Jürgen W. Falter

Radicalization of the middle classes or mobilization of the unpolitical?

The theories of Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix on the electoral support of the NSDAP in the light of recent research

1. Aims and background of this contribution

The fact that Adolf Hitler became Reichschancellor in 1933 and held that office beyond March of that year must largely be attributed to the electoral success of his party. Despite the fact that in the Reichstag elections of 1930 and 1932 the NSDAP[1] was not able to achieve anything like an absolute majority, and that even in the March elections of 1933 failed in this goal by some 2.4 million votes, the party's electoral success was a necessary prerequisite of the "Machtergreifung" (seizure of power). It is the more surprising, therefore, that until now a whole series of aspects of National Socialist electoral behaviour has still not been adequately researched and that important analyses of the party-political background and the social structure of voters who "migrated" to the NSDAP have largely been ignored even by the professional literature. Much of what can be found today in the relevant literature on the end of the Weimar Republic relating to NSDAP electoral behaviour, is unproven speculation or is based on methodologically inadequate ex-

This article was translated by John Taylor (University of Surrey). Financial assistance was provided by the Hochschule der Bundeswehr, Munich.

Social Science Information (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills),
20, 2, (1981), pp. 389-430

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

aminations which thus have little authority (cf. Falter, 1980a, p. 159 ff.)

Whether this verdict also applies to the two most quoted attempts at explanation of National Socialist electoral behaviour, the theory of class and the theory of the mass, will be examined more closely in this contribution. To this end the following discussion will concentrate on one of the major proponents of each theoretical approach, Seymour Martin Lipset for the theory of class and Reinhard Bendix for the mass-theory position, who are still quoted as major authorities of the respective approaches. Firstly, it will be attempted to reconstruct the basic assumptions and conclusions of both positions as explicitly as possible and then to examine their internal consistency, their external compatibility and their theoretical reach. In addition, it must be asked whether their explicit basic assumptions, their implicit prerequisites and their conclusions can be maintained in the light of recent empirical findings on National Socialist electoral behaviour, or whether the results of this analysis do not rather suggest a modification of both attempts at explanation.

2. Lipset's class-theoretical analysis: National Socialism as an expression of middle-class extremism

In Lipset's view (1960) every important social stratum gives rise to both democratic and extremist forms of political expression. Consequently, his thesis says there is not only an extremism of the left and of the right, but also one of the centre. Left-wing extremism, supported by the working class, takes the form of communism or Peronism; the traditional authoritarianism of the upper class is the extremism of the right; the extremism of the centre, finally, whose social base is the middle class, is characterized by fascism.

According to Lipset, all three forms of extremism resemble their democratic equivalents not only in the social composition of their supporters but also in their ideological content (Lipset, 1960, p. 127 ff.). In the democratic spectrum the middle position is represented by liberalism which, Lipset maintains, is supported mainly by small business people, white collar workers and non-religiously affiliated members of the academic profession. In terms of its content, Euro-

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

pean liberalism is distinguished not only by its emphasis on the role of small business, opposition to strong unions and demands for economic equality but also by its opposition to large industry and its rejection of government interference and control; in addition, it is anti-religious, anti-tradition and against socialism.

With the exception of a belief in a strong state, which forms the anti-liberal core of the fascist ideology, fascism stands for the same world view as does liberalism: it too rejects large industry and the trades union movement and is anti-socialist, anti-tradition and anti-religious in its policies (p. 129). Beyond that, the supporters of the NSDAP and of the liberal middle-class parties largely exhibit the same social characteristics as Lipset attempts to show in the main section of his exposition; the rise of National Socialism after 1928 is primarily linked, therefore, to the flood of support from former voters of the centre parties.

In order to explain the desertion by the middle class of the bourgeois-liberal for the National Socialist camp, Lipset calls on the theory of modernization of mass societies propounded by M. Trow, at whose core is the notion that the development of modern industrial society is characterized by the two secular processes of concentration and centralization. The particular casualties of these processes are the small businessmen. Thus, the liberal values mentioned above are just as "reactionary" in face of the inexorable progress of industrial society, as the desire of the middle classes either to retain or to restore their place in society; in fact, these ideas were tantamount to a (futile) attempt to turn back the clock of history. But fascism claimed to be able to do just that and to minimize the importance of "big capital" and of the labour movement (Lipset, p. 134).

The fact that it was particularly the *small, independent, middle-class businessman* who showed a tendency toward National Socialism, is explained by Lipset (p. 101 ff.) with a theory developed elsewhere, namely that a low level of education and a high degree of insecurity facilitate individual extremism. Both of these tendencies characterized the small rural businessmen or owners of small-town businesses; but this tendency is also marked among independent businesses in towns. Self-employed individuals were, therefore, more strongly inclined towards the NSDAP than white collar workers, civil servants or the liberal professions (p. 137).

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

So much for the theoretical speculations of Lipset, which he seeks to support in the course of his analysis by a series of empirical studies. To do so he draws on a number of implicit and explicit assumptions which must be examined just as closely as the empirical validity of the literature he quotes in support, as must the hypotheses on social background, former party affiliations, and the various shifts in party allegiance of NSDAP voters. At the beginning of the empirical section on German fascism Lipset tries to prove, by means of a global analysis of the Reich election results, that it was in fact the voters who had earlier supported the parties of the middle class who were the main source of National Socialist electoral success.[2] With the exception of the Catholic centre party (Zentrum) and its sister group, the Bavarian Peoples Party (BVP), the various centre parties lost nearly all their support between 1928 and 1932, whilst the conservative DNVP was considerably more able to retain its traditional support. Lipset considers this as indicative of his postulate regarding the social origins of liberal and National Socialist voters. The conservatives are said to have lost votes only in the border regions in the East. If the border constituencies are left out of the calculations, the correlation between NSDAP gains and DNVP losses, which is already small, and at 0.25 is lower than the correlation of NSDAP gains and losses by the liberals (0.48), even displays a negative sign (Lipset, p. 140).

This Lipset relates back to the fact that the liberal-bourgeois centre parties relied mainly on small businessmen, white collar workers and government employees, whilst he considers the conservative DNVP to be a typical upper class party (although this is only implicit in his argument) (p. 138 and 140). In areas where the DNVP did lose considerably he says these are either voters from the border areas which were particularly affected by the Treaty of Versailles or — as in Schleswig-Holstein — they were small landowners and businessmen who in other areas would probably have voted liberal.

That the NSDAP particularly attracted voters from the middle-class parties, is further supported by the claim that, after 1930, various regional parties which were also typical middle-class parties, disappeared, for they too bore the clear ideological marks of the National Socialist world-view, as for example in their rejection of urbanism, their anti-centralism and their belief in regional autonomy, ideas whose parallels in NS ideology were the attack on "big business" and " big labour" (Lipset, p. 143).

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

Lipset's proofs (p. 144 ff.) for his twin assumptions that NSDAP voters came, on the one hand, primarily from the "liberal and centre parties" and, on the other, primarily from the self-employed small business community, will need to be examined more closely later on. Here we have only sketched the basic tenets of his argument which accounts for the rise in NSDAP support in the Reichstag elections of 1930 by the flood of votes from the liberal middle classes. Against this the increase in voter participation in 1930 is said not to have markedly helped the National Socialists. Only in 1933 had the NSDAP been able to profit substantially from the mobilization of previous non-voters.

In this connection Lipset makes no explicit explanations concerning the 1932 elections. However, one is given to understand by his remark that the NSDAP was able to mobilize the (politically apathetic) non-voters only after 1930, that is after it had clearly shown itself as a political force even to the uninterested, that the second drastic increase in its support in July 1932 could be accounted for both by the flow of votes from previous non-voters, as well as by new gains from the traditional middle-class voters (Lipset, p. 148 ff.).

If one were to draw a summary of Lipset's argument, the profile of a typical NS voter of 1932 would be of a self-employed, protestant member of the middle class who lived either on a farm or in a small town and who had earlier supported a centre party or one of the regional groupings, opposed both to the power of "big industry" and to the influence of trade unions (p. 148). The fact that the convinced NSDAP supporter was said to be a person who was an economic failure, was a socially reduced, uprooted individual, hard pressed by fate, did not alter anything concerning their middle-class background which must constantly be taken into account in order to understand the success of National Socialism (p. 178 ff.).

3. The mass-theory analysis of Reinhard Bendix and others: National Socialism as the radicalization of the unpolitical

While Lipset, as the representative of a class theory explanation of National Socialist electoral success, argues that the middle classes [3] which had been *structurally* threatened by secular modernization

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

trends and which had *actually* been made deeply insecure by the agricultural and economic crisis of the Weimar Republic, were responsible for Hitler's and his party's electoral success, the proponents of the mass theory position proceed from the notion that the sudden rise of National Socialism after 1928 cannot be adequately explained by a static, class-orientated analytical approach. [4]

The author here primarily discussed, Reinhard Bendix, does, it is true, advance an analysis of electoral movements towards National Socialism in support of this thesis but he only points to the mass-theoretical approach as a contrasting position to the socio-structural attempts to explain electoral behaviour, as in class theory (Bendix, 1952). It is, therefore, necessary to appeal to the far more explicit writings of William S. Kornhauser and Hannah Arendt in order to represent the theoretical basis of mass theory properly.

All mass-theoretical attempts at explaining the electoral success of National Socialism proceed from the assumption that political movements like fascism are facilitated by societies with low levels of integration, i.e. where individuals are "atomized" or where whole social groups are isolated from one another, where primary or secondary relationships have broken down as a result of deep social crisis and where earlier political ties and behaviour patterns have been greatly altered as a consequence of these social upheavals.

Adherents of mass theory believe that atomization and the move to extremism are a step by step process. Firstly, individuals or social groups are torn out of their existing political ties by major social crises such as the collapse of the German Reich and the First World War, the Revolution of 1918/19 or the inflation of 1923. This can be seen especially in people who are not confirmed in their allegiance by membership in socially binding groups such as trades unions or the Catholic church. For this reason, marginally integrated voters are a particularly easy prey for extremist mass movements. They are ripe for the second step; support for an extremist party. This is especially true if a continuation or the reappearance of a social crisis such as, for example, the impoverishment of large sections of the population in the wake of the agricultural and the general economic crisis, prepares the soil for extremist movements (cf. Wernette, 1974, chap. 1).

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

Accordingly, the voters of the NSDAP and those of the other, democratic parties of the Reich, are said to be distinguished by their level of integration into the social and political structure. The mass-theoretical hypothesis further maintains that they lack not only the traditional ties with established parties but also (active) membership in formal organizations such as are represented by the churches, professional associations and clubs. Particularly the apathetic and politically not yet fully integrated younger voters are said to be the first to join the new movement, since they are generally more socially isolated and politically detached than older or politically interested persons.

So much for a representation of the mass-theory position which is basic to Bendix's analysis of NS voter behaviour too, even though he has never explicitly formulated it. Of all the adherents of mass theory, Bendix has developed the most meaningful and therefore most easily testable hypotheses on the various waves of National Socialist electoral support. In diametric opposition to Lipset, who criticized him sharply for this reason, Bendix believes that the NSDAP profited in 1930 primarily from the mobilization of young voters and of previous non-voters. Only later, in July 1932, did the middle-class voters move to the NSDAP in considerable numbers.

He attempts to prove this hypothesis by means of a very general, global analysis of voters and non-voters in the Reich. During the 1930 Reichstag elections 1.7 mill. voters had voted who had not been eligible in 1928. In addition, some 2.5 mill. voters had participated who, although entitled to do so, had not voted in 1928. At the same time, the DNVP had lost almost 2 mill. votes compared to 1928 which had gone to the NSDAP as did another 4.2 mill. new voters. Compared to this, the smaller middle-class parties and the centre party had even been able to increase their total by 1 mill. votes (Bendix, 1952, p. 369).

Thus the NSDAP gains of 1930 are in the first place the result of the flood of votes from young voters and those who had not previously voted and secondly, the result of the radicalization of voters who had previously supported the right. In other words, it is hardly possible to identify the NSDAP electorate in 1930 according to social origins: the move towards extremism by the atomized, unpolitical masses and the ideological contamination of marginal con-

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

servative voters were far more important than the normal socio-structural determinants of electoral behaviour. For even amongst the previous non-voters the middle class was hardly over-represented because the level of electoral participation is known to depend on the level of education and because education itself is distributed according to class. For this reason the middle class is said to have been under-represented amongst the non-voters of 1928; as a result, the new voters of 1930, who had not voted in 1928, probably came from all social camps. Analogously, there is said to be no reason to believe that the young voters who voted for the first time in 1930, largely came from the middle class.

In July 1932 on the one hand, the same influences as in 1930 had continued to apply, in that the NSDAP obtained a further 2 mill. votes from new voters; on the other hand, the NSDAP had now also been successful in obtaining additional support from the middle class. This was to be seen in the fact that, compared to 1930, the small bourgeois parties had lost about 3.7 mill. votes. Even the nationalist right-wing parties had then lost a further 1.5 mill. votes to the NSDAP, whose 7.3 mill. new votes could be explained almost wholly by the movement from these three sources.

Consequently, Bendix views the gain in middle-class support by the NSDAP as a secondary phenomenon which set in only in 1932. The ever deepening economic crisis after 1930 had resulted in a loosening of traditional party affiliations. Because of the economic pressure experienced by everyone, older conflicts of interest between the various segments of the population, which had taken the form of a series of small splinter parties representing a number of small interest groups, had become temporarily bridged over.

The desire to overcome the crisis had thus resulted in a temporary levelling off of antagonism and finally to the election of the NSDAP by large, socially heterogeneous sections of the population. Over and above this a sort of coattail effect and, not least, the effective propaganda of a disciplined and effective National Socialist party organization, had driven additional voters into the arms of the NSDAP (Bendix, 1952, p. 371).

Like the class-theory approach, the mass-theory analysis discusses the elections of November 1932 and March 1933 only marginally. [5] Both approaches appear to be agreed that the NSDAP losses of November 1932 can be explained by the reduction of the number of voters, i.e. by the loss of politically disinterested voters

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

who previously had not voted and by the new-found strength of the DNVP. Conversely, both positions explain the renewed electoral gains of the NSDAP in 1933 by the enormous increase in electoral participation.

If one wants to sketch out a picture analogous to the now famous formulation of Lipset, of the ideal-typical NSDAP voter according to the mass-theory position, he can be described as a radicalized, former supporter of the DNVP or as a former non-voter or a young voter, who together with other marginally integrated, atomized individuals forms an unpolitical "mass" with no particular socio-structural characteristics; mobilized by the economic crisis, and almost without resisting, he became an easy prey of National Socialism. According to the mass-theory view, the National Socialist electorate did not get its specifically middle-class — but by no means typically so — colouration until the July elections of 1932.

4. Lipset's class-theory analysis in the light of criticism

In his analysis of the social basis of National Socialism and other fascist movements, Lipset proceeds from two basic assumptions, one of which, as is shown above, he makes initially explicit and the other which he implicitly appears to presuppose.[5]

(a) This implicit but often qualified assumption of Lipset's relates to the class-theory basis of his argumentation and formulates its basic concept in terms of a theory of interest of political behaviour. Simply stated, this means that social class determines the political, economic and other "interests" of an individual. The common "interests" so determined emit uniform stimuli on all members of the class to behave in a particular manner. Individuals with the same or similar social positions (and so, having the same "interests") will react in the same or a similar manner to events in the political arena.

At its heart this (implicit) basic assumption is concerned with a purely individual theory of motivation, where, for example, economic "interests" belong to the major motivating forces of individual decisions concerning political behaviour (Pappi, 1976, p. 438 ff.). However, this theory of interest is now hardly acceptable for a number of empirical reasons (e.g. the assumed uniformity of

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

behaviour on the part of individuals of the same social or class position exists more in the minds of the theoreticians than in political reality);[7] also the concept of an objective interest, which is used here, is of little value as a means of arriving at empirically valid explanations because of its normative implications (cf. Hirsch-Weber, 1969; Geiger, 1953; Schubert, 1960).But since it is possible to derive empirically true conclusions in a logically meaningful way even from false premises, this critique of Lipset's basic position may suffice to put in doubt the general theoretical soundness of his attempts at explanation but it is insufficient to falsify the special conclusions derived in this way as, for example, his assumptions concerning the various waves of voters who moved to National Socialism.

(b) In contrast to the assumption just discussed, the other, explicit, basic assumption of Lipset's theory is the insistence that the social base and the ideology of political currents correspond and that, therefore, every important social stratum develops not only its own specifically democratic but also its extremist mode of political expression. In the case of the middle classes extremism takes the form of fascism, whose ideology is largely similar to that of liberalism with the single exception of the deification of the state.

The Freiburg historian Heinrich August Winkler has examined whether this hypothesis on the extremism of the centre proves right or whether National Socialism is rather a form of right-wing extremism such as existed in the Germany of the Kaiserreich. On the basis of a detailed analysis of various social demands of the NSDAP he comes to the conclusion that:

> The answers which National Socialism gave to the desire for protection of small business people and farmers and the fear of proletarisation of white collar workers were thoroughly right-wing answers. They had their origins in the social conservative movement of the late 19th century which differentiated between 'exploitative' and 'creative' capitalism. . . What later became the paradox of the fascist movement, the mobilisation of the masses against 'rule by the masses' was already successfully practised during the Empire (Winkler, 1972a, p. 185 ff.).

Ideologically, National Socialism was far closer to the conservatism, anti-parliamentarianism, nationalism and anti-semitism of the DNVP and the equally anti-liberal and anti-parliamentary

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

right wing of the DVP, than it was to political liberalism as represented by the DDP or the moderate forces of the DVP which dominated the party line until the end of the 1920s. By its mobilization of the aversion to traditional party policies, National Socialism also represented positions which strongly resembled the — socially conservative and strongly nationalist — "Wirtschaftspartei" (economy party), a group supported mainly by artisans and middle-class owners of private property (Winkler, 1972 a, p. 179 ff.; Schumacher, 1974; Falter, 1980 b).

However, in its goals and methods National Socialism was a sui generis: the achievement of "Lebensraum" in the East, the reintroduction of pre-industrial, romantically tinged agrarian living conditions, the dominance of the Arian race over the sub-human races and anti-semitism were parts of a programme that certainly owed nothing to the liberal world view but that is decisive for an understanding of National Socialism (Winkler, 1972 a, p. 187). In his all too sparse description of basic fascist positions, Lipset took no account of these final aims — typically he never mentions the biological theories of race of National Socialism — nor was he able to prove, as Winkler overwhelmingly shows, that fascism ideologically represents an "extremism of the centre".

Without doubt this seriously endangers his thesis about the parallels between social basis and ideology. Yet this assumption is not a necessary prerequisite of his theory concerning the middle-class basis of National Socialism; because the Kaiserreich already showed that the mass support for socially conservative and protectionist policies, as well as of anti-semitism, was thoroughly middle-class in origin, in other words, that "right-wing" policies were politically supported by the middle strata of society (cf. Pulzer, 1964; Winkler, 1972 a).

Before we turn to Lipset's observations on the social and party-political background of voters who moved to the NSDAP, I would like to discuss some supporting assumptions and arguments used by Lipset in the course of his exposition. They too must in part be questioned as the recent literature shows. His argument that after 1930 the NSDAP was helped less by the losses of the conservative parties than by the break-up of the liberal camp is propped up by a number of implicit but also explicit supporting assumptions. It appears that Lipset proceeds from the notion that the upper classes were organized in the (right-wing) DNVP, whilst the non-Catholic members of the middle class are said to have voted for the DDP,

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

the DVP, the Wirtschaftspartei or for one of the regional parties. In so doing he treats the DDP and the DVP as two parties with a similar social composition. In addition, he counts the Wirtschaftspartei as one of the liberal parties of the bourgeois centre (Lipset, p. 138) and appears to consider the SPD and the KPD as pure working-class parties having to lose no, or only a tiny margin of votes to the growing National Socialist movement (p. 139).

Lipset seeks to prove this last point with the help of a global analysis of the rates of change in individual party support in the Reich between 1928 and 1933; but such an analysis, also used by Reinhard Bendix in support of his hypothesis, is not a suitable tool for examining voter movements between two elections, for the votes given to the various parties are already balanced numbers, behind which large underground movements of voters from one party to another tend to be hidden, which can become at least partly (and in an extreme case, completely) lost in the final tally (Falter, 1980a). For this reason it is impossible to come to any conclusions concerning the actual shifts of voter allegiance, on the basis of the rates of change in support at Reich level, behind which the actual shifts lie hidden. Naturally, Lipset is aware of this; he nevertheless attempts, primarily in the absence of other data, to draw "some sensible conclusions" from them (Lipset, p. 138), but they cannot be more than untested hypotheses, which are still in need of empirical verification. One such proof, however, is advanced by Lipset in what is at best a limited and extremely fallacy-ridden manner, in that he calculates bivariate rank correlations for the relationship between DNVP losses and NSDAP gains at the level of the (much too large and heterogeneous) 35 constituencies of the Reich (Falter, 1980a).

But even the supporting assumptions by which he props up his hypotheses, are either not relevant or need at least to be thoroughly modified. That is true, for example, for his conviction (nowhere explicitly stated but undoubtedly part of his accompanying argument) that the DNVP as a classical conservative party (which it largely was in its programme) relied primarily on the upper class, even for its electoral base. In so doing, Lipset commits the typical mistake of making an assumption concerning the social base of a party on the basis of its policies or its leadership; it is easy to see that he applies to the DNVP his equation of the social base and ideology of a political movement which has already been questioned earlier,

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

something which is entirely false, at least in this undifferentiated manner.

It is true that there have been only a few empirical studies which dealt with the social composition of the electoral support of the DNVP but they all point to the fact that the DNVP was not a purely upper-class party (cf. Childers, 1976; Cameron, 1977). A glance at the numerical relationship between DNVP clientele and the upper classes would easily have shown this to be so. Practically all studies of the social stratification of German society are agreed that the upper class, to which industrialists, large land owners and the higher rentiers belonged, in 1925 made up only 1 percent of the population (cf. Geiger, 1932, p. 79 ff.; Bolte et al., 1966, p. 44 ff., p. 64 ff.). But in 1928, the DNVP obtained 14 percent of the vote. Even if one proceeded from the fictitious assumption that all members of the upper class voted for the DNVP this would have been only 6 percent in 1928, and in 1930 and 1932 only about 12 percent and 15 percent of all DNVP voters. And even if one were to include the so-called "upper middle class" with the upper class (which would radically alter its character), it would still not explain the election success of the DNVP in 1928, because even the "upper middle class", composed of larger independent businessmen, business executives and civil servants as well as most members of the liberal professions, comprised only about 5 percent of the total population at that time — in other words even assuming that this group voted exclusively for the DNVP it would still only account for about 50 percent of all DNVP voters in 1928.

It is, however, fictitious to assume that the upper class and the upper middle class all voted for the DNVP because the party was almost exclusively the party of the protestant section of the population. And there it had the characteristics of a catch-all party: it was successful not only in rural areas but also in the towns; in areas where many employees worked in the tertiary sector as much as in regions with large land owners and medium sized farms. No matter how the leadership of the DNVP or its membership may have been composed, at the level of its electoral support it was in no way a party of the upper classes only. This is indicated by the existence of the Deutschnationaler Handlungsgehilfenverband (see Annex), long affiliated to the DNVP even if never totally identical with it (cf. Winkler, 1972b.).

In the view of the McGill University NS-researcher, Richard Hamilton, the DVP was much more the party of the upper class —

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

at least in the cities and amongst industrialists — being clearly distinguished from its left liberal neighbour party, the DDP, both by ideology as well as by social basis (Cameron, 1977). The latter appears to have gained more support from the liberal professions, journalists, teachers, etc. whilst the former was supported more by the business community and industrialists.[8]

Unfortunately, there are no conclusive studies of the electorate of the two liberal parties but the results just quoted indicate that there too Lipset's assumptions have to be followed by a question mark (for both in the case of the DDP and the DVP, he proceeds on the basis of an identical social composition).

But Lipset's inclusion of the Wirtschaftspartei in the ranks of the "liberal middle-class parties" must not merely be marked with a question mark but must be decisively rejected (Lipset, p. 138). It is indeed true that the Wirtschaftspartei was supported mainly by "small businessmen and artisans" as Lipset says; but it is just this party which was anything but liberal as I have already remarked above. It was a socially-conservative, middle-class protectionist movement which can be characterized as a precursor of National Socialism — at least as far as its antipathy to all parties is concerned (Winkler, 1972a, p. 179ff.). Between 1930 and 1932 it lost relatively more support than the two liberal parties and the various regional groupings — but Lipset does not bother to check whether this loss was in favour of the NSDAP, merely asserting so on the basis of his global analysis.

Lipset uses the same form of assertion without a sufficient empirical examination, when he declares that the supporters of the regional parties, whom he includes in the middle classes lock, stock and barrel, went over to the NSDAP almost without exception (Lipset, p. 142). Without wishing to seriously question both assumptions here it must, however, be said that the middle-class basis of the regional parties is still not well-proven because it has not yet been adequately examined and that the work of Heberle (1945) Hagmann (1946), Seipel (1933, p. 135), Franz (1957) or Hermens (1933) whom Lipset quotes in support also does not provide the necessary proof. Lipset's attempt to find a connection between the programmes for regional autonomy of these parties and the anti-urbanism and anti-capitalism of the NSDAP rather gives the impression that he is clutching at not very convincing straws.

Two further supporting assumptions of Lipset's relate to the

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

electorate of the two socialist and the two Catholic parties to whom he appears to ascribe the same, almost total power of resistance vis-à-vis National Socialism (Lipset, p. 138). In so doing he underestimates the differences in social composition as well as of the political immunity of the two socialist parties to National Socialist infection. He implicitly appears to presuppose that the SPD and the KPD were equally supported by the working class, which is certainly not the case as contemporary analyses have already tried to show (Neisser, 1930-31, p. 654 ff.; Neumann, 1956, p. 366). Lipset particularly ignores the strong measure of support by white collar workers amongst social democratic voters (Cameron, 1977). Neisser (1930-31) speaks of around 40 percent non-working-class support amongst SPD voters and even from the point of view of its membership the SPD by 1930 was no longer a "workers'" party (quoted in Schmollinger and Stöss, 1976, p. 220). This heterogeneous composition of SPD supporters and members was insufficiently taken into account by Geiger (1930), Heberle (1945) and Pratt (1948) and, in their turn by Lipset and many others, when analyzing the electoral base of National Socialism (cf. also Cameron, 1977).

In contrast, the KPD appears largely to have been a party supported by the industrial proletariat even though especially for the KPD there is no satisfactory information available for its social composition probably because it is considered as self-evident. Furthermore, the recent studies of National Socialist electoral behaviour, the results of which will be more extensively discussed in my concluding section, strongly indicate that both in 1930 and 1932 there was some desertion by SPD voters but not of KPD voters to the NSDAP. But it is not conclusive whether these were primarily non-working-class SPD voters who turned to the NSDAP in 1931.

As regards both the Catholic parties, which Lipset leaves out of consideration in his analysis just as he does the two socialist parties, it is not possible to discern any movement by voters to the NSDAP either in 1930 or in 1932; the Zentrum and the BVP appear during this period to have developed almost total resistance to Hitler and his movement (cf. Meckstroth, 1971, p.156 ff.; Burnham, 1972; Falter, 1979). But at no time in his analysis does Lipset even ask the question, let alone give an answer, why these two Catholic, strongly middle-class oriented parties were not affected by the extremism of the centre. He merely observes that in Germany "Catholic affilia-

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

tion constantly overrides class or other allegiances" (Lipset, p.145), without offering any explanation why this was so.[9]

As a further, indirect, proof of his thesis, Lipset cites the fact that the NSDAP turned to other social strata than the traditional German right, by quoting the differences in electoral behaviour between men and women in the Weimar Republic. In this connection he is quite correct where he states that the DNVP and the Zentrum obtained more female votes than did the other parties. In contrast, the National Socialist and the liberal middle-class parties (amongst whom, as already mentioned, he counts the Wirtschaftspartei), just as the Marxist parties, were supported largely by men. Here Lipset (p. 140 ff.) bases his argument on studies by Duverger (1955), Bremme (1956), Tingsten (1937, p. 37 ff.), Bracher (1955, p. 476), Striefler (1946, pp. 20-22) and others, but neither Bracher nor Striefler or Tingsten provide proof for the apparent preponderance of male voters for the "liberal middle-class parties". On the contrary, Bracher (1955, p. 476), citing contemporary election analyses, speaks of a preponderance of females who voted for the DVP; which is also true for Striefler who, on the basis of the May 1924 elections, shows that there was a balance between women and men voting for the DDP and the Wirtschaftspartei. This is also proven by the votes differentiated according to sex quoted by Tingsten for towns of varying size and social structure for the Reichstag elections between 1930 and 1933.

It is true that until 1932 men tended to vote more heavily for the NSDAP than women, even though the trend was weakening (in 1933 this trend was reversed in Protestant communities, whereas in Catholic areas it remained constant until 1933), but at no time did males preponderate in votes for the liberal parties as Lipset maintains; in fact, with the DVP they were slightly under-represented throughout. If the different electoral behaviour between males and females is evidence of anything it certainly does not support Lipset's argument.

Elsewhere Lipset, as additional proof of his middle-class hypothesis (which is not in principle being questioned here) cites the social composition of NSDAP members from 1933 on. In his view, white collar workers, civil servants and the self-employed were over-represented, whereas workers and farmers were under-represented (Gerth, 1952). With the exception of the farmers, whose membership of the NSDAP Lipset tends to underestimate, his figures are probably correct.[10] Nevertheless, there are two

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

reasons why it may not be legitimate to draw any conclusions concerning the voters for any party on the basis of the social composition of its membership: on the one hand many recent studies have shown that there are many very different factors which influence membership in a party to those which influence voting behaviour (cf. Hamilton, 1981, chap. 2), and on the other hand, readiness to become politically active varies according to membership of social class. Normally members of the middle class are more ready to participate than are members of the working class; the quotient of party members and party voters over the whole political spectrum is therefore far smaller for the middle class than for the working class (cf. Diederich, 1973, p. 41 ff). It is thus quite possible that among NSDAP party members as compared to those who only voted NSDAP, the middle class was over-represented and the working class under-represented. But this could only be clarified by empirical studies which are, however, not yet available. So it would seem there is little point in drawing any conclusions about voting behaviour on the basis of party membership alone without some additional information.

So much for a critique of some of the supporting assumptions which Lipset uses either as basic presuppositions or in support of his arguments without making them explicit. It has been shown that it is necessary to raise a number of questions that a first reading of Lipset's undoubtedly brilliant and, therefore, oft quoted analysis appeared not to require. Before we turn to some of the most important hypotheses which arise out of his argument concerning the various waves of voters who moved to the National Socialists, some remarks are in order concerning his use of the concept of the middle class and its general usefulness in the analysis of elections during the Weimar Republic.

A more careful reading of Lipset's arguments shows that, strictly speaking, he is not speaking about the extremism of the whole of the middle class but only of a part of it, the so-called lower middle class. He is only briefly concerned with the susceptibility to the NSDAP of the upper middle class. In his view it was primarily the self-employed, i.e. farmers, small business people and small industrialists who — more than white collar workers and civil servants — voted for the NSDAP (Lipset, p. 137, p. 145 ff.). As empirical justification for this notion which dominates the relevant literature Lipset relies on Rudolf Heberle's study of Schleswig-Holstein and Günther Franz's on Lower Saxony. Both of these

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

authors take the view that it was primarily the lower middle class who voted NSDAP but they do not advance any analysis of the city populations of the Reich even though they too make some remarks in this connection (which are, however, not substantiated by any data) (cf. Hamilton, 1981, chap. 2).

In Lipset's view the missing empirical proof for the greater susceptibility of the lower middle class to the NSDAP even in the cities, is provided by the American sociologist, Samuel Pratt, in an MA thesis written in 1948. But in his (as yet unpublished) study on the social basis of NS electoral behaviour, in which he specifically considers the question of the affinity between the upper middle class and the NSDAP, Richard Hamilton shows that Pratt's analysis does not permit such a conclusion because of the lack of precision of the census categories on which it was based.

In the category "self-employed", which Pratt calls the "upper middle class" and Lipset labels the "lower middle class", thus turning Pratt's analysis upside down, the census statistics of the German Reich subsume both the owners of trades establishments and retail shops (mainly small shopkeepers) as well as industrialists and large wholesale merchants; in addition it covers a small number of top managers and higher civil servants, even though these make up only 1.6 percent to 4.5 percent of this category. (cf. Hamilton, 1981, chap. 2, p. 26; Childers, 1976, p. 33 ff.).

Those groups whom Pratt labels the "lower middle classes" on the other hand, which the census statistics call "civil servants" and "white collar workers", include all members of these two groups with the exception of the 3.5 percent executives and higher-ranking civil servants already counted in the self-employed category (cf. Pratt, 1948, p. 114 ff.; Hamilton, 1981, chap. 2, p. 25 ff.; Childers, 1976, p. 33).

Such a distribution means nothing less than that Pratt's "upper middle class" (Lipset's "lower middle class") includes both the small businessman who can just make a living *and* large industrialists like Krupp and Thyssen whilst one can also find both proletarianized white collar workers as well as very high civil servants and managers in Pratt's "lower" and Lipset's "upper middle class" categories. Such a broad span for both middle-class categories makes it impermissible to characterize the one group as being "lower" and the other as belonging to the "upper middle class". At best, what appears possible is a subdivision into an "old" (i.e. self-employed) and a "new" (not self-employed) middle

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

class, as for example Theodor Geiger, one of the fathers of the middle-class theory of National Socialist electoral behaviour, has done (cf. Childers, 1976, p. 33). But this method of categorization has completely different empirical implications to those intended by Lipset, Pratt and others.

Be that as it may, whether upper or lower, old or new middle class — the differences in NSDAP electoral behaviour between the two categories reported by Pratt are so small that one can hardly on this basis speak of a divergence in behaviour on the part of the self-employed and non-self-employed middle class vis-à-vis National Socialism, as does Lipset. Nevertheless, using a more exact statistical analysis, based upon the controlling factor of religion, Thomas Childers (1976) shows that, in towns, the NSDAP did better with the old, self-employed, middle class, especially with handicraft occupations, than with the new, non-self-employed middle class (Lipset, 1950, p. 146; cf. Hamilton, 1981, chap. 2, p. 27; Waldman, 1973, p. 193), but this has nothing to do with the lower or upper middle classes as reported by Lipset. In addition, Richard Hamilton's own analysis of National Socialist election successes in the various city districts of Berlin and Hamburg shows very clearly that between 1930 and 1933 the NSDAP was able to attract a great many votes in those districts where the upper middle class and the upper classes lived. But it remains largely unclear how far these results can be projected onto boroughs with a particularly varied economic structure and with differences in political tradition. What is clear is that Lipset's thesis concerning the greater affinity for the National Socialists on the part of the lower, as opposed to the more educated and well-off, middle class cannot be supported by the studies to which he refers. In this way, much of the literature which is based on his thesis of the lower middle class as the natural electoral base of National Socialism and which has come to support this thesis, loses its credibility and power of explanation.[11]

5. On a critique of the methodology and the various assumptions of the mass-theory approach, especially of Bendix

In a manner similar to the preceding section, where I tried to throw some critical light on a number of preconditions and assumptions, as well as on the methodology of Lipset, I now wish in the follow-

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

ing section to take a critical look at the position of the mass-theory attempt at explanation and, in particular, at the arguments of Reinhard Bendix. In so doing, I shall not attempt here to refute the starting hypothesis on which all mass-theory explanations are based; namely that the atomization and subjection to mass society of individuals or groups because of social discontinuities, provide a fertile seed-bed for the growth of totalitarian movements. We shall concern ourselves with this problem at the end of this section.

In his essay of 1952 Bendix is primarily concerned with a general description of the socio-structural determinants of political power. In his view theoretical arguments based on social stratification as an explanation for the success of totalitarian mass movements are of only limited usefulness. He uses the electoral base of National Socialism mainly in an illustrative manner (p. 367). But since, in doing so, he made certain easily checked remarks concerning the various "waves" of electoral support for National Socialism and concerning the social composition of the NSDAP, this part of his essay took on something of a separate identity from the rest of his essay and, by virtue of being often quoted as an analysis of NS-election success, began to take on a life of its own as a paradigmatic example of the mass-theoretical attempts at explanation which went far beyond its original illustrative function. It is with this new role that I wish to concern myself, although it also seems necessary to refer to other representatives of the mass-theory approach in order to arrive at a complete picture of the "Bendix" thesis. According to Bendix the rise of National Socialism was made possible by the existence of a relatively small, tightly organized movement and because of the sudden increase in support from a large mass of voters during a period of crisis (p. 367). Accordingly, social-stratification attempts at explanation, which maintain that the loss of economic security and social status caused the middle classes to lose faith in the traditional political, legal and economic solutions of the political system and thus led to a radicalization of the middle classes, are inadequate to explain the rapidity of the rise of National Socialism or even the fact that members of the middle class now appeared to support an attack on law and order and even on private property whereas normally they are strict adherents of the status quo (Bendix, p. 368).

Bendix further says that in fact it was not middle-class voters who were responsible for the first rise of the NSDAP from the obscurity of a relatively unknown splinter party to becoming the se-

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

cond largest parliamentary power in the Reich. An analysis of the electoral movements would clearly show that in 1930 the Zentrum and the "small middle-class parties" had even gained (more than a million) votes, something that no other parties were able to do with the exception of the NSDAP and KPD. The enormous gains of the NSDAP (approx. 5.6 mill.) came primarily from the 4.2 mill. previous non-voters and young voters and secondly, from the approx. 2 mill. radicalized DNVP voters who in 1930 turned their backs on that party. The "small middle-class parties" had only lost votes to the NSDAP in the July election of 1932 when they lost 3.74 mill. votes. Together with a further 1.5 mill. votes lost by the "nationalist parties" and a further 2 mill. previous non-voters and young voters they explained the latest NSDAP gains of 7.3 mill. votes (Bendix, p. 369). That is to say that the first success was mobilization of the unpolitical and only later of the middle classes.

I have already elsewhere (cf. Falter, 1980a) referred to the inapplicability of global analysis at Reich level in order to discover the actual movements of voters that partially balance out in the final tally. It is true that Bendix cannot be accused of appearing to be unaware of the notion of the ecological fallacy, since it was only made known to a wider scientific public by Robinson in 1950;[12] nevertheless, his assertions must be judged exclusively on whether they are capable of proving what they set out to do and in this respect they undoubtedly fail. It is impossible on the basis of global voter movements, to make such far-reaching assertions as Bendix does; and the conclusions which he draws from them are, therefore, unjustified. But since it is also possible to arrive at a goal by questionable means, this judgement which refers only to the methodological soundness of his argumentation but not to its empirical quality, naturally does not disprove his hypotheses but merely puts them in question.

The final section of this work is reserved for an empirical examination of these hypotheses. Unfortunately, without additional (and risky) analyses it is hardly possible because of the paucity of figures and sources in his essay, to determine on what Bendix bases his assertion that the "small middle-class parties" and the Zentrum won more than a million votes in 1930. It is true that, compared to 1928, the Zentrum and its Bavarian sister party, the BVP, were able to win about 565,000 votes in 1930. But where are the remaining half-million votes which would have to go exclusively to the so-called "small middle-class parties"? The only small party which

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

could possibly be counted in the bourgeois centre and which won additional support in 1930 is the Christlich-Nationale Bauern- und Landvolkpartei. All other "small middle-class" political groupings lost votes in 1930, in all over 1½ mill. votes of whom the DVP, compared to 1928, alone lost more than one million voters. This sum does not contain the losses of the DDP because, for reasons not clear to me, Bendix (p. 369, note 7) does not take it to be one of the "small middle-class parties".

It is very difficult to reconstruct from his remark that the "small middle-class parties" had lost some 3.74 mill. votes in 1932 and retained only 1,126,991 votes, what parties these groupings belonged to without additional information. In fact in 1932 the various non-Catholic middle-class parties (again excluding the DDP) lost even more than 4 mill. voters and retained just under one million votes.[13] If Bendix's figures are to balance he can only be referring to the (purely agrarian) Landvolkpartei as the only "small middle-class party"; but in this case his figures for 1932 do not tally because then the Landvolkpartei lost just over one million votes which would imply that the other 2.7 mill. votes would have to come from the other parties of the centre who had already lost many voters in 1930. Be that as it may, Bendix's assertion that, contrary to the assumptions of the socio-structural theoreticians, the "small middle-class parties" had gained votes in 1930 can only be maintained if one inclines to an extraordinarily favourable interpretation of his figures.[14]

This is also true of some of his other assertions, as for example his thesis that the "nationalistic parties" had lost a further 1.5 mill. votes in July 1932 which — if I have understood Bendix correctly — went to the NSDAP lock, stock and barrel (Bendix, p. 369). But a look at the election statistics shows us, however, that the DNVP, by far the largest of the "nationalistic parties" lost less than 300,000 votes in 1932; that the Konservative Volkspartei, a democratic splinter group of the anti-parliamentarian DNVP also lost just 300,000 votes and that the Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst, a moderate conservative-Protestant new party but which can hardly be counted with the nationalistic right, lost a further 500,000 votes. Even this well-intentioned arithmetic does not enable one to reconstruct on the basis of Bendix's figures where the other half million to one million previously nationalistic voters are to come from, nor to reconstruct the basis of further numerical arguments

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

of which two more must be mentioned here since they appear to weaken rather than strengthen Bendix's proof.

Thus, for instance, Bendix (p. 369, note 7) explains the growth of KPD support in the Reichstag elections of 1930 by some 1.3 mill. *more* on the basis of an increase in young voters rather than because of the radicalization of previous liberal or socialist partisans. I do not wish to challenge this thesis here but rather to point out that he considerably weakens his argument that the young voters were one of the main sources of increase for National Socialism. If I have interpreted his "more" correctly, it would mean that more than half the communist gains in votes would have to come from young voters voting for the first time in 1930, thus at least 700,000 young voters in 1930 would not have voted NSDAP but KPD.[15] This in turn would mean that the missing NSDAP votes from the table of gains and losses would have to come from other sources, for example from the middle-class parties.

In this connection Bendix makes a similar remark, which also undermines his argument, when he states that the gains of the "small middle-class parties" (which only he has observed) can be led back to support from voters of the left and the right who were tormented by the fear of radicalism. Even if in fact the Landvolkpartei in 1930, as the only non-extremist and non-Catholic party to win votes, profited at the expense of the DNVP, a fact which cannot be doubted,[16] these votes could not also have benefited the NSDAP.

In such a manner Bendix undermines his own argument that the NSDAP voters of 1930 were not yet class-oriented and that the increase from previous non-voters and young new voters did not come from specific social classes but from all social strata.[17] Bendix tries to argue that members of the middle class were not over-represented amongst the previous non-voters when he states that the levels of voter participation were dependent on levels of education; education is itself distributed according to class which is why in 1928 the middle-class voters were under-represented amongst non-voters. But this presumably correct argument can also be applied to young new voters whose rates of participation in the Reichstag elections of 1930 were presumably also dependent on education. In this way in 1930 a relatively greater number of young new voters of middle-class origin are said to have voted than their percentage share of the total population would allow one to expect.

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

Nevertheless, these class differences are probably too small to seriously challenge Bendix's position on this point.[18]

The atomization and isolation of NSDAP supporters maintained by other proponents of the mass-theory approach is a sensible rounding out of this theory, even if not explicitly advanced by Bendix himself. According to their theory, NSDAP voters were to be differentiated from the voters of the other established parties by the level of integration into the social and political structure of the Reich. Not only were they not tied traditionally to the democratic parties but they were also not members of formal organizations like the churches and trades unions, trade associations and clubs. What can we say about this hypothesis? By what indicators can we test it? And what consequences will its falsification have for the mass-theory approach?

In order to be able adequately to answer these questions we must first determine what is meant by atomization. If one uses it to mean the absence or the disappearance of intermediary associations, e.g. leisure-time clubs, religious associations or professional associations then it is easy to show that in this respect the Weimar Republic was anything but atomized. Then as now there were a multiplicity of associations and organizations of the most varied kind, although they were organized primarily along the lines of cleavage of Weimar society, i.e. according to social class and religion. Even though the connections between them, such as overlapping membership, were relatively weak, it is nevertheless plain that, at least within the social segments of Weimar society, at an organizational level the pre-conditions for an extensive isolation and massification of the individual were not present.[19] On the other hand, if the atomization hypothesis is supposed to mean a gradual loosening up of political class loyalties, such as might be seen in a growing cross-over of voters between party blocs, even this assumption is not adequately covered by the data. An examination of the net changes in the various political camps between 1928 and 1933 shows that both the socialist and the Catholic voter blocs at an aggregate level remained largely stable, whereas the bourgeois and agrarian centre parties, and to a lesser extent the classical right, sank to a fraction of their original strength once National Socialism began to spread. In addition, ecological analyses show that even at the level of gross alterations between the communist and Catholic parties respectively on the one hand and the NSDAP on the other, only small voter cross-movements occurred; only the SPD, as the

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

only party of these two blocs of voters, lost votes to the NSDAP to an extent worth mentioning, both in 1930 and 1932. In contrast, the various centre parties and the conservative right lost very many voters to the NSDAP (cf. Falter, 1979). Thus even the indicator of a voter's class origins does not support the atomization hypothesis.

In this connection we must finally test whether NSDAP voters as a whole were socially more isolated than the voters of the established parties, as the mass-theory attempt at explanation would imply. But in this instance too the available empirical evidence contradicts rather than supports the mass-theory approach. Thus, for example, the American NS researcher Waldman (1973, p. 214) shows that a smaller party identification, which at an aggregate level must appear in the form of large fluctuation rates from election to election, cannot be made responsible for the NS election successes (cf. also Shiveley, 1972). Something similar is true for the connection between unemployment and NS election support mooted by some mass-theoreticians; according to which unemployed persons, particularly if they have been out of work for long, are not integrated into either the workplace environment nor, by reason of their hopeless economic position, are they able financially and psychologically to maintain social ties (Neumann, 1942, p. 101 ff.; cf. Hagtvet, 1980); thus they become increasingly isolated and in the view of the mass-theoreticians, an easy prey to National Socialism. But the empirical studies of NS electoral behaviour available today show that the NSDAP obtained an increase in support worth mentioning only from out-of-work executives and government employees but not from unemployed workers who rather supported the KPD (Waldman, 1973, p.70; Childers, 1976).

Finally, it may be assumed that the level of social isolation and anomie should be strongest in the large cities where modern industrial society is most developed and where inflation and the effects of the world economic crisis had the greatest effect (cf. Hagtvet, 1980). But all election analyses of National Socialism are agreed that the NSDAP obtained its greatest success in the rural areas and in the small and medium sized towns; in the larger citites and metropolitan centres of the Reich it obtained a less than average share of the votes. This negative correlation between NSDAP election success and number of inhabitants remains constant even if one takes account of other influential factors on NS electoral behaviour (cf. Hagtvet, 1980). But in the rural areas and especially in the smaller towns the network of intermediary ties was

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

extraordinarily dense. Both the Protestant and the Catholic rural population was extensively organized according to occupation, and the keenness of the small-town German to join a club has become proverbial, so that even this perspective gives no support to the atomization hypothesis.

The last assertion of mass theory which I want to discuss in this section is the assertion implicit in the atomization hypothesis, that members of the Catholic church and of trade unions were less susceptible to National Socialism. It cannot be denied that after 1928 National Socialism was less successful in the Catholic areas of the Reich than in the Protestant rural areas and communities, as contemporary election analyses had already shown. The Catholic section of the population remained loyal to the traditional parties of political Catholicism until 1933, i.e. the Zentrum and the Bavarian Volkspartei, although even the normally unshakeable "bastion of the centre" was subject to erosion, which conventional global analyses all too easily tended to miss (cf. Waldman, 1973, p. 109 ff.).

The relevant literature is also largely agreed that membership of trade unions tended to have an immunizing function; trade unionists — by which are meant generally the socialist unions — are said to have voted NSDAP less frequently than people not organized in a trade union (cf. Kappmeier, 1970, p. 87 ff.). Recently, this thesis of the immunizing function of a trade union affiliation, which was again activated in connection with the NPD (Winkler, 1976, p. 2), has been seriously put in doubt. It was seen that, after 1967, not only was membership of a trade union not a hindrance to voting for the NPD but that between 1930 and 1933 the inverse ratio between NSDAP voters and the level of locally resident trade unionists posited by mass theory and class theory with regard to NS voting behaviour could not be empirically supported; in fact in the large cities of the Reich a small positive correlation between the two variables could be determined (Liepelt, 1967; Falter, 1980b). However, without some additional information this does not justify the conclusion that trade unionists not only were not resistant to but were in fact susceptible to National Socialism. In any case, today we are able to say that on the basis of the data now available this thesis of the immunization effect of trade union membership vis-à-vis the fascist contagion cannot be supported and for this reason, at least for the present, we must also

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

refute this assumption of the mass-theory approach (cf. Waldman, 1973, pp. 181-191; Falter, 1980b).

It was the task of this section firstly to discuss Reinhard Bendix's methodology and certain background assumptions and secondly to make a critical examination of some of the mass-theoretical assumptions which proceed from and go beyond him. The discussion of Bendix's arguments shows that his hypothesis could only partly be supported and reconstructed on the basis of his calculations of voting shifts. The analysis of some of the additional assumptions, not necessarily Bendix's own, at least not in that form but implicit in his argument, further showed that the atomization hypothesis of the mass-theory approach was also highly questionable. There is a considerably larger body of empirical evidence that contradicts this hypothesis than there is to support it. In view of this criticism the mass-theory approach must be considered to have failed just as did the class-theory attempt at explanation. But since, as we have said, we can arrive at empirically correct results in a logically meaningful way even on the basis of false premises, the following concluding section will be devoted to an examination of Bendix's and Lipset's hypotheses on the various waves of voters who moved to support National Socialism.

6. Hypotheses on the various waves of voters who moved to support National Socialism

The discussion so far has shown that none of the positions analyzed is without shortcomings; most of the basic and supporting assumptions cannot be empirically supported, are open to question or need to be amplified. For this reason both approaches are of little use as an *explanation* of NS electoral behaviour in their present form. But this does not necessarily mean that the arguments of both approaches concerning the various movements of voters to National Socialism and the social basis of National Socialism are also wrong. The concluding section of this study will, therefore, be concerned with the question as to how far Lipset's and Bendix's assertions concerning the various waves of support for National Socialism and the social composition of the NS electorate are correct.

For this purpose I have made a synopsis of the various basic and supporting assumptions, the various core hypotheses and the results of our discussion so far. This confrontation of both positions clear-

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

Table 1

	The class-theory attempt at explanation of Seymour Martin Lipset	**The mass-theory attempt at explanation of Reinhard Bendix et al.**
Basic assumptions	a) theory of class and interest determinism: social structure, political ideology and party system correlate; b) each social stratum has its own democratic and extremist forms of political expression; c) Fascism as the extremism of the centre throws up the same ideology as does liberalism (but with the assumption of a glorification of the state). d) modernization theory à la Trow.	a) atomization and isolation of individuals and social groups resp. lead to massification and political extremism; b) extremism arises by stages: first a loosening of old political and social ties; resulting in a loss of direction and then a rapid move to extremism; c) membership of large pre-political organizations (churches, trades unions, etc.) has a braking effect on extremism.
Supporting assumptions and unnecessary additional hypotheses	a) supporters of the DNVP come from the upper class (—) b) the Wirtschaftspartei is a bourgeois-liberal party (—) c) electorate of the DDP and DVP originates largely from the same social class (?) d) SPD a purely workers' party and immune to NS (—) e) regional parties are middle-class parties (?) f) liberal parties preferred by males (—) g) inference from NSDAP membership to its voters (—) h) NSDAP success primarily in rural areas (+)	a) possible to discriminate voter shifts on basis of global analysis (—) b) Zentrum and middle-class parties win over 1 mill. votes in 1930 (—) c) nationalist parties lose 1.5 mill. votes in 1932 (—) d) in 1930 ff. previous non-voters and new young voters vote consistently (—) e) Weimar society an atomized society (—) f) NSDAP voters had weaker party ties (to other groups) (—) g) NSDAP voters were less organized/socially more isolated than others (—)

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

Core hypotheses 1930	a) NSDAP rise the result of losses by liberal middle-class parties and regional parties, but not of DNVP-losses. b) NSDAP voters primarily self-employed, middle-class.	a) NSDAP rise result of increased electoral participation, DNVP losses and preference by new young voters. b) NSDAP voters not characterized by particular socio-structural profile.
July 1932	NSDAP rise result of a further decline by centre parties and probably increased support by non-voters but not DNVP voters.	a) NSDAP rise result of continued increase in electoral participation and losses of the right. b) also losses by centre parties (3.7 mill.).
Nov. 1932	Lipset makes no statements	a) NSDAP losses result of decline in electoral participation. b) NSDAP losses result of increased strength of DNVP.
1933	a) NSDAP gains result of rise in electoral participation. b) makes no statements concerning other sources of NS rise	a) NSDAP gains result of increased electoral participation. b) no further indications of other sources of NSDAP gains.
Conclusion	a) attempt at explanation must be considered failed in view of questionable assumptions; b) in their positive assertions core hypotheses are largely correct but not in their negative assertions (e.g., as regards the DNVP and non-voters)	a) as with Lipset, argumentation on voter movements in part not replicable; b) core hypotheses partly true in their positive assertions but not in their negative ones (e.g., as regards socio-structural profile)

ly shows that both Lipset and Bendix proceed from a multiple-stage theory of voting support for National Socialism. Both are in agreement that NSDAP gains were the result of desertions by previous voters of the bourgeois centre parties as well as of support from previous non-voters. There is disagreement over the timing of this movement towards the NSDAP by both groups of voters and over the affinity for the NSDAP on the part of the nationalistic voters of the right, particularly the DNVP. It is also clear that both positions are agreed on the analysis of the elections of November 1932 and March 1933, for although Lipset makes no assertions concerning the November 1932 elections we may indirectly conclude his view of this election.

It seems that Lipset and Bendix are in agreement even over the July election of 1932, "seemingly" because Lipset makes no explicit statements about that election but merely maintains that only *after* 1930 was the NSDAP successful with the unpolitical voters, i.e. those who had not previously voted. They only disagree about the former DNVP voters and their role in the July elections of 1932.

The differences between the class-theory and mass-theory explanations, therefore, are concerned with the question of how the rapid rise in NSDAP support in the Reichstag elections in 1930 can be accounted for: by the radicalization of middle-class voters who had previously supported the bourgeois liberal parties or regional groups as Lipset assumes or, by a flood of former non-voters and young new voters having no firm social profile as well as by the radicalization of former DNVP voters, as Bendix suspects.

In the following section, therefore, we must ask two questions: what was the party-political history of NSDAP voters from 1930-1933 and what was their social background? The answers to these questions show that the waves of voters shifting their allegiance to the NSDAP were considerably more complex than both positions presuppose. In 1930 the NSDAP was able to profit both from the increased electoral participation and from the losses of the smaller centre parties as well as the decline of the DNVP. According to the American political scientist Theodore Meckstroth, in 1928 every third NSDAP voter still supported either the DDP, the DVP or the Wirtschaftspartei, that is to say he voted for one of the groups whom Lipset designates the "liberal middle-class parties".[20] Almost every fourth NSDAP voter came from the ranks of previous non-voters and every fifth NSDAP voter in 1930 had

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

voted for the DNVP in 1928. Almost 10 percent of NSDAP voters in 1930 came from the ranks of the SPD.

A very similar correlation exists between the various new NSDAP voters in the July elections of 1932. However, the NSDAP was now able to make inroads into the electorates of the various regional and agrarian splinter parties who in 1930 had to some extent been able to resist the National Socialists (cf. Table 2).

Table 2
NSDAP increased votes 1928-1932
(in percentage of NSDAP votes in the second election)

Group	1928-1930	1930-1932(J)	1932(J)-1932(N)
Non-voters	23	11	0
KPD	0	0	0
SPD	9	6	0
Zentrum/BVP	0	0	0
Bourgeois centre	31	14	0
DNVP	21	6	0
Smaller parties	2	12	0
NSDAP	14	41	100

Some 23 percent NSDAP voters in 1930 had not voted in 1928, 9 percent had voted SPD, 21 percent for the DNVP, etc. In the figures by Meckstroth for the 1930/1932 elections some 10 percent are missing which cannot be retrieved on the basis of his figures. (For source and legend, see Table 4.)

From the perspective of the various parties affected it is clear that about a third of all liberal middle-class voters (the "bourgeois centre"), a further 25 percent of all DNVP voters, and about a seventh of all previous non-voters in 1928 voted for the NSDAP in the Reichstag elections of 1930. In the July election of 1932 the NSDAP made a relatively even larger inroad into the electorates of these parties than in 1930. Only the two Catholic parties and the KPD were able to show that, statistically speaking, they had suffered no losses to the NSDAP. In contrast the SPD in 1930 lost almost 500,000 and in 1932 even 600,000 votes to the NSDAP (cf. Table 3). The available statistics do not allow us to determine whether these were SPD voters who did not come from a working-class background. What is certain is that neither Lipset nor Bendix are correct in their assertions on the party-political history of

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

NSDAP voters. Neither their assumption that the waves of new support for the NSDAP in 1930 and 1932 were radically different is correct nor is it true that the previous non-voters and new young voters as well as former DNVP supporters (Bendix) or the former supporters of the middle-class parties (Lipset) constituted the main contingent of NSDAP new voters in 1930 or 1932. More thoroughgoing analyses have shown that in both elections not only the NSDAP but all political forces were able to profit from the increased electoral participation including parties who in the final tally had to be content with considerable losses (cf. Meckstroth, 1971, p. 178).

Table 3
Floating voters in favour of the NSDAP
(in percentage of voters of the various groups at the first election)

Group	1928-1930	1930-1932(J)	1932(J)-1932(N)
Non-voters	14	18	1
KPD	0	0	0
SPD	5	7	1
Zentrum/BVP	0	0	0
Bourgeois centre	34	43	0
DNVP	26	33	0
Smaller parties	4	46	0
NSDAP	100	86	87

In the Reichstag election of 1930 something like 14 percent non-voters in 1928, 34 percent voters of the "bourgeois centre" (DDP, DVP, Wirtschaftspartei), 5 percent of SPD voters, etc. of 1928, voted NSDAP.

Consequently, neither Lipset's nor Bendix's ideas concerning the party-political background of new NS voters in 1930 and 1932 (July) are correct. Lipset is right in so far as he assigned the larger share of NSDAP success to former supporters of the middle-class parties. But his assumption that the NSDAP was only in 1932 able to attract worthwhile support from the previous non-voters is wide of the mark as is the claim that the NSDAP was not able in 1930 or 1932 to profit from the deserting DNVP voters. In contrast Bendix has a better evaluation of the share of non-voters and former DNVP voters in the rise of the NSDAP than does Lipset but he is

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

deceived as far as former voters of the middle-class parties are concerned.

But his hypothesis that the NSDAP losses of November 1932 were primarily caused by renewed loyalty on the part of former voters of the right for the DNVP is supported by the results of historical research on election results (cf. Table 4) (cf. Meckstroth, 1971, p. 139). This is also true for the view of both positions that the renewed upswing of the NSDAP in 1933 was primarily the result of a renewed increase in electoral participation (cf. Waldman, 1973, tables 52-54). For this reason Lipset's and Bendix's positive assertions concerning the party-political background of the new NSDAP supporters are largely correct but their negative assertions on the other hand, i.e. what they exclude, are not in accord with present-day findings (cf. Wernett, 1974, p.39; Waldman, 1973, p. 252).

Table 4
NSDAP losses between 1928-1932
(in percentage of votes at the first election)

Group	1928-1930	1930-1932(J)	1932(J)-1932(N)
Non-voters	0	0	2
KPD	0	0	0
SPD	0	4	0
Zentrum/BVP	0	0	0
Bourgeois centre	0	2	4
DNVP	0	7	6
Smaller parties	0	0	1
NSDAP	100	86	87

4 percent of NSDAP voters in 1930 voted SPD in July 1932, 7 percent went over to DNVP etc.

Source: Theodore Meckstroth, 1972, p. 177 ff; the figures in Tables 2-4 represent the so-called transition probabilities in voting between various pairs of elections; they are calculated on the basis of an ecological regression analysis.

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

What then of their differing hypotheses on the social basis of the NSDAP voters? Was the NSDAP primarily an expression of fear of a crisis by the middle classes as Lipset maintains, or was it a result of social isolation and atomization, that is an expression of general political and social restlessness without clear links to particular social strata as the mass theoreticians assert?

All of the recent studies on the social basis of National Socialism are agreed that as early as 1930 the NSDAP was supported especially by members of the Protestant middle classes and by the rural population in northern, central and east Germany.[21] It was supported very strongly in small communities and towns with a high percentage of self-employed individuals in the tradesmen and shopkeeper class. In Catholic regions in the large cities and in towns and areas characterized by large industry on the other hand, it obtained only less than average levels of support. And these tendencies were even strengthened between 1930 and 1933. Of the approximately 3 to 4 million workers who voted NSDAP in 1932 the majority came from small, middle-class businesses, local supply companies and the commercial sector; home-based workers also appear to have often voted NSDAP. But against this, as has been mentioned, the NSDAP was not able to attract unemployed workers to any large extent.

There is, therefore, an undeniable preponderance of Protestant, middle-class NSDAP following. With a percentage share of just 50 percent of the total population in 1930, the old and the new middle classes, as well as the proletarianized intermediate stratum, who despite their middle-class self-consciousness nevertheless lived in the same conditions as the industrial proletariat, and in particular the Protestant rural population, made up some two-thirds of NSDAP support in 1932.

To that extent the results of the studies here evaluated appear to support Lipset's position rather than that of Reinhard Bendix. On the other hand the percentage of workers (among whom as adherents of the class theory one must strictly speaking also number the proletarianized elements of the middle class) is too large to enable National Socialism to be unreservedly characterized as a middle-class movement. Rather it was, more than the other parties, a movement embracing all classes of society but with an obvious preponderance of middle-class voters, a movement whose attraction only the strongly Catholic and industrial workers in the large industries could resist till the end.

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

In this respect too it is possible that the class-theory and the mass-theory approach each "explain" only a part of the phenomenon but not the totality of NS electoral behaviour. In the formulations of Lipset and Bendix which have been presented, however, they advance attempts at explanation most of whose premises have been shown to be false or open to question and whose hypotheses are partly apposite but which partly do not agree with the data. It is, of course, quite possible that an empirically sound theory capable of explaining NS electoral behaviour would need to incorporate elements of both attempts at explanation. Thus, for instance, it is possible that members of the middle class voted NSDAP out of quite different motives and influenced by totally different factors than sections of the working population, and further, that both atomized, politically disorientated individuals as well as economically or socially threatened middle-class voters shifted allegiance to the NSDAP. But the attempts at explanation here under discussion each try to make absolute a single aspect which they then put into the limelight in order to overshadow other, complementary aspects of the same phenomenon. Future theories of National Socialist electoral behaviour should be not only more all embracing but also built on a better foundation as regards their premises than the attempts which have here been examined.

Jürgen W. Falter (born 1944) is Associate Professor of Political Sociology and Methodology of the Social Sciences at the German Military University (Hochschule der Bundeswehr) in Munich, and presently Visiting Professor at the Johns Hopkins University's Center in Bologna, Italy. He is engaged in two research projects on voting behaviour in the Weimar Republic with particular emphasis on the social and political origins of National Socialist voters. Author of numerous articles on German voting behaviour, multilevel analysis (cf. *Social Science Information* 17 (6), 1978) and the origins of National Socialist voters, he has also published several books: *Faktoren der Wahlentscheidung* (1973); *Zur Kausalanalyse von Kontingenztafeln* (1980); *Der Behavioralismusstreit in der amerikanischen Politikwissenschaft* (forthcoming; English ed. in preparation). *Author's address*: Valleystrasse 34, 8 Munich 70, Federal Republic of Germany.

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

Annex

Major parties in the Weimar Republic
(Order: From right to left. Lipset's expressions in italics)

NSDAP — Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (*fascist party*)
DNVP — Deutschnationale Volkspartei (*conservative party*): anti-republican; predominantly anti-democratic and anti-semitic
DVP — Deutsche Volkspartei (*right liberal*): right-wing; predominantly anti-republican; partly anti-semitic
BVP — Bayerische Volkspartei (*Catholic*): Bavarian party of conservative and partly monarchistic Catholicism
Zentrum — Deutsche Zentrumspartei (*Catholic*): only outside of Bavaria; catch-all party; predominantly republican and democratic
DDP — Deutsche Demokratische Partei (*left liberal*): since 1930: Deutsche Staatspartei
SPD — Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (*socialist*): democratic; republican; mildly marxist
KPD — Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (*communist*): anti-democratic; orthodox marxism

Deutschnationaler Handlungsgehilfenverband (union of employees in retail and wholesale stores): biggest association of salaried employees during the Weimar Republic; strongly status-oriented, in strong opposition to the socialist workers' unions; nationalist, partly anti-semitic; politically close to DNVP and DVP.

Notes

1. For an explication of the names of parties, their abbreviations and the designations used by Lipset, see Annex.

2. The fact that Lipset (1960, p. 138) also classes the Wirtschaftspartei as a liberal centre party is more of a minor flaw in his argument because he is here primarily concerned with the middle-class basis of NS electoral success. In fact, even though from the point of view of its social make-up the Wirtschaftspartei was a plainly middle-class interest grouping, from the perspective of its programme it was rather a nationalistic, socially conservative force which stood for anything but liberal policies; it was primarily composed of small businessmen and tradesmen (cf. Cameron, 1977; Schumacher, 1972; Winkler, 1972, p. 179 ff.)

3. Membership of the middle class (or better, the middle strata) is, for most class theoreticians, of whom Lipset and Geiger are only the most prominent, characterized by possession of smaller businesses, i.e. it is related to the self-employed in commerce, skilled trades and agriculture. A member of the middle class so designated brings not only his capital into the business but also his personal labour. He has only a few employees, if any. Because of the small size of the business he is exceptionally

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

vulnerable to economic crises. Since Geiger, the so-called new middle class has been included in this category: it does not possess the means of production or distribution and is not independent. Its inclusion in the middle class is the result of the status accorded to the practised profession and of its life-style. As a result, in the mind of its membership — salaried employees and civil servants — status rather than economic interests tends to predominate. For different reasons, both segments of the middle class (according to Geiger) tend to adhere to a hierarchical view of society and state (cf. Wernette, 1974, chap. 2).

4. Important representatives of the mass-theory approach are: Lederer, 1940; Arendt, 1950; Kornhauser, 1959; Neuman, 1942. For an extensive analysis of these four authors, see Hagtvet, 1980. For a general sketch of the mass-theory position, see Wernette, 1974 and Waldman, 1973. Representatives of the class-theory or better, stratification-theory approach, besides Lipset (1960), are Geiger, Heberle, Pratt, Parsons, Lasswell and others.

5. Bendix makes no assertions on this point whatever; Wernette (1974, p. 29) points out that there are no differences in the evaluation of the November 1932 and the March 1933 elections between the mass-theory and the class-theory positions.

6. Lipset discusses this implicit basic presupposition in his book *Political man* (1960, p. 232, 239, 252) and in his "The psychology of voting . . ." (with others), 1954, p. 1124 ff.

7. Cf. Scheuch, 1972, p. 906; Miller, 1958; Falter, 1972, p. 353; Narr and Naschold, 1971, p. 168 ff. To bring it to a common denominator: the interest-theoretical position, which relies heavily on the socio-economic determinants of political behaviour, throws up too many irregularities to be able to prove the regularity it posits; too many workers vote for conservative parties, too many salaried employees are members of social democratic or socialist organizations to permit the assumption that there is a common identity between socio-economically determined "interests" and political behaviour.

8. Cf. Childers (1976, p. 40 ff.) whose results for towns larger than 15,000 inhabitants do not, however, yield a unanimous picture for both parties.

9. For such a general attempt at explanation of particularly Catholic electoral behaviour see, more recently, Pappi, 1976, p. 476 ff.; Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), 1967; Burnham, 1972.

10. On this point the literature is not without contradictions. See Waldman, 1973, p. 232 ff., and especially Madden, 1976.

11. These remarks are not intended to cast doubt on the fact that the middle strata did provide, both relatively and in absolute terms, the largest share of NSDAP supporters, although one must be careful of pushing this tendency so far as to declare the NSDAP to have been a purely middle-class phenomenon as far as its electoral and membership basis is concerned, and to ignore the millions of workers whose votes the NSDAP was able to make its own (as for example, Kühnl, in *Faschismustheorien* [1979, p. 90 ff. and p. 97] has done). Lipset, too, appears to underestimate the level of working-class voters among NSDAP supporters.

12. Even before Robinson (1950, p. 351 ff.), Cohen and Nagel (1934, p. 377) and Thorndike (1939, p. 122 ff.) pointed out the danger of this ecological fallacy.

13. I include: Landbund, Landvolkpartei, Deutsche Bauernpartei, Volksrechtspartei, DVP, Wirtschaftspartei and Deutsch-Hannoversche Partei.

14. One of the participants in my Seminar on "Attempts at explanation of NS electoral behaviour", J. Mai, finally solved the puzzle as follows:

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

Only if one treats the DVP, and naturally the DNVP, as the only (!) two nationalistic parties, the DDP as a "normal" (i.e. a large or medium seized) middle-class party and reduces the Wirtschaftspartei, the moderate right-of-centre Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst and the Volkskonservativen, as well as all agrarian and regional parties to "small middle-class parties", do Bendix's sums add up, even though this is at the expense of substantially founded party groupings. However, it requires considerable nerve to handle historical material in this cavalier fashion.

15. Such a calculation is, naturally, absurd, since it proceeds from the fiction that *all* young voters including, for example, the Catholic ones who were traditionally loyal to the Zentrum, support one or other of the two extremes. This assumption has as little to do with reality as, for example, the contention that all non-voters or all those who deserted the DNVP, moved to support the NSDAP. Such coarse hypotheses are a typical result of global analysis which tends towards distorted outcomes as criticized above.

16. A number of former DNVP politicians, headed by the then Executive President of the Reichs-Landbund and Minister in Brüning's Cabinet, M. Schiele, shortly before the Reichstag elections of 1930, joined the Christlich-Nationale Bauern- und Landvolkpartei, which presumably motivated a number of former DNVP voters to copy this step on their ballot papers.

17. Other figures found in Striefler (1946, p. 16 ff.) who speaks of 3.2 mill. potential young voters (compared to Bendix's 1.7 mill.). Bendix calculates too small a figure since, in contrast to Striefler, according to his own admission he does not subtract those entitled to vote who died between 1928 and 1930. Incidentally, both authors ignore the traditionally low turnout for young voters which is generally far below the average for all those entitled to vote. However, Bendix makes up for this by his very low figures for those entitled to vote for the first time in 1930.

18. The available evidence concerning the participation of young voters in the Reichstag elections of 1930 is very sparse, but some of the special counts indicate that in 1930 the young voters participated in greater numbers than at earlier elections. cf. Tingsten, 1937, p. 97 ff.

19. Cf. Hagtvet (1980) who provides an extensive (critical) representation and discussion of the major mass-theoretical attempts at explanation of NS electoral success and who points to a number of internal shortcomings and empirical problems, especially with Kornhauser's position (cf. Kornhauser, 1959). Nevertheless, Hagtvet does not take account of the most recent studies on NS electoral behaviour, i.e. Meckstroth, Wernette, Waldman and Childers, which I have evaluated in my essay "Wer verhalf der NSDAP zum Sieg?".

20. This is possibly a so-called apparent non-correlation which disappears, i.e. where a statistical association appears if the distorting variables responsible for the non-correlation are held constant, that is to say, after their effect is eliminated. As long as this cannot be achieved, we are left only with Waldman's results. See also Falter, 1980a.

21. Most of the newer dissertations cited, with the possible exception of Childer's thesis, are based on a data set distributed by the ICPSR in Ann Arbor. Unfortunately, this data set contains many minor and a considerable number of major mistakes such as a large number of wrong figures, the inclusion of already counted and the exclusion of geographical units (counties, towns and city districts etc.). Furthermore, it does not cope adequately with the rather awkward aggregation problems created by a multiplicity of administrative reforms in Weimar Germany. An improv-

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

ed data set should be available from the author in the near future. My own preliminary analyses do show, however, that these shortcomings of the data might not have resulted in too serious distortions. But there is one further problem that has been overlooked in most of the analyses cited in this article: the approximately 1,000 geographical units included in the ICPSR data set show considerable variation in size; they range from about 20,000 voters to more than 1 million voters. Using percentages, as is generally done, may lead to severely biased results if there are no weighting factors included for each unit. I hope within the next three years to be able to report on some comparisons between those earlier analyses and my own results based on an improved and extended data set and on adequate weighting procedures. Finally, it should be pointed out that the results of the ecological regressions given in Tables 2-4 may be biased in the case of non-linear (i.e. contextual) effects.

References

Arendt, H.
1950 *Origins of totalitarianism*. New York.

Bendix, R.
1952 "Social stratification and political power", *American Political Science Review* 46 (3): 357-375.

Bolte, K.M.; Kappe, D.; Neidhart, F.
1966 *Soziale Schichtung*. Opladen.

Bracher, K.D.
1955 *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie*. Villingen.

Bremme, G.
1956 *Die politische Rolle der Frau in Deutschland*. Göttingen.

Burnham, W.D.
1972 "Political immunisation and political confessionalism: The United States and Weimar Germany", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 3 (1): 1-30.

Cameron, D.R.
1977 "The mobilization of nazism: Middle-class party or catch-all party?". (Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Social Science History Association, Oct.)

Childers, T.
1976 "The social bases of the national socialist vote", *Journal of Contemporary History* 11 (4): 17-42.

Cohen, M.; Nagel, E.
1934 *An introduction to logic and scientific method*. New York.

Diederich, N.
1973 "Zur Mitgliederstruktur von CDU and SPD", in: J. Dittberner; R. Ebbighausen (eds.). *Parteiensystem in der Legitimationskrise*. Opladen.

Duverger, M.
1955 *La participation des femmes à la vie politique*. Paris.

Falter, J.W.
1972 "Ein Modell zur Analyse individuellen politischen Verhaltens", *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*: 13 (4): 547-566

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

1979 "Wer verhalf der NSDAP zum Sieg?", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Das Parlament)* B28-29/79, July: 3-21.

1980a "Wählerbewegungen zum Nationalsozialismus 1924-1933 — Methodische Probleme, empirisch abgesicherte Erkenntnisse, offene Fragen", pp.159-202 in: O. Büsch (ed). *Wählerbewegungen in der europäischen Geschichte*. Berlin.

1980b "Wählerwanderungen vom Liberalismus zu rechtsextremen Parteien. Ein Forschungsbericht am Beispiel des NSDAP-Aufstiegs 1928-1933 und der NPD-Erfolge 1965-1970", pp. 92-124 in: L. Albertin (ed.). *Der Liberalismus im politischen System Deutschlands*. Göttingen.

Franz, G.

1957 *Die politischen Wahlen in Niedersachsen, 1907 bis 1949*. Bremen.

Geiger, T.

1930 "Panik im Mittelstand", *Die Arbeit*: 637-654.

1932 *Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes*. Stuttgart.

1953 *Ideologie und Wahrheit. Eine soziologische Kritik des Denkens*. Stuttgart.

Gerth, H.

1952 "The nazi party: Its leadership and composition", in: R.K. Merton et al. (eds.). *Reader in bureaucracy*. Glencoe, Ill. (First published 1940.)

Hagmann, M.

1946 *Der Weg ins Verhängnis. Reichstagwahlergebnisse 1919-1933*. Munich.

Hagtvet, B.

1980 "The theory of mass society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic: A re-examination", pp. 66-117 in: Hagtvet et al. (eds.). *Who were the fascists?: The social roots of European fascism*. Oslo/New York.

Hamilton, R.

1981 *The bases of national socialism — The electoral support for Hitler, 1924-1932*. Princeton, NJ.

Heberle, R.

1945 *From democracy to nazism*. Baton Rouge, Louisiana. (Expanded German ed.: *Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus*. Stuttgart, 1963.)

Hermens, F.A.

1933 *Demokratie und Wahlrecht*. Paderborn.

Hirsch-Weber, W.

1969 *Politik als Interessenkonflikt*. Stuttgart.

Kappmeier, W.

1970 "Konfession und Wahlverhalten am Beispiel der Landtagswahl 1970". Saarbrücken, universität des Saarlandes. (Staatsexamenarbeit im Fache Sozialkunde, unpubl.)

Kornhauser, W.S.

1959 *The politics of mass society*. Glencoe, Ill.

Kühnl, R.

1979 *Faschismustheorien*. Reinbeck.

Lederer, E.

1940 *State of the masses*. New York.

Liepelt, K.

1967 "Anhänger der neuen Rechtspartie. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion über das

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

Wählerreservoir der NPD", *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 8 (2): 237-271.

Lipset, S.M.
1960 " 'Fascism' — Left, right and centre", pp. 127-179 in: *Political man. The social bases of politics*. Garden City.

Lipset, S.M. et al.
1954 "The psychology of voting: An analysis of political behavior", pp. 1124ff., in: G. Lindzey (ed.). *Handbook of social psychology*. Reading, Mass.

Lipset, S.M.; Rokkan, S. (eds.)
1967 "Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: An introduction", pp. 1-64 in: *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives*. New York.

Loomis, C.P.; Beegle, J.A.
1946 "The spread of German nazism in rural areas", *American Sociological Review* 11(6): 724-734.

Madden, J.P.
1976 *The social composition of the nazi party, 1919-1930*. Norman, Okla., University of Oklahoma. (PhD diss.)

Meckstroth, T.
1971 *Conditions of partisan realignments: A study of electoral change*. Minneapolis, Min., University of Minnesota, Dept. of Political Science. (PhD diss.)

Miller, W.E.
1958 "The socio-economic analysis of political behavior", *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 2.

Narr, W.D.; Naschold, F.
1971 *Theorie der Demokratie*. Stuttgart.

Neisser, H.
1930-1931 "Sozialstatistische Analyse der Wahlergebnisse", *Die Arbeit:* 7 (10).

Neumann, S.
1942 *Permanent revolution*. New York.
1956 "Germany: Changing patterns and lasting problems", pp. 354-392 in: *Modern political parties*. Chicago, Ill.

Pappi, F.U.
1976 "Sozialstruktur und politische Konflikte in der Bundesrepublik. Individual- und Kontext- Analyse der Wahlentscheidung". Cologne. (Habilitationsschrift, unpubl.)

Pratt, S.
1948 "The social basis of nazism and communism in urban Germany". East Lansing, Mich., Michigan State University, Dept. of Sociology. (Unpubl. MA thesis.)

Pulzer, P.
1964 *The rise of political anti-semitism in Germany and Austria*. New York.

Robinson, W.S.
1950 "Ecological correlations and the behavior of individuals", *American Sociological Review* 15: 351-357.

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016

Scheuch, E.K.
1972 "Wählerverhalten", pp. 906-908 in: W. Bernsdorf (ed.). *Wörterbuch der Soziologie*. Frankfurt.
Schmollinger, H.W.; Stöss, R.
1976 "Sozialstruktur und Parteiensystem", pp. 217-234 in: D. Staritz (ed.). *Das Parteiensystem in der Bundesrepublik*. Opladen.
Schubert, G.
1960 *The public interest. A critique of the theory of a political concept*. Glencoe, Ill.
Schumacher, M.
1972 *Mittelstandsfront und Republik. Die Wirtschaftspartei-Reichspartei des deutschen Mittelstandes 1919-1933*. Düsseldorf.
1974 "Hausbesitz, Mittelstand und Wirtschaftspartei in der Weimarer Republik", pp. 823-835 in: H. Mommsen; D. Petzina; B. Weisbrod (eds.). *Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik*. Düsseldorf.
Seipel, W.
1933 "Entwicklung der nationalsozialistischen Bauernbewegung in Hessen", pp. 135 ff., in: E. Schmahl. *Entwicklung der völkischen Bewegung*. Giessen.
Shiveley, W.P.
1972 "Party choice and voting stability: The Weimar case", *American Political Science Review* 66 (4): 1203-1225.
Striefler, H.
1946 *Deutsche Wahlen in Bildern und Zahlen*. Düsseldorf.
Thorndike, E.L.
1939 "On the fallacy of imputing the correlations found for groups to the individuals composing them", *American Journal of Psychology* 52: 122-124.
Tingsten, H.
1937 *Political behaviour: Studies in election statistics*. London.
Waldman, L.K.
1973 *Models lof mass movements. The case of the Nazis*. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago. (PhD diss.)
Wernette, R.D.
1974 *Political violence and German elections*. Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan. (PhD diss.)
Winkler, H.A.
1972a "Extremismus der Mitte? Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung", *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 20 (2).
1972b *Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus*. Cologne.
1976 "German society, Hitler and the illusion of restoration 1930-1933", *Journal of Contemporary History* 11 (4): 1-15.

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 15, 2016