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Rainless West: The Integrity Survey's Role in Agency Accountability

Sanja Kutnjak Ivković[1], Maria Haberfeld[2], and Robert Peacock[1]

Abstract

This study seeks to test the capacity to measure individual agency integrity using the theoretical perspective and police integrity instrument developed by Klockars and colleagues. Specifically, sworn officers in a large U.S. municipal law enforcement agency evaluated 11 vignettes describing various forms of police misconduct, from police corruption and the use of excessive force to perjury and planting of evidence. Although our study in Rainless West yields a picture of police integrity that is largely similar to those reported for the three police agencies participating in the study by Klockars and colleagues, we detect substantial differences in the levels of integrity associated with the least serious forms of misconduct. Rainless West offers a lesson for institutions seeking to raise police accountability to explore integrity not only as it applies to the most serious forms of misconduct, but also as it applies to the least serious forms of misconduct.

Keywords

police accountability, police integrity, police ethics, police misconduct, police corruption, use of force, use of excessive force, municipal police

The Search for Police Accountability

Reviewing the past 100 years of law enforcement history, Manning (2009) observed that every large city has experienced multiple police scandals. These events inevitably led to much publicized reform efforts that often provided only limited results

[1]Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA
[2]John Jay College, New York, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:
Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, Michigan State University, 560 Baker Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA
Email: kutnjak@msu.edu

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(Monkonen, 2003; Sherman, 1978). Though the waves of scandal and reform continue, urban police agencies have increasingly adopted new tools and practices to meet what Walker (2005) has described as the new world of police accountability. Walker (2002) defines accountability in terms of the police performance of the crime and disorder control function as well as their respect for the rights of citizens. Moreover, Walker argues that the current era rests on "police practices that build trust, enhance police accountability, and reduce police misconduct" (US Department of Justice, 2001, p. 3). The goal of obtaining a high degree of integrity is critical for an accountable police agency in a democratic society (Caparini & Marenin, 2004).

If policing in the United States and other democracies is moving toward a new era that emphasizes accountability for police misconduct, a fundamental unanswered question is how either a scholar or a police administration can assess one of its critical elements—the police agency's level of integrity. Researchers seeking to measure integrity in a police department frequently use the official data and confront the same paradox; they can never be certain what situation is more positive: an increase or decrease in the level of police misconduct relative to the level previously found in the agency's official statistics (Klockars, Kutnjak Ivković, & Haberfeld, 2006). A higher rate of disciplinary actions for misconduct may be in response to an effective internal affairs effort; in contrast, a department with a high level of actual misconduct could have relatively few reported cases because of their weak enforcement measures and, if anything, the presence of a culture that conceals misconduct. Put differently, two equally sized agencies can share the same number of official misconduct reports, but be polar opposites both in their commitment to hold officers accountable for their behavior and in their success in doing so.

The uncertainty faced by scholars or practitioners assessing police integrity through the use of official reports alone can be seen in the official statistics found by two of the most famous investigatory commissions in U.S. history. At the same time that the Knapp Commission (1972) was reporting that the New York Police Department (NYPD) had widespread and systematic corruption, Cohen (1972) reported that the NYPD's official statistics showed that fewer than 1 in 100 officers received criminal complaints in a given year (Kutnjak Ivković, 2009a). A similar question over official statistics was raised by the Christopher Commission (1991) investigating the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for violations of Rodney King's civil rights. Mr. King's brother had gone to the LAPD the day after his beating but was rebuffed in his efforts to have a complaint filed (Christopher Commission, 1991). It is questionable whether the incident would have received much official or public attention without the appearance of a witness's video recording that was broadcast worldwide a few days later.

Despite the significant media and public concern for the integrity of local police agencies, scholars have had limited success in developing measurements of agency integrity that go beyond those based on official records. Prenzler (2002) points out that, in the past, researchers' knowledge of an agency's level of integrity was largely dependent on the rare public independent commissions (Prenzler's case studies

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included the Christopher Commission in Los Angeles, Mollen Commission [1994] in New York, the MacPherson Inquiry in London, and the Wood Commission in the Australian State of New South Wales). Prenzler (2002) goes on to make the case that these independent commissions are "increasingly being supported by social science research using observational studies, surveys, and interviews to assess the nature and extent of corruption" (p. 11).

Studies that make use of systematic social observation and field research have contributed greatly to the contemporary police researchers' knowledge of policing. Their capacity to measure agency integrity has been limited, however, by the scale required to capture a full range of misconduct. As an example, the three largest police observation studies in U.S. history—the 1967 President's Crime Commission study, the 1977 Police Services Study, and the 1996-1997 Project on Policing Neighborhoods—each employed more than 100 observers in coding more than 22,000 police–civilian interactions over thousands of separate patrol shifts. Despite the massive scale of these pioneering studies, they uncovered very few instances of misconduct. For example, the 22,000 interactions led to the direct observation of just 192 cases of the use of physical force involving a weapon or, much more often, an empty-hand strike or shove down (data obtained from Terrill, 2001; Worden, 1996). Assuming that about 40% of the use of force incidents are excessive (as documented by the observers in, for example, Friedrich, 1980; Reiss, 1967), obtaining 10 cases of use of force misconduct would likely require at least 3,000 observed police–suspect interactions. Most scholars and police oversight agencies are unlikely to have the resources on hand to conduct months of observation studies to measure misconduct and its opposite, integrity, in this manner, nor would this approach be a viable use of resources.

As research in police accountability has grown, the use of the surveys has become an alternative approach to assessing misconduct based solely on official records. Public opinion surveys have been used to assess the level of police misconduct on an agency level (Weizter, 1999; Winick, 1987) and on a national scale (Gerber & Mendelson, 2008; Greenfeld, Langan, & Smith, 1997). Victimization surveys, in which the citizens were asked whether they had been victimized by police misconduct, are generally limited to studies in a very narrow range of subjects, notably studies of excessive force (Eith & Durose, 2011; Weitzer, 2002) or knowledge of police bribes (Faull, 2007; Prenzler & Mackay, 1995).

At the dawn of the accountability era, pioneering scholars across the globe also sought to survey police officers about police misconduct. Those surveys typically would take one of the two approaches: they would ask officers to report whether they or other police officers had engaged in police misconduct or they would ask the officers how serious they considered hypothetical scenarios describing cases of police misconduct (Barker & Wells, 1982; Criminal Justice Commission, 1999; Fishman, 1978; Miller & Braswell, 1992). Over time, surveys asking direct questions of police officers' participation in misconduct have proven completely ineffective, whereas the more indirect survey methods that overcome police resistance to responding to direct queries made as part of a research interview or paper questionnaire have been

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considerably more successful. The resistance to direct surveys cannot be underestimated given past failures. In some instances, police unions shut down questionnaires focused on actual misconduct (Martin, 1994). Other surveys were returned without a single officer answering the corruption questions (Fabrizio, 1990).

To ameliorate the problems experienced by the studies asking direct questions about police misconduct and the respondents' involvement in it, Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (2004) designed a novel approach that focuses on police integrity and measures integrity through police officers' opinions and perceptions on how they would respond in hypothetical situations describing integrity challenges. This novel approach:

> . . . involves questions of fact and opinion that can be explored directly, without arousing the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt behavior are likely to provoke. Using this approach, it is possible to ask non-threatening questions about officers' knowledge of agency rules and their opinions about the seriousness of particular violations, the punishment such violations would deserve or actually receive, and their estimates of how willing officers would be to report such misconduct without asking them directly about their own or others' corrupt behavior (Klockars & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004, p. 1.5).

As existing research on police integrity demonstrates, this approach has been successful in convincing both police administrators and police officers across more than a dozen countries across the world to participate in the study (see, e.g., Klockars, Kutnjak Ivković, and Haberfeld, 2004). The National Research Council (2004, p. 274) concluded that this approach "appears to show considerable promise."

While developing this novel approach to the study of police integrity, the first wave of police integrity surveys focused on a narrow range of misconduct. Greene (2004) observed that criminologists often defined police integrity by the "demonstrated absence" of the singular form of misconduct they were studying. Therefore, historically, most academic and government investigations into the violations of police integrity were primarily focused on police misconduct such as personal gain corruption (Goldstein, 1975; Knapp, 1972; Sherman, 1973), police use of excessive force (Christopher Commission, 1991; Wesley, 1951), or a combination of one or two forms of misconduct (Barker & Roebuck, 1973). Though groundbreaking research, these studies were focused too narrowly for a conceptualization of police integrity that, in the meantime, has grown to include behaviors not previously considered in past efforts to measure the concept, such as racial profiling or off duty drunk driving (see Prenzler, 2009). Seeking to alleviate such a narrow scope, a second wave of studies incorporated a larger number of different forms of police misconduct (see, e.g., Klockars, Kutnjak Ivković, & Haberfeld, 2000).

More recent studies of police integrity generally have followed the methodological approach pioneered in the United States by Klockars and colleagues in the mid-1990s (Greene et al., 2004; Gottschalk, 2009; Klockars et al., 2006; Kutnjak Ivković, 2009b; Kutnjak Ivković & Klockars, 2004; Kutnjak Ivković & O'Connor Shelley, 2008a;

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Kutnjak Ivković & O'Connor Shelley, 2008b; Schafer & Martinelli, 2008). These vignette-based questionnaires sought to survey police indirectly on their views regarding a broad spectrum of misconduct, spanning code of conduct violations to excessive force incidents (see Klockars & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004).

Theoretical Foundations of Police Integrity

In his 1996 keynote address to the U.S. Department of Justice-funded National Symposium on Police Integrity, Stephen Vicchio (1997) argued that the integrity of individual police officers was composed of seven virtues: prudence, trust, effacement of self-interest, courage, intellectual honesty, justice, and responsibility. This and other direct conceptualizations of integrity have proved too difficult to measure empirically, let alone allow the findings to be aggregated over an entire police agency as necessary to quantify organizational integrity. Instead, researchers have generally conceptualized police integrity based on officer behavior (misconduct) that would be minimized in a high integrity agency (see Klockars & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004).

As part of the same Department of Justice-sponsored symposium, Klockars and colleagues (2006) developed an alternative, operational definition of police integrity as the "normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation" (p. 1). According to this definition, police integrity is a feature of individual police officers, groups of police officers, or police departments as a whole (Klockars et al., 2006) and can be used to compare and analyze the level of police integrity across different groups/units/organizations. The definition rests on the premise that police integrity is an inclination to resist temptations (Klockars et al., 2006); it does not assume that officers/organizations who show this inclination will always behave in a way that would indicate high integrity. Moreover, the definition has proved more practical in terms of its capacity for measurement and comparison.

Klockars and colleagues (Klockars & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004; Klockars et al., 1997) not only provided a definition of police integrity, but also developed theoretical and methodological grounds to measure it. The theory of police integrity identifies four dimensions crucial for the level of police integrity: (a) the quality of official rules and the manner in which they are made, communicated, and understood within a police agency; (b) the quality of the detection, investigation, and disciplinary actions taken by that agency; (c) the willingness of officers to report another officer's misconduct; and (d) the influence of the agency's environment on its level of police integrity. This theoretical approach provides the basis to measure police integrity not in terms of aggregate misconduct data (or their absence), but, rather, in terms of how a police agency or its officers recognize, evaluate, tolerate, and are disciplined for a wide variety of police misconduct.

Studies making use of integrity surveys based on this theoretical model have grown considerably since Klockars and colleagues first applied the corruption questionnaire, containing 10 vignettes describing corruption and one vignette on the use of excessive force, in an National Institute of Justice-funded study of 30 police agencies in 1996.

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Over the next 15 years, nearly two dozen studies would build on this corruption-focused survey. Notably, four studies (Burbach Raines, 2006; Jenks, Johnson, & Mathews, 2012; Marche, 2009; Micucci & Gomme, 2005) developed analytical findings based solely on the data from the 30-agency study; another four studies (Chappell & Piquero, 2004; Gottschalk, 2009; Hickman, Piquero, & Greene, 2004; Schafer & Martinelli, 2008) made use of the integrity instrument in surveying other U.S. police agencies. Besides North America, the integrity survey has been tested on police agencies located on three additional continents, encompassing 15 countries (see Alain, 2004; Edelbacher & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004; Haberfeld, 2004; Johnson, 2004; Kremer, 2004; Kutnjak Ivković & Klockars, 2004; Kutnjak Ivkovic & O'Connor Shelley, 2008a,b; Newham, 2004; Pagon & Lobnikar, 2004; Punch, Huberts, Lamboo, 2004; Puonti, Vuorinen, & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004; Torstensson Levander & Ekenvall, 2004; Westmarland, 2004; Zubair & Kutnjak Ivković, 2004).

Over a wide range of cultures and organizational structures, the first corruption questionnaire demonstrated that police officers' tolerance of and unwillingness to report misconduct is highly related to their perceptions of misconduct seriousness (Kutnjak Ivković, 2005b; Kutnjak Ivković & O'Connor Shelley, 2008b). This finding supported the police integrity theory's central premise that agencies must treat misconduct charges seriously to alter officer behavior. Moreover, those officers who did not expect their peers to report misconduct were much more likely to indicate their adherence to the code of silence (Kutnjak Ivković & O'Connor Shelley, 2008a).

In 1998, Klockars and colleagues developed a new version of the questionnaire to measure an even wider range of misconduct in line with the growing public perception that officer misconduct is more than corruption but now incorporates offenses such as verbal abuse of citizens or off duty driving under the influence charges. Klockars and colleagues (Klockars et al., 2000, pp. 9, 11) described the need for a broader version of the questionnaire:

> The survey instrument used in this study was designed to assess only one aspect of police integrity. In all case scenarios but one—the use of excessive force—the misconduct described was motivated by personal gain. In discussing environments of integrity, therefore, this survey makes no observation about abuses of discretion in arrests, order maintenance, discourtesy to citizens, or other police misconduct not usually motivated by temptations of gain. A second generation of this survey will explore those problems.

This second survey was given to three U.S. police agencies (Charleston, St. Petersburg, and Charlotte-Mecklenburg), all of which were among the 30 previously studied police agencies. This second test demonstrated that the officer seriousness ratings and officer normative inclinations to resist misconduct remained consistent over time (see Klockars et al., 2006). Surveying the same three police agencies twice, in 1996 and 1998, presented an opportunity to examine whether the means of the answers provided by the officers in the three agencies in response to common questions changed between

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the two surveys. The researchers found that, with only a few exceptions, likely prompted by policy changes, the police officers' answers in the 1996 and 1998 surveys were similar. This met the researchers' expectations that little would change over a period as short as two years, and supported the validity of the vignette approach to measuring police normative judgments on misconduct and its opposite integrity (Klockars et al., 2006).

Police Integrity Survey and Accountability

In 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued the guide *Principles for Promoting Police Integrity* to provide "best practices" in police reforms. As of 2010, nine cities have adopted the guide's measures as part of DOJ negotiated consent agreements (Chavis Simmons, 2010). Meanwhile, other law enforcement agencies continue to adopt the same accountability practices profiled in *Principles*, such as early intervention systems, use of force reporting, and independent auditors (Terry, 1991; Walker, Appert, Kennedy, 2001). The recent emphasis on accountability reform has also refocused police management on the need to assess the current level of integrity in their agencies.

The police integrity survey offers law enforcement agencies and their oversight bodies an alternative measure of integrity that can bring clarity to the debate on whether the quantity of official reports of misconduct is a product of greater supervisory vigilance or a growing problem in the field. Given more than three dozen tests in departments located in more than 15 countries, the integrity survey offers comparative data on the contours of integrity over a wide variety of police agencies and police environments.

The sensitivity of the survey for measuring changes in norms resistant to misconduct has drawn particular attention from scholars and practitioners. For example, the Klockars and colleagues (2006) study of three municipalities found that the only significant changes between the 1996 corruption survey and the 1998 use of the police integrity survey was found in St. Petersburg, where the seriousness ratings for minor misconduct offenses were observed to change after the city brought on a new police chief who sought to create a culture less tolerant of minor misconduct. As an example, the St. Petersburg sergeants' exam offered between the two administrations of the survey actually included a new bonus question describing the acceptance of discounted food and free gifts that mirrored one of the questions on the integrity survey. The sergeants who correctly identified this as a violation of official rules received additional points on the exam (Klockars et al., 2006). As a result, the researchers were not surprised to find that officers' assessment of seriousness and discipline appropriate for cases describing the acceptance of gratuities increased on the second survey in St. Petersburg.

The police department requesting this study—Rainless West (pseudonym)—had a reputation over the past decade for corruption, particularly a widespread presence of minor misconduct. Just prior to the survey, a sizeable portion of the sworn officers in

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Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of the Four Police Departments

	Rainless West (approximates)	Charlotte-Mecklenburg	St. Petersburg	Charleston
City population	400,000-600,000	445,000	240,000	75,000
Number of sworn officers	750-900	1,300	500	325
Percentage of minority officers	18%	21%	19%	35%

the agency were disciplined as part of a single case of widespread minor misconduct. A newly appointed, results-oriented chief hoped to gain a better understanding of where ethics problems existed across the agency as part of a new accountability initiative. Rainless West management approached the authors to assist the agency's accountability initiative by conducting the survey among sworn officers at all levels of the agency. The study had a dual purpose. On the one hand, the agency wanted a better understanding of their organizational integrity as determined by their officers' attitudes toward a range of misconduct. On the other hand, the survey offered an opportunity for the researchers to assess the validity of the methodology that Klockars and colleagues (2006) developed to measure the level of integrity across the full range of misconduct.

Method

The Research Site and the Respondents

In 2009, Rainless West became the fourth U.S. metropolitan police agency to agree to undertake the new police integrity survey focused on the more expansive set of misconduct cases.[1] The police department preferred to remain anonymous. In honor of Chambliss' (1971) landmark study of the city of "Rainfall West" (which four decades ago prompted a greater appreciation of the organizational approach to police integrity), we titled this city "Rainless West."

Rainless West is one of the largest 50 cities in the United States with a population of about 400,000-600,000. A comparison of Rainless West with the three cities in which the police integrity survey was used previously by Klockars and colleagues (2006) indicates that Rainless West is roughly as large as the largest of the three (i.e., Charlotte-Mecklenburg), and substantially larger than either St. Petersburg or Charleston (Table 1).

The Rainless West police department has about 700-900 sworn police officers, including supervisory personnel, in line with similar cities located west of the Mississippi River. In comparison with the other agencies studied, Rainless West's police force is smaller than Charlotte-Mecklenburg and larger than both St. Petersburg and Charleston (Table 1). The Rainless West police department is as diverse as Charlotte-Mecklenburg and St. Petersburg police departments, with about one out of

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Table 2. Response Rates for Rainless West and Other Police Agencies

	Percent participating
Rainless West	93%
Very large agency (500+ sworn)	60%
Average—Survey 1*	
Charleston—Survey 1**	54%
St. Petersburg—Survey 1**	73%
Charlotte-Mecklenburg—Survey 1**	63%
Charleston—Survey 2***	76%
St. Petersburg—Survey 2***	83%
Charlotte-Mecklenburg—Survey 2***	70%

*Data from four other agencies with more than 500 employees surveyed with integrity surveys. Adapted from *"Enhancing police integrity,"* by C. B. Klockars, S. Kutnjak Ivković, & M. R. Haberfeld (2006). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
**Adapted from *"Enhancing police integrity,"* by C. B. Klockars, S. Kutnjak Ivković, & M. R. Haberfeld (2006). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, pp. 18-19, Table 2.2.
***Adapted from *"Enhancing police integrity,"* by C. B. Klockars, S. Kutnjak Ivković, & M. R. Haberfeld (2006). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer,2006, p. 142, Table 7.1.

five police officers officially categorized as a minority (Table 1). The Rainless West police agency uses the COMPSTAT system and seeks to define itself as a citizens' police agency.

The response rate for the Rainless West police agency was 92.5% (Table 2). This response rate exceeds both the average response rate for the four large agencies that participated in the police corruption survey, as well as the response rates for the three agencies of integrity that participated in both the corruption survey and the police integrity surveys (see Table 2). It is similar to the response rate from St. Petersburg for the police integrity survey (see Table 2).

The overwhelming majority of our respondents are line officers (i.e., nonsupervisors), as was the case for St. Petersburg, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and very large agencies in the 30-agency police corruption survey (see Table 3). Similarly, the majority—in Rainless West, in very large police agencies, as well as in Charleston, St. Petersburg, and Charlotte-Mecklenburg—is assigned to patrol or traffic assignments (56% for Rainless West; Table 3). Last, police officers in Rainless West are experienced as police officers, having a mean length of service of more than 11 years, similar to the police officers in the other three agencies (see Table 3).

In our analyses, we discarded the responses provided by the 2.6% of police officers who reported that they had not answered honestly. This tracked very closely with the three previous metropolitan police forces taking the police integrity survey. Indeed, Klockars and colleagues report that 2.2% of the respondents overall indicated they had not filled out the questionnaire honestly (Klockars et al., 2006, p. 20). Moreover, 88% of the police officers in Rainless West thought most of their fellow officers were

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Table 3. Characteristics of Rainless West Sample

	Response rate	Percent supervisory	Percent patrol/traffic	Mean length of service
Rainless West	93%	17.3%	56.1%	11.08
Very large agency avg.—Survey 1*	60%	14.8%	64.2%	9.18
Charleston—Survey 1**	54%	36.1%	53.7%	10.87
St. Petersburg—Survey 1**	73%	15.4%	58.5%	13.86
Charlotte-Mecklenburg—Survey 1**	63%	12.6%	69.7%	9.42

*Data from four other agencies with more than 500 employees surveyed with integrity surveys (Adapted from *"Enhancing police integrity,"* by C. B. Klockars, S. Kutnjak Ivković, & M. R. Haberfeld (2006). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
**Adapted from *"Enhancing police integrity,"* by C. B. Klockars, S. Kutnjak Ivković, & M. R. Haberfeld (2006). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, pp. 18-19, Table 2.2

answering the survey honestly, comparable with 84.4% of the officers participating in the survey in the other three cities (Klockars et al., 2006, p. 20).

The Police Integrity Questionnaire

The police integrity questionnaire was designed in 1998 with the purpose of widening the focus from police corruption to police misconduct in general. The questionnaire contains 11 vignettes in which the abuse of position is "motivated by a range of motives other than gain" (Klockars et al., 2004, p. 137). To enable assessment of the test–retest reliability measure, five scenarios are exactly the same as they were in the corruption questionnaire (Klockars et al., 2004, p. 138). The remainder of the questionnaire features instances of other forms of police misconduct (e.g., use of excessive force, verbal abuse, false reporting; see Appendix 1).

Along with a short vignette, the police officer taking the survey is presented with seven questions measuring the perceptions about the scenario seriousness, the anticipated and appropriate discipline, and officer willingness to report the case of misconduct found in the vignette. The answers provided to these seven questions are provided as Likert-type scales.

As with most instruments used to measure organizational characteristics in social science, the police integrity survey has methodological challenges. Historically, those researching police corruption, excessive force, and other forms of misconduct routinely have been forced to accept convenience samples from those few agencies willing to expose their reputation to an integrity instrument of any kind. This study also relies on the data including a larger proportion of an agency that voluntarily agreed to participate in the survey.

Furthermore, a self-report survey always faces the risk of socially desirable responding by those filling in the questionnaire even when the subject matter is not reporting on criminal behavior (see Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). Klockars and colleagues

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Table 4. Police Officer Judgment on Case Violating Agency Policy

	Violation of agency policy?				
	Rainless West		Charlotte-Mecklenburg	St. Petersburg	Charleston
Police integrity case / description	Mean	% selecting "5 = *definitely yes*" or "4"	% selecting "yes"	% selecting "yes"	% selecting "yes"
Case 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants	4.39	84.1%	60.2%	98.1%	99.2%
Case 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant	4.29	78.3%	84.1%	89.4%	92.7%
Case 3—Theft of knife from crime scene	5.00	99.9%	98.6%	99.8%	96.7%
Case 4—Unjustifiable use of deadly force	4.56	84.3%	85.5%	92.3%	91.8%
Case 5—Supervisor offers holiday for errands	4.61	88.8%	81.8%	86.7%	79.8%
Case 6—Officer strikes prisoner	4.91	98.5%	97.5%	100%	95.5%
Case 7—Verbal abuse of motorist	4.44	83.9%	93.2%	99.1%	88.1%
Case 8—Cover up police DUI and accident	4.44	81.9%	68.3%	83.8%	85.2%
Case 9—Auto body shop five percent kickback	4.75	92.6%	92.0%	98.6%	93.1%
Case 10—False report of drug possession	4.97	98.8%	97.8%	99.8%	95.9%
Case 11—Sgt. fails to halt beating of child abuser	4.84	94.0%	98.3%	98.1%	97.6%

(2004) sought to reduce the risk of socially desirable reporting through the use of several strategies. First, instead of relying on direct questions about police misconduct, they have inverted the topic and redirected focus on views and opinions, the very cornerstone of their methodology. Second, the questions are designed in a way that makes it difficult to assess what the researchers would like to hear. For example, police officers are asked to evaluate the seriousness of various forms of misconduct, and socially desirable answering would imply that all scenarios should be evaluated as very serious. Yet, answering that all misconduct, including trivial misconduct such as the acceptance of gratuities, is very serious does not logically make sense, and police officers participating in the police integrity surveys before have made such statements (see Klockars et al., 2004). Third, the survey is anonymous. Fourth, the number of demographic questions is limited to a few (e.g., length of service, rank) to prevent potential identification of respondents, and thereby make them feel more comfortable

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in responding to the questions honestly. Fifth, one of the questions on the questionnaire asks the respondents whether they have lied while filling out the survey. Answers provided by the officers who admitted to lying in their responses or who skipped this question were omitted from the analyses.

Results

Assessment of Rule Violations

All behaviors described in the questionnaire constitute violations of the Rainless West's official rules. To facilitate an exploration of the degree to which the respondents recognized and labeled such behaviors adequately, the questionnaire asks them to assess whether each scenario would constitute a violation of official agency rules.[2] The respondents could have selected their answer on a 5-point Likert-type scale.[3] A one-way ANOVA test of the responses to the survey questions produced significant differences ($p < .001$) for every vignette between Rainless West and the other three sampled cities (see Tables 5, 6, and 7).[4] Instead of focusing only on statistical significance, we follow the lead of Klockars and colleagues (2006) by using a more stringent rule of thumb that regards as substantively significant only the differences between agency means in excess of 10 percentage-points.

The mean values and percentages, shown in Table 4, indicate that police officers correctly evaluated the described behaviors as violations of official rules. Despite the fact that all of these behaviors are evaluated as rule violating, the uniformity of the respondents' opinions varies across scenarios, from about three-fourths of the respondents evaluating behaviors described in some scenarios as rule violating (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants; Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant) to some scenarios in which almost all respondents evaluated the behavior in question to be a violation of official rules (e.g., Scenario 3—Theft of knife from crime scene; Scenario 6—Officer strikes prisoner; Scenario 10—False report of drug possession). The respondents were most likely to label a theft from a crime scene (Scenario 3—Theft of knife from crime scene), hitting a prisoner (Scenario 6—Officer strikes prisoner), and falsifying a drug report (Scenario 10—False report of drug possession) as rule violations, and least likely to do so for the acceptance of gratuities (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants), a failure to arrest a friend (Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant), and a cover-up of an intoxicated officer behind the wheel (Scenario 8—Cover up police DUI and accident).

To compare the results from Rainless West with the results from Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Charleston, and St. Petersburg, we recoded the data[5] (see Table 4). Although we do not use any tests of significance in the comparative analysis because of the different scales used in the two studies, we rely on the visual comparison of the Rainless West results with the results from the other three agencies (see Figure 1) and the rule of thumb that a 10 percentage-point difference is substantial (see Klockars et al., 2006). The results show that the recognition of rule-violating behavior is similar for most of the scenarios (i.e., within the 10 percentage-point difference; Table 4).

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Table 5. Police Officer Perceptions of Scenario Seriousness

	Officers own views of scenario seriousness								
	Rainless West		Charlotte -Mecklenburg		St. Petersburg		Charleston		
Police integrity case/description	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	*F*-Test *$P < .001$
Case 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants	2.58	1	2.44	1	3.46	2	3.61	3	113.6*
Case 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant	3.75	4	4.18	6	4.44	5	4.52	8	59.0*
Case 3—Theft of knife from crime scene	4.96	11	4.92	11	4.99	11	4.90	11	6.7*
Case 4—Unjustifiable use of deadly force	4.66	9	4.67	9	4.81	9	4.80	10	6.2*
Case 5—Supervisor offers holiday for errands	4.22	5	4.03	5	4.32	4	4.00	4	10.0*
Case 6—Officer strikes prisoner	4.46	7	3.99	4	4.53	6	4.13	5	40.9*
Case 7—Verbal abuse of motorist	3.10	2	3.36	3	3.70	3	3.60	2	26.7*
Case 8—Cover up police DUI and accident	3.48	3	3.02	2	3.30	1	3.59	1	22.2*
Case 9—Auto body shop five percent kickback	4.39	6	4.37	8	4.64	7	4.44	7	9.0*
Case 10—False report of drug possession	4.89	10	4.80	10	4.96	10	4.62	9	26.3*
Case 11—Sgt. fails to halt beating of child abuser	4.49	8	4.36	7	4.76	8	4.40	6	18.6*

Rainless West officers differed by more than 10 percentage-points from at least two of their peer institutions in minor misconduct vignettes such as Scenario 1 (Free meals/gifts from merchants), Scenario 2 (Failure to arrest with felony warrant), and Scenario 7 (Verbal abuse of motorist). These substantial differences suggest that Rainless West officers were less likely to recognize these minor misconduct behaviors as rule violating and were more uncertain than the officers in their peer agencies were. In terms of its overall profile, Rainless West resembles Charlotte-Mecklenburg more closely than it does the other two agencies.

Perceptions of Misconduct Seriousness

We also explored the respondents' judgments about scenario seriousness.[6] The respondents could have selected one answer on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from "not at all serious" (1) to "very serious" (5). The results, shown in Table 5, indicate

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Table 6. Police Officer Perceptions of Discipline

	Discipline															
	Rainless West				Charlotte-Mecklenburg				St. Petersburg				Charleston				*F*-Test*$p < .001$	
	Should receive		Would receive		Should receive		Would receive		Should receive		Would receive		Should receive		Would receive			
Case	Mean	Mode	Mean	Mode	Mean	Mode	Mean	Mode	Mean	Mode	Mean	Mode	Mean	Mode	Mean	Mode	Should receive	Would receive
1	1.95	Verb. Rep.	2.56	Writ. Rep.	1.88	Verb. Rep.	2.19	Verb. Rep.	2.66	Verb. Rep.	3.18	Writ. Rep.	3.18	Susp.	3.71	Susp.	149.9*	177.0*
2	2.89	Writ. Rep.	3.21	Writ. Rep.	3.38	Susp.	3.46	Susp.	3.76	Susp.	3.82	Susp.	4.62	Dism.	4.64	Dism.	147.1*	103.4*
3	5.49	Dism.	5.58	Dism.	5.37	Dism.	5.26	Dism.	5.62	Dism.	5.43	Dism.	5.67	Dism.	5.60	Dism.	10.5*	16.7*
4	5.05	Dism.	5.28	Writ. Rep.	5.26	Dism.	5.44	Dism.	5.53	Dism.	5.69	Dism.	5.45	Dism.	5.55	Dism.	12.8*	10.7*
5	3.55	Writ. Rep.	3.55	Writ. Rep.	3.35	Writ. Rep.	3.13	Writ. Rep.	3.81	Writ. Rep.	3.71	Susp.	3.73	Demo.	3.76	Susp.	15.4*	33.1*
6	4.04	Susp.	4.36	Susp.	3.57	Susp.	3.94	Susp.	4.16	Susp.	4.43	Susp.	3.93	Susp.	4.17	Susp.	35.4*	31.8*
7	2.41	Verb. Rep.	2.80	Writ. Rep.	2.81	Writ. Rep.	3.14	Writ. Rep.	3.08	Writ. Rep.	3.42	Susp.	3.13	Writ. Rep.	3.40	Writ. Rep.	66.9*	59.6*
8	3.00	Susp.	3.59	Susp.	2.66	Susp.	3.15	Susp.	3.10	Writ. Rep.	3.60	Susp.	3.70	Susp.	4.08	Susp.	42.2*	42.8*
9	3.98	Susp.	4.23	Susp.	4.14	Susp.	4.24	Susp.	4.33	Susp.	4.42	Susp.	4.71	Dism.	4.76	Dism.	19.4*	12.5*
10	5.26	Dism.	5.37	Dism.	4.96	Dism.	4.97	Dism.	5.58	Dism.	5.56	Dism.	5.04	Dism.	4.97	Dism.	31.3*	39.3*
11	4.50	Demo.	4.77	Demo.	4.32	Susp.	4.49	Susp.	4.97	Demo.	5.09	Demo.	4.71	Demo.	4.86	Demo.	28.1*	31.4*

Note: Verb. Rep. = verbal reprimand. Writ. Rep. = written reprimand, Susp. = Suspension. Demo. = demotion in rank, Dism. = dismissal.

Table 7. Police Officer Perceptions of Willingness to Report Misconduct

Police integrity case/ description	Willingness to report								
	Rainless West		Charlotte-Mecklenburg		St. Petersburg		Charleston		
	Own view		Own view		Own view		Own view		
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	*F*-Test *$p < .001$
Case 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants	2.08	1	1.85	1	2.91	1	3.06	2	108.3*
Case 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant	3.09	3	3.33	6	4.00	5	4.09	8	57.8*
Case 3—Theft of knife from crime scene	4.75	10.5	4.51	10	4.86	10	4.62	10	25.0*
Case 4—Unjustifiable use of deadly force	4.75	10.5	4.63	11	4.86	10	4.65	11	9.4*
Case 5—Supervisor offers holiday for errands	3.71	5	3.24	4	3.90	4	3.42	4	28.8*
Case 6—Officer strikes prisoner	4.08	7	3.30	5	4.24	6	3.50	5	73.6*
Case 7—Verbal abuse of motorist	2.62	2	2.56	3	3.17	3	2.97	1	22.9*
Case 8—Cover up police DUI and accident	3.09	3	2.35	2	2.88	2	3.14	3	42.9*
Case 9—Auto body shop five percent kickback	3.95	6	3.66	7	4.28	7	3.99	7	24.9*
Case 10—False report of drug possession	4.64	9	4.23	9	4.83	9	4.22	9	52.9*
Case 11—Sgt. fails to halt beating of child abuser	4.23	8	3.75	8	4.55	8	3.96	6	47.2*

that the respondents' views of seriousness varied greatly across the scenarios. Respondents evaluated the acceptance of gratuities (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants), verbal abuse of citizens (Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist) and cover-up of police DUI (Scenario 8—Cover-up of police DUI and accident) as the least serious forms of police misconduct from the questionnaire. However, they assessed that theft from a crime scene (Scenario 3—Theft of knife from crime scene), illegitimate use of deadly force (Scenario 4—Unjustifiable use of deadly force), and the planting of evidence and falsification of the official record (Scenario 10—False report of drug possession) are the most serious forms of police misconduct.

We analyzed the data not only across different forms of misconduct, but also within the specific form of misconduct. Out of the five scenarios addressing *police corruption* (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants; Scenario 3—Theft of knife from crime scene; Scenario 5—Supervisor offers holidays off for errands; Scenario 8—Cover-up

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

Figure 1. Police Officer Recognition Misconduct Violates Agency Rules*.
*The graph represents the percentage of Rainless West officers that chose the two Likert-type responses (5=*definitely yes* or 4) which could be interpreted as the equivalent of yes in response to the question on whether a scenario violated agency policies. The other three lines respresent the three peer agency officers that responded "yes" to the same question (the only other answers offered were "no" or "not sure"). The vignette cases on the x-axis are placed in order from least to highest seriousness as judged by the Rainless West officers.

of police DUI and accident; and Scenario 9—Auto-body shop 5 percent kickback), acceptance of gratuities (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants) was evaluated as the least serious form, and the theft from a crime scene (Scenario 3—Theft of knife from crime scene) as the most serious form of corruption. Two other traditional forms of corruption, kickback (Scenario 9—Auto-body shop 5 percent kickback) and internal corruption (Scenario 5—Supervisor offers holidays off for errands), were also evaluated as serious, although not as serious as a theft that could also influence the outcome of a criminal case. The seriousness rankings of the corruption questions from Rainless West match closely the U.S. results from the 30-agency police corruption survey that used the same vignettes (Klockars et al., 2004).

The questionnaire included four scenarios describing the *use of excessive force* (Scenario 4—Unjustifiable use of deadly force; Scenario 6—Officer strikes prisoner; Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist; Scenario 11—Sgt. fails to halt beating of child abuser). Traditionally, the use of force is guided through the use of force continuum (National Institute of Justice, 2009). The examples of violations of the policies guiding the use of force provided in the questionnaire range from verbalization or verbal commands (Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist) at the beginning of the continuum, to the use of deadly force (Scenario 4—Unjustifiable use of deadly force) at the end of the continuum. The other two force-related scenarios (Scenario 6—Officer strikes prisoner;

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Scenario 11—Sgt. fails to halt beating of child abuser) are examples of misuse of empty-hand tactics, located in the middle of the continuum. Our respondents evaluated the scenarios in a way that closely matches the use of force continuum by regarding the verbal abuse of citizens as the least serious (Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist), misuse of the empty-hand control as substantially more serious (Scenario 6—Officer strikes prisoner; Scenario 11—Sgt. fails to halt beating of child abuser), and the misuse of deadly force as the most serious (Scenario 4—Unjustifiable use of deadly force).

The last two scenarios (Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant; Scenario 10—False report of drug possession) fall into the category of *other forms of abuse of authority*, characterized by a decision not to take the appropriate action. Falsifying the official report (Scenario 10—False report of drug possession) was evaluated as the second most serious scenario overall, exceeded only by the theft from a crime scene that potentially combines personal gain with a disregard for the investigation outcome. However, the scenario addressing a failure to make an arrest (Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant) was evaluated as much less serious (Table 5).

The officers' views varied greatly across the 11 scenarios (see Table 5), but an examination of the standard deviations for the mean seriousness ratings suggests that the respondents expressed more homogeneous views about the more serious scenarios. In fact, the ranking of the seriousness evaluations is strongly negatively related to the ranking of the standard deviations (Table 5; Spearman correlation coefficient = –.955, $p < .001$). The negative relation between standard deviation and misconduct seriousness suggests that the officers were much more likely to lack consensus over minor misconduct (e.g., free gifts or verbal abuse of civilians), while sharing a more homogeneous set of ratings for misconduct they viewed as more serious (e.g., the theft of a knife or the false report of drug possession cases). A similar observation was reported by Martin (1994) for Illinois police officers and Kutnjak Ivković and O'Connor Shelley (2008b) for officers in two East-European countries.

A comparison of the evaluations of seriousness provided by the respondents from Rainless West and those expressed by the respondents from Charlotte-Mecklenburg, St. Petersburg, and Charleston reveals that, although there are differences in absolute terms (i.e., means), the relative rankings of the scenarios seem to be quite common (Spearman's correlation coefficients were all above .84, $p < .05$). In all four agencies—Rainless West included—police officers were most likely to evaluate the same three scenarios as the most serious (Scenario 3—Theft of knife from crime scene; Scenario 4—Unjustifiable use of deadly force; Scenario 10—False report of drug possession). At the same time, police officers from all four agencies were quite uniform in determining the same three scenarios are the least serious as well (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants; Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist; Scenario 8—Cover-up of police DUI and accident; Table 5).

Perceptions of Appropriate and Expected Discipline

In addition to emphasizing the communication of official rules, the organizational theory of police integrity (Klockars et al., 2006) also predicts that the disciplinary

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actions taken by an agency play a key role in shaping that department's overall integrity levels. Thus, we asked the respondents what discipline they thought appropriate for the behaviors described in the scenarios and what discipline they thought their agency would mete out in such cases.[7] The respondents could have selected an answer on a 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging from no discipline to dismissal.[8]

In the case of Rainless West, our respondents differentiated what they thought that the appropriate and expected discipline should and would be across the scenarios (Table 6). Their assessments of both appropriate and expected discipline were closely related to their evaluations of scenario seriousness (Spearman's correlation coefficient for appropriate discipline = .991, $p < .001$; Spearman's correlation coefficient for expected discipline = .973, $p < .001$); the more serious their evaluation of the behavior, the more likely they were to advocate and expect more severe discipline. In particular, for the four scenarios they evaluated as the least serious (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants; Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant; Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist; Scenario 8—Cover-up of police DUI and accident), they approved and expected less serious discipline, namely verbal reprimand, written reprimand, or, in the case of a police cover-up of DUI, suspension (the mean values are all below the midpoint of the scale). However, for the three scenarios they evaluated as the most serious (Scenario 3—Theft of knife from crime scene; Scenario 4—Unjustifiable use of deadly force; Scenario 10—False report of drug possession), they mostly expected dismissal.

The police integrity questionnaire also enables us to compare Rainless West officers' views on the appropriate discipline for each behavior with their expectations for the disciplinary step their agency would pursue for that same behavior (see Table 6). In the vast majority of cases their evaluations were quite similar. When we compared the means, we found that only two scenarios with substantial differences between the appropriate and expected discipline (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants; Scenario 8—Cover-up of police DUI and accident); in both of these minor misconduct scenarios, the respondents expected more severe discipline to be meted out than they thought appropriate. When we compared the modal disciplinary action (see Table 6), only one of these two minor misconduct scenarios (Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist) had modal values that were not identical; in that single case, the respondents expected more severe punishment (written reprimand) than the one they thought was appropriate (verbal reprimand).

Although the responses about both appropriate and expected discipline expressed by Rainless West respondents were similar to the responses provided by the officers from Charlotte-Mecklenburg, St. Petersburg, and Charleston in the majority of scenarios (see Table 6), they differed from the evaluations expressed by their peers in St. Petersburg and Charleston in the disciplinary actions they thought appropriate for minor police misconduct, and in their expected discipline. In particular, there were substantive differences (differences of at least 0.5 in the mean values) between the views of the respondents from Rainless West on the disciplinary action they thought the department should enforce (see Table 6) and the views of the officers from

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St. Petersburg for three least serious cases of misconduct (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants; Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant; Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist), and the views of the officers from Charleston for five mostly minor misconduct cases (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants; Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant; Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist; Scenario 8—Cover-up of police DUI and accident; Scenario 9—Auto-body shop 5 percent kickback). In all of these cases, officers from Rainless West responded that, compared with their counterparts from St. Petersburg and Charleston, a more lenient discipline is both appropriate and actually expected from their agency to mete out. The disparity in the predicted discipline was the most pronounced in the case of an officer failing to arrest a friend scenario (Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant; Table 6). The average Rainless West officer predicted a *written reprimand* for that misconduct, whereas officers in St. Petersburg expected a *suspension* and Charleston officers predicted a *dismissal* for that same conduct.

The Rainless West officers' perceptions of seriousness and expected discipline were in line with those held by the officers in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg police (see Table 6). The two agencies trailed the other two agencies, particularly over the minor misconduct vignettes, in their choice of appropriate punishment and their expectations on the agency's disciplinary choice. Nevertheless, the two agencies did differ in terms of modal responses for punishment of more minor misconduct. Rainless West officers expected the discipline for the receipt of free food would be more severe. Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers expected more severe punishment than Rainless West officers for failing to make an arrest for a criminal warrant.

Willingness to Report Misconduct

The police integrity questionnaire allows us to determine the degree to which officers in an agency subscribe to the code of silence. The respondents in Rainless West were asked whether they would report a fellow officer who engaged in the behavior described in the scenario.[9] They were asked to make a choice from a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from "definitely no" to "definitely yes."

The results (Table 7) show that the code of silence in Rainless West is far from a flat prohibition of reporting misconduct; rather, the mean values are spread from almost one end of the scale to the other, depending on the specific scenario in question. The extent of the code of silence is strongly negatively related to the perceptions of seriousness (Spearman's correlation coefficient = –.982, $p < .001$); the more serious they evaluated the behavior, the less likely they were to say that they would protect it in silence (Table 7). The mean evaluations of their willingness to report for the four least serious scenarios (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants; Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant; Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist; Scenario 8—Cover-up of police DUI and accident) are all below or around the midpoint of the scale, suggesting that the officers would likely protect such behavior without reporting it. However, the mean evaluations for the three most serious scenarios (Scenario

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3—Theft of knife from crime scene; Scenario 4—Unjustifiable use of deadly force; Scenario 10—False report of drug possession) are all very close to the reporting side of the scale (see Table 7), indicating that the officers would be more likely to report such behavior.

A comparison of the findings regarding Rainless West officers' willingness to report misconduct with the findings from the other three agencies suggests that the contours of the code of silence in Rainless West are very similar to the contours of the code of silence in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, St. Petersburg, and Charleston (Table 7). A comparison of the results from Rainless West with the results from Charlotte-Mecklenburg identifies only two scenarios with meaningful differences (Scenario 6—Officer strikes prisoner; Scenario 8—Cover-up of police DUI and accident). In both, the respondents from Rainless West were substantially *more* likely to say that they would report than the respondents from Charlotte-Mecklenburg were. A comparison with St. Petersburg revealed meaningful differences in the three scenarios, the Rainless West respondents evaluated as the least serious (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants; Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant; Scenario 7—Verbal abuse of motorist), with the respondents from St. Petersburg being more likely to say that they would not protect these behaviors than the respondents from Rainless West were. Finally, a comparison with Charleston revealed mixed conclusions. On the one hand, there were two scenarios (Scenario 1—Free meals/gifts from merchants; Scenario 2—Failure to arrest with felony warrant) in which the respondents from Rainless West were more likely to say that they would stick to the code of silence than the respondents from Charleston were. On the other hand, there was one scenario (Scenario 6—Officer strikes prisoner) in which the respondents from Charleston were more likely to say that they would stick to the code of silence than the respondents from Rainless West were.

Conclusion

Prior to conducting our police integrity survey, we were aware that Rainless West had a reputation for sizeable problems with minor misconduct; a recent public scandal that involved a single case of minor misconduct had led to the disciplining of more than 20% of the sworn force. The approach developed by Klockars and colleagues (2006) allowed us to assess empirically how Rainless West compares with the agencies of integrity identified and studied by Klockars and colleagues (2006; St. Petersburg, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and Charleston Police Departments). The results of our study indicate that the problem with minor misconduct persists within Rainless West, and suggests that the integrity instrument could serve in the future to supplement the city's official misconduct statistics as a measure of their progress in trying to instill norms resistant to misconduct in the agency.

A comparison of the results from Rainless West with the responses from St. Petersburg, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and Charleston reveals that Rainless West systematically differs from St. Petersburg and Charleston—the two agencies that

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topped the 30-agency study's police integrity list—in the officers' views about less serious misconduct. Specifically, Rainless West officers were less likely than officers from Charleston and St. Petersburg to recognize that accepting gratuities, failing to execute an arrest warrant, and verbally abusing citizens were violations of official rules. Moreover, they were less likely to evaluate them as serious, they advocated and expected less severe discipline, and, in the case of St. Petersburg, they were also more likely to say that they would protect such behavior in silence.

However, although Charlotte-Mecklenburg was viewed as an agency of integrity (Klockars et al., 2006), it was not ranked nearly as highly as either St. Petersburg or Charleston. In fact, it ranked "in the middle third of agencies surveyed" (Klockars et al., 2006, p. 40). This was primarily a result of the more lenient attitudes toward less serious corruption among the police officers in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. According to its reputation, Rainless West was similar to Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Indeed, the results of our survey suggest that various measures—be they assessments of rule violations, evaluations of vignette seriousness, or views about appropriate and expected discipline—were generally very similar across the two agencies. In the end, whenever there were noticeable differences in their expressed willingness to report misconduct, our respondents from Rainless West were even less likely to say that they would tolerate such misconduct in silence.

There is no magic formula for altering individual values in an organization. However, Rainless West should seek to address the means by which they communicate their official rules to the employees. As the Klockars and colleagues (2006) survey of 30 agencies demonstrates, all-encompassing rules and procedure manuals do not necessarily translate into officer knowledge in the field. The confusion among police officers from Rainless West likely stems not only from the lack of clear communication and ethics instruction in academy/in-service training, but also from the potential inconsistency in the agency's actions.

An agency's integrity strategy cannot overlook minor misconduct such as verbal abuse or accepting free gifts, the two forms of misconduct that accounted for most of the differences between Rainless West and peer agencies. The police studies pioneer O. W. Wilson argued that police departments should never be permitted to accept any gratuity, not even a free cup of coffee, because these small offerings have a corrupting influence as the officer begins to see other opportunities for using the position for personal gain (Goldstein, 1977). A similar argument could be made that verbal abuse plays the same indoctrinating role for misconduct with no personal gain. If an officer can routinely dehumanize and verbally attack citizens in officer–public interactions, the door is open to more consequential misconduct. This is a position on which most police chiefs would agree, but the Police Integrity Instrument suggests that departments continue to differ based on their commitment to actually communicate and enforce the rules on minor misconduct.

As police agencies continue to adopt early warning systems, citizen review boards, and other reforms intended to enhance police integrity, the Police Integrity Instrument offers an important tool for keeping track of the ethical values of those in the field and

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for assessing whether the police officer attitudes reflect actual policy and cultural goals sought by a reform-minded police administration. Walker (2005) argues that police agency reform is not permanent; instead, policy drift and the erosion of supervision in the field work over time to undermine the continuity of even the most established of reform efforts. An agency committed to integrity must adopt one, if not more, instruments, such as Klockars and colleagues' (2000; 2004) police integrity survey, that routinely measure the views of the police in the field because official statistics will often mask the reality of police views on misconduct.

For police researchers, this case study on a police department's adoption of the police integrity survey as an evaluation tool in their effort to address misconduct will represent another step in the routinized use of research scholarship in the accountability era. Law enforcement agencies in many countries increasingly choose, or are compelled by freedom of information laws, to reveal the data they collect on use of force reporting, citizen complaints, and other forms of misconduct. Rainless West chose to open their doors to a police integrity survey in part because they endorse the viewpoint that the agency is better served trying to gain insights on officer views on what currently is taking place beyond their official reports of misconduct, thus increasing the capability to steer its officers' behavior away from patterns that create potential of turning into a public scandal down the road.

Appendix

Police Integrity Instrument Vignettes

Case	Scenario
#1	A police officer is widely liked in the community. Local merchants and restaurant owners regularly show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food, cigarettes, and other items of small value.
#2	A police officer is aware that there is a felony warrant for a long time friend of his. Although he sees his friend frequently over a period of more than a week and warns his friend of its existence, he does not arrest him.
#3	A police officer discovers a burglary of a hardware store. The display cases are smashed and many items have obviously been taken. While searching the store, he takes an expensive pocketknife and slips it into his pocket. He reports that the knife has been stolen during the burglary.
#4	An officer, who was severely beaten by a person resisting arrest, just returned to patrol duty. The officer approaches a person standing in a dimly lit alley. Suddenly the person throws a gym bag at the officer and begins to run away. The officer fatally shoots the person, striking him in the back. Later determined, the person was unarmed.
#5	A police officer is scheduled to work during the coming holidays. The supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to run some personal errands for the supervisor. Evaluate the SUPERVISORS's behavior.

(continued)

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Appendix (continued)

Case	Scenario
#6	In responding with her male partner to a fight in a bar, a young, female officer receives a black eye from one of the male combatants. The man is arrested, handcuffed, and, as he is led into the cells, the male member of the team punches him very hard in the kidney area saying, "hurts, doesn't it."
#7	A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. As the officer approaches the vehicle, the driver yells, "What the hell are you stopping me for?" The officer replies, "Because today is "Arrest an Asshole Day."
#8	At 2:00 A.M. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense, he transports the driver to his home.
#9	A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives a payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.
#10	A police officer arrests two drug dealers involved in a street fight. One has a large quantity of heroin on his person. To charge them both with serious offenses, the officer falsely reports that the heroin was found on both men.
#11	A police sergeant, without intervening, watches officers under his supervision repeatedly strike and kick a man arrested for child abuse. The man has previous child abuse arrests. Evaluate the SERGEANT'S behavior.

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Notes

1. Though the assessment was requested by a senior police administrator in the agency, the data collection was not handled by the internal affairs or the supervisory chain. Rather, in an agreement with the Rainless West's police administrators, we selected a line officer to coordinate the data collection efforts. The coordinator was trained in the IRB protocol and was closely monitored by one of the coauthors. He explained the study and its protocol to the potential respondents and distributed the questionnaires with the IRB-approved cover letter printed on university stationary. The coordinator was the only employee in the agency who had access to the questionnaires after they were completed by the respondents, keeping them at a secure location. Data entry was performed by the coauthors at their respective universities.

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2. The question was worded: "Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?"
3. Possible answers ranged from 5 = *definitely yes* to 1 = *definitely no*.
4. An ANOVA test was not possible for the question on whether each vignette represented a violation of agency policy because Rainless West and the three-city survey used different response scales for that question.
5. Although the wording of this one question is the same for the respondents from Rainless West and the other three agencies, the offered answers are not. Klockars and colleagues (2006) offered three answers to their respondents (1 = *yes*, 2 = *not sure*, 3 = *no*), while we provided a 5-point Likert-type scale, with answers ranging from 1 = *definitely no* to 5 = *definitely yes*. We coded the answers to facilitate a comparison of affirmative answers provided by the respondents from Rainless West and the previous three-city study by dichotomizing both scales. The scale used in Klockars and colleagues (2006) was dichotomized to "Yes" (the answer 1 from the original scale) and "No" (answers 2 and 3 from the original scale). The scale used in Rainless West was dichotomized to "Yes" (answers 4 and 5 on the original scale) and "No" (answers 1, 2, and 3 from the original scale). Because the scales in the original questions were not identical across the two surveys, these steps are intended to provide only a rough comparison.
6. The question was worded: "How serious do you consider this behavior to be?"
7. The two questions were worded: "If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any, discipline do you think SHOULD follow?" and "If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any, discipline do you think WOULD follow?"
8. Possible answers were: 1 = *none*, 2 = *verbal reprimand*, 3 = *written reprimand*, 4 = *suspension*, 5 = *demotion in rank*, and 6 = *dismissal*.
9. The answer was worded: "Do you think you would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?"

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Bios

Sanja Kutnjak Ivković is Professor at the School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. She holds a doctorate in criminology (Ph.D., University of Delaware) and a doctorate in law (S.J.D., Harvard University). Her research focuses on comparative and international criminology, criminal justice, and law. Professor Kutnjak Ivković's recent book, *Reclaiming Justice: The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Local Courts* (2011), co-authored with John Hagan, was published by the Oxford University Press. Prof. Kutnjak Ivković is the author of *The Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption* (Oxford University Press, 2005) and *Lay Participation in Criminal Trials* (1999). She is the co-author with Carl Klockars and Maria R. Haberfeld of *Enhancing Police Integrity* (Springer, 2006) and co-editor with Carl Klockars and Maria Haberfeld of *Contours of Police integrity* (Sage, 2004), which received American Society of Criminology International Division Honorable Mention. Professor Kutnjak Ivković's research has been published in leading academic and law journals, such as the *Law and Society Review; Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology; Criminology and Public Policy; Law and Policy; Stanford Journal of International Law; Cornell International Law Journal; Policing and Society; Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*.

Robert P. Peacock is a doctoral student in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University and currently serves as Project Coordinator for the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program Office of the US Department of Justice in Kiev, Ukraine. His current research focuses on agency legitimacy and corruption in community policing and environmental enforcement in developing countries.

Maria Haberfeld is Professor and Chair of the Dept. of Law, Police Science and CJA at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. She is an author, co-author, editor and co-editor of 15 books on law enforcement related topics. She is engaged in a number of ongoing research projects dealing with police training, leadership, ethics and multiculturalism.

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