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College of Social Sciences

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МАТЕРИАЛЫ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ

Almaty 2012

Preface and acknowledgements

It is our pleasure to welcome you to the 9th KIMEP International Research Conference (KIRC 2012) at Almaty, Kazakhstan. This year's conference theme is "Central Asia: Regionalization vs. Globalization," and more than 50 sessions and close to 300 papers in five different tracks including Business, Social Sciences, Language, Law, and Continuing Education are presented based on the conference theme. We sincerely thank to all the participants and paper presenters including external and internal faculty members and students in this conference. There are special sessions in Russian and Kazakh languages to provide papers written in these languages. Also, timely issues such as banking and financial services, taxation, and violence related issues are discussed in several parallel special sessions. In the regular sessions, various topics related to the integration and globalization issues including banking, capital market, international cooperation, business ethics, tourism, water and environmental management , geopolitics, trade, technology changes, economics, education, public policy, social and communication are discussed. Proceedings include the full paper, extended abstract and abstract submissions, which are the outcome of authors' research and writing, reviewers' constructive feedback, and subsequent responsive revisions by the authors under time constraints.

In the name of all the people directly involved in organizing KIRC 2012 and preparing the Proceeding, we would like to express our deepest gratitude to all for their joint work! In this context, special thanks to Dr. Razzaque Bhatti of Bang College of Business and his team for their review work of all submitted papers and designing the program. Also, our sincere thanks go to Drs. Kassenova and Harvey of the College of Social Sciences, Dr. Rueckert and Ms. Yessimzhanova of the Language School, Dr. Alimanov of the Law School and Ms. Gimranova of the Continuing Education Center for their hard works in promoting, organizing and programming all activities. We should give our highest appreciations to Ms. Elmira Rayeva, the Conference Coordinator, for her continuous unwavering work on all aspects of the conference, including compiling and formatting the Proceedings. Without her superior management ability, this conference would not be able to realize on time

We would also like to acknowledge that in spite of the financial crisis, K-Cell and LG Company were able to make in-kind and financial contributions to KIRC 2012, and we hope that these types of cooperation would expand throughout the business community in Almaty to help improving the quality of academic conferences such as KIRC in the future. Dr. Hajin Hwang of Bang College and Mr. Stanley of Corporate Development Center provided their time and effort for attracting the corporate contributions.

We would like to thank all the members of various committees for this conference, and especially Dr. Adams, Vice President of Academic Affairs, for arranging the main budget for various expenditures of this conference. Of course, we fully appreciate Dr. Haque who initiated all the beginning processes early from the last year and provided continuous support and help until the last moment.

Finally, our thanks to the office of the President for their support in promotion, contact with external sponsors, and internal resources.

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Legal mechanisms for management of transboundary waters

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Abstract: Transboundary water management is a condition sine qua non for viability of whole socio-economic and political systems of states'. It is not a purely technical issue, but requires an integrated approach to use of water in such areas like agriculture, natural sciences and technology. In order to synchronize all these fields in frame of sustainable water management proper international legal instruments are required.
To establish well functioning transboundary water governance in Central Asia we shall apply instruments deriving from water resources law. First of all I will need to refer to principles of law governing the management of all waters, which the legal instruments shall remain in accordance with. These basic principles are: sustainable development, integrated and conjunctive management, minimization of environmental harm, equitable and rational utilization, public participation, etc. To fulfill the legal obligation to equitable and rational utilize transboundary water resources we need to address certain mechanisms of cooperation. One of them is effective prior notification of states likely to be adversely affected by a proposed use of shared waters. Effective notification shall be conducted by use of central procedural mechanisms, which is environment impact assessment. It is a procedure for evaluating the likely impact on the environment of a proposed activity related to water management. In addition to procedural legal mechanisms of water management there are certain legal means available in case of transboundary water dispute (negotiations, joint water institutions, arbitration, etc.).
Water law facilitates creation of a proper water management strategy for every transboundary water basin. Management of transboundary waters of Central Asia requires clear and comprehensive rules, which are flexible enough to accommodate current and future challenges. Maintaining the basic legal standards for transboundary water management is the way for securing regional stability, development and mutual international cooperation.

A Global Monetary Union: Prospects and Proposition

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Abstract: The suggestion for the creation of a global financial institute and a universal currency is not a new one. We revisit this notion in light of the recent economic turmoil and discuss the implications of the establishment of such. We first illustrate that the prospect for such a currency and institution is a feasible one by testing for co-integration using nominal GDP data from a sample of economies.
Keywords: International Monetary Arrangement, Economic Integration, Common Currency, Cointegration [JEL Classification: F33, F36, E5, C5]

1. Introduction

Recent financial crisis sparked a wave of panic. But, on less wide-spread a scale than Asian financial crisis as what we are observing now. In many aspects, policy measures taken mirror those of the East Asian economies. The loans to Iceland are no different with those made to South Korea and Indonesia, while the Bank of Russia's stance to support the value of the rubble is similar to the actions of Thailand then. National central banks reducing interest rates and resulting foreign exchange depreciations from the outflow of financial capital bear an eerie semblance to the level of capital flight in 1997. A large portion for the cause of the Asian Financial Crisis was placed on currency over-valuations, current account

imbalances[1], a weak global financial system (Stiglitz, 1999), etc. IMF Staff (1998) provides a concise and accessible summary and review of the topic as a whole and we shall not delve into this here.
There are potentially many parallels apart from what we have listed that can be drawn between the present and Asia in 1997, thus with respect to the present economic turmoil, there will undoubtedly, also spawn many further studies and analyses, all with the common aim of understanding the causal factors which could have contributed to the present circumstance. Yet, one major difference now, is in the degree of 'international participation' involved. The upheaval has spread across continents with no region seemingly untouched by it. In a sense, this has possibly become a truly 'international crisis'. The IMF and World Bank will undoubtedly continue to play an instrumental part towards resolving the present economic turmoil. However, one wonders too, in the aftermath of the Asian Financial an alternative institution to the IMF, one who will act in the more conventional central bank lender of last role, but at an international level was proposed by Stanley Fischer (1999), and subsequently by ALerrick and Meltzer (2003).
However, this idea stretches even further back. Mundell (2005) gives a lucid account of the historical background. However, the present economic turbulence seems ripe to once more, consider the prospects of the formation of a financial institute which oversees and governs monetary policy globally. This, in our opinion, will potentially provide for greater economic stability and result in welfare gains for everyone across the globe. This paper seeks to address to show whether the creation of a single international monetary and financial institution is possible.

2. Literatures and Methodology

Testing for the feasibility of a common currency region varies in terms of the methodology and criterion applied. The basis for most of these tests however, stems from Robert Mundell's work. His seminal paper (Mundell, 1961) is perhaps the definitive source, spelling out the conditions and criterion to what makes financial integration feasible. This has subsequently been explored and expanded upon in a variety of regional groupings and configurations, with the criterion based on that set out for the EU rather than that spelt out in Mundell (1961). The primary reason for this is simply due to the lack of data available to carry out the required quantitative analyses (Haug, 2001).
The case for the EU as a whole was covered by Haug *et al* (2000) who studied the prospects of a successful union within the EU. Their results suggest that some EU member countries will encounter economic difficulties in the process of integration with other members over time[2]. Other similar case studies were also conducted for South-East Asia by Ng (2002), Swofford (2005, 2008) who examines the cases of North America and Asia as a whole, and Huang and Guo (2006) for East Asia. Their results tend to lend support that there is the potential for currency unions to be established in each of these regions. South Asia appears to be a somewhat ambiguous case, but Saxena (2005) concludes that even if a currency union is formed on political ideals than economic fundamentals, it can only prove to be beneficial. Tavlas (2009) also reports a less than promising result for South Africa. However, he suggests that the conclusion of a common currency in the region may actually start a dynamic process in which members do become integrated with each other over time.
However, these studies are all done 'intra-regional'. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no test done on an 'inter-regional' level, or between the various plausible monetary unions in the literature. We try to shed some light on this feasibility with our results in this section.

3. Empirics

Data and Grouping

Similar to and following the existing literature, we first form a series of groupings by geography, after which we apply a cointegration test to examine the feasibility of a global monetary union. We examine this in two levels. We first test for cointegration at the regional level, with a geographical grouping of regions, after which we perform the tests on an international basis, using a representative economy of each region.
The groupings are formed using references from the existing literature, and also the following considerations: data availability, economy size, and the history of economic stability. These ensure that we

[1] It is however, interesting to note here that Corden (2007) suggests that current account imbalances may actually not be a contributory factor to financial crises.
[2] Indeed, this was the case with Portugal. See the discussion by Blanchard (2007).

have a well-defined dataset with which to carry out our empirical testing as is[3]. Table 1, lists the various regional groupings we have formed.

Table 1: Regional Groupings and Members

Region	**Members**			
Africa	Cameroon South Africa	Egypt	Libya	Nigeria
Europe	Member States of the EU			
North America	Canada	Mexico	USA	
Latin America	Argentina Paraguay	Bolivia Uruguay	Brazil Venezuela	Chile
Middle East	Iran Oman	Iraq Saudi Arabia	Jordan UAE	Kuwait
Northeast Asia	China Republic of Korea	Hong Kong SAR		Japan
South Asia	Bangladesh	India	Pakistan	
Southeast Asia	Indonesia Thailand	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore
Oceania	Australia	New Zealand		
World	Australia Japan USA	Brazil Saudi Arabia	Germany South Africa	India Singapore

We also have a 'World' bloc, where the members comprise of the member country with the largest GDP in each bloc. This member is also taken as the 'anchor' for each group, the exception being the Southeast Asian bloc[4]. While Singapore's GDP is not the largest in this grouping, her international openness and position as a regional financial centre suggests it could be a more suitable candidate relative to other members. We use Germany as a proxy for the European bloc, for the reason that is where the ECB is located.

Where we differ however, is that we only use time series data of nominal GDP measured in US Dollars from the UN Statistics Department (UNSTAT) and spanning from 1970 to 2007, instead of other variables such as inflation and interest rates. The choice of nominal GDP rather than real GDP stems from the notion that it reflects the value creation from all economic activity and is in a sense, endogenously determined from the interaction of factors such as interest rates and inflation. Furthermore, we do not have to specifically test variables such as inflation and interest rates, variables which can be manipulated by a government seeking to enter/prevent entry into a monetary union. Thus, intuition suggests if nominal GDP converges, it is indicative of a common growth path and pattern among member countries, making the formation of a common currency possible. On this rationale, testing for cointegration using nominal GDP is sufficient to examine for convergence.

3.1. Results

We carry out cointegration tests to explore the plausibility. Therefore, the ADF test for a unit root to log of the variable to all the countries sample observations is carried out.

Table 2: Unit Root Test Results

	Country	***I(d)***	**Test With**	**Country**	***I(d)***	**Test with**
Africa	Cameroon	*I(1)*	Constant & Trend	Nigeria	*I(1)*	Constant
	Egypt	*I(1)*	Constant	South Africa	*I(1)*	Constant
	Libya	*I(1)*	Constant & Trend			
North	Canada	*I(1)*	Constant	USA	*I(0)*	Constant & Trend

[3] We can include as many countries as we wish. However, missing variables, potential outliers and other data anomalies mean we will have to treat our data, which can potentially bias any results.

[4] The choice of the largest economy as the proxy for each bloc is simply that a larger economy will plausibly exert a greater degree of influence in the region as compared to a small one by virtue of size.

America	Mexico	*I(1)*	Constant			
Latin America	Argentina	*I(1)*	Constant	Paraguay	*I(1)*	Constant & Trend
	Bolivia	*I(0)*	Constant	Uruguay	*I(1)*	Constant
	Brazil	*I(1)*	Constant	Venezuela	*I(1)*	Constant & Trend
	Chile	*I(1)*	Constant			
Middle East	Iran	*I(1)*	Constant & Trend	Oman	*I(1)*	Constant
	Iraq	*I(1)*	Constant	Saudi Arabia	*I(0)*	Constant
	Jordan	*I(0)*	Constant & Trend			
	Kuwait	*I(1)*	Constant	UAE	*I(1)*	Constant
Northeast Asia	China	*I(1)*	Constant	Hong Kong SAR	*I(1)*	Constant & Trend
	Japan	*I(1)*	Constant & Trend	Republic of Korea	*I(1)*	Constant
South Asia	Bangladesh	*I(1)*	Constant	Pakistan	*I(1)*	Constant
	India	*I(1)*	Constant			
Southeast Asia	Indonesia	*I(1)*	Constant	Singapore	*I(1)*	Constant
	Malaysia	*I(1)*	Constant	Thailand	*I(1)*	Constant
	Philippines	*I(1)*	Constant			
Oceania	Australia	*I(1)*	Constant	New Zealand	*I(1)*	Constant
World	Australia	*I(1)*	Constant	Saudi Arabia	*I(0)*	Constant
	Brazil	*I(1)*	Constant	South Africa	*I(1)*	Constant
	Germany	*I(1)*	Constant	Singapore	*I(1)*	Constant
	India	*I(1)*	Constant	USA	*I(1)*	Constant & Trend
	Japan	*I(1)*	Constant & Trend			

The results in Table 2, indicate that almost all the series are to be *I*(1), with the exceptions of Bolivia, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. On this basis, we conclude that our data is suitable to test for cointegration and apply both the Engle-Granger 2-Step method and Johansen procedure. Note that as the EU is already a functioning currency union, we do not go perform any tests on this particular bloc. Table 3 reports the results of the presence of cointegration relationship between the variables.

Our test results all reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in each of the residual series except that of Middle East, North America, Latin America and South Asia. Also, the world series for all these blocks are cointegrated. What this suggests that though statistically some blocks member countries data are not cointegrated, however the global series data support the making of formation of any regional monetary union. Multivariate Johansen procedure, i.e. the maximum number of cointegrating relationships present between the normalised dependent variable and the independent in each is $n-1$, also confirm the result [result will be provided upon request].

Table 3: Co-integration Result

Bloc	**Dependent Variable**	**Independent Variables**	**ADF Test P-Value**
Africa	South Africa	Cameroon, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria	0.06512
Middle East	Saudi Arabia	Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, UAE	0.2454
North America	USA	Canada, Mexico	0.4018
Northeast Asia	Japan	China, Hong Kong SAR, Republic of Korea	0.0166
Oceania	Australia	New Zealand	0.0008
Latin America	Brazil	Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela	0.5256
South Asia	India	Bangladesh, Pakistan	0.261
Southeast Asia	Singapore	Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand	0.0478
World	USA	Australia, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa	0.0016)

Question arises, if some of the regional integration cannot be achieved, how can a global one be attained? What is important however, is the effect of regional business cycles to the global economy. This in turn implies that even if there is no sign of convergence now, it cannot be ruled out that there will still not be any after the formation of one.
What is more important however, is as Buiter (1997) stated, political willpower will likely be the key towards the successful establishment of a monetary union, in spite of other arguments such as economic promise and welfare improving outcomes. Furthermore, as Tavlas (2009) stated, even if a region does not exhibit any prospect of integration at present, it is not possible to rule out integration *after* the establishment of the monetary union.

4. The Shape of a Global Financial Regulator


Our results show that there is the prospect and potential for the world to adopt a common international currency. Such a feat will also imply the need to establish an international centralised monetary authority to regulate and implement monetary policy. Without a central body coordinating each region's monetary flows and circulation, there is little difference as to whether there is, or not, the adoption of an international currency. Bearing in mind the role the IMF played as a lender-of-last-resort in both the Asian Financial Crisis as well as now, we feel that the IMF is a very eligible candidate for this role.
However, the IMF does not monitor monetary policies of its members, nor does it exercise exchange rate policing. These are necessary roles which a global financial regulator must perform as well, and the IMF's non-interventionist policy on these issues work against its candidacy for the position. However, it is not for us to suggest who is. Instead, our purpose in this section is to suggest an organisational structure for this international financial authority.

4.1. A Proposed Structure

The most appropriate existing organisations we can draw some inference from are that of the European Central Bank, and the Federal Reserve System.
The ECB resembles a more conventional national central bank structure, where all monetary policy authority is centralised under one roof. Furthermore, all activities pertaining to the conduct of policy are centred under one roof (in Frankfurt), with national central banks holding membership and all contributing towards the overall decision making. The Federal Reserve System on the other hand, operates via a series of branches of regional banks, each of whom gather financial information and relay it back to the Board of Governors for review and policy making purposes. Furthermore, unlike the national central banks in the Euro Zone, each of these regional Federal Reserve banks hold some discretionary power to set the discount rates relevant to each region under its jurisdiction[5]. Both organisational structures have merits which we suggest can be integrated into the new global financial authority.
Figure 1 gives a preliminary proposition to the governing structure of this new institution. What is immediately clear here is that there is a clear and defined hierarchy between the different central banks as shown in the levels between the regional and overall decision-making body.

Figure 1: Proposed Organisational Structure of the New Institution

[5] The ECB is the sole authority in determining the discount rate in the Euro Zone.



This levelling is necessary in order to prevent any individual regional bank making potentially region-specific policies which may prove detrimental to other members, i.e. 'cheating'. One other striking feature is that this seems to bear some resemblance to the Federal Reserve System.
However, unlike the Federal Reserve, we do not suggest the inclusion of private sector banks as members of this new organisation. This is done so as to preserve the institution's neutrality and minimise the prospects of private sector lobbying in decision making[6].

4.2. Roles and Governance

We now consider the roles that this new international financial regulator should take up. Fischer (1999) stressed the need for a formal international lender-of-last-resort from the chaos we saw resulting from the Asian Financial Crisis. Thus, it is obvious that this role will also be fulfilled by the new organisation. A second role would to regulate monetary flow between regions. Matsuyama *et al* (1993) have illustrated that a common currency can possibly lead to individual regions becoming worse-off as a result of insufficient liquidity. By regulating the level of currency flows between regions, it is possible to avoid such an outcome.
A third role of this institution would be to facilitate the dispersement of aid to under-developed and disaster-hit countries. While this is a role undertaken by the World Bank at present, one benefit of having it under the auspices of the new institution would be economies of scale in terms of administration and information sharing. It may also be plausible to integrate the World Bank in with the new institution, especially if it will ultimately reduce the costs of bureaucratic administration.
A potentially tricky question now, would be who ought to oversee this new financial regulator. We propose that the United Nations (UN) hold the tenure of this. The key reason for this being the UN is an essentially politically neutral entity. Of all the international organisations in existence today, the UN holds the distinction of being the largest, with equal voting and voicing rights being accorded to each member. Such a governing authority ensures that neutrality is kept to as large a degree as possible, which fits ideally with how a central bank should be.

[6] This is a feature adapted from the ECB.

5. The Future

Currency Regions as a Precursor

Robert Mundell's seminal contribution (Mundell, 1961) remains the definitive source which spells the conditions necessary for the realisation of a universal currency and the formation of an integrated global financial institute. One primary condition remains the free mobility of labour. On a global scale, it may appear far from certain that this is happening.

One observation which makes a casual onlooker notice this is not happening stems from the various legal requirements for travel[7]. At the regional level however, we already see free labour mobility within the European Union, Africa, Oceania as well as North America. The EU is an established currency union with a regional central bank, the ECB, overseeing the monetary policy of all its member states.

One immediate impediment lies simply with the heterogeneity of development between each region. As Frankel (1999) points out, existing circumstances of individual countries will be a crucial factor in determining the decision of each to join a union. Therefore, it may not be optimal in every country's individual interest to such an undertaking. Furthermore, our results appear to give mixed conclusions to the formation of regional currency arrangements.

Yet, the first step towards the formation of a global financial institute will potentially lie in first uniting each region towards the adoption of a common currency and/or the establishment of a centralised regional monetary authority. When these are established, the international financial landscape gives rise to a resemblance which is very similar to the organisation we propose. Thus, such regional formations will form the building blocks towards the subsequent establishment of an international financial regulator and governor.

An International Union is Possible

Our main conclusion thus far is simply that a unified international financial system (and currency) is not an impossibility. Taken loosely, the world as a whole is simply an enlarged version of a country with obvious benefits towards such a union.

The most telling reason for our optimism is simply that the European Central Bank has shown that it functions. Political concerns such as loss of individual authority and potential self-interest issues have thus far, not appeared to have hindered the ECB in the conduct of monetary policy across member states. This suggests that the ECB is potentially a model for use, and subsequently adapted to suit other regions; see for example, Kawai and Takagi (2005) who examine the case of Asia using the EU's formation criterion, and Miles (2006) who studies the same for Latin America. Furthermore, the EU is not the single monetary union in existence. The Federal Reserve System has been in existence for an even longer period, and it has shown itself to be more than capable of effective control across a group of large and previously historically-diverse regions.

Thus, we believe, contradicting results notwithstanding[8], there is proven ground that such an institution can, and will be, a successful successor to the present monetary system in the world today.

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[7] Such as for example, the Visa Waiver Programme implemented by the USA.

[8] It is important to state here that we are not ruling out there may be possible negative effects from the creation of such an international system. However, we believe that there is more to be gained from its establishment than without.

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Historical Effects of the Theory of Passive Money Supply

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Abstract: The theory of money supply developed more slowly than that of money demand. This was partly because events induced economists to focus not on macroeconomics but on microeconomics – and thus on the short-run effects of demand on money viewed as a commodity. Also, economists assumed that the central bank sought to maximize welfare, which blinded them to the bank's political motives in supplying money. Conversely, the absence of money-supply theory helped the bank pursue policies for political reasons.
Keywords: theory of money supply, monetary policy, Austrian economics, John Maynard Keynes.

1. Introduction

Inflation recurs in Central Asia. The annual increase in the Consumer Price Index from 2000 to 2010 averaged 10.5% for the three countries for which data are available – Kazakhstan (9%), Kyrgyzstan (8.6%), and Tajikistan (13.8%). Inflation was as high as 38.6% (in Tajikistan in 2001) (World Bank 2012).

One cause may be the temptation for political incumbents facing re-election to print money in order to increase temporary spending and jobs. In Kazakhstan, the charter of the central bank calls upon it to stabilize prices but also encourages it to accommodate government policy when this jibes with its own main objectives. Such ambiguity may permit expansionary monetary policy despite eventual inflation.

Countries may lack policies to block a political business cycle, partly because the theory of money supply is undeveloped. This paper looks at historical strictures on that theory and at their consequences for policy. As a case study of a global industry – the production of economic theory – the paper offers implications for Central Asia.

Even today, the received theory of money supply seems less mature than that of money demand. Leading texts of undergraduate macroeconomics (such as Mankiw 2010) express money demand as a function of income and the interest rate (replaced by the exchange rate for a small open economy) and then set money supply equal to demand. It's rarer to identify determinants of money supply and then equate demand to that.

2. Determinants of monetary theory: A history

The lack of theory concerning money supply may owe to the lack of interest of many economists, in the 19th and very early 20th centuries, in money and the macroeconomy. Money-supply theory roots in the controversy over whether economists should concentrate on the "real" (quantities of products and inputs, which are determined by individual decisions responding to relative prices) or on the "monetary" (partly because money may affect the real). John Maynard Keynes (1991, 32), the most influential monetary analyst of his day, attributed the historical dominance of Real Analysis to the victory, in the early 19th century, of David Ricardo over Thomas Malthus concerning whether aggregate demand precipitated economic slowdowns. Ricardo argued that effective demand cannot fall short of the amount consistent

[9] For related discussions, I thank John Dixon, Nikolai Povetkin, and participants in a KIMEP seminar.

with full employment of the national economy. The reason was that prices would keep falling, spurring demand, until all inputs were employed. Monetary Analysis gained ground in the early 20th century when analysts began using aggregates such as national income (Schumpeter 1994, 276-82). It was convenient to aggregate individual amounts in terms of a common monetary unit – and but a step from this to attributing to money real effects on those aggregates.

Until the 1920s, lassitude befell the analysis of money as it had that of economic growth – through a dwindling of related news events. "The history of economic thought reveals again and again a lag in the development of theory behind the march of events," wrote Alvin Hansen (1964, 226). Late classical and neoclassical economists ignored macroeconomics, as the Industrial Revolution called attention instead to market allocation. Money seemed just the broker of exchanges, affecting no relative values.
The analysis of money presented no challenges, since it was only a commodity, subject to the same laws of value as apples and horsecarts (Mill 2006, 506-7). Textbooks emphasized physical properties of a useful money, as if it were just a good, rather than its implications for the macroeconomy.

The belittling of money resulted from, and in, the belief that macroeconomics was merely an aggregate version of microeconomics. Money was not vital to any market (except the money market). By 1936, the opposing view -- that the macroeconomy exceeded the sum of its parts – gained converts. Keynes named his book *The* general *theory* since it avoided the fallacy of composition due to treating the macroeconomy as an aggregate.

In the microeconomic view, money demand derived from output demand: To buy a chair, the consumer must liquidate some asset (Handa 2000, 33). Total spending must equal money demand if people hold money only for spending. Thus total spending determines money supply.

Perhaps this view mistook a tautology for an explanation. The best-known monetary model – the quantity equation of exchange – was an accounting identity: Expenditures equal receipts.[10] That it always held true did not mean that it expressed anything about behavior, but some theorists treated it as if it did. In their eyes, since the equation quantified money demand, it must also explain money supply. "…In our days," Knut Wicksell (1907, 215) wrote, "demand and supply of money have become about the same thing, the demand to a large extent creating its own supply."

3. Effects on theory and policy
3.1 Effects of theory on policy
The precept of passive money supply was official policy for the central bank of the United States. "Federal Reserve notes… are issued only as a need for them develops," a Fed official told a Senate committee in 1919, "and as they become redundant in any locality they are returned to the Treasury in Washington, or to a Federal Reserve Bank for redemption [in gold]….The increased volume of Federal Reserve notes in circulation during the past three years, in so far as it is not the result of direct exchanges for gold and gold certificates which have been withdrawn from circulation, is the effect of advancing wages and prices, and not their cause…."[11] Inflation cannot harm people since it occurs only at their pleasure. "The occasion of the issue of a Federal Reserve note is determined not by the bank for itself but for the bank by the community," said a 1919 Fed report.[12]

Blithe acceptance of inflation resulted from, and led to, anemic theory. Experts in the 1920s "declare roundly that 'the issue of notes has nothing to do with their depreciation,'" wrote Edwin Cannan (1924, 54). "The majority of experts did so in every European country, belligerent and neutral alike, during the war, and in many countries they do so still. Even in Germany the late President of the Reichsbank is said to

[10] Expenditures were the product of the number of money units spent multiplied by the number of times that each unit was spent in a given time period. Receipts were factor payments, which can be viewed as the number of output bundles multiplied by the market price of each bundle (since this price equaled the average cost of producing the bundle in a competitive economy).
[11] This quotation of a member of the Federal Reserve Board is from the *Federal Reserve Bulletin,* August 1919, pages 701-702. I draw upon the excerpt in Miller (1921, 183).
[12] *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, September 1919, page 814. I draw upon the quote in Reed (1921, 64-65).

have believed it to the day of his death, when the paper mark had sunk to a billionth of the value of a gold mark."
Inflation may have stemmed from failure to understand that banks could create money by lending reserves. To Cannan (1924, 63), money-creation theory was "…all moonshine: Every practical banker knows that he is not a creator of credit or money or anything else but a person who facilitates the lending of resources by the people who have them to those who can use them." To Keynes (1950b, 50), bankers committed this fallacy of composition: Since no one bank could create money of several times more than the original amount of its reserves loaned, neither could the bank system.

As late as the 1870s, theory had failed to distinguish between a central bank and a commercial one, noted Walter Bagehot. In the absence of such theory, designers of the Bank of England hierarchy sought stability by emphasizing seniority, not merit. From among the directors came the governor -- and his deputy, who would become governor after the two-year terms for the two leaders had elapsed. The deputy was normally the oldest Bank director who had not yet served in either of the two top posts.

Lacking theory to guide them, central banks may have been passive partly because they observed a self-enforcing mechanism in commercial banking. Evidently, most banks had adopted the reserve ratio of the leading private banks in order to avoid giving the impression of careless lending. Banks had no reason to hold reserves in excess of the standard ratio, since these earned no interest (Keynes 1950b, 53-78). Thus a bank's creation of money depended on the reserve ratio adopted by other commercial banks. The central bank did not have to set this ratio.

The strongest objections to the theory of passive money came from Austrian economists, who regarded control of the money supply as the key to economic stability. If the central bank merely supplied the money demanded, it would have little reason to determine how money related to potential output. So it would take no interest in the price level. Under a global gold standard, this link was not critical to understand, since gold for purchases would flow away from high-price nations and toward cheaper environs, eventually eliminating the international difference in price levels. But in a Babel of national fiat currencies, such adjustments were less transparent. By temporarily distorting relative prices, inflation in Region A might induce misallocations that permanently damaged the economy before agents around the world could infer from the real exchange rates (rarely reported in the media) that they should sell instead to Region B.

3.2 Effects of policy on theory
One reason why non-Austrian economists failed to develop a political theory of money supply may have been their confidence in the central bank. "…We ought to be able to assume that the Central Bank will be at least as intelligent as a Member Bank and more to be relied on to act in the general interest," wrote Keynes. The Bank of England was "the conductor of the orchestra [which] sets the tempo" (Keynes 1950, 30).

Keynes may have imbibed this notion from his teacher. Alfred Marshall (2003, 136-7) had written in 1923 that while the directors of the Bank of England included "many leading business men…it has been stated publicly that, as a general rule, their stakes in the Bank itself are so much less than their stakes in the general commercial prosperity of the country, that they cannot be tempted to sacrifice public interests to those of the shareholders of the Bank….They act with that full sense of responsibility which belongs to public ministers."

In 1873, Bagehot (undated, 18-37 and 62-5) said England's banking reserve was in the hands of "amateurs" (merchants and retirees) who comprised the board of directors for the Bank of England. The nation needed a large reserve for emergencies that raised the demand for liquidity; for example, a crop failure would increase bread prices and thus the cost to a firm of sustaining its workers. But Bank directors opposed a large reserve, since its idleness would reduce the dividend on Bank stock.
Early in the 20th century, Austrian observations of new central banks, such as the Fed, suggested that a populist bent in the enabling legislation would dispose them toward creating money more easily than destroying it. To provide President Woodrow Wilson with inexpensive financing of World War I, the Fed

cut its discount rate to below the coupon rates on U.S. Treasury bonds. Commercial banks could borrow cheaply from the Fed and lend to the Treasury at a slight profit per bond (Miller 1921).

The preference of borrowers for inflation may generate a business cycle, said Hayek (1999, 146-7). Unanticipated inflation would reduce the real debt of borrowers since they could pay off the loan of expensive dollars with cheap ones. Borrowers would attempt risky projects since inflation reduced the cost of financing them. Failed projects would lead to unemployment, a fall in consumption, and to recession.

Keynes assumed that the more powerful the central bank, the better. As the Austrians saw it, policies predicated on this idea could magnify damages done via a mismanaged supply of money. In the U.S., central bankers of the Twenties rejected Marshall's argument that the interest rate could allocate money to its most valuable uses. At the Fed, historicist skeptics of monetary theory viewed the discount rate as a regulator of the money supply, with the secondary purpose of providing profit to regional Fed banks. For efficiency, the Fed should encourage commercial banks to avoid speculative loans which siphoned away money from such productive purposes as financing farm silos (Reed 1921, 74). This reasoning ignored the possibility that speculation improves the allocation of resources. And it could enable special interests to manipulate the bureaucracy.

Analysts focused on monetary theory that ostensibly could stimulate production. This may have diverted them from developing behavioral theories of money supply, although incipient models had long been at hand. In 1752, David Hume (1948, 316 and 319-21) argued that a thriving economy would attract overseas money, which the thrifty would accumulate in pools large enough for hefty loans. Capitalistic societies were thrifty, since they engendered a desire for wealth and for savings to lend out at profit. Hume's successors pursued pecuniary analysis rather than behavioral ones. Money-supply theory remained anemic until the 1970s, when sharp inflations in Western economies coincided with maturation of the economic analysis of political behavior, "public choice."

4. Conclusions

Economists long lacked a complete theory of money supply that accounted for the self-interest of the supply's managers. Consequently, it may have been hard to thwart monetary proposals that served primarily the managers' interests. The theory of money supply might have progressed had economists picked up on early glimmerings such as Bagehot's reflections on the political economy of central banks.

The lack of rigorous theory on money supply may hinder a transition economy like Kazakhstan's, since its central bank has not had enough time to accumulate institutional and legal rules strengthening its political independence.

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Global economies and regional interests

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Abstract: This article analyses the main tendencies of globalisation, its specifications and possible results on national economies.As far as globalisation implies very complex political, economic and social transformations, there is no simple connection between the scales of integration processes and general economic effects. The theoretical part of this article views the advantage of globalisation on developing economic systems as a source of foreign investments, latest technologies and managerial methods, and also identifies some possible threatson national values and local economic interests. The author also analyses the main anti-shock methods, necessary for local governments for overcoming the negative effects of globalisation.
In the practical part of the article, the author studies the politico-economic aspects of participation of Georgia and Caucasus region in the globalisation processes, the importance of regional cooperation for developing countries and provides some recommendationsapplicable to other post-soviet governments in important regions.

Key words: Globalisation, developing countries, regional cooperation, free economic zone, anti-shock mechanisms

1. Introduction.

The World's geopolitical structure is under constant modification. Monopolization of economic processes by the World's largest economies, forms new balance of economic forces and reshapes the universe, based on new principals. Globalization, one of the forms of today's economic relations, has its own ideology and economic rules, often different from countries local systems. Sometimes it is even in conflict with national economic interests. That is why, the main objective of adapting national economies with globalisation, is protecting local interests and decreasing the negative effects of global ideologies.
For this, different countries should adopt different strategies, taking into account the countries social and political situation, economic specification, national values, geopolitical situation, etc. Each county has to elaborate its own anti-shock instruments that helps the increase of advantages provided by global processes and prevents the national economy from their undesirable outcomes. Nevertheless, common interests can be highlighted in very different countries that have common soviet past. Learning on experience and creating regional co-operations, seems the most efficient solution in this case.

2. Globalisation- advantages and constraints

Globalisation breaks political barriers and creates more economic freedom. Opening the boundaries is the only possibility for developing countries to enter international markets, adopt the World's economic rules and learn how to achieve success. The influence of globalisation on this process most importantly depends on the ability of national economies to understand the integration process and manage it for its own interests. The example of developing countries that achieved success, lays on transfers of new technologies and innovation, on spillover effects of investments and on other externalities of economy. At the same time, the success also depends on governments' adequate investment policy, the environment for the

investment and absorptive capacity of the country. That is why, governments of developing countries should analyse how important it is for them to import the foreign capital; identity the means that can guarantee the positive effects from this investment and try to limit the negative impacts.
The World's largest economies can initiate some global processes that impact local social development. Naturally, these large economies define their strategies based on private objectives. That is why, governments of developing countries, should closely study and analyse them (these strategies) and only after adopt them. The main threat of globalisation is exactly the danger that countries may lose their national identity and their culture if they will turn to only a passive user of the World's wealth created by the globalisation. Small developing countries need to elaborate counter strategies as an alternative to control the complex globalisation process and to defend national values. One of these alternatives can certainly be regionalisation. Under this term, we mean creation of regional consolidationsthat serves to better defend local priorities. Another important toolis establishing necessary juridical and institutional bases inside a country and a region.
Another threat of globalisation is price instability. Modifications of the World's market structures can provoke the decrease of the price on country's export. In this case, the solution can be anti-shock methods elaborated by local governments.

3. Anti-crisis management
Undoubtedly, it is up to local governments to take the necessary actions for protecting national interests and balancing the macroeconomic situation inside a country. Most important anti-shock mechanisms against the negative effects of globalisation are establishing adequate juridical and institutional basis, having significant savings and investing in productive assets. In terms of experience, only the countries with such kind of strategy have succeeded in economic development. As the globalisation also requires increase of domestic investments, it is important to prepare suitable macroeconomic mechanisms, human resources, stable financial systems and new technologies. Monetary and fiscal policies should be based on "selective intervention" strategy as well as taxation and credit management and industrial policy. In general, these actions temporarily provoke difficult social consequences. High competence and legitimacy of the government is necessary in this case to guarantee social peace and solidarity. As it is proved, the society reacts better against shocks and crisis under the government that it trusts. This is particularly important for developing countries, whichare often characterized with social, ethnic and class oppositions. It is necessary to have clear relationship between governments and businesses, antimonopoly and corruption free environment. Last but the least, the flexibility of working resources and necessary jurisdiction for social solidarity are also to be noted as effective anti-shock mechanism.

4. Learning on experience – the case of Georgia
The geopolitical situation of Georgia is defined as being a transit corridor and a business platform. The objective of the county today isto become more attractive for international tourism and commerce. For this,developing the road infrastructure still remains the main priority. For motivating the investors and turning the economy more active, the country created free industrial zones (SEZ). The government believes that SEZ should become one of the most important elements of business-platform. The classical definition ofSEZ does not go along with small territories (mainly because of possible decrease of income in the budget). At the same time, creating free zones in Georgia is less attractive for foreign investors because of existence of other free zones in neighbouring countries and because of small size of the market and law development of industrial and infrastructural segments. That is why, investing mainly serves to speculative agreements and so called "money laundering" instead of long-term investments today in Georgia. Creating a free zone in a small port as it is in Georgia, may limit the country in realisation of its marine and thus, foreign policies.
In terms of regional cooperation, free commerce agreements with partner countries become very important. Georgia signed this kind of agreements with Turkey, post-soviet union countries,USA, GSP, EU. In order to attract famous brands and increasing the employment, the government of Georgia should offer preferential conditions to famous businesses. Examples of these conditions aresymbolic prices for buying landfor building a factory and selling the privatisation buildings with attractive prices. The government of Georgia should manage the right infrastructure to facilitate the business activities, like building the roads, providing them with the work forces, etc.
Another issue in Georgia is that the local market is practically not protected from the influence of the expansion of foreign production. In this situation it is acceptable to follow protectionist policy. The latter is

one of the most vulnerable topics of globalisation. By introducing commercial and political restrictions the high competitive foreign production canbe challengedlittle bit and local production can be stimulated this way. Another controversial topic of globalisation that we face in Georgia is mass privatisation – problem of legitimacy of giving away the state properties. The privatisation reveals dogmatic model of monetarist conception that has brought the state property to its minimum and that may bring its industrial potential to liquidation. Very aggressive monetary strategy, strict control of cash and rates also provoke complex social problems. This, of course, corresponds to liberal requirements of free economies, but limits the development of local economic resources and thus, cannot be considered as an efficient tool for the national economic development.

5. Caucasus region – lesson for post-soviet countries

The Caucasus region if one of the most actual in modern economic systems. It has always been the subject of close interest of Russia, USA, Turkey, Iran. Each of these countries has its own vision and interests concerning the integration processes in the Caucasus. Sometimes, this even explains the high level of conflicts in the region. Each country of the south Caucasus has its own role and way of development. Therefore, the versions of integration are also different: The Caucasian House, sub global models – 3+3+2 (Georgia-Azerbaijan-Armenia, Russia-Turkey-Iran, USA-EU), etc. These models are considered abstract as they still need argumentation stating each partner's personal motivation, social-economic factors and ethnic and cultural specifications. The realistic model of the integration of the Caucasus needs redefinition of its role and place in the World's political stage. The stereotypical approach to the region's politico-economic division needs to be reformulated, taking into account modern global and regional circumstances. Political tension and economic instability makes it more difficult to elaborate joint programs and work in coordination. Solving the domestic issues is the necessary precondition for activating the investments and consequently developing local economies.

Being a transit corridor in global processes gives Georgia unique function. The advantage is having exit at the black sea and a boundary with Turkey in Euro-Asian transport-communication corridor. According to North-South and East-West schemas, the idea of transport corridor goes beyond the simple problem of transportation as it includes some branches of domestic economy, like energetics, telecommunications, information systems, industry, agriculture in some cases, education, construction, environmental protection, etc.

6. Conclusions

Importing the latest technologies and innovations, adopting new managerial methods, entering the global competitive markets, clustering foreign investments generates strong sustainable effects and realises the theory of convergence. Nevertheless, these advantages should only be acceptedunder the conditions that the globalisation will also serve the progress of national economies and will be based on the priorities of national ideology in the integration process.

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Limits of Fiscal Decentralization

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Abstract: While there is a strong argument in the literature that fiscal decentralization offers benefits, there are also claims that if fiscal decentralization programs are not properly designed and implemented there could be serious drawbacks which may render fiscal decentralization counter-productive. This paper examines some of to be considered in the design and implementation of fiscal decentralization with the hope that a better understanding of its potential shortcomings will contribute to a proper application of fiscal decentralization initiatives.

Keywords: Fiscal Decentralization, inter-governmental fiscal relations, fiscal federalism, revenue sources and sub-national autonomy.

Recent advances in testing for spatial autocorrelation

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Abstract: We review several approaches to testing for spatial autocorrelation, concentrating on the most recent results. Possible pitfalls in applying the known tests are indicated. Firstly, most existing tests are asymptotic and rely on convergence in distribution of OLS, maximum likelihood or other estimators to a normal vector. Such convergence in spatial models is difficult to establish and some results in the area have not been correctly proved. Secondly, as indicated by W. Krämer and developed further by F. Martellosio, the power of a test for spatial autocorrelation may disappear as the autocorrelation parameter approaches the right end of its natural domain.
Key-Words- Spatial models, Spatial autocorrelation, Asymptotic normality, Power of tests, Cliff-Ord test

1. Introduction

Spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity are observed in fields as diverse as astronomy, geostatistics and econometrics, see (Monmonier, 1996; Upton and Fingelton, 1985; Abler et al., 1971; Banerjee et al., 2004; Benenson and Torrens, 2004; Fotheringham et al., 2000; O'Sullivan and Unwin, 2002). Correspondingly, the number of different approaches and models is bewildering. While the general ideas have been borrowed from statistics (such as linear models, least squares, maximum likelihood, method of moments, etc.) and allow for reasonable classification, the variety of models is impossible to classify, see, for instance, (Honarkhah and Caers, 2010; Anselin 1995; Fotheringham and Rogerson, 1993; Goodchild 1987; Miller 2004; Parker et al., 2003; Murgante et al., 2011). They share, perhaps, only one feature: they are complex and the estimators are of a very intricate structure. For this reason the mathematical complexities facing the researcher are formidable. In this paper, without intending to embrace the universe, we indicate several situations when theorists and practitioners should exercise caution.

2. Something to think about

Mynbaev and Ullah (2008) have given an example of a spatial matrix such that the OLS estimator for a purely autoregressive spatial model converges in distribution to a ratio of two infinite linear combinations of chi-square variables. Such a ratio, as a rule, is not a normal variable. In addition to being nonnormal, the asymptotic distribution is special in other respects. Both the numerator and denominator of the limit fraction are nontrivial random variables, unlike many other econometric problems where the numerator is nontrivial and the denominator is constant. The mean of the fraction in general is not zero. This is the true reason of inconsistency previously mentioned in several other sources. No scaling by the square root of the sample size or any other nontrivial normalizer is necessary to achieve convergence in distribution. The limit distribution does not depend on the second moments of the innovations. Moreover, Mynbaev and

Ullah have shown that assumptions used by several other researchers while deriving asymptotic statements are not satisfied for their example. Mynbaev (2010) obtained similar results for the OLS estimator in case of a more complex model (mixed regressive, spatial autoregressive model).
On a different note, (Krämer, 2005) and (Martellosio, 2010) have discovered that the power of a test for spatial autocorrelation may go to zero when the autocorrelation parameter approaches the right end of its natural domain.
The spatial models considered in the four papers just mentioned are not the most complex. Then what one may expect when the model is structurally less tractable?

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Community as an Innovative Resource in Europe

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Abstract
The local community level is an innovative resource for health behaviour and health prevention. The local situation in six European communities, existing networks, resources and needs of households (esp. elderly, migrants, families with children) were analysed. On this basis specific health intervention in the communities were offered, network started or continued. The results show best practices for community-related offers for health and network. A guideline Community Health Management, a website and specific materials were developed for stakeholders of adult education, community members, researchers and others.

Key-Words: community, resource, health behaviour

1. Introduction
CHANCE - Community Health Management to Enhance Behaviour - is an European project in EU-Lifelong-Learning-Programme GRUNDTVIG from 12/2007 – 11/2009. Project was based on the preliminary assumption that a community's structure determines health information and perception of health information.
Aims of the project
- to compare different European health information systems of the participating countries
- to analyse the communities´ structure
- to analyse health knowledge and perception of health messages, resources and needs of households esp. elderly, migrants and families with children
- to initiate local networks.
- to implement specific community-related offers.
- to develop guidelines for Community Health Management.

2. Methods/Materials

- analysis of national health information systems
- qualitative research: examination of local communities´ structure through local inspection/photos as local network through about 120 interviews and 20 group interviews
- quantitative research: questionnaires (~1.200) for resources of households, perception of health information and specific needs (salutogenesis as basis)
- initiation of local networks and specific community-related offers
- development of guidelines and website with podcasts for stakeholder (adult education, community members) as specific materials (e.g. CDs, calendar, other specific educational and information materials)

3. Results

- Health information systems differ in the six participating countries from simple to high complexity.
- Local network and the inspection of the local community were necessary for specific local-oriented interventions.
- The initiation of local networks needs time.
- The perception of health information was influenced by the complexity of health systems, community, migrational background, age, and gender.
- Mass media play an important role in all participating countries, the influence of physicians differs.
- Needs oriented projects on local and neighbourhood level reach disadvantaged social groups much better than wide-ranging intervention.
- Interdisciplinary exchange and communication was very important for the development of the several instruments for dissemination (www.community-health.eu)

4. Conclusion

Health information must be short, easy to understand, Europe-wide, published over mass media e.g. television, press, internet

Integration of local structure, milieus and social networks in interventions on health information – prevention for behaviour and living condition

Support especially for disadvantaged groups from science-based, but manageable interventions for nutrition, motion and recreation in lifelong learning processes

More interdisciplinary and local oriented teamwork for health prevention

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Business and Society on CSR in Kazakhstan

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Abstract: This paper presents preliminary results of a survey on CSR status in Kazakhstan. The study is descriptive in nature and covers the issues related to CSR perceptions and expectations, driving forces and objectives in CSR activities, the major barriers hindering the development of CSR, relationships with and attitudes towards the major stakeholders in CSR activities. The questionnaires are disseminated among business companies, trade unions and NGOs. The similarities and differences in their attitudes towards CSR are emphasized. The findings of this empirical research may be useful to researchers who work in the CSR field. For managers, the study can provide some guidance in their CSR strategic planning. For policy-makers, it helps to understand better the current status of CSR in the country and work out more effective public policies and instruments in fostering social partnership among major stakeholders. The study may also be useful to NGO leaders to enhance mutual cooperation with the business sector and trade unions in CSR promotion.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility, survey, NGOs, trade unions, management.

1. Introduction

Although publications on corporate social responsibility themes are abundant, most of them are put in European and American context. There is little research on social responsibility of business in Asian countries (Tan and Komaran 2006) and, in particular, in Kazakhstan. There is also a lack of empirical studies on the perception and understanding of CSR by NGOs and trade unions. The concept of CSR is not a universal idea and it differs in different contexts which are determined by the economic, social and political environment in which business operates (Williams and Zinkin 2005): business and society understanding and attitudes towards CSR are different in different countries and regions. It is recognized that CSR principles and practices depend on the social, political, religious and cultural context of the country and "one-size-fits-all" approach is not applicable here (Carriga and Mele 2004, Carrol 1979, 1991, 1999, Crane and Matten 2007, Palazzo and Scherer 2008, Sriramesh, Ng, Ting and Wanyin 2007).

The purpose of this study is to describe the first results of an on-going research, aimed at investigating the approaches to CSR by different stakeholders: business companies, NGOs and trade unions and at understanding of similarities and differences in their CSR perceptions and expectations, driving forces and objectives in CSR activities, the major barriers hindering the development of CSR and relationships with and attitudes towards the major stakeholders in CSR activities. It is believed that understanding of the similarities and differences in CSR approach by major stakeholders will facilitate effective social partnership in the CSR development in the country and the findings of the study may serve as a general guide for different stakeholders, such as CSR managers and decision makers in private and public sector companies as well as civil society groups.

2. Methodology

Several specific purposive sampling techniques are used in this research: maximum variation sampling implying a wide range of selected cases, opportunistic sampling when cases are selected as the opportunity arises and mixed purposeful sampling when the sampling strategies are mixed in order to meet the needs of the study. Purposive sampling is combined with a number of techniques in data gathering, such as random, purposive and snowball sampling (Godambe 1982, Tongco 2007). The assumption is that the survey responses are completed by persons who are knowledgeable about company policies and procedures.

A survey was conducted from July till the mid-December in 2011. Respondents were approached with an extended self-administered questionnaire and when necessary an instructed assistant helped them to fill it out. Altogether 174 usable questionnaires are collected including 122 business 122 companies, 32 NGOs and 19 trade unions. The business firms included in the sample are of different a) size: large with 250 and more employees (32%), medium – from 50 to 249 employees (19.7%), small – from 10 to 49 employees (28.7%) and micro – from 1 to 9 employees (19.7%); b) ownership: private (domestic) - 50%, public - 13.5%, public-private (domestic) - 4.9%, private (foreign) - 23.8% and joint venture - 7.4%; c) sectors of economy: Agriculture, hunting and timber industry (1%), Industry (20%), Production and distribution of power, gas and water (3%), Construction (6%), Trade; repair of cars and home facilities (16%), Transport& communication (8%), Tourism (6%), Financial activities (16%), Real estate business, rent and service provision to enterprises (2%), Education (7%), Public health & social services (5%), Municipal, social & individual services (2%) and Other (7%). Respondents are top and middle managers and rank-and-file employees: 21.3%, 42.6% and 36.1% from business companies; 50%, 31% and 19% from NGOs and 21%, 47.4% and 31.6% from trade unions, correspondingly.

For comparative purposes the content of the questionnaires is essentially the same with only slight modifications adapted to different stakeholders. Two types of questions are used: close-ended questions inviting respondents a) to select all or up to three items that apply to them, and b) to rate five most important issues on a 5-point scale with 1 [most important] to 5 [less important, but more important than the rest]. Data analysis is conducted at an aggregate level and uses descriptive methods such as frequency tables, cross-tabulation, correlations, percentages and mean values. The mean rates for selected answers are ranked in ascending order and the percentages of respondents selecting the same answers are ranked in descending order to find the overall ranks for each answer. Rank order correlations among overall ranks by different stakeholders are calculated. These correlations measure the possible (mis)match between business and society attitudes towards corporate social responsibility. To measure respondents' assessment of Kazakhstani companies' CSR performance level the 7-point Likert scale is used.

3. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework is based on Carroll's model (1979, 1991, 1999). The meaning of corporate social responsibility as defined in the law "On Private Entrepreneurship" states that: "Corporate social responsibility is a voluntary contribution of private entrepreneurship entities into development of society in social, economic and ecological fields" (Law 2010). In compliance with this definition and CSR practices in the country six categories of business responsibilities are considered in this study. The respondents' answers are classified according to the adapted Carroll's pyramid of CSR (Carrol 1991) and dimensions suggested by other authors (Rego, Leal, Cunha, Faria and Pinho 2010) alongside with additional categories of social responsibility important for attaining objectives of this paper. The categories are as follows: legal/ethical responsibilities, responsibilities towards employees, philanthropic responsibilities/responsibilities towards society and community, economic responsibilities, environmental responsibilities and stakeholder responsibilities (Baisakalova 2012).

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 CSR Perceptions and Expectations

From Table1 it can be seen that answering the question "How do you define CSR?" most of business respondents prioritize responsibilities towards employees, followed by responsibilities towards society and legal responsibilities. NGOs and trade unions put in the first place voluntary contribution of business to the development of society in social, economic and ecologic fields directly related with the main activities of the company and in the second place - implementation of social programs/provision of social packages to employees. Correlation between rankings of NGOs and trade unions is moderate and insignificant, while there is no correlation among business and society groups' rankings.

Table 1. Defining CSR

Business	Trade unions	NGOs
Improving labor conditions, health and safety	Voluntary contribution of business to the development of society in social, economic and ecologic fields directly related with the main activities of the company	Voluntary contribution of business to the development of society in social, economic and ecologic fields directly related with the main activities of the company
Taking proper account of the broader interests of society when making business decisions	Implementation of social programs/provision of social packages to employees	Implementation of social programs/provision of social packages to employees
Implementation of social programs/provision of social packages to employees	Improving labor conditions, health and safety	Taking proper account of the broader interests of society when making business decisions

Answering the question "Which of the following statements do you agree with?' business respondents emphasize the voluntary nature of CSR, express economic concerns and demonstrate their understanding of responsibilities towards society (Table 2). There is a) moderate significant correlation between responses of trade unions and business and between trade unions and NGOs and b) low insignificant correlation between business and NGOs.

Table 2. CSR perception

Business	Trade unions	NGOs
Business involvement in social programs is voluntary, not mandatory	Business should not only pay wages and taxes but also be involved in social programs of the country and regions (health, education, poverty, etc.)	Business should not only pay wages and taxes but also be involved in social programs of the country and regions (health, education, poverty, etc.)
Business should provide adequate wages to employees, pay taxes and create new jobs, while the state should solve social problems	Entrepreneurs should broadly inform society about their involvement in social programs and create their positive image	Entrepreneurs should broadly inform society about their involvement in social programs and create their positive image

Social obligations have only big companies with rather high revenues while small companies with low revenues need help themselves	Business should provide adequate wages to employees, pay taxes and create new jobs, while the state should solve social problems	All private companies and entrepreneurs should be socially responsible independently of their profit levels

Business considers provision of additional social security to and training of own employees alongside with environment protection closely followed by philanthropic responsibilities as the most important (Table 3). There is high correlation between overall ranks of selected answers by business and trade unions and business and NGOs (significant at 0.01) and weak insignificant correlation between trade unions and NGOs.

Table 3. The role of business in alleviating social problems

Business	Trade unions	NGOs
Environment protection	Provision of financial and material support to socially vulnerable groups such as the poor, refugees, orphans, invalids, needy old people	Business support to social initiatives of community and civil society
Provision of additional social security to own employees	Creating new jobs	Environment protection
Education, (re)training of employees	Environment protection	Fighting against «social ills»

Around half of business respondents rate Kazakhstani companies' CSR performance as "quite poor" or "poor" and the other half rate it as "satisfactory" and at higher levels. Overall weighted mean of business respondents' assessment of business social performance is close to "satisfactory": 2.9 in the 7-point Likert scale. FPRK and NGOs assessments are about 3.3 and 2.7, respectively.

4.2 Driving Forces in CSR Activities

Business firms as well as trade unions select "Attract and retain potential and existing professional and qualified employees" as the most important driving force in applying CSR, NGOs put it in the second place (Table 4) which reflects the shortage of such personnel in the labor market today. Competitive pressure is ranked as the second most important factor by business. There is an understanding among major stakeholders that CSR activities are beneficial in the long term. NGOs emphasize external aspects of CSR. Environmental concerns relating to products or service as CSR driving forces are put by trade unions at the bottom of the ranking list while by NGOs and business they are on the 17th and 12th positions (out of 20).

Table 4. Driving forces in applying CSR

Business	Trade unions	NGOs
Attract and retain potential and existing professional and qualified employees	Attract and retain potential and existing professional and qualified employees	Draw attention of mass media
Competitive pressure	Attraction of new investors or customers	Attract and retain potential and existing professional and qualified employees
Beneficial in the long term	Beneficial in the long term	A better brand and reputation

There is moderate correlation among percentages of business firms and NGOs (0.6) and business firms and trade unions (0.63) in selecting similar answers; however, they are different in prioritizing the significance of selected answers. The correlation between overall ranks of business and society is weak and insignificant while for trade unions and NGOs it is moderate and significant at 0.05.

4.3 Objectives in CSR Activities

Business firms and trade unions consider corruption as the most important issue for the future success of business; NGOs put it as the second most important issue (Table 5).

Table 5. Socio-economic issues important for the future success of business

Business	Trade unions	NGOs
Corruption	Corruption	Wages and retirement benefits
Workplace conditions, labor safety	Wages and retirement benefits	Corruption
Job losses	Human-rights standards	Human-rights standards

There is high correlation between business and trade unions and trade unions and NGOs overall ranks of socio-economic issues important for the future success of business (significant at 0.01). The correlation between responses of business companies and NGOs is moderate and significant at 0.10. Business and society share a common understanding of the socio-economic conditions in the country.

Table 6 shows the list of CSR prioritized objectives: most of them emphasize internal responsibilities towards employees. Business companies also show their commitment to philanthropy and sponsorship in compliance with NGOs opinion. However, correlation among the overall ranks of 15 answers to this question about the most important CSR objectives is not significant.

Table 6. The most important objectives of CSR activities

Business	Trade unions	NGOs
Paying adequate high wages	Paying adequate high wages	Philanthropy and sponsorship
Improving labor productivity	Decreasing the number of consumer complaints	Elimination of discrimination of Kazakhstani employees (decreasing the share of foreign employees and gap in pay to Kazakhstani and foreign employees)
Philanthropy and sponsorship	Education, re/training of own employees	Paying adequate high wages

The social focus of business companies in CSR activities is dominated by internal social responsibilities towards employees, while NGOs are concerned about their external responsibilities (Table 7). There is no significant correlation among preferences of business and society groups.

Table 7. The social focus of CSR activities by major stakeholders

Business	Trade unions	NGOs
Employee satisfaction and motivation	Management of stakeholder engagement	Communication & reporting of social performance
Management of training and qualification efforts	Management of training and qualification efforts	Management of community engagement
Management of charity	Employee satisfaction and motivation	Management of charity

4.4 The Major Barriers Hindering the Development of CSR

Respondents from business indicate that the lack of a) financial resources (50.8 percent), b) incentives from the government (49.2 percent) and c) relevant knowledge and skills (45.9 percent) are the most important barriers hindering the development of CSR in business companies. Lack of funds and lack of incentives from the government can be considered as interrelated: business wants tax incentives for CSR activities. Other factors are related to the lack of attention from mass media (37.7 percent) and difficulties in assessment of effectiveness of implemented social programs (29.5 percent). There is high correlation of overall ranks between trade unions and NGOs (significant at 0.05) and no correlation between business and society groups. Both trade unions and NGOs put the lack of incentives from the government and the lack of relevant knowledge and skills first. The lack of financial resources and difficulties in assessment of effectiveness of implemented social programs are mentioned as the third major barrier by trade unions and NGOs, respectively.

4.5 Relationships with the Major Stakeholders in CSR Activities

Business companies want to address through their CSR initiatives customers, competitors and trade unions in the first place while NGOs are the last in this ranking list of 14 stakeholders (Table 8). Trade unions and NGOs responses demonstrate moderate correlation (significant at 0.05), there is no significant correlation between business and society groups.

Table 8. CSR stakeholders to address through CSR initiatives

Business	Trade unions	NGOs
Customers	Trade unions	Local communities
Competitors	Customers	Customers
Trade unions	Employees	Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Employees	Local government	Local government
Shareholders	Local communities	Employees

International organizations, local and central governments, followed by NGOs are considered to be the most helpful partners in the development of social programs (Table 9). There is no significant correlation among the overall ranks of responses of all respondent groups.

Table 9. Partners in the development of social programs

Business	Trade unions	NGOs
International organizations	Trade unions	NGOs
Local government	Local government	Local government
Central government	Central government	International organizations
NGOs	NGOs	Local community
Local community	International organizations	Trade unions

To inform stakeholders about CSR activities business companies use websites (37.7 percent), internal documents only (32 percent), printed materials such as brochures, magazines, leaflets, etc. (27.9 percent), mass media (27 percent) and companies' social reports (18.9 percent) are used. There is no significant correlation among respondents' overall ranks.

Table10. Preferable means for informing stakeholders about CSR activities

Business	Trade unions	NGOs
Website	Website	Mass media
Internal documents only	Printed materials (brochures, magazines, etc.)	Website
Printed materials (brochures, magazines, etc.)	Mass media	Company's social report
Mass media	Internal documents only	Printed materials (brochures, magazines, etc.)
Company's social report	Company's social report	Internal documents only

5. Conclusion

The adapted Carroll's pyramid of CSR (Carrol 1991, Rego, Leal, Cunha, Faria and Pinho 2010, Baisakalova 2012) is used for the comparative analysis of responses to the questions discussed in Section 4 based on aggregated data. Business, trade unions and NGOs put six components of social responsibility - legal/ethical responsibilities, responsibilities towards employees, philanthropic responsibilities/responsibilities towards society and community, economic responsibilities, environmental responsibilities and stakeholder responsibilities in the different order. Business put environmental responsibilities first followed by legal/ethical responsibilities and responsibilities towards employees. Legal/ethical responsibilities followed by responsibilities toward employees and environmental responsibilities are put at the bottom layers by trade unions and NGOs, respectively. Ordered overall weighted ranks of economic responsibilities, stakeholder responsibilities and philanthropic responsibilities/ responsibilities towards society and community correspond to the top layers of the pyramid in the same

succession for business and society groups. Similarities and differences in some aspects of CSR approach are shown in Table 11.

Table 11. Overall rank correlations

	Business – trade unions	Business - NGOs	Trade unions - NGOs
Defining CSR	Low insignificant correlation	Low insignificant correlation -	*Moderate insignificant correlation*
CSR perception	*Moderate significant correlation*	Low insignificant correlation	*Moderate significant correlation*
The role of business in alleviating social problems	*High significant correlation*	*High significant correlation*	Low insignificant correlation
Socio-economic issues important for the future success of business	*High significant correlation*	*Moderate significant correlation*	*High significant correlation*
The major barriers hindering the development of CSR	Low insignificant correlation	Low insignificant correlation	*High significant correlation*
CSR stakeholders to address through CSR initiatives	Low insignificant correlation	Low insignificant correlation	*Moderate significant correlation*

The preferences of respondents from business and society groups in defining the most important objectives of CSR activities (Table 6), the social focus of CSR activities (Table 7), partners in the development of social programs (table 9) and preferable means for informing stakeholders about CSR activities (Table 10) are different and demonstrate no significant correlation.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the preliminary findings of this exploratory study are based on aggregated data. Future data analysis by type of ownership, size of company and respondent position will give a deeper insight into the CSR phenomenon in the country.

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Issues of NGO development in Kazakhstan

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Abstract: This article aims to explore and evaluate important issues involved in NGO development in Kazakhstan. The paper gives an overview of the concept of NGOs, history of NGOs in Kazakhstan. The article presents legal basis for NGO development. It focuses on links between NGOs and governmental organizations. The paper presents approaches to management of NGOs and factors influencing management of NGOs.Since there is relatively little information about NGOs' activities in Kazakhstan, the paper helps to understand this area of scientific inquiry.
Keywords: Non-governmental organizations, Civil society, Managing Non-governmental organizations.

1. Introduction

The development of the non-governmental organizations in Kazakhstan has increased dramatically since the mid-1990s.

According to the Ministry of Culture and Information, there are 29,262 active noncommercial organizations in Kazakhstan, including public associations, foundations, associations, religious groups, cooperatives, chambers of notaries, and lawyers. Out of these, 7,307 are public associations, the most common legal form of NGO. (USAID, 2010).

For achieving success NGOs need to provide quality services for their beneficiaries. In this regard management of an organization is of great importance. Managing of NGO has been essential for enhancing its effectiveness and productivity.

Non-governmental organizations aim to establish public institutions capable to develop the civil society, to meet the social needs of population. They reflect the concerns of major social groups in terms of economic, social, and civil rights. Development of NGOs requires favourable environment: a proper legislative basis and links with governmental organisations, donors, and business institutions. In Kazakhstan the NGOs act in various areas including health care, law-enforcement, consumer rights, environment, assistance to the disabled.

2. Factors Influencing Management of NGOs

Clear Mission, Strategy

Development of a mission statement that articulates the broad purpose of the organization is important to the sustainability of NGOs. A well-defined mission statement can help guide the organization and its board of directors in making critical decisions about planning and resource allocation.

Drucker (1990) points out that the first thing to talk about is what missions work and what missions don't work, and how to define the mission. The ultimate test is the right action.

In order to undertake correct actions Fowler (1997) identifies a three-stage process: 1) re-examining and confirming what the NGO stands for; 2) linking these values to long-term choices (through appropriate strategic plans); and 3) translating choices to tangible actions and tasks to be carried out by staff and stakeholders. Undertaking these steps will help to achieve organizational effectiveness.

Many active NGOs in Kazakhstan conduct strategic planning, have well-defined missions. The majority of second generation NGOs has a clear mission and strategic plans. In reality these are not always followed. Very often, NGOs are led toward areas where funding is available Some NGOs that were created recently,

do not make efforts to develop their capacity for strategic planning. (USAID. NGO Sustainability Index 2007).

Human Resource Management

Developing a strong human resources policy and implementing it in practice is necessary for NGOs. Despite the fact that Kazkhstani NGOs increased in the overall sustainability score in 2007, they have some weaknesses: underdeveloped organizational systems in the areas of human resources, performance management, and financial management. (USAID. NGO Sustainability Index 2007).

NGO representatives indicated that the quality and professionalism of services has improved. NGOs offer services including expert analysis, education, health, training, environmental protection, monitoring and evaluation, and others. Organizations offer training courses in teambuilding, strategic planning, and other areas. These training programs have become popular among the business community and government officials, and participants generally pay for the courses. NGOs, on the other hand, are unable to pay for training and, due to the decrease in funding, few training programs are being offered to the NGO sector. (USAID. NGO Sustainability Index 2005). A large group of domestic trainers can provide training in NGO management areas. However, these training courses are not always available due to a shortage of funding. According to Adams and Garbutt (2008), NGOs in Central Asia do not have experience and exposure to a variety of approaches to assist them in adapting ideas to their local context. NGO personnel involved in service delivery often perceive themselves as providing services to recipients, they decide upon NGO activities according to their own understanding of needs. Overall, few NGOs are able to clearly conceptualise their work, few have set goals or indicators for assessing progress and impact (Adams & Garbutt 2008).

In these conditions organization of training programs focusing on replication of the best management practices is of great importance.

Financial Management

Financial sustainability is one of the big challenges facing NGOs in Kazakhstan. Regional sources of NGO funding from local and national agencies, private organizations and public donations have not yet developed.

The main reasons for finding strategies for long-term survival are: decreased donor funding available to NGOs, decreased allocations for the Central Asian region, focus of donors on new markets (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan), decreased amounts for social programs (Alymkulova A., Seipulnik D. 2005).

The level of state financing has increased from 317.7 million tenge ($2.7 million) in 2006 to 1,231 million tenge ($9.47 million) in 2009. (USAID. NGO Sustainability Index 2010). But NGO financial management systems are still weak, mainly due to a lack of transparency. Even leading NGOs do not provide such information on their websites. (USAID. NGO Sustainability Index 2007).

Internal Management Structure

Mature NGOs with good links with target groups, constituencies tend to have developed internal management structures. Having a good and effective NGO board provides a basis for successful management of its organization; helps in better understanding the organizational structure of the NGO, assists in distributing responsibilities among the team members within the NGO organization.

According to research focused on leading NGOs in Almaty and conducted by the Institute for Development and Cooperation, 78 percent of respondents think NGOs need to have a board of directors, but only 31 percent have established such boards. Mostly NGOs create boards of directors to meet the requirements of international donors. Creation of these structures is of great importance, as they are needed to promote transparency. (USAID. NGO Sustainability Index 2007). Due to decrease of foreign donors' presence in Kazakhstan, NGOs do not have the stimulus to develop their organizational structures or implement strategic planning.

3. Conclusion

Last years have been marked by the active growth and development of NGOs. The paper presents the evolution of NGOs, positive and negative factors influencing NGO sector development.

Legal basis for NGO sector development is gradually developing. However, existing legislation needs to be improved to allow civil society to play a more active role in social and political processes.

NGOs are recognized as an important partner by the Government. Initiation of the Civil Forums is a serious attempt by government and nongovernmental organizations to become social partners.

Main problems of NGO sector are caused by the underdeveloped legislative basis, underestimation of NGOs by governmental bodies, financial dependence; deficiencies in internal management structure, human resource management, lack of support by population, and lack of the joint informational space. Regardless of the existing problems the NGOs are making progress, participate in discussions of laws and provide real support to the citizens. To increase the efficiency of NGOs it is necessary to consolidate their activities, to work out a distinct strategy, to analyse their capabilities in providing sustainable development, to develop training centres, to provide consulting services for the NGOs, and coordinate the activities of NGOs.

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Leadership Roles in Kazakhstan Universities: Organizational Development Perspective

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Abstract: The study explores what leadership roles are relevant to Universities' organizational development in Kazakhstan.

Leadership roles are defined as relatively fixed patterns of skills and behaviors needed of individuals to create impact (Wickham and Parker, 2007; Biddle, 1986). The study adopts contextual perspective on leadership, meaning that leadership roles can only be understood as emerged from constrains and opportunities of particular context. The study explores perceptions of universities top administrators related to the types of constrains and opportunities administrators experience in their leadership roles; and what they do to enact their idea of University development. Based on the interpretation of data received from the interviews with three University leaders, the model of leadership roles that are needed to drive Universities development in Kazakhstan is designed.

Key words: *Leadership Roles, Leadership in Kazakhstan, Organizational Development, Educational Leadership*

1. Introduction

Educational leadership is a hot issue in Kazakhstan today. President Nazarbayev has called for a more competitive educational system capable of providing rigorous world-class education. In accordance with strategic development plans 'Education 2020' and 'Kazakhstan-2030', Universities have been intensively transforming. Reform objectives are set to providing competitive education comparable to international standards, reforming of university financial management and capital structures, integration of technologies and innovation into educational process, reformation of human resource management, better servicing of customer needs, and many others. Apparently, University leaders find themselves amidst turbulent and highly uncertain environment, challenged by short finance, intense competition and multiple demands from internal and external stakeholders. The relevant questions are: how University administrators in Kazakhstan experience changing nature of Universities? what kind of leadership is expected in the new environment? and what they consider as right things to do?

2. Research Question

The main research question has been stated as follows:

- What leadership roles are relevant to Universities development in Kazakhstan?

In order to clarify main research question following sub-questions are addressed:

- How do University administrators define leadership?
- How do University administrators define University development?
- How do University administrators experience demands, constraints, choices and opportunities in their leadership roles?

3. Methodology

As the main purpose of the study is to understand the nature of University leadership in depth, the study adopts exploratory qualitative approach. The study is undertaken from the social constructivist, interpretive approach (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Therefore, the study had taken implicit assumption that the most straightforward way to understand university leadership is to explore leadership behaviors, choices and contributions as these are experienced by those who are directly in charge of leadership exercise in Universities. It was decided to interview University administrators in formal leadership roles as they have more influence and resources to create leadership impact. Three Universities administrators have been sampled to answer semi-structured interviews. It is considered that for the exploratory purposes small opportunistic sample can be used. However to control for the specific organizational effects it was decided to ask administrators leading in western style universities as they are considered to form benchmark of leadership practices in the country. After which, collected data is analyzed with the purpose of identifying emergent leadership themes, which are then critically evaluated against the theories and models discussed in the existing literature.

4. Research Findings

In modern literature, school (university) development often relates to following types of leadership: instructional leadership (Burch and Spillane, 2003; Spillane et al, 2003); distributed leadership (Bennet et al, 2003; Gronn, 2003); visionary leadership (Sergiovanni,1994; Starratt,1995); data-driven / innovative leadership (Mc Lean, 1995); value-based/ethical leadership (Beck and Murphy, 1994), and transformational leadership (Leithwood, 1992). It was identified that for development of Kazakhstan Universities' instructional, innovative leadership, value-based and distributed leadership are most relevant themes, whereas visionary and transformational leadership are highlighted as important for limited range of leadership objectives. The findings also suggest relevance of leadership development programs in Kazakhstan Universities.

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Turkmenistan: Isolation amid Globalization

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Abstract: This paper aims to examine the degree and extent to which Turkmenistan, at the beginning of the 21st century, can be cosidered isolated. In describing Turkmenistan, most popular press accounts (and many academic sources) revel in detailing the idiosyncrasies of its first president. Invariably the next most popular theme is the state's isolation. Given the frequency of such references to isolation, the overall lack of a systematic examination of this for Turkmenistan is surprising. This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of specific measures, usually associated with a state's active participation and integration within the latest wave of so-called "globalization," to asses the degree to which Turkmenistan is in fact isolated. Further discussion will situate the Turkmenistan case within the ongoing globalization discourse.

Key-Words- *Turkmenistan, isolation, globalization, neutrality, cross-border flows*

Many accounts have alluded to Turkmenistan's isolation (see e.g. Kilner, 2012; Cutler 2010; Ishaniyazov, 2009; Durdiyeva, 2009; Anceschi, 2008; Antelava 2007; Greenberg, 2007; Rechel and McKee, 2007; Vershinin, 2007; Mitrokhin, 2000). Others have besmirchingly referenced specific elements and the ubiquitous nature of the 'cult of personality' surrounding Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov (1940-2006) (see e.g. Kramer, 2012; Najibullah, 2012; Fitzpatrick, 2011; Elder, 2009; Gillespie, 2007; Remnick, 2006; The Economist, 2004). Turkmenistan was also famously selected as the worst country in the world in which to live (The Economist, 2003). While there may be some interaction and/or relationship between the above, there seems to be a lack of scholarly attention to the degree and magnitude of Turkmenistan's isolation. The purpose of this paper, as a result, is to systematically examine the concept of isolation within the context of contemporary Turkmenistan. With reference to the current wave of so-called "globalization" the authors examine a multitude of variables often associated with global integration and interactions with other locations. Location, physical geography, distance to world markets, openness to trade, flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), migration, information, transportation, communications, internet access, human rights, education, and foreign policy will be investigated in an effort to asses Turkmenistan's isolation. A preliminary examination of relevant data seems to reaffirm Turkmenistan's geographical, political, social, and information-related isolation though economically this condition appears less severe. Implications of this detailed and nuanced representation of isolation for Turkmenistan, particularly in light of contemporary discourses on globalization, will be provided.

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Geopolitics of Oil and Gas in Central Asia: Implications on India

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Abstract: In the globalizing world the energy is a specific guarantee of dynamic development of modern economy. Today energy resources are amongst the main aspects of geopolitical importance of region. They represent a connection link in the issue of strengthening mutually beneficial political interactions between the countries and regions. The necessity of stable oil and gas supplies is necessitated by continuous growing need of leading global economies for hydrocarbons. According to some estimates in the nearest 15-30 years the global consumption of oil will annually grow at the level of 2- 2.5 million barrels a day. In 2002 the demand was 78 million barrels a day, and in 2015 it may reach up to 103 million barrels and in 2025 – 119 million barrels a day. The demand for natural gas will also grow steadily at the level of 2.5% a year till 2025. It is expected that in 2025 the global consumption will constitute 5.2 trillion cubic meters compared to today's 3 trillion cubic meters- it will show 28% growth of today's global consumptions

In this context the emergence of Central Asian Republics CARs has added a new strategic dimension to the geopolitics of the whole of world and more so for Asian countries. This region is thought to contain key global hydrocarbon reserves. A good current estimate is that the Caspian region holds 6000-120000 Mtov (4 to 7 percent of world reserves).Compare to Middle East, where around 65 percent of world reserves are to be found, Caspian reserves are therefore marginal. According to an estimate given by Central Asian sources the confirmed oil deposits are between 13 to 15 billion barrels, which is 2.7 percent of all the confirmed deposits in the world. Natural gas confirmed deposits in Central Asia are around 232 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) which constitute around 7 percent of world deposits. There is also a view that the actual reserves of oil in the Central Asian region are in the range of 60 to 140 billion barrels. The main oil and gas deposits in Central Asia are in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan where as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have enormous Hydel resources.

India is the sixth largest importer of energy resources in the world and its needs are growing. Its stable economic growth and consequently its national security depend on its hydrocarbon supplies. India import 70 percent of its oil requirements and this is likely to grow up to 90 percent by 2025. Its demand for natural gas for the non power sector alone is expected to increase from 120 million cubic meters a day (mcmd) to 391 mcmd by 2025. Since most of the country's crude oil imports are sourced from the Gulf region India is following in the footsteps of other major oil exporting countries. Additionally the increased price of crude oil also pushed the Indian government to search for alternative sustainable sources of raw materials and Central Asia is seen as a likely place. India is increasingly looking to Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) as a reliable source of hydrocarbons. Additionally India can transport the surplus hydropower energy from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan through a power grid extending via Afghanistan and

Pakistan to India. The paper will analyze the nature of Geopolitics of oil and gas in Central Asia. It will examine the potential of Central Asian republics in the globalization era. The paper will evaluate the role of India in the hydrocarbon sector of Central Asia. It will try to examine the role of other powers in the Great Game of hydrocarbon in Central Asia.

Cerberus or Chimera? Exploring RtoP in Central Asia between Localism, Regionalism and Globalism

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Abstract: The paper is a preliminary investigation of a project for analyzing Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) as a shared minimal form of global morality as well as an emerging international norm. Considering Central Asia as an exemplary case study contributes to highlight the main feasibility problems of RtoP implementation. The structure follows the three pillars of the doctrine of RtoP. In the first part we generally address the issue of whether Central Asia states are able or unable, as well as willing or unwilling, to provide protection to their inhabitants against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In the second part we assess the ability of regional and international organizations both to grant assistance for preventing the four crimes that fall under the rubric of responsibility to protect and to foster capability building in the region. In the third part we consider how the international community would react to an emergency involving responsibility to protect in the region with a "timely and decisive response". In particular, we estimate, on the basis of the latest decisions on the matter, the foreseeable constraints on a shared decision at the UN Security Council, and if regional security mechanisms may be effective in case of need, or if an international security mission involving states and organizations beyond the Central Asian border would be more effective.

A Safeguard in Central Asia?
The Politics of Basing and the United States Military

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Abstract: The 2005 expulsion of the United States military from Uzbekistan represented a phenomenon that has long plagued U.S. government strategists and military officials across Southwest and Central Asia since the Second World War: U.S. military expulsion from a foreign country. This paper examines specifically which conditions led Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to either expel or threaten the U.S. military with expulsion from local host bases. It is not obvious that a single tipping point exists. Uzbekistan was successful in removing the U.S. military in 2005 from its Karshi-Khanabad Base but in Kyrgyzstan the U.S. military was able to evade eviction in 2009 through increased military and economic aid and promises of establishing a "transit center" rather than a formal military base as it was referred to previously.

Understanding this puzzle of which factors lead to base eviction or renegotiation of basing terms sheds light on the pressure points in the national security strategies and policies of the Central Asian countries, as well as how the U.S. basing and indeed foreign policy have adapted to ever changing political conditions in host countries.
These 'base politics' dynamics are not new for most Central Asian countries as they endeavor to strike a balance between domestic security concerns like non-state actors or political coups and external security concerns posed by turmoil in Afghanistan or the energy security race that has increased in recent years across the region. In such a volatile environment, U.S. military operations can be adversely affected if ordered to vacate a foreign military base when host nation domestic security concerns outweigh perceptions of regional threats. More importantly, the U.S. military often underestimates how turbulent domestic security challenges and external security concerns can affect base politics. Such deliberate and public

international events that result in expulsion thus elicit important questions about why and when such events occur in nations that host a foreign military power like the United States.
As the United States begins to draw down its troop presence in Afghanistan by 2014, the politics of basing will become increasingly important for the United States as it shifts its focus to maintaining the Northern Distribution Network. At the same time, the United States must confront a regional security environment that is dominated by the rise of both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which recently granted Russia veto rights on future foreign military basing agreements in the region.

Literature review overview
Despite the historical and global importance of foreign military bases for great powers like the United States, the literature on base politics is rather sparse.[i] More importantly, the current base politics literature barely addresses the base politics of Central Asia and the questions that are addressed in this research paper regarding when and why a host nation may evict a foreign military from its territory or renegotiate basing access.
Since the Second World War, the U.S. military has largely viewed Southwest and Central Asia as an essential region for maintaining a forward military presence due to important geostrategic and national interests. However, as a result of regional and global security dynamics of the past decade, especially the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has not been successful at maintaining a continuous military presence in Central or Southwest Asia.

Prevailing literature on military base politics largely misinterprets what has taken place in Central and Southwest Asia. First, some authors argue that domestic security concerns and public outcry have little effect on the outcome of basing negotiations.[ii] Moreover, some scholars have claimed that external security concerns have a relatively insignificant effect on basing agreement outcomes.[iii] Second, certain works assert that security assistance, including economic aid or arms transfers, do not assist in securing basing access.[iv] Third, much of the literature states that regimes dependent on technology transfers or specific technical knowledge from a certain power are unlikely to abrogate a basing contract. Some have also claimed that foreign troop levels or base size do not play a role in affecting base politicization or expulsion of the U.S. military from a host nation.[v]
After closer examination of the base politics at play in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and the effect it has had on the U.S. military, one sees different outcomes from the theories listed here. More specifically, most of the analysis today fails to incorporate the rising role that both Russia and China play in influencing the base politics of the region. Through a methodology of theory-testing and process tracing, this paper endeavors to elucidate the base politics dynamics of Central Asia and the ever evolving relationship with the United States military.

EurasianRegionalismLooking East: Adapting to Challenges, Searching New Models

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Abstract: Eurasian regionalism is a politically steered process of economic and normative integration of several postcommunist states that span the Eurasian continent from Belarus to China. It represents a reaction to economic challenges and security dilemmas of the global age. A search for regional solutions to key national concerns parallels similar developments elsewhere. Since self-reliance is not a viable strategy for the global age, most late developers today require regional affiliations to no lesser extent than memberships in various global clubs. Modeling regional integration in Eurasia on the example of the European Union (EU) presents unique challenges that former Soviet states are not yet prepared to meet. An example of the ASEAN and the process of East Asian community building, which has been actively promoted by Japan, may serve as better signposts for the development of regionalism in Eurasia.

The paper seeks to establish political and cultural causes behind relative success or failure of several successive regional integration organizations (RIOs) in Eurasia, and finds that East Asian integration processes, not the EU, should serve as an appropriate comparator for the post-Soviet states. While all of them were motivated by an idea to create a regional community that would either consciously emulate the European Union or provide an alternative model of regional integration, mechanic adaptation of the external patterns of regional integration to the post-Soviet, post-hegemonic contexts proved impossible. The case studies presented in the paper are generated with the explicit purpose to shed new light on the factors promoting or, alternatively, impeding translation of the existing models of regional integration into the specific contexts of the postcommunist transitions. The paper's methodology is informed by the new regionalism approach (NRA), which sees regional integration as a contemporary strategy of development that economically vulnerable states deploy to ward off predatory tendencies of neoliberal globalization.

Eurasian Union: Challenges and Opportunities

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Abstract: Concepts and ideas of integration in post-Soviet space are not new. Numerous attempts were made to create some forms of integration process either by involving all former Soviet Republics or on regional basis but there were hardly any success and most of the efforts were either ineffective or ended in failure till the creation of the recent Customs Union (CU) between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia that came into force in July 2011. The purpose of the paper is to briefly review the integration process in the region, its success, failures and lessons learned from them. The focus of the paper is, however, on the proposed Eurasian Union; its challenges, difficulties, opportunities and future prospects. The scope of the paper is narrow and limited. Although economic, trade, customs and tax issues are raised and debated from time to time, the main focus is on political, security and ideological issues and preferences of individual member states and their impacts and implications for the Union as a whole and its future prospects.

Key words: Eurasia, Eurasian Union, Eurasian Economic Community, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Single Economic Space, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Customs Union.

Introduction

The concept of "Eurasia" is a contended and elusive one, and before discussing the Eurasian Union it may be useful to provide some clarifications of such concepts as "Eurasia", "Eurasianism", "Eurasian space", "Eurasian integration" and so on in order to put the paper into a proper perspective. "Eurasia" is a geographical concept meaning space and place that is located both in Asia and Europe and in between Asia and Europe. The concept of "Eurasianism" is more complex that has politico-ideological, cultural, security and philosophical meanings and connotations with multiple views. The classical view of Eurasianism was mainly developed by Russian emigrants who believed that the rise of ethno-national movements would threaten the integrity of the Russian empire and advocated for an all-embracing Eurasian identity that could unite all the peoples of Russia in a single entity (Trubetskoi 1927). For long period of time the concept of Eurasianism was viewed mainly as a Russian imperial ideology. Alexander Dugin, a popular nationalist Russian philosopher with anti-western and anti-global views and perceptions, leads the Neo-Eurasian movement whose main goal is to create an empire in the post-Soviet space led by Russia which is important and imperative for guaranteeing stability of the Eurasian zone headed by Russia (Dugin 1999). After the collapse of the USSR, other variations of Eurasianism emerged, like (Turkish, Muslim, Ecological-Economic Union based in greater Altai, Eurasiasm in Central Asia, Caucasian Eurasianism) which are usually attractive to nationalist and conservative politicians, intellectuals and academics with very little or no support from the public.

The concept of "Eurasian integration' is frequently used to understand the political process in post-Soviet space centered on the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) created in 2000 (Emerson & Vinokurov 2009). While "Eurasian space" is mainly a concept developed by President Nazarbayev where he views Kazakhstan as the "epicenter of the world" and Astana, the new capital, is situated "in the heart of Eurasia" and the country is located in between Asia and Europe and plays the role of a bridge between the two

continents (Nazarbayev 2001 & 2005). These ideas are broadly shared by scholars, intellectuals and public in general and have become an integral part of the nation's domestic and foreign policies (Shnirelman 2009). Kazakhstan is one of the most active post-Soviet countries that strongly advocates and passionately works for developing and promoting regional integration by creating multiple organizations both at Central Asian and Eurasian levels by involving other post-Soviet states. However, the recent high ambitious initiative of creating the CU between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia came from Vladimir Putin of Russia with a plan to develop it into a full-blown Eurasian Union by 2015, modeled on the EU.

Brief history of the integration process in the post-Soviet space

The first attempt of maintaining some sort of economic ties among the former Soviet Republics was made on December 8, 1991 when the leaders of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine singed an agreement on the dissolution of the USSR and creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a successor entity. The new alliance was open to all Soviet Republics and subsequently, all but 3 Baltic States joined the CIS.[13]

The CIS soon turned to be an ineffective and inefficient organization mainly because of political, security and ideological concerns as well as lack of commitments and mutual trust among the members. Subsequent attempts were made for further integration. The next attempt came in 1994 to create the Free Trade Zone consisting of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan but it never came into force because of Russia's refusal to ratify it. In 1995 Russia and Belarus created the customs union and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan joined later on. A year later, they signed a treaty with the goal of deepening integration in the economy, science, education, culture and other spheres. In 1999, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan signed a new treaty for a Customs Union and a Common Economic Space with the goal of further economic integration. Subsequently, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (now defunct), GUAM (bringing together Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and so on were created. In 2003 a draft agreement was signed between Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine for creating a Single Economic Space (SES) but it was vague and never came to existence mainly because of Ukraine's opposition to participate in any regional trade associations followed by supranational bodies. At the same time, some states were looking for forming regional institutions with countries beyond the post-Soviet space for economic and security cooperation and the most prominent examples are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). (Qoraboyev 2010). As mentioned earlier, the goals and objectives of the EurAsEC was to create Customs Union among the member states with a clear mandate to create common customs borders among its member states, to have a common foreign economic policy, tariffs and price policy and other mechanisms needed for a common market (Kazanstsev 2008). Russia and Belarus signed a Treaty on Union State Formation in 1999 which stipulated the formation of common economic space and monetary union and the establishment of supranational institutions like, Supreme State Council, Council of Ministers, United Parliament and so on but it could not go far as the Union was more politically oriented than on economic needs and realities (Danilovich 2006).

Creation of the Customs Union between, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia

The foundation of the creation of the current CU was the signing of the Treaty on the Establishment of an Integrated Customs Area and Formation of a Customs Union in 2007 followed by founding control and regulatory agencies during 2007-2010. On November 27, 2009 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia agreed to create a CU that would include the formation of a common customs space by July 2010 and pave the way for further integration resulted in creating a single economic space to be started in January 2012. Accordingly, the CU was created in January 2010 within the framework of the EurAsEC but it was unable to start functioning until the customs and other codes were harmonized.

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[13] . On December 21, 1991 eight additional former Soviet Republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan , Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Alma-Ata Protocol and joined the CIS. For details of the collapse of the USSR and the creation of the CIS, see Karen Jacobsen, *The Commonwealth of Independent States*, A New True Book, 1993

The CU is administered and managed by the regulatory body; Interstate Council (Mezhgossovet) through the executive body; the Customs Union Commission (CUC) created in 2007. Since January 2010, the CUC has been authorized to make decisions on a number of issues, like changing import customs duty rates; maintaining the classification of goods for foreign economic activity; setting tariff exemptions and tariff quotas; defining the system of tariff preference and introducing non-tariff regulations (Krotov2011). The CUC performs its duties and responsibilities through a number of bodies, institutions and committees like, the Committee on the Regulation of Foreign Commerce, Scientific and Expert Council, Court of the Customs Union, Secretariat and so on. The activities of the Customs Union are also regulated by numerous legislations and protocols signed by the member states since 2000.[14]

Russia and Kazakhstan approved the codes in early 2011 but it was not functional until July because Belarus delayed the ratification process. Finally, the CU started its operation on July 01, 2011 when all the three states agreed to remove all customs borders. On November 18, 2011 the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement, setting a target of establishing the Eurasian Union by 2015 similar to the EU but with more focus on economic union in order to avoid politico-military and cultural-ideological divisions and differences. Vladimir Medvedov, the Russian President, seemed to be even more ambitious when he commented that if the prerequisites are there, the parties should move faster and create the Union earlier.[15]

Positions of the Parties

Kazakhstan: Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan, has been, perhaps, the most persistent and dynamic promoter of the idea of Eurasian integration. Kazakhstan's proposal of Eurasian union was promulgated as an official ideology by the top leadership of the country and the focus was on to build peace, solidarity and unity among peoples on the basis of morality, spirituality, cultural and historical interactions of peoples of different ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious backgrounds. Alongside governmental efforts; several civil structures have been created to advance the Eurasian idea. The Eurasian club of scientists, Eurasian Media Forum, Eurasian Academy of Television and Radio, and Eurasian Association of Universities-are meant to work towards the creation of a common information space and to develop the cultural-humanitarian dimension of Eurasian integration. In his response to President Putin's visions of Eurasian Union, published in April 2011, President Nazarbayev welcomed and supported the Russian initiatives but at the same time elaborated his own visions and ideas of Eurasianism in an article published in the Russian Newspaper *Izvestiya* on October 25, 2011. According to him, the Eurasian Union should be based on and follow four basic principles; (1) it must be built on economic pragmatism, (2) it must be based on voluntary participation of member countries; (3) it should be created on the principles of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference into domestic affairs of others; (4) each member country should create its own national institutions on the principles of consensus of all participants without giving up national sovereignty (Nazarbayev 2011, pp. 5-6). In the same article the President also elaborated the main characteristics of the Union: (1) the Eurasian Union must be a competitor in global economic space, (2) it must be developed as a part of the Euro- Atlantic and Asian areas of development and economically it should be a bridge between the dynamic developments in the EU, East, South-East and South Asia, (3) the Eurasian Union should be formed as a self-sufficient financial body which will be a part of the new global financial system, (4) geo–economically and geo-politically the Eurasian integration should follow a special, evolutionary and voluntary path in future, (5) such a Union can only be achieved through wide participation and supports of the society (Nazarbayev 2011). He also dispelled and rejected some misgivings and misperceptions regarding the Union. President Nazarbayev unequivocally mentioned that the creation of the Eurasian Union will be, in no way, restoration or recreation of the former USSR. Similarly, he assured that China is a good neighbor and friend of Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Union will no not affect its relations with China rather Beijing will have a better and open access to a larger market.

[14] For details of the Customs Union's administrative and regulatory system, see Igor Krotov, "Customs Union between the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian federation within the Framework of the Eurasian Economic Community", World Customs Journal, Volume 5, No. 2, 2011, pp. 129-135

[15] "Russia sees union with Belarus and Kazakhstan by 2015", www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15790452, p. 2

The idea was rather a smooth sale in Kazakhstan as the country is doing very well economically and the President has huge popularity and public support and has an overall positive view among the population regarding the CU.

Russia

As mentioned earlier, Russian Eurasianism was mainly debated, discussed and propagated by academics, intellectuals and nationalists with no direct or strong support from Kremlin and/or political leaders. Russian nationalists and Neo-Eurasians enthusiastically supported Vladimir Putin's coming to power in early 2000 and his strong policy towards Georgia and other South Caucasian states and viewed them as the 'policy of Eurasianism in action'. Putin's statement of 'Russia always felt itself a Eurasian country' at the APEC Summit in 2001 was considered by Neo-Eurasians as an official declaration of Russia's Eurasian policy at a global forum. They are delighted with Putin's return to power in 2012 and believe that the Eurasian project is close to his heart and it will be the centerpiece of his foreign policy (Buckley 2011). But that may not be so easy as the opposition is growing and getting more momentum despite Putin's election as President and his party's overwhelming seats in the Russian parliament. Putin's vision of Eurasian Union is a grand project that envisions a unity of all former Soviet states competing with the EU and China. In his words, "We are proposing a model of a powerful, supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles of the modern world …..to play an effective role as a bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific Region," (Putin 2011). He called to all post-Soviet states to join the 'Eurasian Union' where Russian will be language of communications and Ruble as the currency for business. Russia is very aware of the fact that its geo-political options are limited and restricted. Russia will never be accepted as an equal partner in Europe or be allowed to play a dominant role there; at the same time it may not be able to play a leadership role in Asia where Japan, China and India are already playing the contending leadership roles.

Belarus

President Alexander Lukashenka of Belarus in his speech in October 2011 on "The Fate of Our Union" welcomed the Russian proposal for Eurasian union and expressed his country's full support for the CU. However, he reminded that for the success of Russia or any other partner the relations should be based on equality and mutual benefits (Lukashenka 2011). There are also perceptions, even among the top leadership, that Belarus had to pay a high price for joining the CU. In a case study on Belarus, Irina Tochitskaya concludes that Belarusian budget can benefit from the participation in the CU by about 28% but in terms of business and foreign direct investment only the larger states; Russia and Kazakhstan will benefit, not Belarus (2010, p. 1). Belarus is in serious economic trouble and oppositions to President Lukashenka's rule are steadily increasing.

Prospects for expansion

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is at the most advanced stage in joining the CU as it has already applied (as of March 2012) for the membership after initial hesitation and sole searching. Joining the CU will affect the import oriented economy of Kyrgyzstan, the first member of the WTO among the CIS countries, in many different ways: (a) by joining the CU, it will have to use the average tariff rate of 10.6%, set by the CU, more than double of its current rate of 5.1% which may affect its trade; (b) In Kyrgyzstan the current Value Added Tax (VAT) is only 12% but after joining the CU it will rise to 17% which means higher prices for consumer goods; (c) as Kyrgyzstan joining the CU late it may not have equal say in the decision-making process of the CUC.[16]; (d) Kyrgyzstan is worried and concerned about its Membership status in the WTO; whether it will have to withdraw from the WTO or ask for an adjustment status; (e) Kyrgyzstan is also worried that if it does not join the CU, Russia may increase tariffs on oil exports (about 70% of Kyrgyz oil comes from Russia); (f) finally, not joining the CU may risk Kyrgyzstan's security as Russia currently guarantees it. Kyrgyzstan is also the member of the CSTO headed by Russia. Experts believe that despite some negative impacts and influences, it will be in the benefit of Kyrgyzstan to join the CU.

Tajikistan

[16] . Currently Russia has 57% of voting with Belarus and Kazakhstan each with 21.5%. For details see, "Russia's Inevitable Customs Union in Central Asia", in www.eurodialogue.org/Eu-Central-Asia/Russia-Inevitable-Customs-Union -in-Central-Asia, 21.03.2012, pp. 1-2

Tajikistan is the next country that expressed interests in joining the CU although it has not yet applied for (as of March 2012). But because of its overwhelming economic and security dependency on Moscow, it may be easier for Russia to convince this poor and unstable Central Asian country to join the CU. Since Tajikistan is not a member of the WTO it may have fewer problems in adjusting the tariffs and VAT of the CU, but it may face similar problems as the Kyrgyz do. Considering the economic and political circumstances in the country and growing security threats emanating from the south because of escalating conflicts in Afghanistan, Dushanbe will hardly have any choice than to join the CU.

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
These two other remaining Central Asian states have not yet expressed any interest in joining the CU and will most probably resist any attempt of pressuring on them from Moscow. But all will depend on the future trends and growth of the CU; if the proposed Eurasian Union will grow further and be on strong footing, the pressure on them will continue and it will be difficult for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to remain outside the Union economically and politically.

Ukraine
The most important but difficult challenge of the Union's expansion will be whether Ukraine will join or not. So far Kyiv is avoiding the pressure tactfully and diplomatically but the ultimate decision will depend on Ukraine's relationships with its Western neighbors, the European countries as well as its role and place in the EU. Ukraine has neither accepted nor rejected the Russian offer of joining the CU rather put forward excuses mainly based on technical and legal grounds and difficulties. There is no denying the fact that from the very beginning of its statehood, Ukraine has been looking towards the West to become an integral part of the European integration system which was further fomented by the policies of Ukrainian nationalists who were in power for long time. When the Party of Regions, headed by Yanukovich, considered to be a pro-Russian and Kremlin sympathetic leader, came to power there were high hope and expectation that Ukraine's relations with Moscow would be better and closer but no noticeable changes were observed mainly because of strong oppositions from the nationalists and deteriorating economic and trade relations with Russia particularly on the issue of oil and gas supplies (Stern 2006). So, Ukraine's future policy and interests in joining the proposed Eurasian Union will depend on the balance of its prospective relations with the EU and the advantages and benefits it may get by joining the CU. But Kiev's experiences with the European integration process are not very positive which is further complicated by the recent developments in the EU zone and economic downturn and financial crises in many EU countries, like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. In the current circumstances, there are hardly any possibility that the EU will further expand to the East and accept new members, like Ukraine but Brussels can still offer considerable economic incentives to Ukraine and other Post-Soviet states (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan) who are enthusiastic in joining the EU within the framework of "Eastern Partnership Program" so that they remain interested in cooperation with the EU and can resist the pressure from Moscow for joining the CU (Gorbunov n.d).

Challenges
First, there are unsettled issues on tariffs in oil and gas products which may cause future problems because Russia wants exemptions of these sectors but others do not agree. There are concerns that Russia will benefit the most from the CU as it has the most advanced economy, well developed industry and Moscow will become the center of regional financial and business center. Russian banks will be benefited by expanding their markets in Kazakhstan; more so, in Belarus where the financial sector is unreformed and private sectors need more financing because of the economic downturn in the country (Kramer 2010).

Second, the real benefits of the Union must outnumber the costs. There should be a clear and visible gain, viewed by the public, that the CU is benefitting and working in the interests of the public not for the elites and minority groups. There are positive reports and forecasts that the CU will enable the member states to boost their GDP by 15 percent by 2015 (Zviagelskaya 2011). Already there are criticisms, particularly in Belarus and some sectors in Russia and Kazakhstan that because of the CU prices of consumer goods are getting higher as the member countries are imposing higher import taxes vis-à-vis third countries. Prospective members (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and others) are also reviewing and calculating their cost-benefit analysis before making any final decision.

Third, the CU may create new obstacles in member countries' aspirations of joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). After trying for so many years, Russia ultimately got the Membership in December 2011 but for the two other members - Belarus and Kazakhstan- it may not be that easy (currently they are Observers). The initial expectation was that all the three countries would apply together and seek the WTO Membership jointly but that did not happen and if Belarus and Kazakhstan will not get the Memberships soon there may be more tensions and frustrations among them.

Fourth, there is a continuous debate on benefits from the CU. According to the mechanism of distribution of import customs duties between the member countries, Belarus will get only 4.70% while Kazakhstan's and Russia's shares will be 7.33% and 87.97% respectively.[17] Nationalists, political and business elites, oppositions in Kazakhstan and Belarus are worried and concerned about Russian's role and place in the Union and many believe that the creation of the Eurasian union is a design by Russian nationalists and neo-eurasianists to restore Russian hegemony and imperial goals of restoring the USSR. Vladimir Putin's comments like "the Eurasian Union would be built upon the best values of the Soviet Union" (Robert Coalson 2012) are widely interpreted as a drive towards restoring the Soviet empire as well as establishing and strengthening Russia's position as an Eurasian state.

Fifth, the agreement for creating the CU has been signed by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus (who are elected but there are wide criticisms and questions about the freedom, fairness and legitimacy of those elections) and ratified by their respective Legislative bodies (which may not be fully independent and democratically elected either). The issue of the CU was not openly, publicly debated and discussed and it is difficult to measure where there are real public supports on this issue or not. So, there are concerns that any radical political changes in any of the member states (there is a real possibility in Belarus) may jeopardize the future of the Union.

Sixth, there seems to have differences in visions and perceptions among the member states about the future of the Eurasian union. President Nazarbayev unequivocally stated that the Union will not have any anti-Chinese, anti-West, anti--Global and anti-Atlantic directions but Putin's and Lukashenka's views are not very clear on these issues. There are also disagreements regarding the future expansion of the union; both President Nazarbayev and Lukashenka prefer to keep it among the former Soviet Republics while Russian experts argue to include Finland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Moldova and Mongolia into the Union.

Seventh, the CU has made good progress within a short period of time compared to previous attempts for integration but the ghosts of past failures are still alive; not mentioning the psychological and emotional factors of heavy-handed ideological and political totalitarian rules of the USSR. So, any initiative for integration taken by Russian Federation, whether economic or political, will be viewed cautiously and suspiciously by other post-Soviet States for obvious reasons.

Finally, the issue of the speed and time limit of the creation of the Union. Experts and observers cast doubts on whether a Union can sustain and maintain the tempo of such a fast and quick growth and development. As mentioned earlier, the CU started functioning in July 2011 and within 6 months in January 2012, it was elevated to a Common Economic Space (CES) and the plan is to transform it into a full Union by 2015 when for the EU it took more than three decades to attain that stage.

Future Prospects

Despite the above-mentioned difficulties and challenges, there are some positive factors that may help and facilitate the successful operation of the Union.

First, the time and circumstances may be different now than before; there is a growing realization that integration process is taking place in all over the world and there is no viable alternate to deal with the challenges of globalization other than integration process at regional levers. All three leaders signed the Custom's union mentioned this importance again and again.

[17] . For details see, www.tsouz.ru/KTS/meeting 2010-03-25/pages/R_199.aspx

Second, Post-Soviet states are apparently more matured and experienced now after 20 years of independence than before and leaderships have grown up with confidence and optimism about success of regional integration while some of the earlier mistrusts and distrusts have disappeared.

Third, there are growing realizations, particularly among the leaders, that some sort of cooperative relations among the former Soviet Republics will be in everybody's interest and eventually benefit economy, industry, and transportation and communication sectors as they were so interdependent during the Soviet era.

Fourth, a Eurasian union will create a huge market for free movements of goods, services, labor and capital among the member states which may be welcomed and liked by businesses, industries and ordinary people some of whom are still disillusioned about the collapse of the USSR and by restrictions of travels and visits to family members and friends.

Sixth, CIS countries who are interested in joining the integration process of Europe and becoming members of the EU are getting frustrated and upset with the slow progress and a bleak future and they may rethink their positions and be enthusiastic in joining the Eurasian union.

Finally, from global and regional security points of views, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states are worried and concerned about domestic sources of threats and continuous war in Afghanistan, its further escalation without any solution in the horizon, growing fundamentalism and religious extremism in the region and an alliance and friendly, cooperative relation with Moscow, as a member of the Eurasian union, may make these countries feel more stable and secured.

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A regional design for Central Asia in the context of regional and global challenges

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Abstract: Regional level features prominently in global governance discussions. Both interest-driven and value-based approaches consider regional orders as essential building blocks contributing to an effective world order. Central Asia features prominently in these discussions as it attracts interest and involvement of the majority of global actors for reasons of different orders. In this context, the paper aims to contribute to debate on Central Asian regionalism. It will be based on conceptual frameworks of Regionalism Studies that draws from International Relations and International Law disciplines.

Projections on the evolution of Central Asian countries has always carried regional dimension since their political independence in 1991. Several regional organizations and projects have been created or are being proposed to address economic and political aspirations of Central Asian countries.These projects are authored both by Central Asian countries as well as foreign governments and institutions that have stake in region's future orientation. CACO, EURASEC, SCO, Greater Central Asia or New Silk Road Initiativeare prominent examples of these regional efforts.Yet some of these regional efforts didn't conclude (a prominent example is CACO), while others have still to consolidate their position as viable venues of regional cooperation. More importantly, individual reactions of Central Asian countries to these regional frameworks vary in form and content.

Following the demonstration and explanation of differentiated approaches of Central Asian countries to regional cooperation projects, this paper aims to highlight main factors that determine Central Asian countries responses to different regional initiatives. The paper will continue by underscoring that *three main factors*in particular have played determining role in individual responses of Central Asian states to past or existing regional frameworks: *political independence*, *economic opportunity* and *strategic uncertainty*. It will conclude by arguing that any future regional design will need to address all of these three factors in order to ensure adhesion of Central Asian countries. However, this argument concerns not only future projects; it is also pertinent for actual regional initiatives which will face increasing pressures to adapt to changing realities of the region. Indeed, Central Asian strategic and political environment will probably turn to transformation due to both regional and global challenges. The announced withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan is already causing intensive negotiations throughout the region. While, global political and economic transformations initiated by Arab spring or European crisis will surely push existing regional organizations in Central Asia to adopt new kind of strategies.

The Custom Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus and regional structure of Post Soviet Space

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Abstract: В условиях глобализации мир становится все более взаимозависимым, и воспринимается как единое целое. Однако помимо глобализации в современном мире продолжает существовать и процесс регионализации. При этом, чем сильнее какой-либо регион подвергается процессу вовлечения в глобализационные процессы, тем более сложно проходит его регионализация. Что такое регион? Существует несколько определений региона.
Некоторые теоретики считают, что внутренние процессы определяют формирование региона. Другая точка зрения сводится к тому, что регион является элементом мировой системы. Кроме того, существуют варианты регионализации через развитие экономики, социальные отношения, идентичность.
В современных международных отношениях экономический регионализм развивается быстрыми темпами и очень часто региональные соглашения о свободной торговле, создании таможенного союза определяют направления развития того или иного региона.
Таким образом, основные аспекты регионализации обусловлены внутренними особенностями, однако очень часто формирование региона происходит под воздействием геополитической ситуации и развития миросистемы. Так, например, Холодная война и противостояние между США и СССР во многом предопределили формирование Единой Европы. На современном этапе процесс регионализации (и стремление отдельных государств к интеграции) становится ответом на вызов глобализации.
Начиная с 1991 года, на постсоветском пространстве идет сложный процесс регионализации. По географическому принципу можно выделить следующие регионы: Балтийский регион, Черноморский регион, Каспийский регион, с точки зрения культурных особенностей и идентичности проживающих народов можно выделить Европейскую часть СНГ, Южный Кавказ и Центральную Азию. В контексте развития геополитических проектов на постсоветском пространстве можно назвать ЕврАзию, Большую Центральную Азию, тюркоязычный и ираноязычный регион.
Регионы всегда были частью системы международных отношений. И процесс регионализации, происходящий в настоящее время на постсоветском пространстве, является отражением геополитического соперничества и борьбой за сферы влияния многих геополитических игроков.
Одним из способов регионализации становится создание зон свободной торговли и таможенных союзов. Попытка создания Таможенного союза на постсоветском пространстве предпринимается с начала 1990- х гг. Однако реализовать данную идею удалось только в 2010 году и только в составе трех государств – России, Казахстана и Беларуси.
Статья будет посвящена анализу того, каким образом Таможенный Союз РФ, РБ и РК способен повлиять на изменение регионализации постсоветского пространства.
Главным тезисом автора будет тезис о том, что успешная реализация проекта Таможенного Союза будет способствовать кристаллизации ЕврАзии, трансформации Центральной Азии и выходу из данного региона Казахстана, а также отрыву Беларуси от европейской части СНГ.

The formation of CIS:
Russia and Kazakhstan Different Ways to the One Commonwealth.

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The Commonwealth of Independent states is a unique phenomena in world history. The history of its formation still requires serious consideration. Taking into account the large number of problems facing leaders of the CIS nowadays, we should refer to the experience of the beginning of the 1990-s. When in a dire economic and political crisis this organization was founded. After more than 20 years we can conduct a thorough analysis using the materials of the Russian and Kazakhstan archives. This paper is based on available documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation and Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The main purpose of our research is to trace the positions of the

Russian and Kazakhstan leaders during this difficult period of the Soviet Union's collapse and the formation of the CIS as well as the positions of the other actors and the degree of their influence on the process. Some of the drawbacks of this rather imperfect system that were created at that time are still relevant today.

In the end of 1980-s there was a crisis in the USSR between the "Union Center" and the other republicans leaders. Processes which took place in the Soviet republics were almost identical. This was the growth of national consciousness, sometime later were processes of real ethnocracy developed, and at the same time the growth of independent economic forces within the republics. All this stimulated the republican leaders to make attempts at political independence. Under these conditions the "Union Center" had to review its relations with the other republics. In addition, democratic changes inside the RSFSR (abolition of 6 article of the Soviet Constitution on the guiding role of the Soviet Communist Party) led to the reluctance of the communist leaders to take part in political life. It was quite necessary for the Union Center to reestablish a new Union Agreement. In April 1990 the Interregional Deputy Group declared a competition for the best project for a new Union Agreement. There were 380 projects from the all Soviet Union. The project by Maiminas won the competition. According to his conception the main principle should be the "principle of the Sovereign".[vi]

Almost all the projects were also sent to the republican governments and to the RSFSR and KSSR. The leader of the Kazakhstan Republic Nursultan Nazarbaev voted for the Maiminas project and approved the idea of "principle of the Sovereign of the republic".[vii] Obviously, Yeltsin was in support of this also. The Sovereign of the RSFSR could help him in the struggle with the Union Center. Three years later, Yeltsin awarded Maiminas as an Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation.[viii] Soviet leader M.S. Gorbachev tried to find a solution which would be acceptable for all. It was quite challenging for him, because he did not want to give all republics political independents and stood for the "principle of federalism". All republican leaders were invited to take part in a discussion about the future model of the USSR. The first session was held on 21 of February 1990, all participants managed to accept the new version of the Union Agreement and decided to hold another session and also a referendum on the issue.

The Baltic States tried to increase the processes of disintegration. For example, the Government of Estonia decided to hold a referendum on the independence of the state. In this case, was the quite interesting position of Kazakhstan leader Nazarbaev. The Chairman of Estonian Supreme Soviet wrote a special letter to Nursultan Nazarbaev asking to send one or two observers to the referendum. The answer came from the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet . They stated that the "People of Kazakhstan could not imagine themselves without our Unite Motherland and to keep it was very important for multinational the Republic of Kazakhstan".[ix] On the one hand Nazarbaev was against any independent and uncoordinated steps of the other soviet leaders, on the other he also took part in the process of disintegration. In August 1991 Boris Yeltsin came to Almaty and both leaders signed first Agreement of cooperation between RSFSR and KSSR.[x] This agreement increased horizontal links between the two republics and was like some kind of declaration of their political independence. Also there was a practical reason. In the conditions of the political crisis the republican leaders tried to defend their economies and had to cooperate on the horizontal level.

During the preparation for the referendum on the future of the USSR there was a controversy on the wording of the questions which should be asked. Gorbachev articulated the issue thus – "Do you want to keep the Soviet Union as a renewed Federation of Independent *republics* with equal rights…".[xi] Nazarbaev insisted that the wording was as follows – "…the Soviet Union as a renewed Union of an independents states".[xii] The difference of these wordings was clear and principled. It also had a significant impact on the results of the survey. People of Kazakhstan and other Central Asia republics were more "pro-soviet" than people from RSFSR. In the Republic of Kazakhstan 94,1% people voted for the Soviet Union.[xiii]

On 22 July after several sessions Gorbachev declared that the new agreement was ready for signing, which would be held 20 August.[xiv] On 17 August Yeltsin came to Kazakhstan to sign the agreement and also the two leaders were spoke about a "New Union". Then Nazarbaev outlined his position – "Kazakhstan stands for the New Federation. We all should decide together. Now its clear that it should be a Union of Sovereign National States with a common economic space".[xv]

Then the famous dramatic events of 19-20 August 1991 in Moscow only worsened relations between the Union Center and republics. Nazarbaev as well as Yeltsin were against the coup leaders. But, the Kazakhstan leader was very disappointed, before the August coup Gorbachev offered to him the post of Chairman of The Council of Ministers of the USSR. He asked for the time to think about it and suddenly these famous events had occurred. After the failing of the coup he was still against the "renewed Union as a

Federation".[xvi] However, one interesting fact is that Nazarbaev also offered to keep the old name of the future "commonwealth" – USSR, arguing that it could still be used, but now it should be read as Union of Svobodnih (free) Sovereign states.[xvii]

After August Gorbachev had to spend a lot of time trying to calm down and reassure other republican leaders and to return them to the process of negotiations. Only in November 1991 were negotiations resumed. In addition, the President of the USSR offered Nazarbaev the post of Vice President instead of Yanaev who took part in the "August coup". When on 8 December 1991 the Kazakhstan leader was flying to Moscow to signify his consent the USSR "ceased to exist as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality".[xviii] The leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus concluded an agreement on the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Nazarbaev was informed only after, three leaders sent him a letter where they told him about the new "Commonwealth". According to this letter the main reason of their unilateral action was the "crisis of negotiations over the New Union".[xix]

It was a precedent for the creation of such a large-scale regional construction. Later, the President of Kazakhstan said that it was unexpected and added also that he was invited to sign new documents only when he had arrived in Moscow. Boris Yeltsin called him when he was in the airport. He refused Yeltsin's offer because as he had not participated in their formulation.[xx] According to Boris Yeltsin's memories. He was absolutely sure that Nazarbaev certainly would come to Belarus. "When we finished preparing the new documents we informed Nazarbaev and offered him to join us, but he refused".[xxi]

According to another witness of these events the American diplomat Jack Matlock, Yeltsin and Sushkevich were sure about the arrival of Nazarbaev. They went to the airport to meet the Kazakhstan leader and were waiting for him for several hours. Then they came back and signed the new documents.[xxii]

Nowadays its more than just difficult to research many facts of this story. But it is clear that the hurriedness of the preparation led to a great number of drawbacks and other important aspects which disappointed other leaders. The new agreement was designed and signed be the Russian, Belarussian and Ukrainian leaders, that were the leaders of the "Slavic speaking republics". Some radical politicians started to spread gossip about a so called "Slavic plot". Nazarabaev in a press-conference was also asked about his ideas about a "Slavic plot" and would he start to create new a "Turko-Islamic organization".[xxiii] Ideas of a Turkish Confederacy were seriously discussed among the Central Asian republics leaders at this period. The President of Kazakhstan stood for intergration with the CIS instead of the creation of a new organization.[xxiv]

On 13 December, 1993 there was a meeting among the all leaders of the Post Soviet Central Asia republics: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The leader of Turkmenistan Niyazov offered to create a new Confederacy of Central Asia states, he even had prepared a plan for its creation. Also he insisted on the preparation of a statement in which he wanted to convict other "slavic leaders". The atmosphere was rather tense in this meeting. The "Slavic leaders" were seriously worried and called Ashhabad trying to discover the results.[xxv] However, the main point of the issue remained that the CIS had already been created by three states and others could only join and not influence the nature of the agreement.

It must also be noted that, Belorussia insisted on not letting Republics join the CIS which were in conflict with other states. Thus, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia could not be admitted into the Commonwealth. Central Asian leaders decided to meet again in Almaty on 20 of December 1991. In this meeting the main question was about founders and "joiners". An unknown Russian delegate voiced a very lengthy explanation of this issue. "In fact" he said –"Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine were founders as a matter of fact (not debate). But, others could join and could have equal rights as a founders". The position of Ukraine was more categorically – "Others counties could only join the CIS". Also, Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine declared that there would not be another ratification of the CIS agreement.[xxvi]

During these negotiations the President of Uzbekistan voiced the common position held by all the Central Asia states. "Unfortunately they (the other leaders) see us only on the sidelines and we have to accept such attention. They could alive without us, but we, without them, can not, Uzbekistan in particular". Nazarbaev supported him in this position. Both presidents insisted on the dialogue with other the "Slavic leaders" and to prevent a possible split of Eurasia into Europe and Asia. They set one condition – all states will have equal rights and status as founders.

The next day there was a meeting of the 11 leaders of the former Soviet Republics, except the Baltic delegates. There were two representatives from Georgia, but their status did not allow them to participate.[xxvii] 21 December the famous Alma-Ata protocol was signed almost by all the former soviet

republics. The summit did not managed to solve all the flaws and drawbacks. The problems of cultural, law, military and a common economic space were still unresolved. And some of them still resonate today. During the meeting it became absolutely clear in the future who would be for integration and who would be against. For example, Ukrainian leaders used crisis to forward their own goals. They insisted on the creation of the CIS as a "weak Confederacy" and managed a high level of success. As for Russia and Kazakhstan from this period we can speak of correlation in their positions which have become the basis for their relations. Without doubt the very existence of the CIS depends on these relations.

The nationalistic form of the counter-hegemonic effort undertaken by Russia – the creation of the Customs Union

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Abstract: We argue that the creation of the Customs Union (now Common Economic Space) among Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia can be interpreted as a counter-hegemonic effort, if it is evaluated in the light of neo-Gramscian Hegemony Theory. The appliance of neo-Gramscian theoretical framework seems more effective to investigate the ideas and aims behind the Russia's integrationist projects initiated in recent years. Because, although these ideas and aims are of complex character, the above mentioned theoretical approach may shed light on more inner and ideational reasons why Russia, which feels disenchantment with the results of liberal reforms launched in 1990's and unfair global financial, economic system, and is irritated to be encircled by dual expansion of NATO and the EU in adjacent territories, as a reaction to all of these has embarked on the current integrationist projects. These projects are important to assess how post-Communist Russia responds to the global financial, economic system and the negatives sides of globalization, which should be seen as the outcomes of the hegemonic world order.
However, the Moscow-led regionalism should be regarded as the nationalistic form of counter-hegemony rather than progressive one. The analysis of social forces in Russia and the dynamics of Russia-led regionalization suggests that the Customs Union cannot be seen as 'progressive type' of counter-hegemony, but in contrary should be regarded as the 'nationalistic type' of counter-hegemony which gives preference to the concept 'strong Russia' over the efforts to establish social oriented and pluralist cooperation vis-à-vis neoliberal capitalist globalization abroad and authoritarianism in the country. The active position of Russia towards the integration in the post-Soviet area should be viewed in broader perspective as an attempt to institutionalize the Moscow-centred regional block which is shaped by different motives and dynamics but with the common goal to have stronger voice vis-a-vis external forces and at least to restore 'a Big Russia' as a regional power, or at maximum to pave the way for making Russia as one of the polars of the future multi-polar world order, which is the long-term aim of Russia.
Key words: Neo-Gramscian approach, hegemony, Russia, counter-hegemonic efforts, Customs Union, nationalistic form of counter-hegemony.

Symbolic Policy: Refugees' Economic-Sustainability in Kazakhstan

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Abstract: In 1998 the Republic of Kazakhstan became a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, it took this country almost a decade longer to introduce its long-awaited Law on Refugees. In the interim, issues related to refugees were regulated by a number of legislative documents sporadically addressing various legal and socio-economic issues in this sphere. However, the adoption of the law has not brought clarity. On the contrary it has highlighted the confusion permeating laws related to refugee issues and especially those pertaining to employment, entrepreneurship, social assistance, health care and education.
This study examines the opportunities for self-reliance available to urban asylum seekers and refugees in Kazakhstan, with a particular focus on:

- national legislation and regulations relevant to refugees' employment and entrepreneurial activity;
- current labor market conditions and opportunities for employment, business development, and access to financial, and social capital for refugees;
- refugees' coping strategies in accessing sources of livelihood and social welfare.

The results of the study indicate:

1. Self-reliance for asylum seekers in Kazakhstan in the current legal context *is not possible*. Asylum seekers cannot legally work and have no access to any social support, and so cannot sustain themselves. This will not change unless and until the Law on Refugees is revised in a manner that corrects deficiencies identified in this study. Until then, UNHCR should have realistic expectations and make clear distinctions between self-reliance and the ability to survive without assistance.
2. The situation with refugees in Kazakhstan is somewhat better because they are granted the right to work. However, there are significant constraints on this and other rights relevant to self-reliance for refugees. Opportunities for self-reliance will be sufficient and conform to international obligations only when these limitations are resolved.
3. The principle way to change the current situation for both groups, refugees and asylum seekers, is through revision of national legislation relating to asylumseekers and refugees.
4. Without change of the law, any activities and programs that are offered to address self-reliance issues are constrained and cannot have sustained or significant impact on the ability of persons of concern (PoCs) to develop self-reliance. However, recognizing this limitation, there are still benefits to conducting these programs.

Global Crisis and its Unintended Impact on the Kazakh Government: More Trust and Optimism among Astana Migrants amidst the Crisis

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Abstract: This paper considers the effect of the financial crisis on the government evaluation on the part of recent migrants in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. Contrary to my expectations that the trust in the government and in President Nazarbaev would diminish during the crisis my research shows signs of growing trust in the government among migrants and residents of Astana. The data analyzed for this paper come from my personal encounters with Astana's migrants during 2009 and 2010 when I collected in-depth interviews for my dissertation project. Many people were unemployed when I first visited Astana in 2009.

It seems rather a paradox that although the crisis and its implications were widely felt by the population the trust in the government rather increased. Some had more reasons to be optimistic than others since they directly experienced the government crisis recovery actions such as bailing out of bankrupt housing projects. However majority of ordinary people had not felt any benefits coming from the anti-crisis measures. They were self-reliant in solving their problems. Far from disapproving the government's failure to regulate banks and housing 'bubble' in the first place the protest mood was nowhere to be found. The critique came from rather marginalized and isolated activists and journalists who the public generally did not identify with or shared its views.

Increased rural-urban migration in Kazakhstan is as a post-soviet phenomenon since its scale and dynamics are not comparable to previous population movements during the Soviet period. Although the city was a major attraction point for many in the past as well its attraction grew tremendously due to new market opportunities and benefits from globalization forces embracing Kazakhstan. A rather uncontrolled movement of population from rural to urban areas and between cities has developed its own logic in the past 20 years of Kazakhstan's independence. In the 90s rural migrants flooded the old capital Almaty to survive the disastrous effects of *perestroika* while with the move of the capital to Astana, the new wave of migrants followed the capital to the north of the country. Internal migrants in the capital Astana make a diverse group starting from high government officials relocated with their offices on the one hand and with street cleaners coming from nearby rural areas on the other hand. Needless to say their experiences vary enormously. Astana was meant to attract first of all highly educated urban residents wanting to work for the government to help to build the new modern futuristic capital. In short it is a city by the government for the

government in order to effectively administer and control the whole country. The growth of Astana quickly surpassed any anticipated numbers making it a vibrant and dynamic city of all kinds of internal and external labor migrants motivated by economic gains. When the crisis hit Kazakhstan Astana felt it more acutely than the rest of the country when its ongoing construction boom slowed down or even stopped for while.

Looking at the recent trajectories of internal migration in Kazakhstan based on Astana case this paper draws on field work material to explain various responses to crisis among migrants. Based on accounts and stories of migrants I analyze the reasons why Astana migrants stay rather optimistic despite the crisis and what implications it might have for government-society relations in the future. The housing crisis and real estate bubble that were also responsible for the crisis in Kazakhstan posed a challenge for the government which then tightened it control over the construction and banking sector. Consequently I argue that crisis has played a positive role in government evaluation and marks a shift toward more government reliance as opposed to trusting market mechanisms alone.
In Astana the housing crisis has pushed the construction boom but home loans proved to be a disaster for many who put too much trust in banks and loans. Many lost their houses or future flats they invested into. In times of crisis governments usually intervene to different degree and population is generally skeptical of such measures just to refer to some states struggling with Euro crisis for instance. In the case of Kazakhstan the crisis has served to consolidate the nation around the President and the government as a soul guarantor of future progress with regulation of the private sector. These and other factors played a role in positive reception of the government dealing with crisis.

Qualitative as well as quantitative differences of rural-to-urban migration patterns present new challenges and opportunities for Kazakhstan. Cities are becoming a major destination for millions of migrants worldwide who share many features in common. Kazakhstan's population is becoming more mobile in search of better paid jobs and working conditions, but economic rationale is not enough to attract thousands of people. Other factors of symbolic and non-material significance become powerful motivating drive for migrants in Kazakhstan's aspiring capital. But as migrants become more dynamic and self-reliant in the pursuit of economic freedoms their expectations from the government stayed limited while their trust in times of crisis has increased.

Astana is often referred as City of the Future or City of Contrasts which could be indicative of future trajectories in state-society relations in addressing issues of social justice, growing inequality, housing crisis, and *propiska* rules to control capital's growing population. Migrants often leave their jobs as teachers or technical specialists in home towns to work in Astana doing unskilled jobs where they earn twice as much. This creates a situation of loss of skilled labor in smaller towns and rural areas of Kazakhstan which are not experiencing the growth equal to that of Astana or Almaty. During crisis many young graduates stayed in Astana despite the lack of jobs in their specialization opting to try their luck in other sectors. Overconcentration of skilled and unskilled labor in Astana leads to high competition in jobs in every sector. These and other processes will be discussed in this paper as consequences of the crisis and the immediate responses to it.

Thus my contribution to "Central Asia: Regionalization vs. Globalization" conference is about changes in patterns of internal migration in Kazakhstan during crisis and its unforeseen impact on government assessment. Based on my extensive field research in Astana I present some of the material from my dissertation on Astana migrants. I would like to participate in the panel devoted to migration in Central Asia, where some attention is paid to regional differences and internal migration patterns in Central Asian states.

The Impact of Globalization on Expansion of Public-Private Partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia

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Abstract: Governments in many countries turn to public-private partnerships (PPPs) as they may create higher value for money compared to service provision directly by a public agency. Value for money has

been a PPP driver for many Western nations. From 2005, both Kazakhstan and Russia have started employing PPPs as well. What drives PPP expansion in both countries? This study attempts to answer this question from the perspective of factors that come from outside of either country. Three external factors that spur employment of partnerships have been identified. They include influence of international organizations, pressure from foreign investors and, in a more general way, globalizations impulses from the rest of the world. The link between external PPP drivers and value for money in partnerships approved in Kazakhstan and Russia has been also explored. The paper concludes that value for money as justification for PPPs has been largely replaced with growing influence of external drivers related to international globalization trends.
Keywords: public-private partnership (PPP), value for money, PPP drivers

1. Introduction

Public-private partnerships (PPPs), in which partners from the public and private sectors share their resources and risks in order to provide public services, are employed in many countries (Sadka, 2007). As nations such as Kazakhstan and Russia expand their experience in PPPs (for project descriptions see, for example, Public-Private Partnerships in Russia, 2012), a question regarding what exactly drives PPP proliferation needs to be answered. Drivers can be categorized as internal and external, and this paper focuses on the nature and implications of external PPP drivers.

The paper begins with the discussion of methodological underpinnings of this study and its theoretical framework. The validity of comparisons of PPP drivers in Kazakhstan with those in Russia is also justified. The paper moves on to critical appraisal of three external drivers that facilitate the employment of partnerships. After that, a connection between external drivers and value for money is described as the latter is often substituted with the former in an emerging policy paradigm in the two countries.

2. Methodology

This is a conceptual paper that employs qualitative approach based on documentary analysis (Neuman, 2007). This analysis includes three bodies of literature: the Russian language sources as Western literature is silent regarding emerging partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia; official policy documents including government statements, concepts and guidelines; and organizational documentation of private PPP contractors. Constant comparative method (Flick, 2009), with multiple iterations of comparisons regarding statements in various sources, has been used. The underpinning concept for data categories was that external impulses are normally served with internal responses that policy makers and special interest groups choose to give. Identification of an appropriate match between external impulses and internal responses has been a methodological approach adopted in this study.

Methodological stance adopted in this paper involves a comparison of Kazakhstan with Russia. In reference to why reasons behind partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia are examined together and compared, it can be argued that the two nations possess a large number of commonalities in their economies and public policies. Both countries are transitional economies and share many economic, political, business, social and cultural realities that stem from a common Soviet legacy. Although the two economies are different in size, the ways in which governments have shaped PPP development, created a legal and regulatory framework for partnerships show considerable similarities. Thus, meaningful comparisons between Kazakhstan and Russia may contribute to an enhanced understanding of the role that external factors play in PPP development.

3. External PPP drivers

There are three external factors that spur employment of partnerships including influence of international organizations, pressure from foreign investors and, in a more general way, globalizations impulses that are summarized in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Drivers for PPP Development

3.1 Impact of International Organizations

In Russia the impact of international organizations has concentrated in the joint project of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) together with the Russian government-owned Vnesheconombank. One of the departments of the latter is the national PPP Center which is charged with responsibility to serve as a government financing and coordinating vehicle for partnership development. The joint UNDP-Vnesheconombank project has been designed for five years from 2010 to 2014. Its major aim is development of the Russia's potential for PPP projects, and its activities include training of staff, consulting and assistance to regional PPP centers, and preparation of the model projects in water supply, refuse management, energy supply, transport infrastructure, and social infrastructure. In addition, the project is aimed at providing recommendations for drafting regional laws and regulations that would allow extensive employment of PPPs (United Nations Development Program, 2009, pp. 3-4). Although it is premature to evaluate project's impact, its goals clearly address few core impediments to development of partnerships in Russia, i.e. virtual absence of regional legislation governing PPPs, lack of qualified staff, and lack of pilot projects the experience of which would allow to employ typical financing solutions, relevant to a particular sector such as water supply.

The same core impediments exist in Kazakhstan as well, although no international organization has come up yet with a similar PPP development project. It is worth noting that the UNDP project in Russia has yet additional goal of contributing to the formation of the Regional PPP Center for the Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The project has acknowledged the Russia's growing role in the CIS and intends to use the Russian experience for the promotion of PPPs in other CIS countries including Kazakhstan (United Nations Development Program, 2009, p. 5).

Kazakhstan has been included in a technical assistance project (2010-2012) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) aimed at preparation of road maps for Central and West Asia in three sectors including energy, transport, and urban services (Asian Development Bank, 2010). A road map is defined as a strategic plan for both ADB and government which will enable better decisions to provide innovative solutions to sector challenges.

Describing these challenges and the need for technical assistance, the ADB report states that "reforms are needed to improve the efficiency of service provision and to allow the private sector to participate" (Asian Development Bank, 2010, p. 1). Among its goals ADB has declared the improvement in "delivery of infrastructure services that will create an enabling environment for public–private partnerships and private sector engagement" (Asian Development Bank, 2010, p. 3). As ADB works in tight collaboration with national governments and, in addition, Kazakhstani government is co-financing this project, it is fair to argue that the ADB goals are synchronized with those of Kazakhstani public policy. Thus, this international financial institution is likely to impact Kazakhstan in the direction of increased PPP employment.

3.2 Pressure from foreign investors

Among other external PPP drivers there is pressure that comes from foreign investors who are interested in using new business opportunities in transitional countries. The use of foreign investors in Russia and Kazakhstan possesses a number of advantages: foreign firms may bring along the expertise that domestic companies lack, and financing can be arranged easier through foreign banks and access to foreign capital markets.

An example of foreign investment in PPPs in Russia is Northern Capital Gateway – an international consortium that includes Fraport AG Company (Germany), a leading worldwide operator of airports, Greek investment group Copelouzos, and the Russian bank VTB Capital (Northern Capital Gateway, 2010). The consortium won a contract for re-construction and operation of Pulkovo airport in St Petersburg, Russia, and the project has commenced in April 2010.

In 2007, a Turkish company, ATM Grup Uluslararasi Havalimani Yapim Yatirim ve Lsletme Ltd Sti, has won a contract for one of the first PPP projects in Kazakhstan – a concession for 28 years that includes the construction and operation of a passenger terminal of an international airport in the city of Aktau (Kazakhstan Today, 2009). Also, in November 2012 the Turkish company called *The 7 Piramit Company* has won the PPP contract for construction and operation of eleven kindergartens in the city of Karaganda in Northern Kazakhstan, in the form of a concession for 14 years (Regional Center for Public-Private Partnerships of Karagandinskaya Oblast', 2012). These and other examples show the interest of foreign investors in using the newly opened opportunities in Russia and Kazakhstan.

3.3 Integration with Globalization Processes

Finally, a major role in sending external impulses to PPP development in Russia and Kazakhstan can be attributed to globalization processes. This can be described as a general intention in those countries to align their policies, processes and tools in both the public and private sectors with international trends. The growing employment of PPPs in many countries around the world is deemed as one of those trends. Alpatov et al. (2010, p. 26) indicate that Russia's integration with the world economy is one of the main goals of PPPs. It is argued that the connections between PPPs and globalization are developing in two directions: globalization calls for the enhanced employment of partnerships, especially in transitional countries such as Russia and Kazakhstan because PPPs are viewed as an internationally recognized tool; and partnerships serve as an impetus for further development of globalization processes. The latter, in turn, is explained with the two factors: participation and increased use of foreign investment in domestic PPP projects is considered a sign of openness and internationalization, and the same impact is attributed to the government support of domestic private companies that seek participation in PPPs in other countries (Pankratov, 2010, pp. 30-32).

This becomes more evident in reference to the use of concessions in Kazakhstan and Russia: not only PPPs are deemed a global worldwide trend; moreover, a prevailing use of concessions, as opposed to other PPP forms, is deemed to be an international trend as well.

4. External Pressures, Value for Money and the Policy Paradigm

Whilst this paper is focused on external PPP drivers, this sub-section highlights how various factors, both external and internal, contribute to the emergence of the policy paradigm. Although external pressures have been observed in both countries, it is unlikely that governments in Kazakhstan and Russia have formed their PPP policies solely under these influences. As the literature appraisal has shown, the perceived PPP benefits and advantages (that are described as value for money) normally constitute justification of the public policy in OECD countries.

Value for money means that a partnership is supposed to bring larger value compared to when services are provided 'in-house' (i.e. by a public agency) or when services are contracted out to a private company (Kakabadse et al., 2007). The underlying logic is that using a PPP will make sense, in the opinion of many, only if PPP can deliver public sector services cheaper and better, meaning at a smaller cost as opposed to other options, and with improved quality (and other enhanced output features) as opposed to other options (Sadka, 2007). However, "VfM is not the choice of goods and services based on the lowest cost bid" (Her

Majesty's Treasury, 2006: 7). A trade-off between lifetime PPP project costs and service quality is in the core of the VfM concept.

The VfM notion is also supported in a different way: whilst government considers whether to employ a PPP, the overarching aim should be to get a good deal for the taxpayer. If it is not, two serious risks to value for money can arise: that government attention will be focused on executing the process rather than achieving a good outcome; and that government attention will focus on reaching agreement on a deal and not on getting a good deal (Colman, 2000: 73). These notes have particular reference to how partnerships are formed in Kazakhstan and Russia. Government approach to perceived PPP benefits appears to be unbalanced as government is focused on getting benefits from a partnership project in terms of attraction of private funds and the use of new technology. However, PPP efficiency from the VfM perspective is not a major government concern. The KPMG report argues that the cost of contracting out in Russia is about 6% less than the PPP cost (Shabashevich, 2011: 3-4). If and when a partnership can be created without government being much concerned with costs, criteria for the PPP formation become loose or may be used arbitrary, for example, pursuing certain political goals.

Although overall PPP costs may be higher due to extensive government financial support and higher cost of private borrowing, nevertheless the literature claims that PPPs are a preferred form of collaboration between the public and private sectors in Kazakhstan and Russia (Kabashkin, 2010). Thus, the VfM concept appears to be neglected, and it gives place to the PPP policy paradigm. In the latter, VfM subsides into factors that government may select randomly, and external PPP drivers may have significant impact on a decision whether to employ a partnership.

5. Conclusion

The three external factors that contribute to an accelerated proliferation of partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia include the impact of international organizations, pressure from foreign investors and globalizations impulses from the rest of the world. In these countries, government intent to align with perceived international trends appears to be an important policy driver, including the PPP policy. Despite many differences between Kazakhstan and Russia in economic structures, employment patterns, and fiscal and monetary policies, the two nations approach the PPP development in a similar way. The most apparent similarity is disregard to the commonly used (in OECD countries) principle underpinning the employment of partnerships, i.e. value for money. When PPP's value for money is compromised, this suggests that other factors may play a more noticeable role in partnership development. Among these factors, external drivers have undoubtedly attracted government attention in Kazakhstan and Russia which resulted in a number of PPP contracts awarded to foreign companies in recent years.

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Limiting character of nationalization of market economy

М. К. Кудайкулов

В очном соревновании социалистической и капиталистической экономических систем победитель нам известен. Быстротечный и неожиданный крах социалистической экономической системы в конце 80-х годов оставил много вопросов, а ответы на них пытаются дать и сегодня. Что явилось причиной явного поражения одной системы и победы другой, если главной декларируемой задачей обеих систем являлось улучшение благосостояния населения, через удовлетворение возрастающих потребностей. Основным же отличием плановой экономики от рыночной экономики является отношение к средствам производства. В первом случае предполагается общественная собственность на средства производства. Во втором случае основой экономических отношений является частная собственность на средства производства. Обобществление производства в плановой экономике не вызывает вопросов по определению. Но обобществление производства в капиталистической рыночной экономике требует дополнительных пояснений.

«Несколько необычно воспринимается само понятие обобществления производства в капиталистической рыночной экономике, которая, как принято считать, основывается на частной собственности на средства производства. Действительно, как же можно утверждать об обобществлении производства, об общественном характере производства, если производство, предприятия находятся в руках частных собственников капиталистов?»[18].

Обратимся к истокам формирования капиталистического способа производства. Удовлетворение постоянно возрастающих потребностей населения производителями, действующих в рамках «экономического эгоизма» (здоровое желание получать прибыль), ведет к укрупнению объемов производства, что способствует снижению издержек и захвату большей доли рынка. «Сконцентрировать, укрупнить эти раздробленные, мелкие средства производства, превратить их в современные могучие рычаги производства – такова как раз и была историческая роль капиталистического способа производства и его носительницы – буржуазии»[19].

Но процесс перехода раздробленных и мелких средств производства в объединенные мощные производительные силы сопровождается превращением этих разрозненных средств производства, «…. применяемых отдельными лицами, в общественные средства производства, применяемые лишь совместно массой людей. Вместо самопрялки, ручного ткацкого станка, появились прядильная машина, механический ткацкий станок, паровой молот; вместо отдельной мастерской – фабрика, требующая совместного труда сотен и тысяч рабочих. Подобно средствам

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производства, и само производство превратилось из ряда разрозненных действий в ряд общественных действий, а продукты – из продуктов отдельных лиц в продукты общественные»[20].

Не меньше вопросов по процессу обобществления возникало и во времена классиков научного социализма. На этом фоне заслуживает внимание пояснение В.Ленина: «Обобществление труда капиталистическим производством состоит вовсе не в том, что люди работают в одном помещении (это только частичка процесса), а в том, что концентрация капиталов сопровождается специализацией общественного труда, уменьшением числа капиталистов в каждой данной отрасли промышленности и увеличением числа особых отраслей промышленности; - в том, что многие раздробленные процессы производства сливаются в один общественный процесс производства»[21].

Далее В.Ленин раскрывает сущностную динамику производительного процесса: «Если во время режима существования мелких раздробленных предприятий в каком-нибудь останавливалась работа, - это отражалось лишь на небольшом числе членов общества, не производило общего замешательства и потому не вызывало общего внимания, не побуждало к общественному вмешательству в дело. Но если такая остановка произошла в крупном предприятии, посвященном очень уж сильно специализированной отрасли промышленности и потому работающем чуть ли не на все общество и в свою очередь зависящем от всего общества (я беру для простоты случай, когда обобществление достигло своей кульминационной точки) – тогда уже должно остановиться дело во всех остальных предприятиях общества, потому что они могут получить необходимые продукты только из этого предприятия – могут реализовать все свои товары только при наличности его товаров»[22]. Из этого следует, что все производства настолько переплетены и взаимосвязаны, что возникает необходимость рассматривать их в рамках общественного производительного процесса.

По мнению Ф.Энгельса в общество отдельных производителей вклинился новый способ производства - капиталистический. «Среди стихийно сложившегося, бесплановового разделения труда, господствующего во всем обществе, он (новый способ производства – М.К.) установил планомерное разделение труда, организованное на каждой отдельной фабрике; рядом с производством отдельных производителей появилось общественное производство»[23]. Данное описание зачатков плановой системы хозяйствования используемое более крупным участником рынка, и его способность эффективно использовать ресурсы, участвующие в производственном процессе, рассматривается как закономерность в становлении капиталистических рыночных отношений на новом этапе развития.

Такими виделись процессы укрупнения (монополизации) в период развития монополистических объединений в конце XIX века, и давались прогнозы по поводу того, что монополистический капитализм приведет к полному обобществлению производства. *Это означало, что концентрация производства и капитала приведет к ликвидации и поглощению малых и средних участников рынка.*

На основании этой логики в советской экономической системе устанавливается полное обобществление производства, и не только. Обобществление распространяется на сферу услуг, образование, медицину. Возникает закономерный вопрос - почему все в советской экономической системе огосударствлено? Можно предположить, что через передачу средств производства в общественную собственность классики научного социализма пытались опередить естественное развитие капиталистической экономической системы, которая, по их мнению, в кульминационной точке достигнет полного обобществления. Эти процессы, в том числе должны касаться малого и среднего бизнеса.

Каким образом складывается ситуация в начале XXI века в развитых рыночных системах. Мы можем констатировать высокую приспособляемость малого и среднего бизнеса к изменениям рыночной конъюнктуры в современных условиях. В бесконечной череде слияний, поглощений и банкротств можно наблюдать постоянный процесс возникновения новых участников рыночных отношений – фирм, кооперативов, некоммерческих организаций и т.п., как правило, нацеленных на ниши малого и среднего бизнеса. Конечно, необходимо особо отметить государственную поддержку в развитии малого бизнеса в развитых странах. Система антимонопольного законодательства обеспечивает взаимодействие малого и большого бизнеса на основе взаимовыгодного сотрудничества.

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[22] Ленин В.И. Полн. собр. соч. – Т.1. - С.178
[23] Энгельс Ф. Указ. соч. С. 250.

Возникает вопрос – почему же развитые рыночные системы нацелены на государственную поддержку малого и среднего бизнеса? Мы предполагаем, что в ходе становления и развития рыночной экономики были определены сферы экономической деятельности, где более эффективны малые и средние предприятия, или если сказать иначе, то были обозначены сферы, где большому бизнесу «неинтересно».

Но если посмотреть под другим углом, можно рассмотреть момент, суть которого заключается в том, что государство понимает, что необходимо поддерживать предпринимательский дух населения в «хорошей спортивной форме». Делается это для того, чтобы избежать атрофирования предпринимательского начала, что произошло за годы советской власти у абсолютного большинства населения в СССР. Как раз для этого происходит вывод определенных отраслей экономики в развитых странах из сферы интересов «большого» бизнеса. В итоге наиболее талантливые и удачливые в сфере малого и среднего бизнеса будут рекрутированы «большим» бизнесом.

Например, в США насчитывается 21,3 млн. различных экономических единиц, из них на долю предприятий, находящихся в индивидуальной собственности, приходится 74%, на долю корпораций – 19%, на долю товариществ – 6% общей численности фирм. Причем число корпораций и товариществ в последние годы снижается, а число предприятий, находящихся в индивидуальной собственности растет[24].

Конечно 500 крупнейших промышленных корпораций создают около 40% ВВП, но такая ситуация складывается в условиях рыночной конкуренции и рыночного баланса между различными формами собственности и бизнеса, партнерства и сотрудничества разных классов и социальных слоев. Именно этот баланс и делает американскую экономику устойчивой и эффективной. То же самое можно сказать и об экономических реалиях в рамках ЕС[25].

В.Кудров в своей критической статье «К современной научной оценке экономической теории Маркса-Энгельса-Ленина» пытается доказать неверное толкование Лениным того, что на базе концентрации производства происходит концентрация и централизация капитала, что в свою очередь ведет к полному обобществлению производства. Но необходимо отметить, что В.Ленин, столкнувшись на практике со строительством социалистической экономической системы понял, что нельзя сразу передавать все заводы, фабрики и другие хозяйственные заведения в общегосударственную собственность, т.е. обобществлять. На основании нового видения ситуации им был предложен НЭП, который дал весьма успешные результаты.

«Ленин хорошо понимал нереальность и неосуществимость создания сверхмонополии, стоящей над всей экономикой страны и подчиняющей ее себе. Он считал, что хотя развитие и идет к абсолютному господству монополий в экономике и перерастанию их в единую ультрамонополию, фактически дело до этого никогда не дойдет, поскольку развитие совершается крайне неравномерно»[26].

Далее В.Кумсков приводит пример того, как Ленин категорически отверг при обсуждении программы Российской коммунистической партии (большевиков) попытку Н. Бухарина представить современный капитализм только как монополистический, империалистический и финансовый. «Чистый империализм, - указывал Ленин, - без основной базы капитализма никогда не существовал, нигде не существует и никогда существовать не будет. Это есть неверное обобщение всего того, что говорилось о синдикатах, картелях, трестах, финансовом капитализме, когда изображали финансовый капитализм так, как будто никаких основ старого капитализма под ним нет»[27].

Ленин поясняет, что при империализме, монополистическом капитализме, «существует громаднейшая подпочва старого капитализма»[28]. А подпочва старого капитализма, по его мнению, - это мелкое частное хозяйство товаропроизводителей, ведущих свое дело на основе свободной конкуренции, в частности мелких крестьянских хозяйств. Иными словами, старый капитализм - это

[24] Государство и рынок: американская модель. М., 1999, с.12.

[25] В.Кудров. К современной научной оценке экономической теории Маркса-Энгельса-Ленина.// Вопросы экономики.2004. №12.С.122.

[26] Кумсков В.И. Рыночная экономика – вечная экономика. Бишкек.: 2008. С.123

[27] Ленин В.И. Поли. собр. соч. - Т. 38. - С. 151 - 152.

[28] Там же.С. 155.

сфера мелких и мельчайших хозяйчиков, малого и среднего предпринимательства, не втянутая в процессы обобществления и немонополизированная[29].

В.Кумсков объясняет востребованность мелкого хозяйства тем, что всегда существуют товары, которые удовлетворяют спрос в пределах локальных местных и региональных рынков, и такая ограниченность не позволяет производству в этих хозяйствах принять общественный характер.

Крупномасштабное производство, принимающее общественный характер, в странах с высокоразвитой экономикой может взять на себя до 60% всех результатов хозяйственной деятельности. На мелкие хозяйства, малые и средние предприятия, не работающие на всю страну и не носящие общественного характера, приходится до 40% и даже до половины создаваемого и реализуемого валового национального (внутреннего) продукта.

Такое или примерно такое соотношение между обобществленным и необобществленным производством в рыночной экономике будет неизбежно сохраняться, поскольку ее развитие идет на основе прогрессирующего разделения труда[30].

На основании этого можно сделать следующий вывод: в рыночной экономике закономерные процессы обобществления производства достигают определенного предела, т.е. не все производство становится общественным.

Обреченность капитализма К.Маркс обосновывал несовместимостью растущего обобществления производства с капиталистической частной собственностью. Мы понимаем, что капитализм как всякая подвижная система, изменился со времен классиков научного социализма. Сегодня это капитализм с «человеческим лицом», что проявляется в его социальной ориентированности. Большая вероятность того, что марксизм подсказал в каком направлении необходимо двигаться современной капиталистической экономической системе, а капиталисты доказали, что возможен прогресс на основе трансформированной, но все же частной собственности.

Влияние социальных институтов на рост национальной экономики

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Одной из важнейших задач, определяемых на современном этапе развития экономики Кыргызской Республики, является гармоничная интеграция экономической системы республики в мировую экономическую систему. Где, по словам П.Г. Никитенко, «ведущими тенденциями стали глобализация, гуманизация и экологизация социально-экономических процессов, становление постиндустриального(ноосферного) общества, формирование транснациональных корпораций, кластерных структур, региональных интеграционных объединений стран на принципах и правилах Всемирной торговой организации»[31].

Сегодня, во всем мире социальная политика переживает трансформацию. Это касается всех стран, где строится социально-ориентированная экономика – государств благосостояния, социалистического социального государства и различных моделей модернизации в странах с развивающимися и переходными экономиками.

Стремительное развитие технологий, международной торговли создает новые возможности для повышения благосостояния людей во всем мире.

[29] Кумсков В.И. Рыночная экономика – вечная экономика. Бишкек.: 2008. С.123
[30] Там же. С.124
[31] Никитенко П.Г. Ноосферная экономика и социальная политика: стратегия инновационного развития. – Минск: Национальная академия наук Беларуси, 2006. – 479 с.

Глобализация экономики и разработка огромного количества технологических инноваций увеличивают возможности экономического роста стран, что могло бы привести к огромнейшему скачку в социально-экономических отношениях.

В то же время, действие глобализации двояко. И те же процессы, создающие новые возможности, могут увеличить риск неравномерного использования различными странами своих преимуществ.

Как показали результаты мировых кризисов 1998 г. и 2008 г. глобализация экономики и растущая экономическая мобильность увеличивают колебания в уровне доходов, что в сочетании с маргинализацией может привести к значительному ухудшению положения различных групп населения. То есть, глобальные тенденции развития приносят с собой как новые возможности, так и возрастающие социальные риски. В то же время, ослабление роли национальных государств, происходящее на фоне роста влияния международных финансовых институтов, транснациональных корпораций, международных торговых и других соглашений, снижает возможности отдельных государств в проведении независимой политики, в том числе социальной.

Факторами, определившими трансформацию социальной политики в мировом масштабе, также стали:

- условность и подвижность профессиональной структуры;
- новые принципиальные риски техногенного и геополитического характера;
- структурные демографические изменения (в том числе старение населения в индустриально развитых странах);
- плюрализация форм семейной жизни, активное вовлечение женщин в экономическую и общественную жизнь;
- снижение роли профессиональных союзов и традиционного социального партнерства; возникновение новых социальных движений, которые дали право голоса не только среднему классу (основному плательщику налогов и взносов в фонды социального страхования), но и маргинальным группам (лицам с ограниченными возможностями, гражданам, выступающим за интеграцию новых ценностей, прежде всего экологам, и др.).

Реализация социального потенциала республики в рамках международных экономических отношений должна быть направлена на достижение следующих результатов:

- обеспечение открытости национальной экономики для инновационных и ноосферных преобразований, происходящих в глобальной экономической системе, способствующее повышению ее конкурентоспособности;
- развитие и углубление связей по взаимовыгодному сотрудничеству в рамках наднациональных региональных структур, межгосударственных отношений и отношений с международными финансово-экономическими группами.

Достижение таких результатов может быть в результате обеспечения следующего комплекса мер государственного регулирования, принимаемых формальными институтами:

- совершенствование механизма по соблюдению полного спектра институциональных норм и взаимных обязательств в рамках наднациональных региональных отношений с целью снижения уровня социополитических рисков и транзакционных издержек при реализации данного вида отношений;
- проведение политики, направленной на повышение открытости экономики, снижение протекционизма и уровня экономических барьеров в рамках международного экономического сотрудничества;

Механизм государственного регулирования, направленного на совершенствование системы по формированию и использованию социального капитала, как фактора, способствующего повышению эффективности реализации социально-экономических отношений в Кыргызстане, должен предусматривать следующие основные направления:

- повышение уровня доверия в обществе;
- повышение эффективности реализации отношений собственности;
- формирование стабильного гражданского общества;
- приоритетное развитие науки и образования;
- формирование новой экономической идеологии, направленной на реализацию потенциала эффективного развития социально-ориентированной модели экономики.

Одним из важнейших направлений формирования социального капитала на уровне общества становится государственное регулирование процессов по преимущественному развитию науки и образования в республике, которое должно предусматривать реализацию следующих мер:

- восстановление социальных функций образования, стимулирующих развитие в обществе социальных норм, культурных традиций, национальной идеологии;
- восстановление престижа и приоритетного финансирования науки и образования как сферы, предопределяющей основной потенциал роста экономики в условиях формирования инновационного общества;
- признание науки и образования как основного источника формирования человеческого и социального капитала и действительной нормы накопления капитала в обществе;
- формирование достойного уровня оплаты труда для работников науки и образования, препятствующего оттоку научных кадров в другие отрасли народного хозяйства и за пределы страны.

Соответственно, экономический рост страны тесно взаимосвязан с социальными институтами, основанными на социально-экономических отношениях и на современном этапе развития экономики страны должны развиваться:

- институт труда (занятость населения, обеспечивающая качественный уровень жизни);
- институт образования;
- институт здоровья (здравоохранение, направленное на профилактику здоровья населения и здоровый образ жизни).

Рассмотрим и проанализируем состояние каждого из них:

1. институт труда.

Институт рынка труда выполняет функцию социально-экономических отношений, в том числе между членами домохозяйств, а также их интеграции. Более того, институт рынка труда выступает источником экономического и социального существования домохозяйств и т.п. Недостаточная активность институтов может отрицательно действовать на эффективность рынка труда и процессов, происходящих в нем. Об этом свидетельствует процесс внешней трудовой миграции, которая выступает важнейшим фактором функционирования рынка труда. Анализ обследований трудовых мигрантов (2005 – 2010 гг показывает определенные колебания в динамике внешней трудовой миграции (табл.1, диаграмма 1).

Таблица 1


Внешняя миграция населения, *(человек[32])*

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Прибыло в Кыргызскую Республику - всего	**3761**	**3420**	**3960**	**3497**	**3829**	**3903**
Выбыло из Кыргызской Республики - всего	**30741**	**34423**	**54608**	**41287**	**33380**	**54531**

Диаграмма 1

Динамика внешней миграции, чел

[32] Статистический ежегодник Кыргызской Республики 2005 – 2009 Бишкек - 2010



Побудительными факторами внешней трудовой миграции выступают такие институты, как семья, заработная плата, нормативно-правовые акты, регулирующие выезд и трудоустройство трудовых мигрантов, государство, призванное регулировать миграционные процессы, международные политические и социальные институты (МОТ, МОМ, ВОЗ, ВТО), ведущие мониторинг миграционных процессов, организации труда, быта, охраны здоровья и использования мигрантов и т.д.

Многие из этих институтов недостаточно активны. В результате от 80 до 90% трудовых мигрантов находятся в нелегальном положении. Они становятся объектом жестокой эксплуатации со стороны работодателей, представителей силовых и криминальных структур и т.д., теряют возможность равного с местным населением пользования медицинским обслуживанием и другими составляющими социальной защиты. В повышении эффективности внешней трудовой миграции, возрастанию объемов притока денежных переводов семьям мигрантов ведущую роль призваны сыграть политические и правовые институты, институты рынка труда в странах трудоустройства. Вместе с тем, за последние 6 лет экономическая активность населения республики постепенно растет. Сегодня она составляет 2243,7 тысяч человек (табл.1).[33]

Таблица 1
Среднегодовая численность занятого населения, тысяч человек

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Кыргызская Республика	2077,1	2096,1	2152,7	2184,3	2216,4	2243,7

В то же время, если рассмотреть по регионам, то складывается иная картина. За два последних года, несмотря на рост среднегодовой занятости населения в целом по Кыргызстану, по отдельным регионам нашей страны идет снижение (табл. 2). Как видно из данных таблицы 2, в Баткенской, Иссык-Кульской, Нарынской областях спад занятого населения произошел в среднем на 5%, что вызвано миграцией населения. Соответственно, перед государством, ориентированным на построение социально-ориентированной экономики встает задача о создании рабочих мест и тем самым влияния на уровень жизни населения. В остальных регионах произошел рост занятости от 2 до 10%.

[33] Кыргызстан в цифрах. Бишкек - 2011

Таблица 2
Среднегодовая численность занятого населения по регионам,
тысяч человек[34]

	2009	2010
Кыргызская Республика	2216,4	2243,7
Баткенская область	164,9	160,4
Джалал-Абадская область	409,6	419,3
Иссык-Кульская область	175,8	171,8
Нарынская область	86,5	83,9
Ошская область	572,7	577,5
Таласская область	101,2	103,2
Чуйская область	335,2	347,7
г. Бишкек	370,4	379,9

Развитие рыночных отношений нашло отражение в перераспределении занятого населения в пользу частного сектора. В основном, это люди, занятые индивидуальной трудовой деятельностью и на частных предприятиях, в личных подсобных и фермерских хозяйствах. Доля занятых в частном секторе увеличилась за этот период с 83,6 % в 2006 году до 84,6% в 2009 году из общего числа занятых.[35]

Что касается предприятий и организаций государственного сектора, то здесь отмечается снижение доли занятых. Доля государственного сектора экономики составляет 16,4%.

В течение последних пяти лет (2006 – 2010 гг.) число занятых в сельском хозяйстве уменьшилось на 5,1%; обрабатывающей промышленности – 0,7%; государственном управлении, обеспечении военной безопасности и обязательного социального обеспечения – на 0,4%; здравоохранении предоставлении социальных услуг – на 0,9%; предоставлении коммунальных, социальных и персональных услуг – на 0,1%.

В тоже время в непроизводственной сфере произошел рост занятых: горнодобывающей промышленности – 0,2%; производстве и распределения электроэнергии, газа и воды – 0,1%; строительстве – 2,0%; торговле – 0,3%; услуг гостиниц и ресторанов – 1,4%; транспорт и связь – 0,9%; финансовой деятельности – 0,3%; операциях с недвижимым имуществом – 0,9%; образования – 0,4%; предоставлению услуг по ведению домашнего хозяйства – 0,7%.

Сокращение численности занятых и структурные изменения занятости были обусловлены в значительной мере спадом производства во всех отраслях народного хозяйства, несбалансированностью спроса и предложения рабочей силы в результате несоответствия качественных параметров трудовых ресурсов формирующейся структуре народного хозяйства, внешней миграции трудовых ресурсов и т.д.

Снижение уровня занятости населения в народном хозяйстве республики, с одной стороны, обеспечило рост свободных рабочих мест, а с другой, - увеличило потребность предприятий в рабочей силе, более квалифицированной и более подготовленной к работе в новых условиях рыночной экономики. Но приведенные данные не вполне реально отражают ситуацию на рынке труда, поскольку практически не учитывают значительные масштабы скрытой безработицы.

Очень остро стоит вопрос молодежной безработицы, так как недостаточный уровень их профессиональной подготовки, отсутствие производственных навыков влияют на возможность трудоустройства молодежи.

Поэтому наибольший удельный вес среди безработной молодежи занимают выпускники общеобразовательных школ, специальных средних учебных заведений и ПТУ (табл.3). Большинство из них вынуждено заниматься либо поденной работой, либо уезжать на работу в другие страны.

На величину экономических потерь влияет не только снижение численности занятых и производительность их труда, но и изменения в отраслевой структуре занятых.

Сегодня наша страна столкнулась в сфере занятости с рядом проблем, решение которых немаловажно для дальнейшего развития экономики страны:

- резкое снижение уровня занятости и рост безработицы,

[34] Статистический ежегодник. НСК - 2010
[35] Кыргызстан в цифрах. Бишкек – 2011

- отраслевые изменения занятости, не связанные со структурными сдвигами,
- низкий профессионально-квалификационный уровень работающих и падение производительности их труда,
- недостаток труда,
- недостаток средств для обеспечения эффективной занятости и т.д.

Таблица 3
Распределение численности безработных по полу и образованию, в %[36]

	2009	*2010*
Безработные - всего	*100*	*100*
в том числе имеют образование:		
высшее профессиональное	*8,8*	*10,2*
незаконченное высшее профессиональное	*6,9*	*6,4*
среднее профессиональное	*7,4*	*8,8*
начальное профессиональное	*6,4*	*6,3*
среднее (полное) общее	*56,9*	*56,5*
основное общее	*10,4*	*9,0*
начальное общее, не имеют начального общего и неграмотные	*3,2*	*2,7*

Таким образом, исследования показали, что на нынешнем этапе развития страны государственные институты не в состоянии решить эти проблемы. Однако они могут брать на себя роль координатора действий государственных и негосударственных институтов, ориентированных на решение проблем занятости посредством рыночных механизмов. В этом плане большое значение имеет повышение потенциала (capacitybuilding) соответствующих негосударственных институтов (профсоюзы, НПО, ассоциации промышленников, фермеров, махаллинских комитетов и т.д.) Для эффективного функционирования рынка труда требуется полный набор институтов. Поэтому действия правовых институтов должны дополняться социальными институтами рынка труда. Социальные институты рынка труда выполняют функцию социализации, т.е. передачи индивидам установленных в данной институциональной среде образцов поведения и способов деятельности а также воспроизводство рабочих. Большая группа социальных институтов: профессиональные союзы, системы образования и здравоохранения, социального партнерства, страхования, национальные и профессиональные традиции труда, обычаи, привычки делового этикета, моральные нормы приобретают важное значение в становлении эффективных и долгосрочных взаимоотношений на рынке труда.
Таким образом, можно прийти к следующим выводам:
1. Сущность институционального подхода к рынку труда заключается в акцентировании внимания на нормах и “правилах игры” (в том числе стереотипах мышления), управляющих поведением людей в реальном мире.
2. Рынок труда является институтом и, в свою очередь, состоит из подсистем, складывающихся в процессе конкурентного взаимодействия между субъектами данного рынка в сфере трудового обмена. Институт рынка труда предполагает приспособление отношения контрагентов к общепризнанной, стандартной, апробированной в социальном опыте модели экономического поведения.
3. Институциональная структура рынка труда представлена институтами-организациями, институтами-нормами и институциями; формальными и неформальными, сложными и простыми рыночными институтами. В функциональном отношении эта структура представлена следующими институтами: социальными (политические партии, профсоюзы), правовыми (нормы трудового права), экономическими (биржи, трансакции, фирмы и др.).
4. В целях обеспечения регулирования уровня занятости институт рынка труда обеспечивает интеграцию институциональных структур (системы законодательства, социально-экономических

[36] Кыргызстан в цифрах. Бишкек, 2011

программ, средств массовой информации, государственных и негосударственных структур содействия занятости населения, трудовой миграции т.д.).

2. институт образования.

Трансформация экономики Кыргызской Республики привела к тому, что подобно многим другим социальным институтам, образование не было готово к кардинальным переменам. Необходимость изменения сложившейся к тому времени системы образования в значительной мере обуславливалась кризисом общественного строя. В связи с напором радикальных реформ система образования, сложившаяся в СССР, перестала отвечать запросам времени, утратила способность использовать прежние внутренние резервы, поскольку в реформируемом обществе её сдерживали старые принципы организации и условия функционирования.

Результатом требований времени стало принятие Закона Кыргызской Республики «Об образовании», который дал ориентиры для модернизации системы образования в новых условиях:

- отказ от идеологического тотального диктата;
- на государственном уровне продекларированы принципы гуманизма, приоритета общечеловеческих ценностей;
- уважение к правам и свободам человека;
- плюрализм.

Анализ современного состояния образовательной системы нашей страны дает основание ученым прийти к единому мнению. Внешняя система образования, в существенной мере сохраняя свои прежние очертания, приобретенные за годы советской власти, по сути, вскрыла иные недостатки.

Отход от продекларированного Конституцией Кыргызской Республики понятия «социальное государство» и вызванное нарастающим финансовым кризисом сужение финансовых возможностей ведет к резкому сокращению бюджетных расходов на цели образования и, прежде всего, - высшего. В этой связи качественно отличным от советской системы образования стало введение платного обучения.

Другое наиболее заметное изменение в состоянии системы образования Кыргызской республики – это провозглашенные плюрализм и автономия учебных заведений. Им представлены широкие права в самостоятельном определении содержания обучения, выборе образовательных программ. Это обстоятельство привело к снижению качества подготовки. Так, в условиях расширенных возможностей вариативности образовательных программ, разнообразий типов учебных заведений и форм обучения, в угоду конъюнктуре появились учебные программы и циклы дисциплин, которые не имеют никакой ценности, так как не располагают достаточной теоретической и методической базой.

Таким образом, вместо понимания «золотого сечения» расширенных возможностей, ориентированных на развитие динамичности системы образования, встала проблема качества обучения.

Как в общеобразовательных, так и высших учебных заведениях нарушались стандарты учебно-дисциплинарного плана и состава обучения, его базового содержания.

Данные нарушения влияли на качество образования, то есть соответствие процесса обучения и учебно-дисциплинарной динамики, культурной, институциональной практики. Если его нет, то утрачивается смысл образования как социального института.

3. институт здоровья (здравоохранение, направленное на профилактику здоровья населения и здоровый образ жизни).

Сегодня система здравоохранения Кыргызской Республики сталкивается как со специфическими проблемами, обусловленными особенностями ее социально-экономического развития, так и с общими проблемами, возникающими в области обеспечения здоровья населения и имеющими глобальный характер.

Другой вопрос связан с проблемой поддержания и развития системы здравоохранения. На сегодняшний день известны три базовые модели организации и финансирования здравоохранения, причем автором одной из них (модель Семашко) стала Россия[37]. Одна из угроз связана с объемом и методом финансирования здравоохранения. Вопрос о том, сколько средств должна тратить страна на здравоохранение остается открытым.

[37]Юсуфов М. М. Экономические проблемы формирования современного института здравоохранения в современной России

Парадокс реформирования института здоровья состоит в том, что, бюджетной медицине нет равных в сдерживании расходов на здравоохранение. Вместе с тем, нам все время внушают, что средств на здравоохранение не хватает, и при этом выбирают изначально затратный вариант (страхование), игнорируя или даже открыто отрицая относительно менее затратную (бюджетную) систему.

Характеризуя экономические проблемы современного здравоохранения в Кыргызстане здоровье необходимо рассматривать не как просто побочный продукт экономического развития, а как один из важных детерминантов экономического развития и снижения бедности. Расходы на здравоохранение это, прежде всего, инвестиции, которые приносят экономическую отдачу, а не просто как расход/затраты. При этом отношения между здоровьем и экономикой не просто двусторонние, а взаимоусиливающие, то есть обеспечивают большую отдачу от инвестиций определенных средств как в здоровье, так и в экономику по сравнению с инвестициями тех же средств только или в экономику, или в здоровье.

Основными измерителями здоровья населения являются показатели средней продолжительности жизни человека, коэффициент смертности, а также показатели заболеваемости. Показатель средней продолжительности жизни в республике стабильно растет начиная с 2008 года (табл.5).

Таблица 5

Ожидаемая продолжительность жизни при рождении, лет[38]

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
оба пола	67,9	67,7	67,9	68,4	69,1	69,3
женщины	71,9	72,1	72,3	72,6	73,2	73,5
мужчины	64,2	63,5	63,7	64,5	65,2	65,3

Что касается коэффициента смертности, то в 2009г. общий коэффициент смертности составил 6,7 умерших на 1000 населения. Наиболее высокий уровень смертности отмечается в Нарынской, Иссык-Кульской и Чуйской областях (8-9 умерших на 1000 населения), где высока доля пожилых людей. В мировой практике для проведения сопоставимости уровня смертности в странах с различной возрастной структурой производится расчет стандартизованных коэффициентов смертности.

Следуя этим расчетам, уровень смертности в Кыргызстане примерно в 1,4 раза выше среднеевропейского уровня. Таким образом, если бы возрастная структура населения Кыргызстана была такой же постаревшей, как и в среднем по Европе, то коэффициент смертности населения Кыргызстана составил бы в 2009г. 12,1, а не 6,7 промилле.

Как и в большинстве государств СНГ, болезни системы кровообращения являются наиболее частой причиной летальных исходов (49,0 процента общего числа умерших в 2009г.). Подавляющее число умерших от этой причины – лица старше трудоспособного возраста.

Этот класс заболеваний является также основным в структуре причин смерти населения в трудоспособном возрасте.

Второе место в структуре причин смерти занимают травмы, отравления и некоторые другие последствия воздействия внешних причин (9,7 процента общего числа умерших в 2009г.). В этом классе объединены неестественные и насильственные причины смерти, в том числе убийства и самоубийства. В 2009г. впервые за многие годы наметилась тенденция снижения смертности от транспортных травм (17,6 погибших на 100 тыс. населения в 2009г., против 19,2 – в 2008г.). Более 80 процентов числа погибших от несчастных случаев – лица трудоспособного возраста. Здесь мужская смертность почти в 5 раз превышает женскую.

Третьи по рангу причин общей смертности следуют новообразования (онкологические заболевания – 9,1 процента общего числа умерших в 2009г.). Среди них преобладают злокачественные новообразования органов пищеварения – 43 процента из числа умерших от злокачественных новообразований.

Далее в структуре причин смерти - болезни органов дыхания (8,4 процента общего числа умерших в 2009г.).

[38] Уровень жизни населения Кыргызской Республики 2005 – 2009. Годовая публикация. Бишкек – 2010, Кыргызстан в цифрах. Бишкек - 2011

Смертность от инфекционных и паразитарных болезней (2,6 процента от общего числа умерших в 2009г.) является типично мужской. Подавляющему большинству умерших от этих причин (62 процента) диагностирован туберкулез. Из каждых 100 умерших от этого заболевания 77 – мужчины, более 80 процентов из них – в трудоспособном возрасте.

Важнейшей характеристикой здоровья населения является младенческая смертность. В 2004г. осуществлен переход Кыргызстана на международные критерии живорождения и, соответственно, младенческой смертности, когда в органах ЗАГС началась регистрация смерти новорожденных с низкой массой тела (от 500 до 1000г) и дополнительными признаками жизни. В течение 2005-2009гг. ежегодно от различных заболеваний, отравлений и травм из 1000 новорожденных умирал 25-31 ребенок в возрасте до одного года.

Основными причинами младенческой смертности являются заболевания и состояния, возникающие в перинатальном (послеродовом) периоде (в 2009г. – 64,9 процента умерших новорожденных), болезни органов дыхания (14,3 процента), врожденные аномалии (пороки развития - 10,7 процента), инфекционные и паразитарные болезни (4,9 процента), из них 70 процентов - кишечные инфекции.

Высокий уровень заболеваемости приводит к росту численности инвалидов. Как свидетельствуют данные статистического учета, уровень первичной инвалидности не снижается и колеблется в пределах 17-20 человек на 10000 жителей. Рост первичной инвалидности ведет к увеличению численности граждан, нуждающихся в социальной защите.

Ухудшение здоровья населения, неудовлетворительное состояние системы здравоохранения и огромный экономический и социальный ущерб, который несет государство в связи с этим, требуют принятия решительных мер. Это предполагает:

- обеспечение населения гарантированным объемом бесплатных медицинских услуг на основе введения государственного стандарта по охране здоровья и медицинскому обслуживанию;
- регулирование рынка медицинских услуг;
-развитие системы медицинского страхования, предусматривающей создание страховых фондов для финансирования лечебно-профилактической деятельности и использования поступающих средств на покрытие текущих медицинских услуг;
- создание многоукладности в здравоохранении, предусматривающей оказание медицинской помощи населению государственными, ведомственными учреждениями, кооперативами, индивидуально практикующими врачами;
- улучшение лекарственного обеспечения республики за счет расширения научной и производственной базы фармацевтической промышленности;
- развитие системы санаторно-курортного обслуживания;
- создание условий для занятий физической культурой и спортом;
- повышение уровня и качества питания за счет государственного регулирования доходов населения и развития потребительского рынка;
- обеспечение финансовой устойчивости системы здравоохранения за счет государственного бюджета, целевых отчислений предприятий, средств населения, внебюджетных источников и др.

Таким образом, социальные факторы имеют немаловажное, а порой и первостепенное значение в развитии рыночной экономики. Правильная оценка и учет их влияния на результаты хозяйственной деятельности позволит не только повысить роль человеческого фактора в подъеме экономики страны, но и обеспечит интеграцию нашей экономики в мировую систему.

Исходя из вышеизложенного, можно сделать следующие выводы:

1. В современных условиях развития экономики одним из основных приоритетов построения социально-ориентированного общества является использование институциональных ресурсов;
2. экономический рост страны тесно взаимосвязан с социальными институтами, основанными на социально-экономических отношениях;
3. Сущность институционального подхода к рынку труда заключается в акцентировании внимания на нормах и “правилах игры” (в том числе стереотипах мышления), управляющих поведением людей в реальном мире;
4. Рынок труда является институтом и, в свою очередь, состоит из подсистем, складывающихся в процессе конкурентного взаимодействия между субъектами данного рынка в сфере трудового обмена. Институт рынка труда предполагает приспособление отношения контрагентов к общепризнанной, стандартной, апробированной в социальном опыте модели экономического поведения;

5. Институциональная структура рынка труда представлена институтами-организациями, институтами-нормами и институциями; формальными и неформальными, сложными и простыми рыночными институтами. В функциональном отношении эта структура представлена следующими институтами: социальными (политические партии, профсоюзы), правовыми (нормы трудового права), экономическими (биржи, трансакции, фирмы и др.);
6. В целях обеспечения регулирования уровня занятости институт рынка труда обеспечивает интеграцию институциональных структур (системы законодательства, социально-экономических программ, средств массовой информации, государственных и негосударственных структур содействия занятости населения, трудовой миграции т.д.);
7. образование может быть определено как социальный институт, реализующий в процессе взаимодействия социальных общностей функции социализации, развития личности и общественных (экономических, политических и иных) структур;
8. Образование — фундамент культуры не только с точки зрения институциональной, но и личностной. Ведь получение образования есть не что иное, как процесс пробуждения и реализации потребностей в созидании, потреблении и распространении ценностей культуры. Культурная функция образования состоит в воспроизводстве и развитии материальной и духовной культуры самых различных групп и слоев населения.
9. здравоохранение — социальный институт, в котором осуществляется социальное взаимодействие между людьми по поводу сохранения и поддержания здоровья населения, детерминированное объективными и субъективными факторами.
10. Здравоохранение и экономика тесно переплетаются: состояние здоровья населения имеет ключевое значение для экономического развития и наоборот.

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Основные проблемы транспарентности в Кыргызской Республике

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Аннотация: В статье рассматривается институциональные аспекты проблемы транпарентности. Доказывается, что обеспечение прозрачности и доступности информации, равенства возможностей как осуществления, так и контроля деятельности хозяйствующих субъектов в той или иной сфере экономики невозможнодостичжилаемого результата. Автор показывает, что важный фактор институционального порядка, а именно, транспарентность экономики является объективным условием снижения уровня коррупции.

Ключевые слова: транспарентность, экономика, коррупция.

При переходе на рыночные отношения Кыргызстан, как и любая другая страна СНГ, разумеется, не мог за сравнительно короткий 20 – летний срок создать самые благоприятные государственные институциональные условия и рамки для развития рыночной экономики. Многие основы, устои и механизмы находятся еще в процессе становления и создания, наиболее подходящих для страны форм развития экономики. Но основной рыночный каркас с помощью проведенных реформ уже создан и наполнен различными частями, деталями и инструментами, придающими экономике страны рыночный ход развития.

Проблемы транспарентности экономического развитая даже для современной рыночной экономики развитых стран мира является довольно новой, недостаточно исследованной проблемой. Она не случайно связывается с устойчивым характером развития современной экономики, поскольку

именно для устойчивости свойственна транспарентность как открытое и прозрачное состояние экономики. На какой основе создается эта транспарентность, как она сочетается с устойчивостью экономического развития - это проблемы, которые продолжают возбуждать большой теоретический и научно - практический интерес исследователей всей современной мировой экономической науки.

Ускоряющийся процесс глобализации мировой экономики, тенденции к открытости национальной экономики порождают новые факторы, воздействующие на устойчивое развитие экономики. Одним из факторов, оказывающих достаточно сильное влияние на устойчивое развитие экономики, является ее транспарентность. Несмотря на значимость обеспечения транспарентности, определяющейся необходимостью достижения устойчивого экономического развития, она еще мало изучена и достаточно дискуссионна.

Особую важность и актуальность эта проблема приобрела в странах с переходной экономикой, где рыночные экономические отношения еще только складываются, находятся в стадии становления и формирования, где возникает масса всяких осложняющих обстоятельств, подрывающих устойчивость экономического развития. Переходная экономика в постсоветских странах, включая и Кыргызстан, остается еще далеко не прозрачной и очень нуждается в решении проблем, не только практических, но и теоретических, создания условий для транспарентного и устойчивого развития.

Проблема непрозрачности экономики – это характерная проблема, как для развитых, так и для развивающихся экономик. Но особенно остро она стоит в переходных экономиках, что объясняется специфическими переходными условиями (неопределенность в выборе модели государственной экономической политики, отсутствие целостности нормативно-правовой базы и т.д.).

Итак, транспарентность – обеспечение прозрачности и доступности информации, равенства возможностей как осуществления, так и контроля деятельности хозяйствующих субъектов в той или иной сфере экономики, определяемых эффективной государственной политикой, нацеленной на достижение качественного устойчивого экономического развития, исходя из принципов честности, справедливости и высоких моральных ценностей.

Транспарентность не стоит в числе первоочередных целей переходной экономики, но, тем не менее, она, безусловно, является одной из необходимых тенденций ее оздоровляющего и системообразующего рыночного развития. Поэтому исключительно важно, чтобы проводимые в стране реформы направляли экономику именно по пути формирования и развития современных высокоорганизованных и прозрачных рыночных отношений.

Конечно, нужна еще большая работа по совершенствованию и дальнейшему пополнению законодательных и нормативных основ государственного институционального устройства рыночной экономической деятельности. Но транспарентность отношений в экономике заключается не только в полноте и совершенстве государственной институциональной системы, но и в том, как конкретно и оперативно работает эта система, как непосредственно осуществляется ее правила и требования государственными органами и государственными чиновниками. В экономической сфере в последние годы в странах СНГ происходили бурные изменения, появлялись новые непривычные сферы и формы активности, к чему труднее всего приспосабливались властные институты. Именно здесь более всего ощущался рост коррупции. Это вызвано неэффективностью государственного управления и отсутствием прозрачности в деятельности государства:

1. приватизация государственной собственности везде служит серьезным источником коррупции. Это обстоятельство усугублялось масштабностью приватизации и слабостью контроля за ее ходом. Например, в России еще на начальных стадиях около 30 % всех постановлений по приватизации, по данным правоохранительных органов, содержали нарушения норм действующего законодательства. Грубейшие нарушения в методике оценки государственного имущества были допущены в Кыргызстане, вследствие чего многие объекты государственной собственности были приватизированы за бесценок.
2. исполнение бюджета и распределение бюджетных средств - еще одна благодатная сфера для коррупционеров. В числе основных причин — слабая дисциплина исполнения бюджета и сознательное использование бюджетных средств в корыстных целях властных чиновников. Наиболее часто нарушения, наносящие ущерб бюджету и нередко сопряжены с коррупцией, возникают при следующих обстоятельствах:

- поступление налогов и платежей в бюджет;
- денежные зачеты;
- получение связанных с иностранных кредиторов;
- привлечение кредитов коммерческих банков под гарантии и поручительства от имени правительства, вексельные и другие кредиты;
- необоснованно высокая просроченная дебиторская задолженность;
- нецелевое и неэффективное использование средств бюджета;

1. предоставление эксклюзивных прав (льгот, в том числе по экспорту и импорту, налогам лицензирование и.т.п.) - благодатнейщая почва для коррупции. Излишняя бюрократизация процесса выдачи лицензий, или, напротив, отсутствие правового регулирования отдельных направлений разрешительной деятельности как показывает мировой опыт, ведет также к повышению уровня коррупции. Это получило широкое применение и в Кыргызстане.
2. правоохранительные органы и экономическая преступность сращиваясь, создают среду, которая является существенным препятствием для борьбы с коррупцией. Создаются «комплексные бригады», зарабатывающие деньги на развале уголовных дел; за взятки организуется давление правоохранительных органов на конкурентов в коммерческой сфере, эти же средства используются для вымогательства; немало фактов поступления работников правоохранительных органов на службу («по совместительству») в коммерческие структуры и создания таковых под патронажем стражей порядка;
3. противозаконный лоббизм в законодательных органах труднее всего поддается контролю и уголовному преследованию, прежде всего из-за гипертрофированной депутатской неприкосновенности. Сущность бюрократизма в социально-политическом аспекте можно определить как отчуждение аппарата управления от общества, вследствие чего он становится самостоятельной силой с собственными эгоистичными интересами, поддерживаемыми и обеспечиваемыми благодаря использованию им своего положения распорядителя общественными делами.

В идеале государство должно противостоять возникновению непрозрачности и коррумпированности. Однако во многих переходных экономиках оно, способствовало этому. Проявлением бюрократии и лоббизма в странах СНГ стала приватизация государственной собственности. Фактически и юридически произошло «присвоение» государства.

Одной из причин возникновения и процветания лобби и бюрократии, т.е. проводников коррупции и непрозрачности в экономике, является несовершенство формальных и неформальных институтов в рассматриваемой хозяйствующей системе.

Среди главных принципов (институциональных характеристик), на которых основываются формальные правила, обеспечивая стабильное развитие, можно отметить открытость, подотчетность, равенство возможностей.

Неформальные институты (правила) касаются преимущественно традиций и личных стандартов поведения, влияния моральных норм.

Правила морали диктуют, что можно делать, а что нельзя, чего надо избегать и от чего защищаться. Моральные нормы смиряют эгоизм, ограничивают желания и действия, могущие подорвать порядок, от которого зависит функционирование общества.

В принципе формальная институциональная система, основывающаяся на открытости, подотчетности и равных возможностях, ведет к созданию и развитию неформальных правил (моральных норм), обеспечивающих условия

для устойчивого долговременного роста. Однако на практике (при отсутствии открытости и т.д.) предприниматели теряют уверенность, что следование установленным правилам поведения и соблюдение законов помогут им достичь своих целей и что государство будет поддерживать и защищать их.

Роль неформальных институтов, обеспечивающих прозрачность и развитие экономики без коррумпированного (или минимально коррумпированного) общества очевидна. Ярким примером этого является тот факт, что одним из факторов чуда экономического роста Юго-Восточной Азии и Японии выступают неформальные правила поведения субъектов экономической деятельности, проповедуемые конфуцианством. Во многом благодаря честности, справедливости и трудолюбии, эти страны добились наилучших результатов экономического роста и по уровню прозрачности согласно отчетам международных организации находятся на хороших позициях.

Если сложилась система коррупции и большинство людей работает в рамках этой системы, то у людей нет стимула изменять ее или воздержаться от участия в ней. Коррупция может стать частью

системы управления - во многих случаях настолько неотъемлемой, что система не может функционировать без нее. Вот здесь и встает вопрос о наличии политической воли в обществе и государстве. «Политическая воля», подразумевает четкое проявление желания основных участников политического процесса - противодействовать причинам или эффектам коррупции на уровне системы.

В странах с переходной экономикой как уже было показано выше, условия хозяйственной деятельности таковы, что они не располагают хозяйствующих субъектов к открытости, ясности и прозрачности в осуществлении хозяйственных отношений, операций и сделок. Очень многое здесь зависит от государства. И хотя оно вводит законы, правила и нормы для развития нормальных рыночных отношений в экономике, на деле они не очень хорошо соблюдаются. Субъективный подход, корыстные интересы покрывательство неправомерных и даже преступных действий проявляются при проведении приватизации объектов государственной собственности, тендеров на поставку товаров, использование средств государственного бюджета, начислении налогов, определении размеров таможенных пошлин, осуществлении раздела и передела акций существующих и создаваемых акционерных обществ и компаний, распределении прибылей и доходов предприятий, выдачи решений и лицензий на открытие того или оного бизнеса и.т.д. Все эти проявления нетранспарентности в переходной экономике нашли отражение во многих странах на постсоветском пространстве, и в частности в Кыргызстане.

Сама слабость и неразвитость переходной рыночной экономики, казалось бы, указывает на то, что нечего и думать о транспарентности, о внедрении ясности и прозрачности в экономические отношения. И все-таки все это необходимо внедрять использовать с этой целью силу государства. Государство и его органы могут и должны проявить жесткую настойчивость и целеустремленность в том, чтобы экономика развивалась по установленным законам, нормам и правилам, чтобы соблюдалась открытость, ясность и прозрачность хозяйственных отношений, чтобы все в экономике осуществлялось в интересах всего народа, страны, в интересах всего общества.

Таким образом, участие государства является исключительно важным и необходимым фактором развития экономики.

Это участие должна быть активным и эффективным для сохранения стратегических отраслей экономики и защитить интересы граждан своей страны. Однако, «активное» участие не означает давление со стороны государства на рынок и ущемление бизнеса. Все должно осуществляться в разумных границах государственного вмешательства в экономику. С целью обеспечения национальной безопасности и улучшения благосостояния населения. Очень важно чтобы государство, выполняя свои функции, посредством транспарентности добивалось достижения наибольшего результата от реформ.

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Persuasive Appeals by Online Publications:
Interactive and National Factors

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Abstract: Publications around the world, facing commercial and financial pressure to offer online versions, increasingly try to maximize Internet readership. This increases competition for a number of readers that is relatively static. The appeals used by any publication needs to consider cultural and social factors. At the same time, appeals need to address the interactive nature of online publications/audiences. This study compares the indicators of persuasive appeals in two groups of publications (two exemplars of each) gathered during one month: two based in the U.S. and two based in Kazakhstan with a Kazakh audience, as suggested by Kazakh-language content. Its theoretical basis is "Social Judgment Theory" (Sherif & Sherif, 1967), and it uses Discourse Analysis as its method. The significance of this work is, first, its investigation of cultural and technological influences on persuasive appeals and, second, its extension of Social Judgment Theory to consider interactive persuasion factors. The results reveal a) the range of appeals used in such publications, especially how they are similar and different across the three publication categories, with indications of factors for differences (audience characteristics, content, etc.); b) the appeals with indications or absence of interactive focus; c) contrasts between appeals to primarily U.S. readers, international readers, and Kazakh readers. The results demonstrate strong contrasts between U.S. and International appeals, with lesser contrasts between International and Kazakh appeals. The value of these results includes improvements to the theory, and ways to make such appeals more effective by considering interactive and national/cultural factors.
Key words: persuasion, online publications, Kazakhstan.

1. Introduction

The Internet is increasingly important for commerce, which more than ever is the driving force of media. Advertising and public relations depend almost exclusively on effective persuasive messages, although the dynamics of persuasion in the Internet context are only now starting to be understood (Perloff, 2010; Jackson & Jamison, 2007; Pratkanis, 1992). As all publications experience increasing pressure to fight for leadership, especially given the narrow profit margins of almost all online publications, but it is more important than ever to understand interactive persuasion. At the same time, cultural, social, and historical factors must be considered in the efforts to attract and keep readers. This is certainly true in Kazakhstan, where a limited number of viewers of online publications in the concept language increase the pressure for persuasive messages.

The authors examined indicators are persuasive appeals in six publications – two examples each of three groups, gathered during February, 2012. By comparing the variety and balance of appeal factors, in a variety of publication context, we hoped to isolate and identify factors that are shared and contrasting across this group of publications.

2. Location in the scholarly discourse.

The theoretical basis of this research, Social Judgment Theory (Sherif & Sherif, 1967), suggests that people have "latitude of acceptance" that must be targeted by persuaders. According to this theory, a small shift in persuasive effectiveness to carry people from the latitude of non-commitment to acceptance can make the difference between success and failure in attracting readers.

The significance of the study is that it eliminates existing understandings of persuasion online, adding cultural factors that have been considered by previous research went to a limited extent. Another aspect of significance is the ability of the study to help publications reach their target audiences, since the study begins to suggest ways to best persuade specific populations. Finally, social judgment theory is apparently not yet adapted to interactivity, which this study attempts to do.

National factors considered in the analysis include language, since Kazakhstanis use, to some extent, Russian, Kazakh, and English. Another important national factor is education, which is widespread

throughout the country but also unevenly distributed. Age is an important factor in access and use of the Internet, since younger people are more comfortable, capable, and more dependent on the Internet than older populations. Access to the Internet, and especially high-speed Internet, is another factor that helps shape Internet use.

This study addresses three research questions:

RQ1: Which factors are applied by publications in their attempts to attract readers?

RQ2: Which national factors (language, readership nationality, publication focus) are identifiable within persuasive texts?

RQ3: In which ways do publications appear invoke interactivity options within persuasive appeals?

Factors of persuasion have changed radically since the widespread use of the Internet. Along with a well-documented general tendency toward impatience, the Internet-- with its virtually unlimited range of alternative materials to read-- encourages quick decisions by readers about what they want to read. All attitudes toward reading have changed dramatically (Pratkanis,1992), along with a pervasive sense that everything takes too much time and effort. Although people attend and spend more of their time with media materials on the Internet, this reduces the opportunity for any single text to persuade audiences of credibility, relevance, enjoy ability, etc.

The Internet has substantially changed the old idea of "marketplace of ideas," with important ramifications for online publications. By bringing together a huge variety of sources, each only a click away for any reader, an individual publication finds it extremely difficult to keep readers from moving to another site. The underlying assumption of this old concept is that the playing field is relatively level and equal for all players. However, technological knowledge, government control over some trunklines, have replaced the traditional importance of capital expenditure for media control.

The interactivity of the Internet raises central issues about how to persuade potential or existing readers. With increasing expectation of being able to select and jump to other sites, much more than just an attractive appeal is needed to gather readership. A related factor of the Internet is the visual importance and integration between verbal and visual aspects of the site. This factor, while important in traditional media, is even more so in publications that can combine almost all media at the same time.

2.1. Methods

Four kinds of publications were selected: two in the US and two based in Kazakhstan that use Kazakh and/or Russian.

During the entire month of February, these publications were saved for later analysis. This analysis was conducted using the concepts of social judgment theory. The content was compared using the following factors: language, location, content category, audience characteristics, and the degree of interactivity implied by the persuasive appeals. Differences between appeals designed to attract people to the site were also considered in contrast to appeals designed for people already on the site to encourage them to go to additional pages, make selections, and pay for the service.

3. Results

Techniques that originated in propaganda (such as repetition, brought assertions, targeted promises), and labeling (such as name calling) are increasingly used in online materials. An additional characteristic of the world of online publication is misinformation, or information that tries to deceive rather than to inform. One result of this prevalence is increased suspicion among Internet users about anything they read unless it is already part of their belief system. The Internet is notorious disseminating credible – sounding but spurious facts. Hoaxes, lies, and a deluge of undigested information are all hallmarks of Internet content.

Interestingly, the most popular websites in Kazakhstan are entertainment websites including an online cinema, an anime site and free movie sites, match-making websites and educational sites like the one that prepares high school students for their National Graduate Test known locally as ENT. News websites are not on the highest priority, but publications like www.nomad.su and www.vesti.kz make it into the list of top ten most visited sites. In the “services” category, the top ten popular sites include the websites that are devoted to the following topical domains: weather, publishing international books, wedding services, free classifieds and psychology services. In “media” category almost all media types are presented in the leading lists: pure online publication, traditional newspaper’s online twin, TV channel’s website and online radio.

4. Conclusion and Discussion

The Internet's global reach has superseded local languages-- making English, Chinese, and Spanish more important even than before the Internet. This has important implications for local languages like Kazakh, shoving aside traditional mainstream media in favor of media that depends on attracting a very broad

audience across a very wide area. Although the Internet has had incredible impact in dispersing sources of information, it has also allowed governments to, to some extent, control Internet access and content. This is certainly true in Kazakhstan, whose government goes to great lengths to shut down some online sites, especially blogs and political webpages.

Clearly, websites use a range of appeals carefully tailored to their audiences. By considering very popular sites, it seems safe to assume that these appeals are generally effective. Additional research will help amplify this line of study and substantially develop the theoretical basis and data sets that will advance this important general issue, which will surely only become increasingly important as the Internet's centrality increases.

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Central Asian Accent of News Media Genres: Global Demands vs Regional Seasoning

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Abstract: The Soviet past is still echoing and haunting in Kazakhstan -- if not the formal shape and looks of the news, then the inner essence of newswriting techniques. While the global economy and new global information order demands change and reconceptualizating news presentation, no magic transformation seem to be underway. If some print news media are trying to adopt western news writing and news gathering style, then their final outcome (news content) signals signs of resistance: most news pieces are highly opinionated, and (perhaps worse) without proper attribution of the sources of influence. This study compares issue agendas and story focus in Kazakhstan's two major non-governmental national newspapers. Its focus is the varied expressions of opinions within nominal news articles, normally considered undesirable in news reporting but common and well-developed in Kazakhstani news. A discourse analysis of four weeks of articles in newspapers, published in both Kazakh and Russian languages, investigates the extent to which agendas differ, based on the assumption that agendas are clearest in the "opinionation" segments of news articles. The results are discussed in terms of agenda-setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), gate-keeping and framing theories. The study, which applies these theories to a new journalism environment, seems to be the first such analysis in Central Asia.

Key words: origination, newspapers, Kazakhstan, print genres, news reporting

1. Introduction

In a multinational Kazakhstan, especially given its predominantly bilingual media coverage, it is important to look at how each newspaper informs its target audience about the current events. The newspaper plays an important role in creating Kazakhstan's national agendas in the wide range of issues such as social problems, healthcare, education, government decisions, and language policy.

In mass media research, the "hypodermic" or Magic bullet theory claims that mass media have direct and powerful effects on people, their perception and representation of the world (Lowery & DeFleur, 1995). Walter Lippmann in his *Public Opinion* book said that people perceive reality through pictures placed in their minds (Lippmann, 1922). His theory is still topical, because most of the "pictures" that people get come from images provided by the mass media. News media are especially culpable in this sense, because

a majority of people are generally have limited media literacy and expect the news media to tell the truth (Andrew, 2007; Heider et al., 2005; Plaisance & Skewes, 2003; Tai & Chang, 2002; Zelizer et al., 2002).
Most people in Kazakhstan describe the content of print media as more opinionated than neutral. This situation is reminiscent of the early U.S. (American) press when newspapers belonged to different political parties. In Kazakhstan even newspapers that do not officially belong to a particular party are seen as extremely opinionated and biased.
Kazakhstani journalism inherited the Soviet style of presenting information in newspapers, that only represents one "truth": the government's. So if, hypothetically, most western newspapers have 70 percent of neutral information, and 25 percent of mixed information and only 5 percent of pure opinion (where articles are clearly labeled as editorials, columns, commentaries), then most of the contemporary Kazakhstani papers contain 70 percent of pure opinion, editorialized content, commentaries, etc. that is not clearly identified as opinion. Moreover, such content is placed throughout the paper – which makes it a time-consuming, challenging and even exhausting process for the reader to distinguish the facts from opinions.
Since there is little balanced, neutral, and relatively objective reporting content, it is extremely challenging to evaluate the framing of reporting when so many ideas are floating within one sentence, paragraph and article. It seems worthwhile to apply the "marketplace of ideas" model to Kazakhstani print news media and explore the range of opinions within each article, within each newspaper and finally among entire newspapers. It is therefore valuable to explore and analyze the range of opinions.

2. The theoretical framework

This exploratory study develops a theoretical framework to analyze opinionation within and between newspapers. It investigates the nature of post-independence print journalism in Kazakhstan. The results and initial concept will allow formulating in detail the communication nuances within and between two main cultures that coexist in Kazakhstani print media space during the past two decades. The novelty of this approach is that it will introduce/build a new "opinionation" theory: how opinion works within articles, within single newspapers and among newspapers.
To analyze how opinionation functions, two non-governmental private newspapers were chosen: Russian-speaking Vremya and Kazakh-speaking Zhas Alash. Each newspaper is popular, socially important and linguistically unique, which could influence readers explicitly or implicitly through their ongoing discourses.
While *Zhas Alash* has 90-year experience, and *Vremya* was created only in 1999, they have two things in common – they are known for being outspoken and popular among readers. The two newspapers have different audiences: *Zhas Alash* is oriented to Kazakh speaking young population of Kazakhstan, while *Vremya* is targeting Russian-speaking people between 20 and 50. But since many of the Kazakh-speaking elite also understand Russian, they can sometimes be *Vremya* readers as well. But there is little chance that *Vremya* newspaper readership can read *Zhas Alash*, as the great majority of the Russian-speaking population does not speak Kazakh at all.
While the two newspapers exist under a single political system, they represent two different cultural traditions/systems, values, historical experiences: Vremya's reports of major social and political events often demonstrate a high degree of opinionation. Zhas Alash is often considered a special site for the production/generation of content that contrasts to the government line in the Kazakh language.
The significance of this study is in producing a theoretical construct of opinionation; showing the variety of opinionation characteristics; analyzing the content of two contrasting newspapers and comparing them, as well as producing a "snapshot" of current newspaper content for possible baseline value in future research.
Zhas Alash and *Vremya* were analyzed to address the following research questions:

RQ1: What is the range of opinions within articles, within newspapers and between the newspapers?
RQ2: How does the content use opinion to try to influence readers?

An analysis of discourse in two newspapers' content with distinct cultural audiences puts opinionation in a central focus (place), making the opinion both the context and analytical unit for the study of opinionation.

3. Method

These two newspapers were selected because of their unique identity, originality, content expressiveness, and value to their respective communities, along with comparability in many functional aspects, such as wide circulation. Using Discourse Analysis (Richardson, 2007), I will begin to explain opinionation of each newspaper. For preliminary results around 80-90 articles published from February 1, 2011 to March 10, 2011 of the current year (2011) articles were collected. Since the given study is only a theory developing

and exploratory study, 10 articles (each devoted to a different theme like economy, legal issue, language policy, healthcare related article) were selected for discourse analysis.

Within each selected article I identified the opinions, assigned a number to each opinion or indivisible group of opinion and analyzed each unit of analysis based on the following questions:

- to whom does the opinion belong (is it a journalist who is expressing his/her opinion, is it a source or is it unclear whose opinion it is);
- what is the nature of opinion? is the opinion socially based? culturally based? politically based?
- How does this opinion work to influence the reader?

After analyzing ten representative articles for preliminary inspection/examination, I developed the following initial exploratory suggestive categories of opinionation within and between two newspapers.

4. Results

The study of the texts of two national newspapers published in Kazakhstan- *Zhas Alash* and *Vremya* – showcased the unique approach to analyze/ interpret news in Kazakhstani print news media. After careful examination of diverse types of opinions identified as units of analysis, I came up with approximately 25 initial exploratory suggestive **categories of opinionation** within and between two newspapers:

- *Restrictive* – hopes to reduce reader's options – "forced choice"
- *Expansive* – opens the range of options
- *Manipulative* – contains subtle implications like deliberative word choice
- *Bombastic* – over-dramatic, emotional, extremes.
- *Referrant* – send the readers to cultural symbols, icons
- *Probing* - offers some imaginary situation solutions
- *Skeptical/Rejecting* – rejects possibility of some options
- *Revelatory* – claims to open obvious but not known before things
- *Calling/Naming/Nominative* – attaches labels
- *Technical* – plays a technical role for just trying to sound good rhetorically.
- *Reinforcing* – support a previous point
- *Metaphorical* – uses metaphor or allegory to suggest meaning
- *Comparative* – depends on a comparison between two elements of the story
- *Equating* – tries to equate X to Y.
- *Colliding* –brings two non-competing issues to contradiction/fight
- *Generalizing* – suggesting broad conclusions that reduce complexity
- *Prioritizing* - assigns relative importance to issues, events, ideas or information
- *Hierarchy building* – tries to define the hierarchical relationships.
- *Reductive or Conclusive/Resume-providing or oversimplifying* –
- *Directive* – tells readers how to think about and perhaps act on the conclusions
- *Angle/perspective giving* – presents a clear position as preferable to readers
- *Polarizing* – proposes two strongly-contrasting positions, with emphasis on one
- *Predictive* – predicts possible future scenarios
- *Interpretative* – paraphrases the key opinion in other words.
- *Normative* – establishes a norm of correct interpretation or action

5. Conclusions

In market competition to invade their own new space of readership, some Kazakhstani newspapers compete with using an "Any means are justified" motto: some try to use "loud" voice, some use "soft" voice, some adhere to conservative values, some are ready to explore super modern ideas.

In this creative chaos, it might be beneficial for newspapers to have a straightforward direction for print news genres improvement in order to best serve their public – the citizens of Kazakhstan.

The given study offers a unique approach which can be used by readers around the globe for critical consumption of the news pieces published in Kazakhstan. This exploratory study examines the dimensions of "opinionation" within and between two national newspapers (*Zhas Alash and Vremya*). Categories of opinionation provide a dynamic framework for analyzing news messages; the categories may also help inexperienced readers to identify the functions of persuasive arguments hidden within a news piece.

6. Limitations

It is beyond the scope of this study to detail the cultural differences between the two ethnicities. Instead, I wish to focus in this section on the two cultural camps/communities' range of opinions within articles,

within newspapers and between newspapers. In addition, only gathering data from two publications during a fairly short time period clearly reduces the reliability of the results.

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Image Voting vs. Issue Voting in the Parliamentary Elections of January 15, 2012 in Kazakhstan.

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Abstract: This study will examine what factors influence attitudes of voters in their responses to image vs. issue advertising of candidates and political parties. The paper also emphasizes the influential role of mass media in the election coverage.

Elections are an important political activity of citizens. They are able to use their right to choose the people to represent them in the government and promote the better life for themselves. Therefore, the voters' decision -making must be very critical and deliberate. The issues like self-presentational tactics, negative advertising and other concepts analyzed in this research can be helpful to voters since they give them a more critical understanding of election campaign mechanisms. Citizens who are aware of the mechanisms of the candidates' creating favorable images would be critical and evaluative towards campaign statements of candidates that usually contain only promises. Those voters would form their opinion and come to better-informed decisions and less likely to be deceptive of manipulative machinations.

Gopoian (1993) in his research about Images and Issues in the 1988 Presidential Election in the United States used a methodology first suggested in "The two faces of Issue Voting" by Carmines and Stimson (1980) to disaggregate voters into "issue voters" and "image voters". In his study, Gopoian defines image voters as 'those inclined to give greater emphasis to images' and issue voters as ''those inclined to give greater emphasis to issues in casting presidential ballots. The scholar also indicates that "issue voters and image voters behave differently and are guided by different priorities in the process of choosing between candidates". Gopoian admits that it is possible in any given election that "one party may theoretically hold an advantage among those voters choosing on the basis of issues, while the other party may be viewed more favorably among other voters choosing primarily on the basis of image".

The idea of "issue voting" and "image voting" is new for Kazakhstani politicians and voters. Thus, this research is extremely unique and significant because there were no similar studies in Kazakhstan that ever examined the relative effects of issues and images on the outcome of the elections. Political campaign

practitioners, communication scholars, journalists, as well as social sciences students can use the research results for the study in the area of the communication research.

Key words: issue voting, image voting, parliamentary elections, political communication.

Life's Way of Talking: The experiential roots of Blues Music, 1760 – 1875

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Abstract: African American blues is a unique form of self expression, first created by unknown, nameless slaves. The conditions and environment that slaves were cast into have been documented in many studies and commentaries. The question remains: how could illiterate, oppressed African slaves, deprived of their own traditions, religion and even language create such exuberant, painful, "devil" music in the unknown and alien landscape of America? Ironically, all the material goods, physical evidence, and products of slave owners' mansions of those times are now destroyed and ruined… but the blues survives. It has not only survived but circled the globe and influenced other forms of American, European and even Asian music.
This paper is a retrospective analysis of the environment the first batches of African slaves found themselves within. It briefly parallels the life conditions of the slaves and their beliefs on the one hand, and the contents and lyrics of the blues on the other. The description of the slaves' life conditions demonstrates the roots and origins of the contents and lyrics of African American blues. The study's focus is on the slaves' experience under slavery during the XVIII-XIX centuries when, to help cope with inhuman conditions and to survive, they created an unknown but now world-famous way of talking: the African American blues.
Key-Words*: slavery, Blues music, segregation, revolt, culture.*

1. Introduction:

"The African slave trade was a great international crime." (Daniels 1990, p. 30)
This music circled the globe and can now be heard in every part of the world. However, no one knows who, when and where blues was first created– an exuberant, brutal, haunting, "devil's" music, full of suffering, pain and frustration. It is only known that blues were created in the depths of the African slaves' communities by illiterate, chained and oppressed Africans brought to America as slaves. To better understand the roots and origins of the blues, we must trace back through the history of America to the 16th century.

2. Historical Background:

For more than three centuries, slavery existed in America. Slavery was formally legalized in 1517, when Bishop Bartolomeo de Las Casas supported and encouraged immigration to the New World and permitted Spaniards to import African slaves, and ended in 1863, when in Boston's Tremont Temple President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was announced.
But emancipation did not mean liberation and equality for the former slaves. Most of the severe and harsh conditions in which freed African Americans lived remained. An appalling racism and later – segregation, lasted even up to the second half of the XXI century. Not only inequality and oppression were there in the American society, but even lynching and mass massacres during African American demonstrations were part of the American cultural landscape.

3. The Slave Experience:

"Luther Holbert and his wife, negroes … were tied to trees and while the funeral pyres were being prepared, they were forced to hold out their hands while one finger at a time was chopped off. The fingers

were distributed as souvenirs. The ears of the murderers were cut off. Holbert was beaten severely, his skull was fractured and one of his eyes, knocked out with a stick, hung by a shred from the socket.
Some of the mob used a large corkscrew to bore into the flesh of the man and woman. It was applied to their arms, legs and body, then pulled out, the spirals tearing out big pieces of raw, quivering flesh every time it was withdrawn." (Ginzburg in Oakley, 1997, p. 45) The severe and fierce protection of the slave owners' rights left no hopes for lessening the cruel treatment of slaves. Not only slaves themselves were brutalized. From the beginning of slavery, anyone who tried to ease the slaves' fate was immediately and brutally punished. This happened to Vincent Ogé, who-- for struggling for humane treatment of the slaves-- was 'found guilty of conspiring revolt' (Franklin & Moss, 2000, p. 54) and he and his associates were ferociously executed after:
'Their arms, thighs, legs, and backbones were broken with clubs on a scaffold. They were fastened round a wheel in such a manner that their face was turned upward to receive the full glare of the sun.' The judge ordered that 'Here they are to remain for so long as it shall please God to preserve them alive,' after which their heads were to be cut off and exposed on tall poles. (Franklin & Moss 2000, p. 54) Thus, after 1517, when trading of humans in the New World began, America initiated a long-lasting period of slavery, which formally ended only in 1863, and which gave the world the unique and fierce form of musical self-expression we now call African American blues. The terms of service of indentured people were a source of constant irritation for all Concerned. The English began to ask themselves why they should be concerned with white servants when blacks presented so few of the difficulties encountered with whites.
Because of their color, Africans could be easily apprehended. …. Blacks, from a pagan land and without exposure to the ethical ideals of Christianity, could be handled with more rigid methods of discipline and could be morally and spiritually degraded for the sake of stability on the plantation. In the long run, African slaves were actually cheaper. In a period when economic considerations were paramount, this last fact was especially important." (Franklin 2000, p. 39)
In Virginia, which needed to clear forests to increase the cultivation of tobacco, the labor of Africans was applied in larger scales than in other states as the trade in tobacco brought huge profits for the planters. (Nall, 1991). In 1661, Virginia legalized slavery, and other states soon followed. (Snyder 2010).
In reality, the enslavement of Africans started from the moment they were herded onto the ships. British slave traders, who pushed out the Dutch, French and Portuguese slave traders from the sea routes came to dominate by the end of the 18th century. The need for cheap labor of African slaves was increasing, in step with the insatiable appetite of British slave traders because, the greater the number of slaves brought to America, the more profit they gained. The greed and avidity of the slave traders inspired them to invent new ways to increase the number of slaves. They packed the slaves into ships with such density that many did not survive the passage. Countless slaves died from dehydration, asphyxia and other diseases and their corpses were thrown into the sea. Over about three centuries, only an estimated 15 million out of 35 to 40 million involved in the trade survived the journey. (Oakley 1997).
For the white settlers the first batches of slaves appeared as 'black animals' with 'human form' (Oliver 1990, p. xiii), while dancing they 'twisted and writhed their bodies into a
multitude of disgusting and indecent attitudes' as Pinckard described it (Fisher in Oakley 1997, p. 15), and their song was 'a wild yell devoid of all softness and harmony, and loudly chanted in harsh harmony' (Fisher in Oakley 1997, p. 15), while 'Their poetry is like the Music – Rude and uncultivated' added Cresswell (Fisher in Oakley 1997, p. 15), and finally, "They have great amusement in collecting together in groups and singing their favorite African songs; the energy of their action is more remarkable than the harmony of their music" said Pinckard (Fisher in Oakley 1997, p. 14).
The attitude of the white Americans to slaves is clearly expressed by an imaginative white Christian Virginia planter in 1623, debating with his conscience while examining a batch of the first slaves brought from Africa: "Now, these black animals have human form, but they are not really human, for God would not have made men to look like that. So, I'm free to buy them and work them on my tobacco plantation without incurring the wrath of God. Moreover, these odd black creatures will die early in our harsh climate and will leave no record behind of any possible sufferings that they might undergo. Yes, I'll buy five of these to be used as slaves …." (Oliver 1997, p. xiii)
White slave-owners deliberately split the tribes in the slave communities to ensure that the
slaves could not communicate with each other and create a revolt. For the same reasons in some states the slaves were even prohibited to beat drums, a provision of The Black Code of Mississippi. The little that the slaves managed to bring with them was torn away. They were deprived of their culture, traditions, religion and even language. The only thing they could save was African rhythms (Brown, 2009).

The life conditions of African slaves were often much worse than those of livestock; and a slave could be sold or bought at even cheaper price than cattle. But, in some circumstances, the slaves were intentionally bred as livestock since slave-owners thought that the bigger a slave the higher his price; they regarded slaves merely as object and commodity. Exhausting work, cruel punishment for any slight disobedience, death for escape and the full and absolute loneliness of a slaves' life required slaves to release their feelings, pains and sufferings (Kopytoff 1982).

The life conditions and surrounding world in which the slaves existed and survived can be best illustrated by the recollections and memories of the Sam Chatmon, former slave, in his BBC interview:

Yeah, he told me, he told me plenty about slaves. He said when he was a child big enough to remember it, they'd go to these barns and get this corn, was mixed with this rat stuff, rat waste I'll call it, I won't say the other part … The old ladies would take that on to the children tight out there in the pen and mix that stuff up in a big wooden trough, and they'd get down and eat it, just like hogs … And papa say he'd never seen a piece of meat, they'd grease all the children's mouths on a Sunday, and he'd linger behind and he'd get to eat the meat skin. (Oakley 1997, p. 16) With no past and future – bewildered, lost and confused, childlike slaves were perpetually searching ways out from that world. Only rarely could they could take simple music instruments and tried to relieve everything they wanted to its accompaniment. Originally, these were songs to no one and to nowhere. Simple words and simple melodies emerged from the depths of the soul and spoke about the most painfully sincere and true feelings of a man forcibly put into inhuman conditions which were often much worse than that of the cattle. (Mathews 2009).

4. Musical Influences:

The slaves were surrounded by the music brought to America with the European settlers.

The tunes and melodies of popular European music influenced the development of the blues and blues songs. The African American and European blues scholars demonstrate that the harmony and structure of Celtic ballads became integrated into the blues. The blues combined the African and European music traditions. The slaves adapted European musical elements to the blues which can be noticed in basic I-IV-V harmony and call-response structure of the lyrics. They also used European musical instruments to accompany the blues and blues songs.

5. Conclusion:

Thus, the blues became the musical self-expression of a slave, as expressed by Ma Rainey in the 1920's: "White folk don't understand about the blues. They hear it come out, but they don't know how it got there. They don't understand that's life's way of talking. You don't sing to feel better. You sing 'cause that's a way of understanding life … This be an empty world without the blues. I take that emptiness and try to fill it up with something. (Wilson 1985).

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Imagining Kazakhstani identity from a youth perspective

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Abstract: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan's leaders have sought to unite their ethnically diverse population under one inclusive, Kazakhstani national identity. This paper examines how government officials imagine Kazakhstani identity as laid out in the Constitution, Doctrine of National Unity, and various language laws. From these policies emerges the image of Kazakhstan as a multi-national community within a *Kazakh* nation. This study investigates whether government efforts to promote this Kazakhstani identity are successful through qualitative interviews with 30 Kazakhstani youths of various nationalities, from all regions of Kazakhstan. Several trends become apparent that illustrate both the overall success of the government's endeavors as well as Kazakhstani identity's precarious future. While most young people may identify themselves as Kazakhstani (with the exception of young, southern Kazakhs), many also express fears of how the balance between nationalities may change after Nazarbayev. Their stories and reflections further add to our understanding of how citizen and state relations are changing in a post-Soviet context.
Keywords: Kazakhstan 1991–, nationalism, identity politics, ethnic relations

1. Introduction

Like many other post-Soviet states in 1991, Kazakhstani leaders faced the challenge of building a new, independent state from a multinational population. At the time of independence, Kazakhs were minorities in their own country, accounting for 40.1% of the population, while Russians closely followed with 37.4% (1989 census in Olcott, 2002). Today, Kazakhs account for 63.1% of the population, and Russians, 23.7% (2009 census in CIA World Factbook, 2012). Faced with such a diverse population, President Nazarbayev and government officials have attempted to unify all nationalities under one inclusive, Kazakhstani national identity.

In 2009, at President Nazarbayev's initiation, the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (APK) developed a draft of the Doctrine of National Unity, meant to "consolidate political stability, unity, and accord" within Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev, qtd. in Lillis, 29/4/2010). Intended to establish in a single doctrine what Nazarbayev had already envisioned in other policies, the Doctrine promoted the idea of a multinational community, in which citizens identified themselves first as Kazakhstani and then as members of their individual nationalities. To Nazarbayev's surprise, the Doctrine was met with resistance, setting off protest from Kazakh nationalist leaders and opposition parties, who claimed that it was an attack on Kazakh language and culture. Opposition party leaders were also against the Doctrine and wrote an alternative draft, known as the National Unity Blueprint. They rejected the idea of a Kazakhstani nation and instead called for the unification of all nationalities under the idea of a Kazakh nation, in which Kazakh language served as a uniting force for all nationalities. Published in February 2008, the Blueprint led to more protest, with many claiming that it was discriminatory towards non-Kazakhs.

After several months of debate, in April 2010, the APK issued a new Doctrine of National Unity that incorporated the concerns of nationalist leaders and political parties. The Doctrine of National Unity consists of three principles: 1) "one country—one fate," 2) "different origin—equal opportunities," and 3) "development of the national spirit" (Doctrine of National Unity, 2010). According to the Doctrine, Kazakhs play a special role as the "consolidating center of unification of the nation" (Doctrine, 2010). Yet under the second principle, all groups are guaranteed equal opportunities and the right to preserve their culture and language. The third principle emphasizes the responsibility of everyone to take part in the awakening of national identity, especially in promoting Kazakh language.

The debate surrounding the Doctrine of National Identity illustrates the difficulties Kazakhstan faces in uniting around a national identity. Eventually, the Doctrine was accepted, but to what extent do these same issues continue to cause debate in Kazakhstan today, two years later? Do ordinary people consider themselves first and foremost as Kazakhstani, or do they still think of themselves as Kazakh, Russian, etc.? This research explores the debate that surrounds the Doctrine of National Identity by interviewing Kazakhstani youth to hear in their own words how they identify themselves and how they envision their country's future.

2. Methods

This research consists of two methodologies. The first is a basic policy analysis of Kazakhstani legislation related to national identity and its surrounding debate, as expressed in print and online articles. This provides a background for the second methodology, or main part of the research project—interviews with Kazakhstani youth. Either having been born after the collapse of the Soviet Union or too young to remember, youth represent the first generation of Kazakhstanis growing up in a young and independent Kazakhstan. These interviews are ongoing and thus far have included 30 participants. As of April 2012, of the 30 interviewed, the demographics were the following:

By nationality:

Kazakh	Russian	Uzbek	Other	Total
17	6	2	5	30

By gender:

Male	Female	Total
13	17	30

By region:

North	South	East	West	Almaty	Total
5	15	2	2	6	30

Participants' ages range from 19 to 36 years old. They were not chosen randomly and are, therefore, not statistically significant or representative of the population as a whole.

The interviews take the shape of an oral history project, concentrating on specific themes, such as where the participant was born, his/her family history, and his/her opinion on language and identity. Although the researcher cannot form assertions meant to characterize Kazakhstan as a whole, certain trends have begun to emerge that may characterize how Kazakhstani youth perceive their national identity.

3. Results

Three trends have become apparent from the interviews thus far. The first trend is that most participants have agreed that they are Kazakhstani (with the exception of southern Kazakhs as explained below). Members of minority groups, such as Russians, Koreans, Tatars and Uzbeks, are especially more likely to consider themselves as Kazakhstani. They support Nazarbayev's policies, viewing him as a sort of father figure who mediates peace between nationalities. They fear what will happen when he is no longer president.

The second trend is that while members of minority groups may support Nazarbayev and Kazakhstani identity, young Kazakhs, especially from the South, are much more nationalistic. Even if they consider themselves Kazakhstani, they tend to think of this as only their citizenship and something less important than nationality. Being Kazakh is important to them, and they often speak Kazakh at home. They usually think that everyone should speak Kazakh. They are against the Doctrine of National Unity because they say it threatens Kazakh culture. They do not support Nazarbayev because they think he is not nationalistic enough. It is important to them that nationality remains on passports.

The last trend is more surprising. Some participants, especially those who are either Kazakh (but not from the South) or those who are minorities, have expressed that being Kazakhstani is connected to government accountability. They tie national identity with pride for one's country, and they claim that they cannot feel pride until they think that the government is responsible to its people. This is not necessarily surprising to hear from students in Almaty, who are studying political science and economics, but the researcher did not expect to hear this in southern Kazakhstan from people who have not had the same educational opportunities. Yet, in their own words, they expressed similar ideas with greater frustration, claiming that they considered themselves Russian or Uzbek because they could not consider themselves Kazakhstani. Until they think that the government is accountable and responsible, they cannot feel united under Kazakhstani identity.

4. Conclusions

This research is ongoing and continues to explore how Kazakhstani youth perceive national identity. Their impressions of their country's national identity and its future are overall positive. With the exception of Kazakhs from southern Kazakhstan, they consider themselves Kazakhstani. Although some may point out flaws in the government, especially in its accountability to the people, they remain positive that these problems will sort themselves out in the future. In fact, the uniting factor of all the interviews has been how positive participants have been. Regardless of whether they identify as Kazakhstani, they express openness towards other nationalities and identify tolerance as a defining feature of being from Kazakhstan.
In the next few months, the researcher will continue interviewing youth, especially those from the West and East, to fill in demographic gaps and to continue to determine whether the trends above are applicable.

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Nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and the moral demands of a global age.

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Abstract: In this century, federalism as the promise of a reconciliation between regional aggregation and local autonomy does not seem to be very popular. The protracted crisis of the European integration process, the difficulties along the way of other regional integration processes, and the persistent appeal of nationalism (at the state or at the infrastate level) are evidence of that. Nationalism, on the other hand, harbors enough political risks and theoretical difficulties to induce to question its ineluctability. This paper examines the emerging cosmopolitan discourse. It investigates the merits and the shortcomings of cosmopolitanism in its main contemporary variants, and assesses its viability against the ethical and political challenges of a global age.

Keywords: *Cosmopolitanism, nationalism, globalization, global ethics, national identity.*

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The factors of ethnic migration: a case study of the Kazakhs in China

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Abstract: Kazakhs happened to live outside the territory of modern day Kazakhstan under various historical reasons and in different time periods. Since 1991 the government of Kazakhstan has been promoting the ethnic repatriation policy. Big inflow of Kazakh Diaspora has become a considerable factor of changes in economic and social-cultural spheres in the country. In the light of the rising problems, the recipient state and society have to work out a deliberate strategy of the repatriation and integration processes management. That means, first of all, the central role of state in the mutual adaptation of recipient society and the migrants. But the ongoing strategies and practices of migrants also play serious role. They to great extent depend on the cultural context of the countries they came from.
The Kazakhs of China have big migration potential (111718 people, residing in several national-autonomous administrative units – Ili-Kazakh autonomous district, Mulei-Kazakh and Balikun-Kazakh autonomous regions, and some of them are living in Aksai-Kazakh autonomous uezd in Gansu province).
The report is aimed to reveal the hierarchy of push-factors behind the ethnic Kazakh migration from China on the basis of the field materials (semi-structured interviews, surveys) obtained in the XUAR of China.
The report considers the following questions: what is the order of Kazakh migration from China? Which factor is dominant- ethnic needs (positive ethnic identity, ethnic security, social welfare, emotion well-being, recognized ethnic status, self-realization opportunities, etc.) or Chinese domestic problems specifically interpreted by ethnic Kazakhs - labor shortage, changes in ecological situation in the Kazakh traditional living zone (ecological concerns, climate changes, flora and fauna degradation)? What is the place of subjective factors: ethnic mentality, ethnic stereotypes – self-perception and vision of the "other"; motherland constructs building in the migration reasons to Kazakhstan.
Is there direct link between Kazakhs' migration from China and labor migration?
Understanding of these problems will make the activities of services monitoring much more effective. Moreover, it might become the basis to trace the migration tendencies within Kazakhstan among repatriates and to optimize the migrants' adaptation process, as well as to settle the problems with serious conflict potential in the society.

Globalization and the Strength of Parliaments In New Parliamentary Systems? The Case of Kyrgyzstan

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Abstract: Political scientists paid relatively less attention to legislatures in developing countries than to other political institutions; such as the executive, the bureaucracy, and the military because legislatures appeared more ineffective and irrelevant than other institutions. However, the functioning and representative legislature is the essential part of the functioning democracy. Central Asian countries have not achieved full democracy in twenty years after the independence and transition to democracy. In these countries, the executive, mainly the president has since been strengthened and the majority of these countries have evolved into a more authoritarian system. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have authoritarian presidential systems they deem essential in an area marked by ethnic and clan rivalries as well as Islamist insurgency. The legislatures became puppets at the hands of the presidents and have lost their function of representation. In June 2010, Kyrgyz voters approved a new constitution curbing presidential powers and establishing the first parliamentary democracy in the region. Kyrgyzstan switched from presidential system to semi-parliamentary system and elected parliament on October 2010. This resulted in the establishment of more than eighty political parties and five parties in parliament. This paper compares the structure and representation of Kyrgyz Parliament under the presidential system and

under the parliamentary system. It also compares Kyrgyzstan with other Central Asian countries in terms of representation. It hypothesizes that the representative function of the parliament is much stronger under the parliamentary system than the presidential system. On a broad theoretical level, it theorizes that the parliament is weak in full parliamentary system, such as Turkey, because of party discipline and authoritarian presidential systems, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, but the parliament is stronger in new parliamentary systems, such as in Kyrgyzstan and in democratic presidential systems, such as in the U.S.

Local ethnic communities of Tajikistan under the influence of external actors

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Local ethnic groups of modern Tajikistan are a striking phenomenon. The difference between them is due to geographical, religious, ethnic, economical features and their place in the socio-political hierarchy of the country. These groups play an important role in the recent history of Tajikistan. The investigation of their nature and significance is crucial for the comprehension of the social patterns of Central Asia[39].

One of the indicative features of the local ethnic communities of the republic of Tajikistan (RT) is existence of their own foreign policy orientation and sometimes even a kind of particular "foreign affairs". This set of views, ideas and actions is not stable, but it distinctly separates one regional group from another. *Modification of these mental patterns under the influence of current policy of international actors* is the subject of the report.

The research is mostly based on the obtained in vast series of interviews, taken in key regions of RT, including Dushanbe, in the North (Penjikent) in the South (Khatlon region), in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. The expedition took place in summer of 2011. Among the interviewees were experts of state analysis centers, academic institutions, representatives of the main political parties, religious communities (Sunni, Ismailis, Orthodox Christians), local political and business elite… Another source was a set of recent explorations in international relations of Tajikistan.

Studies have revealed some significant changes in the balance of the influences of the leading international players and in their local perception in Tajikistan over the last decade. Obviously, today regional and global powers are considered and evaluated by the society, which is trying hard not only to overcome the effects of civil war, but moreover is looking for new financial sources and new economic, social, political model to adopt[40].

Among the mental changes that can be noticed in all units of Tajik society the most inclusive is the new attitude to Russia, mainly based on "economic pragmatism" and the gently negative impression of its political relations with RT. This revision is caused by the "underside" of labor migration emphasized by local media, dissatisfaction with the results of Russian-Tajik economic cooperation[41], Russia's inability to create effective tools of cultural influence[42] and the emergence of "postcolonial" discourse. Military troops and objects owned by RF, which had secured peace treaties became clear evidence of the lack of Rahmons' power. That's why Tajikistan authorities hastened (with US support) the process of establishing native Border guards corpse[43] and urged for measures against the traces of Russian influence in Tajik language

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and culture[44]. At the same time official media launched the campaign aimed to dispute foreign military bases. As a result positive image of Russia hasn't been brought down only in Badakhshan.
Definite negative feelings are associated in Tajikistan society with the policy of Uzbekistan. Serial measures of I. Karimov's regime (such as the embargo and massive criticism of any of Rahmon's international activities) along with forceful efforts of the Tajik official media to make an "enemy image"[45] of the neighboring country led people to feel themselves victims of Uzbekistan's policy. This feeling has become an integral part of all local mindsets including the mentality of the native Uzbeks.
The other external actors have different effects on particular communities and social strata.
The growth of Chinese influence has caused the most controversial response. Enhancing economic cooperation with China, accompanied by massive investment and the restoration/creation of Tajikistan's infrastructure[46], extends the loyalty of business elites in the North and in central districts, as well as the ruling class's support. But the political price of this rapprochement (continued cession of controversial areas of the Eastern Pamirs to China[47]) strengthens the position of pro-Russian intellectuals in Dushanbe and reinforces the secession movement in Badakhshan. Chinese investment conditions that involve the use of staff and equipment from CPR penalize sections of the labor market, giving rise to anti-Chinese protest among the unprivileged groups of North and South.
Polar and often unexpected responses of ethno-regional communities are produced by the policy of the Sunni organizations maintained by Arab countries and Afghanistan. Thus, The Islamic Revival Party (IRP) sponsored by foreign fundamentalists has devotees among the population of the poor unstable Rasht, and among some intellectuals in the capital.
Minor foreign actors often rely on the development of relations with the RT in the sphere of culture and education. A successful example of this kind is the activities of the French center "Bactria", which has placed all the contacts between Tajikistan and the EU under its control. The attempts to incorporate Iranian and Turkish Schools into the educational space of RT didn't achieve clear positive results, mostly due to some religious and ethno-linguistic bottlenecks.
Among important non-state actors whose influence spread to different regions of Tajikistan impressive progress been made by the Nizari Ismaili organization controlled by Aga Khan IV. It was Aga Khan who built several bridges across the river Panj, connecting Tajik and Afghan Badakhshan[48]. This act of goodwill joined spheres of his predominant influence in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. His educational, infrastructure and economic projects in the Pamir consolidated the Ismaili of RT on the basis of complete loyalty to the religious leader. The obvious achievements and political pliancy allowed Aga Khan IV to expand into areas of Republican Subordination (the central part of the RT) and get rid of any suspiciousness held by local authorities and the Sunni majority.
Thus, due to the historical and cultural features of the development of Tajikistan the occurrence of ethno-regional groups is an important factor influencing the international situation in the republic and its relations with various external actors. Its consideration is half the battle for many of the actors, whose interaction in this region becomes more and more intensive.

Transitions of identity and conflicts in Ferghana

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Abstract: Since the Soviet Union dissolved, several ethnic or national conflicts arise within the border of Soviet Union. The characteristics of these conflicts are different than those conflicts during the Cold War era, because the conflicts are more often waged between neighboring communities, not between neighboring states. Hence, questions of conflict become closely related to the questions of collective identity. Of course, this brought different questions. Naturally, the first question to be asked is, "which

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[48] *Кошлаков Г. В., Тураева М. О., Майтдинова Г. М.* Экономические интересы России…С. 155-168.

collective identity is one talking about-communal, ethnic, national, or international?" The same question can be asked about the conflict. However, conflict seems to be more tangible concept than identity, since conflicts involves material changes on the face of the earth, such as a destruction of the environment or death. Then, the next question is, which type of collective identity matters in a conflict?
This study, therefore, aims to describe and explain relationship between collective identity and conflict drawing on different theoretical approaches in political science. This study struggles with the questions: collective identity, either on national, or civilizational, or religious, or societal level, an important variable in trying to understand current conflicts? What are the prospects for the formulation of identity-based approaches to conflict? In other words, is it, or is it possible at all, to think about collective identity and conflict simultaneously? Consequently, the other question to consider is: Why collective identity is important factor to explain conflict in Ferghana Valley?

After the review of current debates on identity and conflict, the first part of the study focuses on how different schools of thought in political science define and explain collective identity and conflict. We also analyze linkages between collective identity and conflict as theorized by different theories of political science. The final part of this section we will focus on the evaluation of the discoveries of the linkages and insights of the theoretical approaches.

The second part of this study is conflicts in Ferghana Valley. The Ferghana Valley has played either to establish stability in the Central Asia or to become starting point of violent conflict throughout history of the region. The valley has administrational or ethnically divided among several parts during the long history of the region. Currently the tension among different ethnic, social and political groups are high because of overpopulation, the increasing scarcity of water and arable land, economic hardships and social differentiation. For these reasons, the valley is a good area to test explanatory power of different approaches of political science to explain collective identity-conflict relations.

Islamic revival in Central Asia: Afghanistan and post 2014 regional geo-political dynamics

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Abstract: The paper attempts an analysis of the key issues in contemporary regional security system in Central Asia through the prospects of the situation in Afghanistan, those factors that lead to the possible Islamic revival in Central Asia after likely U.S. withdrawal post 2014. Already today the strenthening of Islamist groups even in Kazakhstan, in the country which it was least subject to this given tendency as well as uncertanty of a situation with Islam in Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan gives the basis to believe about further strengthening of Islamic radicalism in this region. The case of Uzbekistan is much more complicated. The question of Islamic revival will stand on the agenda of all countries in Central Asia for a long time and mainly this will be directly connected with peace-building processes in Afghanistan. Peace-making operation of NATO forces in Afghanistan has appeared not so successful in respect of an establishment of the democratic governance building and social modernisation in this country. Peace-making forces could not win the Taliban, so the basic threat from militarised Islam to Central Asia proceeds todays from Afghanistan.

Key-Words: Islamic radicalism, Taliban, regional security, Afghanistan, instability, US strategy, geo-political dynamics

1. Introduction

The devastating terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent American reaction thereof brought about a systematic transformation in the geopolitical situation in South-West Asia – a region which includes both South Asia and the Persian Gulf and stretches into Central Asia. Now, ten years after, besides some notions of "accomplishments", Afghanistan seems to be tilting towards another round of insurgency, instability and insecurity. The Taliban appear to be on the move once again with the same Pakistani-backing and members of the NATO Forces have already admitted that they were "not

winning against the Taliban"[49]. Eventually, the trouble is deeply rooted in the geopolitics of the region more than any other factor, which is not entirely under the control of Washington. It is only a matter of common knowledge that without the continued involvement of neighboring countries – both at govermental and non-govermental levels – Afghanistan's long war could not have been pursued.

2. Afghanistan and Regional Geo-political Dynamics

What are then the regional geo-political dynamics of the United States' military presence in Afghanistan? How the anti-American forces are going to react to an enduring US military presence in South-west`Asia? What strategic measures and policy initiative could be taken by the United States and the regional actors to bring about a lasting peace in the region? These are the questions which haunt us when we go for any serious analysis.

A restrospective analysis of Washington's policy towards the pre-9/11 Afghanistan shows that the United States is ready to accept the fundamentalist regime to further its geo-political ambition in the region[50]. The geo-strategic argument was that since the Taliban was pro-Pakistani, and at the same time anti-Russian and anti-Iranian, the United States ought to accept it. As per this argument, it was not an American affair to ascertain how the Taliban treats its own people, or to cater to "a stable Afghanistan with an aesthetically challenged government than a convulsed Afghanistan that offers a playground for Iranian and Russian devilments"[51]. Nevertheless, the US hoped that after long years of turmoil, the Taliban would unite the country. A Sunni-dominated government in Kabul would serve as a bulwark against the influence of Iran in the region[52].

In this radically altered scenario, Afghanistan neighbors share lots of global and regional geo-political concerns because the stability of Afghanistan has a larger meaning for all of them. The US military presence in this volatile landmass was bound to have a profound effect on the strategic thinking of all the countries, as none of them have ever had discarded the region as a sphere of US influence which now appears to be an unconcealed reality. Hence, the regional geo-politics will partly be shaped by what happens in Afghanistan in the near future, including the nature and duration of the US presence. If the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates, then unalloyed security concerns will dominate.

Moreover, now the Russians began to grow apprehensive about the long-term American military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The fear of possible "encirclement" by the US seems to have prevailed on the Russian psyche. The US interest in expanding the existing infrastructure in the region to meet future strategic contingencies made the Russians uneasy. Russian felt that the US was establishing itself permanently in their own sphere of influence and that could spark a series of geopolitical contests[53].

While the US went to Central Asia only to "solve the afghan problem", Russia has more immediate regional interests that compel Moscow to maintain a long-term presence. Russians fear that the US might seek control of Central Asia's oil and gas reserves and that Moscow could end up having NATO on its borders. America's unilateral moves based solely on its own self-interest have led to unsettling strategic dynamics[54], according to Moscow.

3. The Nature of Islam in Afghanistan and the Taliban Phenomenon: Sufism versus Vahabism

The exact origion of the Taliban according to many writers is shrouded in mystery[55]. According to Kalim Bakhadur, an Indian expert on Pakistan, "this myth has been really promoted in order to cover up the role played by the Pakistan's agencies in the creation and training of the group. Extremist Islam has never been popular in Afghanistan. In fact Afghans have been very tolerant in religious matters. This was because

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[49] Jagmohan Meher, "Understanding the Dynamics of Afghan Instability", Contemporary Central Asia, Vol.10, no.3, December 2006, pp.1-31

[50] Jagmohan Meher, America's Afghanistan War: The Success That Failed, Kalpaz Publication, New Delhi, 2004, pp.1999-227.

[51] Adam Garfinkle, "Afghanistanding," Orbis, vol.43, no.3, Summer, 1999, p.415.

[52] John F.Burns and Steve Levine, "For Afghans, The Taliban Rise to Power Was Deliverance from Tyranny", International Herald Tribune, 2 January 1997.

[53] Leszek Buszynski, "Russia's New Role in Central Asia," Asian Survey, Vol.45, no.4, (July/August 2005), pp.546-565.

[54] Iian Berman, "The New Battleground:Central Asia and the Caucasus," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.28, no.1 (Winter 2004-05), pp.59-69.

[55] Kamal Matinuddin, "The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan; 1994-1997",2000, New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributers, p.21

of the influence of the Sufism in the country[56]. Sufism has been a trend in mystical Islam which originated in Central Asia and Persia. There are several Sunni Sufi orders and among them Naqshbandiyah and Qadriya are the most popular in Afghanistan. The members of the former Sufi order have been close to the Afghan ruling families. Saudi Wahabism could not take roots in the country mainly because of the influence of Sufism. It was only after the Khalqi revolt in 1978 that there began the flow of Saudi arms and money which also brought in Wahabism in Afghanistan.

Most islamic movements in Afghanistan including the one led by Bacha Saqa which over threw the regime of King Ammanullah in 1929 were not inspired by the ideal of setting up an Islamic state as propounded by Islamic ideologies like Mawlana Mawdudi, Syed Qutb and Ayatullah Khomeini. The ideology of the fundamentalist parties appealed to the students of the modern educated schools of colleges and the modern strata of the society[57]. These ideologies interpreted Islam not as a religion but as a political theory. So, Islamic fundamentalism came to Afghanistan through students who went to Al Azhar.

Особенности реализации интеграционной политики государства в современных условиях

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Наиболее важным принципом эффективной реализации экономической политики в современных условиях является принцип наименьшего вреда социально-экономической системе Казахстана. Этому будет способствовать осуществление вектора широкомасштабной, по все направлениям действий в рамках обозначенной стратегии развития страны. Превентивность целевой функции стратегического развития экономики и таким образом подчинение этой целевой траектории всех существующих методов, инструментов государственного регулирования. При этом необходимо учитывать факт возможности усиления деформационных процессов в экономике, которые имели место до начала проведения реформ. Очень важно соблюдать принцип максимального снижения риска для жизнеобеспечения всей национальной воспроизводственной системы РК. В данном случае актуальной проблемой является необходимость решения проблем дисфункциональности систем жизнеобеспечения экономических структур, тем самым способствуя устойчивости этих систем к внешним воздействиям.

Это положения актуализируется еще и активизацией интеграционных процессов в мировой экономики, усилением международных хозяйственных связей Казахстана. В рамках данной траектории развития национальной системы хозяйствования необходимо соблюдать принцип преемственности проводимых преобразований, использования опыта других государств в области реформирования, оценки и адаптированного использования с максимальным положительным эффектом, оценки реальных возможностей, политических ограничений для реального воплощения той или иной стратегии государства. Так же определение этапов, сроков реализации преобразовательной стратегии, текущая корректировка возникающих дисфункций в системе управления экономикой на сегодняшний день являются актуальными для Казахстана.

В условиях глобальной открытости национальных экономик необходимо оценить влияние международных организаций, политических структур, являющихся агентами международной конкуренции на внутреннее развитие страны. Целесообразно избирательно с ориентиром на приоритетные направления развития национальных систем подходить к рекомендациям извне. Вся экономическая политика страны должна быть ориентирована на достижение внутренней устойчивости, на самодостаточное развитие в векторе усиления конкурентных позиций. Самодостаточное развитие ориентирует страну на концентрированное использование ресурсов на

[56] Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central”, 2000, London, I.B.Tauris Publishers, p.84
[57] Oliver Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan” in William Malley’s “Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban”, 1999, London, Hurst &Company, n.no.2, p.199

приоритетных направлениях. Институциональная база кредитования должна носить преимущественно национальный окрас, ориентирована на обеспечение экономической безопасности страны, на повышение конкурентоспособности и эти ориентиры выведут страну на траекторию реального роста.

Реализация государственной политики обеспечивается посредством различных форм. Для повышения конкурентоспособности национальной экономики необходимо использовать те виды экономической политики, которые дадут наибольший эффект в данный момент.

Но так или иначе критерием эффективности реализации всех направлений государственной политики является обеспечение самодостаточности национальной системы хозяйствования, которая объективно предполагает высокий уровень производительности труда. Это можно достичь посредством обеспечения прогрессирующей систематизации элементов макросистемы, которыми являются функциональные подсистемы – сферы и отрасли экономики и обеспечивающие подсистемы – системообразующие виды государственной политики и системы целевых ориентиров, представленных национальными программами развития.

Целью государственной политики является обеспечение целостной системы взаимосвязанных элементов, результатом которой является достижение прогрессирующей систематизации и гомеостаза, а значит ее стойкости. Формирование макросистемы подобного типа обеспечит создание конкурентоспособной экономики.

В реальной жизни достичь данного качества целостности и устойчивости сложно. На практике многие правительственные программы полностью не реализуются. Данный же принцип реализации государственной политики демонстрирует актуальность логической завершенности каждого элемента и ее тесную взаимосвязь со всеми другими элементами. В противном случае мы имеем дело с неэффективной реализацией государственной политики и нарушением целостности системы. Критерием данной неэффективности является разработка новых программ, зачастую дублирующих старые, еще незавершенные стратегии.

Одной из составляющих обеспечивающей подсистемы является политика интеграции, которая в условиях неустойчивости глобальных процессов является для Казахстана наиболее актуальной. Это связано с тем, что Казахстан является неотъемлемой частью советской системы хозяйствования, в которой все хозяйствующие субъекты и связи формировались как необходимые элементы для обеспечения единой воспроизводственной системы СССР. Россия и Казахстан занимали ключевые позиции в системе производства общественного продукта для всего Союза.

Предприятия этих стран имели тесные связи в системе воспроизводства, которые в постсоветский период значительно разрушились. Это явилось дестабилизирующим фактором, который спровоцировал кризис 90-х годов и значительно снизил конкурентные преимущества этих стран на мировом рынке. Казахстанская сторона, понимая значение интеграции в рамках постсоветского пространства в противодействии отрицательным эффектам глобализации, всегда выступала за восстановление связей на новых принципах. Сегодня эти идеи получают конкретную реализацию в рамках формирования Таможенного союза в 2010 году и Единого экономического пространства в 2012 году.

Таким образом, предприятия Казахстана, России, Белоруссии имеют реальную возможность строить отношения на новой более эффективной основе, но базируясь на традиционной специализации. На наш взгляд, эти процессы можно запустить через использования различных форм экономической интеграции, в частности схожих с кластерной организацией воспроизводственных циклов.

Мировой опыт реализации кластерной формы развития позволяет выделить ее общепризнанную характеристику - территориально-производственные схемы взаимодействия. На наш взгляд, данный критерий не отражает реалий современного развития стран, интегрирующихся в рамках мирового рыночного пространства. В соответствии с возможностями интегрирования Казахстана в рамках Таможенного союза необходимо формировать новые организационные структуры, результатом функционирования которых будет повышение эффективности воспроизводственных процессов в интегративном формате. Возможные направления формирования потенциальных объединений кластерного типа следующие:

- Казахстан, Россия, Беларусь: машиностроение, транспортная логистика (Проект Западный Китай-Западная Европа);
- Казахстан, Россия: нефтепереработка, металлургия, электроэнергетика, производства и реализация зерна

Предприятия данных направлений специализации не находятся в одном регионе, а связаны между собой родственными видами деятельности, объедение которых в результате дает эффект прогрессирующей систематизации на уровне глобальной системы, т.е. например, Таможенного союза. В связи с этим целесообразно развивать подобные интегративные объединения хозяйствующих субъектов стран-участниц единого экономического пространства, способствующие их стойкости глобальным вызовам. Естественное, что такое объединение для Казахстана будет не по всем параметрам выгодным, но объективно необходимым. Таким образом, интегрирования Казахстана с Россией и Беларусь, в частности, является реальной потребностью с целью противостоять дисфункциям глобальной системы. Для удовлетворения этой потребности необходимо создавать соответствующие организационные формы экономической интеграции, тем самым создавая условия для реализации прогрессирующей систематизации и обеспечивая самодостаточность системы. Тем самым закономерно задействуется механизм повышения конкурентоспособности на наднациональном и национальном уровне в соответствии с системным принципом.

Данные организационные объединения можно назвать международными интегрированными комплексами (МИК), под которыми мы понимаем определенную группу хозяйствующих субъектов, связанных общностью тех или иных экономических интересов, что подтверждается наличием определенных договорённостей между ними и/или общей цели функционирования в рамках международных интеграционных экономических образований. Основным отличием МИК от других международных образований, таких как ТНК, является то, что компании ТНК это структуры однонациональные по составу ядра акционерного капитала и контролю, но международные по сфере деятельности и создаются по объективным причинам - централизации и концентрации производства и капитала. А МИК создаются сверху при активном участии правительств интегрирующихся стран.

Интегративные формы функционирования основных хозяйствующих субъектов на международном уровне дадут положительный эффект для Казахстана. Необходимо активизировать потенциальные возможности Казахстана, его преимущества для повышения конкурентоспособности национальной экономики. Имеет место большие сложности в реализации данной политики, но процессы интеграции на современном этапе являются объективными и выгодными в рамках Таможенного союза.

Экономическая интеграция Казахстана и Центральной Азии: регионализация и/или глобализация?

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С.Б. Казбекова

Казахстан – Евразийская страна. Он имеет много общего в историческом, геополитическом и оборонном отношениях с сопредельными странами. В этом ряду безусловный приоритет в совершенствовании интеграционных связей принадлежит России и государствам Центральной Азии. Становление и укрепление Казахстана и других государств Центральной Азии предполагает их более тесное экономическое сотрудничество в рамках бывшего постсоветского пространства. Это обусловлено тем, что в процессе движения к открытой экономике и интеграции хозяйств в мировую экономику, эти страны сталкиваются с рядом сложных, но сходных проблем и задач по стабилизации экономики и выводу ее из кризиса. Их легче решать совместными усилиями, с помощью взаимовыгодной интеграции хозяйств этих государств для рационального использования природных, сырьевых, минеральных и топливно-энергетических ресурсов, развития научно-технического и других видов сотрудничества.

Объективная необходимость такой интеграции основана на общности экономических, политических и других интересов этих государств, обусловленной близостью территорий, единством исторических, культурных и этнических корней населяющих их народы. Такая обусловленность в значительной мере усиливается также тесной взаимозависимостью Казахстана и других стран Центральной Азии в силу специфики и особенностей развития и размещения их производительных

сил, природных, трудовых ресурсов и транспортно-экономических связей, сформировавшихся за годы существования административно-командной системы в единое экономическое пространство.
В этом едином экономическом пространстве сложилась общая промышленная инфраструктура, ориентированная на обслуживание добывающих производств, магистральные трубопроводы, энергосистема, сельское хозяйство и оросительная сеть, железнодорожный, автомобильный, воздушный и водный пути, а также протяженные границы со многими государствами Евразийского континента. При этом вся производственная инфраструктура и выпускаемая ею продукция ориентированы на внутренний рынок стран СНГ, а на мировом рынке, за исключением некоторых развивающихся стран, она неконкурентоспособна.
Сложившаяся специализация отраслей и тесная кооперация между предприятиями стран Центральной Азии – основа будущего партнерства на межгосударственном уровне. Поэтому ускорение экономической интеграции, особенно в условиях продолжающегося мирового финансового кризиса, - необходимая предпосылка скорейшего выхода этих стран из кризиса.
Казахстан, как и другие страны Центральной Азии, по интеллектуальному и технологическому уровню, а также рыночному менталитету, не говоря уже об экономическом и структурном развитии, пока не вписывается в постиндустриальную глобальную экономическую систему с ее транснациональными интеграционными тенденциями. Поэтому, всемерно расширяя сотрудничество с дальним зарубежьем, одновременно нужно в полной мере использовать возможности интеграции в рамках региона Центральной Азии. Такую интеграцию можно рассматривать как необходимую и неизбежную ступень развития каждого государства, так как в индустриально развитое сообщество мира можно войти лишь в результате качественных структурных преобразований в экономике и обретения должной конкурентоспособности.
Таким образом, речь идет об интеграции государств Центральной Азии, понимаемой как равноправный экономический союз, формирующийся в результате дальнейшего развития сложившихся хозяйственно-экономических связей, тесной производственной кооперации, имеющего единый рынок сбыта, схожий экономический и рыночный менталитет населения и одинаковый технологический уровень производства. При этом последние обстоятельства являются определяющими в стремлении этих государств к интеграции.
Особую актуальность проблема приобретает в связи с разрушением прежних хозяйственных связей, падением производства и высокой инфляцией в этих странах. Все это диктует необходимость проведения согласованной экономической политики в Центральной Азии, скорейшей экономической интеграции на основе равноправия, независимости, экономической целесообразности и взаимной выгоды суверенных государств.
Именно таким требованиям соответствовал, например, «Договор о создании единого экономического пространства между Республикой Казахстан и Республикой Узбекистан» от 10 января 1994 г.
Очевидно, подписание такого документа означало нечто гораздо большее, чем просто договор между соседними государствами, так как создаваемое Единое экономическое пространство между двумя крупнейшими республиками Центральной Азии, по существу, закладывало прочную первооснову для развития интеграции не только в Центральной Азии, но и во всем экономическом пространстве СНГ.
План-график разработки документов, необходимых для реализации «Договора о создании Единого экономического пространства …», предусматривал подготовку и реализацию ряда важнейших документов, имеющих как тактическое, так и стратегическое значение. Среди них Соглашения о согласованной финансовой, денежно-кредитной и валютной политике, о координации политики в области цен и налогов, о платежном союзе с последующим созданием Валютного союза на основе единой денежной зоны с введением наднациональной валюты, об открытии Платежной (клиринговой) палаты «Казахстан-Узбекистан» в республиках, предложения о создании Регионального инвестиционного банка, Соглашение о создании единого таможенного пространства и таможенного союза, предложения о поэтапном сокращении перечня квотируемой и лицензируемой продукции, по созданию благоприятных условий для добросовестной конкуренции, включая механизм антимонопольного регулирования, и т.д.
К сожалению, разработка и практическое осуществление этих, а также ряда других предпринятых в дальнейшем мер, многие из которых уже начали реализовываться и которые были призваны задействовать важнейший эффективный механизм межгосударственного взаимодействия в

условиях переходного периода, из-за возникших разногласий между политическими элитами государств Центральной Азии было приостановлено.
Это обстоятельство и послужило одной из причин того, почему Казахстан во внешнеэкономической сфере стал проводить политику преимущественной глобализации своей экономики.
Однако теория утверждает, что экономическая интеграция протекает в конкретных территориальных границах, носит в основном региональный характер. Она происходит между государствами с однородной социально-экономической природой, чем определяются политические границы интеграции. Сближение наций, участвующих в интеграционных связях, призвано подняться на качественно новую ступень – достичь оптимизации экономических структур, в особенности посредством создания международных хозяйственных комплексов, что в конечном счете должно привести к повышению общественной производительности труда и позволить членам региональных союзов реализовать экономический эффект и решать тем самым цели социально-политического характера.
Поиск путей вхождения Республики Казахстан в мировую экономику в обстановке происходящих противоречивых процессов в существенной мере осложнился, так как теперь при разработке внешнеэкономической стратегии следовало исходить из сохраняющегося сосуществования противоположных тенденций глобализации и регионализации. Проблема заключается в том, что в результате глобализации, проникновения транснациональных корпораций при поддержке международных валютных организаций для экономики развивающихся стран возникают реальные угрозы и опасность, поскольку основной мотивацией международной экспансии транснациональных корпораций является их заинтересованность в дешевой рабочей силе, рынках сбыта и источниках сырья, а также стремление уйти от уплаты налогов, от соблюдения национального законодательства, проведение операций через оффшорные и другие льготные зоны. Осуществление эффективной региональной интеграции с учетом особенностей каждой страны – основная мера предотвращения или смягчения этих угроз.
Поэтому важно определиться: как, в какой форме и в какой последовательности проводить региональную интеграцию в трансформационных странах? Другой важный урок прошедшего периода состоит в том, что на успешное развитие по пути регионализации можно рассчитывать лишь в случае, если ее (регионализацию) понимают и используют как промежуточный ограниченный по времени этап вхождения в мировой рынок, как этап предшествующий глобализации. Будучи самоцелью, этот путь может завести экономику в тупик, поскольку глобализацию со всеми ее плюсами и минусами отодвинуть на какое-то время можно (как Беларусь, Узбекистан и др.), но отменить нельзя.
Объективное содержание глобализации составляют разнородные по своему происхождению, сферам проявления, механизмам и последствиям процессы. Это позволяет рассматривать глобализацию как самостоятельную, сложную систему явлений и взаимоотношений, целостную в ее системности, но внутренне противоречивую, с ярко выраженными характерными особенностями.
Отсюда глобализация – это процесс, поэтому ей характерны все свойства процессов. Глобализация может развиваться неравномерно: приостанавливаться прорываться на качественно новый уровень, при этом оказывая различное влияние на разные страны.
Этот процесс является объективным, вытекающим из нового этапа развития мировой экономической системы. Однако, помимо экономической, глобализация охватывает такие сферы, как культурная, социальная, политическая. Во всех этих сферах наблюдается процесс усиления взаимозависимости и взаимовлияния. Ни одна область в современном мире не может оставаться в стороне от глобализации.
В последние десятилетия этот процесс подвержен огромному влиянию субъективных сил: отдельных государств, ТНК, международных институтов. Широко распространено восприятие глобализации, как процесса выгодного прежде всего, США и ряду развитых стран. Поэтому глобализация часто рассматривается как американизация или вестернизация мировой экономики.
Основное влияние на ускоренное развитие процессов глобализации в последние два десятилетия оказали:
- научно-технологический прогресс,
- экономическая либерализация (развитие рыночной системы),
- изменения в политической системе в национальном и международном масштабах.
Научно-технологический прогресс глобализирует мировую экономику через развитие транспортных, коммуникационных и информационных технологий.

Развитие транспорта привело к тому, что значительно ускорились и стали дешевле перевозки грузов и пассажиров, сократилось «экономическое расстояние» между странами, которые как бы приблизились друг к другу. Наибольшие изменения произошли в авиаперевозках, которые за исключением авиапочты не существовали 50 лет назад, Теперь для большого круга товаров авиаперевозки являются наиболее быстрым и рентабельным видом транспортировки.

Ключевую роль в технологическом прогрессе сыграло стремительное внедрение информационных технологий. Развитие информационно-коммуникационных технологий повлекло снижение стоимости передачи звука, данных в значительных объемах. Внедрение технологий цифровой обработки данных и конвергенция (интеграция) средств коммуникаций и вычислительной техники позволяет транспортировать огромные потоки информации в кратчайшие сроки по низкой стоимости.

Широкое распространение получил Интернет, в котором уже работает более 250 млн. человек, причём эта цифра стремительно растёт. Лидерами здесь являются - Швеция, Финляндия, Норвегия и страны Северной Америки - США и Канада. Сейчас число пользователей Интернетом превышает 45% всего населения Швеции, 40% населения США и Канады. С внедрением информационных технологий торговая сфера претерпевает революционные изменения.

Развитие телекоммуникаций оказало огромный эффект на глобализацию производственной сферы. К примеру, сегодня дизайн нового компьютерного чипа может быть осуществлён в Силиконовой долине и переправлен для производства на фабрики в Юго-Восточной Азии. Благодаря распространению Интернета и коммуникационных технологий скандинавские страны практически полностью переориентировали спои традиционные производства и инжиниринг на работу в сфере информационных технологий.

Глобализация проходит по трём основным направлениям: преобразование основ конкурентоспособности центров мирового хозяйства, формирование новых регуляторов мирового хозяйства, постоянное воздействие на хозяйственное развитие периферии.

В рамках первых двух направлений за последние десятилетия на мирохозяйственной арене возникли новые мощные действующие силы. Если до середины XX в. в мировом хозяйстве основными субъектами международных экономических отношений были государства и предприниматели, то во второй половине XX в. в мировом хозяйстве быстро развиваются новые организационно-управленческие структуры и регуляторы мирового хозяйства - транснациональные корпорации (ТНК), мировые финансовые центры (МФЦ) и всемирная торговая организация (ВТО).

Эти системообразующие единицы мирового хозяйства тесно взаимно переплетаются и постоянно действуют заодно. Отличие ТНК от МФЦ заключается в том, что они отгораживают в свою пользу отдельные сегменты экономики и производства в самых разных странах и, координируя деятельность образовавшихся анклавов создают собственные модифицированные подсистемы международного разделения труда. Первоначально основной мотивацией международной экспансии ТНК была заинтересованность в дешевой рабочей силе, рынках сбыта и источниках сырья. С 1970-х годов важным фактором их формирования становится политика либерализации, позволившая сильнейшим компаниям и банкам выйти из-под национально-государственного контроля и приобрести немалую самостоятельность в стремлении уйти от уплаты налогов, от ужесточившихся экономических законов, а то и просто по спекулятивным соображениям.

Привлекательность ТНК для стран-реципиентов заключается в том, что они приносят определенные инвестиции, наращивают производство в определенных анклавах, создают рабочие места и в той или иной мере открывают доступ к достижениям современной науки и техники.

МФЦ повсюду выхватывают из процесса воспроизводства (из кругооборота) капитала наиболее однородный и мобильный элемент - деньги - и, манипулируя ими, сосредоточивают в своих руках огромную экономическую мощь. Особую силу им придают последние достижения информатики, позволяющие осуществлять мгновенные операции и в кратчайшие сроки перебрасывать фантастические суммы в любые точки земного шара. МФЦ состоят не только из крупных банков и финансовых институтов, но и включают валютные, фондовые и иные биржи, согласованно действующие по все более унифицированным правилам.

Какие же существуют негативные моменты вступления в ВТО? Ясно, что мы имеем конкурентоспособный сектор только в области выработки первичных продуктов переработки и добычи природных ресурсов. Другие отрасли нашей экономики неконкурентоспособны, в особенности это касается сельского хозяйства и легкой промышленности. Вступив в ВТО, Казахстан столкнется с большими проблемами, т.к. потеряет возможность прибегать к таким

методам защиты отечественных производителей, как количественные ограничения во внешней торговле: квоты, лицензии и т.д. Также от Казахстана требуют снижения уровня таможенных тарифов с потерей права в дальнейшем их повышать. Понятно, что это будет сильнейшим испытанием для бюджета нашей страны.

До нас еще толком не дошло, что вступление в ВТО может грозить полной ликвидацией некоторых отраслей народного хозяйства. Во многих странах эту опасность чувствуют острее, особенно в странах Восточной Европы, чья сельхозпродукция оказывается "вдруг" не нужна. Поэтому необходимо принимать соответствующие меры до того, как политики приняли решения и подписали документы. Для Республики Казахстан не может считаться справедливым, если обязательства по вступлению в ВТО будут основаны на сокращении уровня внутренней поддержки, оказываемого государством аграрному сектору. В 1990 г. сельское хозяйство занимало 34% в ВВП, но за годы реформ уровень сельскохозяйственного производства сократился в 2,5 раза, и теперь его доля в ВВП составляет лишь 8,4%. В этих условиях Казахстану также необходимо добиваться специальных мер защиты внутреннего производства сельского хозяйства. Но требования ВТО таковы, что если страна хочет применить подобные меры, нужны серьезные исследования, чтобы доказать, что производителю будет нанесен ущерб импортом.

Главный положительный фактор - открытие новых возможностей по доступу на мировые рынки. Разительный пример - город Бангалор в Индии, выросший на контрактах американских корпораций в один из крупнейших в мире центров разработки программного обеспечения.

Не секрет, что членство в ВТО существенно повышает инвестиционную привлекательность страны, т.к. одним из основных принципов этой организации является принцип "транспарентности", т.е. полной открытости страны, прозрачности законодательной базы. Естественно, что иностранцы, уверенные в защищенности своих инвестиций, более охотно будут вкладывать свои деньги в экономику данной страны.

Для Казахстана большое значение имеет условие ведения торговли между участниками ВТО на недискриминационной основе, в связи с большой вовлеченностью нашей республики в мировой экспорт нефти, нефтепродуктов, природного газа, электроэнергии и угля. Вступление в ВТО обеспечит нам режим наибольшего благоприятствования с 134 странами-участницами и даст ряд преимуществ в области лицензирования экспорта, стандартов, применения антидемпинговых и компенсационных пошлин и в целом будет способствовать росту внешнеэкономической активности государства. Присоединение к ВТО является неотъемлемым шагом на пути интеграции в мировое сообщество в качестве полноправного участника многосторонней торговой системы и вывода законодательства республики на современный международный уровень.

Что же касается негативных сторон, то можно предположить, что краткосрочные потери, которые несут вновь вступающие страны при сокращении тарифов, будут с лихвой компенсированы долгосрочными доходами от вхождения в мировой рынок. ВТО дает нам только правила торговли и благоприятную среду, т.е. даются возможности, а как отдельная страна будет развивать свой экспорт, зависит от нее самой. Если правительство будет вести грамотную политику и будут эффективно использоваться ресурсы, то будет и повышение экспорта. Казахстан обладает всем необходимым для того, чтобы стать в XXI веке в числе лидеров мирового развития. Гигантские природные ресурсы, научный потенциал, квалифицированная рабочая сила - все это может сделать нас вполне конкурентоспособными в глобальной экономике. В пользу глобализации говорят и слова Генерального Секретаря ООН о том, что "в сегодняшнем неспокойном мире больше всего проигрывает тот, кто остался незащищенным от глобализации. Это те, кто остался за бортом".

Резюмируя все вышеизложенное и отвечая на вопрос вынесенный в заголовок доклада можно отметить, что экономическую интеграцию Казахстана и государств Центральной Азии в мировое хозяйство в сложившихся условиях следует осуществлять путем форсированной регионализации с одновременным просчитанным и аргументированным принятием документов о вступлении в ВТО, т.е. и регионализация и глобализация одновременно.

Профессиональное образование и рынок труда: эффективность взаимодействия

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Резюме. В статье рассматриваются проблемы повышения уровня занятости населения в условиях перехода страны на инновационный путь развития, роль профессионального образования в повышении трудовой активности населения, предложены меры взаимодействия рынка образовательных услуг и рынка труда специалистов в республике.
Ключевые слова: рынок труда, занятость, безработица, профессиональное образование, рабочая сила

Характерной чертой рынка труда специалистов является его тесная связь с системой образования, которая имеет ведущее значение в числе факторов, определяющих качество, размеры и структуру предложения на рынке труда. Система подготовки квалифицированных кадров служит регулирующим средством для пополнения рынка труда специалистов.

Динамика последних пяти лет показывает сокращение количества выпускников учреждений образования (с 761,4 тыс. чел. в 2005 году до 630,2 тыс. в 2010 году) на фоне уменьшения общего числа безработных (с 640,7 тыс.чел. в 2005г. до 498,6 тыс. в 2010г.) (таблица 1). При этом выпускники общеобразовательных школ в 2010г. превзошли число безработных этого уровня образования в 1,8 раз, тогда как квалифицированных специалистов с высшим образованием сократилось за этот период почти в 2 раза, а число безработных этой категории возросло на 7,7%. Доля выпускников вузов в составе безработных подвержена небольшим колебаниям и сохраняется на уровне 2000 года, не показывая явных сдвигов.

Таблица 1 – Потребность рынка труда в квалифицированных специалистах, тыс. человек

Уровень образования	Численность выпускников учебных заведений			Численность безработных		
	2000г.	2005г.	2010г.	2000г.	2005г.	2010г.
Всего	537,5	761,4	630,2	906,4	640,7	496,6
в том числе имеют образование:						
• высшее	64,6	154,2	81,3	115,1	110,0	118,5
• среднее профессиональное (специальное)	79,9	81,2	108,9	231,1	160,4	128,5
• среднее и начальное	393,0	526,0	440,0	560,2	370,3	249,6

Образование является важным инструментом приведения в соответствие спроса и предложения рабочей силы, особенно в условиях инновационного развития экономики республики, которое должно противостоять таким характеристикам рынка труда, как непостоянный уровень занятости и спроса на выпускников. При этом длительный срок подготовки кадров, просчеты в прогнозных оценках потребности в специалистах способствуют возникновению дисбаланса между образовательными потребностями рынка труда и реальным образовательным уровнем рабочей силы.

В последнее время наиболее острой проблемой на рынке труда остается «скрытая безработица» или самозанятость, которая является одним из основных факторов низкого уровня жизни населения. В 2010 году численность самозанятого населения в целом по республике составила 2,7 млн человек (или 33,3% от всего занятого населения), из них 1,9 млн человек (или 49,3% занятого населения села) проживает в сельской местности. Важно отметить, что в этой группе наблюдается увеличение числа лиц со средним профессиональным образованием. На наш взгляд, накопление столь значительного трудового потенциала с достаточно высокими качественными характеристиками в малодоходных хозяйствах населения, которые в условиях нарастающего дефицита квалифицированных кадров в производстве «обеспечивают» занятость сельских жителей, является негативной тенденцией. Это свидетельствует о непреодоленных процессах в сфере занятости и развития рынка труда специалистов.

Масштаб и качественный состав самозанятых отличается от практики постиндустриальных стран, где основную их долю составляют высококвалифицированные рабочие. При этом структура занятости существенно отличается от структуры квалификационной подготовки кадров. Так, в сфере услуг работает значительно больше занятых, чем подготавливается в вузах. В то же время подготовка специалистов для промышленности превышает существующую потребность в них. Недостаток рабочих технических специальностей вынуждает предприятия привлекать квалифицированные кадры из-за рубежа. В сельском хозяйстве ситуация противоположная: доля новых специалистов для сельского хозяйства значительно отстает от удельного веса занятых в этой сфере.
Как видно из таблицы 2, структура подготовки в системе профессионального образования пока не соответствует структуре текущей занятости и перспективным потребностям экономики в специалистах соответствующего уровня подготовки.

Таблица 2 – Структура рабочей силы и подготовки специалистов в системе профессионального образования РК, %

Уровень образования	Занятое население			Выпуск учебных заведений		
	2000г.	2005г.	2010г.	2000г.	2005г.	2010г.
Всего	100	100	100	100	100	100
в том числе имеют образование:						
• высшее	18,2	25,0	29,7	12,1	20,2	12,9
• среднее профессиональное (специальное)	21,9	27,2	28,2	14,8	10,7	17,3
• среднее и начальное	59,9	47,8	42,1	73,1	69,1	69,8

Одной из главных причин, обусловливающих снижение статуса рынка специалистов в республике, является проблема несоответствия цены и стоимости трудовой деятельности, определяющая развитие национального рынка труда в целом и особенно актуальная для рынка труда специалистов. Кроме того, отечественный рынок труда формируется под воздействием ряда факторов, обусловливающих низкую эффективность труда этих кадров: ограничения в выборе места работы, отсутствие стимулов к эффективному труду, перенасыщенность специалистами одних отраслей и их нехватка в других, пассивность кадровых служб, отсутствие развитой системы социально-правовой защиты молодых специалистов и др.
Это говорит о том, что существующая система подготовки кадров с профессиональным образованием в недостаточной степени отвечает квалификационным запросам экономики. В этой связи в сфере образования необходимо усовершенствовать структуру подготовки кадров с учетом прогноза занятости и потребностей рынка труда. Актуальной становится проблема ускоренного и системного развития сети учебных заведений технического и профессионального образования в республике, в частности, в южных регионах, для повышения профессиональной мобильности местного населения с целью снижения притока безработных и слабоквалифицированной рабочей силы в мегаполисы.

По данным Прогнозной схемы территориально-пространственного развития страны до 2020 года для преодоления возможного дефицита кадров будет осуществлен прогноз занятости специалистов на уровне их квалификации в соответствии с развитием приоритетных отраслей и реализацией региональных инвестиционных проектов. По приведенным в ней расчетам в среднем в год требуется трудовых ресурсов в количестве 57,6 тыс. человек, и самая высокая доля требуемых специальностей - в отраслях промышленности (32,4%) и сельском хозяйстве (27,3%). По прогнозным данным, ежегодный ожидаемый выпуск специалистов высшего образования составит 155,2 тыс. человек, а технического и профессионального образования - 168,5 тыс. человек. В результате потребность в трудовых ресурсах в республике будет покрыта полностью.

Для устойчивого роста экономики главной целью в сфере образования является повышение конкурентоспособности образования, развитие человеческого капитала путем обеспечения доступности качественного образования.

Таким образом, рынок труда оказывает непосредственное влияние на рынок образовательных услуг, так как предъявляет свои требования к качественным и количественным характеристикам, которые присущи трудовым ресурсам. Среди проблем, являющихся следствием такого влияния, необходимо отметить и несоответствие структуры спроса на рынке труда и структуры подготовки ресурсов труда, где необходимо изучение потребности рынка труда в квалифицированных специалистах и разработка стратегии эффективного функционирования системы профессионального образования в условиях инновационного развития экономики страны.

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Экономические причины сельской безработицы и пути ее снижения в Республике Казахстан

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Резюме: Одним из элементов фундамента экономики является сельское хозяйство. В данной работе проведено исследование, показывающее какие факторы влияют на уровень сельской безработицы в Казахстане, построена математическая модель зависимости уровня безработицы от рассмотренных факторов, предложены некоторые возможные пути снижения сельской безработицы.

Цель: узнать, каким образом можно снизить уровень безработицы в Республике Казахстан.

В связи с данной целью были поставлены следующие задачи:

1. Выяснить, какие факторы влияют на уровень безработицы в Республике Казахстан.
2. Отобрать факторы, оказывающие наиболее существенное влияние на уровень безработицы путем корреляционного анализа.
3. Построить экономико-математическую модель, которая покажет какой фактор и в какой степени влияет на рассматриваемое явление.

Модель показала, что наибольшее влияние на уровень безработицы на селе оказывают два фактора: количество малых предприятий на селе и средняя заработная плата на селе, продемонстрировала, как уровень сельской безработицы будет реагировать на изменение каждого из них.

Для решения проблемы сельской безработицы, необходимо воздействовать на нее такими факторами, как увеличение количества малых предприятий на селе и повышения заработной платы сельским работникам. По результатам регрессионного анализа, можно сделать вывод, что при увеличении количества предприятий на одну тысячу, уровень безработицы снизится на 1%, а также снижению уровня безработицы на селе будет способствовать увеличение заработной платы на одного сельского работника.

Ключевые слова: сельская безработица, экономика, исследование, модель, факторы

1. Введение.

Одним из элементов фундамента экономики, от состояния которого зависят возможности повышения благосостояния народа, осуществление рыночной программы во всех сферах народного хозяйства, бездефицитность и сбалансированность потребительского рынка, является сельское хозяйство. Однако реформирование экономики в Республике Казахстан, связанное с переходом на

рыночные механизмы хозяйствования, не только не повлекло адекватных изменений, но и привело к катастрофической ситуации в его отраслях. Под влиянием последствий радикальных экономических реформ сельское хозяйство постепенно утратило свое значение как одного из основных секторов экономики страны, от работы которого зависят не только отрасли, перерабатывающие сельскохозяйственное сырье, осуществляющие транспортировку, хранение, продажу сельхозпродукции, но и многие отрасли промышленности, такие как добывающая, металлургическая, машиностроение, химическая, составляющие основу для повышения конкурентоспособности страны. Постепенно падает доля сельского хозяйства в структуре валового внутреннего продукта, разорваны межотраслевые связи сельского хозяйства с другими секторами экономики, что провоцирует угрозу продовольственной безопасности страны и усиление социальной незащищенности сельских жителей.

Переходный этап экономики привел к упадку и инфраструктуры на селе. Непродуманная, ускоренная переориентация государственно-кооперативных форм собственности на частную привела к разрушению сельскохозяйственных предприятий и, как следствие, к высвобождению большой численности работников, высокому уровню безработицы на селе.

Вопрос решения проблемы сельской безработицы разработан недостаточно и требует более детального рассмотрения. Это касается, прежде всего, определения факторов, влияющих на уровень сельской безработицы и в соответствии с этим, определения первоочередных мер, направленных на его снижение.

В данной работе проведено исследование, показывающее какие факторы могут и какие влияют на уровень сельской безработицы в Казахстане, также построена математическая модель зависимости уровня безработицы от рассмотренных факторов, предложены некоторые возможные пути снижения сельской безработицы.

2. Экономические причины сельской безработицы в Республике Казахстан

Безработица – это социально-экономическое явление, предполагающее отсутствие работы у людей, составляющих экономически активное население.

Наличие безработицы в стране свидетельствует о том, что используются не все ресурсы страны (в данном случае трудовые). Безработица приводит к серьезным социальным и экономическим последствиям. В стране происходит снижение экономического роста, ВНП на душу населения, и, естественно, это сказывается на уровне жизни населения.

Огромное значение для развития страны имеет сельскохозяйственный сектор. Ведь именно он должен обеспечить население продуктами питания, а также необходимым сырьем для определенных сфер промышленного производства. От уровня развития сельскохозяйственного производства зависит и развитие всех других сфер. Как сказал наш президент: «Сельское хозяйство – двигатель экономики страны».

Казахстан – государство, занимающее огромную территорию на материке Евразия, по этому показателю страна занимает 9-е место в мире (2 место в СНГ). Общая площадь сельскохозяйственных угодий составляет 36 млн. га (это 6-е место в мире).

Сельское хозяйство является в настоящее время самой экспортоориентированной отраслью, поскольку в мире растут спрос и цены на продовольствие. Но на сегодняшний день на селе имеется ряд проблем, которые необходимо решать для достижения большей эффективности сельскохозяйственного производства.

Проблемы села Казахстана формально можно разделить на экономические и социальные. Естественно, они взаимосвязаны и определенно воздействуют друг на друга.

Одной из основных проблем для сельского населения является отсутствие развитого производства, инфраструктуры, что влечет за собой рост безработицы, низкую заработную плату, высокий уровень миграции «село-город», особенно молодежи. С учетом того, что происходит отток молодежи с сельских местностей, это приводит к старению и нехватке кадров и квалифицированных специалистов. Из-за отсутствия развитой инфраструктуры, малочисленного населения на селе наблюдается неудовлетворительное состояние дорог, недостаток в обеспечении качественное питьевой воды, отсутствие централизованного электроснабжения и т.д. Финансирование, которое осуществляет государство, является недостаточным, либо неправильно распределяется руководителями регионов.

Наличие данных проблем показывает, что практически все социальные проблемы сельчан связаны с отсталостью региона в экономическом плане. Естественно, отсутствие достаточного количества предприятий остро определяет проблему безработицы.

По данным Агентства Статистики Республики Казахстан уровень безработицы в стране в 2010 году составил 5,6%. Численность безработных в этом году составила 483,5 тысяч человек. Тогда как численность сельского населения, по данным Министерства сельского хозяйства РК, составляет 7,3 млн. человек, или 47,2% от общей численности населения страны.

Если обратиться к статистике, предоставленной Министерством труда и социальной защиты населения РК за последние 3 месяца, то можно получить следующие данные:

- На 1 сентября 2011 года на учете в органах занятости состояло 73,5 тыс. безработных, из них 33,1 тыс. чел., т.е. 43,1 процента, жители сельской местности.
- На 1 августа 2011 года на учете в органах занятости состояло 62,4 тыс. безработных, из них 29,2 тыс. чел., т.е. 46,8 процента, жители сельской местности.
- На 1 июля 2011 года на учете в органах занятости состояло 57,4 тыс. безработных, из них 26,5 тыс. чел., т.е. 46,2 процента, жители сельской местности.

То есть в среднем 45% всех безработных – жители сельской местности. По данным Агентства статистики Республики Казахстан, уровень безработицы на селе за 2010 год составляет 5,24%.

Казалось бы, согласно статистическим данным, уровень безработицы на селе не превышает общеказахстанский, однако течение безработицы усугубляется рядом факторов. Например, агропромышленный сектор нуждается в высококвалифицированных специалистах, обучавшихся либо в лучших университетах страны, либо за рубежом. Большинство же сельских жителей не имеет возможности предоставить такое образование своему подрастающему поколению.

Другой фактор безработицы - отсутствие предприятий, которые могли бы создавать рабочие места для сельского населения, малого бизнеса.

Но какой именно фактор оказывает набольшее влияние на уровень безработицы на селе? Влияют ли другие факторы на ее уровень? Чтобы определить, какие это факторы и в какой степени они влияют на уровень безработицы, мы построили экономико-математическую модель.

Для того чтобы построить модель мы взяли различные факторы, которые теоретически каким-либо образом могут повлиять на уровень безработицы на селе: экономически активное сельское население, количество малых предприятий на селе, инфляция, доля сельскохозяйственной продукции в ВВП страны, инвестиции в сельское хозяйство, индекс цен производителей на сельскохозяйственную продукцию и средняя заработная плата на селе. Все статистические данные были взяты в Агентстве статистики Республики Казахстан, за период с 2000 по 2010 годы (таблица 1).

Год	Уровень безработицы на селе (%)	Экономически активное население на селе (%)	Количество малых предприятий на селе	Инфляция (%)	Доля сельскохозяйственной продукции в ВВП страны (%)	Инвестиции в сельское хозяйство (%)	Индекс цен на сельскохозяйственную продукцию (%)	Средняя заработная плата на селе на 1 работника (тыс. тг)
2000	13,49	39,18	7690	9,80	8,10	1,30	103,80	5657
2001	7,77	44,35	8213	6,40	8,70	1,50	118,90	6893
2002	7,35	43,64	8879	6,60	8	1,40	100,1	8174
2003	7,11	43,31	9294	5,70	7,80	1,30	106,3	9580
2004	7,08	43,63	8900	7,90	7,10	2,00	127,1	11978
2005	6,96	43,3	11193	9	6,40	1,70	101,4	14981
2006	6,77	43,14	12310	8,60	5,50	1,10	101,2	18811
2007	6,37	47,5	12660	18,80	8,70	1,65	120,3	24676

2008	5,97	48,03	12864	9,50	5,20	1,85	139,4	31407
2009	5,9	47,63	13221	6,20	6,20	1,70	103,1	34171
2010	5,24	47,48	12624	7,80	8	1,86	93,3	36477

Таблица1. Факторы, теоретически влияющие на уровень безработицы

Нами был проведен анализ корреляционной зависимости уровня безработицы на селе и различных факторных признаков.

Между экономически активным сельским населением и количеством малых предприятий на селе существует тесная связь (r= 0,79, где r – коэффициент корреляции). Чтобы избежать последствия мультиколлинеарности, фактор экономически активного населения на селе также не следует включать в модель.

Для того, чтобы построить саму модель мы использовали регрессионный анализ. Для того, чтобы регрессионный анализ показал наиболее точные результаты, необходимо, чтобы на исследуемое количество факторов приходилось примерно в 5 раз больше элементов выборки. Для проведения регрессионного анализа нами было взято 2 основных факторы, связь которых является наиболее тесной по отношению к уровню безработицы (Таблица 2).

Уровень безработицы (%)	Количество малых предприятий на селе	Средняя заработная плата на селе на 1 работника (тыс.тг)
13,49	7690	5657
7,77	8213	6893
7,35	8879	8174
7,11	9294	9580
7,08	8900	11978
6,96	11193	14981
6,77	12310	18811
6,37	12660	24676
5,97	12864	31407
5,9	13221	34171
5,24	12624	36477

Аппроксимируя статистические данные по выбранным переменным, мы получили следующую модель зависимости уровня безработицы на селе и двух факторных признаков: количество малых предприятий на селе и средняя заработная плата на селе на 1 работника.

$Y = 14{,}5 – 0.001x_1 – 0.000013x_2,$

где Y – уровень безработицы на селе

x_1 – количество малых предприятий

x_2 – средняя заработная плата на селе на 1 работника

3. Результаты

Построенная модель показала, что наибольшее влияние на уровень безработицы на селе оказывают два фактора: количество малых предприятий на селе и средняя заработная плата на селе на 1 работника. Также модель продемонстрировала, как уровень безработицы на селе будет реагировать на изменение каждого из двух факторов.

Практически все промышленные предприятия сосредоточены в городской черте, поэтому происходят высокие миграционные процессы (село-город). Поэтому увеличение заработной платы сельчанам приведет к меньшему оттоку сельского населения в город, и, в последующем, может привести к увеличению численности сельского населения.

Создание новых рабочих мест и, соответственно, снижение безработицы и увеличение количества занятого населения на селе может быть достигнуто в результате повышения инвестиционной, инновационной привлекательности сельского хозяйства, внедрения в производство сельскохозяйственной продукции новых технологий, методов и техники на лизинговой основе, продвижения институтами развития лучших инвестиционно-инновационных проектов, в том числе поиска зарубежного инвестора, а также в результате глубокой подготовки местных специалистов, всоответствии с требованиями рынка, и повышения их квалификации.
Таким образом, анализ исследуемой проблемы показывает, что необходимо первоочередное решение вопросов по созданию социально-экономической инфраструктуры села, увеличению заработной платы сельского населения, инвестирование сельского хозяйства, создание механизмов стимулирования притока квалифицированных специалистов на село. Данные меры помогут решить ряд проблем, существующих на сельских территориях.

4. Заключение:

В заключении проведенного исследования можно сделать следующие выводы:

1. Безработица - многоликое понятие, и многие экономисты его рассматривали. Особенно проблемной выглядит сельская безработица, т.к. агропромышленный сектор является одним из основных секторов экономики, который призван обеспечить продовольственную безопасность страны. И именно развитие и укрепление сельского хозяйства позволит не допустить продовольственного кризиса или продовольственного дефицита. Но для этого необходима рабочая сила, а сегодняшняя ситуация в Казахстане показывает, что не имеется достаточно трудовых мест, поэтому уровень безработицы на селе высок.
2. Многоликость безработицы и ее различная трактовка учеными объясняется тем, что как показало исследование на нее может влиять множество факторов: экономически активное сельское население, количество малых предприятий на селе, инфляция, доля сельскохозяйственной продукции в ВВП страны, инвестиции в сельское хозяйство, индекс цен производителей на сельскохозяйственную продукцию и средняя заработная плата на селе.
3. Исследовав возможность влияния на сельскую безработицу разных факторов методом корреляционного и регрессионного анализов, мы пришли к выводу, что в Казахстане особенно сильно влияют на уровень сельской безработицы следующие факторы: недостаточное количество малых предприятий на селе и низкая заработная плата на одного сельского работника.
4. В связи с этим, для решения проблемы безработицы на селе, необходимо воздействовать на нее такими факторами, как увеличение количества малых предприятий на селе и повышения заработной платы сельским работникам, которые позволят значительно снизить уровень сельской безработицы. По результатам регрессионного анализа, можно сделать вывод, что при увеличении количества предприятий на одну тысячу, уровень безработицы снизится на 1%, а также снижению уровня безработицы на селе будет способствовать увеличение заработной платы на одного сельского работника.
5. Корреляционный анализ показал, что существует средней тесноты связь между уровнем безработицы и инвестированием в сельское хозяйство, следовательно, необходимо стимулировать и мотивировать инвестиционные вложения в сельское хозяйство.
6. Одной из проблем на селе является демографическая ситуация, высокий уровень миграции, как следствие низкой заработной платы на селе и отсутствия инфраструктуры. Решением данной проблемы будет являться увеличение средней заработной платы и создание механизмов стимулирования притока квалифицированных специалистов на село.

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Coverage of the 2010 OSCE Summit by Kazakhstani newspapers: Professionalism and Objectivity

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Abstract: The OSCE Summit in Astana on December1-2, 2010 was one of the most important international events in Kazakhstan since its gaining independence (Bugajski, J., http://csis.org/files/publication/101028_KazakhstanOSCEChairInterim_WEB.pdf).
However, few if any studies have analyzed news coverage of this or any major events in Kazakhstan.
Media research in Kazakhstan, conducted by international organizations, focuses on freedom of the press, the media-government relationship, narrow media law issues, and on ownership and presidential influence on news organizations (Freedom of the Press 2010 – Kazakhstani report, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-in/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=printdoc&docid=4ca5cc5cc).
Very rarely has any research explored factors of journalistic professionalism. The Western approach to professionalism in journalism is based on principles of impartial, fair and accurate reporting.
The nominal purpose of journalism is to serve the interests and activities of citizens. So this study analyzed the coverage of the OSCE Summit in Astana: how well did it follow core professional norms? Specifically, to what extent did the reporting demonstrate objectivity and subjectivity?
The authors considered three significant aspects of uncertainty of professional standards in Kazakhstani journalism:
1) Propagandizing: Only one trial in Kazakhstan, in 2002, has addressed the "Ethics Code of Kazakhstani Journalists." This document, initiated by influential groups in politics and business, proclaimed propaganda as one of professional journalism functions in Kazakhstan.
2) Government financing: The government of Kazakhstan pays to promote specific programs or causes. Coverage of the OSCE Summit in Astana was one of the 20 state subsidized topics (http://www.nomad.su/?a=3-200911230335).
3) Jockeying of special-interest groups: Local experts note that current mass media more and more function as a means of information wars in inter- clans fighting. http://www.internews.kz/newsitem/19-07-2010/12216),
The study assembled criteria of journalistic objectivity and subjectivity, e.g. as defined by McQuail (1994) and others. Although sometimes treated as simple versions of the absence of the other, in reality they have distinct qualities and goals. Key aspects of **objectivity** include accuracy in reporting, balance in presenting different sides of an issue, using only verified facts and separation them from opinion. **Subjectivity** is often defined as sensationalism, using of unnamed sources, and (this) political attachment, propaganda. Both sets of characteristics were created and theorized to attempt a rigorous and comprehensive framework for analysis. In addition, other accepted norms of journalistic professionalism were listed to expand the analysis.
Research question: To what degree do indicators of objectivity and subjectivity, along with other accepted norms of journalistic professionalism (such as independent and multiple sources), show the influence of media ownership and political orientation of media in newspaper coverage of the OSCE Summit in Astana?
For comparative content-analysis, articles related to the Summit were gathered from three Russian-language newspapers: the state owned Kazakhstanskaya Pravda and 2 major opposition private newspapers

(Svoboda Slova and Respublica). 123 articles were gathered from the week November 29 to December 5, 2010 (2 days before the event, 2 days during the event, and 3 days after the event).
The central findings are as follows: 1. regardless of ownership and political orientation, objectivity was not the priority of Kazakhstani media coverage of the OSCE summit in Astana. 2. Most reporting was one sided, opinionated, unbalanced and biased toward media owners benefit, and executed as PR promotion. 3. The two main indicators of subjectivity were inflammatory language (in oppositional newspapers), and derogatory presentations of the importance of the event. 4. Very few other main norms of journalism were included in news reports.

Big Characters: Public Discourse on Development using Billboards in Yunnan, China

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Abstract: China is changing rapidly and profoundly in ways that are contested within the nation in public discourse, in some cases through the modern version of a tradition called "big-character" billboards. This form of discourse is given much more official leeway than other forms of public political expression. This study analyzes public dialog on development and politics on these billboards to open out our understanding of what is discussed, by whom, and how. We examine what is allowed and discussed and the terms of reference, for example efforts to reconcile and blend traditional and globalizing terms. Globalization and modernization are seen in complex ways by the government, groups and population, which are reflected in public discourse. This exploratory study uses Social Semiotics to investigate the nature and codes in the verbal and visual elements of such billboards. Public signage was photographed during December and January in Yunnan Province, southern China, the site of two dramatic governmental efforts: reurbanization in the regional capital city Kunming (especially construction of a city-wide metro system), and urbanization in the recently-traditional town of Jinghong. The codes, signs, and contexts were then analyzed for explicit and implicit meanings and surrounding socio-cultural associations. The goal of the study is to both examine the codes and signs in discourse about these enormous projects, and to develop a framework for analyzing public discourse in China. Its conceptual significance is its theorization of the use of political functions of public discourses on development in the state that experiences unprecedented pressures to change.
Key Words- China, Ideology, Public Discourse, Political Conflict, Billboards, Social Semiotics

1. Introduction

China's development is exploding and well-known. Changes within the country, partly because of government control over the media and information, encourage outsiders to imagine China situation as monolithic however, the tradition of public discussion of issues goes back for many centuries in China, and both continues and is changed by modern technology (Mann, 1984).
This study analyzes public discourse on modernization and change as seen in billboards and banners in a rapidly – modernizing part of China. We use social semiotics to investigate the meanings of public discourse. The goal of this study is to understand how change is framed in public discourse, to help explain the factors that include economics, politics, cultural, and social norms.
The research question of this study is "which contesting meanings of modernization are apparent in public proclamations in China"?

2. Literature Review

After 1980, the political and social system of China under Deng Xiaoping quickly shifted from a socialist to a form of political organization called "Chinese socialism." (Kraus, 1977). This means that, while society is extremely centralized, consumerism, industrial production for export, westernization of institutions and projects, etc. have become dispersed and predominant (Massey, 2000). Yunnan province, in the far southwest of China, is one of the largest provinces and also one of the least industrialized; it has

the greatest diversity of natural ecologies and cultural groups and the entire nation. For that reason, it is been protected by the government, but at the same time has been the target of massive population translocation and construction. In is tradition in China of the oldest tradition within China of "big character" signs was embraced during the late 1960s Cultural Revolution, when it became both a form of democracy by allowing individuals to present their opinions to the community, as well as a form of mobilization and indoctrination by the government. Special areas for large signs spread across the country and became part of the Chinese approach to community building and community control. This tradition has been updated in modern times through large posters, billboards, and banners that are tolerated much more than other forms of public expression (Nabudere, 1997).

The Chinese government and people have very complex understandings of globalization and modernization (Kang, 1996). The government wants to benefit from Western technologies and institutions, while filtering out unwanted factors such as public dissent and decentralization of power. Chinese people, on the other hand have a less ideological focus, although a large number except the government ideology and priorities (Boutonet, 2011). At the same time, both the government and population of China are understandably proud of an ancient and powerful culture as well as social traditions such as a strong family and community life.

Every society and time has its own particular approach dialogue within the community about important issues (Williams, 1996; Gandy, 2006). This "Public Discourse" is one way that societies regulate and elaborate the shared meanings of the community. Chinese society is unusual in having a large number of limits on such discourse while allowing the dramatic and Democratic option of opinion billboards. This includes attitudes toward dissent and public discussion of a rapid and dramatic changes that are transforming Chinese society, landscape, and ideology (Thornton, 2002).

Access to publicly – placed billboards is an international phenomenon (Johnson, 2008), although in the West this communication is dominated by official and commercial messages. The use of billboards for public dialogue is A very typical Chinese option. As part of the process of transforming Chinese society and culture, the government goes to a great deal of trouble to place billboards that try to convince its people of the value of centralized pressures for change. To some extent, this reflects class differences that are reemerging in the China with broad disparities between wealthy and the working class. In another way, it's reflects pressures for and against urbanization as part of the modernization process. It is certainly problematic to suggest that all Chinese citizens totally accept and desire high-rise buildings and shopping malls; many people, especially older groups, are uncomfortable with such change. This is only exacerbated in areas where old buildings – and therefore communities – are being torn down to make way for new buildings. While many people welcome the opportunity to buy more products in modern shopping areas, they are less happy when familiar neighborhoods and homes are torn down, and when they are told where to move my the government, often into homes with a higher price.

The government is trying to not only centralized physical living space of its population, but also the symbolic spaces controlled by ideology. This means that government proclamations follow socialist slogans even as capitalist activities are encouraged. This inherent friction and tension are especially clear in areas where urbanization and globalization are most dramatic.

The theory of "Social Semiotics" (Jensen, 1995) provides an excellent model for collecting and analyzing data to understand not only the rich meanings of texts but also the social context within which they operate.

3. Methodology:

The authors decided to collect data in Yunnan China as an excellent representation of rapid globalization in a relatively traditional and rural area. The first authors took photographs of every available billboards, banner, and poster related to development into Yunnan cities: Kunming and Jinghong. Kunming is a very large city with a fairly long urban history, while Jinghong until very recently was a quiet regional town whose homes were largely traditional wooden structures. Photographs of about 84 such public signs were taken and analyzed my the other author, using principles of social semiotics, identifying both denotative and connotative meanings, patterns of meanings within the groups of texts, and the social context of the two areas understudy. Cultural, social, ideological, economic, and other meetings were elicited and analyzed.

4. Results:

The most basic distinction among the texts are pro-government and individual. Within the pro-government group, some are pro-construction (growth) others are pro-environment (protection) and the third group are

pro- policy. These signs were professionally produced, colorful and often included photographs and, in two cases, the insignia of the Chinese Communist Party. Among the individual signs, there is only one purpose: protecting the basic, quotidian rights of community members. These signs were hand-painted, black lettering on long white banners strung in areas of the city whose communities feel threatened by modernization.

Among the pro-government construction signs, the meanings include the government's ability to lead people to create a plan that builds civilized city and society. "Civilized" implies clean, orderly and moral. The government encourages everyone to engage in this actively and in a coordinated way following the government leadership. The promise is that people can live a harmonious life together. Some signs suggest, explicitly and implicitly, hard work with phrases such as "a colorful city built by two hands" and liking hard work with courage. Hands are also brought in to create social meanings with phrases such as such as "hand in hand, heart to heart." Another proposes a "civilized city built by all the people" and "built for homeland, shared by you and me." In this context, the Chinese phrase "you and me" refers not to two individuals, but is a shorthand way to indicate "everyone."

Pro- government environment signs, on the other hand, suggest ease, with such phrases as "to beautify the environment just needs two steps forward" and "To protect the environment is to protect yourself"—in other words, equating the environment and the citizens' interests. However, individual action is not implied; rather, following government leadership will bring individual benefits but a "unit" as the smallest form of identification—a discrete group such as a party branch or organization. Several signs refer to "consciousness" as discipline and order and, in an expression of communalism, suggests that a city—e.g., Jinghong—is capable of consciousness.

Pro-government policy signs equate socialism with cultural development, specifically Chinese socialism. For example, another theme (once very common but now rare) is for deepening reform of the cultural system—seen as a implied challenge to American cultural dominance in the effort to make China a cultural super-power, through "soft power." A localized poster increases the internal and external opening of Yunnan toward China as well as toward other nations. Yunnan is represented as a bridge to other, more southwesterly regions of China and beyond.

Personal health is invoked in one sign, calling for citizens to "prevent 6 common contagious diseases" and promote health, with the suggestion that the government cares for citizens.

Individual/private group signs were set up by a local worker's group. These were relatively emotional as they complained about conditions in an older neighborhood of Kunming. They focused on complaints against local corruption, nit by questioning national law. They call on the government to protect their rights to their own homes, which they represent as . They criticize some local officials as colluding with private, commercial organizations to profit by denying basic rights. They represent these officials as acting like umbrellas to protect illegal actions by officials in league with private interests, with "umbrella" implying payments to officials. One sign refers to the "real right law of PRC" as being violated because they cannot stay in the homes. "Long live the Communist Party of China—we want to survive", thus equating the government with survival.

Another category of these signs says that the government "should be trustworthy" and care about public opinion and "take the life of the public seriously", suggesting without direct criticism that the government can only create a harmonious society (often represented as a key goal of the government). The signs claim that contracts were violated for several years and that community members might have to leave their homes, become beggars, and perhaps die on the street.

5. Conclusions and Discussion:

The posters and billboards are a form of media, with unique flexibility in the Chinese context, to show that government policies and public responses to them. These big-character signs mostly are a way the government can bring their goals, meanings and policies onto public streets where they can be seen. This is important because few people read Party newspapers or websites, but will read these while waiting for a bus or leaving a shop.

The signs reproduce slogans to mobilize and motivate a population that is expected to see the government as the central source of not only work and law, but also of meanings that reach back to China's distant past but into its glorious future. Government leadership is able to help citizens improve their own futures, but only if they contribute their efforts and faith. However, they also have a paternalistic flavor that treat citizens as children who need guidance… accepted even when groups protest their treatment at the hands of

corrupt officials. This is tolerated by the government specifically because the streets and walls are a special, relatively controllable, locus of dialog.
This form of research and analysis holds great promise as a window into the culture of a China emerging as a world leader. However, past posters suggested that even windows need screens to protect the people inside from unwanted problems. Billboards and other large-character signage serve both purposes.

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Positing "Reactivism": Political Objectivist Influences on Dialogical Processes

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Abstract: Traditionally, political discourse was predicated to some extent on the idea of formative dialog: that the interplay of proposed ideas and arguments would gradually lead to the syncretic, dialectic evolution of a position that benefits from the strengths of both positions. This process is based on subjectivist and pluralist assumptions. However, political discourse in the U.S. and, increasingly, in other nations, is characterized by a new model of relatively absolutist confrontation. In this case, a group's own position is barely mentioned except in broad, emotive labels; opposing positions are defined, simplified, and vilified. One practical impact of this communication strategy is a virtual paralysis of the political process in the U.S. through rejection of a pluralist perspective. This form of political discourse has always existed, at least as an initial tactic, but can now be seen as increasingly dominant. It reflects a radical objectivist view that ideas of opposing groups can and should be appropriated and rejected, regardless of the arguments of members of those groups. This paper proposes, develops and explores the concept "Reactivism" as a theoretical construct that will facilitate future empirical analyses of political discourse. It often links the assumption of manichaen contrast with the activist desire to enforce positions in line with a given position on society. Elements of the process include: an assumption of dichotomies that must be only rejected or embraced; equation of an acceptable or unacceptable position with the character and motivations of others, especially those who advocate an unacceptable position; claims of disastrous and overwhelming consequences that would result from adoption of the antithetical position; the urgent, totalizing need to change situations as political activists; an appeal to historical foundations that justify absolutist values; representation of the own group as victims and the other group as perpetrators; and an "objectivist" perspective that rejects subjectivism and pluralism, and assertions of an unchallengeable description of the topic.

"I want you to just let a wave of intolerance wash over you. I want you to let a wave of hatred wash over you. Yes, hate is good… Our goal is a Christian nation. We have a biblical duty, we are called on by God to conquer this country. We don't want equal time. We don't want pluralism." –Randall Terry, anti-abortion activist, Fort Wayne, Indiana, August, 1998.

1. Introduction:

Many political commentators decry the increasing polarization of political discourse, but the communication and psychological foundations of this important phenomenon have not been recently explored, or applied to the fairly recent form that this study focuses on.

This research analyzes the factors of communication polarization in terms of goals, implications, and psychological principles. This study assumes that it is possible to infer social and psychological factors from the interactions of people in political situations, and attempts to not only explain the roots of this change, but also to note discursive strategies that appear successful in countering what has been called "rejectionism" (Leathers, 1979). Such reactive, activist discourse is not restricted to one group or ideology. It appears to have underlying psychological appeals that may well be reinforced by short-term success, even at the cost of long-term political problems.

To help initiate and elaborate a conceptual superstructure that could be used to investigate such discourse, this theoretical paper proposes the idea of "reactivism" as the linkage between attitudes and actions, each supporting the polarity and certainty of the other. Such irreducible connections between ideas and action are a hallmark of this form of discourse.

2. Literature review:

Several authors have explored the idea that many people need to have fixed, absolute, and motivating beliefs. In the past, political theorists assumed that such tendencies would be counterbalanced by respect for the views of others and belief in the value of pluralism for a democratic society (e.g., Hunter & Dahl, 1962).

Since the 1980s, many political commentators in the US and other countries have expressed concern that political dialogue has been replaced by conflicting ideological monologues. This has led to a situation in the United States of virtual political stalemate and paralysis, in which the American two-party system has been used as a means to polarize debate, which is often little more than competing assertions of absolute and contradictory values.

Although this process has been often noted, few communication scholars have attempted to clarify the process of this kind of debate; Hoffer (1951) was an early author who explored the psychology of the "true believer"; but no authors have addressed the psychological processes that lead to an increase of manichaean discourse.

Two important strands of philosophical thought during the last century can be characterized as objectivist and subjectivist. The influential book "the Social Construction of Reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) suggested that humans have little direct access to objective reality, but mostly live in a world that is relatively subjective although socially distributed and adopted. On the other hand, the objectivist writings of Ayn Rand (1964) and Peikoff (1991) are often cited in arguments that it is possible and preferable for people to understand and act on a concrete reality.

In terms of political discourse, this meta-debate has been expressed by dialogue that moves between assertion of a position and respect the position of others. Most political philosophers consider this second approach – usually called pluralism – as an underlying and necessary value of political interaction, compromise and evolution.

Almost all observers and commentators on the political scene are likely to agree that political discourse has become more dichotomous and aggressive over the last 20 to 30 years. Although this tendency is visible in most political systems, and most destructive in situations like Rwanda and Bosnia, the integration of reactivist sentiments, statements and political activism has probably been most systemically applied in the U.S. political system during this period.

3. Overview of the Concept:

The two main characteristics that appear obvious are a) a belief that values are either totally desirable or totally undesirable (usually based on a simplified and purposive reading of history, culture, etc.) and b) they

believe that positive values must be acted on as quickly and fully as possible, and that negative values and actions must be eliminated in the same way. These can be analyzed in reactivist discourse.
I have investigated hate speech, anti-abortion movements, bias in news, and sociopolitical dogma for many years. On the basis of the literature and my empirical studies, I have developed the theoretical construct "reactivism" to help address and explain – and perhaps ultimately contend with – this form of discourse.
Many analysts decry the increasing polarization of political and social discourse (e.g., Simons, 2000). However, the communication and psychological foundations of this important phenomenon have not been recently explored. This research analyzes central factors of communication polarization in terms of goals, implications, and psychological principles. This study assumes that it is possible to infer social and psychological factors from the interactions of people in political situations, and attempts to not only explain the roots of this change, but also to note discursive strategies that appear successful in countering what has been called "rejectionism." Such reactive discourse is not restricted to only one group or ideology, but appears to have an underlying benefit that may well be reinforced by short-term success, even at the cost of long-term political problems.
One problem that society faces with reactivist discourse, and one benefit to those who depend on it, is that absolutist assertions cannot be effectively responded to through reason. Reasoning requires logical assumptions that can be challenged and sequences that can be explicated. Both of these processes are antithetical to the reactivist project, which is overwhelmingly affective and simplistic. People who disagree with any or all reactivist discourse feel compelled to similarly adopt absolutist positions that are not open to true discussion.

4. Characteristics of reactivism:

From my analysis in several previous studies, I have concluded that reactivism is based largely on fear and rejection of complexity. As a reaction against a gray world of moral ambiguity, only black and white positions provide the security of moral certainty. I conjecture that this rejection of complexity is mostly the result of a media saturated society, leaving many people feeling overwhelmed and in need of security wherever they can find it.
One clear characteristic of reactivist discourse is that only the minimum of explanation of one's own position is desirable, while most of the content and all of the detail of the discourse is devoted to the positions, motivations, and consequences of the opposing positions. This follows from the idea of "rejectionism", in which a group defines itself much more clearly mark what it opposes than what it proposes.
I have tentatively identified the core characteristics of reactivist perspectives and communication. These include the following:

- the assumption of dichotomies, each subject only to total rejection or acceptance:

the world, especially in terms of core values, is seen as into clear camps. One must be unquestioningly accepted and adopted, while the other must be rejected and removed with equal certainty.

- equation of an acceptable or unacceptable position with the character and motivations of others, especially those who advocate an unacceptable position:

not only are the actions of an opposing group unacceptable, but every aspect of their motivation and personal character must be questioned in the most dramatic possible times. This totalizing rejection simplifies conclusions and decisions because, once an opponent has been totalized as evil, become easy to understand and reject. It also helps give unshakeable confidence in a position that cannot gain credibility from a basis in objective information.

- claims of disastrous and overwhelming consequences that would result from adoption of the antithetical position:

just as historical foundations are important, and the character of the opposing camps becomes all embracing, all discourse seems to depict horrendous consequences if the opposing group succeeds in encouraging its will on the people with the correct views and actions;

- the urgent, totalizing demand to change situations through political activism:

given the overwhelming contrast and self defined disastrous consequences of failure, the own group is morally obligated and justified in demanding unquestioning changes to every possible part of the situation related to the topic. In other words, social and political activism is the only rational response the complex of good versus evil suggested by reactivism.

- an appeal to historical foundations that justify absolutist values:

the credibility of assertions and actions that reject opposing positions in totality stems from a simplified and purposive reading of history. For example, American tea party groups laud Ronald Reagan and Thomas Jefferson as their faultless progenitors, while ignoring the huge number of ideas and actions from both men that clearly contradict much of the tea party agenda;

- the need to represent the "own group" as victims and the "other group" as perpetrators:

reactivist discourse asserts that the own group is a helpless victim of for nefarious activities of the other group. This underlying assumption justifies any claims and actions, because it is seen as self defense. The discourse thus contraposes moral right plus innocence against immorality plus aggression;

- an objectivist perspective that rejects subjectivism and pluralism:

the need for comforting certainty and unreflective action demands a belief that the world can and should be understood in concrete and directly – accessible terms. Without objectivism, it is impossible to construct a clear and unambiguous reality. This kind of reality is seen in the dogmatic and dramatized depictions of reactivist discourse;

- assertions of an unchallengeable description of the topic:

there is no room for descriptions, conclusions, and calls to action. No form of doubt, either from the speaker or from listeners, is treated as an option. When totalizing explanations and responses are necessary, there is no room for questions.

5. Research agenda:

Limited research has been conducted into the forms of discourse included within the concept of "reactivism", so more studies should link and explore the discursive psychological and social dimensions of this phenomenon. Such studies would also help improve the theory by applying and testing it against empirical data and by collectively improving the theory in relation to other concepts of discourse, argumentation, etc.

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Obscure Past and Hazy Future: the Institutional Failure of Sociology in Kazakhstan

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Abstract: This paper examines the causes of failure of sociology in Kazakhstan. The failure is in both professional and academic spheres. I explain the failure of local sociology on the basis of the sociology of profession. The blurred professional status of sociology in global scale is the key cause of the failure of local social science. Based on the sociology of profession, I suggest three version of the understanding of science: 1) as a set of technologies; 2) as an ideology; 3) as a critical thinking. Every understanding is legitimated by a special authority (power). This is business or state in the case of technologies, the public in the case of critical thinking and the state in the case of an ideology. Key problem is that the local sociology has failed in all three cases.
Keywords: Sociology, Failure, Professionalization, Isomorphism

1. Introduction

Sociology in Kazakhstan is currently faced with various critique, different accusations and even exposures (Гуревич 2011; Кобжанов 2009; Бессапожников 2009). Although the critique usually is fulfilled in extremely populist manner, the general accusation seems absolutely true. Indeed the local social science created ery weak self-image for twenty-year history. The weakness concludes in both professional and academic spheres.

Unraveling of causes I argue that the failure of local sociology cannot be understood exclusively through analysis of Kazakhstani context. Science is a flexible and multi-faceted network rather than a rigid structure with clear boundaries. Even social sciences overcome different boundaries quite easily despite their higher level of dependence from national context than natural sciences. Therefore explaining causes of the failure we should include global context in the analysis.

In same time I refuse from popular explanations suggested by various versions of academic colonialism. Despite clear and precise description these theories are misguided explanations reducing analysis to the set of typical clichés and exposures. In opposition to the given view I draw an attention to more reflexive explanation on the basis of the sociology of profession (Abbott 2005) and ideas of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Sociology as an academic discipline and sociology as a profession are not independent but really interdependent spheres. My key idea is that a blurred professional status of sociology in global scale is the key cause of the failure of local social science.

Unfortunately the short volume of paper does not allow giving a comprehensive explanation so many parts of discussion are presented very briefly. This paper, in short, starts from some descriptions of the failure of

local sociology. Then the theoretical framework of discussion is presented. Finally on the basis of theoretical discussion I give explanation of failure.

***2.* Background information (where is so pessimistic view from?)**

Why I speak about the failure of local sociology? On what kind of proofs and arguments can this failure be demonstrated (or indicated)? Mentioned above the critique of sociology (Гуревич 2011; Кобжанов 2009; Бессапожников 2009) has emotional and rhetorical character rather than strong argumentations and evidences. Although we feel intuitively that this is true we cannot state the failure exclusively on the basis of rhetoric. There is no doubt that more strong facts are necessary for the evidences of the loser story of local sociology.

Beyond opportunity to speak more I focus just on two arguments. First argument demonstrates the failure of local sociology as science and second one is as the profession. "The SCImago Journal & County Rank" formed on the Scopus database demonstrates that the Kazakhstani social sciences are presented only 67 papers (). It is small quantity.

Moreover the specific disciplinary division is noted in the case of local social sciences. This division can be defined as a disciplinary shift. Keim (2008) notes that local sciences (or periphery sciences) usually don't have strong link with their analogies in core discipline. Instead of that local social sciences usually connect with western "area studies". This point is absolutely true in the case of local sociology. Kazakhstani sociologists ignore totally all themes which does not have strong link with Kazakhstan.

Second argument is connected with the professional failure. The enrollment rate on the specialty 'sociology' is very small. It is really unpopular specialty. Currently just three universities in Kazakhstan have sociology as specialty but the number of students enrolled on this specialty is quite small. Other two universities also offering 'the sociology' closed the enrollment on this specialty as the number of students was minimal.


***3.* Professionalization and development of science**

3.1 Theoretical model

Science is usually depicted as hermetic field with the high level of autonomy from other fields (Бурдье 2005 {1976}: 473-517). For example, classical research in science studies have presented that the development of science exclusively depended on internal-driven factors (see Kuhn 1970). However appeared in 1970th the sociology of scientific knowledge expressed doubts concerning the key role of internal-driven factors of development of science and sociologists began to focus on external-driven factors.

The thesis of given paper is closely connected with sociological intention and the explanation of local sociology's future is based on internal factors. Although scientists always tend to present science as independent sphere, science has strong connection with different components of society. Typical combinations of these links are presented in next figure.

Figure 1



Of course, the ideal types are presented on this figure and we observe the mix of these types in the case of real science. In same time it seems analytically useful to distinguish three imaginations concerning science.

Science as the set of technologies is the case of instrumental understanding of scientific knowledge usually associated with natural sciences. In this case the science is understood as a set of objective knowledge on the basis of which it is possible to profit. Usually business presents a science in this light but in case of developing countries the state frequently considers a science in this way.

The aforesaid gives an opportunity to suppose that natural sciences are usually considered in a similar way. However this is not a prerogative of natural sciences and it is possible to find similar cases in social sciences (economics) too. On the basis of Andrew Abbott's ideas (2005) it is possible to assume, that it is connected with professionalization of fields around of a science. If a science is wrapped densely by the network of various professions, this science will be more likely presented as the set of technologies.

Professions compete for the legitimate right to control the certain field of activity. Showing the right to fields, the professions must demonstrate unique technical abilities. The profession receives the exclusive rights on the certain field of activity if profession may convince that its technical abilities are extremely important for the work in this field. These technical abilities are usually developed during formal training which is frequently carried out at university. Thus the science and the profession can be depicted as the linked ecologies and they give mutual legitimating.

The second understanding of a science can be called the science as an ideology. This type has been popular in social sciences. Usually a state can be defined as the initiator of this understanding. The most popular example of this science is a history especially in the new states. However many less rough examples of a science as ideologies also exist. The good example is historical materialism (and social sciences in general) in USSR or the liberal 'creed' (faith) in case of the economics.

The third way is the presentation of science as the initiative on total emancipation. This understanding is connected with a role of the educator which the science likes to attribute to itself. Currently the project of public sociology can be a bright example of similar movement and, in general, sociology can be a good example of a similar science.

The public is necessary for the development of this understanding of science because public is the main customer of this science. It is not surprising that in France (the motherland of sociology) sociology was born from the literary markets (Коллинз 2002 {1998}: 977-1020; Heilbron 1995). Thus audience (public) was main power which inspired authors.

3.2 Sociology

How this scheme can be applied to social science. Sociology is pre-paradigm science (Kuhn 1970: viii; 15) with the low level of internal integration. Therefore sociology coming from two countries is really two different sociologies. Quite conditionally, two main types of sociology can be defined if to consider sociology globally. First type is the American sociology (American = US) depicted as the set of technology and other type is, already mentioned above, the French sociology which may be defined as the case of the critical thinking. The good example of this division is the specialization of the American and French sociology. The American sociology aspires to create middle range theory (Мертон 2006) while the French sociology becomes known because of own social theory.

It is also important to note that sociology as technologies seems really precarious because discipline does not have strong association with concrete profession(s). Though to some extent sociologists began to associate in social consciousness with mass-surveys, nevertheless sociology was not able to receive the exclusive right on this area.

However mentioned examples of sociology come from the core of scientific knowledge (= the western science). The situation on a scientific periphery is partly different from a previous description because sociology does not develop on a green field here but it is being formed by the certain base borrowed from 'the developed science'. This variant sounds as the peculiar case of path-dependence.

According to the idea of social isomorphism it is possible to suppose that the reception of scientific ideas is not a totally rational process. The acceptance of scientific ideas (theories, findings or patterns) develops in the conditions of limited understanding and sometimes is fulfilled by means of direct (simple) imitation and/or ceremonial procedures (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). How is this process organized?

Having an opportunity to observe high standards of academic life of scientists from universities of Western Europe and Northern America, Kazakhstani scientists (as scientists from the global academic periphery) try to adopt 'western' practices as key to success. However, as an unfortunate observer (Schultz 1953), they have the opportunity to observe the process entirely. Hence, aspiring to success by means of imitation, they create cargo cult science (Feynman 1974).

Coming back to the figure 1, it is possible to note that in the case of science in developing countries the reception of ideas (from the core of discipline) in paradigm sciences is easier than pre-paradigm ones because the patterns are clear, precise and unequivocal. The example of exception is the history but we should remember that this science has a clear ideological function. Other low-integrated pre-paradigm disciplines such as sociology and/or social anthropology obviously lose in competition with economics and/or political science. Generally speaking, we observe the failure of local sociology in all three cases from the figure 1.

In developing countries, business and public do not play the important role in the development of science, and the key role is played by the state. Therefore two understandings of science become widespread: science as the set of technologies and science as ideology. The role of supplier of technologies in social

sciences is usually associated with economics. Also in the case of Kazakhstan, economics got a status of the key ideologist of a market society. History (as scientific discipline) occupied the second ideological niche connected with the designing of collective memory that it is very important for the nation-building project.
In that way the local sociology became 'unemployed'. The lack of clear links with various professions puts our sociology in precarious position. The market of commercial research and consulting is really limited and narrow in Kazakhstan. Moreover sociology does not have exclusive right on this niche (how I noted above). The position on ideological niche is also very weak. These problems becomes increasingly dangerous due to the low integration of discipline when every sociologist offers own sociology.
In this way the future of local sociology is not optimistic. It is interesting that the government is going to bring sociology into the school program. It does not seem as good idea if the motivation of the government consists in that to give the work of the 'unemployed' local sociology.

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Career choices of the young people in oil rich countries: Case of Kazakhstan

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Abstract: The paper analyzes possible career choices in the oil rich country. As oil sector is booming and provides extra rent for the government, students might be interested in government jobs and possible in rent seeking positions if the law enforcement and judiciary institutions are weak and business and science cannot suggest equally motivating opportunities for the young and ambitious.
States totally dependent upon the extraction of oil rent is a rare case, but certain dependency brings about stronger role of the state officials working on distribution of the rent. Seeing these processes young people would think twice where to go in their professional career. One of the options can be even emigration because global markets can attract young people as well.
Kazakhstan is relatively new case on oil dependency and is good example how 'distributive' positions became important ones. So it is almost clean social experiment in determining the career choices of the young people in case of oil abundance.

Key-Words- Kazakhstan, Employment, Rent seeking, Youth, Institutions, Resource Abundance

1. Introduction

Employment patterns in oil rich countries have became an interesting topic for researchers in the context of Dutch disease and resource curse concepts. Where do talented people go in oil rich countries on the example of Kazakhstan? It is my main research question. It was addressed before on the example of Latin American countries (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1991). These authors claim that in Latin American countries ambitious ones face the choice to go to business or to redistributive state or parastatal agencies to climb the social ladder. I look to Kazakhstan because oil does not provide a lot of employment and does not create a lot of production links for other industries. In these sense rational choice would be to join redistributive agencies or transnational corporations rather than science or entrepreneurship.

Actors are rational and look to the signals that institutional environment or decision makers send to them and thus making long term rational choices.

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Illegal Settlements and the Right to Subsistence: An investigation into land seizures in Almaty and Bishkek

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Abstract: This paper aims to explain how poor and propertyless groups struggle for basic necessities through land invasions, examining how fundamental rights to subsistence and dignity are superior to private property claims (Alexander and Peñalver, 2009; Singer 1987; Gray and Gray, 1998; Thompson, 1971). Witzum (1997) argues that Adam Smith in *Lectures on Jurisprudence* suggests that land is embedded with a moral right to ensure that every person in the community can employ their labour to share in the fruits of the land to subsist, despite attempts by rich elites and government officials to exclude poor individuals from enjoying their due share. I will argue that property can be viewed as propriety, involving reasonable expectations of land use and moral responsibilities towards others in pursuit of human capabilities and a flourishing society (Alexander, 2008; Gray, 1994). I will also offer a critique of the property rights approach to land that depicts property as a commodity with transferable and exchangeable rights that aim to maximise utility, reduce transaction costs, and re-structure society along free market principles (*à la* de Soto, 1994; 2000; Demsetz, 1967). The paper will contribute towards an interdisciplinary understanding of property that draws upon different literatures, including law, moral philosophy, economics and sociology.

The study reveals that illegal settlers (*zemlyazakhvatchiki*) and poor families deliberate upon the moral aspects of land and property, though sometimes their judgements are distorted by nationalist feelings and racialised identities. Poor and propertyless groups struggle for basic necessities, lacking access to social rights and facing class contempt and state coercion. We criticise de Soto's ideas on legalising squatters' holdings, suggesting that his property rights approach to land offers a flawed moral vision for society and a mis-understanding of illegal settlements.

One important implication of the study is that international donors need to re-think development strategies for increasing growth and reducing poverty, and for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to abandon the national residential registration system (*propiska*).

The paper draws upon extensive research in Almaty and Bishkek on illegal settlements (*novostroyki*). My research assistants and I conducted over 50 semi-structured interviews with poor groups, elites and state

officials last year. The project was part of a larger project that also examined internal migration and city registration system.

Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: A Continuing Debate

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Abstract: There has been continuous debate about the effects of fiscal decentralization on aggregate national productivity and economic growth. While fiscal decentralization has been hypothesized to enhance economic growth due to "productivity enhancements", a number of studies on the positive correlation between fiscal decentralization and economic growth remain contentious. This paper examines both sides of this debate and suggests that while the debate continues, fiscal decentralization still offers a number of benefits for public governance.
Keywords: Fiscal Decentralization, fiscal structures, inter-governmental fiscal relations, and economic growth.

1. Introduction

Fiscal decentralization, in its purest form, presumes that sub-national governmental units are given the autonomy over the provision and financing of public goods and services. In a decentralized country, sub-national governments have discretion to govern their own budgets without interventions from the central level (Golem, 2010). According to Grewal (2010), interest in fiscal decentralization has been rising in recent years. International organizations, including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank have also been encouraging the member countries to embrace fiscal decentralization as part of their broader strategies for enhancing efficiency of the public sector and for strengthening participatory decision-making at local government levels. While decentralization refers to the delegation of responsibilities by the central government to sub-national governments, fiscal decentralization gives sub-national governments the authority to raise revenues for operations of government. Fiscal decentralization may occur through authority over spending powers, or taxation powers (Grewal, 2010). The fiscal decentralization approach treats local government as a subordinate tier in a multi-tiered system and usually outlines principles for defining the roles and responsibilities of orders of government (Shah and Shah, 2007). In spite of its widening appeal, fiscal decentralization remains controversial regarding its purported benefits. A case in point is that fiscal decentralization enhances economic growth. On the other hand, there are a number of studies that question the validity of such an argument, and suggest that fiscal decentralization may even be detrimental to aggregate economic growth. This paper examines both sides of this argument and notes that regardless of the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, fiscal decentralization still offers a number of benefits essential for public sector governance.

2. Reasons for fiscal decentralization

Proponents argue that fiscal decentralization offer a number of benefits for governments and citizens alike. Some of these benefits are as follows:

2.1 Accountability

It is argued that if sub-national governments are in charge of administering their own tax revenues, they are more likely to be held accountable for their performance by local populations (Freinkman, 2010). In short, the decentralized form of government brings about welfare-enhancing results and makes government activities more accountable. Furthermore, sub-national governments are closer and more responsive to the needs and preferences of local residents, thereby allowing a closer match between the preferences of the population and the mix of public goods and services chosen by government (assuming that preferences are heterogeneous across different sub-national units) (Golem, 2010). Furthermore, competition between governments of various jurisdictions may have a further positive influence on performance, if local

populations compare achievements of their governments with those of governments in other jurisdictions (Besley and Coate, 2003).

2.2 Quality of Public Services

In general terms decentralized provision of public services enhances the quality of public services because sub-national governments may have superior knowledge of local preferences and needs and thus can be able to target public spending better (Freinkman, 2010; Oates, 2005). A central argument for fiscal decentralization rests on the assumption that it increases local influence over the public sector. The pressure from the local population exerts some pressure on local officials regarding the quality of services demanded by the population (Andersen and Van Den Berg, 1998). Since political agents have a better knowledge of the preferences of their constituency, the provision of public goods can be tailored more efficiently to their needs (Feld et al., 2010).

2. 3 Revenue Autonomy

According to Freinkman (2010), the measure of fiscal decentralization best reflecting incentive effects at the local government level is revenue autonomy, or the share of municipal government expenditure financed by own municipal revenue (i.e. revenue over which municipalities have some control, and which cannot be easily withheld by the regional authorities). With fiscal decentralization, local governments may invest in policies that with time increase their revenue base and the value of their office. However, they will lack incentives to do so if all the benefits of growth and development accrue to higher-tier governments. Similarly, if centrally appointed bureaucrats merely administer central funds, they may lack incentives to put effort in improving quality of public services, since they may be unable to derive economic or political benefits from the results of their actions.

2. 4 Political Autonomy

Fiscal decentralization allows sub-national governments to have sufficient political autonomy and be subject to effective political competition. Thiessen (2003) argues that fiscal decentralization lessens concentration of political power and weakens the influence of vested interests on public policy thus promoting democracy, development and long-term economic growth.

3. Conflicting arguments on fiscal decentralization and economic growth

Studies concerning the relationship between fiscal expenditure and economic growth have focused on testing Wagner's "Law of growing state activity", which states that government fiscal expenditure increases with the growth of an economy (Chen and Wu, 2008; Bird, 1971). The law suggests that with rising income, the demand for public goods and services increases, which in the long run increases economic activity and growth (Thiessen, 2003). There have been contradictory conclusions on the test of Wagner's law. While a number of hypotheses support the law, there are other arguments questioning its validity.

One of the first arguments that fiscal decentralization enhances economic growth was proposed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) in their "Leviathan restraint hypothesis", where they argue that governments may behave as revenue-maximizers to the detriment of taxpayers. Brennan and Buchanan contend that competition among different levels of government provided by fiscal decentralization may prevent revenue maximization, thereby allowing competing governments to focus their efforts on objectives other than revenue maximization, such as maintaining stable, or even lowering, tax rates and efficient production of public goods and services under certain revenue constraints. Hence, fiscal decentralization may contribute to containing the size of governments' budgets and may prevent an oversupply of public goods and services and/or 'x-inefficiency' in the public sector. Consequently, fiscal decentralization should, ceteris paribus, have a positive impact on per capita growth due to more efficient use of resources (Thiessen, 2003; Golem, 2010).

The second argument that fiscal decentralization facilitates economic growth is the "productivity enhancement hypothesis", which can be found in the works of researchers such as Vazquez and McNab (2003). According to this hypothesis, fiscal decentralization implies a transfer of responsibility associated with accountability to sub-national governments. This provides incentives for local governments not only to consider local residents' preferences but also to search actively for innovations in the production and supply of public goods and services. Production costs and prices of public goods and services could thus be lower and their quality better in the long-run (i.e. greater "producer efficiency") (Vazquez and McNab,

2003). Furthermore, fiscal decentralization relieves the central government from many tasks, allowing it to concentrate better on efficient production of those public goods and services for which it still bears responsibility (goods and services with large spillovers among communities and/or substantial economies of scale in production) (Grewal, 2010).

The third argument supporting the positive impacts of fiscal decentralization on economic growth is the "diversification hypothesis" which maintains that uniform levels of public goods and services across jurisdictions will generally be inefficient (Oates, 1977). The hypothesis states that if in a model of only two communities, each has a different demand for a single public service being offered, immobile individuals, no economies of scale in the production of the public service and no spillover effects from one community to the other, then the uniform level of public services offered in each community is inefficient. This is because marginal benefits of the public service differ due to the different demand schedules in each community. Therefore, resources can be saved without detriment to anyone involved by diversifying government outputs in accordance with local demands, thereby creating greater "consumer efficiency" (Vazquez and Mc Nab, 2003). Introducing mobility of people into the model creates incentives for individuals to move to the community that is perceived as supplying the best combination of public service and local tax rate. By so doing, individuals contribute to efficient resource allocation. Even if individuals have identical preferences and are relatively immobile, fiscal decentralization may still offer efficiency advantages if decisions by sub-national governments better reflect the priorities of taxpayers. In supporting the positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth Oates (1993) argued that the thrust of the basic case for fiscal decentralization (greater allocative efficiency) should also apply to economic growth. It states that since centrally determined policies do not consider regional and local conditions in the provision of public goods and services as well as locally determined policies (for instance, regarding infrastructure and education), economic development and growth might be promoted if local authorities have input into such policy decisions (Thiessen, 2003).

In an opposing argument, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) developed the "fragmentation hypothesis" which states that the competitive impact of fiscal federalism depends on the number of possible alternative jurisdictions that are available for voters and firms and the transaction costs that migrations induce. The more jurisdictions that exist, the less costly is emigration. They argue that the potential for fiscal exploitation varies inversely with the number of competing governmental units in the inclusive territory (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Thus, with increasing numbers of jurisdictions the scope for taxation diminishes without disappearing entirely. In a political economics model in which voters have a group-based social conscience, such social fractionalization reduces political support for redistribution and thereby also reduces the size of government. This results in a more fragmented territory with individuals sorting themselves into more diverse communities, thereby causing a smaller government sector. This creates inefficiencies since increasing returns to scale in the consumption of public goods cannot be fully exploited (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Freinkman, 2010). According to Thiessen (2003), fiscal decentralization may also create perverse incentives and worsen structural imbalances (Besley and Coate, 2003) such as one when one government level grants a tax exemption, the original revenue from which was in large part received by another level of government. Effective and timely coordination among the different government levels may be difficult to implement, possibly also leading to long-run adverse growth effects (Chen and Wu, 2008). Similarly, Dabla-Norris (2006) argued that fiscal decentralization may aggravate fiscal imbalances, thereby, endangering overall macroeconomic stability, unless sub-national governments are committed to fiscal discipline and the decentralization package includes incentives for prudence in debt and expenditure management.

4. Empirical studies

Empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralization and economic growth is mixed. According to Chen and Wu (2008), Henrekson (1993) demonstrated the lack of a co-integration relationship between government expenditure and economic growth using data on Sweden covering the period from 1961 to 1990. Using data on Greece from 1951 to 1992, Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1995) found that it did not support Wagner's Law. Abizadeh and Gray (1985) used data in the post World War Two era and showed that the data on Canada and England supported Wagner's Law. Payne and Ewing (1996) examined 22 countries, amongst which, the data on Australia, Columbia, Germany, Malaysia, Pakistan and the Philippines all supported Wagner's Law. Kolluri and Panik (2002) examined data on the G7 countries between 1960 and 1993, with the results also supporting Wagner's Law. Islam (2001) used data on the US between 1929 and 1996 and showed that a long-run equilibrium relationship existed between per capita real income and the relative size of government, thus supporting Wagner's hypothesis. Miller and Russek

(1997) examined the impact of fiscal structure on economic growth taking budget constraint into consideration, and found that when developing countries financed government expenditure with bonds, this had a negative impact on economic growth. Brothaler and Getzner (2008) applied Wagner's law to data from Austria and found no relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth**.** Similarly, Getzner and Neck (2002) and Neck and Getzner (2007) explored the validity of Wagner's Law, suggesting that the "law" is not valid for Austria.

5. Conclusion

The basic economic argument for fiscal decentralization is that it differentiates the provision of local outputs according to local tastes and circumstances, thereby increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of economic development planning and implementation, particularly that which relates to local or rural development (Kolluri and Panik, 2000). There are also the added benefits of accountability, revenue and political autonomy, and enhance quality of public services. However, the benefits of fiscal decentralization and its relationship with economic growth as espoused by Wagner's Law remain theoretically ambiguous. Thiessen (2003) suggests that it could thus follow that in advanced countries, whose citizens have pronounced heterogeneous demand preferences, neither a highly decentralized nor a highly centralized system promotes long-run per capita growth best, but a decentralized system with "adequate" central government interventions which avoids negative effects from overly restrictive regional autonomy and inequality, on the one hand, and from excessive fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments, on the other. How a measure of this adequacy can be determined remains unclear. Similarly, for developing and transitional countries, the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth remain inconclusive.

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Lead in Almaty Streets: Adverse Effects on the Environment

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Abstract. The aim of this study is to investigate lead pollution in Almaty and its detrimental impact on the environment, including soil, plants and living species. Lead belongs to criteria air pollutants and being heavy metal with a distinct neurotoxic effect on humans it is especially harmful on children, causing mental retardation. As most toxins, lead tends to bioaccumulate in soil and biological species. The study includes monitoring of lead in soil and other biological objects. Collection of soil samples was performed on the major intersections of Almaty with subsequent analysis using different physical, chemical, biophysical and microbiological methods. Animal testing experiments were conducted on rats to investigate an adverse impact of lead intake and lead accumulation on natural micro flora in internal organs and tissues: intestines, stomach, liver, kidneys blood and excrements of white purebred rat species. Based on this study there were allocated three zones in Almaty, differing in lead concentration level in soil, the results being in agreement with overall air quality parameters. The results of lead content in certain plants allowed propose lead migration scheme in ecosystem of Shelek region of Almaty. Microbiological experiment resulted in conclusion of dose-dependent correlation between exposure time of lead *acetate and amount of bacteria (E-coli) in intestinal tract and difference in behavior for high and low of levels of lead intake.*
***Keywords**: lead, toxin, bioaccumulation, neurotoxin, environmental impact.*

1. Introduction. Lead appearance in our environment is purely a result of anthropogenic impact of human activity. Industrial plants, producing non-ferrous and heavy metals, lead-based paints, car emissions represent major sources of lead in the atmosphere. Being heavy metal, small particles of lead from the

atmosphere get into the soil, water, food. Further, lead may be inhaled or swallowed by humans, causing detrimental impact on important health functions: blood, nervous, immune, renal and cardiovascular systems. Lead exposure of infants and children can slow down cognitive development, causing learning deficits and even severe damage to the brain functions.

Almaty is not an industrially developed city, with minimal amount of plants, none of which are chemical, but air quality is a serious ecological problem. Almaty was named the 3d most polluted city in Kaazkhstan according to recent ecological study. The major contributors to Almaty smog (combination of 'smoke' and 'fog') are as follows:


1) thermal inversion, typical for the cities located high in the mountains with sharp continental climate and limited air movements, when the layer of warm air is sandwiched between two layers of cold air;

2) emissions from coal burning power plants;

3) emissions from landfills and waste incineration;

4) car emissions, which comprise the majority of all air pollutions in the atmosphere. The number of automobiles in Almaty increased considerably in 2011 and now exceeds half a million cars, while the city population on January 1, 2012 was estimated to be about 1.45 mln people.

2. Results. Historically, lead compound (tetraethyl lead) has been used to increase octane number, which is an indicator of detonation ability of gasoline. In 80s many developed countries banned lead additives to



gasoline, which resulted in the decline of global lead emissions. Kazakhstan is now in process of gradually upgrading its standards of automotive fuel and introducing more stringent environment requirements for vehicles. Unleaded gasoline is now widely applied in Almaty for automobile fuel, but the atmosphere and soil still contain more lead than the corresponding MAC values (Maximum Admissible Concentration). The samples of soil in different areas of Almaty were analyzed for mechanical composition, chemical properties, including humus content, soil acidity and lead concentration. Lead in soil may exist in two forms: mobile (soluble, easily absorbed by plants) and insoluble (precipitates, not easy accessible). The results in fig.1 demonstrate lead concentration at major intersections of Almaty as compared with lead MAC value for soil, equal to 32 mg/kg. All the soil samples taken on major intersections of Almaty city, demonstrated elevated level of lead in soil. Based on lead pollution, we may divide our city into two parts: upper area, located to the south from Tole bi street and the lower one with magnification ratio of ~2 and even more.

Microbiological study conducted on the population of white purebred rats who were exposed to intoxication by increasing doses of lead. It is known that the first protective barrier against pollutants is gastrointestinal tract. To reveal mechanisms of functioning of lead ions both type of experiments were conducted: *in vivo* and *in vitro*. The following abiotic and biotic factors were considered for their impact

on health functions: duration of exposure to toxic substance (lead), pH, nature of electrolyte (medium), toxic dose, the latter was varied from 1/960 to 1/14 LD50 dose.

3. Conclusion. The response of intestinal cells to increasing lead exposure shows satisfactory protection from adverse effect at low dose of lead, but when the dose reaches 1/14 LD50, the change in bacterial micro flora becomes more noticeable. In general, changes in qualitative and quantitative composition of microorganisms serve as a response reaction of intestinal micro flora to different doses of lead acetate.

The obtained results may be used in future to assist in modeling conditions occurring in intestinal system as the response to elevated exposure to toxins. The revealed correlation between lead dose and lead content in feces together with distribution data on different microorganisms in feces depending on the dose justifies the fact that increasing dose of lead leads to disbacteriosis, which is considered as violation of ecological equilibrium in organism.

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Emergent Environmental Disease: AIDS in Kazakhstan

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Abstract: Rapid increase in numbers of HIV cases was observed in Central Asia in the recent years. Without concerted action it is likely that a generalised epidemic will develop in 5-20 years. The countries of the region are highly vulnerable to a crisis of HIV/AIDS over the coming decades. Young people are especially vulnerable to HIV infection. HIV can be prevented. We can learn all the ways to stay healthy, allow for risk reduction education to reduce or eliminate high-risk behavior. The study reveals trends in AIDS morbidity/mortality in Kazakhstan. Possible roots of HIV transmission are discussed.

Keywords: HIV, AIDS, HIV transmission, HIV prevention.

1. Introduction. The global epidemic of HIV/AIDS is rapidly becoming the worst infectious-disease catastrophe in recorded history, surpassing the Bubonic Plague of the 14th century and the influenza epidemic of 1917, each of which killed 20 million people. Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) has affected 60 million people worldwide since 1981, greater than 20 million people have already died because of AIDS, according to UNAIDS, which coordinates the United Nation's response to the epidemic. There are estimated to be 33 million people living with HIV in the world – about 0.6% of the world's living population. About one-third is between 15-24 years. Most people are unaware they are infected. Young women are more vulnerable. The fastest growing HIV epidemics are in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

2. HIV/AIDS in Kazakhstan


At the end of 2011, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimated that the number of people living with HIV/AIDS in Kazakhstan in 2011 was between 14 000 and 77 000 (UNAIDS 2011). The most unfortunate regions of HIV/AIDS in Kazakhstan are Temirtau, Almaty, Pavlodar. The main transmission is by sharing needles and/or syringes (primarily for drug injection), but growing sexual transmission. A major HIV outbreak occurred among children in Shymkent, due to transmission in hospitals (Ministry of Health 2006; UNAIDS 2007). The main regulatory document with regard to patient rights is the Law on Protection of Population Health of 7 July 2006. The patents are entitled to receive free high-quality care in the context of the guaranteed benefits package. The basic benefits package covers specified health services which are paid from the national state budget. Services include: programmes for communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The country is still at an early stage of the HIV/AIDS

epidemic, but there are a number of factors in place that create the potential for a dramatic increase: widespread injecting drug use, migration, an extensive commercial, sex industry, high-risk behaviour, marginalization of vulnerable groups, low public awareness of HIV/AIDS and limited capacity of the Government and civil society to implement effective responses. Without concerted action it is likely that a generalised epidemic will develop in 5-20 years.

3. How AIDS destroys Globalization. AIDS is destroying the twin rationales of globalization strategy: cheap labor and fast growing markets. AIDS has a devastating impact on developing economies, because, unlike other diseases that primarily affect young children and old people, it kills young and middle-aged adults in their most productive years as employees and customers. The epidemic is reducing the demands for goods and services in developing markets.

4. Historical Facts. The first known instance of HIV in a human was found in a person who died in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1959. HIV was introduced to North America by a Haitian immigrant who contracted it while working in Congo in mid 1960s. The AIDS epidemic officially began on June 5, 1981, when the U.S. CDC reported unusual cases of Pneumocystis pneumonia in five homosexual men in Los Angeles. In May 1983, Dr. Luc Montagnier's team at the Pasteur Institute in France, reported a new virus that they believed was the cause of AIDS. In May 1984 a team led by Robert Gallo of the United States confirmed the discovery of the virus. In May 1986 the virus received its current name – Human Immunodeficiency Virus.

5. HIV: properties and role. The Human Immunodeficiency Virus is a specific type of virus that attacks and deteriorates the body's immune system. HIV is a retrovirus that uses its RNA and the host's DNA to make viral DNA. It has a long incubation period. HIV consists of a cylindrical center surrounded by a sphere-shaped lipid envelope. The center consists of two single strands of RNA. HIV causes severe damage to and eventually destroys the immune system by utilizing the DNA of CD4+ lymphocytes to replicate itself, destroying the CD4+ lymphocyte. Two Types Recognized: HIV-1, HIV-2, both transmitted through sexual contact, blood, from mother to child, and cause indistinguishable AIDS. HIV-1 predominant virus, due to high rate of replication, mutates rapidly into subtypes, HIV-2 less easily transmittable, period between initial infection and illness longer than HIV-1. Throughout Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia are unevenly distributed HIV-1 Subtypes. 10 genetically distinct subtypes known major group (*Group M*) contains subgroups A to J, group O (*Outliers*) contains distinct group of heterogeneous viruses. Major differences between HIV-1 Subtypes: genetic composition, biological differences; certain subtypes may be associated with specific modes of transmission. Many countries report a variety of subtypes. A person can be co-infected with different subtypes. Subtype C accounts for more than half of all new HIV infections worldwide.



The Human Immunodeficiency Virus

HIV lifecycle phases: binding and entry, reverse transcription, replication, budding, and maturation. Host cells infected with HIV have a very short lifespan. HIV continuously uses new host cells to replicate itself. Up to 10 million individual viruses are produced daily. During the first 24 hours after exposure, the virus attacks or is captured by dendrite cells (type of phagocyte) in mucous membranes and skin. Within five days of exposure, infected cells make their way to lymph nodes and then to the peripheral blood, where viral replication becomes very rapid. HIV enters the host from an infected host. Once inside the host, the virus begins to multiply. Virus begins to destroy helper T-lymphocytes. Virus changes the genetic structure of the cells it attacks. The body begins to produce antibodies.

HIV is the virus that causes AIDS. AIDS stands for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. By name, we can understand a lot about the disease. It is Acquired, meaning that it must be transmitted from an outside source. It affects the Immune system, and cause a Deficiency. This means that it causes the body's natural defense to be worn down. It is a syndrome which simply means that it is a general name for a number of common symptoms. AIDS is not a virus in itself. It is simply a name for the later stages of HIV. When people are infected with HIV, they do not die of HIV or AIDS. These people die due to the effects that the HIV has on the body. With the immune system down, the body becomes susceptible to many infections, from the common cold to cancer. It is actually those particular infections and the body's inability to fight the infections that cause these people to become so sick, that they eventually die. A person with AIDS can still pass HIV to others.

You become infected with HIV by having sexual intercourse with an infected partner, by injecting drugs using a needle or syringe which has already been used by someone who is infected. HIV can be found in primarily four bodily fluids. If you can remember the four bodily fluids, you can remember how HIV is transmitted. HIV can be present in blood, vaginal fluids, semen, and breast milk. Some people have been infected through transfusion of infected people. But in most countries all blood used for transfusions is tested for HIV. In these countries HIV infection via a blood transfusion is now extremely rare. An infected pregnant woman can pass the virus on to her unborn baby either before or during birth. Approximately 30% of children born to HIV infected mothers get HIV-primarily through the birthing process. HIV can also be passed on during breastfeeding and therefore mothers should not breast feed their children. In fact the fastest growing segment of our population that is becoming infected with HIV are heterosexuals (straight), and between the ages of 18 and 24. Some people have had multiple exposures without becoming infected, some people have been exposed one time and become infected.

Transmission Clarification: HIV cannot be transmitted through hugging, kissing, holding hands or sharing food or a drink with someone who is infected. There is a very low concentration of the virus in tears and saliva. It would take two gallons of saliva at once for anyone to be infected with HIV. There are no known cases of transmission through mosquitoes or any other animals.

6. Early testing and diagnosis. The test for HIV is voluntary and confidential. No one can be forced to get tested for HIV. Window Period -this is the period of time after becoming infected when an HIV test is negative. 90 percent of cases test positive within three months of exposure, 10 percent of cases test positive within three to six months of exposure. Those who are infected are capable of infecting others without having symptoms or knowing of the infection. People Infected with HIV can look healthy, can be unaware of their infection, can live long productive lives when their HIV infection is managed, can infect people when they engage in high-risk behavior.

7. Treatment and Prevention. Medications are available to prolong life but they do not cure the disease. Positive results do not ensure the infected person will develop AIDS. Early detection is important so that infected individuals can receive immediate treatment, decrees risk of HIV transmission from mother to newborn baby. There are a few simple ways to protect yourself and others against HIV. They include abstinence, monogamous relationship, using a male or female condom, and never sharing a needle when injecting drugs.

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Water shortage issues in Kazakhstan

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Abstract: Kazakhstan is located in Central Asia, in its northern part, and takes up the majority of the region area-wise. The vast territories of the country are exceptionally rich with natural resources. Unfortunately, the one resource we will be concerned with (for the reason of it being absolutely vital and of utmost importance) is demonstrating neither sufficient quantity nor adequate quality, necessary to ensure that the population's needs are met. There are two aspects of that problem. Firstly, we should consider if we have enough water – in general terms (water being used for irrigation, energy production, industrial and other needs). Secondly, out of all the water we have, only some percentage is suitable for drinking. We are concerned with both availability of water in general and, more specifically, drinking water.

Keywords*: water resources, water shortage, trans-border rivers, water resources management, water quality standard.*

Although there are numerous bodies of water in Kazakhstan, including the largest lake in the world – Caspian Sea, as well as the great lake of Balkhash and various other lakes and water reservoirs, there are two important factors concerning our water supplies that keep us from being able to call ourselves the water-wise self-sufficient country. Firstly, we have virtually no major rivers of our own; that is, rivers that originate in Kazakhstan. Surely, we have plenty of smaller rivers and creeks that are wholly ours, but if we talk about major rivers – rivers that have any economic and industrial significance – we are very dependent on our neighbors. There are Shu, Talas and, most importantly, Syrdarya from Kyrgyzstan; Oral, Ishim and Irtysh from Russia; Ili from China etc. Secondly, the water sources that are actually in Kazakhstan lack proper handling, proper administration and management; problems at hand are not dealt with efficiently. Whatever is happening to our rivers and lakes is not monitored thoroughly and is generally of little interest to the majority of the people as well as many officials.

Problems are numerous and can be divided into the categories listed below. Pollution – bodies of water in Kazakhstan are largely in a poor condition, since there is not enough regulation over polluting the water. Poor cooperation with upstream countries (the countries that control our rivers) – there is little willingness to find a compromise from either side, and everyone is trying to exert their bargaining power as much as possible and give up as little as possible of what they have. Poor water resource management and outdated irrigation technology – there are few incentives to update whatever we have left from Soviet times and develop a brand new resource supervising system. Those issues are largely overlapping and interwoven. Most of them have their roots in Soviet period of Kazakhstani history, when upstream and downstream republics were just regions of the same country and therefore, management over water resources was easier to accomplish. Now that these regions represent different countries, it became much more difficult to attain the sustainable usage of water resources. Thus, a little progress has been made since; it can be even said that moving backwards took place, with Central Asian countries clinging to their Soviet-legacy fields and irrigation systems and to their shares of local water resources.

Nowadays, a significant part of Kazakhstani population has limited access to drinking water of decent quality, and it often does not meet the quality standards. With Kyrgyzstan using up Syrdarya water to produce electricity in winters, farmers don't get enough water in spring, when it is most needed. Meanwhile, on the other hand we have floods in Southern Kazakhstan and Oral hand and (although it is a different issue) citizens of Almaty and Astana using water in amounts far greater than they actually require.

If only all that water we have could be redistributed efficiently and fairly, it would be a great relief for us all in this world of scarce resources.

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The Role of Popular Protest Mobilization in Advancing Transition to Democracy

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Abstract: This paper has two dimensions; firstly, it is interested in the link between society's protest mobilisation and democratization processes in Kazakhstan. Based on the theoretical assumption that instances of extensive protest mobilization cause democratization, I argue that transition to democracy in Kazakhstan stalled in the mid-1990s due to the failure of social movement organizations (SMOs) to effectively mobilize masses for various acts of protest. Secondly, the research paper is trying to explain the cyclicity of protest events in Kazakhstan since 1991 until 2010. By utilising the process-tracing approach I am investigating the intervening causal mechanism between competing explanatory variables - derived from major collective action theories: political opportunity structures (POS), resource mobilisation, framing strategies and relative deprivation – and the cyclicity of protests in Kazakhstan. According to my preliminary findings, the waxing and waning of protest activity can be best attributed to the difficulties surrounding the identification and construction of resonant collective action frames. Among other findings are that people are more readily protesting around socioeconomic rather than political grievances; additionally, restrictive political opportunities for protest activities can prevent masses from protesting around political grievances, but not the socioeconomic ones.

The paper aims to contribute to the large pool of democratization literature which in its current shape seems to underplay the role of popular protest mobilization in advancing transitions to democracy. Additionally, the research is first of its kind to attempt to employ collective action theories mentioned above in the context of post-communist Central Asian societies. Finally, the study is based on author's primary elite-interview data and content analysis of five weekly newspapers conducted in the National Library of Kazakhstan in Almaty.

What Happened in the Middle East and the Maghreb?

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Abstract: This paper utilizes the results of previous research regarding democratic orientations in the Muslim world as a starting point for building a theory-based explanation of the "Arab Spring". Widespread desire for democratic practices and support for democratic norms, in conjunction with leading theories devised to explain collective political behavior, that is, relative deprivation theory, mobilization theory, and modified rational actor theory, provide the necessary components for collective action. This paper argues that a desire for a collective good, deprivation regarding that good, the presence of mechanisms for

achieving the good, and rewards or selective incentives for individual participation in a movement designed to achieve the collective good were all in evidence at the time of the Arab Spring. Theory and evidence then combine to help explain the eruption of popular movements for change in the Arab world.

"Hopes were high that the Middle East and the Maghreb would be swept up in the latest wave of democratization that began thirty years ago. But by the latter half of the 1990s any optimism in this regard seemed misplaced. The democratic winds of change – the practice of competitive elections, the adherence to the rule of law, and the protection and promotion of explicit rights and liberties - seem to have largely bypassed many of these countries… [P]olitical systems in the Arab world have undergone little change."

This is how I began a recent article on the political situation in the Middle East and the Maghreb ("Democratic Orientations in six predominantly Muslim countries" *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* spring issue, 2010). The thrust of that article, which analyzed the attitudes of ordinary people in a half dozen countries in the Middle East and the Maghreb, was that indeed attitudes of people in this part of the world fundamentally reflected the widespread desire for democratic government, and such desire emphatically trumped competing attachments to authoritarian arrangements.

Table I
Orientations, Characteristics & Evaluations

How democratically is your country governed (mean score on 10 point scale)	% Iraq **	% Egypt **	% Jordan 7.8	% Morocco 5.0	% Iran 5.2	% Turkey 5.9
Democratic orientations	%	%	%	%	%	%
Importance of living in Democratic country (absolutely important)	*	96.1	96.0	91.0	81.7	97.2
Democratic political system (very good/fairly good)	88.4	98.2	96.1	96.4	92.4	92.9
Authoritarian orientations	%	%	%	%	%	%
Strong leader (very good/fairly good)	20.9	16.5	18.4	26.7	74.2	58.1
Army rule (very good/fairly good)	17.7	57.2	74.7	28.0	34.6	32.8
Democratic essentials (mean score on 10 point scale)						
People choose leaders (definitely essential characteristic)	8.8	9.4	8.5	8.2	8.2	8.5
Civil rights protected (definitely essential characteristic)	8.1	8.5	8.4	7.7	7.7	8.4
Change laws via referenda (definitely essential characteristic)	8.1	8.9	8.4	8.0	7.5	8.4
Women same rights as men (definitely essential characteristic)	6.4	7.9	7.7	7.6	7.6	8.8

*The question concerning "living in democratic country" was not included in the Iraqi survey.
** The question concerning "how democratic is your country" was not included in the Iraqi or Egyptian surveys.

Such findings fly in the face of many theories that posit a basic disjoint between Arab attitudes and institutions and democratic political systems A number of possible factors have been put forward to explain this situation, from the rational calculation of political leaders and their clients bent on retaining power, privilege, and economic rewards, to the incompatibility of Islam with fundamental components of democratic systems, or that a sufficiently large independent middle class necessary to spearhead a drive for more participation and individual liberties is lacking. Compatible with these latter theses is the proposal that a political culture necessary for the implementation and survival of democracy, is lacking in the Muslim countries of the Middle East, contributing to the continuation of non-democratic or insufficiently democratic regimes. Yet if such factors account for the persistence of non-democratic regimes for such a long period of time, how do we explain the current upheavals that herald the same sorts of transformations that marked the turn to democracy in so much of the previously non-democratic world beginning some three decades ago?

There Is No Such Thing As An Established Authoritarian System

It is almost never when a state of things is the most detestable that it is smashed, but when, beginning to improve, it permits men to breathe, to reflect, to communicate their thoughts with each other, and to gauge by what they already have the extent of their rights and their grievances. The weight, although less heavy, seems then all the more unbearable.

Alexis de Toqueville, Letter to Pierre Freslon, 23 September 1853 Selected Letters, p. 296 as cited in *Toqueville's Road Map* p. 103.

The idea that authoritarian regimes are inherently unstable has to do with the nature of change. Authoritarian regimes cannot loosen control gradually without instigating movements designed to speed up and broaden the process. And, significant change results in a regime becoming non-authoritarian. New (and thus often fragile) democratic regimes can also fail and revert to authoritarian measures, as we have often seen in many parts of the world. By contrast, established democratic regimes do a better job of maintaining themselves, perhaps because, once consolidated, they offer an institutionalized method for solving conflict and replacing elites (managing change). A key component of this stability is the consequent widespread feeling of legitimacy enjoyed by such systems in the minds of their own citizens. In short, if system characteristics reflect basic citizen attitudes or values, even periodic poor performance or dissatisfaction with particular actors (individuals or political parties in power) do not jeopardize the system as such.

Authoritarian regimes on the other hand, suffer from constraints in regard to their policies designed to maintain control. Authoritarian regimes can perpetuate themselves in two (or possibly three) fundamental ways: via positive economic performance, or the application of force and repression.[58] One is a carrot, the other a stick. Indeed, authoritarian regimes do a relatively poor job of maintaining themselves, and of authoritarian regimes it is military regimes which are the most fragile (See Giddes, 1999). As has been noted,

… it is not evident that authoritarian countries are more stable than democracies. Quite the contrary. Although democratic politicians spend a lot of time vacillating, arguing and being loud and disagreeable, this can reinforce stability in the medium term; it allows the interests and viewpoints of more people to be heard before action is taken. On the State Fragility Index, which is produced annually by George Mason University and studies variables such as "political effectiveness" and security, democracies tend to do much better than autocracies (The Economist 1-14-2010).

Nevertheless, the distribution of economic rewards or the instigation of fear are powerful weapons, and ones that the autocratic regimes of the Middle East and the Maghreb have employed at various times with success. What happened then to mitigate the effectiveness of these formidable tools?

The Failure of Distributive Systems and Individual Fear:

Kleptocratic Elites vs. Calculating Kantians

Relative Deprivation Theory and Unconventional Political Action

[58] the third might be by providing short-term fundamental order in societies riven by intense, violent divisions of class, ideology, ethnicity, religion, etc.

Even in many resource-rich regimes wealth is poorly distributed. Greed, corruption and self-serving behavior on the part of elites and their clients leave many people with little benefit from their country's riches. The resulting "relative deprivation" is a powerful force for dissatisfaction, trumping even absolute deprivation as a motivating factor in collective action. Relative deprivation as a "formal object of study" emerged from research conducted during the Second World War on American soldiers. At this time it referred to a psychological state resulting from evaluating one's own well-being "by comparison with levels of benefit obtained by others." Individuals were postulated to feel resentment and anger if they believe that they are being deprived relative to comparable others. In this sense, the condition is specifically put forward as the result of inter-personal comparison. However, later work implies that relative deprivation is more simply the desire for some "unattained outcome" coupled with the feeling that one "deserves" the outcome. In this sense, "referent cognitions" can refer to intra-personal (perceived state versus desired state), as well as inter-personal comparison (Folger, in Masters and Smith 1987, pp.184-185, 187; see also Crosby, 1976; 1982). Both of these variations of relative deprivation can be regarded as "egotistical" relative deprivation.

One further formulation of the relative deprivation thesis is referred to as collective relative deprivation. In this construct, relative deprivation is manifest through an individual's feelings of closeness to a particular group, coupled with the perception that the group is relatively deprived. This type of relative deprivation has been found to be associated with collective protest action (Grant and Brown, 1995).

The relative deprivation thesis of unconventional political action proposes that there exists a monotonic causal relationship between relative deprivation and political discontent. This in turn is proposed as resulting in civil disturbances. When individuals feel that they are relatively deprived they become discontented and react. This reaction can take the form of unconventional political action, including rebellion and other acts of a violent nature. In this sense, relative deprivation theory rests on a more fundamental proposition, the frustration-aggression thesis.

Although the relative deprivation theory of unconventional political action has been embellished in various ways (see for example, Gurr's list of hypotheses associated with his development of this theory, 1970), the basic proposition stands. As Gurr has stated: "[d]iscontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence" (Gurr, 1970, p.13; see also Runciman, 1966; Walker and Pettigrew, 1984).

Rational Actor Theory and Unconventional Political Action

Fundamentally, rational choice theory proposes that individual behavior is a function of the calculation of personal costs and benefits derived from engaging in any particular activity. The costs are usually formulated in terms of time, money, and effort expended. For example, Frey posits that disposable income, prices and time are the most important variables constraining human behavior (1992, pp.8,26). The benefits are usually regarded as some type of potential material gain for the actor. If the costs of any activity outweigh the benefits, a rational individual will abstain (Becker, 1976).

Attempting to explain *collective* behavior, which includes most unconventional political activity, raises a special problem in the context of a rational actor model. Theoretically, it has been persuasively argued that most individuals should not take part in unconventional political actions aimed at providing "collective goods", - that is, goods which, as opposed to private goods, are indivisible and available for public consumption (Samuelson 1954). One can, after all, enjoy the potential collective benefits accruing from such activity, should the activity be successful, without incurring any of the costs associated with actual participation. As the success of a collective endeavor can rarely be envisioned as hinging on the participation or abstention of any one individual, it simply makes more sense for a rational individual to "free ride" on the efforts of others (Olson, 1965). Yet, people do participate in unconventional political action, despite the potential costs associated with such action.

Therefore, much attention has been focused on discovering why some individuals do indeed take part in such activities. Olson's explanation revolved around the notion of "selective incentives" that could *only* be enjoyed if one actually participated. This formulation is generally accepted as a plausible explanation of participation in interest groups or other types of organizations that can devise material selective incentives restricted to a recognized membership. However, rational choice models which propose individual political participation based on selective material incentives encounter problems when applied to unconventional political behavior. Potential material benefits appear to play an insignificant role in the individual decision making calculus associated with participation in collective political activity, primarily because such activity provides few opportunities for the provision of such incentives (Salert, 1976; Mueller, 1979; Muller and Opp 1986). When one regards the majority of participants in unconventional political action then, the

market metaphor of conventional rational choice theory is simply not an adequate explanation of their motivation (for a critique of Olson's rational model for collective behavior, see Barry 1978).

As a consequence, the more successful rational choice models of unconventional political behavior place major importance on *psychic benefits* as important influences on an individual's decision making calculus (see e.g., Tullock 1971; Silver 1974, 64-65; Opp 1979; Muller and Opp 1986; Opp 1989; Coleman 1990; Muller, Dietz and Finkel 1991, pp.1273-4; Even some economic theorists do at least address the potential importance of non-material rewards - see e.g., Harsanyi 1955; Sen 1977, 1982; Hirschman 1982; Margolis 1982).

Selective incentives can be enjoyed whether a particular unconventional political action is successful or not. Additional motivation for participation in such actions has been found to be associated with individual calculations of their potential individual contribution to successful group activity, in the sense of a collective endeavor achieving its political aims. As touched upon earlier, central to the free rider thesis is the proposal that "even if the member of a large group were to neglect interests entirely, he would still not rationally contribute toward the provision of any collective or public good, since his own contribution would not be perceptible" (Olson 1982, p.64). Curiously, however, it seems that individuals regularly *overestimate* the degree to which their individual participation can contribute to the potential success of unconventional political action. Explanations of why this might be so are various, but one plausible suggestion is that individuals may adopt the "useful fiction" that each individual participant is important to the success of a unconventional political action, in order to stave off mass defection and the assurance of failure of the collective endeavor (Finkel, Muller and Opp 1989, p.886). To this end, an individual's perceptions of personal political efficacy associated with participation in particular political activities, has been put forward as a central explanatory mechanism in rational actor models of collective political action.

A related concept is that of the "calculating Kantian." This concept puts forward the proposition that a sense of "duty" to participate can be part of the psychological makeup of a potential participant, but only if the individual perceives that like-minded people will also do their part (Finkel, Muller, and Opp, 1989). When one sees then a "critical mass" of others taking part in an unconventional action, one joins in. Otherwise one will suffer a "psychic cost" associated with avoiding one's perceived duty.

Finally, there is the concept involving individual perceptions of the potential for success of particular political activities. Even those convinced of their individual importance to a unconventional political action may defect if they perceive that the particular endeavor is doomed to failure. Thus feelings of political efficacy are ideally coupled with perceptions of the potential success of particular political actions in individuals desiring the procurement of collective goods and contemplating participation in such actions. Such mechanisms have been found to be of special significance in terms of turning a desire for collective goods into actual participation in unconventional political action. These mechanisms thus serve an important function in that they allow for the inclusion of a desire for collective goods to enter into the set of independent factors posited to generate unconventional political action. Through the inclusion of these factors, desire for collective goods can enter into the decision making calculus despite the vexing free rider problem. Thus, like selective incentives, these calculations can function to help overcome the so-called "paradox of participation."

Like relative deprivation models of political behavior, rational actor models of such behavior have been embellished in various ways (see Green and Shapiro 1995). But the heart of such models really revolves around these two sets of independent causal agents for political protest. The most powerful, and parsimonious, rational actor models of such behavior then, propose an explanatory matrix in which the desire for public goods is coupled with utilitarian variables and psychological motivations. In these models, the individual makes a rational calculation to participate in unconventional political action or not, depending on the costs and benefits associated with such action. These costs and benefits take the form of positive or negative reinforcement resulting from personal participation. Additionally, participation is much more likely if the individual desires the provision of the collective goods at issue, especially if the perception is that protest may be successful in achieving such goods and that the individual's personal participation will be efficacious (see Tilly, 1975; Muller, Dietz and Finkel 1990 pp.7,9; Finkel Muller and Opp 1989 p.890).

As noted, relative deprivation theory is closely associated with "frustration-aggression" theory, which posits that frustrated individuals will often act spontaneously and aggressively to alleviate their frustration. Even if nothing concrete results from this action, the acting out of frustration in itself becomes a "psychic reward". Combined with the snowball effect that spontaneous uprisings engender on likewise frustrated individuals, people can be brought together to protest a repressive system in the street. Rationality is then

reintroduced into the matrix when spontaneous, non-rational uprisings of frustrated and deprived individuals attract "Calculating Kantians", people who are willing to do their part, and to take considerable risks, if the perception is that others will do likewise (Finkel, Muller and Opp, 1989). The protest action can then take on the attributes of an organized, goal-directed political challenge to the existing regime. The question is, why has this perception manifest itself to such an extent in the contemporary Middle East and Maghreb when it did not do so previously?

Technology and the Spread of Information

The fall of the repressive systems in the former Soviet Union and the adoption of more open and less repressive systems as a result have been explained, at least in part, on the failure of these systems to keep up economically with their democratic counterparts and the growing perception that citizens of Liberal Democratic regimes enjoyed a degree of individual autonomy and a set of individual rights little present in their own systems. The spread of this knowledge can be attributed to new technologies like satellite television, cheap air travel, and the like. The contemporary world has witnessed the penetration of the internet to nearly all corners of the world and especially the spread of cellular phone use and the increasing power of cell phone technology to allow technologically empowered individuals to bear witness to events for a global audience, and enable activists to rally like-minded individuals in their own societies to participate in collective protest and regime challenging activities. This technology-driven social change is not new (over three decades ago the cassette tape powered the Khomeini revolution in Iran, just as the printing press contributed to the protestant revolution and the French revolution in centuries past), but the degree to which these new technologies have penetrated the societies in question and the widespread ability to manipulate these technologies by so many in the demographically dominate youth sector of these societies is new. Autocratic regimes no longer have a monopoly on information or its dissemination, nor do they have a monopoly on the ability to mobilize society. Communication technology is power.

The Mosque - Social Forces Theory and Unconventional Political Participation.

The literature concerning political participation and the effects of social networks and other manifestations of social forces is extensive. A basic premise of research in this area is that organizational membership is strongly associated with political activity. Indeed, in regard to conventional political activity - voting, campaign activity, contacting political decision makers, etc.- it verges on a truism that organized groups are one of the most important external factors influencing individual behavior across a variety of political settings (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978, chap. 7; Campbell et al., 1976, Chapter 12).

The relationship between unconventional political behavior and organized groups is also widely regarded as firmly established, although popular conceptions of this relationship and scholarly acceptance of the basic premise have not been matched by as much solid empirical evidence of the type so frequently encountered in investigations of conventional political activity. That is not to say that such evidence is wholly lacking. A considerable body of work in the area of unconventional political activity points to such a positive relationship. Yet the study of this area has not been as rigorous as that devoted to conventional political acts. Indeed, much of the literature devoted to organizational influence and unconventional political activity is of a qualitative nature, which assumes but does not investigate the effects of group influences at the individual level (see, e.g., Killian, Chapter 1, in Evans, 1973), or that proposes plausible hypotheses concerning the causal relationship between organizational membership and unconventional activity but does not test these hypotheses (see e. g. Kamienecki, Coleman, and Vos, 1995). Among this latter body of work one finds the proposition that mobilization is facilitated by membership in movement type organizations that effectively comprise "associational networks" that lead to protest activities (Jeske, 1995 p.12). Membership in these organizations, in turn, is determined by the provision of "solidarity incentives" which are also the basis for the behavior that results from membership in these organizations (McAdam, 1982, p.43). A smaller but still impressive body of recent work has concentrated on measuring explicitly the influence of organized groups on the propensity of individuals to engage in unconventional political acts (see, e.g., Snow, 1980; Muller and Opp, 1986; Klandermanns and Oegema 1987; Dalton 1988; Finkel, Muller and Opp, 1989; Finkel and Opp, 1991; Leighley, 1995; see also Anderson, 1996, for the influence of specifically non-political group ties to influence unconventional political acts). These studies have largely found evidence of the importance of organized groups and/or interpersonal ties to individual decisions to engage in such activities.

Many studies that have looked at group membership and individual political behavior point to three fundamental mechanisms that may account for this influence: 1) the reduction in costs associated with communication difficulties (Opp and Gern 1993, p.662); 2) the provision of interpersonal ties by the group, which are considered to play a significant role in political behavior (Oliver 1984; see also Scholzman,

Verba and Brady 1995, on the influence of "selective social gratifications" associated with group based political activity); and 3) increases in personal feelings of political efficacy associated with formal group membership (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). Yet, the specific theoretic linkages of such factors to individual level variations regarding group membership and unconventional political behavior have not been fully investigated (see Stoecker, 1995). It appears indisputable that (like in Poland and East Germany in the 1980's and Iran in the 1970's) the presence of an influential institution outside the institutions of the State, that is, organized religion, has played and important role in the uprisings. The inability of the State to completely subdue and dominate this institution, has been significant.

Conclusion

A number of theses have been put forward to explain the dearth of liberal democratic practices in the Muslim world. Among them two – a class-based explanation for continued authoritarian rule and a religion-based explanation for the same - explicitly propose that values and beliefs matter in regard to the institutionalization and survival of liberal democratic political systems. The absence of a dominant and robust middle class, and a religious tradition that posits a dogmatic religious basis for social and political organization that leaves little room for alternative or oppositional political forces, make liberal democratic polities very difficult or impossible to establish and maintain, because in societies where the middle class is small and weak and where the Muslim faith is dominant, people's basic support for liberal democratic norms and procedures will be negligible, according to these theses. While authoritarian orientations are held by significant numbers in these societies - societies without dominant middle classes and where the vast majority of citizens are Muslim - such attitudes are a minority perspective and are very much trumped by wide-spread support for the basic building blocks of a liberal democratic system (Spehr, 2010).

Table II
Support for Democracy versus Authoritarianism
Paired Samples T Test

Democratic Orientation	**Authoritarian Orientation**	**T**
	mean	mean	
Iraq	4.8[1]	1.5	45.8*
Egypt	5.5	2.4	92.2*
Jordan	5.5	2.8	49.9*
Morocco	5.4	1.9	55.6*
Iran	4.6	3.0	42.9*
Turkey	5.2	2.8	38.6*

[1] = response to "having a democratic system" only (multiplied by 2)
* = significant at the .0001 level
n.b.: Indexes range from 0 to 6

That is very heartening and bodes well now that movements for change have come to the region. Deep-seated majority support for democracy may indeed be needed to weather bad times and to thwart determined opposition and their attempts to reverse or hijack the revolutions, even if that opposition represents only a minority of the population in this important part of the world.

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Democratic Discourses and Actors in the Authoritarian Regimes: Comparing Central Asia and Beyond

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Abstract: This panel was inspired by the recent events of the Arab Spring and the seeming authoritarian persistence in Central Asia. Three papers will analyze three possible forces of democratization: political opposition, general population, and political regimes in order to explain the lack of political change in Central Asia. All authors are united by similar methodology, which studies discourses and collective action frames to elicit conclusions.

Specifically, the paper of Mr. Nurseit Niyazbekov, a PhD Candidate in Politics at Oxford University, aims to concentrate on the role of popular protest mobilization in advancing transitions to democracy. The paper argues that transition to democracy in Kazakhstan stalled in the mid-1990s due to the failure of social movement organizations (SMOs) to effectively mobilize masses for various acts of protest. According to his preliminary findings, the waxing and waning of protest activity can be best attributed to the difficulties surrounding the identification and construction of resonant collective action frames. His research is first of its kind to attempt to employ collective action theories in the context of post-communist Central Asian societies. Mr. Niyazbekov will base his argument on discourse analysis of opposition actors in Kazakhstan. The study is based on author's primary elite-interview data and content analysis of five weekly newspapers conducted in the National Library of Kazakhstan in Almaty.

The next paper will look at the understanding of democracy among the general population. Dr. Scott Spehr will present his paper that utilizes the results of previous research regarding democratic orientations in the Muslim world as a starting point for building a theory-based explanation of the "Arab Spring". Widespread desire for democratic practices and support for democratic norms, in conjunction with leading theories devised to explain collective political behavior, that is, relative deprivation theory, mobilization theory, and modified rational action theory, reveal the necessary components for collective action. This paper argues that a desire for a collective good, deprivation regarding that good, the presence of mechanisms for achieving the good, and rewards or selective incentives for individual participation in a movement designed to achieve the collective good, were all in evidence at the time of the Arab Spring. Theory and evidence then combine to help explain the eruption of popular movements for change in the Arab world.
The last paper presented by Dr. Assel Rustemova will analyze democratization discourse of the authoritarian rulers. It argues that they effectively manage to juxtapose authoritarianism in more beneficial light than democracy. Democracy is used in two ways: as a goal and a future aspiration, but also as a phenomenon that requires initial preconditions, which can be "temporarily" mended by the authoritarian practices in exchange for economic benefits. The goal of becoming "democratic and capitalist" states allows regimes to appear "modern," "safe" and "normal" to its people and the international community, while maintaining, by authoritarian means, "social justice" in the case of Uzbekistan or breeding wealth in the case of Kazakhstan. Therefore, the primary threat of democracy in Uzbekistan is inequality and in Kazakhstan is instability. The underlying claim of these stories is that democracy is accused in being a shallow system that only cares about procedures and laws and fails to solve nascent substantive political issues. In other words, the paper will show that authoritarian rulers justify their stay in power by depicting democracy as a deficient system that requires 'correction' and 'intervention' on part of the political regime to achieve a better society. The rulers are seen as the only ones capable of achieving this goal. There are two primary outcomes from these stories: a) liberal democratic opposition remains unpopular, because it is forced to provide a 'democratic critique of democracy' since the rulers acknowledge allegiance to democratic principles; b) opposition that actually wins popularity re-installs negative understanding of democracy and provides an alternative vision for 'better society' to justify their claim to power. The lessons learned in Central Asia can also explain the reason why "Arab Spring' revolutions fail to bring liberal changes to societies, and instead advance ultra-conservative groups to power.
Nygmet Ibadildin will serve as the discussant for our panel. His research on values of various social groups in Kazakhstan will contribute to our research.

Some Factors in Mistreatment within Law Enforcement and Penitentiary Systems in Kazakhstan -
An exploratory (and preliminary) study of the period of 2008-12

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Motto:
"…no man is an island, therefore, send not to know for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee." (John Donne, 1624).

Unfortunately, despite the growing awareness of human rights issues in Kazakhstan and the country's explicit commitments to the standards of international law and the censure of human-rights-monitoring international organizations, some basic human rights are anything but fully respected by many bodies of the government in Kazakhstan. In our paper we focus on the systemic violation of human rights and mistreatment of citizens by law enforcement forces in this most developed country of Central Asia. Our objectives are as follows: 1) to tentatively (and partially) map out the general situation in (dis)respecting human right in the KKZ by law-enforcement officers; 2) to identify, analyze, and explain attitudes of police officers in Kazakhstan toward mistreatment of detained citizens and use of torture, as well possible factors that shaped their attitudes and behavior. We would like to contribute to understanding of the persistent occurrence of such practices and their causes, including institutional, social, psychological, and political factors. Underlying our research may be such philosophical questions as: What is happening when *homo sapiens* do not mean the same to some as *human being?* Why citizens who should be united by the same goals grossly mistreat each other? Why those in charge in protecting citizens' safety and security effectively endanger the latter? Therefore, there is a significant ethical dimension in our research: human beings shall become mutually responsible for each other's well-being, dignity and freedom of fear of government and should be able to stand for these values and rights.

In the first part of our paper, we provide a brief review of the literature on the topic and of the main relevant theories; in the second part we document the situation in Kazakhstan in this area, focusing on the relevant commitments of the Kazakhstani government in human-rights issues and then on expert opinion and individual case studies already documented elsewhere. In the third part we focus on interviews of a non-random (limited) sample of witnesses and provide short analyses of these cases. In the next part and in Conclusion, we attempt at a more comprehensive analysis and interpretation of our findings. An Appendix of our paper includes the transcripts of the selected interviews conducted.
Two main methods were available for our research: archival research and content analysis and witness interviews. For archival research and content analysis we have intensively search both international and local sources on the issue. Witness interviews were carried out under the circumstance that did not allow any systematic sampling technique; however, as randomly collected individual life-stories of expert witnesses, they provide explanatory evidence on their own.
Being aware of the sensitivity of the issues under investigation and potential safety concerns, we have conducted this research under strictly controlled conditions, as risk-free as possible and mostly relied on unobtrusive archival research methods.[59]

As such, our preliminary research report is meant as a first part of a longitudinal study aimed at improving the human-rights situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Post-independence economic change in Kazakhstan: transition, restructuring, and economic policy

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[59] To address ethical concerns and those of of personal safety of participants in this field experiment, we changed most of the personal information about each of the witnesses, including their real age, ethnicity, and some other background details. However, the information regarding their gender, career occupations, and some social and psychological characteristics, is revealed. Otherwise, no parts of the interviews were modified.

Abstract: This paper offers a preliminary examination of structural changes in Kazakhstan's economy over the course of its independence. The paper is divided into three sections, the first reviewing Kazakhstan's economic performance (1991-2011) through broad measures of gross domestic product (GDP) *per capita*, economic growth, and economic development. Second, against the broad historical backdrop, sectoral changes in contribution to GDP, employment, and income over the course of independence will be presented and analyzed. Third, a tracing of Kazakhstan's economic policies as related to restructuring and diversification will also be presented. The paper concludes with policy recommendations and possible future trajectories for the economy of Kazakhstan.
Key-Words- Kazakhstan, economic change, transition, sectoral shifts, employment, income, economic policy

The Republic of Kazakhstan, having recently completed two decades of independence, continues its progress as an economy in transition. Like its fellow transition economies within the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), transition in this case represents a shift from a centrally-planned economy toward greater privatization and free market orientation (IMF, 2000). Within the aforementioned regions, this transition was met initially with economic shocks and subsequently with varying degrees of recovery (Parker et al., 1997). In tandem with this brand of transition, it is likely that Kazakhstan has also experienced shifts in its economic structure over the past 20 years. This supposition, buoyed by past experiences of the world's most developed countries (MDCs) has been codified by the Clark-Fisher hypothesis (see e.g. Katouzian, 1970; Pandit, 1986). Here, transition takes the form of development, and as an economy develops sectoral changes (restructuring) shift away from the primary (agriculture and extractive activity) and secondary (manufacturing) sectors into the broadly defined tertiary (services) sector. One of the aims of this paper, then, is to examine the post-independence sectoral shifts within the Kazakhstan economy to see if the basic Clark-Fisher tenets hold for this case.

A description and analysis of restructuring (sectoral shifts) in Kazakhstan's economy will be accomplished using sectoral income data from Kazakhstan's Agency of Statistics (2011b) and supported by sectoral employment and GDP composition from the same source (2011a, 2011c). In general, we seek to examine sectoral shifts across the 20-year independence period, although data availability may constrain the years available to us. At first glance, a sizeable tertiary sector shift has occurred in Kazakhstan, with services accounting for 33.5% of GDP in 1990 and 51.7% of GDP in 2010. The analysis of employment and income data by sector will reveal if this tertiary shift has been accompanied by similar growth in service sector jobs and inflation-adjusted wages.

Following an analysis of sectoral data across the 20-year time period and a detailing of post-independence economic restructuring in Kazakhstan, we next turn our attention to economic policy. The government of Kazakhstan has attempted to meet the challenges of transition by proposing several strategies for diversification, industrialization, and innovative development. Seemingly all under the framework of the well-known Kazakhstan 2030 initiative, select programs have included "30 Corporate Leaders" aiming to diversify the national economy and to build a proper platform for the realization of innovative ideas, the "Cluster Model of Economic Development" intending to rearrange the geography of economic activities by clustering related production activities to capitalize on agglomeration economies of scale, and the "Forced Industrial-Innovative Development Program for 2010-2014" seeking to increase labor productivity and GDP share of manufacturing. A critique of past economic policies will be provided in reference to our analysis of restructuring and economic change in Kazakhstan. In addition, policy prescriptions and a likely future trajectory for Kazakhstan's economy will be provided.

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Examining Green Economy in Kazakhstan

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Abstract: The green economy in this article will be considered as an object that combines the relationship between the economy and the environment while contributing to a reduction in the unit to reduce waste, pollution and use of resources, materials and energy, waste, emissions and environmental pollution will diversify the economy, creation of decent jobs, promoting sustainable trade, reduce poverty and increase equity and income distribution.
Today's generation consumes resources without regard to the fact that these same resources descendants will be used. At the heart of "green" technologies based on the principles of sustainable development and reuse of resources.
This report provides compelling economic and social arguments for investing in "greening" the most important economic sectors in order to change the character of development, and direct the flow of public and private capital to reduce carbon emissions and efficient use of resources. Accordingly, in the "green" economy model, GDP will not be an indicator of human welfare. Thus in this study we will compare two options for Kazakhstan's GDP and "green" GDP to show how wrong we have previously considering GDP as a measure of human welfare.

1. Introduction

This study will show the importance of the transition to "green economy" and the recalculation of GDP, taking into account the cost of removing the negative influences to the environment. The main objective of the economic development is the growth of the welfare population. The development of the economy should take place in the long run that obliges us to abandon from the old system of calculating GDP, and introduce a new indicator of economic well-being "green GDP".
Most interpretations of sustainability take as their starting point the consensus reached by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987, which defined sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).
Now there is the introduction of a new paradigm of economic development - the "green" economy, which can be defined as a system of economic activities associated with the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services aimed at improving human welfare in the long run. However, it does not expose future generations to significant environmental risks and resource constraints. New directions for the transformation of the economy are becoming more widely developed. To go to the "green economy" offers a wide range of instruments: pricing, subsidies, taxes, public investment, etc (Information portal ICTSD, 2011).

2. Problem and significance

Kazakhstan has won first place in the world in greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP reported by the news agency "Новости-Казахстан", March 16, 2011 with reference to the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Environment of Kazakhstan for 2011-2015. The plan notes that made an inventory of sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the country, as well as a forecast of carbon dioxide emissions suggest that the specific emissions of greenhouse gases per unit of GDP (3.38 pounds per dollar) Kazakhstan takes first

place in the world. "The energy industry contributes most to the greenhouse gas emissions. Experts believe that by 2020 the share of coal in the generation of carbon dioxide emissions reach 66% of the total gross emissions, which are formed from fuel combustion (Information portal ICTSD, 2011).
Therefore, Kazakhstan in the shortest possible time must decide in which direction to develop their economies. In favor of a brown economy or in the long term use of renewable and clean sources, thereby promoting the development of a green economy.
Kazakhstan expects the water crisis, and if the problem is not resolved, it will soon be left without water ... the situation can save only the introduction of the principles of "green economy" that there was much talk at IV ended Astana Economic Forum (Information portal ICTSD, 2011).
The problem is that many countries have opted for a model of GDP growth, but not really considering the pollution problem and the finiteness of fossil resources. In the same way if the company would be so stupid that would be considered equal to its total revenue in net profit. That is not considering all the disadvantages of this model, and maybe just closing his eyes, looking only for a short period.
Kazakhstan will have to choose whether to participate in the green boom or continue to follow the strategy to build a conventional GDP.

3. Objective
Our objective is to identify and analyze institutional reforms enabling diffusion of green technologies in Kazakhstan. Also we have **t**o study the applicability of economic projects in Kazakhstan to reduce emissions. One of the important points is to find a path towards sustainable economic development, international competitiveness and environmental protection. The main purpose of this paper is to show the difference of GDP and “green” GDP for Kazakhstan and to do some conclusions about the economic development of Kazakhstan.
All of the above points are very important points because answering them; we can determine the level of readiness of Kazakhstan to the transition to "green" economy.

4. Literature Review
Back in 1902 one of the founders of neoclassical economics Irving Fisher admitted: "Economic prosperity depends on the degree of physical life satisfaction" and not a direct function of production and consumption of goods and services. In 1934, the author of the concept of conventional GDP Simon Kuznets, speaking before U.S. senators warned: "The Wealth of Nations can not be adequately measured by national income".
In fact, we notice that the economic indicators of the country are not factors of economic prosperity. For example production and consumption has shown good results at the moment, but in order to achieve this result, the state invests in the production, which is the source of pollution and will reduce "fake" economic growth indicators in hundreds of times in the near future. Humanity is in pursuit of profit does not pay attention to changes in the environment that adversely affects the country's economic growth and prosperity of mankind as a whole.
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, former World Bank Chief Economist, argues that an unhealthy interest in the dynamics of GDP was one of the causes of the crisis, as governments and economists have overlooked other important factors to the detriment of future development, including social and environmental. (Information portal kapital.kz, 2011).
In a recent interview with "Ведомости", he said that France, Australia and Korea have already put in my stats so-called "green GDP". Gradually, this approach will be adopted for use, and other countries, said Stiglitz, visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy for the development of new indicators to measure success. "It is a mistake to believe that a concentration of the economic growth leads to improved well-being."

5. Methodology
First we need to define the main factor adversely affecting the environment in Kazakhstan.There are many factors that impact on the environment. But in our work in the calculation of the "green" GDP, we will consider one of the most important parameter that is most harmful to the nature of the Republic of Kazakhstan. We rely on data that were published by agency "News of Kazakhstan".
Kazakhstan takes first place in the world on specific indicator of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP. Completed inventory of sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the country, as well as a forecast of carbon dioxide emissions suggest that the specific emissions of greenhouse gases per unit of GDP (3.38 pounds per dollar) Kazakhstan takes first place in the world (Information portal infoclimate.org, 2011).

In constructing the model we will use the following parameters

GGDP - is a "green GDP", which will take into account: carbon dioxide damage, mineral depletion, energy depletion

GDP (constant 2000 US$) – is a Gross domestic product refers to the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period.

CDD – Carbon dioxide damage is estimated to be $20 per ton of carbon (the unit damage in 1995 U.S. dollars) times the number of tons of carbon emitted.

MD - Mineral depletion is equal to the product of unit resource rents and the physical quantities of minerals extracted. It refers to bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, and silver.

ED - Energy depletion is equal to the product of unit resource rents and the physical quantities of energy extracted. It covers crude oil, natural gas, and coal.

"Green" GDP will be calculated using the following formula

$GGDP_i = GDP_i - CDD_i – MD_i - ED_i$ (1)

Where i - year for which the measurements are made.

This model for calculating the GGDP, we have built based on the fact that it is necessary to subtract from GDP the negative impact that requires recovery calculated in dollar terms.

Table1. Statistics data for Kazakhstan in the period from 1993 to 2009 (Data are in millions).

Source: World Bank, World Development Database.

In my work I used a qualitative method of data collection methods that plays an important role in impact evaluation by providing information useful to understand the processes behind observed results. The data were taken from the World Bank, which proves the reliability and quality of data used.

From Table 1 we can see that the greatest damage to the economy of Kazakhstan causing energy depletion.

Based on data from table1 and formula (1) we will calculate "green GDP"

Table2. Calculated “green” GDP (Data are in millions).

Year	Adjusted savings: carbon dioxide damage (current US$)	Adjusted savings: energy depletion (current US$)	GDP (current US$)	Adjusted savings: mineral depletion (current US$)
1993	1 156,09	2 211,88	23 409,03	129,24
1994	1 065,04	1 848,59	21 250,84	156,98
1995	908,70	2 038,05	20 374,31	213,87
1996	781,38	2 565,55	21 035,36	173,70
1997	732,38	2 619,70	22 165,93	219,75
1998	714,83	1 724,17	22 135,25	98,62
1999	675,64	2 264,85	16 870,82	78,17
2000	757,08	4 629,85	18 291,99	167,70
2001	896,24	4 974,52	22 152,69	122,32
2002	935,59	5 196,94	24 636,60	144,18
2003	967,49	7 029,56	30 833,69	205,53
2004	1 113,58	11 561,55	43 151,65	484,60
2005	1 184,68	16 456,15	57 123,67	677,06
2006	1 326,07	19 997,14	81 003,86	1 665,62
2007	1 614,41	23 132,21	104 853,48	1 632,07
2008	1 591,24	37 702,71	133 441,57	1 674,61
2009	1 663,36	21 541,42	115 306,08	1 215,01

. Source: World Bank, World Development Database.

Table 2 shows the computed data for a "green GDP" of Kazakhstan, calculated by the formula (1), which was shown above

Year	Adjusted savings: carbon dioxide damage (current US$)	Adjusted savings: energy depletion (current US$)	GDP (current US$)	Adjusted savings: mineral depletion (current US$)
1993	1 156,09	2 211,88	23 409,03	129,24
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2009	1 663,36	21 541,42	115 306,08	1 215,01




Figure1 GDP and "green" GDP growth in the period from 1993 to 2008.

Based on data in Table 2 we will construct a graph for visual comparison between GDP and green GDP. The graph shows the trend in GDP and green GDP growth and decline. Throughout the period from 1993 to 2008 we see that the trend growth of green GDP was less than GDP trend. Also, in the graph we can observe that in 2000 there was an increase of GDP, while we are seeing the decline of green GDP. After 2000 we observe a significant distance between the graphs, it is said that during this period was caused enormous harm to the environment of Kazakhstan.

6. Conclusion

Many advanced countries are moving away from coal and oil imports in favor of clean energy - wind, solar. Therefore, in future volumes of Kazakh exports of fossil fuels can be significantly reduced. And it allows for the business. At the same time, there is now great interest of foreign investors in renewable energy development in Kazakhstan.

Correctly calculating all the economic parameters, we can rebuild the economy of Kazakhstan in favor of long-term development of the country moving away from the "brown" to "green economy", thus taking the "green" GDP Indicator for the main factor of well-being, which will take into account all the negative consequences of human nature and harmful in reality we will see economy, rather than the false figures that are designed only for a short period. Resources on earth are being depleted, thus adhering to the old model of our planet will become extinct.

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Topic of research paper: An experimental investigation of discrimination in Kazakh Labor market

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Abstract: The research is dedicated to investigation of labor market in Kazakhstan. The main purpose of the research is identification of presence or absence of discrimination in free Kazakh labor market. In fact, the researcher was interested in two types of discrimination, which are discrimination by ethnicity and discrimination by age. The Almaty city labor market served as a main research area. To achieve the main

goal, there were revised a lot of empirical papers and identified that the correspondence testing method is the most appropriate method for such analysis. So, it was determined that by using correspondence testing, which is sending almost identical resumes to open vacancies it is possible to draw a conclusion on state of discrimination in the market.
Firstly, for conducting of correspondence testing for ethnicity discrimination analysis in Almaty city labor market, there were prepared a set of resumes and a bank of vacancies. To manipulate perception of ethnicity, each resume was assigned with modern Russian sounding name, traditional Kazakh sounding name and with modern Kazakh name. The contents of resumes were identical, except the names of applicants. Then, three resumes (one with modern Kazakh name, one with modern Russian name and one with traditional Kazakh name) were sent to one position. To avoid employer's misperception, resumes were not sent in one time. Instead, after sending the first resume the researcher waited one day before sending the second one. As a result, 720 applications were sent to 240 companies within 3 months (from September 2011 to November 2011). After applying for the vacancies, the researcher registered callbacks in the simultaneous way. A callback is defined as any action of a firm that signals interest in the respective resume, including offers for interviews, direct job offers and leaving contact information on the voice mail. In contrast, automatic responses confirming the receipt of applications are not considered as callbacks, as well as written requests for additional information. For every reaction of a firm, be it a callback, rejecting the applicant, or a request for more information, a data set was collected.

Secondly, for analysis of age discrimination in Almaty city labor market, the researcher decided to use the method developed by Fidell (1970) and send unsolicited job inquiries to employers.
The restaurant service was chosen as the research occupation. Thus, pairs of men aged twenty-seven and forty-seven, were used to apply for the position of waiters. Here, to manipulate perception of ethnicity, each resume was assigned with modern Russian sounding name and Modern Kazakh sounding name. So, there was developed a table which included a list of all restaurants in Almaty with their e-mail addresses. As a result, there were found 129 well-known restaurants and there were sent unsolicited job inquiries of two males (the first aged 27 and the second 47) to all 129 restaurants. To avoid employer's misperception, resumes were not sent in one time. Instead, after sending the first resume the researcher waited one day before sending the second one. As a result, for every reaction of a firm, there was collected a data set.

Finally, there was identified that applicant with the modern Kazakh sounding name has a callback rate higher by 21.02 percentage points in comparison with applicant with Russian sounding name. Thus, the applicant with modern Kazakh name should expect 5 callbacks for every 10 ads she or he applies to; on the other hand, an applicant with Russian sounding name would need to apply to 12 vacancies to achieve the same result.
The candidate with Traditional Kazakh name has a lower callback rate by 42.03 percentage points in comparison with the applicant with Modern Kazakh name. As a result, the applicant with Traditional Kazakh name receives 1 callback from 12 applied vacancies; at the same time the applicant with Modern Kazakh name needs to apply only to 2 vacancies to get the same result as the applicant with Traditional Kazakh name.
The Probit analysis results showed that Modern Kazakh name raises the probability of being called back and invited for an interview by about 6% in comparison with Traditional Kazakh name. However, the Russian name raises the probability of being invited for an interview by 12% in comparison with Traditional Kazakh name.
So, applicants with identical resumes are differently treated in Almaty labor market.
Next, it was also underlined that the age discrimination exists in Almaty labor market. Despite the fact that resumes of 27 aged and 47 aged applicants were almost identical, 97% of responded companies preferred young applicant rather than 47-aged applicant. Probit analysis showed that the young age increases the probability of being called back and invited for an interview by 53% comparing with older age.

Optimal currency portfolio: the case of Kazakhstan

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Abstract: The financial crisis in 2008 revealed the importance of currency risk management. From the first year of its introduction, Kazakhstani national currency, the tenge, was highly volatile and was devalued

several times. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the degree of riskiness of alternative portfolios - comprising of four major international currencies, the US dollar, euro, pound and yen - for Kazakhstan. The research is based on popular risk management tools such as Value at Risk, backtesting, stress testing, and sensitivity analysis.

The study reveals that the US dollar is the strongest currency in comparison with the euro, the pound and the yen, whereas the yen is the weakest. However, by forming a portfolio comprising of all four currencies, it is possible to significantly decrease the risk of unexpected depreciation of one of them. This is explained by diversification effect, where the risks of individual components offset each other making loss smaller. Analysis of alternative portfolios shows that a portfolio consisting of the dollar, the euro, and the pound performs better than other combinations. The findings are applicable to construction of currency portfolio for Kazakhstani people and could protect their savings from unexpected losses. The results can also be used for forecasting purposes since the analysis investigates the general attitude of exchange rates and takes into account their behavior in unexpected critical situations that may happen in the future.

Violent Conflict, Identity and Game Theory

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The extent of violent conflict seems to be declining over the very long run according to most attempts to measure it. Some of these attempts, particularly those surveyed recently by Stephen Pinker, will be critically reviewed and it will be argued that even if this is true, it should not lead to decreasing concern about violent conflict. To the contrary, it will be argued that there are reasons for increasing concern.

The following question will then be discussed: What can we expect theory in general and game theory in particular to contribute to our understanding of violent conflict? Also, what should we not expect game theory to contribute? After a brief discussion of other approaches to the study of violent conflict in subjects, some contributions of traditional economic theory will be discussed before focusing attention on game theoretic contributions. Attention will be given to those aspects of game theory that make it particularly suitable for the analysis of violent conflict before noting the shortcomings of game theory for this purpose.

Then, the concept of Identity will be introduced in a general philosophical way and then related to the particular problem of rational choice of strategies in strategic situations. There are many types of Identity: These include National, ethnic, religious, tribal, social, political, and class as well as family, gender, sporting and ethical. Some of these have received special attention recently in studies of violent conflict. It is also the case that Identity is thought be important in efforts to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict, efforts to stop it if there is an outbreak of it, and peace keeping after violent conflict has ceased. Some examples of this literature will be discussed.

At this point a central issue can be raised concerning game theory and identity. On the one hand, game theory provides the main theoretical model for the analysis of violent conflict. On the other hand, Identity is not an explicit part of any game theoretic model. The issues that arise from these two points therefore include the following: To what extent can game theory be extended to include Identity? How can this be done? Does including Identity in game theory reduce its effectiveness. These issues have been largely neglected apart from one notable exception, that of the joint work of Akerlof and Kranton. Their contribution will be briefly discussed in the light of the issues raised above. Interestingly, Akerlof and Kranton give almost no attention to a general definition of Identity and, indeed, they have been criticized for this. However, it will be argued that the absence of a general definition is a merit and not a shortcoming. They certainly do not need a general definition for their purposes. Rather, they focus on Prescriptions that arise from arguably any relevant concept of Identity and this view will be supported.

However, their prototype game theoretic models are limited to single identities. This may be seen as a limitation in view of Sen's recent use of multiple identities in his book, "Identity and Violent Conflict: The illusion of destiny". Actually, extending Akerlof and Kranton's model to a general game theory model with multiple identities does not raise any significant difficulties, though it is intricate.

Sen's claim is that if agents have multiple identities and if these are recognized by agents with other identities, the prospect of violent conflict is less than if agents have single identities and are seen as such by agents with other multiple identities. This contrasts sharply with the view that has become common

following Huntington's enormously influential book, "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order". It will be argued that game theoretic models with multiple identities could lead to a more precise understanding of the views of both Sen and Huntington.

The Aral Sea in 2012: Hope, pessimism, uncertainty

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Abstract: The Aral Sea crisis has spawned a plethora of research investigating its anthropogenic causes and ecological consequences. Perhaps somewhat less studied have been the wide-ranging impacts on the local human populations. Recent construction of a dam, dyke, and spillway complex has led to a stabilization of the Northern Aral Sea, the enhancement of ecological integrity, and a seeming return of the fishing industry. To the south, however, the larger Big Aral continues its desiccating retreat. The main bodies of the Aral present a confounding paradox, one engendering optimism; the other breeding continued despair. As a result, the prospects for the Aral region's sustainability remain tenuous.
Key-Words- Aral Sea, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, fishing, cotton,

Central Asia's Aral Sea represents a dramatic case study in which anthropogenic drivers of ecological change have destroyed ecosystems and in so doing have also negatively impacted human populations. The natural environmental damage, urging many commentators to refer to the Aral case as one of the world's worst ecological crises, has many interconnected facets. The most obvious, the shrinking and disappearing sea, manifests ubiquitously in photographs of stranded fishing vessels rusting in the desert. Other ecological consequences have included a destruction of wetland ecosystems (particularly in the Amudarya delta), a decrease in waterfowl and other species, the near disappearance of fish and other aquatic species, and a loss of the inland lake's climate moderating influence. As human populations within the Aral region are yet another of the species within the regional ecosystem, negative influences on people also abound. The drying Aral seabed contains salts and agricultural chemicals that once propelled by steppe winds, assault local populations though the air they breathe. Contaminated and salt-laden drinking water, as well as the persistence of agricultural chemicals and dioxins in the food supply, further contribute to ill effects on human health. The near extinction of most of the Aral's fish species, in addition to eliminating an important source of protein for regional residents, meant the disappearance of the fishing industry and the employment and income it provided. The largely anthropogenic causes of the Aral Sea crisis have wrought damage to the region's ecology and human populations. In turn, the crisis has threatened the ecological and social sustainability of the Aral Sea region.

While the Soviet Union was not the first to grow cotton in Central Asia (see e.g. Soucek, 2000) (indigenous populations and imperial Russia had previously viewed the region as conducive to growing this crop), the scale of the irrigation networks necessary for meeting the ever-increasing Soviet production targets largely contributed to the Aral Sea's demise. Water from the region's major river systems, the Syrdarya and Amudarya, was diverted through unlined, open irrigation ditches to water an increasing land acreage cultivated in cotton. The inherent inefficiency of this irrigation system translated into water losses though evaporation and seepage into dry soils at increasing distance from the main rivers. Groundwater levels rose, bringing dissolved salts and other minerals nearer to the surface. (Feshbach and Friendly, 1992). The resulting water-logging and mineralization of formerly arable land often forced farmers to expand cotton areas even further. Prodded by each successive five-year plan, Soviet farmers (understandably under the circumstances) sought to increase cotton production through the heavy application of fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, and defoliants. Toxic elements in many of these inputs also seeped into the groundwater or were washed downriver closer to the Aral region. These toxic substances continue to persist within the Aral ecosystem today.

By the 1960s and into the 1970s, it became clear that the Aral Sea was shrinking. Deprived of much of its only source of incoming water (from the Amudarya and Syrdarya) the sea's water balance shifted in favor of evaporative losses. The Aral's retreat accelerated through the 1980s and by 1989 it had split into the smaller Northern Aral Sea (NAS) in Kazakhstan and the larger southern Aral mainly in Uzbekistan. By the

mid-2000s a World Bank-funded project along the southeastern extent of the NAS was completed. This dam, dyke, and spillway complex, costing an estimated $85 million, directed and contained Syrdarya river water into the NAS. As a result, the level of the NAS rose, its salinity decreased, and its general ecological health improved allowing the return of many fish species (and a return of the fishing industry) (Pala, 2011). In small, isolated fishing villages surrounding the NAS, the return of the fishing industry has spawned a new wave of optimism. For the remainder of the Aral Sea, however, continued desiccation with little incentive to improve the situation leaves a continued pessimism. The Aral Sea's future, while tenuous, holds the key to the region's continued ecological and social sustainability.

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Soil degradation in rice fields of Kazakhstan: Boron toxicity and its adverse effects

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Abstract. This paper is devoted to serious ecological problem in agriculture: soil degradation in rice fields in South Kazakhstan and in particular, to boron toxicity in rice, which resulted in reduced crop yields. The following abiotic factors were investigated to determine the ability of boron to accumulate on rice fields: soil type, soil properties like salinity and acidity, season (level of precipitation), water logging /water shortage. The results demonstrate the severity of boron excess for fertility of rice crop which depends on boron ionic composition in soil. Adverse impact of both boron deficiency and boron excess are discussed. The necessity of boron fertilizers is shown for soils with high boron mobility.

1. Introduction. Rice is mainly grown on meadow soils on the territory of Kazakhstan. Meadow soil types are the main land suitable for rice cultivation in Kazakhstan, they include many subtypes that differ in extent and depth of salinity and alkalinity. The high level of alkalinity is one of the crucial genetic features, and therefore, its purposeful regulation defines fertility and effectiveness of soil and crop productivity. The objects of current research are soils of rice fields located in the lower reaches of the rivers Syr Darya, Ili and Amu Darya (Kyzylorda province). Stationary research was conducted on Akdalinsky and Karalinsky irrigation systems in order to develop methods of boron management in rice production in these regions.

2. Concepts, Methodology. Boron belongs to seven main micronutrients (Fe, Mo, Zn, Cl, Cu, Mn, B) necessary for productive crop growth and is important in sugar transport, cell division, and synthesis of certain enzymes. Although boron is needed by plants in relatively higher quantities versus other microelements, the range between boron deficiency and toxicity is very narrow. Exceeding the recommended application rate or applying boron too frequently can result in toxic concentrations of boron in soils and plants, and as the result, reduction in crop yield, and in case of rice even termination of vegetation. Boron demand is estimated to be equal 12 – 50 mg/kg of dry matter.

3. Results. Boron if existing in soluble form, is easily being leached out, absorbed by plants, and therefore, subject to fluctuations in soil concentration. Keeping boron concentration at optimal level helps to maintain carbohydrate metabolic processes in plants, perform protein synthesis, seed and cell wall formation. Boron deficiency is a plant disorder characterized by fall of flowers and ovaries, low yield of seeds and fruits at

normal development of vegetative mass. Boron does not move from old organs into the young, growing ones. Acute boron deficiency leads to death of growth points of the roots and above ground organs, chlorosis of the apical growing point, followed by its necrosis. The plant bushes, but new formed sprouts soon stop growing. The absence or deficiency of boron infringes the normal flow of carbohydrate, and therefore starch and sugar are cumulated in potato laves.

The plants require boron throughout the entire vegetative period. Boron content is different in crops (in mg/kg of dry matter) : 4,7–8,1 in grains; 10-13 in potatoes; 22-23 in sugar beets. 30 to 270 g/ha of boron is carried away with various crops harvested. To provide optimal plant nutrition boron content in soil should be in the range 0.02 – 0.05 mg B per 100 g of soil. Assimilable forms of boron in soil are mainly presented by boric acid (H_3BO_3) and its soluble salts. Boric acid both formed in soil and introduced into soil with fertilizers is quite mobile compound, poorly fixed by soil and able to be washed out with precipitation. Therefore, areas of excessive moisture of the soil are poor in mobile forms of boron. The least amount of boron is contained in the sod-podzolic soils.

The soils of the southern regions of Kazakhstan are rich in boron, but even there may be identified certain areas where the application of boron fertilizers may be effective. The content of boron depends on the texture of the soil and the amount of humus in it: humus is richer in boron than mineral layer of soil; clay soils contain more boron than sands. Availability of salts of boric acid in soil depends on the acidity. With increasing acidity, the hydrates of sesquioxides of Fe and Al bind boron due to their hydroxy-ions and reduce boron availability. Similarly, boron availability is being reduced in liming process due to OH^- not Ca^{2+} ions. Among the indicators of biochemical soil activity, chemical factor is essential one, contributing into boron accumulation in rice fields, which eventually has adverse impact on rice growth especially during germination period.

According to study conducted by Mamutova Zh.M., flooded meadow soils of Kazakhstan for several years revealed the high content of mobile boron: > 10 mg/kg of soil. The study of the causes of boron toxicity in meadow soils of rice fields and the development of boron regulation methods is of practical interest.

A distinctive feature of water-soluble forms of boron is a low limit of toxic concentration and narrow range of efficient concentration in soil solution. Typically, water-soluble fertilizers contain a dose of boron equal to 0.050 – 0.40 kg / ha or 0.2 – 1.0 mg/ liter of soil, but for some crops the threshold concentration may be even lower, and the efficient range much narrower. Moderate excess of mobile boron in soil leads delays plant growth and reduces crop yield but significant boron excess acts as a general herbicide causing all the plants die.

The need for accurate and uniform soil application of low boron doses requires a high degree of farming. Disregarding and violating these requirements inevitably leads to failure and apparently becomes the basis of an unjustified fear of boron and exaggeration of its dangers.

In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that boron has high level of mobility, quickly and easily leachable from the soil. As it is known, boric acid, applied on soil, after the third rain could not be detected even qualitatively.

4. Boron deficiency. The main difficulties of using water-soluble boron fertilizers are due to the fact that a single dose to be applied on soil is limited by a low threshold of toxicity, but plants consume relatively high boron amount. In addition to this, a considerable portion of the boron is leached during irrigation and rain. As a result, the concentration of boron in soil solution rapidly falls below allowable limit and the plants begin to starve. Therefore, to maintain boron content in optimum concentration range is not easy. However, this challenging problem is solvable, but only with the help of water-soluble boron salts boron.

5. Boron fertilizers. Usage of boron fertilizers in Kazakhstan however is considered with great caution, and as a rule, farmers prefer not to use boron fertilizers at all because of the frequent occurrence of “boron toxicity” in rice fields. Complexity of boron ionic composition in soil and water solutions defines the diversity and difficulties in determination of different forms of boron. Lack of reliable analytical methods for boron thus represents additional reason of non-usage of boron fertilizers in Kazakhstan.

Application of boron requires special attention, high culture in farming and precise work with trace doses of micronutrients. It is obvious that because of deficiency of mobile boron, which is frequently the case, the boron fertilizers become essential to obtain complete and high-quality crops. The development of boron identification and analysis methods becomes therefore a high priority problem in rice production.

Keywords: *boron, toxicity, boron deficiency, micronutrient, boron fertilizers.*

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Loss of Biodiversity in Kazakhstan: Snow Leopard, National Symbol

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Abstract. Loss of biodiversity belongs to major environmental problems caused by anthropogenic activities both in global and local scale. Snow leopard or IRBIS, one of the rare big mammals of Kazakhstan listed in the Red Book of Kazakhstan as ‘rare’ species, is also the national symbol of Kazakhstan. Despite this, the population of Snow Leopard in Kazakhstan continues to decline, accounting for 100-120 species left. The main threats to biodiversity in general and to population of these species are discussed. The strategy of its conservation includes creating legislative base, implementation of which implies cooperation between government, conservation agencies and public. One of the goals is increasing awareness of the public in the necessity of saving and protecting snow leopard as an element of our ecosystem.
Keywords: biodiversity loss, snow leopard, habitat destruction, conservation.

1. Introduction. The vastness of the territory of Kazakhstan and its unique geographical location in the heart of Eurasia led to a wide variety of natural conditions and, accordingly - vegetation and wildlife. According to the Book of the genetic pool of fauna of Kazakhstan, there are 835 species in total in Kazakhstan, that compile only vertebrate animals like fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals [4]. But unfortunately, a large number of numerous species and their habitats have declined due to anthropogenic activities. 125 species are listed currently in the Red Book of Kazakhstan. According to USAID, the industrial and agricultural expansion that occurred in Kazakhstan during last 30-40 years produced adverse effects on our natural ecosystems and related ecological processes [1].
Snow Leopard is one of those endangered species. Snow Leopard or Irbis, is a rare medium sized cat, weighing in average 50-70 kg. Snow Leopard or Irbis, listed in the Red Book of Kazakhstan since 1978, became the national symbol of Kazakhstan, which was proposed by Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in his address to the nation "Strategy 2030". But despite this fact, the estimated number of snow leopards in Kazakhstan is declining from 180-200 to current number of these species 100 - 120.
2. Threats to biodiversity. Loginov O. States that the main threats for the population of snow leopards in Kazakhstan are poaching, decreasing number of animals that represent prey for snow leopards, occupying the higher position in the food web, conflict with farmers, degradation and fragmentation of key habitats, lack of awareness of local people and local authorities of the problem and the need to preserve this unique animal and, finally lack of measures to protect the species in Kazakhstan [5,6].

2.1. Poaching: Poaching appears as killing and illegal catching of snow leopard for getting their fur, which is highly prized all over the world. Unfortunately, it is the same in Kazakhstan. Their lustrous fur is made into coats, hats and other garments. Pelts sell for thousands of dollars on the black market, and it typically takes 6-12 skins to make one coat. Snow Leopard skeletons sell for twice the amount of their furs. Over the past five years, their bones have become in demand as a substitute for Tiger bones in traditional Asian medicine. With so much people from Snow Leopard areas who are barely able to survive on a few dollars a day. To them, poaching is an extra source of income to help feed their families. In addition, lack of jobs offered to local people also leads to illegal hunting for the "Red Book" species and animals. Despite an enforcement of security measures, creation of new protected areas and a significant increase in fines for illegal hunting for snow leopard (2000 MCI or more than 2 mln tenge), poaching is not eradicated. (Loginov, 2011)

2.2. Prey population decline. Reduction of the number of animals that are the objects of power (meals), occupying the lower position in the food web. In the first years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the protection of nature in all post-Soviet countries has significantly deteriorated, which strongly affected the number of not only rare species, but those for whom hunting is allowed. According to Cheranev [2], before 1978, a year when the first Red Book of USSR and Kazakhstan was published, hunting was permitted for many species, which are rare and endangered today. The population of prey animals for snow leopard, like many erstwhile ungulates such as mountain sheep, has not still recovered [2].

2.3. Conflict with Herders: When Snow Leopards and humans come into close contact, conflict usually arises. The cats often attack livestock because they are much easier to stalk and kill then their prey. Herders in the area depend heavily on the well being of their animals, and so the loss of a single sheep, goat or horse presents a huge setback. Herders often retaliate for these losses by poisoning, shooting or trapping Snow Leopards. Killings of this nature rarely get reported, and so the number of Snow Leopards killed in this manner is unknown.

2.4. Habitat Loss: The habitat to which the Snow Leopard has adapted is a very specific and fragile environment. These snow covered mountainous areas are being threaten by both global warming and the encroachment of humans. Snow Leopards typically inhabit the area between the tree line and the permanent snow line. Temperature changes have caused the permanent snow line to recede, which causes the Snow Leopards to move further up mountain slopes. At these high elevations, vegetation is scarce, as are the herbivorous animals on which the big cats prey. Not only is global warming posing a threat, but as humans become more mobile, they push further into Snow Leopard territory. Grazing too many cattle within the area of snow leopard in Kazakhstan is also can cause, and in some places has already led to degradation of sub-alpine and alpine meadows and wild ungulate exclusion of their native habitats.

2.5 Lack of Cooperation. There is no shortage of laws designed to protect the Snow Leopard, but creating laws is only half of what is required. Implementing these laws requires cooperation between not only governments and conservation agencies, but also the general public. Lack of awareness and support – herders living with snow leopards sometimes do not understand why they are important elements of the ecosystem and why they need to be protected.

Duisekeeyev admits that in many areas the local population remains ignorant about running environmental laws and ongoing projects / conventions on snow leopard. The need and motivation to maintain this large predator, attacking and damaging their households, makes it difficult to be brought to the local people [3].

Regulating /legislative acts of the RK to preserve rare animals, particular - the snow leopard, as well as animals that make up its prey and habitats are often not effectively enforced. The main measure to protect rare and endangered species is specially protected natural areas. However, only 5% of the area range of snow leopard is under their protection in Kazakhstan [6] which means that the remaining 95 % currently exist without protection. In addition, most of the State inspectors and other employees that work in such specially protected natural areas have low wages and often lack of equipment.

3. Solutions. In order to take real actions to solve the problem, the government needs state it at the national level. Like many of neighboring countries - Russia (2002), Uzbekistan (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2009), Kazakhstan (Snow Leopard Fund) has authorized the strategy of conservation of snow leopard only in 2011. The common solutions that will enrich the incarnation of the strategy are: conducting research to establish habitat characteristics of snow leopard in Kazakhstan, population dynamics and the spread within the Kazakh part of the area; to enlarge the area of reserves and national parks, as well as taking at least 70-75% of area range under specially protected natural areas; creating some operational measures to curb poaching, training police and customs officers and of course, to make a large scale promotion of the

snow leopard protection based on socio-economic programs. The last one is more close to us, young generation that can participate in various charity activities for saving snow leopards in our own country, like many European countries .

4. Conclusions.

A. It is important to create private Snow Leopard Conservation Agencies that will implement programs aimed at research, education and preservation.

B. Donate money to organizations trying to save snow leopards.

C. Volunteer your time and talents to educate others or help fundraisers.

We honestly believe in realization of goals of the Snow Leopard Fund.

At the same time we also propose to create special zones and territories (under NP) along with the rehabilitation centers for the following purposes: intentionally multiply snow leopard population and to host those that were seized from poachers. Moreover to make these territories open for local visitors and tourists from all over the world so, that it is possible to observe the growth of a leopard from the "birth" up to the moment of their reintroduction into wild.

If one day such centre opens its doors for us or our children, we will be really happy to recognize a tiny piece of our contribution the process of saving Snow Leopards…

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Water Wars in Central Asia

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Abstract: From ancient times Central Asia countries had enough water resources for living, on the average, there was four thousand tons of a superficial (river) drain per person. Nevertheless, Central Asia region has attracted the world's attention due to enduring water wars. Nowadays, water is not only the main resource needed for live, but also it is the trump card in political wars.

Water war can lead not only to social problem, such us lack of fresh water, but also can cause economical problems. Poor irrigation practices employed in Central Asia during many years are considered as one of the main reasons of water shortage and low quality of water. The deficit of water resources creates obstacles for development of agricultural industry. Thus, in Central Asia there is a high rate of unemployment, lots of poor people, moreover, the standard of living is low.

The water problems in Kazakhstan are taking more significant turnover. While big cities use water in an unlimited amount, most of small cities and villages do not have enough water at all, they mostly use water from wells. Aral Sea is decreasing very fast, the sea which was the 4th biggest in the world, today is close to disappearing. In fact, it caused problem for agriculture and surrounding nature. The Irtysh water which originates in China (Black Irtysh), then flows through Kazakhstan and Russia, today creates serious problems on water quantity and between these countries. And the country located downstream the river is

in unfavorable situation. How to split the river which has inflows in several countries? These questions are lying in legislation area and are the subject of negotiations and agreements between countries. We expect higher efficiency of the official bodies responsible for water problems in Kazakhstan, one of them being the Committee on Water Resources of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Creating a network of watershed councils, expansion of their power, development of watershed programs and increasing the efficiency of water usage for each major river of Kazakhstan are among the measures that could mitigate the acute situation. In addition, development and implementation of evidence-based guidelines for limiting water use and wastewater discharge may help. In general, new legal rules in water usage area should be followed by defining mechanisms for their enforcement.

One of the indirect ways to reduce water shortage problem is to decrease per capita water consumption in Kazakhstan. Currently, average per capita water consumption in Kazakhstan is higher than in Europe. Water saving habits should be cultivated in our people, starting from the very small children. Differentiated water tariffs existing in many countries may assist in reducing water usage in Kazakhstan. Similar system of differentiated rates on electricity is already implemented, with two levels of consumption, the higher one being charged at higher rates. Education of people in environmental area is another way how considerable effect may be achieved without huge investments.

Many infectious diseases are the result of poor water quality. Anthropogenic activity generate different types of water pollution: biological, industrial. It seems to be logical to impose higher penalties /fees /taxes on the industrial plants for polluting water in order to compensate damage to human health and the environment, introduce payments for ecological services.

Keywords: *water recourses, water war, water shortage, water pollution.*

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Challenges of Changing Communications Industry Suggest Need for 'Professional PhD' Could such an approach provide a Central Asian university a competitive edge in the world's education marketplace?

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Abstract: The Communications Industry is facing great changes related to new technologies, new business models and new global opportunities. While universities outside the U.S. are experimenting with professional doctoral programs to meet the needs of industry, U.S. educators are silent. There is no research or discussion about this possibility. This report explores the responses of 767 communication executives, who say the industry would benefit from graduates of a professional doctoral program, and they believe graduates of such a program are needed in academia, as well.

1. Introduction:

The Communications Industry is changing very rapidly. New technology is changing not only how news media and PR practitioners can do things technically but also strategically. For example, the technology already existed before the 2008 election, but it was the Barack Obama PR/marketing team that figured out how to employ the technology strategically to win a presidential election. In the process they immediately changed the way PR/marketing professionals did their work. During the next year, the number of Facebook users grew by 350% and Twitter users by 1,500% (D Steven White, 2010). The technology was there before, but it seemed to be the shocking use of new media by Obama that ignited the rocket-like ascent of social media. In the same way, all communication professionals must try to keep up with both the technical

changes and the new strategic opportunities. And as one who teaches communications technology, it seems the more I learn, the more I realize I don't know.

But technology and technology-related issues are not the only things that have changed for many communication professionals. Even before the Web, the industry was conglomerating. Companies that used to concentrate exclusively on one medium began expanding into other media. Newspaper chains, for example, began expanding into TV, radio, magazines and then new media. It was difficult for media executives to understand all the technology, business, and journalistic differences between even the traditional media. And with convergence of media onto the Internet, even the skill set of individual communication professionals is expanding dramatically. While there are still specialists, there is growing pressure for professionals to learn cross-media skills and technologies. And on top of that, in this era of globalization, communication executives must learn to deal with the challenges related to international laws, languages and cultures (Vivian, 2009). With all these skills, understandings, strategies, technologies, and business models in mind, we asked 767 North American communication executives if there is a need within the industry itself for a "practical PhD" – a professional doctorate similar to the MD, JD and EdD degrees.

2. Literature Review:

Many hours of online search has yielded little previous research on this specific subject. There has been an ongoing discussion within departments of mass communications as to the need to employ more academics with significant professional background – even if they have only a master's degree. The editor for the top media communication education journal – Journalism & Mass Communication Educator – lamented the continuing practice of hiring professors with only master's degrees (Claussen, 2006) as he reviewed the Association of Educators of Journalism & Mass Communication's in-depth Report of the Task Force on the Status and Future of Doctoral Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (Salmon, Charles, et al, 2006). And a recent review of 50 job postings on http://HigherEdJobs.com by American publicly owned universities for tenure-track assistant professors in journalism, PR/marketing, broadcasting and graphics showed that 46 percent of the postings allowed applicants without PhDs. And many of the postings specifically stated that a master of fine arts degrees would be considered terminal degrees.

But rather than eliminate the requirement for a PhD, could a doctoral degree be designed to meet the needs of both industry and academia, thus encouraging greater demand and providing a larger pool of candidates with both a doctorate and extensive professional experience? The AEJMC task force report (Salmon, Charles, et al), still available on the organization's Web site, representing its most authoritative discussion on the subject, never raised even the possibility of a professional doctorate in communications. This is in spite of the fact that universities in the United Kingdom, Australia and other countries have been offering professional doctorates in communications for about two decades. It is also in spite of the fact that professional doctorates overall have been increasing in the U.S. Kot and Hendel (2011) examined doctoral programs in 32 top U.S. universities, finding that they average 4.7 professional doctorates per university, but none that offered one in communications. Altogether, they offered 33 types of professional doctorates, led by the Doctor of Education (EdD) degree, offered by 26 of the 32 universities, followed by law and medicine, each offered by 16 universities. In contrast, the first professional doctorate offered in Australia, according to Kot and Hendel, was the Doctor of Creative Arts, started at the University of Wollongong in 1984. The more recent Doctor of Communication degrees being offered in the UK and Australia are not clearly designed to provide the Communications Industry with employees with expertise in the most rapidly changing areas of concern. The degree offered by the Charles Sturt University seems to be typical (http://www.csu.edu.au/courses/postgraduate/communication_doctor/course-structure). Professionals can work on it part-time over an eight-year period. It only has five courses: Approaches to Enquiry in Communication (16 points), Research Project Development in Communication (16 points), Reflective Practitioner Perspectives in Communication (16 points), Project Proposal Communication (16 points), and Dissertation/Portfolio (128 points). Whether it offers the flexibility for students to develop new areas of expertise the industry needs is not clear.

This study explores the response by North American industry executives to the need for a professional doctorate within the Communications Industry and its usefulness within academia.

3. Methodology:

A survey letter was emailed to representatives of mass communication organizations, which included print, broadcast, new media and public relations executives. Executives were contacted by email, most of which

was sent through the Expedite Simplicity email service. Each respondent was sent an introductory email with an embedded link to our survey, which was hosted by the Qualtrics survey research program. Surveys were emailed to members of six media databases: EasyMedalist.com, Data-Aide.com, Contacts on Tap, Congress.org, Editor & Publisher, and the Expedite Public Relations list. Three follow-up emails were sent after our initial contact. The Qualtrics survey program prevents any respondent from answering more than once.

Respondents were asked to react to a series of statements, using Likert-like graded preference scales (strongly agree to strongly disagree) to express their opinions. This report will focus on executives' responses to only five statements from the survey that relate to the possible need for professional PhDs.

Respondents were 767 media and public relations executives representing an overall response rate of 17.3%. Because of the nature of Internet security systems, most bulk emails -- even when sent by permission -- are blocked. The email service we used was able to track how many letters were blocked, how many were opened, and how many recipients actually clicked on the link to the online survey, hosted at http://qualtrics.com. Initial emails were sent to contacts in the six media databases. Three follow-up emails were sent after our initial contact. Most of the emails were sent through the Expedite Simplicity email service, which showed a block rate of 80%. Consequently, 4,418 letters actually reached a standard email inbox, of which 783 recipients clicked on the survey link. According to Qualtrics, 98% of those who clicked on the survey link then completed on the survey.

Of the respondents, 263 identified themselves as print media executives (34%); 154 broadcast, cable or new media executives (20%); and 258 as public relations executives (34%). Ninety-two respondents did not categorize themselves in any category (12%).

With 767 survey responses, we are pleased with the large N of our study. A potential limitation comes from the relatively high email filter rate of 80%. We have no way of ascertaining whether the 20% who did receive the email are randomly distributed across the sample. We have no evidence to suggest that those who received the email significantly differed from those whose Internet filters rejected our correspondence. It seems unlikely that this would lead to significant selection bias, but no data is available to prove it did not.

Email-based surveys do typically suffer from a lower response rates than do surveys delivered by the Postal Service. Recent research suggests that low response rates do not bias a sample, and studies with low response rates are producing the same results as surveys taken years earlier when response rates were higher (Keeter et al, 2006).

Additional support for statistical reliability is consistency between subgroups within the sampled population (Raines-Eudy, 2000), and our findings revealed great consistency between newspaper, magazine, broadcast, new media and PR executives, with differences easily explained by the differing needs of each subgroup.

4. Results:

Because of the many challenges already noted, perhaps in no field is it more important to have university professors with industry experience than in journalism and public relations. They are needed to prepare students for the expectations and challenges of the "real world." Relating to this need, the most direct statement to which executives responded was: "Mass communication students need more hands-on experience." With this statement 89% of the communication executives agreed or strongly agreed. Only 1% disagreed, and 10% were neutral or undecided.

Because of the perceived lack of practical skills training at most universities, more than half (53%) of the professionals agreed or strongly agreed with Statement 2: "University mass communication education would do a better job by providing one year of general education, two years of intensive mass communication training, and a one-year professional apprenticeship" so working professionals could complete the training. Only 11% disagreed. Current AEJMC accreditation standards require no more than 25-30% of coursework within the major.

Table 1 - Support for Radical Change

Item Number	Simply respond by indicating how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.	Grand Total (including newspapers, magazines, broadcasting, new	
		Strongly Agree/Agree	Strongly Disagree/Disagree
1	Mass communication students need more hands-on experience.	89%	1%
2	University mass communication education would do a better job by providing one year of general education, two years of intensive mass communication training, and a one-year professional apprenticeship.	53%	11%
3	I would rather hire a person with a communications master's degree than a person with a mass communications Ph.D, all else being equal.	40%	11%
4	Mass communications doctoral programs today are too focused on theory and research.	50%	3%
5	The communications industry needs graduates from a "practical Ph.D" program (comparable to a medical doctor program) that provides hands-on cross-departmental and cross-media expertise, including so called "new media."	55%	12%
6	A person with a "practical Ph.D" as described above would have value within the communications industry.	59%	8%
7	A person with a "practical Ph.D" as described above would do a better job at a university preparing the next generation of mass communication professionals than those with a research-based Ph.D.	57%	6%
		767 100.00%	

The next five questions related to the value and nature of PhDs for both universities and mass communication organizations. We first wanted to ascertain the current value of a traditional PhD within the communications industry. So, we asked communications executives to respond to Statement 3, "I would rather hire a person with a communications master's degree than a person with a mass communications PhD, all else being equal." Forty percent of the executives agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, and only 11% disagreed or strongly disagreed.

We then asked executives to respond to Statement 4, "Mass communications doctoral programs today are too focused on theory and research," to which 50% agreed or strongly agreed, and only 3% disagreed or strongly disagreed.

With Statement 5 we wanted to determine the possible demand for employees with "professional doctorates" within the communications industry. We asked executives to respond to the statement, "The communications industry needs graduates from a 'practical PhD' program (comparable to a medical doctor program) that provides hands-on cross-departmental and cross-media expertise, including so-called 'new media.'" Fifty-five percent of the executives agreed or strongly agreed, and 12% disagreed or strongly disagreed. Statement 5 was then verified by the response to Statement 6, "A person with a 'practical PhD,' as described above, would have value within the communications industry," with which 59% of the communications executives agreed or strongly agreed, and only 8% disagreed or strongly disagreed. The final statement relating to this issue read, "A person with a 'practical PhD' as described above would do a better job at a university preparing the next generation of mass communication professionals than those with a research-based PhD." With Statement 7 about 57% of the executives agreed or strongly agreed, and only 6% disagreed or strongly disagreed.

In a follow-up survey currently being conducted, American professors surprisingly also agree with these latter conclusions, although not nearly so overwhelmingly. With 186 professors surveyed to date, they agree 45%-39% that such PhD graduates would be of value in industry, and they agree 44%-32% that they are needed in the classroom. I will make a complete report on the survey of professors when it is completed.

5. Discussion & Conclusions:

It is clear from responses to Statements 1 and 2 that industry executives are not pleased with the graduates of North America's university mass communication programs. Perhaps new to this discussion is the degree of their dissatisfaction and willingness to support radical change that greatly contradicts AEJMC's accreditation standards – perhaps changes that might be introduced by corporate universities. To see that most communication executives would be willing to support university programs that look much more like trade schools could be very tempting to a for-profit university looking for a competitive edge in recruiting students.

But responses to Statements 3-7 should be of interest even to public universities. As noted previously, a growing number of professional doctorates are already being offered by universities around the world, including in the U.S. However, mainly overseas universities are experimenting with professional doctorates specifically in communications. Statement 3 reveals that executives feel that current PhDs have little value within industry. In fact, they have less than no value. When given a choice in hiring someone with a traditional PhD or master's degree, "all else being equal," they agree (or strongly agree) 40-11% that they would give preference to the candidate without a PhD.

Statement 4 suggests in part why – that the current focus of the traditional PhD program on research and theory fails to produce employees who can contribute positively to the "real world."

But Statements 5 and 6 raise a question that warrants further study. The executives agree 55%-12% with Statement 5 that industry – not academia, but industry – needs graduates from a "practical PhD" program with "hands-on cross-departmental and cross-media expertise, including so-called 'new media.'" And the executives confirm this support with Statement 6, agreeing 59%-8% that graduates from such a professional doctoral program "would have value within the communications industry."

And, finally, reflecting back on their dissatisfaction with current mass communication bachelor program graduates, they agreed 57%-6% that graduates of a professional doctoral program would help improve universities' undergraduate programs, as well.

1) Past research is silent on the subject as to whether mass communications and public relations need professional doctoral programs, which at least seems worthy of discussion.

2) Never in the history of the world has communications as an industry faced so many and such diverse problems, and never before have the industry's executives expressed such widespread support for graduate programs that would help address these challenges.

3) While the professional doctoral programs in the United Kingdom and Australia still tend to be research-based, this study suggests the need to explore what kind of graduates the industry would really like to hire. Enhanced content suggested by this study might include:

a. Communication executives may want employees with broadened cross-departmental and cross-media skills that might require what some could call bachelor-level coursework or perhaps experiential programs similar to the series of internships that MD programs require. Medical students who want to be pediatricians, for example, may still serve internships in such diverse areas as psychiatry, dermatology and cardiology. And those internships are preceded by at least overview courses that cover the breadth of medical science.

b. In this era of conglomerates, executives may want bachelor graduates with training primarily in newspaper journalism to have graduate coursework that will broaden their cross-media skills into magazine, broadcast and new media journalism.

c. Media and PR executives looking for the next generation of executives may want those who went through a journalism B.A. sequence to receive cross-departmental graduate coursework related to the functions of the advertising sales, human resources, production, circulation and IT departments. Some of these attributes may require in-depth, cross-disciplinary coursework beyond typical mass communication curricula at any level. More MBA-level management coursework or advanced digital technology coursework, for example, might be desired by executives.

d. In this age of globalization, executives may need some employees who understand communication law that goes beyond American court decisions to the constraints presented to international organizations by the laws of other nations. And also related cultural barriers that often take the form of laws but which may present challenges even if not officially codified.

4) According to Kot and Hendel (2011), one of the main factors leading to the development of professional doctoral degrees is the employability of graduates, and this study clearly suggests that if a

university will build such a program, employers will come – come looking for employees capable of dealing with the challenges of the 21st century.

5) Because American universities seem so adverse to even discussion the possibility of a professional doctorate, this opens new doors of opportunity for foreign universities. And in this age of globalization and of advanced distance-learning technologies, the opportunity to compete internationally seems open even to a university in Central Asia.

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«Почему опыт отца,

не станет мудростью сына»

Народная пословица.

Институт Ипотеки. Историческое формирование.

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Abstract: В данной статье рассматриваются понятия «Ипотека». Происхождение термина «Ипотека» . Исторические виды залога «Фидуция» и «Пигнус» . Соотношение нескольких залоговых прав на одну и ту же вещь. Понятие «Залогопринимательь», гласные формальности при установление Ипотеки.

Keywords: Ипотека, Фидуция, Пигнус, Залогопринимательь, Рескрипт, Папирус.

1. Введение .

Распад СССР, определенные трудности в осуществление сделок в Республике Казахстан с недвижимостью и землей вызывали жесткие законодательные ограничения, которые существовали до недавнего времени по земельным отношениям. В значительной степени эти трудности на определенный период были устранены Указами Президента Республики Казахстан от 24 января 1994 года «О некоторых вопросах регулирования земельных отношений» и 5 апреля 1994 года «О дальнейшем совершенствований земельных отношений», разрешившими аренду земли на срок до 99 лет с возможностью залога этого права. С принятием Конституции Республики Казахстан от 30 августа 1995 года, в которой были провозглашены и закреплены рыночные устои экономики, в том числе и по вопросу недвижимости и земельным отношениям, а также отказ от государственной монополии на землю а также принятие специального законодательного акта – Указа Президента Республики Казахстан, имеющий силу закона « Об ипотеке недвижимого имущества» от 23 декабря 1995 г. с изм. - обусловлена спецификой сделок с недвижимостью. Такое законодательство является необходимым элементом рыночной экономики.

2. Понятие ипотеки.

Так в чем же суть самого термина «Ипотека», где и как он возник, исторически как сформировался. Итак сам термин «Ипотека» имеет греческое происхождение. Исторически впервые в юридическом значении он был применен в начале VI в. до н. э. Солоном. Ипотекой, или, дословно, подставкой, назывался столб, который устанавливался на пограничной меже должника с надписью, что это имущество служит обеспечением претензий на известную сумму. С тех пор слово «ипотека» стало употребляться в переносном смысле для обозначения залога. Это греческое название использовалось и в античном Риме для обозначения института гражданского права, обеспечивающего поземельный залоговый кредит. Ипотека было одной из трех наиболее совершенных форм залога, отвечавших потребностям экономического быта Древнего Рима. Институт ипотеки можно назвать своеобразным достижением правовой мысли и частного права, поскольку право залога в Древнем Риме не просто связывалось с правом собственности или владением, но сам залог все в большей степени приобретал черты особого вещного права.

2.1. Формы залога.

Первыми шагами в области оформления залогового права были **фидуция** и **пигнус**. Первый вид залога был истинно доверительным (фидуциарным), поскольку закладываемая вещь переходила в собственность кредитору, каждому должник тем самым оказывал особое доверие. В случае своевременной уплаты долга предмет залога возвращался должнику. Кредитор становился одновременно с возникновением залога собственником его предмета, т.е. имел право владеть, пользоваться и распоряжаться им по своему усмотрению. Он имел возможность отчуждать предмет залога без предварительного согласия и уведомление должника, даже до истечения времени, когда требование подлежало исполнению. Таким образом, полнота заключавшегося в этой форме залога обеспечения приобреталась в ущерб должнику.

Исторически второй вид залога – **пигнус** – предполагал передачу кредитору в обеспечение долга вещь не в собственность, а во владение. Эта форма залога меньше закабаляла должника. Тем не менее при залоге, например, земельного участка должник, мелкий землевладелец, лишался возможности сидеть на земле и обрабатывать ее. Таким образом, сельский хозяин не мог получать доходы от своего хозяйства и, следовательно, лишался и экономической возможности покрыть свой долг, а кредитор получал ненужную обузу, так как главный интерес его заключался в получении своего капитала обратно, а не в ведении хозяйства. Следовательно, и этот вид залога в полной мере не отвечал интересам ни должника, ни кредитора.

Ипотека как третья форма залога сложилась в классический период в преторском эдикте. Она была призвана освободить залог от всех названных недостатков. При ипотеке даже владение не переходило кредитору. Кредитор здесь был не собственником и не владельцем, а субъектом особого залогового права, который приобретал возможность в случае неисполнения обязательства истребовать заложенную вещь, у кого бы она к тому времени ни оказалась, продать ее и из вырученной суммы покрыть свое требование к должнику.

Первоначально ипотека разливалась на почве найма сельскохозяйственных участков. В договор обыкновенно включался особый пункт, в соответствии с которым все «приведенное, привезенное, принесенное» на нанятый участок (сельскохозяйственный инвентарь, рабочий скот и т.д.) не должно вывозиться нанимателем с участка, пока не будет погашена задолженность нанимателя по договору, т.е. перечисленные виды имущества должны были служить обеспечением долга нанимателя по плате за наем участка. Таким образом, закладываемые вещи не выходили немедленно из владения и пользования залогодателя, и кредитор имел право абсолютного иска об истребовании вещи с целью ее продажи.

В дальнейшем со специального случая (найма) сложившаяся форма залога была распространена и на все другие случай обязательств.

Введение в практику ипотеки как формы залога, при которой сама вещь не передавалась тому, кому она закладывалась, а в случае не исполнения обеспеченного залогом обязательства продавалась, сделало возможным установление на одну и ту же вещь нескольких последовательных залоговых прав. Соотношение нескольких залоговых прав на одно и ту же вещь определялось их старшинством, т.е. временем установление залога. Так складывался ранг залоговых прав. Право требовать продажи заложенной вещи признавалась только за

первым залогопринимателем , требования же других удовлетворялись в порядке очереди из остатка суммы, вырученной от продажи заложенной вещи, после удовлетворения первого залогопринимателя. Нижестоящий залогоприниматель имел право предложить первому удовлетворение по его требованию с тем, что бы занять его место. Такой переход первого ранга (старшинства) к лицу, удовлетворившему первого залогопринимателя, назывался ипотечным преемством. Если суммы, вырученной от передачи заложенной вещи, не хватало на удовлетворение залогопринимателей, недополучившие могли предъявить обязательственный иск к должнику в общем порядке.

3. Общая оценка Ипотеки.

Ипотека в римском праве при всех ее достоинствах не была абсолютно совершенной формой залога. Так, в русской дореволюционной цивилистике отмечалось, что, во-первых, в Риме не было речи об отделении залога движимых и недвижимых и недвижимых вещей; во-вторых, в римской ипотеке положение обеспечиваемого имения было для кредитора, да и для самого собственника покрыто мраком неизвестности, поскольку сделки совершались в отсутствие формальной гласной процедуры. Отсюда делался вывод, что римская ипотека была установлением частным, лишением всякого общественного значения. Думается, что при всей правильности общей оценки ипотеки в нее следовало бы внести некоторые уточнения. В период абсолютной монархии в Риме был издан **рескрипт**, в силу которого ипотека, установленная письменно в присутственном месте или перед тремя достоверными свидетелями, должна была иметь предпочтение перед непублично установленной ипотекой. Кроме того, изучение **папирусов**, найденных на территории некоторых римских провинций, показало, что в них уже в I в. н.э. существовала система поземельных книг, в которые заносились вещные права на землю и ознакомление с которыми позволяло убедиться, принадлежит ли данный участок должнику, заложен он или нет. Следовательно, некоторые «гласные формальности» при установлении ипотеки все же соблюдались.

Анализ ипотеки в римском праве важен для того, чтобы подчеркнуть исторический момент обогащения гражданского права классическим вещным правом – залоговым. В римской ипотеке как вещном праве проявился абсолютный характер. Залогопринимателя при переходе предмета залога от должника по личному обязательству к другим лицам защищало право следования и основанный на нем вещный иск. Право преимущества защищало интересы старшего кредитора, тем самым устанавливая старшинство залоговых прав. Отличительной чертой вещного обеспечения у римлян был его вспомогательный (придаточный) характер в смысле служения личного требованию, для которого устанавливался залог и которое продолжало существовать до удовлетворения кредитора. При этом действительность залога ставилось в зависимость от действительности требования и все ограничения первого отражалась на втором.

Обращение к историческому опыту формирования института ипотеки и ипотечной системы в античном Риме, в европейских странах полезно для анализа современного положения дел в области ипотечных отношений и у нас в Республике Казахстан.

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Становление правового государства в Республике Казахстан: опыт 20 лет

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Проблеме правового государства посвящено немало исследований. Многим оно представляется чем-то вроде очередного «светлого будущего». В преамбуле Конституции провозглашено: «Мы, народ Казахстана,.. признавая себя миролюбивым гражданским обществом, приверженным идеалам свободы, равенства, согласия», а в п.1 ст. 1 Основного Закона с категоричностью записано: «Республика Казахстан утверждает себя демократическим, светским, правовым и социальным государством, высшими ценностями которого являются человек, его жизнь, права и свободы».

Мы рассмотрим в своей статье институт президентства в Казахстане как условие построения демократического правового государства. Институту президентства в Казахстане уже более двадцати лет. За это время он уже успел столкнуться с рядом проблем. Но сначала сделаем небольшой экскурс в историю вопроса. Нормой демократического мира после второй мировой войны стала парламентская система правления. Однако в 80-х и 90-х гг. все новые претенденты на демократию в Латинской Америке и Азии (Корея и Филиппины) избрали чисто президентские системы. В настоящее время из 25 стран, которые сейчас составляют Восточную Европу и бывший Советский Союз, только три (Венгрия, Чешская Республика и Словакия) избрали чистый парламентаризм. Многие новые демократии предпочли президентскую форму правления. Важнейшее преимущество президентских систем в том, что они создаются для осуществления стабильности исполнительной власти и в этом они преуспевают.

Президентский демократический режим - это система взаимной независимости ветвей власти - законодательной и исполнительной. Обе имеют собственный источник легитимности в виде фиксированного выборного мандата. Президентские системы более, чем парламентские, склонны иметь исполнительную власть, чья программа последовательно блокируется законодательной властью.

Принципиальное значение имеет в связи с этим вопрос об образовании высших представителей исполнительной власти- глав государства и административно-территориальных и национальных единиц. В конституционных монархиях глава исполнительной власти- премьер-министр- назначается, как правило, монархом из числа лидеров победивших на выборах в парламент партий**;** что касается глав местных органов исполнительной власти, то порядок их образования не отличается от способов, существующих в республиках. В республиках глава государства- президент- избирается гражданами, и тогда наделяется обширной компетенцией-властью. В этом случае он обладает относительной самостоятельностью перед парламентом (президентская республика). Или избирается парламентом, и обладает ограниченными полномочиями (парламентская республика).

Тем не менее, в Республике Казахстан предпринималась попытка сочетать президентскую форму правления с относительно сильной властью президента, как главы государства и главы исполнительной власти, с принципами парламентаризма, что нашло свое воплощение в Конституции 1993 года. По этой Конституции Президент в значительной степени был ограничен в назначении и смещении правительства Верховным Советом. Громоздкий однопалатный Верховный Совет- 177 депутатов - избирался при практически отсутствующей многопартийной системе. Небольшие по составу партии не имели ни определенных программ, ни какого-либо опыта политической деятельности. Члены этих партий, зачастую популисты и демагоги, выдвинувшиеся на митингах, становились депутатами. Это был непрофессиональный парламент – «законодательный» орган, в котором многие депутаты более заботились о собственном благополучии, личных амбициях, чем об интересах народа и государства. Неудивительно поэтому, что он оказался неработоспособным. Его деятельность вступила в глубокое противоречие с требованиями коренных социально-экономических и политических реформ. Кроме того, выборы

Верховного Совета последнего, тринадцатого созыва, признаны неконституционными, и он был распущен [1].

В создавшейся ситуации единственным выходом из политического кризиса стала необходимость критического осмысления Конституции 1993 года как не соответствующей условиям переходного периода, и разработка новой Конституции, в которой по нашему мнению, на основе собственного недавно приобретенного опыта Республики Казахстан, других стран СНГ, мирового опыта найдены адекватные решения сложившихся социально-экономических, политических, государственных проблем.

В Конституции Республики Казахстан 1995 года найдена новая, соответствующая условиям современного Казахстана форма правления - президентская республика. Тем более, что у народа Казахстана имеется признанный лидер, которому он полностью доверяет руководство страной.

По Конституции 1995 года «Президент Республики Казахстан, является главой государства, его высшим должностным лицом, определяющим основные направления внутренней и внешней политики государства и представляющим Казахстан внутри страны и в международных отношениях» (ст. 40, п.1). Значительным является и то, что «Президент республики -символ и гарант единства народа и государственной власти, незыблемости Конституции, прав и свобод человека и гражданина» (п.2) [2].

Столь высокий статус Президента Республики вытекает из конституционной характеристики нашей страны, как государства с президентской формой правления. Это означает, что главе государства в структуре государственной власти принадлежит ведущая, системообразующая роль.

Если главной особенностью системы правления в государстве Казахстан по новой Конституции назвать значительное усиление института президентства, то это будет верно. Однако весьма неполно, ибо одновременно благодаря новому статусу Президента Республики Казахстан как бы «над ветвями власти» и конституционному возвышению его координирующей роли в механизме их взаимодействия значительно усиливаются, прежде всего, потенциал казахстанского парламентаризма и, конечно, самостоятельность исполнительной вертикали, а также полнее гарантируется независимость судебной власти.

Придание Президенту статуса главы государства вызвано объективными причинами. Прежде всего, этого требовало повышение уровня персонифицированного представительства государства как внутри страны, так и в международных отношениях. Выполнение вытекающих из этого функций наиболее целесообразно главой государства, а не высшим должностным лицом, входящим в систему исполнительной власти, что в меньшей мере соответствовало бы высокому статусу органа государственной власти Республики Казахстан, ставило бы исполнительную власть над законодательной.

Институт президентства теперь не «вмонтирован» в исполнительную ветвь власти, как было по Конституции 1993 г., но призван олицетворять и осуществлять государственное единство казахстанского народа. Так, согласно статье 40 раздела 3 Конституции Республики Казахстан 1995 г., Президент, являясь главой государства, его высшим должностным лицом, которое определяет основные направления внутренней и внешней политики нашего государства и представляет Казахстан внутри страны и в международных отношениях (ч.1), служит, во-первых, символом и гарантом единства народа и государственной власти (ч.2) и, во-вторых, обеспечивает согласованное функционирование всех ветвей государственной власти, а также ответственность ее органов перед народом Казахстана (ч.3). В соответствии с этой, по существу конституционно закрепленной концепцией казахстанской модели президентской республики, выстраиваются все остальные элементы системы правления, образуя слаженный механизм «сдержек и противовесов».

Установление Конституцией новой системы президентской формы правления в Казахстане позволяет существенно повысить роль и ответственность исполнительной власти. Отныне Правительство самостоятельно осуществляет исполнительную власть в РК. Теперь Правительство само, а не Президент, как было по Конституции 1993 г. (см. ст.75), возглавляет систему исполнительных органов и осуществляет руководство их деятельностью (ч.1 ст.64, раздел 5 Конституции 1995 г.).

Президент республики по предложениям о его структуре и составе премьер-министра, который назначается на должность также Президентом (п.3 ст.44), но с согласия Парламента на совместном заседании палат (п.5 ст.53). Освобождение от должности премьер-министра или члена правительства производится Президентом республики самостоятельно.

Кроме того, Президент вправе по своей инициативе принять решение о прекращении полномочий правительства или освобождении от должности любого его члена. Освобождение от должности премьер-министра означает прекращение полномочий всего правительства. В этой норме находит выражение принцип коллегиальной ответственности правительства, закрепленный в ч.1 ст. 68 Конституции.

Нетрудно заметить, что Конституция устанавливает весьма тесное взаимодействие ветвей власти. При этом их разделение гарантируется не только четким разграничением правомочий и недопустимостью вмешательства в компетенцию друг друга (см.ст.53-57 и ч.3 ст.61 раздела 4 «Парламент»; ст.66 раздела 5 «Правительство»; ст.75-78 раздела 7 «Суды и правосудие», но также и специальными конституционными гарантиями.

К ним можно отнести, во-первых, недопустимость «совмещенного мандата»: члены правительства не вправе быть депутатами представительного органа, занимать иные оплачиваемые должности, осуществлять предпринимательскую деятельность (ч.2 ст.68), на них не распространяется правило «должностного иммунитета»; депутаты парламента также не вправе занимать иные оплачиваемые должности и заниматься предпринимательской деятельностью, что в противном случае влечет прекращение депутатских полномочий (ч.3 ст.52); для них установлен институт «депутатской неприкосновенности». Во-вторых, предоставление права законодательной инициативы только двум субъектам: депутатам парламента и правительству республики (для сравнения ст.61 ч.1 Конституции 1995 г.. и ст.71 Конституции 1993 г.). В-третьих, отнесение права давать официальное толкование норм Конституции РК к полномочиям специального органа государства по контролю конституционной законности - Конституционного Совета, а не как было прежде: сам законодатель - Верховный Совет РК мог официально толковать принимаемые и изменяемые им же законы, включая Основной Закон страны (ср. п.4 ст.7 Конституции 1995 г. и п.3 ст.64 Конституции 1993 г.). В-четвертых, что исключительно важно еще и для стабильности новой Конституции, теперь изменения и дополнения в нее могут быть внесены, как правило, республиканским референдумом, проводимым по решению Президента, которое он принимает по собственной инициативе или по предложению парламента или правительства; либо опять же по инициативе Президента изменения и дополнения в Конституцию РК 1995 г. может принять парламент, но если Президент решит передать их проект на его рассмотрение в совместном заседании палат (см. п.1ст.53; п.10 ст.65; ч.1ст.91). И наконец, в-пятых, упрочение гарантий независимости судебной власти путем установления особого конституционного порядка избрания высших судей Сенатом и назначения всех других судей Президентом республики (ст.82); финансирования судов непосредственно за счет средств государственного бюджета (ст.80); несовместимости должности судьи с депутатским мандатом, занятием иной оплачиваемой должности или предпринимательской деятельности (ч.4 ст.79); путем закрепления в Конституции республики института «судейского иммунитета» (ч.2 ст.79) и др.

Вместе с тем впервые в истории Казахстанского конституционализма устанавливается демократический институт импичмента, или отрешения главы государства от должности. Поскольку логикой государственной жизни предполагается свобода политической воли главы государства, ответственность Президента Республики Казахстан (не считая возможности неизбрания его на второй срок) наступает «за действия, совершенные им при исполнении своих обязанностей, только в случае государственной измены и может быть за это отрешен от должности Парламентом. Решение о выдвижении обвинения и его расследовании может быть принято большинством от общего числа депутатов Мажилиса по инициативе не менее чем одной трети его депутатов. Расследование обвинения организуется Сенатом, и его результаты большинством голосов от общего числа депутатов Сената передаются на рассмотрение совместного заседания Палат Парламента. Окончательное решение по данному вопросу принимается на совместном заседании Палат Парламента большинством не менее трех четвертей от общего числа голосов депутатов каждой из Палат при наличии заключения Верховного Суда об обоснованности обвинения и заключения Конституционного Совета о соблюдении конституционных процедур» (ч.2 ст.47).

Предусматривает теперь Конституция и то, к какому должностному лицу в государстве Казахстан переходит исполнение обязанностей его главы в случае досрочного освобождения или отрешения от должности Президента Республики, а также в случае его кончины. Так, согласно ч. I ст.48 Конституции исполнение обязанностей Президента временно переходит к Председателю Сената, а при невозможности им принять на себя обязанности главы государства они переходят к

премьер-министру республики. Затем, в двухмесячный срок с момента досрочного прекращения полномочий Президента должны быть проведены внеочередные выборы главы государства.

На этот период Конституция закрепляет необходимые обществу демократические гарантии. Исполняющий обязанности Президента республики не имеет права распускать Парламент, прекращать полномочия правительства, назначать республиканский референдум, а также вносить предложения об изменениях и дополнениях в Конституцию (ч.2 ст.48).

При этом следует оговориться, что ни при каких условиях не могут быть изменены установленные Конституцией унитарность и территориальная целостность нашего государства, республиканская форма правления в Казахстане.

Само собой разумеется, что термин «правовое государство» из всех признаков правового государства, прежде всего, включает в себя именно правовую систему - основу всех остальных признаков правового государства, в противном случае его называли бы «государство законности» или как-нибудь иначе. Понятие-термин «правовое государство», еще раз подчеркиваем, включает в себя нормативно-правовую основу правового государства. Особенно это звучит, когда мы имеем в виду не просто понятие «правовое государство», а «современное демократическое, светское, правовое и социальное государство».

В заключение приведем слова Президента Республики Казахстан, высказанные им в Послании народу Казахстана. В своем ежегодном Послании народу Казахстана Президент Республики Казахстан- Лидер Нации Н.А.Назарбаев подчеркнул: «Пятое. XXI век предъявляет высокие требования к управлению современным государством, которое все больше усложняется. Наша важнейшая задача- подготовить квалифицированный политический класс управленцев. Поручаю Правительству, Администрации Президента до конца первого полугодия 2012 года подготовить предложения по кандидатурам в президентский кадровый корпус. Специальная комиссия будет подбирать кандидатуры по критериям образования и профессионализма, высоким моральным качествам, инициативности и успешности работы на порученных участках. Они будут иметь зарплату сопоставимую с бизнес-структурами, привязанную к динамике экономического развития страны. Они составят основу новой управленческой элиты, которой предстоит достойно вести наш Казахстан в XXI веке» [3].

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Governmental Website Support for Small Businesses: An Analysis of Selected Governmental Websites Comparing the United States with Europe with Kazakhstan

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Abstract: A review of the importance of small businesses to the countries' economic vitality; the emphasis governments placed on providing information and assistance to entrepreneurs; and the ease of obtaining such information. The United States have the most developed website with a plethora of information for the small business owner - from how to start up a business, the regulations involved, and the programs available, where and how to obtain assistance, and exporting assistance. While Europe also have a tradition of small firms, their approach is more fragmented because of the sovereign status of the member states of the European Union. The central government, the European Commission (EC) has formulated initiatives to help its member states promote and encourage the formation of small businesses, but ultimately must leave the final implementation to the member states. Lastly, a transitioning country like Kazakhstan has several interests it must balance – from modernizing its economy to promoting both large and small businesses to

the necessary expertise to help small businesses be a cornerstone of the future economic health of the country.
Keywords: small businesses; small and medium-sized enterprises; job creation

1. Introduction:
Many nations around the world have realized the importance of small businesses to the health of its economies. Small businesses are the backbone of national economies – creating jobs, wealth and economic mobility. There are many statistics pointing to the importance of small businesses to the economic well-being of a nation and its people.

2. Comparative developments of governmental website support:
Looking at the support governments provide to potential small business owners should provide some insight into the commitment a government has for the development and sustainment of small enterprises. Additionally, how such support is disseminated is important because of the need for good, relevant and timely information. In today's highly linked technological age, using the internet is a fast and efficient way to disperse important small business information. We will look at several countries' approach on this front.

2.1 The United States:
In the United States, a small business is defined as any firm with fewer than 500 employees. Small businesses employed more than half the US private sector, non-farm workforce.[1] In terms of payroll, approximately 44% are through small businesses. In terms of job creation, over 65% have come from the small business sector over the past 17 years with about 52% home based. Additionally, approximately 97% of exporters are small businesses.[2]

In 2009, the latest data available for this review, over 27 million small businesses were identified in the United States.[2] Because it is so important to the US economy, the government (federal, state and local) have made the viability of small businesses one of its top, long standing priorities. To further this goal, the Small Business Administration (SBA) was created to support and develop small businesses and entrepreneurs. The SBA was founded in 1953, tasked to provided assistance to small businesses through 4 avenues: Access to Capital; Entrepreneurial Development; Government Contracting; and Advocacy.[3] As stated on its website, the mission of the SBA is to serve as "an independent agency of the federal government to aid, counsel, assist and protect the interests of small business concerns, to preserve free competitive enterprise and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of our nation."[4]

Small businesses is so important that the agency has a section on starting and managing a business.[5] The site is very user friendly and has the major issues identified and populated with advice. It has important subject matters such as: Writing a Business Plan; Establishing Financing; Loans, Grants, and Funding; Business Laws and Regulations; Marketing; and Licensing and Permits.[5] It even has templates and step-by-step instructions on how to complete forms. For example, the site has information on how to write a good business plan.[6] There is even a link providing assistance on how to export to other countries and the resources available for such activities.[7]

In comparison to the United States, Europe also recognized the importance of small businesses to the health of its collective economy (the European Union). In Europe, the small business sector is identified as the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME), with many defined as 50 or fewer employees.[8] So important is this sector that the European Commission created an Ac specifically to advance and promote small and medium-sized enterprises. This became known as the Small Business Act for Europe and "reflects the Commission's political will to recognise the central role of SMEs in the EU economy and for the first time puts into place a comprehensive SME policy framework for the EU and its Member States."[9] One of the goal of the European Commission (EC) is to reduce regulations and bureaucracy. The EC is attempting to ensure that the European Union (EU) responds better to the needs of the small business community.[9] One initiative out of the EU is the "Think Small First Principle" which "requires that legislation takes SMEs' interests into account at the very early stages of policy making in order to make legislation more SME friendly." [10]

2.2 The European Union

While Europe sees small businesses in similar light as the United States, it's approach is different. Unlike the US, there is no Small Business Administration or Ministry dedicated to the promotion and advancement of small business interests. Europe does not have a culture of entrepreneurship found in the US, but rather is trying to develop and encourage such a culture through the Small Business Act and the Think Small First Principle. Europe's approached is to promote small enterprises by encouraging its member states to put the interests of small businesses (enterprises) at the forefront of any national legislations – trying to ensure that proposed laws help and not hinder small enterprise formation and operations.

To Europe's benefit, they do have a dedicated website to explain and promote the importance of small enterprises. This is accomplished under the guidance of the European Commission (EC), the governing arm of the European Union. Like the United States, the EC website also has information on starting up a small business and the website also have additional information to assist in all the facets of small businesses, from starting up to financing and promotion access to markets. A major difference with Europe's Small Business Act (SBA) is that it does not have the force of legal authority behind it, but rather is more akin to goals, at the European level, and through the EC, encourages Member States of the European Union to make small business friendly laws and rules.[11]

Why the focus on small businesses within Europe? The numbers suggests Europe's future lies with its small business sector. For example, from 2002 to 2010, 85% of new jobs were created by small businesses. This translates into a net gain of over 1 million jobs. Additionally, the vast majority of the new jobs were created by newly formed small businesses (those in operation 5 years or less).[12] So contrary to what is depicted in the mainstream media, it is not the governments that are employing workers, but small firms.

2.3 Kazakhstan

Moving from Europe to Kazakhstan, we see that the national government of Kazakhstan also has ambition to promote small and medium-sized enterprises through the "Road Map for Business 2020."[13] It is featured prominently on the government's invest in Kazakhstan's website. However, there is not a lot of electronic assistance, but rather a more personal (physical) interaction and assistance at the regional levels. While this is consistent with the traditions of the country where personal, physical interaction is still important, it also serves as a limitation because it does not fully leverage the advances and efficiencies from increased use of technology. This means that finding and accessing information is more difficult and cumbersome. Moreover, the information available to potential small businesses are sparse in terms of the need for helping small businesses and the support available to small businesses such as how to create a business plan, or how to run a small business. But, in the context of the national economic policy, Kazakhstan is moving on several fronts, such as updating business laws to be more investor friendly, reducing administrative delays and easing requirements. These initiatives cover both large and small companies, foreign and domestic. So, in a way, the country is addressing improvements to the small business sector, but in a broader sense because the country is also addressing the needs of larger domestic firms and international firms doing business, or wanting to do business, in Kazakhstan.

Given the relative business history and development stage of a country like Kazakhstan, it is not surprising that the institutional support for small businesses would be light, since the domestic laws, traditions and expertise in the area of small businesses are largely absent in these countries. It is important to note that Kazakhstan's economic tradition came out of the communist model where the state is the progenitor of economic production, not the individual. It will take time for countries like Kazakhstan to development a deeper understanding of private enterprise and for its citizens to be more fully engaged in creating economic wealth, not to mention time for its legislators to craft laws to promote growth through merit rather than though personal connections or access to power. What is encouraging for Kazakhstan is that a large segment of the country already is pro private business. According to official statistics, 31% of the working population are self-employed. [14]

So while there are challenges Kazakhstan must over come (modernizing education, anti-corruption, updating antiquated laws), Kazakhstan has the resources and the mindset to be successful in developing and nurturing a small business sector.

3. Share of Net New Jobs Data:

United States:	65% (9.8 million out of 15 million net new jobs between 1993 and 2009)
European Union:	85% of new jobs were created by small businesses between 2002 – 2010
Kazakhstan:	67,000 new jobs were created by the small and medium business sector in 2011 (15)

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Развитие инфраструктуры рынка земель сельскохозяйственного назначения

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Резюме: Рынок земли является неотъемлемой частью экономики любого развитого государства. В развитых странах принимаются законы, которые стоят на защите любых прав собственности, в том числе и земельной.

За годы независимости в республике с переходом к рыночной экономике преобразованы земельные отношения и создан новый земельный строй. Ликвидирована государственная монополия на землю и введена частная собственность на отдельные категории земель. Осуществлен переход к платному землепользованию. В стране созданы условия для равноправного развития всех видов хозяйствования. Развивается рынок земельной недвижимости.

Ключевые слова: Земля, аренда, земельная рента, кадастровая стоимость земель, рыночная стоимость земли, первичный рынок земли, вторичный рынок

1.Ведение.

Казахстан располагает крупнейшими земельными ресурсами. Общая площадь земельного фонда составляет 272 млн. гектар. В связи с этим земельные отношения в Казахстане – очень интересный и актуальный вопрос. Объектом земельных отношений является вся земля в пределах территории Республики Казахстан, отдельные земельные участки независимо от того, что на них расположено и от правовых оснований их закрепленности за отдельными субъектами, а также право на земельные участки и земельные доли. (Земельный кодекс РК.- Алматы: Юрист,2004)

Земельные отношения в Казахстане – насущный и актуальный вопрос. Они складываются достаточно давно и на данный момент более-менее утверждены. Довольно долго проводились земельные реформы и на данный момент Правительством Республики Казахстан рассмотрен и в 2003 году принят новый Земельный Кодекс, который пересмотрен и существенные изменения, на данный момент утвержден и опубликован земельный кодекс 2012.

Основной целью проводимой в РК земельной реформы является введение многообразия форм собственности и землепользования, переход на рыночные земельные отношения и формирование рынка земли. Поэтому определение направлений развития земельных отношений и разработка механизма формирования эффективного рынка земли являются новыми и актуальными проблемами.

В настоящий момент земельные отношения в Казахстане строятся на Земельном кодексе, на основе Конституции Республики Казахстан и на основе нормативно-правовых актов, принимаемых в стране. Также в Казахстане существует множество Постановлений Правительства Республики Казахстан, утверждающих земельные отношения, ставки платы за землю, порядок определения оценочной стоимости земельных участков.

Законодательные акты издаются в Республике Казахстан для того, чтобы установить основания, условия и пределы возникновения, изменения и прекращения права собственности на земельный участок и права землепользования, порядка осуществления прав и обязанностей собственников земельных участков и землепользователей, регулирования земельных отношений в целях обеспечения рационального использования и охраны земель, воспроизводства плодородия почв, охраны прав на землю физических, юридических лиц и государства, создания и развития рынка недвижимости, укрепления законности в области земельных отношений.

С принятием нормативно-правовых актов, Постановлений Правительства Республики Казахстан, утверждающих земельные отношения, ставки платы за землю, порядок определения оценочной стоимости земельных участков, Президента Республики Казахстан, имеющих силу законов, «О земле», «Об ипотеке недвижимого имущества», «О государственной регистрации недвижимого имущества и сделок с ним» начато построение системы законодательных основ рыночных земельных отношений. (Сейфуллин Ж.Т. Земельный кадастр Казахстана. Алматы, 2000 г.)

В правовом отношении, в республике сняты ограничения для приобретения земель в пользование и собственность в целях развития малого, среднего и крупного бизнеса, привлечения инвестиций в промышленность, транспорт, связь и другие отрасли. Государством передает в частную собственность на безвозмездной основе, для ведения личного подсобного хозяйства, для садоводства и дачного строительства, для строительства и обслуживания жилых домов. В республике также развиваются арендные отношения по земле.

2. Основная часть.

Становление рынка земли в республике осуществляется поэтапно. Формирование первичного рынка земли включает в себя операции с земельными участками и правом землепользования между государством с одной стороны, физическими и негосударственными юридическими лицами - с другой. Наряду со сделками с земельными участками и правом землепользования в республике проводились законные сделки с условными земельными долями.

В отношении земель сельскохозяйственного назначения, до принятия в 2003г. Земельного кодекса РК и введения частной собственности, действовал рынок права землепользования (аренды), что было близко к имеющимся рынкам права хозяйствования (аренды) на земле в некоторых странах - Китай, Голландия.

Несмотря на то, что проведены масштабные изменения в земельных отношениях, большая часть земельного фонда перешла к негосударственным субъектам, введена частная собственность на сельскохозяйственные земли и некоторые категории земель, в РК еще не сформировался полноценный рынок земли и рыночный оборот земель, не решены ряд важных задач: новые агроформирования не смогли обеспечить эффективное использование сельскохозяйственных угодий, развитие рынка земли и переход земель к эффективно хозяйствующим субъектам осуществляется медленно, не сформирована действенная система ипотечного кредитования.

Земельные участки, переданные (передаваемые) в частную собственность (с1996г.)	
Гражданам РК	Гражданам и негосударственным юридическим лицам, в т.ч. иностранным
Для ведения личного домашнего (подсобного) хозяйства, садоводства и дачного строительства	Под застройку (застроенные) зданиями и сооружениями, в т.ч. жилыми и их обслуживание
Земельные участки сельскохозяйственного назначения, продаваемые в частную собственность (с 2003г.):	
Гражданам РК и негосударственным юридическим лицам РК	

Земельные участки, передаваемые государством в землепользование		
Постоянное землепользование	Временное землепользование	
Юридическим лицам РК	Краткосрочное (до 5 лет)	Долгосрочное (от 5 до 49лет)
Государственным: осуществляющим сельскохозяйственное и лесохозяйственное производство; -на особоохраняемых природных территориях; - в иных случаях;	-гражданам и юридическим лицам Республики Казахстан; -иностранцам и иностранным юридическим лицам;	-гражданам и юридическим лицам РК; - иностранцам и иностранным юридическим лицам;

Рисунок 1. - Законодательное закрепление прав на землю

Рынок земли является неотъемлемой частью экономики любого развитого государства. В развитых странах принимаются законы, которые стоят на защите любых прав собственности, в том числе и земельной.

За годы независимости в республике с переходом к рыночной экономике преобразованы земельные отношения и создан новый земельный строй. Ликвидирована государственная монополия на землю и введена частная собственность на отдельные категории земель. Осуществлен переход к платному землепользованию. В стране созданы условия для равноправного развития всех видов хозяйствования. Развивается рынок земельной недвижимости.

Преобразование земельных отношений особенно заметно в аграрной сфере, где задействована основная часть земельного фонда. Земля - основное средство и условие для развития сельскохозяйственного производства. На рисунке показана динамика сельскохозяйственных земель.




Рис 2 Динамика площади земель сельскохозяйственного назначения

В процессе реформирования сельскохозяйственных предприятий в 1991-2005 годы площадь земель сельскохозяйственного назначения по республике сократилась на 136,2 млн. га. В последующем площадь земель этой категории ежегодно возрастала и общее ее увеличение с 2005 по 2011 год составило 11,5 млн. га.

Несмотря на то, что часть земель сельскохозяйственного назначения была передана для различных несельскохозяйственных целей, данная категория земель в целом увеличилась в

отчетном году на 339,8 тыс. га, преимущественно за счет освоения земель запаса. Это обусловлено тем, что с каждым годом сельхоз товаропроизводители расширяют свою деятельность в сфере развития животноводства и производства растениеводческой продукции.

Основной прирост за текущий год произошел в Костанайской (385,1 тыс. га), Актюбинской (279,5 тыс. га) и Акмолинской (162,9 тыс. га) областях.

Одновременно в связи с неиспользованием части земель для сельхозпроизводства и их невостребованностью в ряде областей, 829,6 тыс. га земель сельскохозяйственного назначения были переведены в земли запаса, в том числе в Южно-Казахстанской - 448,9 тыс. га, Павлодарской – 142,5 тыс. га, Жамбылской -130,0 тыс. га и Атырауской -108,2 тыс.га.

В категории земель сельскохозяйственного назначения находятся наиболее ценные в сельскохозяйственном отношении земли республики: 96,8% пашни, в том числе 90,6% - орошаемой, 59,9% многолетних насаждений, 62,0% залежи, 41,5% сенокосов, из них 42,8% - улучшенных и 51,6% - лиманного орошения.

Группа сельскохозяйственных организаций с удельным весом пашни от 25% до 50%, которых в республике числится 12,9%, занимает 11,2% всей пашни, находящейся в данных формах хозяйствования по республике в целом. Наибольшее число организаций (41,7%) находится в группе с удельным весом пашни более 50%, в которых сосредоточено 84,1% всей пашни, числящейся в негосударственных сельскохозяйственных организациях республики.

Таким образом, в составе негосударственных сельскохозяйственных организаций иное направление занимают около 60% хозяйств.

Проведенный в ходе земельной реформы процесс реформирования крупных землепользований с выделением большого количества мелких земельных участков для организации крестьянских, фермерских хозяйств и других форм хозяйствования, выполняя положительную функцию по становлению реального собственника на земле, выявил целый ряд недостатков, негативно сказывающихся на уровне эффективности сельскохозяйственного производства, проведении мероприятий по организации рационального использования и охраны земель. В результате некоторые хозяйствующие субъекты оказываются неспособными осуществлять свою хозяйственную деятельность.

В течение 2011года по данным земельного учета распались или преобразованы в другие формы хозяйствования 6833 крестьянских и фермерских хозяйств, 186 хозяйственных товариществ и акционерных обществ, 14 сельскохозяйственных кооперативов.

В этот же период организованы новые хозяйствующие субъекты: 7 332 крестьянских и фермерских хозяйств, 194 хозяйственных товарищества, 43 производственных сельскохозяйственных кооператива. Наибольшее количество крестьянских и фермерских хозяйств создано в Алматинской – 5 306 (72,4%), Восточно-Казахстанской – 433 (5,9%) и Западно-Казахстанской – 247 (3,4%) областях.

Согласно, земельного учета в 2011 году из 6 833 крестьянских и фермерских хозяйств, прекративших свою деятельность, 2 191 отказались вести хозяйство, 319 были преобразованы в другие формы хозяйствования. Из общего числа субъектов, отказавшихся от ведения крестьянского хозяйства, 675 (30,8%) числятся в Восточно-Казахстанской области.

Заложенные в земельном законодательстве страны правовые нормы приближены или совпадают с аналогичными законами зарубежных стран. Вопрос о земле остается судьбоносным для всех государств без исключения. С ним связаны священные традиции народа и судьбы людей, их ответственность перед будущими поколениями и, наконец, судьба государства.

Землю можно свободно покупать и продавать, конечно, в рамках этих законодательств. Частная собственность на земли сельскохозяйственного назначения имеется практически во всех странах мира с развитой рыночной экономикой (Швеция, США, Франция, Германия, Япония, Россия, Кыргызстан, Армения). В развитых странах доля земель сельскохозяйственного назначения, находящихся в частной собственности, составляет 50 и более процентов. Например, в США сейчас насчитывается более 630 тысяч фермерских хозяйств. Они владеют огромным количеством земли на правах собственников и производят примерно 80% всей сельскохозяйственной продукции в стране.

В последние годы в связи с укреплением экономического положения многих хозяйствующих субъектов обозначились тенденции освоения залежных земель хорошего и среднего качества.

Развивается рынок земель сельскохозяйственного назначения. По состоянию на 1 ноября 2011 года в республике было продано 912,4 тыс. га земель сельскохозяйственного назначения на сумму 15,9 млрд. тенге.

Динамика продажи государством земель сельскохозяйственного назначения с начала введения частной собственности на данную категорию земель представлена в таблице 1

Таблица 1 Динамика продажи государством земель сельскохозяйственного назначения.

тыс. га

Показатели	годы							
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Продано земель (нарастающим итогом)	48,9	156,5	287,0	499,4	772,9	830,2	864,5	912,4
в том числе: продано земель за год	48,9	107,6	130,5	212,4	273,5	57,3	34,3	47,9

Наибольший объем продажи государством земель в частную собственность происходил в 2007-2008 годах (было продано соответственно 212,4 и 273,5 тыс. га). В последние три года темпы продажи значительно снизились и составляют около 50 тыс. га в год.

Значительная часть земельных участков площадью 765,7 тыс. га (84%) приобретена по полной кадастровой стоимости на 15,0 млрд. тенге, которая переходит в рыночный оборот.

Следует отметить перспективы государственной политики по земельным отношениям, в выборе форм собственности на землю (собственность или аренда), и платной передачи в частную собственность.

Земельный рынок - одна из самых прибыльных статей доходов бюджета развитых государств мира. (Сводный аналитический отчет о состоянии и использовании земель РК за 2011 г.,Астана 2012)

3,Заключение.

Земля является специфичным продуктом, который имеет свои особенности. Земля предоставлена человеку природой, то зависимость характеристик земли от природно-климатических условий является главным свойством земельных ресурсов. Указанные условия влияют на плодородие почвы и ее продуктивность, что лежит в основе разделения земельных участков на: лучшие, средние и худшие. Продуктивность земли может быть улучшена на всех участках в результате дополнительных вложений труда и капитала, которые обеспечат интенсивное освоение земель.

Вследствие фиксированности площади земельных угодий природой, предложение земли характеризуется в общественном масштабе неэластичностью, но для конкретного пользователя предложение земли обладает определенной эластичностью, поскольку имеется возможность увеличить имеющуюся земельную площадь за счет конкурентов.

Следует отметить, что в условиях формирования рынка собственники земли неохотно идут на продажу участков, отдавая предпочтение получению стабильного дохода от передачи земли в аренду, вследствие чего следует на продажу незначительная часть земельного фонда. Этот существенный фактор, и ограничения государства на свободную продажу земель, сдерживают развитие земельного рынка, что делает его предложение неэластичным, в чем определяется важная особенность рынка земли.

Земельное законодательство должно быть направлено на закрепление и охрану прав собственности на землю, стимулирование дальнейшего развития рынка земли, ипотечного кредитования под залог земли и права землепользования, формирование системы гарантий для проведения таких операций, обеспечение государственной регистрации прав на землю и сделок с ними, на укрепление и развитие арендных земельных отношений, введение в рыночный оборот земель сельскохозяйственного назначения проданных в частную собственность, развитие самого рынка земли и его инфраструктуры.

В регулировании земельных отношений в условиях рынка, важное место занимает примененный в РК принцип приоритета земельного законодательства перед гражданским, который осуществляется в большинстве развитых стран мира. Гражданское и земельное право базируются на разных принципах правового регулирования имущественных отношений. Так, в основе гражданского права положены недопустимость вмешательства в частные дела, свобода

распоряжения имуществом вплоть до его порчи и уничтожения, свобода договоров, свободное принятие решений субъектами права.

Земельное право, исходит из наличия у субъекта собственности не только права по распоряжению имуществом (землей), но и обязанности рационально использовать землю в соответствии с целевым назначением, для чего предусматриваются различные меры государственного регулирования: устанавливается правовой режим категорий земель, нормирование предоставления земли в собственность, государственный контроль за использованием и охраной земель, особый порядок наследования и предоставления земельных участков, государственный контроль операций с землей и другие.

Гражданское право основывается на обеспечении свободы имущественных прав, а земельное - на обеспечении рационального использования и охраны земли, как основного природного ресурса. Такие различия в принципах, диктуют необходимость в приоритетности применения земельного законодательства в регулировании земельных отношений. В большинстве развитых стран мира этот принцип находит свое воплощение в отходе от абсолютной частной земельной собственности, ее модернизации и значительного ограничения, путем правового регулирования частной собственности. В развитых странах мира, прежде всего Западной Европы, активно и широко регулируются земельные отношения, в том числе частная собственность на землю. При этом, применяется модель приоритетности земельного законодательства в регулировании земельных отношений, что обусловлено преобладанием социального, экологического и общественного значения земли, над чисто имущественным содержанием частной недвижимости.

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[i] As Robert E. Harkavy writes, “The subject of the (historically) global (or sub-global) basing networks of the rival, contending great powers and global hegemons is one which has been the subject of surprisingly little scrutiny by academic theorists.” Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 2.

[ii] See Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Alexander Cooley, “ Base Politics”, *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2005); C.T. Sandars, *America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Robert J. Hanks, *The U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects* (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982); Robert E. Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982); James R. Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the*

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[iii] Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 18, 255-256; and Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 45.

[iv] See Robert E. Harkavy, *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 324, 356.

[v] Cooley (2008), 257, 266.

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[xvi] АПРК. Ф.7. Оп.1. Д. 416-а. Л.2.

[xvii] Там же. Л.4.

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[xxvii] АПРК. Ф. 7. Оп. 1. Д.387. Л.35.