ENHANCING THE SECURITY-AUTONOMY MODEL: EXAMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS ON ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the study of alliances and their internal dynamics. It examines the effects of divergent foreign policy decisions and domestic political factors on alliance behavior using two historical cases, the Triple Alliance of 1882 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of 1949. The study tests two hypotheses and applies the findings to the current dynamic within NATO involving the United States and the European Union (EU). First, it identifies key factors within the security-autonomy, capability-aggregation, domestic politics, and institutionalization models of alliance behavior and determines if divergent foreign policy decisions are omitted as a key factor. Second, the study tests and analyzes two historical cases to examine if domestic political factors and divergent foreign policy actions by less powerful alliance members are important factors in alliance dissolution or realignment. The findings appear to support both hypotheses. The subsequent analysis yields a possible enhancement of the security-autonomy model and a recommended change to U.S. policy supporting greater EU security independence.

The research and writing of this thesis
is dedicated to Michelle A. Robinson. Without your help
and patience this would not be possible.

Many thanks,
Klaudius K. Robinson

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND METHODOLOGY

Focus

This thesis focuses on the study of alliances and their internal dynamics. Models of alliance behavior attempt to explain and possibly predict how alliances function.[1] Although much work has been done in this field, certain variables received less attention, including the foreign policy actions of alliance member states and what effect they have on an alliance.

Leading researchers in this field associated states' capabilities with their quests for autonomy and security.[2] Some progressed to linking the narrowing of capabilities between a dominant state and a lesser state, referred to as narrowing a capability-asymmetry gap, to eventual alliance dissolution.[3] However, none of these studies took into account the foreign policy decisions of a lesser state which are divergent to those of the dominant state and the effect this has on the alliance. These sorts of friction-causing events in international relations and the international system may have an effect on alliances.

In addition to this omission, individual state leaders or internal state politics, already identified as factors by the domestic politics model, may play an important role in alliance dynamics. Individual leaders exert influence on a state's actions, which

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[1] Altfeld, Michael F. "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test." *The Western Political Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (1984): 523-544; Bennett, Scott D. "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984." *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 3 (1997): 846; Morrow, J. D. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991): 904-933.

[2] Altfeld. "The Decision to Ally," 523-544; Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," 846; Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry," 904-933.

[3] Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry," 904-933.

includes state foreign policy decisions.[4] In certain cases, this influence may be more prevalent as a factor in alliance dissolution or realignment.

Importance

The topic of individual state foreign policy actions and their effect on alliance dynamics is an underexplored subject. Several theories attempt to explain alliance dynamics but none of them expound on how a lesser states' foreign policy actions affect the alliance.[5] As a result, U.S. national security policy makers and their advisors do not have enough research to draw upon when making national security decisions involving alliances in which the United States is a member state. The lessons learned from this study could add to the knowledge available to U.S. policy makers in developing and executing future decisions involving alliance relationships such as the European Union's (EU) relationship with NATO.[6]

Questions

This study attempts to examine two questions in alliance behavior:

1. Which identifiable factors in models of alliance behavior influence alliance dissolution or realignment?

[4] Byman, Daniel and Pollack, Kenneth M. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In." *International Security* 25, no. 4 (2001): 107-146.
[5] See Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration."; Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally." ; Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry." These theories include the security-autonomy model, capability-aggregation model, domestic politics model, and institutionalization model.
[6] This study does not assume a continuing NATO alliance is beneficial to U.S. interests. It simply presents data and analysis. If U.S. interests coincide with a continuation of NATO, then policy makers will have the tools to assess possible warning signs of dissolution or realignment. The same is true if policy makers want to hasten a discontinuation of the alliance.

2. Are divergent foreign policy actions a factor in alliance dissolution or realignment?

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Models of alliance behavior omit divergent foreign policy decisions as a factor influencing alliance dynamics.

Hypothesis 2: Domestic political factors and divergent foreign policy actions by less powerful alliance members are important factors in alliance dissolution or realignment.

The first hypothesis will be examined through analysis of current and past writings on the subject. The second hypothesis will be tested using historical case studies.

Background

This study focuses on alliance behavior in general but draws policy implications and recommendations geared towards the dynamics within NATO. In order to do this, this study makes two assertions and supports them. First, the EU is coalescing into a unitary body which may act more like an individual state in the future.[7] Second, EU coalescence may result in it behaving increasingly like an individual state within NATO. Currently, the EU is not a federalized state nor is it a state actor within NATO but it is showing signs of becoming both.[8] The EU evolved from an internal economic

[7] The terms unitary body, unitary actor, unitary voice or single actor all refer to an international entity comprised of various actors (states) behaving like a single state in the international system.
[8] Bodnari, Florentina. "What Can the EU Learn from the American Federalism?" *Conference Papers - American Political Science Association*, August, 27, 2003, 1-27; Council of the European Union, "EU-

commission to a global actor with a unitary foreign and defense policy over a fifty-year span.[9]

The EU traces its origins to the Council of Europe established in 1949 and the European Economic Community (EEC) established in 1957.[10] European states established these entities to increase economic cooperation. Since then, the EU evolved to encompass broader areas of cooperation to include foreign and defense policies.[11] Currently, the EU operates under the mandate of the Lisbon Treaty which established a stronger European Parliament, a President of the European Council, a High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). In addition, the treaty introduced a legal representative position for the Union that enables the EU to conclude international agreements and join international organizations. The EU is therefore able to speak and take action as a single entity.[12] There are also claims the EU may be moving towards eventual federalism.[13] There is a stark contrast between the EEC of 1957, which mainly dealt with establishing common internal market policies, and today's EU.[14]

NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus." http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf (accessed October 12, 2010).

[9] Stohr, Rudolf. "The Growth and Evolution of the European Union." January 2008.http://www.coceral.com/cms/dokumente/10015534_292758/26bdfa61/The%20Growth%20and%20Evolution%20of%20the%20European%20Union.pdf (accessed November 9, 2010).

[10] Stohr. "The Growth and Evolution of the European Union."

[11] Stohr. "The Growth and Evolution of the European Union."

[12] Europa, "Treaty of Lisbon." http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm (accessed October 28, 2010).

[13] See Bodnari, "What Can the EU Learn from the American Federalism?" 1-27; Burgess, Michael. "Introduction: Federalism and Building the European Union." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 26, no. 4 (1996): 1; Bellamy, Richard and Castiglione, Dario. "Building the Union: The Nature of Sovereignty in the Political Architecture of Europe." *Law and Philosophy* 16, no. 4 (1997): 421-445. These are some examples of EU moving towards federalism. The Treaty of Paris (1951), Treaty of Rome (1957),

The EU is increasingly behaving like an individual state in NATO.[15] Recently, the EU gained a unitary voice within NATO and has access to NATO planning, assets, and capabilities much like any other NATO member state.[16] The EU has more control of European defense assets and policies through Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the European Defense Agency (EDA) than it did in the past.[17] There are even calls within the EU to establish its own army.[18] The Lisbon Treaty includes a "solidarity clause", calling for the EU and its member states to act jointly, outside of NATO, if a member state is the target of a terrorist attack.[19] Additionally, the EU established and fielded defense forces comprised of what are termed "Battlegroups" (BG).[20] NATO's treatment of the EU as a unitary actor, coupled with increases in EU defense capabilities, results in the EU behaving more like a unified state actor than an international organization.

Methodology

This study tested the first hypothesis by examining existing literature on alliance behavior. The examination included the following models: the security and autonomy model, capability-aggregation model, domestic politics model, and institutionalization

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Maastricht Treaty (1992), and Treaty of Lisbon (2009) all move the EU towards a central federal structure. Most literature acknowledges this transformation and supports a semi-federal view of the current EU.

[14] Europa. "Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, EEC Treaty." http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_eec_en.htm (accessed October 28, 2010).

[15] Council of the European Union, "EU-NATO."

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Mardell, Mark. "Call for EU to Build Its Own Army." June 5, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7439104.stm (accessed October 28, 2010).

[19] Europa, "Treaty of Lisbon."

[20] European Union: Institute for Security Studies, "Security and Defense Policy." June 5, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7439104.stm (accessed October 15, 2010).

model.[21] The study used these models because they specifically address alliance behavior. Other theories, such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism (to include some of their strands) address alliance issues, but these theories do not specifically address alliance behavior. This study examined the four models of alliance behavior to identify key factors which are inherently important to their explanatory power. This was done to determine if divergent foreign policy decisions were identified as a factor in any of the models.

This study examined the second hypothesis using a comparative case study analysis of two cases of divergent foreign policy actions of alliance member states vis-à-vis the alliance. The dependent variable in these situations is the continuation of the alliance and the independent variable is the foreign policy actions of a lesser alliance member state in relation to the dominant member state under the conditions of a narrowing capability-asymmetry gap. This study used J.D. Morrow's research titled "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances" as a basis for measuring changes in the capability-asymmetry gap.

Morrow demonstrated a correlation between a state's security and its autonomy.[22] His conclusions include the following: asymmetric alliances are easier to form and last longer and a change in a state's individual capabilities is likely to lead to alliance dissolution.[23] He used six different indicators to measure an alliance member state's internal shift in capabilities: military expenditures, military personnel, total

[21] See Appendix A for explanations of each model.
[22] Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry," 904
[23] Ibid. Asymmetric alliances have states with unequal capabilities.

population, urban population, iron and steel production, and energy consumption.[24] This study added divergent foreign policy decisions to Morrow's original six variables to determine if this factor played a part in alliance dissolution or realignment.

Morrow contends that these composite capabilities are a crude indicator of military capabilities, but nevertheless allow measurement of changing capabilities within an alliance.[25] In using this method of measurement, he suggests that alliances are more likely to break as their members' capabilities change.[26] His conclusion lacks an additional variable that causes increased friction and is associated with an eventual realignment or dissolution of the alliance.[27] Divergent foreign policy decisions by a less powerful but rising state are not addressed as a cause of eventual alliance dissolution or realignment.

Key concepts

Definitions

This study defines divergent foreign policy decisions as actions or policy decisions by member states within the alliance that deviate from the policy of the dominant state. Furthermore, realignment of the alliance is a member state leaving or joining the alliance and dissolution is the complete disintegration of the alliance as a whole. The realignment or dissolution point is the date on which realignment or dissolution occurred.

[24] Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry," 923.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.

Types of alliances selected

For the purpose of this study and simplicity, alliances selected for the case studies met three criteria to be considered valid as proposed by the Correlates of War (COW)[28] project: "first, the alliance must be signed by two qualified system members; second, the alliance treaty must contain language that would qualify it as a defensive pact, a neutrality or non-aggression pact, or an entente; third the effective dates of the alliance have to be identifiable."[29] Additionally, the alliance must last long enough to allow measureable changes in quantifiable data to occur. Alliances lasting fifteen years allowed for measured changes in the capability-asymmetry gap. Measurements were taken in the beginning, middle, and end of the alliance to determine changes. The shortest alliance used in the case studies lasted for seventeen years and the longest for thirty-three years prior to dissolution or realignment.

The literature on alliances identifies three alliance types, Defense Pacts (Type I), Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pacts (Type II), and Ententes (Type III).[30] These alliance types differ by the amount of support pledged by alliance members to other members of the alliance. Type I alliances obligate members of the alliance to provide aid and come to the defense of other members if they are attacked by a non-alliance

[28] The Correlates of War (COW) project has promoted the systemic study of war by utilizing rigorous scientific analysis to identify its causes and precursors, collecting data on conflicts between state, non-state, and intra-state actors since the end of the Napoleonic era. COW was founded under the leadership of University of Michigan political scientist J. David Singer in 1963 and is now recognized as the authoritative source for international war data. Currently, Douglas Gibler and others continue research under the aegis of this project.
[29] Gibler, Douglas M. *International Military Alliances 1648-2008.* 1, Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2009, liv, lvii-lviii.
[30] Gibler, *International Military Alliances,* lvii.

member.[31] Type II and Type III alliances may include attack or defense aid clauses. However, Type I alliances always have this form of obligation, thereby making them more useful for this comparative study since they have more binding security commitments.

Qualifying states and treaties

According to the Correlates of War project, qualified members of the international system are states that are sovereign, autonomous, and recognized as such by other members of the system. [32] The language contained in the treaty must specify what type of alliance it is or it must be easy to deduce this information if it is not in the treaty.[33] The written agreement must pass a ratification process and can be secret (i.e. not available to non-member states at the discretion of member states) or open.[34] Lastly, the effective date of the alliance is important in determining how long the alliance lasted.[35] The dissolution of alliances is sometimes difficult to attribute to a certain date or event. The study ameliorated this problem because all the cases involve alliances which have a clear endpoint (dissolution point) or realignment point.

Case selection

The Correlates of War project documented over 450 alliances spanning 350 years, which appears to be a large data pool from which to choose cases.[36] However,

[31] Gibler, *International Military Alliances,* lvii.
[32] Ibid., xlix-lvii.
[33] Ibid.. lvii-lviii.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid., 551.

available literature precluded the inclusion of certain alliances.[37] Relevance is also a key component in this study's case selection. An effort was made to select alliances which mirror the current NATO dynamic. Other efforts to mirror the current NATO dynamic included establishing and adhering to the following criteria: alliances which allowed members to join or leave without fear of severe repercussions (i.e. invasion by other members), multi-member alliances (bilateral alliances do not mirror NATO), and alliances formed not using coercive efforts.[38]

The set of cases were developed by searching for alliances that had multiple members, allowed members to join and leave freely, and were not coercive. Surprisingly, only four cases met these criteria for mirroring the current NATO dynamic. In chronological order, these are: The Triple Alliance of 1882, The 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance[39], NATO[40], and the 1954 Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration among the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Turkish Republic.

Based on the criteria outlined, this study examined two cases to determine the extent to which there is a link between divergent foreign policy decisions of a lesser state as its capabilities and self-security increase vis-à-vis the dominant state, and the dissolution or realignment of the alliance. The two cases are: the Triple Alliance of 1882

[37] For example, the 1923 alliance between Estonia and Latvia or the 1934 alliance between Saudi Arabia and Yemen do not have extensive literature readily available.
[38] Examples of alliances not included are the Warsaw Pact and colonial alliances. These alliances were formed through coercive efforts by the dominant state.
[39] Cuba left this alliance in 1962 causing realignment.
[40] France withdrew its defense forces and left the command structure of this alliance in 1966 causing realignment.

and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 (see Table 1). The Inter-American Treaty was not chosen because Cuba is still a member but is excluded from participation by the other alliance members.[41] The 1954 Treaty of Friendship was excluded because of constraints on gathering data.

Table 1: Alliance cases selected for analysis

Alliance	Members	Enacted/Dissolved or realigned	Years Active
Case #1: Triple Alliance of 1882	(3) Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy	1882/1915	33
Case #2: North Atlantic Treaty of 1949	(12)[42] United States, Canada, UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland	1949/1966[43]	17[44]

Quantifiable comparison

Each case study involved an examination of a lesser state and the dominant state in the alliance taking into consideration the six criteria utilized by Morrow as well as the seventh one added for the purpose of this study. The study compared the dominant state and the state that was the first to leave the alliance.

There are two main rationales for comparing a dominant state to the first state to leave the alliance. First, the dominant state of an alliance has greater control especially

[41] Gibler, *International Military Alliances,* 369.
[42] NATO had 12 original members with later editions of: Greece and Turkey (1951); German Federal Republic (1954); Spain (1981); Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1997); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (2004); Croatia and Albania (2009).
[43] France pulled out of the command structure in 1966 but the alliance continued. For the purpose of this study 1966 will be viewed as the change/realign date within the alliance since France essentially pulled its defense forces from alliance use.
[44] See footnote #43.

in restraining the actions of lesser states.[45] The restraint is related to security-autonomy tradeoffs. A lesser state sacrifices its autonomy for security gains from the dominant state and/or other states in the alliance.[46] However, the dominant state is termed dominant because it has the greatest security resources and can provide the most benefit to lesser states.[47] This dominant position allows for more leverage over lesser states. Therefore, any counter action by a lesser state vis-à-vis the dominant state may signal a change in the lesser state's perception of its security in the alliance or the international system.

Second, the first state to leave the alliance signals the first measurable change to the alliance structure in terms of dissolution or realignment. An alliance may undergo several realignments in its duration with states joining or exiting. However, this study focused on the first state to leave the alliance because the scope of including all realignment changes was too great.[48]

Comparison of the two states in both alliance cases began by gathering and inputting data from three points in the duration of the alliance: at the beginning, middle and realignment/dissolution point. The gathered data corresponded to each of Morrow's six factors and established which member was the dominant state and which was the lesser state. Conversion of each individual factor's data into a ratio

[45] Snyder, Glenn H. *Alliance Politics.* New York: Cornell University Press, 1997, 320-322.

[46] Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," 848.
[47] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 180-181.
[48] NATO expanded to include Greece and Turkey (1951) and German Federal Republic (1954) during its duration before France left the command structure in 1966. Time and data gathering constraints prevented adding these countries to the case study.

represented the capability-asymmetry gap between the two states. Comparing each individual factor's beginning, middle, and realignment/dissolution point ratio allowed measurement of the capability-asymmetry gap throughout the duration of the alliance. For example, the study compared Morrow's military population factor ratio between Germany and Italy in 1882, 1897, and 1914 to determine any changes from when Italy joined the alliance to when it left.

For the seventh, additional factor, the study identified the total number of divergent foreign policy decisions (sorted by date) undertaken by the lesser state using a literature review of historical events. Divergent foreign policy decisions met the following criteria for inclusion in the study. First, a state must make or execute the foreign policy decision so that its outcome has tangible results. That is, the executing state enacts the decision either through stating it as policy or acting on it through a variety of diplomatic tools (i.e. signed treaty, use of military, foreign aid). This is applicable to both the dominant and lesser state. Second, the foreign policy decision must be counter to the public position of the dominant state on the same matter. For example, State A (dominant state) publicly states it does not want State B (lesser state) to increase its defense forces, yet State B increases its defense forces.

The two alliances selected for this project lasted thirty-three (Triple Alliance) and seventeen years (NATO). To allow for a comparison between them, the study divided

each alliance's duration into quarters.[49] Plotting the divergent foreign policy decisions by quarter allowed for comparison between the cases. According to the second hypothesis, there should be an increase in the number of divergent foreign policy decisions as the asymmetry gap narrows and the realignment or dissolution point of the alliance nears.

Contribution

This study contributes two pieces of analysis to increase the information available to U.S. policy makers. First, it tests the extent to which an association exists between divergent foreign policy decisions and alliance dissolution or realignment. Second, it identifies key influencing factors in other models of alliance behavior and applies them to each test case. Identifying certain factors' presence in both cases may show a trend. Application of these factors to the NATO alliance of 2010 may signal which factors policy makers should pay attention to when formulating policy.

The scope of this study is limited to two cases, one of which occurred far in the past. Despite occurring over one hundred years ago, the case of the Triple Alliance holds lessons for NATO in 2010 for the following reasons: it was a multilateral alliance, it was geographically located in Europe, and it involved two current NATO members. Additionally, the applicability of international relations models and theories should not be historically constrained. An international relations theory should be able to explain phenomena regardless of when they occurred for the theory to be considered sound

[49] Breakdown of alliance duration: Triple Alliance – 1st quarter (1882-1890), 2nd quarter (1891-1998), 3rd quarter (1899-1906), and 4th quarter (1907-1914). US-NATO-France – 1st quarter (1949-1953), 2nd quarter (1954-1957), 3rd quarter (1957-1961), and 4th quarter (1962-1966).

and adequate.[50] Nevertheless, the limitations of this study are obvious. Testing of more cases (not specific to NATO), over a longer period of time may yield better data.

Roadmap

In Chapter 2 the study tested Hypothesis 1 and examined the findings. The examination yielded interesting results which were compiled into a comprehensive table. The table is referenced throughout the rest of the paper and provides a good overview of the results. Chapters 3 and 4 focused on Hypothesis 2. Results of the testing and analysis were divided between the two chapters. Chapter 3 examined the importance of divergent foreign policy decisions and how they could be added to one model of alliance behavior. Chapter 4 examined the importance of domestic political factors on alliance behavior. Chapter 5 provides implications for policy makers, U.S. national security policy, and for one model of alliance behavior. Additionally, Chapter 5 presents policy recommendations which stem from the analysis and findings conducted in Chapters 2-4.

[50] Vasquez, John A. *The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory after Enlightenment's Fall. International Relations Theory Today.* Ken Booth and Steve Smith. University Park: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995, 230-232

CHAPTER 2 – TESTING HYPOTHESIS 1

Existing models of alliance behavior pay insufficient attention to foreign policy decisions

Based on the findings in this study, models of alliance behavior attempt to explain alliance dynamics using certain factors but they pay insufficient attention to a state's foreign policy decisions.[51] An examination of four models of alliance behavior yielded key factors specific to each model used to measure alliance behavior. None of the identified factors were foreign policy decisions. These findings uphold Hypothesis 1. The testing of Hypothesis 1 is summarized in the first two columns of Table 2.

Examination of the four models and identification of factors

Morrow used six factors to quantify the capability-asymmetry gap and measure changes in the security-autonomy of alliance member states.[52] Realism frames his model. His definition of security focuses on military power and the capacity to produce it. The capability-aggregation model frames its explanation in neo-realism.[53] The presence of a threat and an imbalance between the threat and the threatened state govern alliance formation and behavior. Domestic politics focuses solely on the dynamics within a state and is most closely linked with liberalism and constructivism.[54] State leaders affect alliance behavior. Therefore, changes in a state's leadership or dramatic changes in policy are factors. Lastly, the institutionalization model is framed

[51] See Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984." Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test." Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." These theories include the security-autonomy model, capability-aggregation model, domestic politics model, and institutionalization model.
[52] Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," 923.
[53] Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," 848-849.
[54] Ibid., 849-850

by liberalism and its factors are longevity, a high level of cooperation, and mutuality of interests.[55]

Table 2: Factors influencing alliance dynamics derived from models of alliance behavior

Models of Alliance Behavior	Factors	Triple Alliance 1882-1914	NATO 1949-1966	EU in NATO 2010
Security-Autonomy (Morrow)	Military Expenditure	No	No	No
	Military Personnel	No	No	Yes[56]
	Total Population	No	No	Yes[57]
	Urban Population	No	No	Yes
	Iron and Steel Production	Yes[58]	Yes[59]	Yes[60]
	Energy Consumption	Yes[61]	No	Yes[62]
Capability-Aggregation	Present Threat	No[63]	Yes	No
	Existence of an Imbalance in Power Between Threat and Threatened State	No	Yes	No
Domestic Politics Model	Change in Political Leadership	Yes[64]	Yes[65]	Yes[66]
	Major Change in Political Leader's Policy	Yes[67]	Yes[68]	No
Institutionalization Model	Lasted More than 20 Years	Yes	No	Yes
	High Level of Cooperation in Alliance	No	Yes	Yes
	Mutuality of Interests	No	Yes	Yes

[55] Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," 850.
[56] European Defense Agency, "European – United States Defence Expenditure in 2008." December 2009.www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=828 (accessed October 27, 2010).The European Defense Agency has more total active military personnel than the United States.
[57] European Commission Eurostat, "Total Population." http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 (accessed October 27, 2010). The EU has greater total population than the United States
[58] The asymmetry gap narrowed between Italy and Germany in steel production.
[59] The asymmetry gap narrowed between France and the US in iron and steel production.
[60] Steel on the Net, "World Steel Production Report." http://www.steelonthenet.com/production.html (accessed October 27, 2010).
[61] The asymmetry gap narrowed between Italy and Germany in energy consumption.
[62] U.S. Energy Information Administration, "International Energy Statistics." http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=6&pid=29&aid=12 (accessed October 27, 2010). EU electric output is greater than U.S. output.
[63] Italy did not perceive a major threat from any of the Triple Entente powers.
[64] Bismarck was forced to resign.
[65] De Gaulle assumed the French Presidency during this time.
[66] The EU has two main leadership positions: President of the European Council and President of the European Commission. So far, neither of these positions displayed a propensity for strong-willed leadership.
[67] German policies changed from *Realpolitik* to *Weltpolitik* following Bismarck's death.
[68] De Gaulle's policy shifted French industry to a high priority level; he also pushed for an independent French nuclear weapons program.

All four models of alliance behavior do not take into account the importance of foreign policy decisions on alliance dynamics.[69] None of these models use divergent foreign policy decisions as a factor influencing alliance behavior. This lack of attention leaves the study of alliance behavior incomplete. However, divergent foreign policy decisions could be added to Morrow's six other factors to determine changes in the capability-asymmetry gap. The study expands on this in Chapter 3 because it is linked to the findings of Hypothesis 2.

Additional literature on alliance behavior omits foreign policy actions

Realism, liberalism, and constructivism form the basis of the four models examined in Hypothesis 1. A review of this literature did not yield divergent foreign policy decisions as a key factor affecting alliance behavior. According to these theories, key factors influencing alliance behavior are power, cooperation, or ideas (in reference to the main international relations theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism).[70] An examination of this literature produced the following factors influencing alliance behavior: balance of power, balancing against threat, cost/risk versus benefit analysis, constraining power, and reforming or integrating states into the international system.

[69] This study demonstrates the influence of divergent foreign policy decisions on alliance behavior in Chapter 3.

[70] Ratti, Luca. "Post-Cold War NATO and International Relations Theory: The Case for Neo-Classical Realism." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 4, no. 1 (2006): 82; Ikenberry, G. John. "America's Liberal Hegemony." *Current History* 98, no. 624 (1999): 25-26; Berenskoetter, Felix. "Creating (In)Security from Within: The Ontological Purpose of Alliances." *Conference Papers - International Studies Association* (2006): 1.

According to some traditional alliance literature, alliances are formed to balance power in the international system.[71] A primary prerequisite for an alliance to form is the need for an alliance ideology so that there is something that the alliance is formed against.[72] Stephen Walt asserts that alliances are not simply mechanisms for balancing in the international system but rather a response to threats.[73] Michael Altfeld builds on this research and proposes that states will only join and maintain an alliance if the costs and risks do not outweigh the benefits.[74] Alliance theory and models continue to evolve with one of the most recent additions being G. John Ikenberry's institutional interdependence model.[75] He asserts that balancing is less important as alliances form to constrain power, reform states, or speed the integration of losing states into a functioning international system after war.[76] The literature surrounding these theories does not place any importance on divergent foreign policy decisions as a key factor influencing alliance behavior. Therefore, neither models of alliance behavior nor the theories they are based on, pay sufficient attention to state foreign policy decisions as a factor in alliance behavior.

[71] Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Alliances*. New York: Random House, 1979. Morgenthau H. J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985, 201.
[72] Liska, G. F. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968, 27.
[73] Walt, Stephen M. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987, 17-49.
[74] See Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test."
[75] See Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
[76] Ibid.

CHAPTER 3 – TESTING HYPOTHESIS 2, PART ONE: DIVERGENT FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS

Divergent foreign policy actions have an effect on alliances

The research involving the three case studies supports Hypothesis 2. An association does exist between divergent foreign policy decisions and alliance dissolution or realignment. In both cases, there is a marked increase in divergent foreign policy decisions by the lesser state vis-à-vis the dominant state and the lesser state leaving the alliance (see Table 3). These instances of divergent foreign policy decisions appear to increase in the second half, and in one case, peak in the last quarter of the cases studied.

Table 3: Number of divergent foreign policy decisions by the lesser state in case studies by quarter [77]



Morrow's six factors play a lesser role

Morrow's six factors appear to play a lesser role in measuring security-autonomy changes in the cases studied. Results from establishing a ratio in each factor exhibited

[77] Breakdown of alliance duration: Triple Alliance – 1st QTR (1882-1890), 2nd QTR (1891-1998), 3rd QTR (1899-1906), 4th QTR (1907-1914). US-NATO-France – 1st QTR (1949-1953, 2nd QTR (1954-1957), 3rd QTR (1957-1961), 4th QTR (1962-1966). See Appendix B for list of contradictory foreign policy decisions and sources.

changes between the lesser and dominant state (see Table 4). However, the changes in both cases were minimal and some factors actually displayed a widening (decreasing percentage in Table 4) of the capability-asymmetry gap prior to alliance dissolution. Narrowing (increasing percentage in Table 4) of the capability-asymmetry gap occurred in the industrial and economic factors involving iron/steel production in one case (NATO) and steel production and energy consumption in another case (Triple Alliance). This seems to indicate that increased industrial output may affect a state's security apparatus more than the other factors and has a significant effect on the state's perceived security within the international system (see Tables in Appendix C for actual figures).[78]

Table 4: Summary of ratio changes using Morrow's six factors[79]

	Triple Alliance 1882				NATO 1949			
Factors	**1882**	**1897**	**1914**	**Overall Percent Change**	**1948**	**1956**	**1965**	**Overall Percent Change**
Military Expenditures	0.44	0.43	0.44	0%	0.10	.08	0.10	0%
Military Personnel	0.52	0.45	0.42	-10%	0.34	0.23	0.19	-15%
Total Population	0.63	0.59	0.53	-10%	0.28	0.26	0.25	-3%
Iron and Steel Production	0.042 0.003	0.02 0.01	0.03 0.07	-1.2% +7%	0.13 0.09	0.34 0.13	0.38 0.16	+25 +7
Energy Consumption	0	0.14	0.25	+25%	0.08	0.08	0.09	+1
Urban Population	0.61	0.57	0.46	-15%	0.24	0.23	0.24	0%

Case #1: Triple Alliance 1882

This case pitted Italy, the lesser and first state to leave the alliance, against Germany, the dominant state in the alliance. Morrow's six factors were examined to determine if there was a profound change in the lesser state's capabilities vis-à-vis the

[78] Wilson, Trevor and Prior, Robin. "Conflict, Technology, and the Impact of Industrialization: The Great War 1914-18." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24, no. 3 (2001): 128-145.
[79] Compilation of the data from Tables 7A, 7B, 7C, 8A, 8B, and 8C in Appendix C.

dominant state (see Tables 4 and 5). According to the findings, the capability-asymmetry gap did not narrow in four factors from the beginning to the end of the alliance. Some factors such as military personnel and total population demonstrated a widening gap. Two factors displayed narrowing: steel production and energy consumption. The seventh factor, divergent foreign policy decisions, showed a marked increase in the second half of the alliance's lifespan (see Table 3). This may suggest that divergent foreign policy decisions may account for changes in perceptions of state security not adequately captured by Morrow's other six factors.

Table 5: Ratio between the capabilities of dominant and lesser state in case study 1 (Triple Alliance) in the beginning, middle, and end of the alliance[80]



Case #2: NATO 1949

In this case, France was the first state to cause realignment in the alliance by leaving NATO's command structure in 1966.[81] The findings demonstrated that gap narrowing between the United States and France occurred only in one factor (see

[80] Table is a compilation of the data in Tables 7A, 7B, and 7C in Appendix C.
[81] Cody, Edward. "After 43 Years, France to Rejoin NATO as Full Member." *The Washington Post*, March 12, 2009.

Tables 4 and 6). This data showed a narrowing in steel and iron production, widening in military personnel, and largely unchanged status in the other factors. Unlike the previous case, France's divergent foreign policy actions began earlier in the life of the alliance (prior to the halfway mark). These actions peaked in the 4th quarter (see Table 3) suggesting an association between divergent foreign policy decisions and eventual alliance dissolution or realignment. Again, Morrow's factors did not adequately measure changes in a state's perceived security vis-à-vis the dominant state.

Table 6: Ratio between capabilities of dominant and the lesser state in case study 2 (NATO) in the beginning, middle, and end of the alliance [82]



Overall, the study expected to see a narrowing in most of Morrow's factors prior to alliance realignment or dissolution. This was not observed.[83] In the Triple Alliance, Italy narrowed the gap in iron production and energy consumption, just two of the six factors. In NATO, France narrowed one factor, iron and steel production. In both cases, Morrow's six factors do not signal for realignment or dissolution as the security-

[82] Table is a compilation of the data in Tables 8A, 8B, and 8C in Appendix C.
[83] See Tables 7A, 7B, 7C, 8A, 8B, and 8C for actual numerical data.

autonomy model predicts. However, in both cases, divergent foreign policy decisions increased prior to alliance dissolutions and realignment (see Table 3) possibly capturing changes in a state's perception of security that the other six factors failed to.

Adding to Morrow's security-autonomy model

Adding divergent foreign policy decisions to Morrow's model may fill a gap in increasing its explanatory and predictive power. According to the security-autonomy model, a state must feel secure outside of the alliance in order to conduct autonomous actions.[84] Divergent foreign policy decisions are a form of autonomous action.[85] A lesser state's divergent foreign policy decisions increase prior to alliance dissolution or realignment (see Tables 3). This may signal an increase in perceived security not measured by one of Morrow's six factors. The capability-asymmetry gap may narrow in other factors linked to power outside the scope of Morrow's model. As tested on the two cases in this study, Morrow's six factors do not accurately capture the change in a state's perceived security.

There could be other factors contributing to a state's perceived security which are outside the scope Morrow's model. Morrow uses only six factors to measure a state's power vis-à-vis another state in an alliance.[86] His factors are focused on military power. However, there are other measures of a state's military power which are omitted from

[84] See Bennett. "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration."
[85] See Snyder, *Alliance Politics*. A state reliant on an alliance for its security would probably not want to do anything to cause its removal from the alliance. In this case compliance is a result of dependence. According to Snyder, a needy state is more dependent on the alliance. Lack of security is a need in an anarchic world.
[86] Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry," 923.

Morrow's model. For example, the number and type of naval combat ships, number of nuclear weapons, or number of tanks. Additionally, a state's perception of its security could change based on other capability changes vis-à-vis the dominant state in the alliance. For example, a dominant state's advantage is somewhat diminished if the dominant state is heavily reliant on airpower and the lesser state acquires a large amount of effective anti-air weapons.

Divergent foreign policy decisions may capture changes in a state's perceived security by encompassing factors which Morrow's model does not measure. Identifying all the factors that affect a state's power and then gathering data for them might be a difficult task. Using divergent foreign policy actions bypasses the need to do this by capturing perceptions of state power and security in one factor. If the lesser state can secure itself without the help of the alliance, it should seek autonomy and its actions will probably exemplify this perception (through divergent foreign policy decisions).

CHAPTER 4 – TESTING HYPOTHESIS 2, PART TWO: DOMESTIC POLICY ACTIONS

Domestic political factors influence alliance dissolution or realignment

In addition to adding a seventh factor, the domestic politics model of alliance behavior may fill in some of the gaps left by the security-autonomy model in explaining alliance dissolution or realignment.[87] Of the identified factors to test Hypothesis 1, only the domestic factors were present in both cases (see Table 2). Except for the security-autonomy model's iron and steel production, all other factors identified within the four models of alliance behavior did not occur in both cases. The appearance of the two domestic politics factors in both cases suggests that the domestic politics model is an important factor in alliance dissolution or realignment.

Case #1: Triple Alliance 1882

Otto von Bismarck's departure from German politics may account for a change in Italy's perception of its security. He crafted policy to attain a balance in the international system by securing treaties which allowed him to constrain foreign state actions.[88] The Triple Alliance originated in 1882 yet Italy, the lesser power, did not execute any divergent foreign policy decisions until 1900.[89] Bismarck engaged in German policy making and rendered his advice to policy makers until his death in 1898. All seven of Italy's contradictory foreign policy actions occurred after Bismarck's death (see Table 3).

[87] Barnett, Michael N. and Levy, Jack S. "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73." *International Organization* 45, (1991): 369-395; Kimball, Anessa L. "Political Survival, Policy Distribution, and Alliance Formation." *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 4 (2010): 407-419. Internal politics matter in alliance formation duration and eventual dissolution. This model explains that the individual leaders play a critical role in alliance dynamics.

[88] Schmitt, Bernadotte E. *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*. New York: H. Fertig, 1971, 3-5.

[89] Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, p 68; see also Sontag, Raymond J. *European Diplomatic History*. New York: The Century Co., 1933.

This may suggest that Bismarck's political influence within the alliance may have contributed to Italy feeling secure.

According to the domestic politics model, Bismarck's influence over how Germany behaved and its influence in Italy's international behavior played a key role.[90] His individual ability to craft a *Realpolitik* policy thereby establishing a natural balance in the regional and international order possibly prevented Italy from exerting policies counter to his. Italy may have felt secure because of the balance in the system and the alliance crafted by Bismarck. After his death, German policy began to change towards *Weltpolitik* and Italy began to assert itself more forcefully.[91] In this sense, the domestic politics of the dominant state influenced the lesser state's action within the alliance.

Case #2: NATO 1949

In this case study the arrival, not departure, of a key individual in domestic politics may have influenced alliance dynamics. Charles De Gaulle came to power in 1958 promoting French nationalism.[92] He proposed several initiatives to increase France's position internationally and took on an anti-American policy stance to satisfy his domestic constituency.[93] In the face of a Soviet conventional and nuclear threat, he changed French policy away from total reliance on U.S. security guarantees.[94] He focused French resources on industrial output because he perceived industrialism as

[90] Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments," 369-375; Kimball, "Political Survival, Policy Distribution, and Alliance Formation," 407-410.
[91] Taylor, A. J. P. *Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman*. New York: Vintage Books, 1955, 264.
[92] Sowerwine, Charles. *France Since 1970*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 263-266.
[93] Kedward, H. R. *France and the French: A Modern History*. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2006, 393.
[94] Kedward, *France and the French*, 393.

being the key to self-reliance.[95] Consequently, France executed a total of thirteen divergent foreign policy actions, ten of which occurred after De Gaulle came to power.

De Gaulle changed French domestic and international policy.[96] His ascendancy to power coupled with a change to French policy altered France's behavior within NATO. The French government began to behave more assertively because De Gaulle linked industrial capacity and output to state security. French industrial output increased from 1948 to 1966 in iron and steel production by twenty-five percent (see Table 4. French internal domestic politics satisfied the two key factors identified within the domestic politics model (see Table 2). The importance of De Gaulle's influence on French policy and perceptions of its security cannot be understated.

Alternate explanation: perceptions of what security means influenced state behavior

In both cases, Morrow's six factors failed to adequately measure changes in a state's perceived security. Industrialization and a state's reliance on certain economic factors, such as steel production may play a more important role by compensating for losses in other factors. For example, increased steel production and energy consumption may account for production of and mechanization of defense materiel. Forecasts for the type of war to be fought in the early 20th century called for speed, decisive action, and a reliance on technology and industrialization for replacement of materiel.[97] According to this thinking, wars of attrition (i.e. the U.S. Civil War) which

[95] Hoffman, Stanley. *Decline or Renewal: France Since the 1930's*. New York: The Viking Press, 1974, 286.
[96] Kedward, *France and the French*, 393.
[97] Wilson and Prior, "Conflict, Technology, and the Impact of Industrialization," 128-130.

placed a greater emphasis on army sizes and available population were not the wars of the future.[98] The size of defense forces mattered less than what a state could do with them.[99]

Additionally, individual domestic state interests may drive policy. Italy had a greater interest in naval power than land power. It strove to be the predominant power in the Mediterranean and enacted several policy measures to secure its Mediterranean foothold.[100] This also may contribute to the explanation as to why the steel and energy consumption gaps narrowed and others, namely military personnel, did not. Steel is an important commodity in shipbuilding and navies at the time required a fraction of the personnel that land forces did.[101]

In France, Charles De Gaulle decided to focus French efforts on harnessing industrial power.[102] His personal perception of security influenced policy and France's behavior within NATO. In addition to industrial output, De Gaulle also placed an emphasis on developing a nuclear weapons capability as a guarantor of French security.[103] However, NATO leaders wanted to manage France's nuclear weapons and

[98] Donald, David H. *Why the North Won the Civil War.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960, 7-16. Advantage in available personnel and army size are the two of the main reasons cited for the Union's ultimate victory in the U.S. Civil War.
[99] Wilson and Prior, "Conflict, Technology, and the Impact of Industrialization," 128-130.
[100] Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 100-113. Italy wanted territories all around the Adriatic Sea and had interests in North Africa. This placed a heavy emphasis on naval domination in the Mediterranean.
[101] *The World Almanac and Encyclopedia 1898.* New York: Press Publishing Company, 1898, 328-329. Whitaker, Joseph. *Whitaker's Almanack for 1893*. London: 1893, 342.
[102] Hoffman, *Decline or Renewal*, 286.
[103] Ibid.

their scope of use within NATO.[104] The United States wanted overall ownership of the nuclear capability and favored a "flexible response" over mass retaliation. [105] The French government saw this as a betrayal of U.S. security guarantees and decided to develop a nuclear program outside the governance of NATO. De Gaulle's individual perceptions of security based on industrial output and French nuclear weapons shaped state policy. This could be a reason why the other capabilities did not narrow yet French divergent foreign policy actions increased.

Alternate explanation is not ideal for future research

The alternate explanation takes into account historical events as they pertain to each case. Applying this method to future research on the subject may be an exhaustive approach. Each case would be examined individually using historical context to determine why a state's behavior changed. A simpler method is to apply the two key factors identified in the domestic politics model to help explain and possibly predict state behavior. Researchers can apply the two factors to a broader range of historical cases without having to examine the historical context of each case.

[104] Kaplan, Lawrence S. *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004, 31-32.
[105] "France's Nuclear Weapons: Origins of the Force de Frappe." http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/France/FranceOrigin.html (accessed October 6, 2010).

CHAPTER 5 – POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Implications

The implications of this study affect U.S. policy makers, U.S. foreign policy, and Morrow's examination of the security-autonomy model of alliance behavior. A review of pertinent literature demonstrated that models of alliance behavior omit divergent foreign policy decisions as a factor influencing alliance behavior (Hypothesis 1). This omission of a factor influencing alliance behavior leaves the study of alliances incomplete. As a result, policy makers may rely on models of alliance behavior which do not provide enough tested research on which to make sound policy decisions. Adding divergent foreign policy decisions as a factor influencing alliance behavior could add explanatory depth to at least one model.

This study identified the security-autonomy model as place for this factor. Specifically within the security-autonomy model, divergent foreign policy decisions could be included as a seventh factor in addition to Morrow's six. Including divergent foreign policy decisions as an additional factor may help capture changes in the capability-asymmetry gap outside the scope of the six factors he used. This may increase his model's explanatory power.

Testing and subsequent analysis of Hypothesis 2 demonstrated that domestic political factors and divergent foreign policy decisions are important factors in alliance dissolution or realignment. Using only two cases to test this hypothesis limits the scope and applicability of the findings and more research is needed. Nevertheless, these two

cases provide implications for U.S. policy. First, domestic political factors played an important role in the two cases used for this study (see Table 2). A change in leadership and a change in policy may signal a change in the dynamics of an alliance. States in an alliance which undergo these changes may be prone to change the dynamics within the alliance leading to dissolution or realignment. Second, divergent foreign policy decisions may signal a change in a state's perception of security in the international system or within the alliance. A measured increase in the number of these decisions over a period of time may signal a warning of an upcoming change in alliance dynamics.

The implications of Hypothesis 2 are grounded within the two assertions made in the beginning of this study. First, the EU is coalescing into a unitary body which may behave more like a state actor in the future. Second, EU coalescence may result in it behaving increasingly like an individual state within NATO. Despite beginning to behave like a unitary actor, the EU is still decades away from federalism or even complete state-like behavior. Therefore, the implications surrounding the findings of Hypothesis 2 may have an impact on future strategic and U.S. national security planning involving forecasts beyond the next decade.[106]

[106] Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5; Strategy Division. "Joint Vision 2020." Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000.; National Intelligence Council. "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World." Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008.; Metz, Steven. "Strategic Horizons: The Military Implications of Alternative Futures." March 7, 1997.http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/horizon.pdf (accessed November 7, 2010). http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/horizon.pdf. These are examples of future planning and strategic vision documents. The implications of this study may influence these types of documents which attempt to predict future strategic and national security implications based on current trends.

In relation to the current structure of NATO, U.S. policy makers should see evidence of divergent foreign policy decisions by the EU in the run-up to a dramatic alliance shift. Some of this behavior is beginning to emerge already.[107] If the EU coalesces into a more tightly-knit institution, it may want to expand its roles and capabilities and challenge the United States internationally, not just in the economic arena, but also the political arena and eventually the security arena. According to the security-autonomy model, EU perceptions of security are linked to capabilities.[108] The EU's capabilities would dramatically increase if individual state resources were brought fully under EU control. Up to this point, U.S. presidential administrations and U.S. policy supported the EU's project of increasing self-defense, coalescence, and autonomy.[109] Based on the findings of this study, it may become more prudent for U.S. policy to shift away from advocating a stronger and unified EU security role.

Recommendations

This study bases its recommendations on the assumption that U.S. policy makers want NATO to continue. If policy makers seek the opposite policy, NATO dissolution, the recommendations should be disregarded. In reference to the findings of Hypothesis 2, policy makers should seek to identify and track the number of divergent

[107] See the following European Union: Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, "EU Commission Takes Action to Enforce 'Open Skies' Court Rulings." July 20, 2004.http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/200400116.htm (accessed October 12, 2010); Chaffin, Joshua and Clark, Pilita. "EU Claims Victory in Airline Emissions Wrangle" *Financial Times*. (2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/872b4d44-d492-11df-b230-00144feabdc0.html (accessed October 12, 2010); BBC News, "EU Allies Unite Against Iraq War." January 22, 2003.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2683409.stm (accessed October 12, 2010). These are examples of EU foreign policy which contradicted the stance of U.S. policy recently.
[108] Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry," 923.
[109] Archik, Kristin and Gallis, Paul. "NATO and the European Union." *CRS Report for Congress*, January 4, 2005, 21.

foreign policy decisions the EU enacts in the future. This data must be tracked from the inception of the EU and continuously updated. An uptick in the number of divergent foreign policy decisions may signal an upcoming shift in the dynamic within NATO. However, alone this is not a strong indicator of a shift, but coupled with domestic factors, it may present a better signal.

U.S. policy makers should be aware of two key domestic factors: the emergence of a strong leader capable of shifting or transforming EU policy and an evident shift in EU policy. Application of all the factors identified in Hypothesis 1 demonstrated that the EU achieved one of the two key domestic politics factors (see Table 2). The Lisbon Treaty created a new position, President of the European Council and a new leader assumed the position. Metrics for dramatic shifts in policy are beyond this study and require further research. Nevertheless, the shift must be a departure from the current policy. Currently, the powers of the President of the European Council are limited.[110] Reforms of the powers the office holds as well as any future treaties expanding the role of the EU may give the President and the EU more control over EU member states. There is a marked trend in EU behavior which signals a propensity for further coalescence to occur since the powers of the EU gradually expanded over the last fifty years.[111] If this were to happen, it may set the stage for an EU move closer to federalism. A lean towards federalism along with the emergence of the two key domestic factors identified in the study may result in a change to the dynamics within NATO.

[110] Europa, “Treaty of Lisbon.”
[111] Bodnari, "What Can the EU Learn from the American Federalism?" 1-27.

If policy makers deem NATO beneficial or even necessary to U.S. interests, then the United States must take steps to prevent the occurrence of the three identified factors stemming from the analysis of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Attempting to limit divergent foreign policy decisions, preventing the emergence of a strong leader, and stopping a shift in EU policy would be difficult to accomplish and may be regarded as provocative by the Europeans. An indirect approach to undermine future EU moves towards federalism or increased unitary policies may be the best way to accomplish U.S. goals in this arena. This study recommends a three pronged approach to indirectly prevent the occurrence of the three factors. Continuing U.S. security guarantees, which are appealing to the Europeans (i.e. defer their costs), relegating the EU to a secondary status by dealing with European states directly, and not advocating an autonomous EU defense capability.

Policy Recommendation 1- United States' decreased support of autonomous EU defense capability

Up to this point the United States supported an increased EU defense capability beginning with calls for a "European Defense Pillar" in NATO when the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was first debated.[112] U.S. support rested on maintaining collective EU defense within the framework of NATO.[113] However, despite these calls, the Treaty of Lisbon (1992) included the Petersberg Tasks which range from humanitarian missions to tasks of crisis management (including peacemaking)

[112] Hunter, Robert E. *The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor.* Rand, 2002, 8-10.
[113] Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy*, 8.

outside of NATO control.[114] Peacemaking may include military forces to establish and maintain a cessation of hostilities using force (combat operations) if necessary. The Petersberg Tasks are veiled in humanitarian and peacemaking efforts but they do not exclude combat operations. This is somewhat alarming because it allows the EU to conduct combat operations as a unitary body outside the control of NATO. Therefore, it behooves the United States to reverse its support for a "European Defense Pillar" in or outside of NATO.

Additionally, the United States should prevent the EU from attempting to enact an autonomous defense capability. The EU is attempting to become less reliant on U.S. defense equipment through "buy European" programs.[115] U.S. security assistance and security cooperation programs with individual EU and NATO member states must continue in order to place a greater reliance on U.S. security systems, training, and replacement parts. These bilateral training and exchange programs bind individual EU and NATO states to the U.S. through dependence on military hardware, software, and training.[116] It would be costly for the EU to develop weapons systems and training support infrastructure.[117] Budgetary issues are a prohibitive factor in expanding defense capabilities for certain EU members as will be shown later in this section.

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[114] Europa: Glossary, "The Petersberg Tasks." http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm (accessed October 15, 2010).
[115] The EU developed or is attempting to develop weapons systems which are devised and built strictly through a European consortium, thereby excluding any US involvement. An example of this is the Airbus A400M transport aircraft program.
[116] Adams, Gordon. "Transatlantic Defense-Industrial Cooperation and American Policy." November25, 2002.http://www.eusec.org/adams.htm (accessed November 7, 2010).
[117] Field, Catherine. "Britain and France to Work Together." November 4, 2010.http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10685127 (accessed November 7, 2010).

Policy Recommendation 2 - United States' decreased support of EU coalescence

The United States must continue direct bilateral relations with individual EU member states. The bilateral relations will undermine a stronger EU voice by focusing on individual state needs rather than the collective. In a sense, this is dominance through division. What the United States should avoid is encouraging and speaking to the EU as a unitary body on all policy issues.

The U.S. and EU economies account for about half of the world economy.[118] In this realm, it would be difficult to discount the EU, but the United States shouldn't have to. The EU originated as an economic and trade organization and has boosted the U.S. economy through interdependence.[119] However, the United States should resist other forms of contact with the EU as a unitary body on issues dealing with foreign policy and defense and continue speaking to individual EU member countries on a bilateral basis. If the United States addresses the EU in lieu of speaking to individual states, the EU may gain more legitimacy as a unitary body through these relations.

Policy Recommendation 3 - United States' increased support of NATO and security guarantees to Europe

According to the research in this study, if the EU were to perceive its collective security increasing, it might begin making divergent foreign policy decisions eventually leading to NATO dissolution or realignment. U.S. reliance on NATO is not an existential

[118] European Commission on Trade, "Countries: United States." http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/ (accessed October 15, 2010).
[119] Europa, "A History of the European Union." http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm (accessed October 15, 2010).

problem but it does affect national security. First, NATO is helping in Afghanistan through troop contributions and operations.[120] Second, NATO is helping to uphold some of the struggling democracies who were under Soviet rule, and finally, NATO is helping the United States cope with problems associated with globalization.[121] It is in the best interest of the United States to prevent NATO's dissolution.

Most EU member states are facing economic and budgetary crises.[122] The latter was brought on because of government social welfare programs which included expanding social benefits, lowering retirement ages, and not addressing declining birth rates and mortality rates.[123] This problem is being addressed in European societies which are dependent on the state for health care, retirement programs, and other benefits through reform programs but results will not be immediate and it may take decades for the reforms to have an effect.[124] With most EU member states' individual tax burdens surpassing fifty percent per household, increasing taxes to pay for these programs is not an option.[125] Imposing programs and reforms to decrease government

[120] Kemp, Danny. "NATO Facilitating Taliban Talks in Afghanistan: Petraeus." *AFP*, October 15, 2010.
[121] "NATO and the National Interest." *American Foreign Policy Interests* 31, no. 2 (2009): 134-136.
[122] Stepek, John. "The Eurozone is Heading for a Fresh Crisis."*MoneyWeek*, (2010), http://www.moneyweek.com/news-and-charts/economics/the-eurozone-is-heading-for-a-fresh-crisis-04420.aspx (accessed November 7, 2010).
[123] See the following Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation, "The Demographic Future of Europe – From Challenge to Opportunity." October 12, 2008. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/situation_in_europe/c10160_en.htm (accessed October 12, 2010); Shah, Neil. "European Economy Promises More Pain; 'Going to See New Lows'." *Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition*, January 12, 2009; "Europe Fights Slowdown in East, West." *Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition*, February 4, 2009; Alber, Jens. "What the European and American Welfare States Have in Common and Where They Differ: Facts and Fiction in Comparisons of the European Social Model and the United States." *Journal of European Social Policy* 20, no. 2 (2010): 102-125.
[124] Pavolini, Emmanuele and Costanzo, Ranci. "Restructuring the Welfare State: Reforms in Long-Term Care in Western European Countries." *Journal of European Social Policy* 18, no. 3 (2008): 246-259.
[125] Vrana, Debora. "The Basics: Think Your Taxes are Bad?" *MSN – Money*. http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/taxes/p148855.asp (accessed November 2, 2010).

social welfare spending such as increasing the national retirement age, is politically unpopular and daunting. Some politicians and their parties may suffer at future polls if they attempt reforms aimed cutting their citizens' benefits.[126]

With this already heavy burden, most European NATO countries are facing difficulties contributing the NATO mandated two percent of their GDP towards defense.[127] The United States will remain a potent and necessary member of the alliance by offsetting European defense costs through continuing U.S. security guarantees using NATO. Additionally, any EU security development must be nested within NATO's structure to allow transparency and prevent autonomous action.

[126] This is evident with the political setbacks President Sarkozy is suffering in France by trying to raise the retirement age.
[127] Brunnstrom, David. "NATO Emphasizes Defense Spending Crisis." *Reuters,* (2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64G48920100517 (accessed November 11, 2010).

APPENDIX A: ALLIANCE MODEL EXPLANATIONS

Security-autonomy model

The security-autonomy model explains that states attempt to improve both security and autonomy but there are tradeoffs between the two in an alliance structure.[128] Morrow extends this research by examining the capability-asymmetry gap between lesser and dominant states suggesting states will leave an alliance if they can achieve security outside of it.[129] His six factors attempt to quantify the closure of the asymmetry gap and show that this leads to alliance dissolution.

Capability-aggregation model

The capability-aggregation model leans on the realist or neorealist view of international alliances. This model contends that states aggregate their power to balance against other power or against threats.[130] Foreign policy decisions are tied to the perception of a state's power or the threats it faces. Therefore, these decisions are irrelevant in determining alliance behavior since they are the dependent variable.

Domestic politics model

A number of studies have found that aspects of domestic politics affect alliance behavior.[131] Regime change, individual state leaders, minor or major constituencies are just some of the factors that may play a role in determining a state's behavior in an

[128] Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," 849.
[129] See Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry."
[130] Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 17-49. See also Waltz, Kenneth. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." *International Security* (2000).
[131] See Gaubatz, Kurt T. "Democratic States and Commitments in International Relations." *International Organization* 50, (1996): 109-130; Barnett and Levy. "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments," 369-95. Siverson, Randolph M. and Starr, Harvey. "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 38, (1994): 145-161.

alliance.[132] A state's foreign policy is shaped by individuals who may or may not act rationally, but their influence over state actions is nonetheless important.[133]

Institutionalization model

The institutionalization model generally contends that alliances are established and designed to help their members develop collective solutions to problems.[134] They help the involved actors resolve their differences and cooperate but usually require a mutuality of interests to do so. Time is a significant factor in this model because long-lasting alliances are harder to dissolve.[135] They begin to perpetuate themselves.

[132] Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," 854.
[133] Byman and Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men," 107-108.
[134] Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984," 850.
[135] Ibid.

APPENDIX B: LIST OF CONTRADICTORY FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

Italy

1) 1900 - France and Italy made secret agreement about Morocco (counter to German desires).[136]
2) 1902 - Italy changed alliance treaty. Italy specified that it would not conduct policy directed against France (counter to German desires).[137]
3) 1902 - Secret agreement reached between France and Italy (if France declared war on Germany, Italy would not aid Germany).[138]
4) 1906 – During the Algeciras Conference Italy stood by France against Germany on France's claims to Morocco.[139]
5) 1908 - Italy wanted compensations (according to terms of treaty of Triple Alliance) because Austria annexed Bosnia. Austria denied altering the status quo and did not compensate Italy. Italy then stood by Triple Entente on the issue.[140]
6) 1911 - Italy invaded and annexed Tripoli, bringing it into conflict with the German-backed Ottoman Empire.[141]
7) 1914 - Italy did not agree with German backed Austro-Hungarian policies of bringing Serbia under control by force.[142]
8) 1914 - Italy cited violation of alliance treaty (Italy was not consulted prior to Austrian actions prior to WW I) and didn't stand with treaty members when WW I began.[143]

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[136] Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 68; see also Sontag, *European Diplomatic History*.
[137] Seymour, Charles. *The Diplomatic Background of the War.* New Haven: Yale University Press , 1916, 35,147
[138] Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 57-59.
[139] Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 76; see also Manhart, George B. *Alliance and Entente 1871-1914.* New York: F.S.Crofts, 1932, 91-92.
[140] Sontag, *European Diplomatic History*, 124-125.
[141] Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 93; see also Sontag, *European Diplomatic History*.
[142] Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 113.

France

1) 1954 - Prime Minister Pierre Mendes of France met with his cabinet and authorized a program to develop an atomic bomb (counter to U.S. desires).[144]

2) 1956 - France initiates Suez Crisis despite warnings from the United States.[145]

3) 1956 - France endorses an independent nuclear program against U.S. desires.[146]

4) 1959 - President De Gaulle prohibited NATO nuclear weapons from being stationed in France.[147]

5) 1959 - France withdraws from the NATO Mediterranean Command.[148]

6) 1960 - President De Gaulle puts a restriction on NATO using the French Air Force.[149]

7) 1960 - At Reggane in Algeria France detonates first nuclear bomb (plutonium) against U.S. desires.[150]

8) 1963 - France refuses to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.[151]

9) 1963 - President De Gaulle withdraws remaining French naval units from NATO.[152]

10) 1964 - France does not support the United States over Vietnam when President Lyndon B. Johnson escalates the war.[153]

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[143] Manhart, *Alliance and Entente*, 15-52; Sontag, *European Diplomatic History*, 195, 200; Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 113.
[144] "France's Nuclear Weapons: Origins of the Force de Frappe." http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/France/FranceOrigin.html (accessed October 6, 2010).
[145] Kedward, *France and the French,* 338-339; see also "France's Nuclear Weapons: Origins of the Force de Frappe." http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/France/FranceOrigin.html (accessed October 6, 2010).
[146] Kedward, *France and the French*, 394.
[147] Howell, Mark. "Looking Back: De Gaulle Tells American Forces to Leave France." http://www.mildenhall.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123196265 (accessed October 7, 2010).
[148] Cogan, Charles. *Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO--Then and Now.* Westport: Praeger, 1997, 123.
[149] Sowerwine, *France Since 1970*, 309.
[150] "France's Nuclear Weapons: Origins of the Force de Frappe." http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/France/FranceOrigin.html (accessed October 6, 2010); see also Kedward, *France and the*, 391.
[151] John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, Historical Resources, "JFK in History: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/Nuclear+Test+Ban+Treaty.htm (accessed October 6, 2010); see also Kedward, *France and the French*, 391.
[152] Sowerwine, *France Since 1970*, 309.

11) 1964 - France recognizes Communist China in 1964.[154]

12) 1966 - President De Gaulle visits Cambodia and holds the United States responsible for the Vietnam War 1966.[155]

13) 1966 - France announces decision to pull out of NATO military command.[156]

[153] Ibid.
[154] Kedward, *France and the French,* 393.
[155] Sowerwine, *France Since 1970*, 309-310; see also Kedward, *France and the French,* 393; Hoffman, *Decline or Renewal*, 303.
[156] Cody, "France to Rejoin NATO as Full Member."

APPENDIX C: CASE STUDY DATA TABLES OF MORROW'S SIX FACTORS

Table 7A: Morrow's six factors for case #1 (Triple Alliance in 1882)

Data for Case Study 1 (1882): Beginning of Alliance						
Alliances	Military[157] Expenditures	Military Personnel[158]	Total[159] Population	Iron and Steel[160] Production	Energy[161] Consumption	Urban Population
Germany	$101 million	437,500	45.7 million	5.7 million 1 million	0	11 million[162]
Italy	$44.5 million	226,200	28.6 million	0.2 million 3,000	0	6.7 million[163]
Ratio	0.44	0.52	0.63	0.042 0.003	0	0.61

Table 7B: Morrow's six factors for case #1 (Triple Alliance in 1897)

Data for Case Study 1 (1897)						
Alliances	Military[164] Expenditures	Military[165] Personnel	Total[166] Population	Iron and Steel[167] Production	Energy[168] Consumption	Urban Population
Germany	$160 million	611,500	53.5 million	10.1 million 4.9 million	1.00	15.5 million[169]
Italy	$68 million	278,000	31.7 million	0.2 million 64,000	0.14	8.9 million[170]
Ratio	0.43	0.45	0.59	0.02 0.01	0.14	0.57

[157] Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 117-119. Cross referenced with *The Statesman's Yearbook,* 1883-1966 ed. London: Macmillan, 1883-1966.
[158] Ibid
[159] Mitchell, B. R. *International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1993.* 4 ed. London: Macmillan Reference, 1998, 81. Population estimate for 1882.
[160] Ibid., 452, 466. Iron ore and crude steel production in metric tons. Top number is iron. Bottom number is steel. This is applicable to all tables in Appendix C.
[161] Electric energy output was insignificant to be measured in 1882.
[162] Lees, Andrew and Lees, Lynn H. *Cities and the Making of Modern Europe, 1750-1914.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 5-133. Lee, W.R. *European Demography and Economic Growth.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 193. Figure derived from a percentage of the total urbanized populace (cities of 20,000 of more inhabitants) based on total population and is an approximation.
[163] Lee, *European Demography and Economic Growth*, 231. Figure from cities with at least 20,000 inhabitants.
[164] Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 117-120. Cross referenced with *The Statesman's Yearbook*.
[165] Ibid. Active army and navy personnel.
[166] Mitchell, B.R., *International Historical Statistics*, 82. Population estimate for 1897.
[167] Ibid., 452, 466. Iron ore and crude steel production in metric tons.
[168] Ibid., 562-563. Figure for the year 1900 in giga-watt hours produced. No data for Germany is available prior to 1900.
[169] McElligott, Anthony. *The German Urban Experience 1900-1945.* London: Routledge, 2001, 14. Figure from cities with at least 20,000 inhabitants.
[170] Lee, *European Demography and Economic Growth*, 231.

Table 7C: Morrow's six factors for case #1 (Triple Alliance in 1914)

Data for Case Study 1 (1914): End of Alliance						
Alliances	Military[171] Expenditures	Military[172] Personnel	Total[173] Population	Iron and Steel[174] Production	Energy[175] Consumption	Urban Population
Germany	$338 million	834,000	67 million	20.5 million 13.8 million	8.80	23.4 million[176]
Italy	$149 million	347,000	35.4 million	706,000 911,000	2.20	10.8 million[177]
Ratio	0.44	0.42	0.53	0.03 0.07	0.25	0.46

[171] Schmitt, *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente*, 117-120. Cross referenced with *The Statesman's Yearbook*.
[172] Ibid. Active army and navy personnel.
[173] Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics,* 85. Population estimate for 1913. 1914 estimates are not available for Germany.
[174] Ibid., 452, 467. Iron ore and crude steel production in metric tons.
[175] Ibid., 562. Giga-watt hours produced.
[176] McElligott, *The German Urban Experience*, 14. Figure from cities with at least 20,000 inhabitants.
[177] Lee, *European Demography and Economic Growth*, 231.

Table 8A: Morrow's six factors for case #2 (NATO in 1948)

Data for Case Study 2 (1948): Beginning of Alliance						
Alliances	Military[178] Expenditures	Military Personnel	Total Population	Iron and Steel[179] Production	Energy[180] Consumption	Urban Population
US	$13.5 billion	1,445,910[181]	146.6 million[182]	47,709 80,316	336,592	96.8 million[183]
France	4.8 billion FRF ($1.4 billion)	502,595[184]	41.5 million[185]	6,099 7,243	27,604	23.4 million[186]
Ratio	0.10	0.34	0.28	0.13 0.09	0.08	0.24

[178] NATO Press Release M3(65)1, "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence - Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (1949-1965)." December 15, 1965. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_65833.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed October 12, 2010). The NATO definition of defense expenditures may differ slightly from actual country defense budgets or expenditures as reported by respective country governments. This figure represents the 1949 US and French defense expenditures. The French figure was given in French Francs and converted to US dollars using the mean 1949 exchange rate of 3.3196 FRF = $1 provided by the Pacific Exchange Rate Service at http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf (accessed October 12, 2010).

[179] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1948.* New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1949, 138-139, 238. 1947 iron ore and crude steel production in thousand metric tons.

[180] Ibid., 258. Million kilowatt hours produced.

[181] U.S. Department of Commerce, "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1951," 209. http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1951-01.pdf (accessed October 7, 2010). Includes active Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corp personnel.

[182] U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. "Population Estimates Program." http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt (accessed October 7, 2010).

[183] US Census Bureau, "Table 1. Urban and Rural Population: 1900 to 1990." http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/urpop0090.txt (accessed October 7, 2010). 1950 urban population figure. The United States conducts a census every ten years. Data for specifically for 1948 is not available.

[184] Martin, Michel L. *Warriors to Managers: The French Military Establishment Since 1945.* Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981, 371. Includes active army, navy and air force personnel.

[185] Ibid. p 512.

[186] United Nations, *Demographic Indicators of Countries: Estimates and Projections Assesses in 1980.* New York: United Nations, 1982, 402.

Table 8B: Morrow's six factors for case #2 (NATO in 1956)

Data for Case Study 2 (1956): Middle of Alliance						
Alliances	Military[187] Expenditures	Military Personnel	Total Population	Iron and Steel Production	Energy Consumption	Urban Population
US	$45.9 billion	2,804,738[188]	168.9 million[189]	51, 171[190] 104,522	683,970[191]	125.3 million[192]
France	17.9 billion FRF ($3.6 billion)	655,679[193]	43,.3 million[194]	17,120[195] 13,399	53,829[196]	28.5 million[197]
Ratio	0.08	0.23	0.26	0.34 0.13	0.08	0.23

[187] NATO Press Release M3(65)1, "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence." The NATO definition of defense expenditures may differ slightly from actual country defense budgets or expenditures as reported by respective country governments. This figure represents the 1959 US and French defense expenditures. The French figure was given in French Francs and converted to US dollars using the mean 1959 exchange rate of 3.3196 FRF = $1 provided by the Pacific Exchange Rate Service at http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf. Accessed 8 OCT 10.

[188] *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1957.* New York: Press Pub. Co, 1957, 740-741. Includes active Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corp personnel.

[189] U.S. Census Bureau, "Population Estimates Program."

[190] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1957.* New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1958, 157 and 271. 1956 iron ore and crude steel production in thousand metric tons.

[191] Ibid., 302. Million kilowatt hours produced.

[192] US Census Bureau, "Table 1." 1960 urban population figure. The United States conducts a census every ten years so data for specifically for 1956 is not available.

[193] Martin, *Warriors to Managers*, 371. Data for 1956 not available. This is the 1957 figure.

[194] *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1957*, 409. UN estimate of France's population in 1955.

[195] Ibid., 158, 271. 1956 iron ore and crude steel production in thousand metric tons.

[196] Ibid., 305. This figure is in million kilowatt hours produced.

[197] United Nations, *Demographic Indicators of Countries*, 402.

Table 8C: Morrow's six factors for case #2 (NATO in 1965)

Data for Case Study 2 (1965): End of Alliance						
Alliances	Military[198] Expenditures	Military Personnel	Total Population	Iron and Steel[199] Production	Energy Consumption	Urban Population
US	$51.9 billion	2,643,888[200]	194.3 million[201]	50,407 119,260	1,157,391[202]	149.6 million[203]
France	25.3 billion FRF ($5.1 billion)	513,982[204]	48.5 million[205]	19,345 19,604	101,442[206]	36.3 million[207]
Ratio	0.10	0.19	0.25	0.38 0.16	0.09	0.24

[198] NATO Press Release M3(65)1, "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence." The NATO definition of defense expenditures may differ slightly from actual country defense budgets or expenditures as reported by respective country governments. The French figure was given in French Francs and converted to US dollars using the mean 1965 exchange rate of 3.3196 FRF = $1 provided by the Pacific Exchange Rate Service at http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf. Accessed 8 OCT 10.
[199] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1966*, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, (New York, 1967), 183-184, 301. 1966 iron ore and crude steel production in thousand metric tons.
[200] *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1966.* New York: Press Pub. Co, 1966,437, 449, 600. Includes active Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corp personnel.
[201] U.S. Census Bureau, "Population Estimates Program."
[202] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1966.* New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1967, 363. Million kilowatt hours produced.
[203] US Census Bureau, "Table 1." Urban population figure for 1970. The United States conducts a census every ten years so data specifically for 1965 is not available.
[204] Martin, *Warriors to Managers*, 371.
[205] *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1966*, 599.
[206] Ibid., 358. Million kilowatt hours produced.
[207] United Nations, *Demographic Indicators of Countries*, 402.

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