bloc. All other Israelis were interviewed in the New York area. Among Israelis, all but three respondents were of European origin, whereas those of Middle Eastern and North African origin form about half the general population. At the same time, the great majority of Israel's political and military leadership are of European origin. In this respect also, the sample of respondents is consonant with the purposes of the study.

The Interviews

Validity of responses: The most common question asked about interview studies is: how do you know the respondent is telling the truth (Campbell, 1966: 4-5)? How do you know his responses reflect his "real feelings?" Regarding this issue, Dexter (1970: 121), in his work on elite interviewing, points out that such feelings may be in flux, that informants may have conflicting opinions. We found some crucial ambiguities. Part of our purpose was to explain them and to assess their implications. The question of how one knows whether a respondent is telling the truth does not touch upon another important and subtle task of the interviewer. As Dexter puts it: "the researcher will not ask himself, 'How do I know if the informant is telling the truth?' Instead, the researcher will ask, 'What do the informant's statements reveal about his feelings and perceptions?' " (p. 131).

Lasswell and Arora (1969: 2) suggest the difficulty of continuous deception in regard to their analysis of the public statements of political elites. Their reflections are also appropriate to the interview material on which this study is based: "It may be that an element of conscious deception is present in many public statements. Language, however, deceives the deceiver; it cannot be stripped bare of its complex relation to a total flow of subjectivity. Within limits, it remains an unwilling 'mirror of the soul'."

The question of private interviews with individuals: Harkabi (1971a: 92) has suggested that for purposes of studying the Arab-Israeli conflict or, by implication, any international conflict, one should pay attention to what individuals say in public and in groups. For it is as groups that they formulate political positions, and it is as a group, or series of groups in the case of Arabs, that they must confront the adversary. Policies are usually, though not always, made in groups; and group dynamics of various sorts

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can indeed affect their formulation (Janis, 1972). Yet, Harkabi (1971a: 93) himself also recognizes the importance of assessing the *impact* of public statements made by political leaders, writers, and journalists. Opinions expressed individually and in private reflect this impact. They may also indicate *possibilities for attitude change.* In situations of highly intractable conflict, focusing only upon manifest and public positions leads necessarily to the conclusion that there is no way out, no possibility for conflict resolution other than total defeat of one side. Latent dispositions may indicate unseen possibilities. Eliciting these dispositions is facilitated in the context of private, individual interviews. Most importantly, attitudes expressed individually and in private may provide guidelines as to what kinds of policies would be effective in producing change. These are the political functions served by the analysis of latent as well as manifest attitudes.

CONFLICT ORIENTATIONS OF ARABS AND ISRAELIS

Arabs

Overt acceptors of Israel: For Arabs, acceptance or nonacceptance of Israel is the most relevant dimension when assessing possibilities for conflict resolution. Among our respondents, one group is ready to accept Israel openly and unambiguously and to compromise with it. Virtually all of these overt acceptors, however, seemed at least somewhat peripheral in their Arab identity or unusual in their contact with Israel. They tended to be Egyptian Copts, Tunisians, Lebanese, or Palestinian West Bankers—the latter having been in direct conflict with Israel for several years. Among Arab leaders, those who have unambiguously accepted Israel also tend to come from these groups (Hourani, 1967; Shihadeh, 1971; Shamir, 1971; AlRoy, 1971: 55-56). Within the Arab world they have had relatively little influence in molding opinion or determining strategy regarding Israel. Thus, they have not significantly affected the nature of the conflict.

Totalists: A second group of Arabs shows no evidence of accepting Israel or readiness for compromise. They will not recognize Israel, they refuse to negotiate in any way, and they are unambiguous about the elimination of the Jewish state. This stance of totalism is a familiar one for students of the conflict and has, perhaps, been the most salient one for

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Israelis as they look at the Arab world. It has been most clearly reflected in the positions of Iraq, Libya, Syria until the 1973 war, and the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine)—now the core of the "Rejection Front."

Latent acceptors. The open and closed orientations toward Israel are straightforward and familiar. More intriguing and complex is a third orientation. Those who reflect this disposition manifestly reject Israel, when asked directly if it is possible to compromise. But they nevertheless show unmistakable evidence of *latently* accepting Israel and of expecting that it will continue to exist. This is a finding which can be of immense importance when assessing the possibilities for cooperative conflict resolution and the strategies most likely to bring it about.

Latent acceptors can, on the surface, look very much like totalists. They may reject the idea of compromise: "No, it's not possible, there's no way." They may talk about eliminating the "Zionist structure" of Israel, of eliminating it as a Jewish state. The interesting thing about these latents, however, is that on a whole series of questions which imply compromise but do not directly focus upon Israel or upon issues which tap raw emotions, such as the effects of Israeli force, they respond quite differently from totalists. Their latent acceptance is suggested by openness on a variety of issues including Security Council (SC) Resolution 242, a series of hypothetical Israeli initiatives involving rehabilitation and compensation for the more than half million Palestinian refugees living under Israel's control, and the possibility of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Openness on at least one of these issues was our operational indicator for latent acceptance. Most importantly, it is indicated by expectations for the future.

Latents first of all show openness on the crucial issue of a Palestinian state *alongside* Israel. To the question—"How would you feel if an independent Palestinian state were established on the West Bank and Gaza Strip?"—a latent responds: "My first reaction would be very happy. This would solve the problem. But then I would have to find out what kind of state it is. If the Palestinians did that and were happy, I'd be satisfied."

Following the 1973 war, the PLO began to come out in favor of establishing a national authority over any territory gained back from Israel. Thus, it would now be easier for Arabs to support a West Bank-Gaza state. At the time of the interviews, however, the PLO resolutely rejected the idea of such a state (Fateh, 1971: 15). Indications of openness among

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our respondents regarding a West Bank-Gaza state should be read in this light. Totalists, by way of contrast, show no sign of compromise: "And Israel still there? I'm not for that. This is an Arab land." They declare that they would reject such a state, even if it were established as the result of a plebiscite supervised by the UN: "I'd reject that. It doesn't satisfy my aspirations for Palestine. I refuse any kind of compromise."

With respect to SC Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which calls for "acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area," a resolution rejected by Syria (until the 1973 war), Iraq, and the various Palestinian organizations, a latent declares: "If the Israelis accept it completely—but they haven't accepted it and that's why so many Arabs refuse to accept [it]." This response is quite different from those of the totalists who say: "No! It means we cannot have war any longer;" or "Sadat is kneeling in front of Zionist imperialism."

Latents also show openness regarding Israeli initiatives toward rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees under its control. To the question—"How would you react if you read in the newspaper tomorrow that Israel were unilaterally acting to settle the refugees on the West Bank—building housing, establishing industries, factories, job opportunities, new towns?"—a latent responds: "I would be glad, but it's not going to happen. Let them do it, but it's unrealistic to expect that they would." A totalist declares by way of contrast: "This is not the core of the problem. This is a side issue, a distraction."

Finally, latents show expectations that Israel will continue to exist. When asked what comes to mind when they think of the Middle East 50 years from now, they tend to reveal an attitudinal set in which Israel has a place: "This is very difficult. I would say there will still be an Israel, but there will be an Israel and a Palestine with a peace treaty." Totalists indicate quite opposite expectations: "Israel will have been dissolved;" or "There will be no Israel."

Now the possibility of a latent acceptance position is, by definition, problematic for both the political analyst and the statesman. Latency is not directly observable. One can point to evidence which suggests or hints at such a disposition. Openness on issues which imply compromise with Israel, particularly if coupled with expectations that this state will continue to exist, comprise strong evidence of latent acceptance.

Harkabi (1971b: 248) suggests that Arab leaders, since the 1967 war, have purposely used moderate or euphemistic language to couch long-

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TABLE 1
Conflict Orientation Among Arabs According to Country and Religion

	Totalists	*Latents*	*Overts*	*Total*
Total Muslims	9	16	8	33
Total Christians	6	4	7	17
Total Respondents	15	20	15	50
Egyptians (total)	3	8	6	17
Muslims	1	6	2	9
Copts	1	1	3	5
Other Christians	1	1	1	3
Palestinians (total)	3	5	5	13
Muslims	3	5	2	10
Christians	0	0	3	3
Lebanese (total)	3	1	1	5
Muslims	0	0	1	1
Christians	3	1	0	4
Iraqis (total)	2	2	0	4
Muslims	1	1	0	2
Christians	1	1	0	2
All Muslims				
Syrians	3	1	0	4
Saudis	0	2	1	3
Tunisians	0	0	2	2
Jordanians	1	0	0	1
Kuwaitis	0	1	0	1

NOTE: As can be seen from the table, the proportion of Muslims and Christians on the totalist end of the spectrum is roughly the same. The overrepresentation of Christian Arabs among Egyptians, Lebanese, Iraqis, and to a slight extent among Palestinians does not very much distort the quantitative distribution of orientations (6 totalists, 4 latents, and 7 overts among this group) although, interestingly, the proportion of totalists and overts is somewhat greater than among the respondents as a whole. The proportion of overts is higher among Christians (7 of 17) than among Muslims (8 of 30). The former finding, together with the fact that the other overts were found, for the most part, among Tunisians, Lebanese, and West Bankers, led to the hypothesis that open, unambiguous acceptance of Israel was a position found only among peripheral Arabs or those in direct contact with Israel. Thus, the proportion of minorities in the sample helped lead to an important hypothesis, while not precluding the provision of a wide spectrum of opinion for analysis.

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standing totalist goals. The change in rhetoric, he suggests, results from the damage done to the Arab cause by extreme declarations. Those whom we classify as latents, however, do not use euphemistic language when asked directly about accepting Israel. They *refuse*. Only when asked about expectations for the future, or possibilities which entail compromise but do not directly focus upon Israel, do they indicate latent or indirect acceptance. Because they manifestly *reject* compromise, the thought process here involves not so much the kind of conscious deception which is theoretically possible and which Harkabi seems to suggest, but rather a more deeply rooted reluctance to admit, to others or to themselves, their expectations that Israel will continue to exist.

Binder (1969: 10) points to the possibility of what amounts to a long-run totalist position:

> The Arabs . . . are apparently . . . flexible in compromising in the short-run, but seem to be quite adamant regarding the long-run. In the short-run they are willing to concede the existence of Israel, to grant free passage, to end their belligerency, and even to discuss issues such as bi-nationalism and federal arrangements. In the long-run, however, their view of an adequate solution to the refugee problem and their demand for an alteration of the cultural basis of the Israeli state suggest an adamant refusal to accept a peaceful regional order which leads to co-existence rather than to cultural and perhaps political assimilation.

The long-run totalism to which Binder alludes is certainly a possible position for Arabs. However, the attitude of short-run flexibility and compromise which he describes as part of this stance does not characterize the Arabs I have classified as latents. The latter do *not* openly and directly indicate that they are willing to compromise with Israel, even in the short run. Also, latent acceptors indicate expectations that Israel will continue to exist. Such expectations are neither logically nor psychologically consistent with a long-run totalist position.[3]

3. I did not attempt, in the research reported here, to distinguish between latent acceptance and long-run totalism. Data which would help to differentiate between these positions are expectations about the future. In response to a question on the Middle East 50 years from now, about half the Arab respondents, including overts, did not associate to Israel one way or the other. They mentioned areas such as improved health, higher standards of living, and greater Arab unity. However, among those who were classified as latents or totalists and who did mention Israel, all of the former indicated expectations that it would exist while all of the latter declared it would not. None of those classified as latents on other questions suggested Israel would not exist. This finding strengthens the validity of the latent category. It is

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The possibility of latent acceptance among Arab leaders: Discovering latent acceptance among respondents who are amenable to depth-interviewing is one thing. Establishing it on the level of leadership is quite another. In this section, I extrapolate from interview data on elites and point to some similarity and congruence with public statements of leaders and with official positions of Arab states and Palestinian organizations.

Several leaders in the Arab world have taken what appears to be a less-than-totalist stance towards Israel, but not one of open, unambiguous acceptance. It is difficult to know whether openness on such issues as SC Resolution 242 or a Palestinian state alongside Israel indicates latent acceptance or camouflages long-run totalism. This is all the more difficult as we cannot know the expectations of these leaders. Nevertheless, it is useful to indicate what kinds of data on the level of leadership can *suggest* latent acceptance. Following the 1967 war, both Egypt and Jordan accepted SC Resolution 242. However, they were not willing to negotiate directly with Israel. The latter regarded such willingness as a test of Arab intentions. Moreover, declarations which indicated Egypt's seeming acceptance of Israel were accompanied by statements that suggested ambiguity. Nasser (1970: 50) spoke about Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." Since the latter phrase has often been interpreted by Arab leaders as requiring Israel's elimination, its usage projects, and is probably meant to project, ambiguity to both Israelis and Arabs.

Still, the positions of Egypt and Jordan during the 1967-1972 period were distinctly different from those of Syria, Iraq, and the PLO on SC Resolution 242 and on the possibility of a political solution. Moreover, the former were the object of much criticism by the latter, who seemed to feel that the Egyptian and Jordanian positions could lead to a de facto settlement with Israel, regardless of rhetoric about the Palestinians. They seem to have reacted to what they sensed was the possibility of latent acceptance of Israel, particularly on the part of Egypt, the leading Arab state.

With the advent of Sadat to the presidency, Egypt appeared to be moving toward open recognition of Israel. In December 1971, Sadat

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impossible to know the expectations of those classified as latents who did not mention Israel, one way or the other, in associations to the Middle East 50 years from now. Some might have proven to be long-run totalists. In reviewing the data, the tenor of the responses suggests that several of the latents might have fallen into such a category had I systematically attempted to test for it. The possibility, status, and implications of a long-run totalist position are being assessed in ongoing research.

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(1971: 47) responded affirmatively to a question on whether he would "be willing to agree to direct negotiations for the drafting of a peace treaty." He stipulated that Israel would have to "withdraw to international borders" and added that he would "never agree that the occupation of our land should be used as an instrument to impose conditions." Most importantly, Israel would have to commit itself to withdrawal *prior* to any negotiations or peace treaty. By stressing this point and by indicating that Israel would have to begin moving in such a direction before any talks, Egypt's position appeared highly tenuous to Israelis. Thus, its position was not quite one of latent acceptance, as Sadat spoke openly about the possibility of recognition and peace. Nevertheless, it projected enough ambiguity for Israeli leaders to interpret it as the "Theory of Two Stages"—elimination of the consequences of the "1967 aggression" first and of the "1948 aggression" later (Meir, 1973: 455).

Following the 1973 war, however, Egypt no longer demanded Israeli commitment to total withdrawal as a precondition for direct negotiations. In fact, Sadat himself suggested a Geneva Conference in which there would be such negotiations with Israel, albeit in a multilateral context that would also include the United States and the Soviet Union. This was the first time that an important Arab leader openly and officially suggested face-to-face negotiations. Still, the Egyptian position continued to be accompanied by pronouncements which projected ambiguity. Foreign Minister Fahmy declared, for example, that Israel would have to ban immigration for 50 years if it wanted peace (*New York Times*, 1974).

Since the 1973 War some PLO leaders have intimated that they would be willing to accept a West Bank-Gaza state, at least for the time being (Tripartite Palestinian-Egyptian-Syrian Communique, 1974: 164). Yasir Arafat, for example, declared in this connection:

> I am fully confident that the revolution—after eight years of constant struggle during which it encountered many challenges, crises and conspiracies out of which it emerged victorious—is capable of finally coming out with a historic decision that would protect its gains and accomplishments as well as all the victories it has realized for the Palestinian people [*Los Angeles Times*, 1973].

At the same time, whenever such a position is espoused, its proponents are always careful to point out that this is a tactical demand and that the establishment of a Palestinian entity "should not be a substitute for the historical rights but rather a step on the path of struggle leading to those rights" (*Los Angeles Times*, 1973; Arafat, 1974b: 172).

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One may question the meaning of accepting Israel in the "short run." The implications of such a position and the possibility of its leading to coexistence seem to be feared by the Palestinian "Rejection Front" and the clearly totalist states of Iraq and Libya. Their understanding is reflected in their violent reaction to any hint of openness on the part of any Palestinian group regarding any negotiations and the setting up of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. In response to the Tripartite Palestinian-Egyptian-Syrian Communique (1974: 164), which called for "an independent Palestinian authority to be established in the Palestinian territory that is liberated by political or military means," the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (1974: 165-166) issued a statement which declared: "This settlement is being planned by American imperialism, Arab reaction, and timorous persons in favour of surrender, with deceptive gradualness." The PFLP rhetoric is exactly like that of the totalists among our Arab respondents, both in tone and in substance.

Division among the Palestinian organizations can be interpreted as merely a reflection of tactical differences. However, it may also be that the "Rejection Front" feels that, regardless of present intentions, the willingness to engage in face-to-face talks and to accept a West Bank-Gaza entity, even for "the time being," may well lead to de facto coexistence in the long run.

Still the tone of the most recently issued political program of the PLO (Palestine National Council, 1974a), as well as Arafat's speech before the UN (1974a), suggest a position closer to long-run totalism than latent acceptance. The former advocates the establishment of a "combatant national authority" over any land regained from Israel and declares that the PLO will struggle against any proposal for a Palestinian entity the price of which is recognition or peace. Although Arafat, in his UN speech, characterized the idea of a Palestinian state which would replace Israel as a "dream," he also spoke about struggling so that this "dream may be fulfilled." And he talked about Zionism "ineluctably" perishing. To the question–"If Israel goes back to the 1967 frontiers, and a Palestinian state is established on the West Bank and Gaza, will that bring peace to the Middle East . . . are those the conditions for peace in the Middle East?"–Arafat (1975: 8) replies: "Some of the conditions, some of the conditions."

As suggested, statements which would help to distinguish between openness to compromise as a tactical maneuver (camouflaging long-run totalism) from such openness as indicating latent acceptance are expecta-

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tions that Israel will continue to exist or beliefs that the price for its elimination, particularly in view of Israel's reputed possession of nuclear weapons, would be too high. Such expectations cannot be elicited from speeches or written documents, although they did appear in the course of depth-interviews with our respondents.

Israelis

Annexationists: For Israelis, the most salient issue since the 1967 war has been the occupied territories. Differences on this issue are most important when assessing possibilities for conflict resolution. Among Israelis, there are those who want to annex the occupied territories, particularly the West Bank and Gaza Strip, no matter what positions the Arab states or Palestinian organizations might take regarding peace. On the political level, this orientation is reflected in the positions of the right-wing Likud Bloc, part of the National Religious Party (NRP), and the Greater Israel Movement (Brecher, 1972: 155-156, 172-174, 179-180). In the 1973 elections, Likud received approximately 33% of the vote and 39 seats in the 120-member Knesset. The NRP received about 8% of the vote and 10 seats. Recently, it was brought into the government coalition, enabling the latter to increase its 1-seat majority.

In response to probes on questions regarding absorption of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel, and the accordance of full political rights to the inhabitants, annexationists indicate a number of hopes, expectations, and beliefs which would resolve for them the conflict between incorporation of territories containing approximately one million Arabs and the maintenance of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. First, some hope for or expect massive immigration. Second, they believe that many Arabs would leave the territories, either because of unwillingness to live in Israel or because of economic incentives that could be provided. Third, some suggest that the high Arab birth rate is not permanent.[4] Fourth, the Arab population could be absorbed into the Israeli political system in the same way that about half the Israeli Arabs have voted for the Labor Alignment in the past. Fifth, Israelis would predominate, some suggest, because "they are more talented" and technologically advanced.

4. Friedlander and Goldscheider (1974), in a demographic study, indicate that should the West Bank, Gaza, and small adjoining areas in Sinai be annexed, the Arab population of Israel in 25 years would be 35-52%, depending upon birth rates and immigration.

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Hard Bargainers: Other Israelis are open in principle regarding the occupied territories. Among these, the dominant orientation for the leadership and public, and also for our respondents, is one of hard bargaining. Those who reflect this stance have, first of all, demanded direct negotiations as a prerequisite to any movement away from the territorial status quo. Second, they believe that Israel should not put its bargaining cards on the table before negotiations begin. Third, they demand the maximum in return for land: full peace and a formal treaty. The flavor and style of this approach is very much reflected in the following statement by one respondent:

> If they want peace, why not sign a peace treaty? There is either peace or war. There is no in between . . . I would insist on recognition. . . . Because if we give something concrete, we want to get back something. The only thing they can give us is recognition.

Some hard bargainers would also require additional guarantees, such as open borders, diplomatic relations, and trade. Their style is tough, guarded, and cautious, stressing the maximum in quid pro quos. But unlike that of the annexationists, it is open in principle.

This quid-pro-quo orientation is also reflected in attitudes on the question of recognizing a Palestinian people. Hard bargainers characteristically stress that the Palestinians should not be recognized unless and until they are willing to reciprocate: "I don't believe in . . . unilateral initiatives. . . . As long as the announced purpose of the Palestinians is to destroy Israel, there is no reason to recognize them."

On the official level, this orientation has generally been reflected in the positions of the Labor Party, which has always directed the government (Ben Porat, 1972). Therefore, it is particularly important. The government has precluded negotiations regarding sovereignty over Jerusalem and has declared that Israel would not "come down" from the Golan Heights. Various cabinet ministers have also suggested that Israel should retain control over the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheik (Meir, 1971; Ben Porat, 1972; Brecher, 1975: 460-462). Regarding the bulk of the occupied territories, however (i.e., the West Bank and Sinai), the position of the government has been open. The concern of hard bargainers is with security rather than territory per se. This concern has also been reflected in the government's preference for dealing with Hussein of Jordan regarding the West Bank and Gaza. He is a known entity, has proven comparatively moderate, and has expressed a willingness to recognize Israel.

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Conciliatories: A third group of Israelis is more conciliatory in both tone and tactics. They are distinguished from the hard bargainers, first, by their suggestion that Israel should declare, prior to negotiations, that it would be willing to withdraw from all or most of the occupied territories in return for peace, or that it should at least indicate which territories it would be willing to relinquish. Second, they are more open to return of particular territories.

The difference between conciliatories and hard bargainers, however, is also one of political style—of how to deal with the Arabs. The conciliatories are less demanding in their quid pro quos, and less insistent on direct negotiations and on Arab commitment to full and formal peace as conditions for moving toward some kind of settlement. They are also more open to unilateral recognition of the Palestinians. They are not, however, in favor of any unilateral withdrawals.[5]

On the political level, various aspects of the conciliatory orientation have been reflected in the positions of some Labor Party leaders, the left-wing Mapam Party, and the Movement for Peace and Security. Among the Labor Party leaders have been Abba Eban, Pinchas Sapir, Arieh Eliav, Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, and, to a lesser extent, Yigal Allon, the present Foreign Minister. Their positions have included suggestions that Israel should declare, prior to negotiations, it would be willing to return most of the territories, pronouncements against "sweeping annexationism," and a willingness to recognize a Palestinian right to self-determination (Ben Porat, 1972; Brecher, 1972, 146-149; 163-169, 285-290, 349-353; Eban, 1975).

The Rabin government has also moved somewhat away from the "pure" hard bargaining position of its predecessor. Regarding the Palestinians, for example, Foreign Minister Allon (1974) declared before the United Nations:

> Only a peace founded on respect for the interests of all the Arab states, and also for the needs of the Palestinians, and also for Israel's vital needs for defensible borders, can be genuine, stable and durable. . . .
>
> Mr. President, Israel is cognizant of the existence of the question of Palestinian identity.

5. Among our Israeli respondents, 7 were classified as annexationists, 12 as hard bargainers, and 9 as conciliatories.

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There is a fourth orientation among Israelis which I label "functional annexationism." Those who reflect this stance are not in favor of keeping the territories because of ideological or religious reasons, as is the case with many supporters of Likud and the NRP. However, they are not willing to relinquish them short of a total change in Arab attitudes–from leadership pronouncements to the public media to education in the schools. Because they do not think that the Arab world will be ready for a "real peace" in the foreseeable future, they believe that Israel should concentrate on maximizing its security and should therefore maintain the territorial status quo. Two or three of the hard bargainers verged on this position. Moshe Dayan although his statements regarding the territories vary, has on occasion made declarations which reflect such an orientation (see, for example, Dayan, 1971: 48).

Effects of the 1973 War on Arab and Israeli Conflict Orientations

What consequences has the 1973 war had for the Arab and Israeli orientations delineated here? On the Arab side, the totalist orientation continues most clearly in Iraq, Libya, and among the Palestinian "Rejection Front." Egypt appears to have been moving from latency toward open acceptance of Israel, although its position is by no means unambiguous. Though this change perhaps started with the advent of Sadat to the presidency, the Egyptian initiative in the October War and the image of victory, I believe, permitted Sadat to more openly speak about the possibility of peace and direct negotiations. This war had the effect of easing some of the psychopolitical concerns about admission of defeat and the image of surrender which helped to keep repressed the acceptance of Israel on the part of Arab, and particularly Egyptian, latents (Kaplowitz, 1975: 28-36).

On the other hand, the increased economic power of some Arab states may have made the achievement of totalist goals appear more feasible. Changed expectations could have the effect of moving latents toward totalism. Sadat Hassan (1973), PLO observer at the UN, suggests that indeed he does see the constellation of world politics as conducive to the aim of eliminating Israel. He speaks of support for the Palestinian struggle as "the collective will of the overwhelming majority of mankind." He notes the rapid increase in the number of countries which have recognized the "inalienable rights" of Palestinians, among which he includes self-

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determination in the "entire homeland." And he suggests: "New realities have emerged from the recent confrontation in the Middle East. They clearly indicate not only the present capabilities of the Arab Nation, but the potentialities of tomorrow."

The possibility of a long-run totalist position has, indeed, emerged as a major question since the 1973 war. Many Israelis ask whether the aim of even seemingly open acceptors is not one of ultimate totalism. There is particular concern regarding Egypt. While the results of the 1973 war may have psychologically and politically freed some Arabs to move toward open acceptance of Israel, nothing has occurred to change the virtually unanimous Arab opinion that no justice or legitimacy attaches to Israel. Therefore, the stimulation or reawakening of a sense that Israel can be eliminated could move latents and even overts toward totalism. The future evolution of Arab attitudes in the direction of open acceptance or totalism may depend upon developments that could begin to transform the competitive, belligerent context of the conflict into a more cooperative one versus those that could strengthen the sense that Israel can be eliminated.

On the Israeli side, the annexationist position continues among the Likud and NRP, although these parties are not monolithic in their attitudes regarding territory. A position which appears close to functional annexationism is reflected by Defense Minister Peres, who advocates a provincially autonomous West Bank with Israel retaining control of defense, finance, and foreign affairs.

The classical hard bargaining position continues to characterize an important segment of the leadership and public. This has been evidenced, most recently, by the government's great reluctance to relinquish land in Sinai without firm Egyptian quid pro quos in the form of a nonbelligerency statement, if not a peace treaty. At the same time, the orientation of the government is more one of evolving toward peace rather than demanding a variety of maximalist quid pro quos without which there can be no movement toward settlement. There is also more discussion about the necessity of solving the Palestinian problem.

THE RECIPROCAL EFFECTS OF POLITICAL STYLES AND STRATEGIES OF CONFLICT

Having portrayed the conflict orientation of Arabs and Israelis, we are now in a position to ask how they interact—what responses they elicit

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from the other side and what kinds of processes result. The reasoning in this section is based on responses to questions which attempted to evoke reactions to various hypothetical strategies and moves.[6]

That totalists have mutually reinforcing effects on opposite sides of a conflict is not surprising. Needless to say, Israeli hard bargainers are also not made more conciliatory by terrorism or declarations with overtones of totalism. In the Arab world, domestic political rivalries; the predominance of the military in Syria, Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, Egypt; and the dynamics of inter-Arab politics which render leaders who tend toward compromise vulnerable to attacks because of the humiliation and shame attendant upon acceptance of Israel—all enhance the disposition toward totalism (Kerr, 1972a, 1972b; Vatikiotis, 1972). In Israel, the Likud and the NRP, together with a portion of the Labor Alignment sympathetic to Dayan and Peres in their dispositions toward functional annexationism, comprise a political weight which the government must carefully consider as it formulates policies regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The consequences of interaction between Israeli hard bargainers and Arab overts might well be peace. As indicated, however, unambiguous acceptance of Israel has not been a politically important position in the Arab world. Even now, willingness to accept Israel on the part of the most important Arab state, Egypt, appears clouded with ambiguity to cautious, hard bargaining Israelis.

Regarding the effect of the Israeli hard bargaining orientation and deterrence-force-reprisals strategy on Arab totalism, we can infer, from the very existence of Arab latents who do not feel Israel is legitimate, that Israel has been able to convince many Arabs of its staying power. However, as long as Arab acceptance remains ambiguous, tenuous, or sub-surface, there can be no cooperative conflict resolution.

Israeli Hard Bargainers and Arab Latents

Most intriguing, therefore, are the mutual interaction effects of the Israeli hard bargainers and Arab latents. The hard bargaining stance has

6. It should be noted that we assess the cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of attitudes by verbal behavior, i.e., by the response of interviewees. The behavioral component can only be inferred, however, as we did not observe how respondents act. In addition to the kinds of attitudes we explore, there are also other variables which influence foreign policy behavior of a situational and environmental nature. In the case of the Middle East conflict, these might include superpower pressures and rewards, regional politics, armament levels, and economic incentives.

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characterized Israeli governments for many years, while Arab latents seem to have included important leaders in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even in Syria and the PLO. Therefore, the interaction of these orientations is particularly important.

The predominant Israeli style and strategy, the emphasis upon realpolitik, and the persuasiveness of this orientation among much of the leadership and public, stems from a perception of unremitting Arab hostility and a deep concern for Israel's existence. It is reinforced by the memory of holocaust in Jewish history. Israeli strategy and style are the obverse of the Arab politics of nonrecognition: while the latter seeks to withhold legitimacy, the former fall back upon the assumption that the Arab world will eventually accept what exists and what it cannot destroy. Arab nonacceptance reinforces the orientation of hard bargaining, the reliance upon force, and the reluctance to show a more conciliatory face.

Nevertheless, our data do suggest that a significant portion of Arabs latently accept Israel. The development of official Arab positions from 1972-1975 also suggests the latency that we detected. Thus, a key question is: what effects may the Israeli hard bargaining orientation and strategy of conflict have had in helping to keep repressed Arab latency?

The psychopolitical forces which have helped to keep Arab acceptance latent, and the possibly reinforcing effects of Israeli style and strategy, are illustrated by Arab responses on a variety of issues, particularly those which involve the use of force and the possibility of direct negotiations—two issues which tap sensitive areas of emotion and pride. Thus, *all* mainstream Arabs among our respondents denied that Israel, through the use of force, has been able or will be able to convince the Arab world that it is in the Middle East to stay.[7] Yet more than half suggested latent acceptance of Israel on other issues.

Psychopolitical factors are indicated by the tone and content of responses to the question on whether force can convince the Arab world of Israel's staying power. The responses in this section were all made by Muslim Arabs classified as latents. Two Egyptians, for example, declared:

> Not in a million years. . . . If they were fighting Germany or the United States, yes. But the Arabs will never acknowledge defeat. If the Israeli air force bombs Suez and wipes it off the map, the Arab press will say Israeli planes were hit.

7. As indicated, all of the overts seemed at least somewhat peripheral in their Arab identity or unusual in their contact with Israel. I use the term "mainstream Arabs" to refer to Muslim Arabs other than Tunisians, Lebanese, or West Bankers. I did not attempt to measure, by independent means, the degree of Arab identification among our respondents. Therefore, the terms "peripheral" and "mainstream" should be understood only in the sense specified.

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> They put the challenge to the Arabs. Therefore the Arabs won't likely come to a decent compromise.

Similar concerns were reflected in perceptions of Israeli reprisals. An Egyptian and Palestinian declared that the aims are: "Terrorizing; [to] get the Palestinians to give up." Conversely, some of the most important aims attributed to guerrilla warfare are the gaining of attention and recognition and the instilling of pride.[8] A Palestinian said:

> One of their aims was restoring dignity to the Palestinian people; another, unifying the Palestinian people; another aim was to prove to the whole world that there is a Palestinian problem and there is a Palestinian people existing in the Middle East.

The psychological needs and cultural processes which have helped to keep acceptance of Israel latent are most evident in attitudes toward direct negotiations. Not one mainstream Arab favored such talks. Asked about this issue, an Egyptian explained: "the Arabs will save face by not sitting." What does it mean to "save face by not sitting?" If we are to follow the lead of a compatriot, it means sparing oneself humiliation: "The character which the Arabs have is inherited from their great-great-great grandparents. Ready to be killed and not to accept something which could be considered humiliation." This respondent gives as an analogy on the interpersonal level: "a wife not accepting that her husband go out with another woman if it becomes known."

These responses suggest the self-esteem requirements, as influenced by political culture, which make difficult the acknowledgement of defeat and dispose against open recognition of Israel (see also Smith, 1957: 97-165; Berger, 1962: 135-165; Patai, 1972: 89-117; Glidden, 1972). If Arab latents have not openly or consciously accepted Israel's existence, in part because of these particular definitions of self-esteem and pride, then it is likely that the Israeli *emphasis* upon strategies of force, together with the threats and reprisals necessary to sustain such strategies, has had the effect of helping to keep latent the acceptance of Israel by an important segment of Arab leaders and elites. Yet it is that very acceptance which is a prerequisite for cooperative conflict resolution and the lack of which reinforces Israel in its hard bargaining style and strategy. Hence, the cyclical and mutually reinforcing nature of this conflict. The reciprocal

8. These are not the only aims. Mainstream Arabs divide about equally between these aims and those of a "unitary state" or "regaining Palestine."

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effects of Arab and Israeli political style and strategy are highlighted by the remarks of an Arab journalist (Sarih, 1969: 6-7):

> *The Israelis have so humiliated the Arabs militarily, and in other ways, that no self-respecting Arab can accept the added humiliation of inaction or surrender.* . . . The Israelis repeatedly issue warning to the Arabs about the dire consequences of Arab action, and the dire consequences are promptly dished out by the Israelis on a scale much greater than the original Arab act. "Israel will hit back with seven blows for each one she receives," Mrs. Meir told the Israeli Knesset on July 1, this year.
>
> This is not mere rhetoric. In the experience of the Arabs so far, Israel hits back seven fold times seven fold.
>
> *These words and actions of the Israelis sound to us Arabs superlatively arrogant, provocative, and hateful.* If Israel really wants to negotiate, this conduct will certainly not create the necessary climate [italics added].

This statement underlines the concern with humiliation and surrender; the salience of Israeli threat, force and reprisal; and the feedback effect on Arab attitudes. To mitigate this effect, the hard bargaining strategy would have to be supplemented and the emphasis shifted.

It is possible that Arab concerns with self-esteem and pride have attenuated since the October War, the successful use of the oil weapon, and the increased flow of wealth in the Arab world. National identities change, and the October War, I believe, had a relatively important effect on both Arab and Israeli self-images and perceptions of the other. However, the impact of this war remains somewhat uncertain and, as yet, not fully analyzed. Moreover, national identity changes usually involve lengthy, cumulative processes.

It could be argued that the Israeli stance of hard bargaining and use of force will have the effect of eventually compelling open acceptance of Israel—that it will transform Arab totalists and latents into overts. This assumption is frequently made by proponents of the hard bargaining approach (Brecher, 1972: 283). Prima facie, it might seem like a reasonable assumption. If a state insists on strict, clear quid pro quos, uses maximum force against terrorism and in war, and projects staying power long enough, the adversary will eventually be compelled to accept its existence. However, the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as our data on conflict orientations, suggest that this assumption is questionable. *All* of the overts among our respondents seemed peripheral in their Arab

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identity or were unusual in their contact with Israel. There were virtually no mainstream Arabs who openly, unambiguously accepted Israel. It is the peripheral identity or close contact with Israel's reality and power which allows some to openly accept the state's existence without unacceptable loss of self-esteem.

Even if there is no evidence that a hard bargaining, use of force approach can convert Arabs into open acceptors, still one could argue that it may move totalists toward at least latent acceptance. Perhaps this is so. However, even if politically influential totalists in the Arab states and among the Palestinians become latents, as long as whatever acceptance there is remains on this level—and assuming that Israel continues to want to live as a nation and cannot be totally defeated—the pattern of highly competitive, destructive conflict will continue. Thus, the possibilities for cooperative conflict resolution hinge, in part, upon the question: can the context of the dispute be changed so that latent acceptance on the part of Arabs becomes open recognition and Israeli concerns with security are eased, thereby permitting return of lands occupied in 1967?

THE POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Analysis of the mutual effects of conflict orientations can illuminate some of the complexities of international behavior and clarify blockages to cooperative conflict resolution. The psychopolitical analysis employed here also aims at facilitating such resolution. In this regard, the data suggest two broad possibilities. The first would entail the creation of a Palestinian state, or what might be a Palestinian-Jordanian state, alongside Israel. The second would involve the creation of one state from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River encompassing Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The disposition of this territory and its population comprises the major issue of the conflict.

A PALESTINIAN STATE ALONGSIDE ISRAEL

Although our Arab respondents were not enthusiastic about a Palestinian state alongside Israel, more than half the total and almost half the mainstreamers were open to it, particularly if accepted by the Palestinians:

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"would be happy; would solve the problem; better than what there is now; would be the best solution; if the Palestinians accept, o.k."

There were misgivings about the smallness of such a state and about compromising the "just rights" of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, it was seen by those who favor it as a means of enhancing Palestinian identity and self-esteem (see also Shamir, 1971). A West Banker declared:

> If it's going to be just a puppet state of some kind, I'd be against it. But if it's based on long-lasting peace in which the Palestinians can have dignity and independence in their own affairs, with other Arab countries, and some relations with Transjordan, then I'm for it.

The openness to such a state was found among our respondents at a time when the PLO resolutely rejected such a notion and termed it a "Zionist idea."

For most Israelis, relinquishing versus keeping the West Bank and Gaza Strip poses a dilemma of security versus the continuation of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. The boundary of the West Bank, at one point, falls within 12 miles of the Mediterranean adjacent to Israel's most populated areas, while the Gaza Strip juts to within 35 miles of Tel Aviv. Hence, the concern with security. If these territories were to be annexed, however, and their populations accorded full political rights, including the right to vote in Knesset elections, Israel would most likely lose its Jewish identity politically, demographically and culturally (Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1974). If they were annexed without according full rights, Israel would lose its democratic character. Willingness to undergo such transformations would require basic changes in Israeli political culture with respect to values of democracy, national self-determination for all peoples, and Israel as a Jewish state. Such changes could not occur easily, nor is there any indication that Israelis desire them.

Among Israeli respondents, the overwhelming majority of "non-annexationists" would accept a Palestinian state to the east, *if they could be assured that it would live in peace with Israel.* Some would favor such a state because of their support for the principle of self-determination and their belief that it would help to fulfill a variety of political, cultural, and psychological needs among Palestinians, thus leading to an Arab-Israeli settlement. This reasoning is most characteristic of the conciliatories (see also Simon, 1968).

The hard bargainers are less concered with "rights" and more with pragmatic considerations. One such respondent replied to a question on

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whether Israel has a right to the West Bank: "I would not put it in terms of 'right' because this is a very theoretical question—what is right and what is wrong. But I would say that Israel should not be in the West Bank because it is populated totally by Arabs." Such reasoning is not disposed toward consideration of any degree of legitimacy in Palestinian claims. Nevertheless, the Labor Alignment which predominates in the government coalition and which has been characteristically hard bargaining, does appear willing to return the West Bank or most of it to Jordan.

At the Rabat Summit Conference in November 1974, however, the Arab states accorded to the PLO authority over any part of the West Bank or Gaza Strip obtained from Israel. The prospect of a state dominated by the PLO, with its present positions and tactics, makes the security dilemma even more salient for Israelis. They are extremely wary of creating an irrendentist state with claims to all of Israel, a possibility regarding which hard bargainers are not disposed to take risks. While the PLO position has evolved regarding a West Bank-Gaza entity and is now different from that of the "Rejection Front," still it understandably appears tenuous, at best, to Israeli hard bargainers. Hence, the essential bind which characterizes Arab-Israeli relations: latent, ambiguous, or highly tenuous acceptance of Israel on the part of important and relevant Arab actors locks into and reinforces the hard bargaining, use-of-force position among Israelis, while the latter also appears to reinforce the former.

Producing Change in a Hostile Adversary

How to undo such binds is one of the most important contributions which psychopolitical analysis can make to the study and practice of international relations. In order for the Palestinian state option to materialize, one prerequisite is that the context of the dispute—the political-psychological environment—would have to change such that tenuous Arab acceptance of Israel becomes unambiguous. Deutsch (1964: 151-152) has suggested several requirements for producing change in the orientation of a hostile adversary.

> First of all, there must be some motivation to change—the gains . . . from a hostile orientation must not be so great as to outweigh the anxieties and difficulties engendered by the present situation.

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> Second, they must be made aware that the experienced anxieties and difficulties are causally connected with their competitive, hostile orientation.
>
> Third, the current environment must not provide substantial justification and support for the continued maintenance of the defensive, hostile orientation appropriate in the past: new experiences, convincingly different from their past experiences, must indicate a genuine interest in their well-being.
>
> Fourth, they must perceive that they will gain rather than suffer, have less anxiety rather than more, if they adopt a new orientation.

Consonance with social-psychological theories on attitude and behavior change: Although it is beyond the scope of this article to deal extensively with various social-psychological theories relevant to Deutsch's prescriptions, these steps are in line with, and bring together some of the implications and recommendations of, several major theories of attitudinal and behavioral change. These approaches are not mutually exclusive (Freedman, Carlsmith, and Sears, 1970: 252). Rather, there are areas of consonance, agreement, and overlapping.

The first requirement stated above—that the gains from a hostile orientation must not be so great as to outweigh the difficulties—is in line with what has been labeled stimulus-response, reinforcement, behavioristic, and learning theories of attitude and behavior change (Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969: 89-154; Deutsch and Krauss, 1965: 77-125). These approaches view behavior as a function of the balance between positive and rewarding versus negative and punishing feedbacks. They emphasize "rewards," "reinforcers," and "satisfiers" in conditioning or producing behavior (Deutsch and Krauss, 1965: 79). If the gains from a hostile orientation outweigh the difficulties, the relevant party will be reinforced in his adherence to it. Conversely, if the difficulties engendered by the hostile orientation outweigh the gains, it will become aversive, and the tendency will be to drop it or to be disposed toward change. Learning approaches tend to emphasize the provision of positive incentives and to minimize conditioning via punishment. Although the latter may inhibit undesirable responses, it can also stimulate additional hostile dispositions without permanently weakening the "habit strength," tendency, or need to make the response (Deutsch and Krauss, 1965: 83).

Deutsch's scheme is also in line with consistency theories which emphasize that attitudes and behavior change as the result of inconsistency and dissonance among beliefs, feelings, and actions (Zajonc, 1966; Elms, 1972: 220-227; McGuire, 1969: 268). These theories would recommend

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declarations and actions dissonant with hostile enemy images. They do not, however, specify which of many ways will be used to reduce imbalance when it occurs (Zimbardo and Ebbessen, 1970: 82-83; McGuire, 1966: 10-14). Some of the possibilities would not entail change from a belligerent, competitive orientation to a more cooperative, friendly one. For example, one can derogate the actor or communicator by deciding that certain changes are a ruse and that one's own cautious, belligerent guard must be kept up. One can also fail to perceive the implications of new, dissonant messages and behaviors. Thus, the attempt to introduce dissonance by providing new experiences does not guarantee change in a more cooperative direction. Its effectiveness is probably enhanced if accompanied by other strategies.

In this regard, Deutsch's requirements are consonant with functional and psychoanalytic theories which suggest that attitudes and behavior can serve a variety of needs, including protection of the ego from threats (Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner, and White, 1956). The important implication is that behavior which arouses ego-defensive hostilities should be minimized and complemented by that which least stimulates and aggravates such defensiveness. To the extent that latent but not open acceptance of Israel, or open compromise in the short-run but totalism in the long-run, are ego-defensive attitudes serving to protect against the damage to self-esteem attendant upon admitting defeat or acknowledging inability to accomplish longstanding, ideologically ingrained goals, they are particularly elicited and aggravated by threats to the ego. In this case, Israeli *emphasis* upon a strategy of deterrence, massive reprisals, and warnings constitutes such a threat. This "reality-oriented" strategy is ineffective in producing change in attitudes and behavior rooted in the dynamics of ego defense (Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969: 317).

Bem (1970: 54-69) argues that attitudes follow behavior and, therefore, one of the ways to change attitudes is to change behavior first. This is not an easy prescription to apply to international relations, where producing behavioral change in an adversary is precisely the problem. However, Deutsch's scheme does call for changing hostile orientations by providing new experiences which are possible in situations of occupation. In this respect, it is in line with Bem's particular behavioral theory.

Application to the Arab-Israeli conflict: The requirements for producing change in an adversary have, in some respects, been fulfilled regarding the Palestinians in the occupied territories. They have suffered as

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a result of the conflict. They seem to have been aware, judging from their reluctance to support the guerrillas, that military action would be unrewarding–that it would bring Israeli sanctions, restrictions, and disruptions of everyday life. About whether the guerrillas can accomplish their stated aims, our West Bank respondents said: "I think they are misinformed;" "I think it's silly;" "They cannot win themselves," "When I look at the underground in Europe . . . how they knew what they wanted–I think we have a long way to go." These attitudes are in accord with those to which Shamir (1971: 25) on the basis of surveys and day-to-day contacts refers, as he suggests that West Bankers did not appear to believe in a military victory over Israel. What they have not been provided with are the *substantially new and convincingly different* experiences which might have indicated to them, as well as to the Arab world, a genuine Israeli interest in their well-being and in the problem of the Palestinians. Since the 1967 war, Israel may have been in a position to provide some of these experiences. This is where supplementing the hard bargaining style and the emphasis upon force could be effective.

Hard bargainers have demanded extensive attitudinal and behavioral change in the Arab adversary. But their maximalist quid-pro-quo approach–together with the emphasis upon threat, force, and reprisals–has not been sufficient to provide the necessary motivation to change. While a hard bargaining approach may be useful when parties to conflict have already agreed to discuss a settlement and are in a negotiating position, it is inadequate, in and of itself, for producing change in an intensely hostile adversary. It can constitute a challenge to such behavior without providing sufficient motivation to change. When not supplemented by substantial positive inducement, it may also have the effect of helping to reinforce defensive adherence to the challenged positions (Deutsch, 1962: 103).[9] I say "helping to reinforce" rather than "producing," because such defensive adherence is also rooted in internally generated images and needs which are shaped by Arab history, culture, and politics.[10] A particular

9. The overwhelming emphasis in the international relations literature has been upon negative sanctions. One exception is Baldwin (1971), who suggests the different consequences which might ensue from positive versus negative sanctions. George and Smoke (1974), in their intensive analysis of deterrence attempts, also conclude that there is a need for research on the role of "inducements" and "promises" as part of a more general theory of inter-nation influence. They recommend the supplementation of deterrence with inducement policies for creating and guiding change in favorable directions.

10. See especially Smith (1957: 97-165); Berger (1962: 135-165); Kerr (1972a, 1972b); Vatikiotis (1972); and Kaplowitz (1975).

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strategy of conflict on the part of another nation can aggravate or mitigate the effects of such internal sources of behavior. However, it may also be that, even if Israel were able to operationalize Deutsch's recommendations for a firm but cooperative strategy, this might not be sufficient to elicit like responses and to transform the context of the conflict. Also, a cooperative response on the part of Arab latents, from whom it might be most expected, could hinge upon expectations and these are changeable. Moreover, latents have to take into account the totalist view, to which great prestige attaches and which has been the traditional Arab norm vis-a-vis Israel. This norm will perhaps be reinforced by recent UN General Assembly resolutions on Zionism. Thus, it may be that an outside actor could not provide sufficient motivation to change in a cooperative direction no matter what it did.

Nevertheless, the attitudes of our respondents suggest several policy implications in this regard. Three possible Israeli moves go further than any others in eliciting favorable responses from Arabs: (1) Israeli recognition of a Palestinian people; (2) full rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees under Israeli control; and (3) a declaration that Israel is not, in principle, opposed to a Palestinian state alongside of it but, rather, that its main concern is with security and whether any particular state would be willing to coexist in peace.

Initiatives toward full rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees go furthest in eliciting favorable responses. Our question on this issue was phrased: "How would you react if you read in the newspaper tomorrow that Israel were unilaterally acting to settle the refugees on the West Bank—building housing, establishing industries, factories, job opportunities, new towns, etc.?" Toward such a policy Arabs indicated openness:

> Very surprised . . . this would be the beginning of a change in attitudes and there is no indication of such a change.
>
> This would be a good move. It would be showing they really care about the refugees and Palestinians.

The possibilities for eliciting change through such a policy were profoundly illustrated by the reaction of an Iraqi respondent who was active in pro-Palestinian organizations and who indicated no sign of openness on any other indicator: "If Israel could conduct such a program, to be honest

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with you, if Israel could conduct such a program successfully, I think a lot of the heat would be released on both sides of the line."

About half of the more than 500,000 UN-registered refugees in the occupied territories are located on the West Bank and half in the Gaza Strip. Thus, rehabilitation would probably mean providing incentives, opportunities, and accommodations on the West Bank for some of the refugees in the crowded Gaza Strip. Some 18% of the refugee families in the latter area have already been resettled in new housing there in order to make more room in the camps for security reasons. The kind of initiatives which would fulfill the requirement of indicating genuine interest in the well-being of the others, however, would have to be such that they would not likely be interpreted solely as an attempt by Israel to improve its security. Indeed, one requirement for producing change in a hostile adversary is that the stimulus situation must be distinct from others to which competing hostile or negative responses have been learned (Deutsch and Krauss, 1965: 82). Initiatives toward rehabilitation and resettlement would clearly have to project genuine interest in the well-being of the refugees. Such moves also must not have important prior conditions attached—which would put them in the hard-bargaining, quid-pro-quo category.

Recognition of a Palestinian people would constitute a second means of helping to make manifest the latent acceptance of Israel: "Would be a break-through; I would be glad; a first step; would like it." A West Banker declared about such recognition:

> I think it would be the beginning of a new life for us, or for me in particular, because then our rights as human beings would be recognized. We would have a land, a country, something with which we could identify.

The great majority of Israeli respondents would be very much in favor of total refugee rehabilitation. An important barrier, however, is that the political future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been uncertain. If these territories were to be returned to Jordan or to a Palestinian entity, then a pragmatic, quid-pro-quo viewpoint would suggest that Israel do nothing unilaterally. As one respondent put it: "It might be throwing money away." Official Israeli policy on the refugee problem has always emphasized that it could not be solved by Israel alone. If the territories were to become part of Israel, then pragmatic reasoning would dispose the government toward doing nothing that might enhance the numbers of Arabs there.

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Until now, the principal Israeli effort regarding the refugees has been to open the labor market. This policy has provided employment for more than 50,000 Palestinians while also benefiting Israel's economy. Israel has had, until now, immediate rewards in terms of tranquility in the occupied areas and fulfillment of labor needs. At the same time, it has not risked the initiation of projects that might be rejected by the Palestinians (Peres, 1970: 274-275). A quid-pro-quo orientation precludes such policies without a concrete return in the form of a peace treaty.

Regarding the West Bank, a quid-pro-quo orientation and a concern with security dispose Israel toward dealing with Hussein. He has declared he would be willing to accept a Palestinian-Jordanian federation or even West Bank independence, if that is what the inhabitants wish. However, his claim to represent the West Bank Palestinians has been rejected by Arab states and the PLO. The latter has also found his offer of provincial autonomy unacceptable (Palestine National Council, 1974b: 225). If a settlement were to be made with Hussein alone, the situation between Israel and the Palestinians could revert to what it was prior to the 1967 war, in which case mutually satisfying resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be doubtful.

Regarding Israeli recognition of a Palestinian people, a quid-pro-quo orientation also prevails. Among our respondents, all annexationists were opposed, while most conciliatories were in favor of such recognition by Israel. The hard bargaining majority, however, took a characteristic position: most opposed recognition unless and until there is reciprocation in the form of clear Palestinian acceptance of Israel. However, even if there is latent acceptance among Palestinians, as suggested by our data, the psychological, political, and cultural forces which keep such attitudes latent preclude open recognition. Again, we observe the double-bind created by the interaction effects of the Israeli hard bargaining and Arab latent orientations.

A UNITARY STATE

Virtually all the Israeli respondents rejected the idea of a unitary Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean because it would deny them self-determination. But a significant minority of one-third did not reject this idea in principle. The refusal of annexationists in this regard is not surprising. However, several non-annexationists also found it difficult to reject the idea of one state in principle. Their most

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usual response was that this is not a sincere and not a salutary idea, given the way in which the world is organized:

> I think it's not serious and therefore not justified. [If they are honest and serious, is it a justified demand?] Theoretically yes, reality-wise no. Hypothetically, if there are no more national values, no more national feelings, if that were the case, for what would we need a Jewish state?

Most of the Israelis who say they favor one state in this area via annexation, or who suggest they could live with such a state, indicated that they assume it would remain Jewish demographically, culturally, and politically; otherwise, it would not be able to fulfill the needs for which it was created. Thus, it is doubtful that they would continue to favor annexation, despite the ideological and religious bases of the position, if their expectations did not seem to be materializing. The Israeli government has not annexed any of the occupied territories with the exception of East Jerusalem, nor has it, until now, permitted any extensive settlement on the West Bank.

Almost all mainstream Arabs are in favor of the PLO idea of a unitary Palestinian state—"a progressive, democratic and non-sectarian Palestine in which Christian, Moslem and Jew will worship, work, live peacefully and enjoy equal rights" (Fateh, 1971). Their aspirations regarding the character of this state, however, differ greatly from those of Israelis who favor one state. First of all, the new Palestine, as they conceive it, would be both uninational and Arab. It would not be a binational state, and Israelis would not be recognized as a nationality. Although our respondents indicated some difficulty with the notion that Israelis would be merged into a Palestinian identity, that is the conception they tried to articulate. Israelis would become Palestinians of the Jewish faith. These ideas are consonant with the ideology of Fateh and the PFLP (Fateh, 1971; PFLP, 1971).

The intention is also to have a state which would be demographically Arab. Immigration laws will reinforce the Arab character of the new Palestine. There will be no Law of Return for Jews. On the contrary, immigration will be restricted to Palestinians for "a transitional period" (Fateh, 1971: 20). Arabs also expect that many Jews would leave. First of all, as one respondent put it, "the foreign people—Germans, Russians, and Americans—would leave." Moreover, it was suggested that many Oriental Jews would like to return to the Arab countries. Again, these attitudes are in line with PLO doctrine (Fateh, 1971: 21).

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The majority of our Arab respondents were, not surprisingly, against the establishment of a unitary state via Israeli annexation: "Full political rights are not something you give from above." Nevertheless, a third of the mainstream Arabs would accept such a state via annexation, if the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were given full rights. Their reasoning is clear: "If I thought they meant it, then there's nothing called Israel. . . . It means Israel is not a Jewish state. It would change basically."

Thus, the conceptions of Arabs and Israelis who favor one state in the area of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip differ greatly. Therefore, despite the convergence among some Arabs and Israelis on the idea of one state, there is considerable doubt as to whether such a state would lead to cooperative conflict resolution.

OTHER POSSIBILITIES

There are other possibilities regarding the West Bank and Gaza Strip, although it is also doubtful that any of them would lead to cooperative conflict resolution. First—and this is the scenario most discussed—Israel could grant some kind of administrative or provincial autonomy to these areas. They would not be sovereign, nor would they be part of Israel in the sense that their inhabitants would have the right to participate fully in the political system, including the right to vote in national elections. In view of increasing Palestinian national consciousness, it is doubtful that such an arrangement, in and of itself, would prove even minimally satisfying over the long run.

Second, Israel could annex the territories without offering full political rights, thus creating a vassal population. Such a development would be fundamentally dissonant with Israeli political culture. Nor do any Israeli groups project ideologies which would render such a situation palatable. Menahem Begin (1971: 336), for example, head of the Likud Bloc, calls for annexation with the granting of citizenship to all who apply.

Third, the status quo could continue indefinitely with the conflict eventually obsolescing. This, however, would require fundamental changes in Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian values and feelings. Israelis would have to accept indefinitely what would amount to a de facto colony, while the Arab states and the Palestinians would have to acquiesce. Neither the history of the conflict nor present attitudes suggest such a development. Among our Arab respondents, even the most conciliatory would be unwilling to accept this scenario. Obsolescence of hostility and distrust

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over time is a possibility. However, for such attitude changes to lead to cooperative conflict resolution, there would also have to be changes in the territorial and/or political status quo–bringing us back again to the possibilities we have suggested.

Fourth, the West Bank and perhaps Gaza could revert to Jordan. In order for such a scenario to lead to cooperative conflict resolution, the Palestinian people would have to feel that they were able to achieve self-determination and an acceptable national identity within such an entity. Indeed, a West Bank-East Bank federation could become a Palestinian state, politically and symbolically. This area is already Palestinian demographically. However, the Hashemite Kingdom has proven much more resilient than many expected. In any case, it is questionable whether cooperative conflict resolution could take place regarding the Palestinian issue, as long as the state to the east of Israel were a Jordanian entity politically and symbolically, even if such a state included a returned West Bank. Such, after all, was the situation from 1948-1967. It is possible that a Palestinian-Jordanian federation could fulfill Palestinian needs for self-determination. However, Palestinian hostility toward Hussein, the PLO rejection of Hussein's plan for provincial autonomy, and the Arab states' rejection of Jordanian authority over a returned West Bank have rendered cooperative conflict resolution via this scenario less probable, at least in the near future.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have attempted to illustrate the utility of psychopolitical analysis for understanding and cooperatively resolving seemingly intractable international conflicts. The delineation of conflict orientations on both sides of a dispute facilitates analysis of their interaction effects. This may indicate how parties can get locked into conflicts as well as suggest ways out. In order to assess the possibilities for cooperative conflict resolution in such disputes, it is also useful to explore latent dispositions in addition to manifest attitudes. Where compromise seems to be rejected in principle, psychological needs and cultural patterns not evident to the casual observer may be involved. Techniques of depth-interviewing which encourage the free play of associations, thoughts, and images can help to tap these sources. Their illumination facilitates analysis of policies which might be effective in undoing binds and redirecting intractable conflict processes.

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We found two straightforward Arab orientations toward Israel–open acceptance and total rejection. We also discovered an intriguing and possibly crucial third orientation involving manifest rejection but latent acceptance. Analysis of responses indicated some of the psychopolitical needs and cultural processes that help to stimulate repression and denial of acceptance.

Among Israelis, we found orientations of totalism, hard bargaining, and conciliation. Particularly important are the locking-in and mutually reinforcing effects of the Israeli hard bargaining and Arab latent positions. The hard bargainers require unambiguous acceptance of Israel as a precondition for moving toward a settlement which would involve withdrawal from occupied territories. They also emphasize deterrence, threat, and the use of force, both in verbal behavior and in action policy, in order to enhance Israel's security and to convince the Arab world that Israel is there to stay.

The refusal of Arab latents to recognize Israel openly, however, derives from a variety of cultural patterns and requirements for self-esteem which include concerns with humiliation, admission of defeat, images of surrender, and face-to-face negotiations. These concerns are exacerbated by lack of success against a small state located in the midst of the Arab world. The repression of acceptance on the part of latents seems to be reinforced by the Israeli hard bargaining orientation and emphasis upon threat and force. Conversely, the Arab refusal to accept Israel reinforces the hard bargaining position which emphasizes caution, displays of strength, and predisposes against showing a conciliatory face.

From both Arab and Israeli data on the various issues of the conflict, we suggested a number of policies that have some potential for breaking out of this bind. These include Israeli recognition of a Palestinian people; efforts at total rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees under Israeli control; and declarations that Israel's main concern with the Arab state to the east is whether it is willing to coexist, and that Israel is not in principle opposed to a Palestinian state. Since recognition of the PLO by the Arab states as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and the invitation of PLO observers to the UN, any official Israeli declaration regarding a Palestinian state or recognition of a Palestinian people might be perceived as pertaining to the PLO. We have indicated the problematic nature of the PLO's position and pointed out that in their official statements they declare their long-run aim is totalism. The Israeli government is emphatic about not according legitimacy to the PLO under these conditions. Still, it is possible to distinguish between the accordance of legitimacy to some

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Palestinian claims—which would be entailed in statements regarding a Palestinian people and state—from recognition of the PLO or Israeli acquiescence in the setting up of a PLO state. Total rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees, the single most effective move in eliciting favorable attitudes from our Arab respondents, could clearly be directed toward these Palestinians and not toward the PLO. Such moves would not necessarily have any decisive effects at the moment of this writing and in the present context, where the PLO and the Arab states at the UN are emphasizing the illegitimacy of Israel. However, they may be potentially useful.

Attitudes toward territorial issues indicated some possibilities for convergence. One would entail the creation of a unitary state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean, which has been suggested by both Palestinian organizations and Israeli annexationists. Since Arab and Israeli aspirations regarding the character of such a state differ greatly, however, this development would hold the potential for continued conflict and instability, fulfilling neither Israeli nor Palestinian needs. A second scenario would entail the creation of a Palestinian or Palestinian-Jordanian state alongside Israel. In this regard, there is convergence between the crucial Arab latents and the Israeli hard bargainers. This would not preclude continued conflict, but it is a scenario which holds a possibility for cooperative conflict resolution.

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Noel Kaplowitz is Lecturer in the Political Science Department at the University of California, Los Angeles. He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1973, where he completed a dissertation on psychopolitical aspects of the Middle East conflict, focusing on attitudes and images of Arabs and Israelis. He is working on the integration of psychology and international relations, and on a critique of current IR theories and methods from this perspective.

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