Article

Party Politics
17(6) 767–799
© The Author(s) 2010
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1354068810376779
ppq.sagepub.com

Who votes in Africa? An examination of electoral participation in 10 African countries

Michelle Kuenzi
University of Nevada Las Vegas, USA

Gina M. S. Lambright
George Washington University, USA

Abstract

The question 'Who votes in Africa?' has yet to receive significant attention. We use Afrobarometer survey data to assess the determinants of voting for over 17,000 voting-age adults in 10 African countries. We find that Africans are driven by many of the same forces as their counterparts elsewhere. The agencies of mobilization are important in determining who votes in these countries. Notably, identifying with a political party is one of the most important predictors of voting. Thus, although political parties may have questionable democratic credentials in many African countries, ultimately, political parties serve the function of getting citizens to the polls. Certain attitudes also influence individuals' decisions of whether to vote, including support for democracy. Among the demographic variables, age registers a significant, positive relationship with voting. Interestingly, the study's findings regarding the socio-economic status (SES) model are contradictory. Educated Africans in these countries are significantly more likely to vote than their less educated counterparts, as the SES model would lead one to expect. Contrary to what one would expect based on the SES model, more impoverished Africans are also significantly more likely to vote than their wealthier counterparts. In addition, the institutional and political context influences individuals' propensities to vote.

Corresponding author:
Michelle Kuenzi, Department of Political Science, University of Nevada Las Vegas, 4505 S. Maryland Pkwy Box 455029, Las Vegas, NV 89154–5029, USA.
Email: michele.kuenzi@unlv.edu

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Keywords
Africa, citizens, clientelism, political participation, statistical analysis

Paper submitted 30 June 2008; accepted for publication 13 June 2009

Introduction

The question 'Who votes in the United States?' has been largely answered in the political science scholarship devoted to this subject (e.g. Nie et al., 1976; Teixeira, 1987; Verba et al., 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). In contrast, the question 'Who votes in Africa?' has yet to receive significant attention. Several studies have examined political participation within a single African country (e.g. Bratton, 1999; Kuenzi, 2006), but there has been little cross-national research to explore the nature of electoral participation across Africa's multiparty regimes. Now that most African states have at least the formal features of democracy, such as multiparty elections, it is important to see whether the norms and behaviour of the citizenry support these democratic institutions. This article seeks to identify the factors associated with electoral participation in sub-Saharan African countries.

In other work, the factors that influence voter turnout in Africa at the cross-national level are examined (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2007). In this article, we use individual-level survey data to examine the factors that affect an individual's propensity to vote in 10 African countries. We use Afrobarometer (AB) Round 1 survey data to test the relationships of interest for over 17,000 voting-age adults in the 10 African countries. Political parties play a critical role in determining who votes in the African countries of study, largely because of the characteristics of the African context. Variables associated with several other approaches also help explain who votes in Africa. Certain attitudes influence individuals' decisions of whether to vote. Among the demographic variables, age is an important predictor of voting. Interestingly, the study's findings regarding the socioeconomic status (SES) model are contradictory. On the one hand, educated Africans in these countries are significantly more likely to vote than their less educated counterparts, as the SES model would lead one to expect. On the other hand, contrary to what one would expect based on the SES model, more impoverished Africans are also significantly more likely to vote than their wealthier counterparts. In addition, the institutional and political context influences individuals' propensities to vote.

Our article is an important contribution to the literature on voting in Africa. In their path-breaking book on public opinion and democracy in Africa, Bratton et al. (2005) examine the determinants of political participation using the AB Round 1 merged dataset, but they examine a number of types of political participation and therefore do not devote a great deal of attention to voting. In fact, only one regression equation of voting is estimated. Our examination of voting differs from that of Bratton et al. (2005) in important ways. We use different statistical techniques. We also examine the influence of several variables Bratton et al. (2005) do not consider and include contextual variables, which they do not, in our models, including a measure of ethnic diversity. Of those variables that are shared in our models, several are measured differently. Moreover, we restrict our analyses to different subsamples in order to interrogate our results fully.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Thus, we offer a much more thorough and rigorous examination of the individual-level correlates of voting than do Bratton et al. (2005) and come to some different conclusions.

Theory

Although the political, economic and social contexts of Africa differ from those of other areas of the world, we hypothesize that citizens of African countries are driven by many of the same forces as their counterparts elsewhere. With reference to voting, they want to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of engaging in this activity. Rational choice theorists largely acknowledge that one must include psychological costs and benefits when analysing the 'calculus of voting'. As Fiorina (1976) notes, the decision to vote involves both instrumental and expressive considerations. When the social/psychological variables are excluded from the calculus, the costs of voting would seem clearly to outweigh the benefits, and one would therefore not expect to see people turn out to vote. Downs (1957) initially argued that one additional factor (the 'D term') propelling people to vote was the desire to avert the failure of democracy should no one show up at the polls. Of course, as Fiorina (1976) points out, averting the failure of democracy is a collective action problem, and Downs does not tell us how this collective action is overcome. Riker and Ordeshook (1968: 28) elaborated on the 'D term' (the expressive dimension) to make it include satisfaction from 'compliance with the ethic of voting', 'affirming allegiance to the political system', 'affirming a partisan preference', 'deciding, going to the polls, etc.' and 'affirming one's efficacy in the political system'. In fact, Fiorina (1976: 393) observes: 'Empirically, most of the action appears to be in the D term'.

Although we expect that Africans engage in the calculus of voting, as do their counterparts elsewhere, one must take into account the characteristics of the political landscape in African countries, since these characteristics affect people's perceptions of the costs and benefits of voting. Salient characteristics of many African countries include high levels of poverty, low levels of education and media penetration, and relatively high proportions of the population living in rural areas and working in agriculture. Given the low levels of education and media penetration, as Bratton et al. (2005) note, many of the countries of study have what can be termed 'low information' environments. Some of the underlying structural characteristics of African countries have contributed to the existence and resilience of neopatrimonialism.[1] As Wantchekon observes, 'clientelist politics is most attractive in conditions of low productivity, high inequality, and starkly hierarchical social relations' (2003: 400).

Elections and political parties in Africa differ considerably from those in the advanced industrial democracies. Neopatrimonialism, or 'personal rule', was the defining characteristic of the pre-transition regimes (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Neopatrimonialism has survived democracy, and many scholars note that citizens often pursue narrow, short-term, interests through voting as opposed to more generalized, long-term, interests. For example, Lindberg (2003) finds that MPs in Ghana must expend a significant amount of money and effort distributing sums of cash and personal services to voters in order to achieve success at the polls. Similarly, Wantchekon's (2003: 405) field experiment in Benin reveals that, with regard to the political messages delivered

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

by presidential candidates, clientelist appeals (i.e. platforms taking 'the form of redistributive transfers to one or several groups of voters') are much more effective than programmatic appeals (i.e. platforms taking 'the form of public goods provision').

People often vote in a block and are strongly influenced by the prescriptions of village notables or group leaders, especially in rural Africa (Bratton et al., 2005). With regard to materialistic considerations, social groups may pledge their support for a candidate and expect 'their candidate' to direct resources to them once elected (cf. Nugent, 2007). With regard to the 'D term' or expressive dimension, an important benefit to be obtained from voting is often the social approval one receives for demonstrating loyalty to village notables or family members and the psychological satisfaction one accrues from engaging in a group effort (cf. Schaffer, 1998).

Mobilization agents

Both political parties and voluntary organizations constitute what Norris (2002) calls 'mobilizing agencies'. In democracies, political parties are the primary link between citizens and government. In the electorate, parties help to clarify and 'simplify the choices for voters', provide 'symbols of identification and loyalty', as well as educate voters about policies and the government and mobilize people to vote (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000: 5–7). Norris (2002) finds that identifying with a political party is one of the most important predictors of voting based on the pooled survey data from the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) 1996 Role of Government III study of 22 countries.

What functions do African political parties perform? Manning (2005) enumerates the many ways in which the characteristics and functions associated with African political parties and party systems differ from those attributed to parties and party systems in the comparative politics literature. She contends that, for example, as opposed to representing social cleavages, political parties attempt to manipulate and politicize these cleavages to serve their own ends (2005: 722). Many other students of African politics have also observed that political parties have largely been the vehicles of individual politicians or ethnic mobilization (Mozaffar et al., 2003; van de Walle, 2002; Widner, 1997). Erdmann (2007: 36–7) lists some of the other 'typical characteristics' of African parties, including 'barely distinguishable programmes', 'weak bureaucratic organization', factionalism, informality and personalism. In general, the political parties and party systems of Africa are known for their weakness and lack of institutionalization (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005).

In fact, the depth of attachment people have to parties and the extent to which ethnic, expressive, patronage or programmatic considerations are salient seem to vary across party systems. In some countries, one sees stable party attachments (Lindberg, 2007), and in others there is a high level of volatility. Moreover, Erdmann and Stohl's analysis reveals significant differences in the importance of ethnic identity across countries and even across parties in the same country (2008). They find that while ethnicity matters, ethnic identity is only one factor among others that attracts voters to political parties.[2]

Despite the variations seen in the nature of parties and party systems across countries, party membership both decreases the costs and increases the benefits associated with

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

voting in African countries. Bratton et al. (2005: 299) observe that while parties in Africa may be weak and lacking in organization, they are still key mobilization agents because, compared to other institutions, 'parties can seem relatively strong'. In the 'low information environments' of Africa, we expect political parties to play a critical role in getting out the vote. Although political parties in Africa fail to perform many of the functions associated with parties in the comparative politics literature, they do perform functions that affect the voting calculus. For example, like elsewhere, parties in Africa clarify and simplify the choices before voters, and thus party identification can mitigate the costs associated with collecting information on the candidates contesting the election. Parties may provide a symbol of loyalty in Africa, and thus voters need not expend much effort in deciding for whom to vote. In addition, the mobilization efforts of African parties reduce the amount of time voters need to devote to the logistics of voting, and those identifying with a party are more likely to be the targets of mobilization efforts than those with no party identification. As noted, in other cases, less concrete benefits may be obtained from voting for the party with which one identifies. Randall (2007) argues that the seemingly substantive representation some ethnic groups may receive through clientelistic ties is probably more likely 'symbolic collective representation'. Thus, some citizens would obtain satisfaction simply 'affirming a partisan preference' and, by implication, support for and solidarity with their ethnic group or social group through the act of voting. In his study of political participation in Zambia, Bratton (1999) found identification with a party to be one of the most important predictors of voting. We also expect to find a positive relationship between identifying with a political party and voting.

There are several mechanisms that underlie the relationship between identifying with a party and voting. Material benefits, patronage networks, expressive benefits and even programmatic concerns all appear to play a role in parties' ability to mobilize citizens. In some situations, representatives of political parties may offer cash or some type of good to individuals for their votes. Bratton finds that nearly a fifth of Nigerians are 'personally exposed to vote buying' (2008: 621). Bratton (2008: 622) also finds that both vote-buying and intimidation are relatively ineffective electoral strategies in Nigeria, although he does find that vote-buying increases party loyalty.

Instead of individualized vote-buying, parties are generally able to mobilize voters through patronage networks. Indeed, Lehoucq (2007) finds that the conditions giving rise to vote-buying are relatively rare. As Lehoucq notes, parties have strategies other than vote-buying to ensure that voters cast their ballots for them. Citing a number of studies, Wang and Kurzman (2007) note that, in some countries, parties can rely on the patronage networks that already exist in communities. As they observe: 'Where this is the case, the campaign need only mobilize relationships of trust at the top of the hierarchy, leaving the lower-level brokers to be mobilized by patronage leaders' (2007: 74).

In fact, this is an apt description of what occurs around election time in many African countries. As noted, people often vote in a block and are strongly influenced by the prescriptions of village notables or group leaders, especially in rural Africa (Bratton et al., 2005). Political parties are often linked to some type of intermediary who can deliver votes to the party's candidate. This person might be the chief of a village or some 'village notable'. Kuenzi and Lambright (2007) note that in many African countries entire villages are sometimes mobilized to vote for a party. Thus, many parties may not have

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

coherent platforms or be ideological in nature, but they are able to establish effective links with voters.

With regard to developed democracies, Karp et al. (2007: 96) note that: 'Parties, therefore, have an incentive to reduce the costs of mobilization efforts by targeting voters that are less costly to reach'. Although they contend that the higher population density of cities makes them more attractive locations for parties to canvass, we expect that African parties' efforts are more likely to reap benefits in rural areas for several reasons. Where are the conditions most auspicious for mass mobilization through patronage networks? According to Lehoucq (2007: 42), the most auspicious conditions are in 'Tightly knit communities – typically found in rural and "traditional" areas'. Here, one can 'detect and punish defectors' (Lehoucq, 2007: 42). In a similar vein, Conroy-Krutz (2009) argues that mobilization in Africa is likely easier in rural areas because vote-buying is more costly with weaker enforcement mechanisms in urban areas. In general, it may also be easier for parties to mobilize voters in rural Africa where resource scarcity increases the impact of party efforts to buy votes.

However, ease of monitoring and punishing are certainly not the only reasons rural areas are ideal places for mass mobilization. As elsewhere in the world, in Africa, social cohesion tends to be much stronger in rural areas than in urban areas. Those in rural areas are more likely to behave in accordance with the desires of those of prominence, such as village notables or the chief, than those in urban areas where such community leaders may not even exist (Bratton et al. [2006: 16] make a similar point). Based on data from the United States, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia, Coleman (2004) finds evidence that social conformity not only affects people's propensity to vote but also their vote choice. Nowhere is the pressure to conform and show solidarity with the group greater than in a rural African village. In fact, as noted, one of the major benefits to be achieved through voting is the psychological or 'expressive' benefit of demonstrating loyalty to village notables or family members (see Schaffer, 1998).

Finally, policy issues also affect voters' party preferences in some African countries. For example, Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) find that even in Kenya's 2007 election, notable for the violence that followed it, voters' support for a particular party was based on ethnicity, but also policy interests and performance evaluations. Lindberg and Morrison conclude that, in Ghana, 'only about one in ten voters is decisively influenced by either clientelism or ethnic and family ties in choosing political representatives' (2008: 96).

Associational membership

Connected to the social capital literature is the notion that the more engaged people are in their communities, the more likely they are to vote. Based on United States data, Brady et al. (1995) find that participation in voluntary organizations increases people's civic skills, which leads people to have a greater propensity to participate politically. Moreover, civil society groups are often linked to political parties, which then link citizens to the political sphere.

Although the link between political parties and civil society is thought to be weak in Africa (Erdmann, 2007), the linkages between some civil society organizations and political parties have deep roots. Historically, within Africa's one-party regimes the only

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

civil society organizations sanctioned were those aligned to the ruling party. Even with the transition to multiparty politics, these linkages still exist as newly formed parties struggle to establish links with civil society organizations seen as politically important, as has been the case with Kenya's former ruling party, KANU, and the Maendeleo women's organization (Tripp, 2001). Bratton (1999) finds that membership in certain types of civil society groups has a significant, positive relationship with voting in Zambia. We expect to find a positive relationship between associational membership and voting. Associational membership increases the civic skills of African citizens, which mitigates the costs and increases the satisfaction associated with voting. In addition, members of associations are more likely to be the targets of party mobilization efforts than non-members because of the aforementioned linkages and because parties want to maximize the results of their efforts by focusing on potential voting blocks.

Demographic variables

A plethora of studies have pointed to the importance of demographic factors in predicting who votes. Modernization theorists saw education as a key force in promoting political participation (Lerner, 1958; Lipset, 1959). SES and education more specifically have been found to be the most important predictors of voting in the United States (Teixeira, 1987; Verba et al., 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) observe that education helps endow individuals with the skills they need to grapple with the logistical demands of voting. Higher levels of education are also associated with higher levels of interest in politics. In addition, those with high levels of education are likely to come from homes with educated, politically aware, parents (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).

Studies have found that SES has a greater effect on electoral participation in the United States than in other countries (Norris, 2002). Nonetheless, Norris finds that both education and income have significant positive effects on voting. When Norris tests these relationships for the individual countries, however, she finds that education does not have a significant effect on voting in over half of the countries, including most of those of Western Europe. The situation is similar for income (2002: 92–5). Such is probably the case because of the strong party systems in Western Europe. As others have noted, where political parties are vigorously serving their functions in the electorate, individual characteristics and initiative are less likely to determine who votes (e.g. see Powell, 1986). Another reason those of lower socio-economic groups in the United States may be less likely to vote is because their interests are not represented by either party. Thus, they do not have a strong interest in influencing the outcome of the election. In contrast, in many Western European countries the interests of the poor are represented by political parties. As for the developing world, Bratton (1999) finds no support for the SES model in his study of political participation in Zambia.

If, as Bratton (1999) argues, political parties function more as agents of mobilization as opposed to representation in Africa, then we might not expect to see a strong relationship between education and political participation in our countries of study. In short, the relationship between education and political parties works both ways. The 'low information environment' of Africa renders political parties a key force when it comes to voting.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

On the other hand, we hypothesize that the nature of elections and parties renders SES less important vis-a-vis voting than it might otherwise be. Nonetheless, we would generally expect education to have a positive effect on an individual's propensity to vote.

The relationship between gender and political participation appears to have changed in the advanced industrial democracies. As Inglehart and Norris (2000: 441) observe, in the past, studies found that men were more likely to participate in politics than women. Now, in some contexts, women are more likely to vote than men (see, e.g., Leighley and Nagler, 1992). The studies of the developing world generally point to a scenario of women being less likely to vote than men (see, e.g., Bratton, 1999; Krishna, 2002). Given how men dominate the political sphere in Africa, we expect women to be less likely to vote than men in our countries of study.

Political attitudes

Attitudes, it is theorized, also affect individuals' decisions of whether to vote. Political interest, for example, is linked to voting in numerous studies. Another stream of the literature on turnout focuses on social cohesion and social capital. Based on 1992 United States NES data, Knack and Kropf (1998) find that living in countries with 'cooperative norms' increases the probability that one will turn out to vote. In addition, they find a positive relationship between social trust and the likelihood of voting. Krishna (2002) finds social capital to have a significant positive effect on average village political participation rates in India. We therefore expect to find a positive relationship between social trust and voting in the African countries of study.

Those who have more trust in government institutions, it is thought, will also be more likely to vote, and some empirical support has been found for this relationship (see Cox, 2003; Norris, 2002). We expect those citizens in our countries of study with higher levels of political trust and more positive affectations towards the government to be more likely to vote than those with lower levels of trust.

At the aggregate level, some have hypothesized that poor economic performance depresses turnout in developed countries but stimulates turnout in developing countries (Kostadinova, 2003; Radcliff, 1992). As Radcliff observes, 'outside of the first world, citizens are more sensitive to economic conditions' (1992: 446). According to this logic, the citizens of African countries are likely to be especially sensitive to economic performance given that Africa is the poorest region of the world. It was the extended economic crisis which propelled people to take to the streets in protest against the authoritarian governments in Africa in the early 1990s (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). We therefore expect negative evaluations of economic performance to increase the likelihood of voting in Africa.

Modernization theorists also saw media exposure as a force likely to stimulate political participation (e.g. Lipset, 1959). Exposure to media is thought to increase individuals' desire to vote because they learn about the issues and candidates relevant in a particular election and therefore obtain more psychological gratification from voting. Media exposure also increases individuals' ability to vote because they obtain information about the logistics of voting from the media. We expect level of media exposure to have a positive relationship with voting in Africa.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Contextual variables

Our focus in this article is on individual-level explanations of electoral participation, but we recognize that political and institutional characteristics of the context in which individuals find themselves will bear upon their decisions of whether to vote. We hypothesize that institutions influence political behaviour in Africa in much the same way they do in other parts of the world. For example, Jackman (1987) and others have argued that disproportionality has a negative association with turnout because it decreases the effect each vote has on the electoral outcome. As Powell (1986: 21) notes, proportional representation also provides parties with an incentive to mobilize voters since they have a good chance of winning seats. Thus, we expect African citizens to be more likely to vote under proportional electoral rules than majoritarian electoral rules. In addition, we expect citizens to be more likely to vote when elections are held concurrently, since voters get a greater payoff for the effort of going to the polls when two electoral races are at stake as opposed to just one. As Aldrich (1993: 261) observes 'there will be "economies of scale" for voting in several contests at the same time, and the voter will need to associate lower (expected) benefits to find it worthwhile to vote in any one contest'.

As has been observed in industrialized countries (Franklin, 2004), the closeness of the electoral race is likely to affect an individual's calculus of whether to vote, since an individual's vote is more likely to make a difference in closer electoral contests. Aldrich (1993) notes that studies have shown that parties and candidates are more likely to engage in extensive campaign and mobilization efforts in the case of close elections. Indeed, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) report that the correlation between competitiveness (percentage of the vote obtained by the winning candidate) and voter turnout in the founding elections of 28 African countries in the early 1990s is -0.499 ($p = 0.007$).

Ethnic fractionalization and competition are thought to influence the consolidation of democracy (Huntington, 1991). It is hard to predict how ethnic fractionalization or ethnic saliency would influence turnout. On the one hand, one could hypothesize that ethnic saliency would stimulate turnout as people would tend to fear that members of other ethnic groups would vote for their ethnic parties, which could then capture the power of the state. Thus, people would be motivated to go to the polls and 'defensively' vote for the party associated with their ethnic group. On the other hand, since ethnic party mobilization is associated with violent conflict (see Reilly, 2006), some might be tempted to stay at home in such situations.

Finally, the level of civil liberties in a country may influence turnout. For example, Kuenzi and Lambright argue that: 'Where governments restrict citizens' civil liberties and political rights, elections are unlikely to be truly free and fair or competitive. In such environments, citizens may be less likely to expend the resources required to vote' (2007: 669–70). While Fornos et al. (2004) find that level of democracy positively affects turnout in Latin American countries, Kuenzi and Lambright's (2007) analysis reveals that level of democracy is not associated with higher turnout in Africa. In fact, they find that turnout is actually higher in less democratic countries, although this relationship does not hold once they exclude countries classified by Freedom House as 'not free'. Despite the findings from other regions, we do not expect level of democracy to

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

significantly affect voters' decisions to participate in African elections because of the critical role of party mobilization.

Conceptualization and operationalization[3]

Selection of countries

We use Round 1 AB data to examine voting behaviour using individual-level data from 10 African countries.[4] Why do we only use Round 1 AB data? The voting variable was not included in the merged AB Round 2 dataset, so we could not use that dataset. For whatever reason, there is very little variation in reported electoral participation in the Round 3 dataset. In fact, 93 percent of respondents said that they had voted, 1 percent said that they decided not to vote and about 6 percent said that they did not vote for various reasons. Moreover, the Round 1 survey is substantially different from the surveys of the subsequent rounds, and question wording differs across survey rounds. Because of the differences in some measures between the survey rounds, it would be very hard to pool the data, even simply by country. Thus, Round 1 provides us with the best data to explore the correlates of voting in Africa. Although Round 1 surveys were conducted in 12 countries, cases from Uganda and Ghana are excluded from our analysis because variables needed to examine the explanatory power of different explanations for voter participation are not available for these two countries. Thus, the analysis presented below covers the following 10 African countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The total number of cases for these 10 countries is 17,256.[5] With the exception of Zimbabwe, all of these countries regularly hold multiparty elections and are rated as either 'free' or 'partly free' by Freedom House. We therefore also conduct our analysis without the cases from Zimbabwe (see Appendix 2).

Dependent variable: Voting

Our measure of voting for the 10 African countries is based on the AB question about whether the respondent voted in the most recent round of national elections. We use a dichotomous measure of who voted among the voting-age population: 1 = yes, voted; 0 = no, did not vote.[6] As have all or nearly all of the studies on individual-level electoral participation cited in this article, this study focuses on reported voting behaviour. While there is likely to be a gap in actual voting behaviour and reported voting behaviour, almost all studies based on survey data must simply examine reported behaviour since that is the information available.

Nonetheless, in order to see whether over-reporting was biasing the relationships between the variables of interest and turnout, we ran our analysis separately for those countries in which reported and official turnout are within 10 percentage points of each other and those in which the difference between the two is greater than 10 percentage points.[7] The results are essentially the same for the two groups of countries (results not shown).

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Independent variables

Mobilization agents: Political parties and voluntary associations. Party identification (PID) is captured with a survey question asking respondents if they are close to any political party. This AB question captures PID, rather than formal membership or affiliation. Dalton and Weldon (2007: 182) observe that, although this is a 'softer' measure of partisanship than others, 'the question taps affinity to a party, is separate from immediate vote choice, and can be used in nations with diverse party systems'. In order to measure membership in voluntary associations, we created an index of associational memberships based on responses to questions about membership in four different types of voluntary association: religious organizations, development associations, business organizations and trade unions.[8] Higher values correspond to reported higher numbers of memberships. We operationalize associational memberships in this way because we expect differences in overall levels of civil society activism to affect voting regardless of the four types of organization to which respondents belong. However, we conduct our analysis with different measures of associational membership to cross-check our results.

We also include in our analysis most of the factors identified in the literature as influencing voter participation, including demographic variables (gender, age, income, education and rural/urban status), political attitudes (support for democracy, efficacy, social trust, political trust, political interest, views on the state of the national economy and the performance of political institutions) and contextual variables. The Round 1 datasets for individual countries contain a language variable that could be used as a proxy for ethnicity, but the merged dataset does not contain this variable, so we are unable to examine the impact of ethnicity on voting at the individual level. As noted below, however, we include an aggregate measure of ethnic fractionalization to test whether voters are more apt to vote in more diverse countries. We also explore the influence of ethnicity on voting in other ways, including analysis for a single country for which ethnicity data are available.

Demographic factors. The AB surveys include standard survey items for respondents' gender, level of education, age and rural/urban status. Higher values on education and age measures correspond to higher ages and levels of education. We recoded the measure of gender so that men are coded as 0 and women as 1. For the measure of urban/rural status, rural areas are coded as 0 and urban areas as 1. Since income was not included in the Round 1 merged dataset, we use the following question about access to food as a proxy for income: 'Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you gone without food for your family?' (Afrobarometer, 2004: 26). We recoded this variable so that higher values correspond to less frequent hunger. Respondents who report that their family 'always' goes without food receive a score of 1, while those who report 'never' going without food receive a score of 4.

Political attitudes. The AB surveys include a number of questions commonly used in other surveys to measure political attitudes. For example, we use a standard survey item to measure social trust. The response 'most people can be trusted' is coded as 1, while the

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

opposite response, 'you must be very careful' is coded as 0 (see Afrobarometer, 2004: 44). We created an index of political trust to measure trust in political institutions. The AB Round 1 merged dataset does not include data on trust in several political institutions, such as parliament, local governments or political parties. Therefore, the index of political trust used in our analysis only captures levels of trust in three political institutions: the police, the courts and the army. Higher values reflect higher levels of trust in these institutions.[9]

We also include measures of support for democracy, political efficacy and political interest in our analysis. We measure support for democracy using a standard survey item that asks respondents to select among three statements indicating different preferences for democracy. We recoded the variable so that the statement indicating respondents prefer democracy corresponds with higher values.[10] We are able to measure political efficacy using only a single question that asks respondents about their ability to understand politics because the AB Round 1 merged dataset does not include other questions to capture efficacy, such as respondents' ability to influence the opinions of others or make their representatives listen. Higher values on this measure correspond to greater feelings of efficacy, as demonstrated by a positive response to the question about one's ability to understand government. Political interest is measured using a survey question asking respondents about their interest in politics and government. Higher values correspond to higher levels of interest.

To capture individuals' perceptions of economic conditions, we include a measure of how respondents evaluate the state of the national economy. This variable is coded so that respondents who reported being 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the state of the economy receive higher scores.

We also include a measure of how respondents evaluate the performance of parliamentary representatives. The question wording varied slightly across some of the 10 countries, so that in some cases respondents evaluated the performance of their elected member of parliament (MP) and in other cases were asked about the performance of parliament generally. This slight difference is not all that important given that elected representatives generally serve as symbols of the larger political institution, especially in rural Africa, where an MP provides the only link to the national parliament. We use this measure as opposed to a question that probes feelings about general government performance or questions about the performance of the president because it is available for all 10 countries.

Contextual variables. We also include in our analysis several contextual variables found to be important predictors of aggregate turnout in Africa (see Kuenzi and Lambright, 2007). We include three measures of the institutional context in which citizens make decisions about voting. The difference in seat-shares between the top two parties winning seats in the legislature is our measure of the closeness of the election. In addition, our analysis includes measures of whether elections are conducted under majoritarian electoral formulas and whether legislative and presidential elections are held concurrently.

As noted above, we are also interested in how politicized ethnicity shapes voting, if at all. We therefore included in our analysis Posner's measure of politically relevant ethnic groups (PREG) for each of the 10 countries (2004). We use Freedom House civil liberties

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

scores to measure the level of civil liberties in the year preceding the election discussed in the AB survey in each of the 10 countries.

Results

What factors influence the likelihood that individuals will vote? Since our measure of electoral participation is dichotomous, we use logit to estimate the effects of the explanatory variables on voting. Table 1 presents four models estimating voter participation.[11] Model 1 estimates the effects of the individual-level variables of interest on voting. The remaining models include the contextual variables. Because our data are multi-level and include both individual-level survey data and aggregate data measured at the country level, we conducted analysis appropriate for such data, including clustering the standard errors by country and multi-level analysis. Models 1 and 2 report results using the clustered standard errors, while the remaining models report results of the multi-level analysis with random effects included for each of the survey-level independent variables.

As hypothesized, identification with a political party is one of the most important predictors of voting. The coefficient for identifying with a party is positive and highly significant in each of the models displayed in Table 1. Examination of predicted probabilities reveals that identifying with a party increases the probability of voting by about 15 percent, all else being equal.[12] With reference to the 22 countries covered in the ISSP survey, Norris finds 'Eighty-seven percent of those who could name a party affiliation voted, compared to 56 percent who could not' (2002: 97). With regard to the 10 African countries, we find that 83 percent of those who report feeling close to a political party also report voting, compared to 62 percent who report not feeling close to a political party. Norris finds a larger gap than we do, but the proportions of respondents in the respective categories are surprisingly similar, given the very different sets of countries covered in our studies.

Given the weakness and lack of institutionalization of the political parties and party systems of Africa, how can parties be critical forces in mobilizing the vote? Despite party weakness, PID is relatively high in African countries, given the newness of multipartyism. The average percentage of respondents reporting they felt close to a political party across the 10 African countries of study is 55.9 percent (see Table 2). Despite the putative weakness of political parties in Africa, Lindberg (2007) finds that party competition has been stable in 11 countries. Based on Lindberg's (2007) study, six of the 10 countries covered in our analysis have stable party systems: Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. Where is PID the highest? The four countries with the highest rates are all countries which Lindberg (2007) finds to have stable party systems. The rates of PID for Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and Tanzania are 75 percent, 82 percent, 71 percent and 79 percent, respectively, compared to the overall average of 56 percent. In these countries, PID appears to be a relatively stable identity that influences voting behaviour.

In other countries, party attachments are less stable and shallower. Indeed, ideology means little when it comes to party attachments in many of Africa's neopatrimonial regimes (see, e.g., van de Walle, 2003). In contrast to situations in which people must actually pay dues to acquire membership status, those feeling close to parties in Africa

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Table 1. Estimates of electoral participation in 10 African countries (logit). Dependent variable: Vote in last election?

Model variable	*Model 1 Clustered standard errors (by country)* –	*Model 2 Clustered standard errors (by country) W/contextual variables*	*Model 3 Multi-level analysis (random effects) W/contextual variables*	*Model 4 Multi-level analysis (random effects) W/FH civil liberties scores*
Close to a political party? (1=yes)	1.32*** (0.198)	1.32*** (0.178)	1.27*** (0.060)	1.27*** (0.060)
Membership in voluntary organizations	0.097** (0.047)	0.168*** (0.039)	0.156*** (0.030)	0.156*** (0.030)
Age	0.030*** (0.004)	0.028*** (0.003)	0.029*** (0.002)	0.029*** (0.002)
Urban/rural status (1=urban)	–0.200*** (0.064)	–0.242*** (0.095)	–0.197*** (0.062)	–0.197*** (0.062)
Income or how often does your family go hungry? (4=never)	–0.174*** (0.056)	–0.100** (0.046)	–0.137*** (0.039)	–0.137*** (0.039)
Gender (1=female)	–0.137 (0.092)	–0.179** (0.089)	–0.173*** (0.056)	–0.173*** (0.056)
Level of education (9=post-graduate)	0.185* (0.099)	0.016 (0.073)	0.079** (0.035)	0.079** (0.035)
Support for democracy (3=prefer democracy)	0.056 (0.074)	0.123*** (0.043)	0.153*** (0.040)	0.153*** (0.040)
Political interest	0.071** (0.033)	0.035 (0.025)	0.049** (0.025)	0.049** (0.025)
Political trust	0.032*** (0.009)	0.033** (0.015)	0.026** (0.0126)	0.026** (0.012)
Generalized trust (1=generally most people can be trusted)	0.184 (0.216)	–0.056 (0.095)	–0.070 (0.082)	–0.070 (0.082)
Understand government	–0.009 (0.022)	0.020 (0.028)	0.005 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Evaluation of performance of parliament (4=strongly approve)	0.206*** (0.042)	0.175*** (0.035)	0.199*** (0.031)	0.199*** (0.031)
Satisfaction with national economic conditions (4=very satisfied)	–0.057 (0.044)	–0.071*** (0.025)	–0.048** (0.023)	–0.048** (0.023)

(continued)

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Table 1 (continued)

Model variable	*Model 1 Clustered standard errors (by country)* –	*Model 2 Clustered standard errors (by country) W/contextual variables*	*Model 3 Multi-level analysis (random effects) W/contextual variables*	*Model 4 Multi-level analysis (random effects) W/FH civil liberties scores*
How frequently listen to radio news? (5=every day)	0.092*** (0.028)	0.088*** (0.016)	0.075*** (0.017)	0.075*** (0.017)
Politically relevant ethnic groups		0.206 (0.665)	0.440 (0.511)	0.470 (0.592)
Whether electoral system is majoritarian system? (1=yes)		–0.868** (0.379)	–0.745** (0.306)	–0.740** (0.309)
Whether executive and legislative elections are held concurrently? (1=yes)		0.599** (0.290)	0.439 (0.292)	0.428 (0.313)
Percent difference in seat-shares between two largest parties in legislature		–0.013** (0.005)	–0.020*** (0.005)	–0.020*** (0.006)
Freedom House civil liberties scores (1=free)				–0.018 (0.184)
Number of cases	10496	10496	10496	10496
Number of units	–	–	10	10
Pseudo R^2	0.1299	0.1657		

Standard errors are given in parentheses. *$p \leq 0.10$, **$p \leq 0.05$, ***$p \leq 0.01$ for two-tailed test.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Table 2. Party identification in Africa

	Percent reporting feeling close to a political party	*Percent reporting feeling close to ruling party*
10 African countries	55.9	70.7
Botswana	75.3	60.5
Lesotho	57.4	66.3
Malawi	82.2	56.8
Mali	57.7	72.4
Namibia	71.1	80.1
Nigeria	36.8	64.3
South Africa	44.7	75.5
Tanzania	79.2	78.7
Zambia	36.8	70.6
Zimbabwe	45.3	70.7

often expect to receive some type of personal reward for their support. Still, it is not surprising that political parties play an important role in mobilizing the vote. As noted earlier, there are no other institutions to rival political parties in this area, and parties are often able to mobilize people to vote with relative ease, given the right patronage resources. In countries such as Senegal, there was a realignment of party loyalty from the PS to the PDS once the PS was defeated by the PDS-led coalition in the executive election of 2000. Many of those who had been members of the PS for years switched their allegiance probably partially out of the bandwagon effect (see Coleman, 2004) and simply because they wanted to be allied with the ruling party because of its central role in the distribution of patronage.

Nonetheless, despite Africa's ruling parties' greater access to state resources (see, e.g., Bratton and van de Walle, 1997), we find that losing parties prove equally successful at mobilizing voters. The coefficient for a dummy variable for whether an individual identifies with a losing party (1 = yes) is significant and positive when substituted for the measure of PID (results not shown). The measure of PID is also significantly related to voting when analysis is run for only those respondents who identify with the losing party (results not shown). The impact of party mobilization similarly persists when we restrict the sample to only those countries that are 'free' or 'partly free' and drop all of Zimbabwe's cases (Model 12 in Appendix 2). We also included Freedom House civil liberties as an additional check to see whether voters are less likely to participate when they face a more restrictive political environment. The results of our analysis do not change when this additional contextual variable is included in the model (see Model 4 in Table 1). Moreover, the level of civil liberties does not significantly affect the likelihood of voting in Africa. The coefficient for this measure is not statistically significant.

Individuals who report a higher number of memberships in voluntary associations are also more likely to vote.[13] The coefficient for associational memberships is positive and significant across all of the models in Table 1. Bratton et al. (2005) find that associational membership has no effect on voting. This difference in findings probably results from differences in the operationalization of variables, specifications of models and methods

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

employed between the two studies. Also, as noted, our analysis excludes cases from Ghana and Uganda. Bratton et al. (2005) operationalize associational membership with two dummy variables, one for being a member of a religious organization and one for being a member of any other type of organization (i.e. being a member of a labour, business or development association). When we adopt the same operationalization of organizational membership as Bratton et al. (2005), we still get results that differ from theirs. Membership in a religious organization is not significantly related to voting, but membership in the other types of organization is positively and significantly related to voting (results not shown).

Several demographic variables appear to influence voter turnout. Age has the predicted significant, positive relationship with turning out to vote in the models presented in Table 1.[14] That is, older people are more likely to vote in African countries, just as they are elsewhere in the world. A 50-year-old is almost 15 percent more likely to vote than an 18-year-old in Africa.[15] This finding is in line with the findings in the advanced industrial democracies as well as Bratton's (1999) finding in Zambia and Bratton et al.'s (2005) finding. Norris (2002), too, finds that, among the demographic variables, age is the strongest predictor of who will turn out to vote.[16]

The results displayed in Table 1 support our expectation that women would be less likely to vote in Africa. The coefficient for gender is negative, as expected, and statistically significant in most of the models in Table 1. Interestingly, when the model is run for individual countries only, we find that the sign of the coefficient is positive for four of the countries and negative for the other six countries (results not shown). The coefficients are significant in six cases, and in two countries, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, women are significantly more likely to vote than men. Although our results confirm our expectation that men vote at a greater frequency than women in these 10 countries, the individual country analysis reveals that the relationship between gender and voting is shaped by context.

Contrary to modernization theory, we hypothesized a negative relationship between urban residence and voting. The results displayed in Table 1 support this hypothesis. In each model presented in Table 1, the coefficient for urban is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. The behaviour of political parties might help explain why those in rural areas have a higher probability of voting. Africa's governing parties often receive the bulk of their support in rural areas and have historically focused their mobilization efforts outside the urban areas (see, e.g., Bratton et al., 2005). Only 30 percent of urban respondents in these 10 countries report feeling close to the ruling party compared to 47 percent of rural respondents. Moreover, only 48 percent of urban respondents report feeling close to any political party at all compared to 64 percent of rural respondents. In all 10 of the countries studied, rural respondents were more likely to report feeling close to a political party than their urban counterparts. In several countries, such as Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mali, the reported rate of party identification for rural residents is over 10 percentage points higher than that reported for urban residents. As noted above, there are many reasons to expect that parties' mobilization efforts might be easier in rural areas, including the lowered cost of mobilization efforts, established patronage networks, ease of monitoring and punishing defectors and the high levels of group solidarity and pressure for conformity that pervade rural communities. Thus, rural Africans'

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

greater likelihood of feeling close to a political party may be an indication of parties' efforts to mobilize voters in rural areas or, alternatively, may facilitate party mobilization efforts in these areas.

To further explore the potential joint effect of PID and rural residence, we include an interaction term for rural and PID in our analysis (see Model 6 in Table 3). The coefficient for PID remains positive and highly significant. While the coefficient for the dummy variable for rural residence is positive and comes close to reaching statistical significance, the coefficient for the interaction term is positive and significant at the 0.10 level. This suggests that parties' mobilization efforts in rural Africa are particularly effective for getting voters to the polls.

Income is not related to voting in the way the SES model would lead us to expect. The proxy measure for income is negatively and significantly related to voting in all of the models in Table 1. These results indicate that respondents who reported frequently going without food are more likely to vote than respondents who did not frequently face situations of hunger. One interpretation of this finding is that poorer Africans are more likely to vote in hopes of effecting change. Another interpretation is that poorer Africans may be more susceptible to the promises of patronage from parties and candidates due to their precarious economic situation. They may also, therefore, be targets of parties' mobilization efforts. As Calvo and Murillo (2004: 743) argue, 'the utility from patronage declines monotonically with income (or skills), and transfers to higher-income voters (middle classes) do not provide the same returns to pork as those to low-income voters (the poor)'.

Table 3 presents results of analysis that explores the combined effect of poverty and PID. We used our proxy for income, the question about the frequency with which respondents face food scarcity, to create a dummy variable for poverty. Respondents who report always or often going without food are coded as 1 and those who report never or only sometimes going without food as 0. The results when this variable and an interaction term (poverty * PID) are included in the analysis are presented in Model 7 in Table 3. When the interaction term is added to the model, the coefficient for poverty is positive and highly significant and for PID it remains positive and highly significant. The coefficient for the interaction term, however, is negative and not significant. Thus, it appears that the effect of PID on voting is relatively constant across different levels of wealth and an additive model is most appropriate.

The results presented in Table 1 reveal that education has a positive relationship with electoral participation in these African countries. This finding holds across various model specifications and even for selected samples of cases (see Appendix 2). Interestingly, however, the average level of education of those who report being close to a political party is lower than that for respondents who did not report being close to a political party. In the clientelistic party systems of Africa, those who are not as educated are probably more likely to let political parties guide their behaviour than those with more education. Table 4 offers some support for the interpretation that the impact of parties is greater among less educated respondents. The difference in the probability of voting between individuals who report being close to a party and those who do not is largest (23 percentage points) for Africans with no formal schooling. The difference narrows to 20 percentage points for Africans with primary schooling,

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Table 3. Estimates of electoral participation in 10 African countries with interactions. Dependent variable: Vote in last election?

Model variable	*Model 5* *Multi-level analysis (random effects) W/ethnic*PID*	*Model 6* *Multi-level analysis (random effects) W/rural*PID*	*Model 7* *Multi-level analysis (random effects) W/poverty*PID*
Close to a political party? (1=yes)	1.02*** (0.082)	1.19*** (0.079)	1.28*** (0.064)
Membership in voluntary organizations	0.158*** (0.030)	0.156*** (0.030)	0.157*** (0.030)
Age	(0.029)*** (0.002)	0.029*** (0.002)	0.029*** (0.002)
Urban/rural status (1=urban)	–0.196*** (0.062)		–0.201*** (0.062)
Income or how often does your family go hungry? (4=never)	–0.145*** (0.039)	–0.137*** (0.039)	
Gender (1=female)	–0.170*** (0.056)	–0.175*** (0.056)	–0.173*** (0.056)
Level of education (9=post-graduate)	0.087** (0.035)	0.077** (0.035)	0.075** (0.035)
Support for democracy (3=prefer democracy)	0.151*** (0.040)	0.152*** (0.040)	0.152*** (0.040)
Political interest	0.051** (0.025)	0.051** (0.025)	0.049** (0.025)
Political trust	0.026** (0.012)	0.026** (0.012)	0.026** (0.012)
Generalized trust (1=generally most people can be trusted)	–0.072 (0.082)	–0.069 (0.082)	–0.074 (0.082)
Understand government	0.004 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Evaluation of performance of parliament (4=strongly approve)	0.195*** (0.031)	0.199*** (0.031)	0.198*** (0.031)
Satisfaction with national economic conditions (4=very satisfied)	–0.046** (0.023)	–0.047** (0.023)	–0.049** (0.023)
How frequently listen to radio news? (5=every day)	0.075*** (0.017)	0.074*** (0.017)	0.076*** (0.017)

(continued)

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Table 3 (continued)

Model variable	*Model 5* *Multi-level analysis (random effects) W/ethnic*PID*	*Model 6* *Multi-level analysis (random effects) W/rural*PID*	*Model 7* *Multi-level analysis (random effects) W/poverty*PID*
'Primordial' identity (1=primordial identity)	–0.109 (0.073)		
'Primordial * close to party	0.500*** (0.115)		
Rural (1=rural)		0.123 (0.077)	
Rural * close to party		0.184* (0.112)	
Poverty (1=impoverished)			0.342*** (0.111)
Poverty * close to party			–0.083 (0.170)
Politically relevant ethnic groups	0.424 (0.520)	0.434 (0.511)	0.480 (0.503)
Whether electoral system is majoritarian system? (1=yes)	–0.680** (0.311)	–0.742** (0.306)	–0.761*** (0.301)
Whether executive and legislative elections are held concurrently? (1=yes)	0.501* (0.298)	0.439 (0.292)	0.440 (0.287)
Percent difference in seat-shares between two largest parties in legislature	–0.020*** (0.005)	–0.020*** (0.005)	–0.020*** (0.005)
Number of cases	10393	10496	10496
Number of units	10	10	10

Standard errors are given in parentheses. $*p \leq 0.10$, $**p \leq 0.05$, $***p \leq 0.01$ for two-tailed test.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Table 4. Predicted probabilities of voting in Africa. Impact of education and party identification

		Close to a party	*Not close to a party*
No formal schooling	0.800 (0.757, 0.842)*	0.873 (0.842, 0.905)	0.647 (0.560, 0.734)
Primary only	0.828 (0.788, 0.868)	0.893 (0.864, 0.921)	0.688 (0.605, 0.771)
Secondary only	0.853 (0.802, 0.903)	0.909 (0.875, 0.944)	0.726 (0.631, 0.822)
Post-secondary	0.874 (0.812, 0.937)	0.923 (0.882, 0.964)	0.762 (0.648, 0.875)

Probabilities in column 1 based on different levels of education, while all other variables are set to their means. Probabilities in columns 2 and 3 based on specified values of party identification variable and different levels of education, while other variables are set to their means.
*95% confidence interval given in parentheses.

to 18 for those with secondary schooling and to only 16 for those with post-secondary education.

Several attitudinal variables register significant relationships with voting. As can be seen in Table 1, Africans who express greater support for democracy and higher levels of trust in political institutions are more likely to vote. These findings are consistent with the notion that one psychological benefit of voting is showing one's commitment to a political system (democracy) one supports. Political interest also registers a positive relationship with voting. On the other hand, generalized trust does not appear to be related to voting.

The measure of political efficacy (ability to understand government) is also not a strong predictor of voting. The coefficient for efficacy is actually negative in Model 1, while it is positive in the other three models, although it never reaches statistical significance. That the expressed ability to understand government does not register a stronger relationship with voting might seem surprising as the ability to understand political affairs is a commonly used measure of efficacy and efficacy is regularly linked to political participation. If voting is largely driven by patronage considerations and mobilization agents, however, this result is understandable. Indeed, Bratton et al. find that voters in Africa are no more likely to be informed about political issues than non-voters (2005: 298).

In contrast, citizens' evaluation of government performance is a robust predictor of voting. Those who have more favourable evaluations of parliament's performance are significantly more likely to vote than those with less favourable evaluations. The coefficients for parliamentary performance are significant and positive in each of the four models displayed in Table 1. Again, this finding is consistent with the notion that those who have a positive affectation towards the political system will glean satisfaction from 'affirming allegiance' to that system through voting. In contrast, Africans dissatisfied with the state of the economy are more likely to vote than their more satisfied counterparts. The coefficient for economic satisfaction is significant and negatively related to voting in all of the models in Table 1 except for Model 1, which does not include the contextual variables.

The results in Table 1 offer evidence that media exposure is linked to voting in Africa. The sign of the coefficient for the individual measure of listening to radio news is positive and significant in the analysis in Table 1. This finding is consistent with that of Kuenzi and Lambright (2007), who examine voter turnout in Africa at the aggregate, cross-national, level.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

As can be seen in Table 1, the institutional context appears to influence Africans' decisions to vote. Two of the three institutional variables register a significant relationship with voting in the expected direction across the various model specifications. Respondents are more likely to report voting where elections are conducted under more proportional electoral formulas. Kuenzi and Lambright (2007) also find that proportional electoral rules have a significant, positive association with voter turnout. The measure of the closeness of the race is significantly and negatively related to reported participation, indicating that people are more likely to vote when elections are close.[17]

We do not find evidence that ethnic fractionalization is linked to voter turnout, but we do find some evidence that ethnicity may be linked to turnout in some contexts. In fact, the measure of ethnic fractionalization, Posner's politically relevant ethnic groups, is not significantly related to turnout in any of the models in which it was included. Two alternate measures of ethnic fractionalization are also not related to voting.[18]

We examined the impact of ethnicity further, although indirectly, in Model 5 in Table 3. We created a dummy variable to indicate whether respondents listed what Geertz (1973) would call a 'primordial' identity, such as ethnicity, religion or race, when asked about how they identify themselves.[19] Respondents who described themselves in ethnic, religious or racial terms were coded as 1, while those who offered other identities, such as occupational, were coded as 0. We interacted this measure with the 'close to party' variable. The coefficient for PID remains positive and significant but the coefficient for the 'primordial' identity variable is not statistically significant and is actually negative. The coefficient for the interaction term, on the other hand, is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the joint effect of identifying in ethnic or religious terms and feeling close to a party significantly increases the likelihood of voting.

We decided that it was probably best to examine a single country for which data on respondents' ethnicity are available in order to accurately assess how ethnicity might affect our model. Therefore, we restricted our analysis to Nigeria, a country in which ethnicity is extremely salient. (We use the Round 1 Nigeria dataset, which contains a language variable, and it is from this language variable that we created our ethnic categories.) Indeed, aside from Burundi and Rwanda, ethnicity has probably been more salient in Nigeria that in any other African country. We compare the results of one model that includes variables for ethnicity with one that does not.

As can be seen in Table 5, ethnic identity does appear to be related to voting in Nigeria. Those of Yoruba ethnicity were significantly more likely to vote than the members of other groups and those of Hausa ethnicity were significantly less likely to vote. The coefficient for Yoruba is positive and significant at the 0.10 level, while the coefficient for Hausa is negative and significant at the 0.05 level (see Model 9). This finding makes sense given that Obasanjo, who is of Yoruba ethnicity, contested (and won) the 1999 presidential election. Most importantly, when we compare the two models, we do not see big differences in results. In particular, the results for PID are nearly identical across both specifications. In only one case is a variable significant in one of the models but not in the other. The coefficient for education is positive and significant at the 0.05 level in Model 8 and positive, but not significant, in Model 9. Such is the case because the Hausa have significantly lower levels of education than the other ethnic groups. Since Hausa respondents were significantly less likely to vote, education

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Table 5. Estimate of electoral participation in Nigeria (logit). Dependent variable: Vote in last presidential election?

Model variable	*Model 8*	*Model 9 W/ ethnicity*
Close to a political party? (1=yes)	1.52*** (0.107)	1.56*** (0.108)
Membership in voluntary organizations	0.140** (0.060)	0.115* (0.061)
Age	0.030*** (0.004)	0.029*** (0.004)
Urban/rural status (1=urban)	0.005 (0.101)	–0.006 (0.101)
Income or how often does your family go hungry? (4=never)	–0.081 (0.065)	–0.065 (0.066)
Gender (1=female)	–0.237*** (0.090)	–0.247*** (0.090)
Level of education (9=post-graduate)	0.047** (0.024)	0.031 (0.024)
Support for democracy (3=prefer democracy)	0.157** (0.068)	0.135** (0.069)
Political interest	0.089 (0.062)	0.104 (0.062)
Political trust	0.001 (0.010)	0.011 (0.011)
Generalized trust (1=generally most people can be trusted)	–0.193 (0.129)	–0.123 (0.131)
Understand government	–0.014 (0.037)	–0.022 (0.038)
Evaluation of performance of parliament (4=strongly approve)	0.213*** (0.054)	0.235*** (0.054)
Satisfaction with national economic conditions (4=very satisfied)	–0.138*** (0.054)	–0.104** (0.054)
How frequently listen to radio news? (5=every day)	0.113*** (0.027)	0.120*** (0.027)
Yoruba (1=Yoruba)		0.214* (0.120)
Hausa (1=Hausa)		–0.300** (0.125)
Igbo (1=Igbo)		0.115 (0.142)
Number of cases	3068	3068
Pseudo R^2	0.1335	0.1376

Standard errors are given in parentheses. *$p \leq 0.10$, **$p \leq 0.05$, ***$p \leq 0.01$ for two-tailed test.

registered a negative relationship with voting when Hausa was excluded from the model. On the dimension of ethnic salience, Nigeria is our most extreme case, yet we can see that including the ethnicity variables did not substantially change the results of the analysis or the conclusions at which we would arrive.

Conclusions

In this study, we test the external validity of many of the results involving electoral participation and find that some are not applicable in the African context while others are. The political behaviour of the citizens of African countries is influenced by many of the same forces that influence political behaviour elsewhere. As in other regions of the world, the voting decisions of citizens in Africa is affected by the perceived costs and benefits associated with voting. Once one takes into account the nature of the political

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

and social landscape of Africa, the political behaviour of African citizens is comprehensible. In the 'low information', neopatrimonial environments of Africa, political parties play a major role in determining who votes. Despite their putative weakness, political parties decrease the costs and increase the benefits associated with voting in Africa. Associational membership also increases the likelihood that one will vote in Africa. Some attitudes, such as political interest, support for democracy, political trust, perceptions of the economy and evaluations of government performance, also appear to influence who votes in Africa. In addition, the results reported in this article support the contention that certain institutional arrangements affect individuals' propensity to vote.

On the other hand, our results offer contradictory support for the SES model of voting. Education is positively linked to voting in Africa, as has been consistently observed in the United States and many other democracies. Yet, the proxy variable for income actually manifested the opposite relationship one would expect based on the SES model. Another factor that appears to function in an opposite manner than would be expected, based on modernization theory and the experiences of other democracies, is urban residence. The findings make sense, given the neopatrimonial nature of most African countries and the critical role that parties play in mobilizing voters.

What are the implications of this study's results for the future of democracy in Africa? Political parties clearly play a key role in promoting turnout in Africa. On the one hand, do parties help instill in the public the civic habits, such as voting, which undergird a democracy? Will the public be able use their power as voters to demand that those in government respond to their needs and preferences? Or rather will those who obtain office be able to simply pursue their own interests and worry only about obtaining sufficient patronage to distribute to their followers? Do current electoral processes in African countries tend to select those who embrace strategies that are at the very edge of democratic practice or blatantly undemocratic? In short, do the wrong people come to power? Bratton (2008: 621) offers a bleak assessment: 'African election campaigns are mainly moments for politicians to engage in mass mobilization and the manipulation of electoral rules'. Bratton (2008) contends that corrupt electoral practices do help create situations in which those most poorly suited for public service are likely to ascend to office. Desposato (2007), too, argues that when politicians obtain office by buying votes they will not be motivated to pursue programmes and policies beneficial to citizens. Thus, to the extent that political parties largely get out the vote through the mobilization of patronage networks, one has reason to be very concerned about the quality of representation voters achieve through elections.

In a more optimistic vein, on the macro level, it seems that political parties help link citizens to elections and thus help drive the process of political incorporation (see Lipset, 1959). Jenkins and Kposowa (1992) found that high levels of voter turnout helped prevent coup activity, and thus we might contemplate the possibility that increasing the number of people involved in electoral processes will decrease the probability that political actors will resort to non-electoral means to achieve power. On the micro level, there is also cause for some optimism. Our results indicate that, for some, interest in and information about politics inspires them to go to the polls. As they gain more experience with democracy, these voters are likely to be inclined to hold leaders more accountable and push the democratic process forward. As noted earlier, in some countries, policy and

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Appendix 1. Summary statistics

	Mean	*Standard deviation*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
Vote in last election?	0.799	0.401	0	1
Close to a political party? (1=yes)	0.588	0.492	0	1
Membership in voluntary organizations	1.27	1.00	0	4
Age	36.1	13.6	17	100
Urban/rural status (1=urban)	0.507	0.500	0	1
Income or how often does your family go hungry? (4=never)	3.36	0.736	1	4
Gender (1=female)	0.472	0.500	0	1
Level of education (9=post-graduate)	1.39	0.943	0	3
Support for democracy (3=prefer democracy)	1.36	0.682	1	3
Political interest	2.58	1.15	1	4
Political trust	7.63	2.64	3	12
Generalized trust (1=generally most people can be trusted)	0.167	0.373	0	1
Understand government	2.09	1.07	1	4
Evaluation of performance of parliament (4=strongly approve)	2.58	0.960	1	4
Satisfaction with national economic conditions (4=very satisfied)	2.36	1.30	1	5
How frequently listen to radio news? (5=every day)	3.94	1.64	0	5
Whether electoral system is majoritarian system? (1=yes)	0.811	0.392	0	1
Whether executive and legislative elections are held concurrently? (1=yes)	0.532	0.499	0	1
Percent difference in seat-shares between two largest parties in legislature	59.61	26.37	1.1	96.6

performance considerations appear to drive voting behaviour. Based on his analysis of over 200 elections in Africa, Lindberg (2006: 139) finds that 'Repeated elections – regardless of their relative freeness or fairness – appear to have a positive impact on human freedom and democratic values'. Instead of discrediting democracy, in many cases flawed elections appear to pave the way for democratic gains in the future, as citizens and politicians begin to embrace a new set of rules through which they can pursue

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Appendix 2. Additional estimate of electoral participation in 10 African countries (logit)

Model variable	*Model 10 Multi-level analysis (random effects) Excludes party identification*	*Model 11 Multi-level analysis (random effects) Includes those 'unable to vote'*	*Model 12 Multi-level analysis (random effects) Excludes Zimbabwe*
Close to a political party? (1=yes)		1.13*** (0.053)	1.31*** (0.063)
Membership in voluntary organizations	0.215*** (0.029)	0.171*** (0.026)	0.151*** (0.032)
Age	0.030*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.002)
Urban/rural status (1=urban)	–0.253*** (0.060)	–0.109** (0.054)	–0.187*** (0.065)
Income or how often does your family go hungry? (4=never)	–0.142*** (0.038)	–0.124*** (0.035)	–0.135*** (0.041)
Gender (1=female)	–0.237*** (0.054)	–0.084* (0.049)	–0.228*** (0.058)
Level of education (9=post-graduate)	0.042 (0.034)	0.084*** (0.032)	0.095*** (0.036)
Support for democracy (3=prefer democracy)	0.175*** (0.038)	0.107*** (0.035)	0.153*** (0.041)
Political interest	0.145*** (0.024)	0.070*** (0.023)	0.057** (0.026)
Political trust	0.031*** (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.026** (0.012)
Generalized trust (1=generally most people can be trusted)	–0.017 (0.079)	–0.122* (0.069)	–0.097 (0.083)
Understand government	0.018 (0.025)	0.005 (0.024)	–0.001 (0.027)
Evaluation of performance of parliament (4=strongly approve)	0.226*** (0.030)	0.149*** (0.028)	0.191*** (0.032)
Satisfaction with national economic conditions (4=very satisfied)	–0.041* (0.022)	–0.034* (0.021)	–0.049** (0.023)
How frequently listen to radio news? (5=every day)	0.077*** (0.016)	0.070*** (0.015)	0.077*** (0.017)
Politically relevant ethnic groups	–0.073 (0.578)	0.433 (0.800)	0.397 (0.544)

(continued)

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Appendix 2 (continued)

Model variable	*Model 10 Multi-level analysis (random effects) Excludes party identification*	*Model 11 Multi-level analysis (random effects) Includes those 'unable to vote'*	*Model 12 Multi-level analysis (random effects) Excludes Zimbabwe*
Whether electoral system is majoritarian system? (1=yes)	–0.544 (0.344)	–0.236 (0.470)	–0.748** (0.322)
Whether executive and legislative elections are held concurrently? (1=yes)	0.680** (0.332)	0.003 (0.467)	0.502 (0.343)
Percent difference in seat-shares between two largest parties in legislature	–0.022*** (0.006)	–0.017** (0.008)	–0.021*** (0.006)
Number of cases	10535	11307	10055
Number of units	10	10	10

Standard errors are given in parentheses. $^{*}p \leq 0.10$, $^{**}p \leq 0.05$, $^{***}p \leq 0.01$ for two-tailed test.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

their interests. Studies based in the United States have supported the idea that voting is 'habit-forming' (Gerber et al., 2003; Green and Shachar, 2000). In many African countries, political parties may have questionable democratic credentials, but, ultimately, political parties serve the democratic function of getting citizens to the polls. In short, these parties help to promote citizens' acquisition of one of the most important political habits in a democracy, that of voting. It is important, however, to monitor the extent to which electoral participation will result in the effective representation of citizens' interests as Africa's multiparty electoral regimes continue to mature.

Notes

1. Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 62) define neopatrimonialism as 'those hybrid political systems in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions'.
2. Posner (2005: 92) makes a similar point.
3. Appendix 1 presents summary statistics for all of the variables included in our analysis. Also, a detailed appendix with the wording of the Afrobarometer survey questions used in our analysis is available upon request.
4. According to the website http://www.afrobarometer.org/methods.html, the Afrobarometer used a 'clustered, stratified, multi-stage probability' sampling design in order to obtain 'National probability samples that represent an accurate cross section of the voting age population' in the countries of study. Please see this website for additional sampling information.
5. The 17,256 cases are distributed across the 10 countries as follows: Botswana (N = 1200); Lesotho (N = 1177); Malawi (N = 1208); Mali (N = 2089); Namibia (N = 1183); Nigeria (N = 3603); South Africa (N = 2200); Tanzania (N = 2198); Zambia (N = 1198) and Zimbabwe (N = 1200).
6. The question wording and response categories varied between the seven southern African countries included in the Southern African Barometer and the three remaining countries: Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania. The questions about voting included in surveys in Mali, Tanzania and Nigeria were dichotomous already, including only two response options – yes or no. The response categories for the original voting questions used in the Southern African Barometer's survey in the seven southern African countries are: I decided not to vote; I was unable to vote; I voted; no election in my area; can't remember; refused to answer; and missing data. It is difficult to know how precisely respondents and survey enumerators interpreted the distinctions between some of the items in this response set because these categories are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, we chose not to include 'unable to vote' (N = 1584) and 'no election in my area' (N = 161) in the non-participation category and excluded these response categories from our analysis. We also excluded missing data (N = 90) and responses coded as 'can't remember' (N = 200) and 'refused to answer' (N = 2). The results of our analysis are essentially the same when we include those who responded that they were 'unable to vote' (see Appendix 2).
7. Official turnout and reported turnout are within 10 percentage points of each other in Botswana, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. The difference between the two figures exceeds 10 percentage points in the remaining countries: Lesotho, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

8. The average correlation between the four measures of membership in different voluntary organizations is 0.3783 ($p < 0.01$). Cronbach's alpha on the index is 0.684.
9. The measures of trust for these three political institutions are highly correlated with one another. The average correlation between the three measures of trust is 0.6268 ($p < 0.01$). Cronbach's alpha on the index is 0.764.
10. The statement 'A: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government' is coded 3, while the statement 'C: For someone like me, a democratic or non-democratic regime makes no difference' is coded 1. The middle position was coded 2.
11. We also ran Model 1 using the Afrobarometer's country weight, afcombwt, rather than clustering the standard errors by country. The results (not shown) are nearly identical to those displayed in Table 1. Because many of the independent variables included in our analysis are likely to be related to one another, we also considered the possibility that multicollinearity could be influencing our results. Yet, none of the correlations between the 15 independent variables drawn from the Afrobarometer survey data is higher than 0.3265 and the variance inflation factor (VIF) score for Model 1 (Table 1) is only 1.13, which suggests that collinearity is unlikely to affect the results. Similarly, the VIF score for Model 2 is only 1.21.
12. All of the predicted probabilities reported in the article are based on Model 1 displayed in Table 1. Predicted probabilities are calculated by varying the values of the explanatory variable of interest while the values of the other explanatory variables are held constant at their means.
13. The results of the analysis are almost essentially the same when party identification is excluded (see Appendix 2).
14. When we ran our analysis operationalizing age as age plus age squared, the results were the same as those reported in Table 1.
15. When all independent variables are set to the mean and age is set to 18 years, the probability of voting is 0.75. When the value for age is increased to 50, the probability of voting increases to 0.89.
16. The relationship between age and voting is known to be curvilinear with the probability of voting increasing through middle-age, but then declining as people become elderly and less mobile. In fact, Norris (2002) finds a curvilinear relationship of this sort.
17. We re-ran our analysis excluding three explanatory variables for which there are many missing cases or that do not register a significant relationship with voting: political trust, generalized trust and political efficacy. Dropping these variables does not substantially change the results in any way (results not shown).
18. We ran Model 2 substituting two alternate measures of ethnic fractionalization, Mozaffar et al.'s (2003) and Fearon and Laitin's (2003). Neither of these measures is related to voting in Africa.
19. Afrobarometer question no. 91 offered a short prompt and then asked: 'Besides being Nigerian, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?' (Afrobarometer, 2002: 42).

References

Afrobarometer (2002) 'Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria, November–December 1999', Data Codebook and corresponding survey data.

Afrobarometer (2004) Data Codebook for the Twelve-Country Merged Data Set and corresponding survey data.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Aldrich, J. H. (1993) 'Rational Choice and Turnout', *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 246–78.

Brady, H. E., S. Verba and K. L. Schlozman (1995) 'Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation', *American Political Science Review* 89: 271–94.

Bratton, M. (1999) 'Political Participation in a New Democracy – Institutional Considerations from Zambia', *Comparative Political Studies* 32: 549–88.

Bratton, M. (2008) 'Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian Election Campaigns', *Electoral Studies* 27: 621–32.

Bratton, M., Y. Chu and M. Lagos (2006) 'Who Votes? Implications for New Democracies'. Available at: www.Globalbarometer.net

Bratton, M. and M. Kimenyi (2008) 'Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in Perspective', Afrobarometer Working Papers.

Bratton, M., R. Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi (2005) *Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Recovery in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bratton, M. and N. van de Walle (1997) *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Calvo, E. and M. Murillo (2004) 'Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market', *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 742–57.

Coleman, S. (2004) 'The Effect of Social Conformity on Collective Voting Behavior', *Political Analysis* 12: 76–96.

Conroy-Krutz, Jeffrey (2009) 'Incumbent Advantage and Urban–Rural Geography in Sub-Saharan Africa'. Working paper, Michigan State University.

Cox, M. (2003) 'When Trust Matters: Explaining Differences in Voter Turnout', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41: 757–70.

Dalton, R. J. and M. P. Wattenberg (2000) 'Unthinkable Democracy: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies', in R. J. Dalton and M. P. Wattenberg (eds) *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R. J. and S. Weldon (2007) 'Partisanship and System Institutionalization', *Party Politics* 13: 179–96.

Desposato, S. W. (2007) 'How Does Vote Buying Shape the Legislative Process?', in Frederic C. Schaffer (ed.) *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Downs, A. (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.

Erdmann, G. (2007) 'Party Research: Western European Bias and the "African Labyrinth"', in Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann and Andreas Mehler (eds) *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Erdmann, G. and A. Stohl (2008) 'Voters and Political Parties in Anglophone and Francophone Africa Compared'. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Chicago, IL, November 13–16.

Fearon, J. D. and D. D. Laitin (2003) 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review* 97: 75–90.

Fiorina, M. P. (1976) 'The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects', *Journal of Politics* 38: 390–413.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Fornos, C. A., T. J. Power and J. C. Garand (2004) 'Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980–2000', *Comparative Political Studies* 37: 909–40.

Franklin, M. (2004) *Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Geertz, Clifford (1973) *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Gerber, A. S., D. P. Green and M. Green (2003) 'Partisan Mail and Voter Turnout: Results from Randomized Field Experiments', *Electoral Studies* 22: 563–79.

Green, D. P. and R. Shachar (2000) 'Habit Formation and Political Behaviour: Evidence of Consuetude in Voter Turnout', *British Journal of Political Science* 30: 561–73.

Huntington, S. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Inglehart, R. and P. Norris (2000) 'The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective', *International Political Science Review* 21: 441–63.

Jackman, R. W. (1987) 'Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies', *American Political Science Review* 81: 405–24.

Jenkins, J. C. and A. J. Kposowa (1992) 'The Political Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic Competition, Military Centrality, and the Struggle over the Postcolonial State', *International Studies Quarterly* 36: 271–91.

Karp, J. A., S. A. Banducci and Shaun Bowler (2007) 'Getting Out the Vote: Party Mobilization in a Comparative Perspective', *British Journal of Political Science* 38: 91–112.

Knack, S. and M. Kropf (1998) 'For Shame! The Effect of the Community Cooperation Context on the Probability of Voting', *Political Psychology* 1998: 585–99.

Kostadinova, T. (2003) 'Voter Turnout Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe', *European Journal of Political Research* 42: 741–59.

Krishna, A. (2002) 'Enhancing Political Participation in Democracies – What is the Role of Social Capital?' *Comparative Political Studies* 35: 437–60.

Kuenzi, Michelle T. (2006) 'Nonformal Education, Political Participation, and Democracy', *Political Behavior* 28: 1–31.

Kuenzi, M. and G. Lambright (2001) 'Party System Institutionalization in 16 African Countries: A Replication of Mainwaring and Scully', *Party Politics* 7: 437–68.

Kuenzi, M. and G. Lambright (2007) 'Voter Turnout in Africa's Multiparty Regimes', *Comparative Political Studies* 40: 665–90.

Lehoucq, F. (2007) 'When Does a Market for Votes Emerge?', in Frederic C. Schaffer (ed.) *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Leighley, J. E. and J. Nagler (1992) 'Individual and Systemic Influences on Turnout: Who Votes? 1984', *Journal of Politics* 54: 718–40.

Lerner, D. (1958) *Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Lindberg, S. I. (2003) '"It's Our Time to Chop": Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism Rather than Counteract It?' *Democratization* 10: 121–40.

Lindberg, S. I. (2006) 'The Surprising Significance of African Elections', *Journal of Democracy* 17: 139–51.

Lindberg, S. (2007) 'Institutionalization of Party Systems? Stability and Fluidity among Legislative Parties in Africa's Democracies', *Government and Opposition* 42: 215–41.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Lindberg, S. and M. K. C. Morrison (2008) 'Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana', *Political Science Quarterly* 123: 95–122.

Lipset, S. M. (1959) 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', *American Political Science Review* 53: 69–105.

Manning, C. (2005) 'Assessing African Party Systems after the Third Wave', *Party Politics* 11: 707–27.

Mozaffar, S. and J. Scarritt (2005) 'The Puzzle of African Party Systems', *Party Politics* 11: 399–421.

Mozaffar, S., J. Scarritt and G. Galaich (2003) 'Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies', *American Political Science Review* 97: 379–90.

Nie, N. H., S. Verba and J. R. Petrocik (1976) *The Changing American Voter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Norris, P. (2002) *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nugent, P. (2007) 'Banknotes and Symbolic Capital: Ghana's Elections Under the Fourth Republic', in Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann and Andreas Mehler (eds) *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Posner, Daniel N. (2004) 'Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization', *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 849–63.

Posner, Daniel N. (2005) *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Powell, G. B. (1986) 'American Turnout in Comparative Perspective', *American Political Science Review* 80: 17–44.

Radcliff, B. (1992) 'The Welfare State, Turnout and the Economy: A Comparative Analysis', *American Political Science Review* 86: 444–54.

Randall, V. (2007) 'Political Parties in Africa and the Representation of Social Groups', in Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann and Andreas Mehler (eds) *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Reilly, B. (2006) 'Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies', *Democratization* 13: 811–27.

Riker, W. H. and P. C. Ordeshook (1968) 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', *American Political Science Review* 62: 25–42.

Schaffer, F. C. (1998) *Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Teixeira, R. A. (1987) *Why Americans Don't Vote: Turnout Decline in the United States, 1960–1984*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Tripp, A. (2001) 'Women's Movements and Challenges to Neopatrimonial Rule: Preliminary Observations from Africa', *Development and Change* 32: 33–54.

van de Walle, N. (2002) 'Africa's Range of Regimes: Elections without Democracy', *Journal of Democracy* 13: 66–80.

van de Walle, N. (2003) 'Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41: 297–321.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016

Verba, S., K. Schlozman and H. Brady (1995) *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wang, C. S. and C. Kurzman (2007) 'The Logistics: How to Buy Votes', in Frederic C. Schaffer (ed.) *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Wantchekon, L. (2003) 'Clientelism and Voting Behavior – Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin', *World Politics* 55: 399–422.

Widner, J. (1997) 'Political Parties and Civil Societies in Sub-Saharan Africa', in Marina Ottaway (ed.) *Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead*, pp. 65–81. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Wolfinger, R. E. and S. J. Rosenstone (1980) *Who Votes?* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Author Biographies

Michelle Kuenzi is an Assistant Professor at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA. Much of her research has focused on public opinion and political behaviour in Senegal. She has published on these subjects in *Democratization, Community Development Journal* and *Political Behavior*. She has also conducted research on party systems and the consolidation of democracy in Africa and has published on this subject in *Comparative Political Studies* and *Party Politics* (with Gina Lambright).

Gina M. S. Lambright is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Her research interests include political reform, decentralization and the politics of development in Africa. She has conducted and published research (with Michelle Kuenzi) on party systems in Africa's new multiparty regimes in *Comparative Political Studies* and *Party Politics*. She is currently working on a project exploring local government performance in several African countries.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on April 9, 2016