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Cross-National Policy Networks and the State: EU Social Policy Transfer to Poland and Hungary

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This article challenges optimistic claims about the power of nonstate actors in cross-border policy networks. In a pilot study of two most-likely cases, the article examines the social policy network between the European Union and Poland and Hungary prior to accession. Two dimensions guide the analysis: Whether states act as gatekeepers and whether national borders restrict communications. The article shows that while labor and employers easily communicate with the EU, contacts fail to cut across national borders. Network data show that the EU significantly controls the flow of communication, a fact that runs counter to the notion of networks as fluid entities that enable all actors to link freely with others. Governments and the EU have an interest in network construction and control. Only by tracking network contacts empirically, the article argues, are we able to estimate the capacities and limits of nonstate actors in transnational politics.

KEY WORDS ♦ cross-border politics ♦ nonstate actors ♦ policy networks ♦ regional integration ♦ transnationalism

Introduction

To what extent is interest representation in the European Union (EU) transnational? This article presents a pilot study to examine two dimensions of transnationalism in a limited but most-likely case setting: First, to what extent do governments act as gatekeepers in EU policy transfer? If interest representation in the EU were indeed transnational, then we would expect governments not to play any significant role as gatekeepers in policy transfer negotiations. Second, to what extent do national boundaries shape interest

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representation in EU policy transfer? In a transnational policy network, we would expect policy-related communications to cross national boundaries rather than be segmented by them.

I focus on EU social policy as a most likely case of a transnational policy network capable of producing dense cross-border networks among diverse sets of actors. If transnational interest representation exists anywhere, we should expect to find it in the EU, given its unique degree of regional integration. Moreover, EU social policy grants certain nonstate actors (i.e. employer organizations and trade unions) a specific role in policy-making and implementation. Concretely, European social dialogue is a procedure for peak-level consultations between European-level employer and labor organizations with the option of concluding agreements that will lead to Community legislation.[1] Such legislation may then be implemented in the member states by labor and employers themselves or through legal transposition. Social dialogue is also an element in the European Employment Strategy, at both the European and national levels. The social partners regularly consult with the Council and the Commission in the Standing Committee on Employment and with the heads of state or government of the past, current, and future EU presidencies. Furthermore, in order to discuss macroeconomic policy, the social partners meet regularly with the Commission, member state economic and finance ministers, and the European Central Bank.

In this article, I develop a typology of transnational policy networks and use social network analysis to examine preliminary evidence of a transnational policy network drawn specifically from accession preparations of Poland and Hungary. Accession preparations constitute a special scenario for the development of a cross-border policy network. On one hand, given that such a network takes time to evolve and accession negotiations were primarily intergovernmental, we would expect both border effects and states' gatekeeping function to be stronger than in a network among member states. On the other hand, however, accession conditionality required the adoption of EU rules across all policy fields, including social dialogue, giving candidates an incentive to include the social partners in policy adoption and implementation.

My argument proceeds as follows: I begin by relating my research to recent literature on transnational advocacy and policy networks. Next, I conceptualize transnational networks along two dimensions that tend to be conflated in much of the debate on transnational politics: the extent to which territorial states shape network interactions and the ability of governments to mediate between intergovernmental organizations and nonstate actors. The bulk of the article assesses network interactions in Poland's and Hungary's adoption of EU social policy prior to accession. The study shows that at least in this instance, border effects constrained cross-border communications.

Relevance

My research addresses the role of states in transnational politics. Over the past decade, a vibrant literature on transnational activism has emerged that challenges the traditional state centricity of Neorealist, Neoliberal, and even some Constructivist approaches.[2] Likewise, theories of network governance in multilevel settings such as the EU highlight the blurring of distinctions between government and nonstate actors in given policy fields.

Transnational coalitions that rise above territorial states and link nonstate actors[3] with their peers in other countries as well as with governments and intergovernmental organizations have been credited with many accomplishments: Achieving international and domestic policy change, improving the status of societal representatives in their domestic settings, and creating a transnational political public (Boli and Thomas, 1999; Fox and Brown, 1998; Gordon and Turner, 2000; Guidry et al., 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al., 1999; Scholte, 2004; Smith et al., 1997; Young, 1997). Much has been made, for instance, of nonstate actors' ability to render the operating procedures of international financial institutions more transparent and accountable (Dingwerth, 2004; Edwards and Gaventa, 2001; Fox and Brown, 1998; Hulme and Edwards, 1997; Mason, 2004). Sectors that pose inherently transnational problems, such as environmental policy, are said to lend themselves to the influence of nonstate actors and their cross-border networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Wapner, 1997; Young, 1997). Some analysts have hailed the increasing density and visibility of cross-border advocacy coalitions as proof of an emergent transnational or even global civil society capable of exercising some measure of democratic control in an increasingly polycentric world (Archibugi, 2004; Edwards and Gaventa, 2001; Florini, 2000; Kaldor, 2003; Scholte, 2004, 2005). Others, skeptical about applying the liberal democratic paradigm on a global scale, see functional representation by non-territorial interest groups as a much-needed democratic corrective to cross-border policy-making (Bäckstrand, 2006). The sources of influence of these coalitions include mass membership, knowledge, money, job-creating capacity, access to international organizations and national governments, and moral authority (Josselin and Wallace, 2001: 253).

Like the literature on transnational contention and advocacy, theories of network governance emphasize cooperation between state and nonstate actors. The concept of policy networks is based on the idea that where policy-making and implementation are widely dispersed, intergovernmental, state and nonstate actors occupy overlapping spheres and organized interests permeate state institutions.[4] Policy networks are seen as relatively open, combining formal and informal exchange and conflict as well as cooperation (Benner et al., 2004; Bogason and Toonen, 1998; Kenis and Schneider,

1991; Pappi and Henning, 1999; Reinicke, 1999/2000; Rhodes, 1996, 1997). But whereas transnational advocacy coalitions are ostensibly delineated by substantive agreement, policy networks are demarcated by stakes and/or expertise in a given policy area.[5] In contrast to transnational advocacy coalitions and their presumed fluidity of power relations, the concept of policy networks allows for some hierarchies in the interest of technical knowledge and political expedience.[6] Policy networks, it is argued, are likely to arise in settings of multilevel governance, cross-border policy problems, high issue complexity, and dispersed decision-making.

Both in the transnational advocacy literature and in the policy network literature, the question of exactly *how* states and intergovernmental organizations interact with nonstate actors needs to be investigated more systematically. If a network's boundaries are assumed to be perpetually in flux and outsiders can become insiders at any moment, empirically assessing transnational interactions may seem daunting.[7] Yet unless we actually trace cross-border contacts, we cannot know whether it is possible to have a vibrant transnational network that nevertheless fails to influence domestic or international policy. Similarly, mapping network interactions is necessary if we want to assess whether networks emerge spontaneously or are constructed deliberately by certain actors. Whether cross-border networks are indeed devoid of hierarchies, as much of the transnational advocacy literature implies, requires empirical investigation. My article takes on Beck's (2003) challenge that the 'methodological nationalism' prevalent in the social sciences be reassessed. By deploying social network analysis to evaluate the significance of states, I contribute to an emerging trend toward more systematic empirical study of transnational politics (Anheier and Katz, 2003; Blatter, 2003, 2004; Diani and McAdam, 2003; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006; Katz and Anheier, 2006; Stark et al., 2006; True and Mintrom, 2001).

The literature on transnational activism suggests that states may function as targets or allies of advocacy coalitions or as filters for political contention. Durable trends of international NGO proliferation (Boli et al., 1999) have spurred research on states and intergovernmental organizations as *targets* or *allies* of nonstate actors' pursuits. Scholars see nonstate actors as capable of setting agendas, changing the normative frames of reference among state actors, and altering organizational modes of operation, state policies, and behavior. Keck and Sikkink's (1998: 12–13) famous 'boomerang pattern' of influence describes states and intergovernmental organizations as potential allies of societal actors in repressive systems. In some cases, the mere existence of supranational organizations and rules may enhance the impact of certain issue networks (Gelb, 2002). However, the account of nonstate actors enlisting states and intergovernmental organizations for their own

purposes misses the extent to which states act as *filters* for the cross-border activities of nonstate actors. States control access to their territory, though not always to their citizens (Huntington, 1973; Vallier, 1971; Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004), their political institutions affect modes of organization (Josselin, 2001a; Krasner, 1995), and they continue to provide the main opportunity structures for political mobilization and focal points for collective identities (Riker, 2002; Tarrow, 2001a, 2001b, 2005).[8] Even in the domestic context, the notion of civil society's bottom-up flourishing is countered by skeptics who emphasize the primacy of state structures in shaping popular mobilization (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978) and associational life (Skocpol et al., 2000; Crowley and Skocpol, 2001; Skocpol, 2003). Along similar lines, one may question whether civil society is an adequate theoretical concept outside the territorial state at all, given its origins in modern social contract theory that in turn served to justify centralized territorial governance (Harris, 2006; also see Bartelson, 2006; Bowden, 2006; Olesen, 2005).

The state-as-filter argument acknowledges the influence of state structures (as well as intergovernmental organizations) on the activities of nonstate actors. Yet it falls short of recognizing the possibility of *deliberate entrepreneurship* by states and intergovernmental organizations in dealing with nonstate actors. If NGOs can employ government support for their cross-border activities, then the reverse might be true as well (Gilpin, 1971: 54; Hägel and Peretz, 2005; Nye and Keohane, 1971: xx). There are multiple reasons why both states and intergovernmental organizations might act as network *engineers*: accessing nonstate actors' technical expertise, moral authority, or constituents (Donnelly, 2002); seeking mandate extension by cultivating NGO networks as possible clients; and delegating policy implementation to nonstate actors (Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2001; Sassen, 2002). Contacts with nonstate actors may function as substitute for democratic legitimation, especially for intergovernmental organizations that lack electoral accountability (Keohane, 2002: 36; Keohane and Nye, 2002). The next section takes up the idea of states as filters and entrepreneurs and develops a typology of transnational ties around two potential effects of states: Territorial segmentation and gatekeeping.

Cross-Border Networks: Border Effects and States as Gatekeepers

Both Neorealism and Neoliberalism instruct us to focus on unitary state actors as principal units of analysis, an approach that is called into question by the transnational network literature. Following Nölke's definition of transnational policy networks as 'a group of public and/or private organizations where at least one organization does not operate on behalf of a

national government or an intergovernmental entity' and which 'are connected by a significant level of interactions . . . across national boundaries' (2003: 278), states can play two fundamental roles in transnational advocacy and policy networks: Imposing territorial boundaries and controlling the interactions among different types of actors. I thus present two variables to capture the ways in which states interfere with transnational politics: first, governments as gatekeepers between society and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and second, border effects based on territorial states. Two conditions together thus make for a transnational network: direct links among state, nonstate, and IGO actors, and cross-border interactions. By contrast, a network cannot be called transnational if one or both conditions are violated: If contacts tend to be between IGO and national actors, with the latter failing to reach across national boundaries to their peers elsewhere, we are not dealing with a transnational network. The same is true when national governments control society's access to IGOs and foreign governments.

Both variables are continuous and can produce an unlimited number of possible constellations, as Figure 1 suggests. If one were to treat the variables as binary, four ideal-typical combinations would result, as illustrated in Figures 2–5. (1) The first network graph refers to a situation in which a government interacts with an IGO, but not with other governments directly. Societal actors remain excluded from the interaction. This occurs, for instance, when international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund negotiate with a given government over macroeconomic stabilization. (2) The second scenario is typical of how Neorealists conceive of multilateral organizations. Here, governments negotiate with other governments as well as with the organization as a whole. Nonstate actors may be connected with their own governments and their peers across borders, but are considered irrelevant for policy negotiations at the international level. Moravcsik's (1998) liberal intergovernmentalism illustrates this scenario. In his account, the grand constitutional bargains of European integration have been the result of government-to-government negotiations. Intergovernmental actors, he argues, are at the receiving end, while societal actors matter only at the national level by helping to shape the stated policy preferences of their own governments *prior to* intergovernmental negotiations. A less controversial example outside of the EU would be NATO. (3) In the third scenario, governments do not control the access of nonstate actors to the intergovernmental organization. However, border effects are relevant in that neither governments nor nonstate actors communicate directly with their peers in other countries. Empirically, the plausibility of this scenario is perhaps somewhat questionable. But outside the context of intergovernmental organizations, relations between a metropole and its colonies

might illustrate this set-up, where the colonies are integrated in the economy of the metropole, but not of fellow colonies.[9] (4) In the fourth scenario, all actors are, at least potentially, connected to one another, regardless of type of organization and country of origin. This is the ideal-type of a transnational policy network.

The following section applies the two dimensions of state interference to examine a policy network that *a priori* would appear to be a likely candidate for transnationalism.

Figure 1
Framework for Analyzing Transnational Networks: Border Effects and Government Gatekeeping



Case Study: EU Enlargement and Social Policy Transfer to Poland and Hungary

The study of EU enlargement and social policy allows us to examine a network in a most-likely scenario. The analysis here presents a pilot study of a cross-national policy network at one point in time (2000/01). As such, it can and will be replicated on a larger scale, but does not permit generalization beyond the sample. The controlled, paired comparison of Poland and

Figure 2
Border Effects and Governments as Gatekeepers
Source for Figures 2–5: Sissenich (2007: 112–114)



Notes to Fig. 2–5: Graphs produced by NetDraw (Borgatti et al. 2002)
IGO = Intergovernmental Organization
SA1 etc. = State Actor in Country 1 etc.
NSA1 etc. = Nonstate Actor in Country 1 etc.

Hungary offers insight into domestic determinants of organizational contacts, thus enabling us to probe the effects of territorial boundedness and gatekeeping.

European integration presents the highest degree of institutional density to be found anywhere in contemporary international politics. If transnational networks emerge, they are most likely to do so in an environment in which policy-making is shared among states or delegated to joint institutions. In preparation for EU accession in 2004, all entrants faced the same set of accession requirements and EU preparatory instruments and had to demonstrate full compliance with EU laws and policies, which meant transposing and implementing them in national law and practice.[10] While it is true that, after the end of the Cold War, Central and East European countries cast off the forced commonality of their previous COMECON membership, EU accession presented them with incentives to share expertise and coordinate negotiating strategies. The accession preparations raised the likelihood of cross-border contacts among national actors. First, national actors had an incentive to communicate regularly with EU institutions. This was obviously the case for government actors negotiating the accession conditions and demonstrating their country's readiness. But nonstate actors were also likely

Figure 3
Governments as Gatekeepers, but without Border Effects



Figure 4
Border Effects Exist, but Governments do not Act as Gatekeepers



Figure 5
Transnational Policy Network: No Border Effects, Governments do not Act as Gatekeepers



to benefit from EU contacts, whether through material support or by exchanging information. The EU, in turn, was likely to communicate not only with candidate governments but also with nonstate actors in order to build constituencies for its own work. Similarly, the EU could expect to enhance its monitoring capacity by interacting directly with groups targeted by EU policies. Second, cross-border contacts among peers from different accession countries were likely for two reasons: On one hand, candidate countries faced the same EU demands and could learn from one another's strategies and practices. Governments struggling to adopt a set of EU laws could shop for problem-solving approaches among their peers elsewhere. On the other hand, EU institutions specifically created an infrastructure for cross-border dialogue among actors from the candidate countries. This infrastructure included international conferences and consultative forums, financial assistance for cross-border cooperation, and support for international affiliations of nonstate actors.

We can thus specify the following *hypothesis*: Because of Europe's high level of integration, the participatory features of EU social policy, and certain shared opportunities and constraints among candidate countries, we would expect the network around EU social policy transfer to Poland and Hungary to be transnational. Thus, we would expect nonstate actors to be directly connected to EU institutions and national governments not to exercise gatekeeping functions. Likewise, given multiple occasions and incentives for peer interaction, we would expect territorial boundaries to be easily crossed by organizational links.

Here, I focus on Poland's and Hungary's accession to the EU. Both countries could be expected to be well connected to European and international institutions: They were consistently among the most advanced EU accession candidates. Both had embarked on the democratic transformation with extensive experience in market socialism and levels of liberalization not seen elsewhere. Both countries were highly integrated with the EU economy even prior to 2004. Thus, in 2000, 83 percent of foreign stock in Hungary's economy came from EU countries, compared to 77 percent of foreign stock in Poland (UNCTAD, 2003). Despite these similarities, we can expect Poland and Hungary to vary in terms of cross-border contacts and government gatekeeping due to the fact that the countries differ in size,[11] exposure to the international economy, government stability, and legacies of collective action under state socialism, all of which are elements of territoriality. For a long time, Hungary's economy was more open to foreign direct investment than Poland's. In 2000, FDI stock accounted for 43 percent of Hungary's GDP, compared to 22 percent of Poland's (UNCTAD, 2003). Politically, Poland has experienced frequent changes in government since 1989 and faces highly unstable coalitions, whereas Hungary has had relatively stable governments. Poland, with a history of labor-based mass mobilization against state socialism, now has a highly bifurcated landscape of interest representation in which previous allegiance with the regime still constitutes a major cleavage. Hungary experienced a more gradual reform of state socialism from within the regime; present socioeconomic interest representation is highly fragmented on both the labor and employer sides, but less politicized than in Poland (Ekiert and Kubik, 1999; Seleny, 1999). Hence, while we should expect both countries to have developed extensive cross-border contacts, Hungarian actors were likely to be more connected with other European actors than was the case for their Polish peers.

In order to investigate how nonstate actors communicated with governments and EU institutions prior to enlargement, I map out patterns of regular contact among organizations with stakes in EU social policy and enlargement. Network analysis allows us to trace where actors turn in order to advance their goals (Scott, 2000; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The next section therefore specifies tests for the extent to which governments act as gatekeepers and national borders shape communication patterns in this particular network.

Propositions

I use three different network concepts to analyze the extent to which states acted as gatekeepers and borders affected interactions in the EU enlargement and social policy network: cliques, structural equivalence, and brokerage.

First, tracing cohesive subgroups allows us to compare within- and between-group interactions. The concept of cliques denotes a subgroup of actors that fulfills the following two conditions: (1) All subgroup members have direct ties with one another. (2) There is no other actor in the network with direct ties to all of the subgroup's members (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 254). Cliques in a network may overlap, i.e. have members in common. Co-membership of different types of actors in the same cliques indicates opportunities for easy flow of communication among EU, state, and nonstate actors. Co-membership of actors from Poland and Hungary indicates that borders do not inhibit communications between both countries; by contrast, if cliques are limited to actors from one country and EU institutions, border effects are operating. In other words, cohesive subgroups should not cut off nonstate actors from EU institutions, nor should they isolate national actors from their peers in other countries.

Proposition 1a: If governments acted as gatekeepers, cliques will not contain EU and nonstate actors at once. If governments did not act as gatekeepers, some cliques will contain both EU and nonstate actors.

Proposition 1b: If borders inhibited communications, clique membership will be limited to actors from the EU and one country. If communications crossed national borders, by contrast, we can expect actors from more than one country to share cliques.

Second, we can argue that if governments do not act as gatekeepers, the communication patterns of nonstate actors should not differ radically from those of EU and state actors. Structural equivalence captures similarities in the network positions of different actors. Actors are structurally equivalent if their ties to and from all other network actors are identical (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 356). Because actors are rarely fully structurally equivalent, existing routines measure the extent to which the network positions of actors converge. I compare profile similarities based on the correlations among actors' ties.[12]

Proposition 2a: If governments acted as gatekeepers, equivalence clusters are likely to separate EU, state, and nonstate actors. By contrast, if governments did not interfere with nonstate actors' access to the EU, then equivalence clusters will contain actors of several types (nonstate, state, and EU).

Proposition 2b: If borders inhibited communications, we could expect clusters to contain national actors from only one country. If communications crossed national borders, by contrast, we could expect equivalence clusters to contain national actors from more than one country.

Finally, some organizations are likely to stand out as vital to the network, connecting actors that may not have any direct way of communicating. Intermediaries have particular control over communications among other actors. A measure that captures inter-group mediation derives from the idea of brokerage. According to Gould and Fernandez (1989: 92–4), a broker is any

actor who assists communications in a network whose participants differ in their interests and activities. This differentiation implies that exchanges vary in meaning depending on the actors involved. Brokerage, specifically a measure termed liaison, allows us to examine who facilitates between-group communication among EU, state, and nonstate actors. Given three actors and a network partition into non-overlapping groups, Gould and Fernandez define a *liaison* as an actor who facilitates communications between two separate groups. All three actors belong to different groups.[13] We can formulate the following propositions about nonstate actor participation and border effects:

Proposition 3a: If governments controlled the access of nonstate actors to the EU, we could expect them to have higher *liaison* scores than either EU or nonstate actors. If governments did not mediate between the EU and societal actors, EU and government actors will not differ systematically in their liaison scores.[14]

Proposition 3b: If borders inhibited communications between actors from Poland and Hungary, then we might expect the EU to have functioned as liaison to mediate between the two countries. If border effects are nonexistent, we would not expect the EU to score systematically higher than other actors.

Having specified expectations for the three measures of cliques, structural equivalence, and brokerage, I will now discuss the results of the network analysis.

Data Analysis

Despite the inherently fluid character of the network around EU enlargement and social policy, the use of quantitative measures requires the imposition of some type of boundary. At the outset, approximately 80 organizations (EU, government, and nonstate actors) were specified based on their presumptive theoretical relevance to EU social policy transfer to Poland and Hungary. Thus, the purpose of the investigation was to verify whether actors who should *theoretically* participate in the transfer of EU social policy to Poland and Hungary were in fact doing so.[15] Ties were measured via a survey that asked respondents to indicate with which of the other actors they were in regular contact. The response rate was 40 percent, or 32 organizations. Only organizations that responded to the survey could be included in the complete network that forms the basis of my quantitative analysis here. Of the 32 actors included, four are EU institutions; two belong to the Polish government and four to the Hungarian government; four are Polish and 12 are Hungarian nonstate actors (employer and labor organizations); three represent Europe-wide nonstate actors; and three belong to other categories.[16] Table 1 presents a complete overview of actors included in the network.

Table 1
Actors Included in the Network

Organization Name	Abbreviation
EU Institutions	
Commission Directorate General for Enlargement, Hungary Team	K-DGEnl-HU
Commission Directorate General for Enlargement, Poland Team	K-DGEnl-PL
Commission Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs	K-DGESA
Commission Directorate General for Enlargement, PHARE	PHARE
Polish Government Institutions	
Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs	PL-Mlab
Poland's Delegation to the EU	PL-Del-BX
Hungarian Government Institutions	
Hungary – Office of the Prime Minister	HU-PM
Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	HU-MFA
Hungarian Ministry of Family and Social Affairs	HU-MFSA
Hungary's Delegation to the EU	HU-Del-BX
Hungarian Trade Unions	
Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions	HU-Liga
National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions	HU-MSZOSZ
Autonomous Trade Unions' Confederation ASZSZ	HU-ASZSZ
National Alliance of Workers' Councils	HU-MOSZ
Polish Trade Unions	
NSZZ Solidarity	PL-NSZZ
All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions	PL-OPZZ
Hungarian Employers' Organizations	
National Association of Entrepreneurs	HU-VOSZ
National Federation of Consumer Cooperatives	HU-AFEOSZ
Federation of Hungarian Manufacturers	HU-MGYOSZ
Hungarian Industrial Association	HU-OKISZ
Hungarian Association of Craftsmen's Corporations	HU-IPOSZ
Confederation of Hungarian Employers' Organizations for International Cooperation	HU-CEHIC
National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives and Producers	HU-MOSZ/E
Union of Agrarian Employers	HU-AMSZ

(*Continued*)

Table 1
(*Continued*)

Organization Name	Abbreviation
Polish Employers' Organizations	
Polish Confederation of Private Employers	PL-PKPP
Confederation of Polish Employers	PL-KPP
European Peak-Level Organizations	
European Trade Union Confederation	ETUC
Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe	UNICE
European Center of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Public Interest	CEEP
Others	
ILO Central and Eastern Europe Team	ILO-CEET
World Bank – Hungary Office	WB-HU
Friedrich Ebert Foundation[1]	FES

Source: Sissenich (2007: 118).

[1] One of Germany's internationally active party foundations that are financed by the federal parliament and thus could be classified as 'quasi-nongovernmental organizations'.

The network survey was administered between February 2000 and May 2001.[17] As such, it represents a conservative snapshot of the policy network during the pre-accession phase. Undoubtedly, the network evolved as accession preparations progressed, but time-series data were not an option with this project. The survey documents ties as reported by one representative of each organization.[18] Information for each node was gathered separately in order to cross-check mutual actor perceptions of a given directional tie (Pappi and Henning, 1999). Thus, each actor was asked whether it was the source and/or the target of regular contacts with every other actor, as well as whether it was a member of any of the other organizations in the network.[19] The information from the three directional relations ('we initiate regular contact,'[20] 'they initiate regular contact,'[21] and 'we are members in'[22]) was compacted into a matrix with 32×31 $(= 992)$ observations (ignoring self-ties because these are meaningless here). This matrix ('A reports any tie with B') registers any tie an organization reported with another actor. It is thus based on directed ties, but leaves open whether the organization in question is the source or the recipient of contacts or membership affiliations. In order to increase reliability, I symmetrized this matrix by counting only those ties on whose existence source and target agreed.[23] Thus, only reciprocal ties are

registered. The resulting matrix ('confirmed ties') is a conservative estimate of regular contact and affiliations within the network and serves as the basis of the analysis presented here.[24] The matrix of confirmed ties has a density of .27, which means that 27 percent of all possible ties are actually present in the network.[25] Except for brokerage measures, which require directional ties, the analysis was performed on the matrix of confirmed ties. Brokerage scores were measured on the matrix 'A reports any tie with B'.

Cliques

There are 32 cliques with a minimum of four members. Tables 2 and 3 show the frequency of clique co-memberships for four types of organizations (EU, state, nonstate, other) and four types of origin (EU, Poland, Hungary, other). Examining the cliques yields three insights: First, clique patterns differed significantly between Poland and Hungary. Hungary had nine cliques limited to actors from Hungary, while Poland had none that were limited to Polish actors. This is largely due to the differences in the organizational make-up of interest representation in each country. Poland has two main employer and labor organizations, respectively. Ideological competition divides both labor and employer federations between organizations founded in opposition to state socialism and those that conformed to the system prior to 1989. Hungary, by contrast, has nine employer and six labor federations. Thus, Hungary's extreme organizational fragmentation increased the likelihood of intra-country cliques. In Poland, the smaller number of organizations and the fierce competition between the two labor and employers' organizations, respectively, *reduced* the likelihood of intra-country cliques.

Second, Hungarian *nonstate* actors shared seven clique memberships with EU actors, compared to two for their Polish equivalents. Hungarian *state* actors shared nine clique memberships with EU actors, compared to three for Polish state actors. The larger number of Hungarian government actors probably accounts for part of this difference, but it also suggests that Hungarian actors were better connected at the international level. Third, the EU is party to 18 cliques in terms of organization type and 17 cliques in terms of organizational origin. This makes the EU the focal point of the network.

Following Proposition 1a, if governments acted as gatekeepers, we would expect EU and nonstate actors not to share clique memberships. As Table 2 shows, there were a total of 11 cliques in which both EU and nonstate actors were members. Thus, it appears that nonstate actors could easily access EU institutions without the mediation of their governments. Following Proposition 1b, if borders inhibited communications, we would expect clique membership to be limited to actors from one country and the EU. Table 3 shows that there were only two cliques in which both Polish and

Table 2
Frequency of Clique Co-Memberships
by Organization Type

Clique Combinations, by Organization Type	Frequency
SA, NSA	7
EU, SA	6
EU, NSA, O	5
EU, SA, NSA	5
NSA, O	5
EU, O	1
EU, SA, NSA, O	1
SA, NSA, O	1
EU	1

Source: Sissenich (2007: 119).

Note: EU = EU institution; SA = state actor; NSA = nonstate actor; O = other.

Hungarian actors participated. Though we lack any basis for comparison outside this particular network, this is a rather small number compared to other clique combinations within the network and suggests the presence of border effects.

Table 4 shows the results for statistical associations between clique co-membership and organization types. Three variables describe actor attributes: organization type, state versus nonstate actor, and country of origin. I use two measures of association: Pearson's correlation and multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure (QAP regression). QAP regresses a dependent matrix on one or more independent matrices. In Table 3, the dependent matrix is that of clique co-memberships, the independent matrix for each bivariate regression is based on actor attributes ('organization type', 'state/nonstate', and 'origin', respectively). Clique co-membership is not significantly associated with organization type or the state/nonstate actor distinction. In other words, EU, state, and nonstate actors frequently overlapped in their clique memberships, as expected in a network that allows nonstate actors direct access to the EU. However, there turns out to be a statistically significant relationship between clique co-membership and organizations' origin. That is, cliques linked actors at the national and the EU levels, but rarely connected Polish and Hungarian actors directly. There were two exceptions: One clique included the Polish and Hungarian delegations to Brussels. Here we can suspect that geographic proximity aided cross-national communication. The other exception was a clique that

Table 3
Frequency of Clique Co-Memberships
by Origin of Organization

Clique Combinations, by Origin	Frequency
HU	9
EU, HU	6
HU, EU, O	4
HU, O	4
EU, PL, O	2
EU, PL	2
EU	1
HU, PL, O	1
PL, O	1
EU, O	1
EU, PL, HU	1

Source: Sissenich (2007: 199).

Note: EU = EU institution; HU = Hungary; PL = Poland; O = other.

linked the Polish and Hungarian post-Communist successor unions (OPZZ and MSZOSZ). Their tie goes back to cross-national networking among trade unions under state socialism (author's interview, Budapest, 11 February 2000).

Both the substantive analysis of clique patterns and the statistical analysis of clique co-memberships yield the same results: Governments did not act as gatekeepers, but border effects impeded communications between actors from Poland and Hungary. Thus, the EU was the focal point of networking by state and nonstate actors, but neither government nor interest groups tended to seek out their peers in other candidate countries. This finding is important. It suggests that even under conditions of extensive networking among intergovernmental, state, and nonstate actors, relations may remain primarily bilateral. Intergovernmental organizations may set up opportunities for networking, but incentive structures do not necessarily favor cross-border interactions. The EU, it seems, encouraged activism directed toward Brussels, but did not provide any incentives for actors from several countries to interact directly with one another.

Structural Equivalence

If governments interceded between nonstate actors and EU institutions, we would expect the relational profiles of actors to differ systematically according

Table 4
Measures of Association between Clique Co-Membership and Organizational Characteristics (Thirty-Two Actor Network, Clique Size: 4, Number of Cliques: 32)

	Organization Type	State/Nonstate	Origin
Pearson's Correlation	.021	.046	.259
(Significance Level)	(.387)	(.183)	(.000)**
R-square[1]	.000	.002	.067
(Probability)[2]	(.818)	(.362)	(.001)**

Note: $N = 992$. Statistical significance: * $p = .005$, ** $p = .001$, two-tailed test. R-square based on QAP regression. Probability based on the proportion of random trials yielding an R-square as large as or larger than observed.

to their organization type (Proposition 2a). Similarly, if borders inhibited communications, we could expect equivalence clusters to separate actors from different countries (Proposition 2b). As a measure of structural equivalence in the patterns of ties, I use the Pearson product correlation coefficient of every pair of profiles (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 368–70). Table 5 shows the partition resulting from splitting actors based on convergence of iterated correlations.[26] Clearly, border effects separate the profiles of Hungarian and Polish actors. Furthermore, there is some evidence of states acting as gatekeepers. Although each cluster contained actors of more than one type, there were no clusters containing both EU and nonstate actors. In other words, while the profiles of nonstate actors resembled some state actors, they did not resemble EU institutions.

Liaison

The liaison measure allows us to estimate the extent to which any actor controls the flow of communication among groups in the network. Table 6 shows two sets of weighted liaison scores, i.e. by organization type (to capture gatekeeping) and country of origin (to capture border effects).[27] Note that the liaison scores are specific to each given network and help facilitate the comparison of actors inside the network. As absolute numbers, the scores are meaningless and cannot be compared between networks. Nonstate actors scored low on both measures. This makes sense: Even in a highly participatory network, we would not expect them to aid communication between governments and the EU. Four of the five highest-scoring liaisons between organization types were EU or international actors who helped nonstate actors communicate with their governments. Two EU institutions served as

Table 5
Structural Equivalence Clusters (CONCOR)

Cluster	Organization Name	Organization Type	Origin
1	K-DGEnl-HU	EU	International
	K-DGEnl-Pl	EU	International
	K-DGESA	EU	International
	PHARE	EU	International
	PL-Mlab	State	Poland
	PL Del Bx	State	Poland
2	PL-NSZZ	Nonstate	Poland
	PL-OPZZ	Nonstate	Poland
	ETUC	Nonstate	International
	PL-PKPP	Nonstate	Poland
	PL-KPP	Nonstate	Poland
	UNICE	Nonstate	International
	CEEP	Nonstate	International
	ILO-CEET	Other	International
	FES	Other	International
3	HU-PM	State	Hungary
	HU-MFSA	State	Hungary
	HU Del BX	State	Hungary
	HU-Liga	Nonstate	Hungary
	HU-MOSZ	Nonstate	Hungary
	HU-ASZSZ	Nonstate	Hungary
	WB-HU	Other	International
4	HU-MGYOSZ	Nonstate	Hungary
	HU-MFA	State	Hungary
	HU-AMSZ	Nonstate	Hungary
	HU-VOSZ	Nonstate	Hungary
	HU-AFEOSZ	Nonstate	Hungary
	HU-MSZOSZ	Nonstate	Hungary
	HU-OKISZ	Nonstate	Hungary
	HU-IPOSZ	Nonstate	Hungary
	HU-CEHIC	Nonstate	Hungary
	HU-MOSZ(E)	Nonstate	Hungary

Source: Sissenich (2007: 122).

Note: Self-ties ignored. Depth of splits: 2. Convergence criteria: 0.2. $R^2 = 0.207$.

principal mediators between nonstate actors and governments: The Commission DG on Employment and Social Affairs and PHARE, a funding agency assisting countries in preparing for accession. Two other international actors, the International Labor Organization's Central and Eastern Europe Team and the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation, also acted as important mediators between governments and nonstate actors.

Following Proposition 3a, we can conclude that governments did not act as gatekeepers between the EU and nonstate actors. Among state actors, only the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stood out as a significant liaison. Given the usual image of foreign ministries as operating at the intergovernmental level, this is somewhat surprising. It suggests that Hungarian nonstate actors could easily approach a ministry normally concerned with diplomatic contacts, but they did not depend on the ministry's mediation in order to be heard by EU institutions. As for cross-border communication, international actors were clearly important as mediators between Poland and Hungary. Four of them were notable: The Commission DG on Employment and Social Affairs was in the lead once again, followed by the ILO's Central and Eastern Europe Team, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and PHARE. European umbrella organizations of labor and employers were relatively less important as mediators among actors from Poland and Hungary. Following Proposition 3b, the evidence points in the direction of significant border effects.

Table 7 shows mean liaison scores and chi-squares for relevant subgroups of this analysis. EU organizations on average brokered over two and a half times as many contacts between *types of organizations* as did states (17.63 versus 6.72), and nearly twice as many as other international actors (9.27). The chi-square indicates that this intergroup variance is statistically significant. By contrast, EU organizations and other international actors on average brokered about the same number of *cross-border contacts* (roughly 15), while both state and nonstate actors were irrelevant in this respect; the intergroup differences were statistically insignificant. International actors, meanwhile, were on average responsible for three times as many liaisons between *types of organizations* (roughly 10) as was the case for Polish (2.06) or Hungarian actors (2.54). Polish and Hungarian actors were completely irrelevant for brokering *cross-border contacts*, a role that fell squarely to international actors, an intergroup contrast that is statistically significant. In other words, organization type turns out to be significantly associated with liaisons between types of organization. Consistent with Proposition 3a, this provides evidence of a network in which EU actors brokered relations between state and nonstate actors. Rather than states acting as gatekeepers for contacts between the EU and nonstate actors, it was the EU that occupied this influential position as a mediator. Liaisons between the countries differed

Table 6
Weighted Liaison Scores (Matrix "A reports any tie with B")

Organization (Type) (Origin)	Liaison by Organization Type	Liaison by Origin
K-DGESA (EU) (international)	47.85	45.38
PHARE (EU) (international)	20.56	15.08
K-DGEnl-HU (EU) (international)	1.36	0
K-DGEnl-PL (EU) (international)	.73	.25
HU MFA (state) (Hungary)	13.58	.25
HU Del BX (state) (Hungary)	7.80	.33
HU MFSA (state) (Hungary)	6.66	0
HU-PM (state) (Hungary)	4.62	0
PL Del BX (state) (Poland)	4.08	.5
PL Mlab (state) (Poland)	3.57	.06
PL-OPZZ (nonstate) (Poland)	1.80	.61
HU-Liga (nonstate) (Hungary)	1.75	.34
HU-MOSZ (nonstate) (Hungary)	1.75	.34
PL-PKPP (nonstate) (Poland)	1.36	.70
HU-MSZOSZ (nonstate) (Hungary)	1.28	.34
PL-NSZZ (nonstate) (Poland)	1.12	.64
UNICE (nonstate) (international)	1.04	3.42
HU-CEHIC (nonstate) (Hungary)	.91	.2
HU-AMSZ (nonstate) (Hungary)	.54	0
ETUC (nonstate) (international)	.52	3.73
HU-ASZSZ (nonstate) (Hungary)	.50	0
HU-VOSZ (nonstate) (Hungary)	.43	0
PL-KPP (nonstate) (Poland)	.41	.14
HU-IPOSZ (nonstate) (Hungary)	.32	0
HU-MGYOSZ (nonstate) (Hungary)	.29	0
HU-OKISZ (nonstate) (Hungary)	.16	0
HU-AFEOSZ (nonstate) (Hungary)	.06	0
HU-MOSZ(E) (nonstate) (Hungary)	.00	0
CEEP (nonstate) (international)	.00	0
ILO-CEET (other) (international)	13.57	26.11
FES (other) (international)	13.08	20.21
WB-HU (other) (international)	1.16	0

Source: Sissenich (2007: 124).
Note: Individual scores are based on $N = 32 \times 31$ nodes $= 992$ observations.

systematically by organizational origin, making international actors the only relevant liaisons in the network. This means that for Polish and Hungarian actors to communicate, they usually required an international mediator. Consistent with Proposition 3b, border effects were thus operating.

Table 7
Mean Liaison Scores

	Liaison by Organization Type	Liaison by Origin
Total Mean ($N = 32$) (St Dev.)	4.78 (9.33)	3.71 (9.78)
Means by Organization Type (St Dev.)		
EU ($N = 4$)	17.63 (22.15)	15.18 (21.33)
State ($N = 6$)	6.72 (3.73)	.19 (.20)
Nonstate ($N = 19$)	.74 (.61)	.55 (1.09)
Other ($N = 3$)	9.27 (7.03)	15.44 (13.69)
Chi-square (significance level)	17.04 (.001)	3.27 (.352)
Means by Origin (St Dev)		
International ($N = 10$)	9.99 (15.18)	11.42 (15.27)
Poland ($N = 6$)	2.06 (1.45)	.44 (.27)
Hungary ($N = 16$)	2.54 (3.8)	.11 (.15)
Chi-square (significance level)	2.04 (.361)	9.40 (.009)

Note: $N = 32$. Chi-squares based on Kruskal–Wallis test (one-way ANOVA) for nonparametric data.

We can now sum up the data analysis (see Table 8). First, there is considerable evidence that nonstate actors participated in the network and could access both governments and EU institutions to exchange information and voice preferences. States, in other words, did not act as gatekeepers. Second, border effects separated Polish and Hungarian actors. Candidate countries apparently did not seek each other out for consultation on negotiations with the EU concerning their adoption of EU social policy. Instead, contacts in the network were directed toward Brussels. Regardless of countless opportunities for labor and employers to interact with their peers from other candidate countries (such as in the context of European peak organizations or EU-sponsored conferences), actors apparently had few incentives to build links among candidate countries. Third, one EU agency (the Commission DG-Employment and Social Affairs) controlled much of the communication flow among groups in the network, suggesting that the initiative of network construction may lie with intergovernmental and/or state actors, an aspect often neglected in scholarship on transnational advocacy. The data also show considerable variation in the network positions of actors within any given group. Both EU and state agencies have a division of labor that puts some at the forefront of network communications, while others engage solely in intergovernmental negotiations. Whether nonstate actors can have any substantive impact on policy formation and implementation may

Table 8
Summary of Network Evidence

Indicator	Governments as Gatekeepers	Border Effects
Cliques	No	Yes
Structural equivalence	Limited	Yes
Brokerage	No	Yes

Source: Sissenich (2007: 125).

depend on political incentive structures that are exogenous to the specific policy network. In the case of EU enlargement and social policy, the intergovernmental framework of accession negotiations apparently trumped the structural network access that nonstate actors had. The strategic context outside of the network may have favored competition among candidates for a speedy accession rather than cooperation in the face of similar challenges.

Conclusion: Implications and Directions for Further Research

Analyzing the apparently vibrant network around EU social policy and enlargement highlights the limits of cross-border communication. This pilot study combined multiple factors that made it unlikely for states to act as gatekeepers and for national borders to restrict communications: deepening regional integration, an explicit policy-shaping function granted to select nonstate actors, and shared challenges of EU accession that meant that candidate countries would benefit from sharing information about best practices and rule adoption strategies. All these factors should promote a network in which nonstate actors participate alongside state and EU agencies and where actors of several countries reach out to one another. Yet the evidence from Poland's and Hungary's accession shows that, although nonstate actors could access state and EU actors, cross-border communications among national actors remained scarce. In this particular network, national actors did not seek out their peers from other countries, but instead directed their efforts toward Brussels. In other words, the mere availability of structural opportunities for cross-border networking was insufficient for generating such ties. Furthermore, nonstate actors did not take the lead in network construction. As the brokerage measures indicate, certain EU and other international actors controlled communication flows in the network, whereas nonstate actors tended to be at the receiving end. This contrasts sharply with

the bottom-up view of transnational relations that prevails in much of the research on activist networks.

The scope of inference of this study is limited to the network data presented here. Nevertheless, my findings suggest that we need to differentiate between network structures and exogenous political opportunities if we are to understand transnational politics. Political incentives ultimately set by states and intergovernmental organizations may reward bilateralism (such as between the EU and national actors) regardless of ample opportunities for cross-border networking. Just as states influence the conditions that guide how nonstate actors mobilize, intergovernmental organizations do the same at the international level. Furthermore, by offering actual measurement of interorganizational contacts in transnational space, albeit in a small dataset, this study advances the debate on how best to trace cross-border networks systematically in a variety of contexts.

The data focus on two countries prior to their 2004 accession. Clearly, more expansive survey research is needed to assess whether border effects operate primarily in candidate countries or also among member states. Beyond that, there are several ways of extending this research on transnational political mobilization, such as by studying networks of varying sizes and comparing networks in different sectors. Extending the sample will add variation in terms of economic and political integration, past experience with mass mobilization and socioeconomic interest organizations, and progress toward democracy and market capitalism. All these factors would seem, *prima facie*, to increase the likelihood that states do not act as gatekeepers and communication flows freely across borders. Research on cross-border networks in other policy areas would add variation in terms of institutionalization of interest representation and modes of political mobilization. Whereas labor and employers tend to mobilize via elections and close ties with political parties, NGOs often choose a range of unconventional tactics (Josselin, 2001b: 180). Cross-sectoral comparisons would also help us understand the influence of substantive policies. For instance, the cost of implementing EU social policy in the new member states may be negligible, therefore triggering little activism, whereas environmental policy requires significant investments for decades to come and is likely to divert resources from other acute areas of need.

In sum, the present study offers three important insights about cross-border politics: First, NGO interactions with one another as well as with states and intergovernmental organizations may remain nationally distinct despite formal opportunities for cross-border exchange. Second, networks may be the result of careful construction by intergovernmental agencies that place themselves at the center of interactions. By supporting NGO activities, intergovernmental organizations may create constituencies that will in turn provide political backing for institutional expansion. Third, political opportunity

structures are seldom fully contained within the network of cross-border communications. Diverse intergovernmental agencies relate differently to NGOs. One agency's close relations with NGOs do not automatically produce a network in which nonstate actors participate freely and national actors communicate with their peers from other countries. Intergovernmentalism may prevail even when individual agencies successfully build networks in which nonstate actors participate.

Notes

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1. The legal basis of EU social policy consists of the Treaty on European Union (OJ C340 [10.11.1997]: 145–172, Art. 2 [consolidated version]) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (in force since 1 January 1958, OJ C 340 [10.11.1997]: 173–308 [consolidated version], esp. articles 39–42, 125–130, 136–150, 152, and 158–162). The social dialogue was established through the Agreement on Social Policy of 1991, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty via the Protocol on Social Policy and incorporated into the Treaty on European Union via the Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 138–139 TEC).
2. See Wendt (1999) for an example of state centricity in Constructivism.
3. I adopt Josselin's inclusive definition of nonstate actors as organizations that are 'largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control: emanating from civil society, or from the market economy, or from political impulses beyond state control and direction' (Josselin, 2001a: 3). This definition covers groups conventionally termed 'nongovernmental organizations' (NGOs) as well as for-profit actors, religious entities, think tanks, terrorists, and criminals (see also Halliday, 2001: 21 and 25). The definition is problematic, of course, in that it takes as given what should be the subject of empirical investigation: The autonomy of nonstate actors.
4. The literature varies in the extent to which it *presumes* (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999) or *shows* (Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Pappi and Henning, 1999) policy networks to encompass a wide array of state and nonstate organizations.
5. Defining networks by common values presumes an outcome that may or may not result from transnational communication. Neglecting material or professional incentives for network participation in favor of idealistic motivations discounts the possibility of advancing democracy through material claims-making, for instance by trade unions.

6. But see Ansell et al. (1997) and Ansell (2000) for a use of the concept that emphasizes strategic shifts in power among network actors.
7. Keck and Sikkink argue that the methodological difficulties and costs of investigating network relations empirically cancel out any theoretical gains (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 31).
8. But see Smith and Johnston (2002) for an argument about increasingly similar opportunity structures for actors from multiple national contexts.
9. See Cardoso and Faletto (1979) for the classic statement of dependency theory.
10. Accession criteria and procedures were the same for all candidates of the 2004 wave: (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; (2) existence of a functioning market economy; (3) capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union; and (4) ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Copenhagen European Council, *Conclusions of the Presidency*, June 1993). The last criterion calls for the adoption of roughly 100,000 pages of EU legislation. The conditionality of accession means that whereas enforcement mechanisms vis-a-vis member states are differentiated and specific, accession candidates face one categorical threat: indefinite delay or outright denial of entry. Hence, the pressures to conform to EU demands were exceptionally high.
11. Hungary's population size is roughly one-quarter of Poland's.
12. The measure produces scores between 0 and 1, 1 representing perfect structural equivalence.
13. Given flow $1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3$, where 2 is the broker, the role of a liaison can be described as follows: $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ (all three actors belong to different groups) (Borgatti et al., 2002).
14. Note that no claim is made here that liaison scores should not differ systematically among all three groups. We would not expect nonstate actors to act as liaison between governments and the EU. The nature of the EU and the accession process implies that the EU and governments will interact directly.
15. This is a nominalist approach, which sets network boundaries based on theoretical considerations. Whether the actors involved experience the network as such is subject to empirical investigation (Laumann et al., 1983).
16. The imbalance in the number of Hungarian versus Polish state actors is due to the lower response rate among the latter. The imbalance in the number of Hungarian and Polish nonstate actors is due to the more fragmented organizational landscape in Hungary. Whereas Poland has two main employer federations and two main labor federations at the national level, Hungary has nine employer and six labor federations.
17. Twenty-three face-to-face interviews and nine electronic responses.
18. Among employers' organizations and trade unions, this was usually the international affairs secretary or the person assigned to European integration issues. In the case of ministries, the informant tended to be a representative of the department handling EU accession. Among EU institutions and Europe-wide nongovernmental organizations, the informant was generally the person in charge of enlargement affairs.

19. In the case of perfect reciprocity of perceptions of contacts, the Pearson correlation between matrix 'we initiate' and the transpose of matrix 'they initiate' would be 1. In fact, the Pearson correlation is .44, indicating that only in 44 percent of all observations do both actors agree on the tie.
20. The matrix 'we initiate regular contact' has a density of .333, which means that 33.3 percent of all possible ties are actually present. Software used for analyzing the network data: Borgatti et al. (2002).
21. The density of matrix 'they initiate regular contact' is slightly lower, with 30.9 percent of possible ties actually present. The Pearson correlation between matrix 'we initiate' and matrix 'they initiate' is .77, suggesting a high level of reciprocity among actors in initiating regular contact (statistically significant at the .0005 level, SD = .051).
22. With only 1.6 percent of possible ties present, the matrix 'we are members in' has by far the lowest density.
23. This cautious estimate screens out contacts that are interpreted differently by source and target. Such disagreement is itself worth studying (Knoke and Chermack, 2005), but does not constitute the focus of this article.
24. The Pearson correlation between 'A reports any tie with B' and 'confirmed ties' is .732 (statistically significant at the .0005 level, SD = .048).
25. By contrast, the directional matrix 'A reports any tie with B' has a density of .41.
26. Also termed CONCOR. For details, see Wasserman and Faust (1994: 376–81); Breiger et al. (1975).
27. Weighted brokerage scores take into account the existence of alternative brokers that connect any two actors. When B is one of two brokers connecting A and C, weighting gives B only half of the credit for the link between A and C.

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