

2008-12-01

# Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin: Soviet-Russian Foreign Relations with the United States from 1990 Through the Fall of 2008: A Strategic Analysis

Terry W. Simmons

*University of Miami*, [terssimmons@hotmail.com](mailto:terssimmons@hotmail.com)

Follow this and additional works at: [http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa\\_dissertations](http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations)

---

## Recommended Citation

Simmons, Terry W., "Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin: Soviet-Russian Foreign Relations with the United States from 1990 Through the Fall of 2008: A Strategic Analysis" (2008). *Open Access Dissertations*. Paper 171.

This Open access is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Scholarly Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository. For more information, please contact [repository.library@miami.edu](mailto:repository.library@miami.edu).



UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

GORBACHEV, YELTSIN AND PUTIN: SOVIET-RUSSIAN RELATIONS  
WITH THE UNITED STATES FROM 1990 THROUGH THE FALL OF 2008:  
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

By

Terry W. Simmons

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty  
of the University of Miami  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Coral Gables, Florida

December 2008

©2008  
Terry W. Simmons  
All Rights Reserved

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

GORBACHEV, YELTSIN AND PUTIN: SOVIET-RUSSIAN RELATIONS  
WITH THE UNITED STATES FROM 1990 THROUGH THE FALL OF 2008:  
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Terry W. Simmons

Approved:

---

Roger E. Kanet, Ph.D.  
Professor of Political Science

---

Terri A. Scandura, Ph.D.  
Dean of the Graduate School

---

Bruce M. Bagley, Ph.D.  
Professor of Political Science

---

Joaquin Roy, Ph.D.  
Professor of Political Science

---

Ralph Clem, Ph.D.  
Professor of Political Science  
Florida International University

---

Darrell Slider, Ph.D.  
Professor of Political Science  
University of South Florida

SIMMONS, TERRY W.  
Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin: Soviet-Russian  
Foreign Relations with the United States from 1990  
Through the Fall of 2008: A Strategic Analysis

(Ph.D., International Relations  
and Comparative Politics)  
(December 2008)

Abstract of a dissertation at the University of Miami.

Dissertation supervised by Professor Roger Kanet. (317)

Cold War Soviet foreign policy was driven by a strategic competition. A competition-détente cycle based on the superpower rivalry between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the Warsaw Pact dependencies, and the United States of America and its respective alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) existed for over forty-five years. Following the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the implosion of the USSR, remnant Soviet and subsequent Russian foreign policy, changed dramatically. Though some fragmentary Soviet style vertical controls of the foreign policy of the transitional Gorbachev years and the first years of Yeltsin's first administration were recognizable, their respective foreign relations operated on the defensive realities of a splintered empire in every conceivable manner.

This dissertation will track and analyze each president's foreign policy goals within the dependent variables of social, economic and political influences of post Cold War realities. In an absolute sense, each president formulated Russian foreign policy based on domestic considerations. This fact constitutes the independent variable in this analysis.

From the bellicosity of the Cold War through the opposition of Russia to America's unilateralist approach to the second Iraqi war, Russia attempted to return

as a major player in international relations as a whole and as an interlocutor with the United States in a strategic sense. This engagement has produced the gambit of political polemics, from the strident Soviet “launch on warning” correlation of forces fighting doctrine to the interactive and more personal political good will venue between Bush and Putin. *It is this “push-pull” political history that prompts the primary research question: Is the present Russian strategic relationship with the post 9.11 United States the beginning of a new and unique post Cold War international relationship or is it simply a continuation of the familiar confrontation-détente cycle historically endemic to Russian-American relations? Has the American occupation of Iraq, a perennial Russian client state, derailed the post 9.11 accommodation between the two countries?*

## Acknowledgements

I owe a debt of gratitude to all those who patiently listened and advised and to my dissertation committee members who bore me infinite patience even when I was less than cooperative. Those excellent academic scholars, Professor Roger Kanet, Professor Bruce Bagley, Professor Joaquin Roy, Professor Ralph Clem of Florida International University as well as Professor Darrell Slider of the University of South Florida, and Professor Elise Giuliano, helped guide me through this arduous but exciting research.

Without the initial instructive advice of Dr. Holly Ackerman of the University of Miami research staff, this project wouldn't have begun. Mr. Steve Ralph, the International Studies Graduate advisor at the University of Miami, helped me navigate the contentious pathway to my objectives.

I hope I have honored their guidance with this project. Mistakes and omissions are, of course, my responsibility.



## Preface

The experience of the Cold War was an epic of major importance and consequences for the world. Through the trials and tribulations of the post-Cold War transition, we can reflect on the fact that the world was not plunged into darkness during those days of bipolar confrontation. After a half century of nuclear standoff and brinksmanship, perhaps the new political order that is evolving from the aftermath of this great confrontation will eventually move in the direction of accommodation and reciprocal progress. Perhaps not.

The unipolar hegemon, the United States, may eventually become a benevolent world leader and not be systemically and perpetually tempted by the lures of neo-realism as proscribed in the Bush Doctrine. After some serious foreign policy miscalculations following the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the United States can become the inspirational leader that will pave the way for global harmony rather than neo-realism and discursive foreign policy. To have gained the world and then to have lost it through the politics of myopia and self-interest would truly be the ultimate tragic irony.

Russia has a central role to play in any world vision for peace. After all, the shortcomings of the socialist-communist experiment have given way to a hybrid, if illiberal, Russian democratic experiment. Though far from perfect, the march of Russia toward pluralism should not be stymied nor discouraged, regardless of faltering attempts and elements of revanchist vertical-control recidivism. The long tradition of strongman rule in Russia may eventually give way to genuine pluralism and balance of powers in the evolving institutional governmental design. Or, the re-

emergence of the strengthened Russian economy may sway Putin to maximize his personal power in the traditional imperialism of the past.

The pioneering effort of Mikhail Gorbachev to change the direction of the Soviet state is still being reflected upon and analyzed. As the innovator of dramatic social reforms, he unleashed a sequence of events that put him in the position of becoming the bewildered custodian of powerful unintended consequences. The results of those consequences are still being scrutinized. The ultimate rejection by the Soviet satellites as well as the republics of the vision of a neosocialist Union in 1991 was powerful and unmistakable. The appeals of the Yeltsin democrats were appealing by contrast. The nationalism of the repressed Soviet republics could no longer be contained. The zeal for self-determination everywhere in the Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact countries could no longer be denied. The tidal wave of rejection of the CPSU and the KGB was irresistible. The socialist-communist experiment was essentially dead, an anachronism of determinist dialecticism.

Celebrating the conversion from socialism-communism to democracy, however, was tentative and short-lived. Yet Boris Yeltsin tried to contain both the fallout from the implosion of the Soviet Union and appear at least, to engineer some elements of democratic governmental reform at the same time. In foreign affairs, he attempted to maintain the dignity of the Russian Federation while responding to the defensive necessities and imperatives of the newly diminished Russian state. In the myriad of social, economic and political problems Yeltsin faced, Washington struggled to aide Russia in its new democratic experiment while simultaneously advancing a neo-containment of its former adversary through the expansion of NATO

and subsequent expansion into Central Asia, areas of traditional Russian influence. This set of geopolitical and foreign policy problems was immense in scope considering the free fall of the Russian economy and staggering social dislocations that constantly threatened the Russian Federation as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Chechnya, the oligarchs, and the Russian mafia assured Yeltsin that regardless of his generally successful drive toward elements of democratic pluralism, both his domestic and resultant foreign policies would suffer many challenges and setbacks. Gaider's shock therapy economics caused a revanchist backlash and led to the 1993 confrontation between the Duma forces backed by the neo-communist nationalists known as the Red-Browns and Yeltsin's presidential democratic regime. Civil war seemed imminent as hundreds died in the siege of the Russian White House.<sup>i</sup> The fact that war did not result because of the reluctance of the Russian people to include the military, attests to the fact that none of the opposing forces wanted to end the First Russian Republic and begin a free fall into anarchy in an already fragile post-Soviet state.

As Washington and the rest of the world held their collective breath at the prospect of a Russian internal war, Yeltsin's abilities as a charismatic and dynamic new democratic leader brought tacit foreign policy support from the international political community. Despite the harsh memories of the Cold War, Russian success at democratic reform was universally hoped for. Yeltsin's tendencies toward covert vertical controls could be partially forgiven in light of his overall push toward

---

<sup>i</sup> Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution*. Political Changes from Gorbachev to Putin. 108-110. McFaul describes the urgent appeals of various military and political factions not to escalate the confrontation and lead the country into civil war.

democratic reforms and growing pluralism. Yeltsin's tactics were viewed as problematic in the short term.

In Yeltsin's second term and Vladimir Putin's subsequent administrations, the trend toward re-establishing Russian credibility in both domestic consolidation and foreign policy status drove Russian power politics and international relations considerations. The problems of Chechnya as well as Islamic terrorism from the former Muslim republics have served as an unexpected catalyst in ushering in a new Russian-American diplomatic venue of strategic cooperation. Until the American unilateral invasion of Iraq, that cooperation seemed positive and promising. At the strategic level many traditional American-Russian sticking points appeared to be solvable. The Treaty of Moscow, though largely symbolic, served as a milestone for the new relationship between Washington and Moscow addressing long-standing nuclear disarmament issues.

Russia's reemergence, catalyzed by a remarkable economic recovery based on natural gas and oil coupled with Washington's foreign policy problems associated with the ill-advised invasion of Iraq, have led to a new stridency in Russian foreign policy. Putin has rejected calls for a western-style democracy and put Washington on notice that Russian foreign policy will henceforth be based on independence of action regardless of Washington's objections. This has effectively ended the temporary détente precipitated by 9/11 and returned Russian-American relations to a familiar, yet new, tension.

Russia's invasion of Georgia on August 6, 2008, in response to the brutal invasions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili

served to verify Moscow's new foreign policy independence and nationalistic fervor. Russia will protect its Near Abroad. That is now obvious. It is cause for Ukraine to proceed very cautiously in its consideration to join NATO. It also is a stern warning to Washington that Medvedev and Putin will not tolerate Washington's meddling in Russia's traditional back yard.

## Table of Contents

Introduction and Overview .....	1
Chapter I     Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin: Revolution and the Future .....	22
Chapter II     Boris Yeltsin: Chechnya and Russian Foreign Policy .....	70
Chapter III    The Arrival of Vladimir Putin: New Blood, Continuing Domestic Consolidation Problems and Foreign Policy Challenges.....	98
Chapter IV    September 11, 2001: George Bush and Vladimir Putin - New Possibilities .....	124
Chapter V     The American Hegemon and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-emption .....	162
Chapter VI    The United Nations: American Unilateralism: Russia Joins “Old Europe” .....	208
Chapter VII   Russian Foreign Policy: Return to the Past? A New Nationalism? .....	242
Chapter VIII  Conclusions and Avenues/Suggestions for Further Research .....	271
Appendix A   Siloviki Personnel and Associates .....	290
Bibliography .....	301

## INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1990'S

The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a strategic political analysis to examine and explain Soviet-Russian foreign policy from the closing days of communist-socialist rule in the USSR from Gorbachev's reformism and innovations through Yeltsin's transition-era democratic administrations to the integrationist, re-centralization approaches of the first and second Putin governments. The foreign policy generated by each subsequent Russian leader as a result of the domestic factors and western, especially American, influences will serve to answer the primary research question and subset secondary thematic questions. What are the identifiable distinctions of each leader's regime and what effects have the foreign policy decisions of each Russian leader had on the continuing Russian-American strategic relationship? Are the changes episodic or systemic in an historical perspective, or do identifiable sea changes, especially since the anomaly of 9/11, exist?

The analytical methodology to be utilized is to contrast and compare through a time-line case study the three Russian leaders and to critically analyze their attempts to steer their respective governments through the internal extraneous and intervening variables of social, economic, and strategic-political security influences (the independent variable) as well as the complicated reactions of the new Russian governments to outside influences, particularly from the United States (which serves as the dependent variable in this analysis.) Finally, the manifestation of Russian-American tensions accentuated by the unilateralist test of the current state of affairs between Putin's Russia and Bush's United States will be evaluated. The current level of tension created by Vladimir Putin's refusal to let Georgia suppress Abkhazia and South Ossetia after August 6, 2008, attests

to Moscow's rigorous new resistance to Washington's efforts to court and encourage neo-containment policies against Russia. Georgia and possibly Ukraine, will experience Russia's determination to protect its Near Abroad and to counter American-inspired "color revolutions" in the FSU territories. Dimitry Medvedev, in his September question and answer session at the International Club Valdai, made several substantial points in his responses to questions by reporters and statesmen. He emphasized, in no uncertain terms the following:

- (1) Russia **will not** back down from NATO;
- (2) Russia **will** defend its traditional Near Abroad;
- (3) Russia **will not** allow itself to be "neo-contained" by the West, especially the United States, in Cold War fashion; and,
- (4) Russia **will** resist American unilateralism and missile deployments in Russia's historical sphere of influence.

He was very explicit on all of these foreign policy points.<sup>1</sup>

*Where have we been and where are we going?*

The Cold War era has begun to fall into general perspective in the political-historical literature, notwithstanding many still inexplicable episodes, of course. Even the post-Cold War period is beginning to take on some general focus, though most political scholars no doubt agree that there are still many systemic questions, especially in the cause and effect arena. It is the political dynamic of Soviet-American, Russian-American interstate relations and the overall strategic direction and implications of their

---

<sup>1</sup> Dimitry Medvedev. International Club Valdai. The Exhibition Center (GUM), Moscow, reported in Johnson's Russia List 2008. #169-15, September 2008. JRL Homepage: [www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/funding](http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/funding).



respective foreign policies that still defy clarity to this day. The “twists and turns,” as well as general counter-intuitive applications of Russian foreign policy in particular, have presented a formidable challenge to international relations (IR) scholars.

The post-Soviet transition from Gorbachev to Yeltsin began with the failure of Gorbachev to salvage the rule of socialism with the rejected Union Treaty in 1991, setting the stage for the democratization reforms of Boris Yeltsin. Federated socialism would not happen under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. The democrats, under Boris Yeltsin, turned back the reformulation attempts of both the communists and the Gorbachev neo-socialists.

Vertical controls of the Soviet era were maintained in large part by the first Yeltsin government but only in the guise of pluralistic democratic reforms. Yeltsin, in the Russian tradition, consolidated his powers under the rubric of economic and parliamentary reforms. By 1993 the Yeltsin political team faced a reorganized resistance from the revanchist nationalist-communist remnants of the ex-Soviet military, KGB and the Congress of People’s Deputies. This combination of rightist reactionary forces desired a return to the past. Yeltsin resisted the efforts by this united front resulting in a dramatic confrontation which took place at the Russian White House; as a result, Yeltsin won the April 1993 referendum on his government.

In 1993 the Speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, strongly advocated the position that re-establishing ties with the ex-Soviet republics, operating in the ex-Soviet space, was the more appropriate course to take and defied Yeltsin’s western orientation and his plan to model the new Russian Federation completely on the western

democratic model.<sup>2</sup> Yeltsin fell back on his popularity with the Russian people, at that point still untarnished, to stymie efforts to derail the new democratic orientation of Yeltsin reformists despite efforts by Khasbulatov and others like him, to dilute Yeltsin's reforms.

After nearly two weeks of intermittent political intrigue and armed confrontation, Yeltsin managed to rally populist resistance to the nationalist coalition and re-established order. The world waited anxiously for the Russian people to set a course toward a regressive past or a progressive future. The outcome was highly uncertain throughout the episode. Civil war seemed an imminent possibility.

Despite the social, economic and political discord of Yeltsin's first administration, the Russian democrats sustained power, albeit with contradictory mechanisms of democratic reform and rusty central control features from the past constantly vying for control. In his second administration, Yeltsin again avoided disaster both in domestic politics and foreign policy despite this growing physical debilitation and increasing loss of personal respect both by his subjects and the international political community. Russia continued to struggle with the problems of successful statehood. An outwardly democratic regime was still under the influences of a state command system deeply rooted in the traditional imperial Russian past.

Vladimir Shlapentokh, in his conceptualization that there has always been a dominance struggle between the imperial federated Center and the regions, posits that pattern continued even in the face of a second Russian revolution after the demise of the USSR.

---

<sup>2</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov. *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*. (Lanham, New York, Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006), 66.

The anti-Communist revolution of 1991 and the victory of the liberals accelerated the process of decentralization. Calls for the expansion of regional rights corresponded well with the democratic ideology that dominated the Kremlin in 1992-1993 and was dear to the regional leaders who emerged after the collapse of the Soviet system.<sup>3</sup>

Originally embraced by Yeltsin in 1992, by the time of the White House revolt, Yeltsin saw strong re-assertion by the Kremlin as a necessary tool to re-establish order and to maintain his personal leadership as a democrat, even while exerting more traditional vertical controls to stave off disaster. In comparison with the elites of Moscow and the struggle for dominance for power at the Center, the regions felt alienated from the edicts of Moscow. The slogan “democratism and centralism are incompatible,”<sup>4</sup> summed up the political dichotomy existing at the time. Yeltsin wanted democratic reform controlled by the Center. The Duma wanted control over Yeltsin to modify his democratic reformism, and the republics wanted virtual autonomy to decide their own political and socio-economic affairs, effectively disassociating themselves from Moscow. Considering the breadth and length of the tremendous disillusionment with Gorbachev and growing doubts about where Yeltsin was taking the Russian state, these splinters seem entirely logical; everyone was looking for identification and a real sense of security in uncharted waters.

Political intrigues, to include complicated, contradictory, inter-economic-inter-governmental relations with the Russian crime syndicates and oligarchs, suppression of political rivals and the press along with Yegor Gaidar’s “shock therapy,” all kept the disoriented ex-Soviet, now Russian, citizen confused and off-balance. The “fire-sale

---

<sup>3</sup> Vladimir Shlapentohk, in Collaboration with Joshua Woods. *Contemporary Russia As A Feudal Society: A New Perspective On the Post Soviet Era*. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 176.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 178.

appropriations” of State economic machinery to the new Russian “business class” accentuated the sense of helplessness of the average Russian Citizen. The average Russian man and woman felt helpless and largely disenfranchised under the new drastic changes. Boris Yeltsin began to fade in the popularity competition raging between those who wanted to return to the past and those who wanted to launch Russia toward a bold new future.

Russian foreign policy appeared confused and indecisive at this point. The dissolution of empire and encroachment of NATO and the United States into traditional Russian spheres of influence disoriented Russian foreign policy; by supplicating himself to President Clinton while suffering the indignities of impotence in foreign relations with the U.S., the European Union, as well as all other major state actors, Yeltsin appeared inept and weak.

Yeltsin, despite his new democratic credentials, found himself caught in the Russian strongman rule syndrome. He resorted to familiar Russian tactics to survive. Democracy, as espoused by Boris Yeltsin, was largely symbolic and high utilitarian in nature and application; he set interest groups against each other, a familiar tactic of past regimes. Confusion began to cloud the democratic image of a disoriented and disorganized leader.

*“Putin”*

Vladimir Putin, the very symbol of the Soviet *ancien regime*, with his organic ties to the CPSU through his prior membership in the KGB, was the hand-picked protégé of Boris Yeltsin. As a good Leningrad-St. Petersburg “family” member, his rise to power was carefully engineered. His image as a no-nonsense strong leader filled the leadership

vacuum created by the increasingly inept and discredited Yeltsin. With a very carefully crafted biographical “legend,” Putin was placed beyond the usual initial scrutiny of a newly arriving head of state. His intelligence background was cast in terms of strength of character and discipline instead of a sinister reminder of the harsh Soviet era. New strength and stability arriving in Moscow was the message to the Russian people. It was a welcome message after Yeltsin’s debacles and declining Russian stature in world affairs.

Putin began his first administration cautiously; a loss of state control punctuated by the ascendance of gangster capitalism catalyzed by oligarchic arrogance, as well as the malaise associated with the second Chechen war, called for carefully measured initial responses to these problems. He methodically began to reorganize the ministries and to suppress the media. The trappings of democratic reform were affected while Putin began, in the traditional sense, to consolidate executive power, the one constant in Russian political history. Russian business tycoons were put on notice to cooperate with the State or be exiled or worse.

His chief foreign policy problems were inherited from Boris Yeltsin; Yeltsin had been reactive and not interactive in his attempts to engage the West, the Americans in particular. Chechnya remained a political relations disaster for Russia in the international community, reminding all observers that Russia still *enforced* policy, harkening back to central controls and the *Realpolitik* of the old days of the rule of the CPSU and the Red Army. Putin’s aggressive prosecution of the war created the active perception that not much had really changed in Russian foreign policy. Its strict declarations of borderlands domination were certainly nothing new. NATO expansion into the Central and Eastern

European satellites as well as the former republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, was particularly loathsome for the struggling Russian re-identification process as well as for the former republics of the USSR, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Yeltsin was seen as ineffectual and weak in his diplomatic responses to the NATO “incursions” into traditional Russian space and spheres of influence of the FSU (former Soviet Union).

In addition, the resurgent nationalists in the Duma played up the perceived appeasement of Washington’s dominance over Russian internal and foreign affairs and Putin found himself on the diplomatic defensive until the dramatic events of September 11, 2001. Russian obstructionism was initially dramatized by Putin’s attitude of “*nyet-politics*” (*mine*) with the United States, in particular with regards to NATO expansion, American ABM Treaty violations and negative overtures concerning Russian-American missile defense protocols established during the Cold War. American expansion into the FSU republics in central Asia also alarmed Russian sensitivities. American political and military initiatives in Georgia, Ukraine and the Caucasus in general, represented another front of political incursion by the hegemonic Americans into traditional Russian “space”.

A unique window of opportunity presented itself to reorient Russian foreign policy and international relations after 9/11. Before that seminal event, Russian politics, internal and external, looked alarmingly similar to those of the Cold War era. Putin, until the tragic morning of September 11, 2001, looked like another arch-typical Russian realist, bent on the unenviable task of restraining and counter-balancing the global hegemony of the now expanding unipolar United States.

Vladimir Putin, not insignificantly, called George Bush the very day of the terrorist attacks in America and offered Washington full cooperation in the defense of the

United States. A subsequent “junior partnership” was formed shortly thereafter. Though some of the Russian political elite and the people themselves chafed at the designation of “junior partner,” Putin defended the new strategic relationship as a necessary step in the fight against international terrorism. With the advent of the new macro-level relationship, he attained political tradeoffs with the Americans on several levels. Washington effectively muted the steady drumbeat of criticisms regarding the second campaign in Chechnya and the general American polemics toward Moscow began to take on a supportive tone. Putin refrained from the prior rebuke of the new direction of American missile defense doctrine.

The new banner of cooperation served both countries well in their respective interstate and international relations until the Bush administration by-passed the United Nations in a unilateral exercise of the Bush Doctrine, attacking Iraq in the spring of 2003.

Iraq, a traditional Soviet-Russian client state, maintained bundled economic-commercial and socio-political ties to Moscow. Combined with the growing domestic criticisms of the new Putin-Bush political accommodations and the opposition to the war in general in Western Europe, the micro-level strains began to infringe on the larger strategic relationship effectively ending the quid pro quo of the short period after 9/11. The most visible symbol of this unraveling began at the United Nations as France, Germany and Russia responded to domestic constituent pressures to unite against the American hegemonic venture resulting in the disconcerting American unilateralist approach in Iraq.

The new sense of cooperation suffered and the old confrontational atmospherics returned. Putin became largely mute in his careful rhetoric toward the United States as he

approached re-election in 2004; the traditional Russian imperative of a strong, independent leader who reflects the images of the Russian Empire and its glorious past, necessitated that Putin not appear subservient to Washington.

*The Study of Russian Foreign Policies*

With all three Russian leaders, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin, political, economic-social factors have influenced state security perceptions and subsequent foreign policy variables and political postures. Conversely, the resulting foreign policy has affected domestic debate and has, therefore, created a cyclical “inside-out” dynamic. It is this pervasive dynamic that is used in this dissertation as the primary analytical tool to establish political linkages and to identify prevailing trends as well as issues. This relationship between the independent variables will determine the political track of the five transition administrations following the fall of the communist regime and socialist experiment in the Soviet Union and Russia.

The dichotomous nature of the Russian-American political relationship continues as both states have found it difficult, indeed, to escape their post-cold War legacies and respective political cultures. Both practice a tough-minded brand of realism, although the strategic-strength dynamics have changed dramatically. Russia is returning to vertical control mechanisms and is identifiably an illiberal hybrid democracy at best. Putin has reinstalled a sense of a proud imperial Russian past while, arguably in a constructivist mode, has established a political construct to deal with the realist hegemonic Americans through astute political tactics and the power of agency. By creating the appearance and assumption of a new stridency in foreign policy, Russian words will be more effective



than Russian arms.<sup>5</sup> His acumen is visible in the usage of homeland European states as political cover to re-sustain Russian diplomatic and strategic status on the Continent. Political cooperation and expanded trade relations with the European Union have served to counter-balance American domination within the larger Russian-American rapprochement.

This research will contribute to the current literature and debate in the field by offering fresh insights into the nature of Soviet-Russian transition foreign policy, based upon the critical examination of transition precursors in Gorbachev's attempts to liberalize socialist rule (*glasnost*) as well as to reach accommodations with the West through a demilitarized Soviet foreign policy (the New Thinking) and economic restructuring (*perestroika*).

Caught between two fires that Gorbachev ignited (the Soviet conservatives and the revanchists), Yeltsin supplanted Gorbachev politically, thereby destroying his base. Mikhail Gorbachev became the *custodian of unintended consequences* and was progressively marginalized. Gorbachev's descent from power was followed by Yeltsin's attempts to ride the whirlwind left by Gorbachev. The United States sensed the power shift and began to covertly support the new rising Russian star although American public proclamations still trumpeted the Gorbachev reforms. Yeltsin's confused and multi-dimensional administrations reoriented Russian transition politics, both domestic and foreign. His efforts, were marred, however, by the disappointment of a proud people and the continued resistance of the revanchist Right. He did, however, sustain the transition

---

<sup>5</sup> See Nick Onuf and Vendulka Kubalkova in their individual and collaborative discussion of the power of agency in *International Relations In a Constructed World*. (Armonk and New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998.), Introduction.

regardless of how haphazardly, avoiding potential calamity on a continual basis. This is to his credit. He avoided disaster.

Vladimir Putin, as heir to those favoring a strong centralized state, returned post-cold War Russia to a more balanced and coherent course. His first administration was spent “picking up the pieces” domestically left by the discredited and debilitated Boris Yeltsin and fending off the new global hegemon, the United States on the foreign policy front. Re-establishing Russian cohesion and power from the traditional Center (Moscow) and revitalizing vertical state controls in an illiberal hybrid democracy continue to mark Putin’s methodologies. A key operational variable in the Russian-American relationship has been 9/11 and the asymmetrical struggle of radical Islam against all western power centers: Israel, the European Union, Russia and the United States.

Russian foreign policy, therefore, has encountered some of the same obstacles in the post-conflict transition period that it experienced during the Cold War containment policy era by the United States. The de facto neo-containment strategy of the United States has been blatantly obvious, regardless of declaratory policy from Washington. NATO’s eastern expansion does serve to contain a re-emerging Russian state with aspirations to re-establish some semblance of empire. NATO-EU expansion eastward, regardless of its competitive nature and overlapping jurisdictional aspects, does preclude Russian expansion and geopolitical influence into Europe. Both Yeltsin and Putin realized that Russian influence must be diplomatically based and competitively won in the future. Notwithstanding usage of energy politics, Russian foreign policy initiatives have faced the new reality of accommodation not necessary in the days of diktat.

Yeltsin's uncoordinated efforts to continue traditional Russian great power status foreign policies with the U. S. and NATO, met with disturbing disdain by the Americans, diminished the stature and effectiveness of the Russian government as a whole. Not until America's discomfiture and growing diplomatic isolation over Iraq has Russian foreign policy been re-acknowledged in international relations as worthy of Russian return to great power status. Putin has astutely relied on a concrete vestige of Russian international power, the veto power of the U. N. Security Council.<sup>6</sup> Combined with the new petro economy and the geopolitical re-emergence of Putin's consolidations, Russia must be recognized and dealt with by the world community. Isolating Russia is no longer viable.

The familiar cyclical confrontation-détente-confrontation pattern seems to once more be resurfacing, regardless of name and system changes in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) now known as the Russian Federation. With the Bush administration's failure in the American mid-term elections, battlefield reversals particularly in Baghdad, and growing American domestic and international resistance to the war, Putin now has the distracted Americans at a disadvantage, thereby offering the opportunity to re-establish muted Russian foreign policy goals not necessarily congruent with those of the United States. It is, of course, axiomatic, that nations will act in their own national interests whenever possible.<sup>7</sup> The applications of the Bush administration through the implementation of the Bush Doctrine during the two republican administrations, has

---

<sup>6</sup> J. L. Black, *Vladimir Putin and The New World Order: Looking East and Looking West?* (Lanham, New York, Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2004), 345.

<sup>7</sup> Christopher Layne, a protégé of the neo-realist Waltz, has expanded on the work of Kenneth Waltz to take the position that, despite political globalization and the effects of agency on the perceptual aspects of diplomacy, nation-states still ultimately act in their own interests first whenever possible and ultimately as opportunities arise.

borne out the renewed American applications of pre-emption and democratic evangelism as a neo-realism cornerstone of a hegemonic attempt to negate internationalism and return to American primacy after the implosion of the USSR and the ascendance of American military power. The general rejection of this approach by both allies and foes has handicapped American foreign policy; Putin has stepped into the void to reassert Russian power and renew Russian foreign policy strength in international affairs.

Polemically, this new Russian stridency has placed obstacles in the path of American-Russian relations. America, hampered by the stalled war effort in Iraq, domestic resistance to the draconian measures of the Bush administration such as the enemy combatant status controversy, violation of the internationally accepted *habeas corpus* guidelines, not to mention the Patriot Act and unwarranted electronic eavesdropping on America's own citizens, has caused the strain to show up at the strategic level as well as in the unraveling of Russian-American nuclear arms agreements and the ABM controversy in Europe.<sup>8</sup> Putin's astute moves at the G-8 meeting in Germany in 2007 further pressured the Americans by showing their refusal to consider Putin's proposals as obstructionist and a counter to world peace.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Organization of the Dissertation*

A literature review will be followed by chapter 1 tracing effects of *glasnost*, *perestroika* and *the new thinking*, in particular, upon the CPSU, the communist system and the Soviet empire and the opportunity they provided for Yeltsin to eventually

---

<sup>8</sup> "Russia: Using Missile Defense as a Geopolitical Lever.", Stratfor.com, 6/13/07, <http://www.stratfor.com>.

<sup>9</sup> Stratfor.com, 6-13-07, p. 3. Putin suggested locating the proposed ABM system proposed for Poland and the Czech Republic be instead located in Azerbaijan to be more effective in deterring Iranian missile launch on the United States. As an earlier American initiative asking Russia to stop complaining and join the ABM proposal in Europe, Putin's counter-proposal put the Americans on the diplomatic defensive at the G-8.

supplant and displace Gorbachev; this resulted in the determination of Yeltsin to subvert the entire Soviet system toward a western democratic orientation resulting in the demise of the Soviet Communist Party(CPSU) and the eventual collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in1991.

As Yeltsin muddled through ten years of experimentation with Yegor Gaidar's "shock therapy," dismantling the machinery of the Soviet command economy, the United States and NATO subsequently exerted an aggressive neo-containment approach to Russia and threatened the Russian state with complete irrelevancy in international relations. Combined with the expanding process of demographic problems of all kinds, to include severe national health problems, Yeltsin's prospects of maintaining morale and order in the post-Soviet state were severely threatened.

Chapter 2 describes Yeltsin's efforts to maintain peace while keeping western powers at bay as well attempts to stabilize Chechnya. In chapter 3, the transition from Yeltsin to Putin is elaborated.

Putin's pre and post 9/11 relations with George Bush describe a period of good will and accommodation resembling periods of Cold War détente. This is followed by a chapter on Russian-EU relations and Russian efforts to reestablish the "European home" concept introduced by Gorbachev and others as well as Russia-EU coordination in an attempt to balance against the American "Open Door," perpetuated by NATO after the Cold War as a return to multilateralism while the Bush administration struggles to extricate itself from Iraq.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Christopher Layne. *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006).

The last two chapters deal with a broad description of Putin's attempts to confront the United States while cooperating at the high politics level on strategic issues of mutual importance to the United States and Russia while, bolstered by the new petro-economy in Russia, setting his own newly independent foreign policy course for reemerging Russia. The last chapter offers some conclusions and directions for further research in an attempt to answer the original research question and the subsequent subset of questions deriving from those preliminary findings.

Contributing to future research on the post-Soviet transition period by documenting the political history of Gorbachev the visionary, Yeltsin the anti-communist reformer, and Putin, the non-ideological pragmatist, this research will hopefully serve scholars in the field and prompt further examination regarding the foreign relations of the new Russian state. This dissertation analyzes a legacy of Soviet command authority and ideological xenophobia to Gorbachev's "the new thinking" revolution to extreme risk taking and survival under Yeltsin to the familiar vertical controls that are endemic and symbolic of the unique Russian political history under Putin and Medvedev.

#### *A Literature Review*

The economic, social and security-political variables determining both domestic and subsequent foreign policy decisions by both Yeltsin administrations are treated particularly well by Dmitri Trenin in his book, *The End of Eurasia, Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*, 2000.<sup>11</sup> Trenin describes a fractured imperial

---

<sup>11</sup> Dmitri Trenin. *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002).

empire facing severe geopolitical problems accentuated by demographic dislocations and foreign policy pressures on all levels.<sup>12</sup> Russia is attempting to reassemble that empire.

Putin's efforts to redefine and re-secure Russian borders served to stabilize and delimit the new Russian state. Following Yeltsin's largely impotent attempts to mollify Primakov and his Eurasianist thrust, Putin would continue Yeltsin's orientations until he could stabilize and modify Russian foreign policy on his own terms; he was careful in the transition period, not to make too radical turns too soon. He had to ease out Yeltsin's "family" and to quell the situation in Dagestan and Chechnya. His task has been to give notice to the international community a clear working definition of what the new Russia is and what it intends to do to secure its traditional near abroad and its borderlands.<sup>13</sup>

Putin was caught, however, on the horns of a security dilemma. Prior to 9/11 and subsequently after the American invasion of Iraq, the intransigence of the Chechen problem dogged Russian foreign policy and has mired new security arrangements with the United States. Foreign policy machinations by Putin and Igor Ivanov failed to convince the international political community that the problem of Chechen independence and/or reintegration into the Russian Federation has been solved. The first attempted Chechen elections reintegrating the break-away republic back into the Russian fold has been viewed by many as a fraudulent attempt by Moscow to paper over the

---

<sup>12</sup> Trenin, a former staff officer in the higher echelons of the Soviet military-security apparatus, has an acute sense of geopolitical mission in both pre and post-Soviet regimes. Now an analyst with the Moscow Carnegie Institute for International Peace, his appreciation of the contrasting missions of the CPSU years and the new Russian democratic forces impacted by the vagaries of a new societal experiment with pluralism, highlight the severity and confusion of the new post-cold war Russian regimes. Traditional hard-line control from the Center has largely found itself at the mercy of extraneous floating variables, both domestic and foreign, resulting in a disoriented foreign policy and sense of mission for "what is left of Russia." (mine)

<sup>13</sup> Trenin. The End of Eurasia.

festering insurgency of the Chechen peoples as described by Gilles Kepel's *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*.<sup>14</sup>

With the American campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and the resulting foreign relations deterioration between Washington and Moscow over Iraq, much of the traditional historic harshness and confrontational political posturing have returned to the bilateral relations between these actors. Even so, George Bush and Vladimir Putin have tried to resurrect the rapprochement and political accommodations that sprung to life immediately after the attacks against New York and Washington D. C. on September 11, 2001. High-level strategic Russian and American security interests still revolve around a common front against international terrorism and strategic cooperation on WMD (Weapons of mass destruction) and diplomatic unity at the level of high politics.

Bush's war on terrorism and Putin's war in Chechnya have a clearly identifiable reciprocal element that predisposes both foreign policy establishments to try to repair the damage done in the American-Iraqi war. The unilateralism of the Bush administration and the client relationship between Moscow and Baghdad were symptomatic of the differences in the American and Russian international positions. Both countries acted out of national security interests. But at the strategic macro level, broad based strategic diplomatic cooperation still appears to be worth the effort to shore up dichotomies of strategic congruence and tactical cleavages. Strategic security cooperation between Russia and the United States against *jihad*, or militant Islam, has prompted commonality

---

<sup>14</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002).



of purpose for both nations as has the non-proliferation agenda having coterminous applications. Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*.<sup>15</sup>

Comparisons of the relevant literature in this area of research reveal that each Russian leader has done his part in the continuing Russian saga. Without Gorbachev's dramatic efforts to modernize socialism and introduce a degree of expressive pluralism to the moribund Soviet economy and international relations, the communist doctrine may have prevailed for much longer or, worse, resulted in nuclear war. Though Gorbachev lost control, his legacy served as a dramatic precursor for the fledgling experiments in economic market reformism and voting as a means of expressing the common will rather than diktat and continued security problems.

Yeltsin, although highly criticized, was also a victim of the multiple negative impacts that Gorbachev could not reverse. Perhaps his efforts at stemming civil war and open revolution are his badge of courage. History may judge Boris Yeltsin as a tragic-comedic figure but his ability to "keep things together" cannot be questioned.

Yeltsin and then Putin have utilized many of the dynamics that Gorbachev introduced into Russian foreign policy. Glasnost opened the possibilities of domestic and foreign dialogue. Yeltsin, though rejecting Gorbachev's socialism, utilized Gorbachev's applications of the *New Thinking* to establish constructive dialogue and business and political channels with the West and particularly the Americans, opening up the opportunities of a newly integrated Russian eco-political age, accentuated, of course, by the strength of the newly dynamic petro-dollar economy.

---

<sup>15</sup> Ahmed Rashid. *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000).

Yeltsin allowed his appointees much latitude. By contrast, Putin's new appointees are reserved and deliberate practitioners of quiet, stealthy policy applications, orchestrated by their boss and strictly adhered to.

Yeltsin too, was not averse to appointing *siloviki* (former KGB and military officers) to top posts in the state. But under him a pure civilian could also have gotten the appointment. Under Putin, if a civilian was appointed to a top post, in many cases he was swiftly found to have connections with the *silovik*.<sup>16</sup>

According to his official biography, Mikhail Yefrimovich has always been a purely civilian person. But there is much talk in political circles of his very good relations with Kremlin people in uniform. Some even describe Fradkov as 'silovik official with a background in security and military affairs in civilian clothing.'<sup>17</sup>

Building upon the legacy of change initiated by the visionary Gorbachev and the clumsy yet courageous Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin seems determined to return Russia to ascendancy instead of devolution and a return to xenophobic isolation. He has stood on the shoulders of his predecessors with all the vagaries and dislocations that their respective regimes wrought. Considering the width and depth of the possible calamities that could have befallen the Soviet-Russian behemoth, it seems indeed quite remarkable that has done so well.

### *Conclusion*

This introduction and overview has reviewed a sample of current literature in the field and suggested directionality and progression of Soviet-Russian foreign policy. It is now time to introduce the pioneering efforts of a man both cursed and revered both in Russia and internationally. He has been called a fool, a despot, even a traitor. It is the

---

<sup>16</sup> Mikhail Rostovsky and Aleksandr Budberg. "Sneaking Up Unnoticed." *World Press Review*, May 4, 2004, 30<sup>th</sup> Edition from *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, March 2, 2004, 22.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 22.

position of this discussion that Mikhail Gorbachev was not any of those things but *rather a visionary, as well as a Cold War pragmatist who became the victim of unintended consequences*. This position is carefully considered in the evidentiary trail examined during and after his reign. Without his bold initiatives, *Perestroika, Glasnost, and the New Thinking*, arguably, none of his successors would have had the ability to introduce change from the moribund system that, by scholarly consensus, possibly might have struggled along for many more destructive years, even potentially culminating in nuclear war as a result of the intense bipolar struggle with the United States.<sup>18</sup>

Yeltsin seized the initiative from Gorbachev when the nationalities question had finally exploded with the opportunities of glasnost that Mikhail Gorbachev had released. The fact that Gorbachev had been pinned in by the Soviet right and the Russian left democrats, could be viewed as a “sign of the times” that Gorbachev did not see coming but felt he could control anyway. Socialism had lost its appeal even after Gorbachev’s desperate attempts to repackage it without the repressive communist labels.

---

<sup>18</sup> See Don Oberdorfer, Richard Crockatt, Odd Arne Westad and John Lewis Gaddis in their post-cold war analyses of the transition period, particularly after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, and the struggles of Gorbachev and Yeltsin to keep things together during the calamitous free fall of the Warsaw Pact, the CPSU, and finally the implosion of the USSR after Gorbachev’s final desperate gamble to reconstruct socialism in a new Union Treaty in 1991. Also see analyses by Richard Sawka as well as Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott that richly describe the turmoil that the existing Gorbachev and the entering Yeltsin had to contend with to avoid total disintegration of the transition and residual Russian state. Their books: Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a new Era: the United States and the Soviet Union*, 1983-1991. (Washington D. C.: John Hopkins University, Press, 1998) ; Richard Crockatt, Odd Arne Westad, ed. *The Fifty Years War: the United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991* (London: Routledge, 1995) ; Odd Arne Westad. *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*. (London: Frank Cass, 2000); John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, Third Edition, (London: Routledge, 1996) ; Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, editors. *Conflict, cleavage and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

## CHAPTER I

### MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AND BORIS YELTSIN: REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE

When Mikhail Gorbachev took power from Konstantin Chernenko in 1985, he had already been steering the Soviet ship of state for some time behind the scenes for the ailing Chernenko. The protégé of KGB head and later General Secretary Yuri Andropov, Gorbachev had risen through the ranks of the CPSU and had, at a relatively early age, become a candidate member of the Party well ahead of schedule.

Andropov and Chernenko were in office but a short time. They both were largely incapacitated due to chronic illnesses. Gorbachev, the hand-picked protégé of the former KGB boss Andropov, was in a position after the death of Andropov, to ascend to the CPSU Secretary General slot but Chernenko was chosen even though his was widely viewed as a caretaker government with Gorbachev the real power behind the scenes.<sup>19</sup>

Immediately following Chernenko's death in 1985, Gorbachev set about to reorganize and reorient the Party. He began, in typical Soviet fashion, to consolidate his power. What was new was the swiftness with which he proceeded. CPSU apparatchiks were put on notice to get on board with Gorbachev's new reformist programs or become victims to the sweeping reorganization.

The gerontocracy that had perpetuated itself since the death of Brezhnev in 1982 was discarded for a new generation of educated technocrats. Alexandr Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze became, with Gorbachev, the new ruling troika of the Soviet

---

<sup>19</sup> Gorbachev's official position was the unofficial number two in the CPSU. He was the Communist Party Secretary in charge of ideology. He used this position to begin the reformist programs that would guide his coming administration, especially perestroika. See Gorbachev, Mikhail, Sergeevich. *The Gorbachev Foundation*. <http://www.mikhailgorbachev.org/> [accessed February 10, 2006].

Union. *Glasnost*, *Perestroika* and the *New Thinking* became the reformist platform. Revanchist *ancien* regime functionaries became rapidly marginalized and replaced. Gorbachev stunned both the USSR itself and the West with his reformist zeal and boldness.

Though he enjoyed early successes, especially in foreign policy, Gorbachev began to suffer setbacks when the nationalities question created increasingly strident nationalistic fervor in the Baltics and the eastern European satellites. Hoping to revitalize Comecon and appeal to the long-suppressed feelings of the subjugated nationalities, to create a new socialism, Gorbachev, instead, opened Pandora's Box, starting largely with the nationalist movements of 1989. The re-unification of east and West Germany, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall, ignited the rush to freedom, along with the Solidarity movement in Poland.

With a taste of new openness and economic self-determination, the oppressed states under Soviet domination no longer had any interest in a new socialist configuration. They wanted independence. Meanwhile, the military, KGB, and dedicated Soviet communists, wanted to reverse the reforms of Gorbachev and re-stabilize the Soviet empire. Caught between growing fires, Gorbachev's best efforts to outmaneuver his opponents, his forte, failed. The attempted coup in August 1991, showed the frustration of the Right while Boris Yeltsin, a dedicated anti-communist, used the event to undermine Gorbachev's efforts to create a Union Treaty from the Left.

Boris Yeltsin rescued Gorbachev from the coup plotters while taking steps to supplant him soon thereafter. He worked with others to stymie Gorbachev's efforts to hold the USSR together under the new Union Treaty. At meetings leading to the

Belevezhkaya Accords in Minsk, Yeltsin sealed Gorbachev's fate. The USSR dissolved quietly in December 1991, and Gorbachev resigned as head of the defunct USSR.

Gorbachev booed from the sidelines, sometimes loudly, but did not directly interfere with Yeltsin. Since his intense efforts in early 1990 to maintain a political unity under a new socialist formulation, he has never converted from socialism, although he did renounce communism and the CPSU. His vision for the Soviet Union was one of reform, not ideological revolution. He became a victim of his own charisma and energy. He became the *custodian of unintended circumstances* and accelerated the dissolution of communist Soviet socialism.

In 1990 *Soyuz*, the conservative voting bloc in parliament, harkened back to the old days, evolving from the conservatives but resisting Gorbachev's vision of a new socialist union.<sup>20</sup> Gorbachev's reforms were now regarded as too slow and the democratic forces were enjoying increasing momentum. Gorbachev, citing the need for a new post of President of the USSR was elected in 1990 for a five-year term.<sup>21</sup> However, Gorbachev's popularity was rapidly waning as the forces he had unleashed outstripped his efforts for graduated, incremental, changes. Power decentralization and dissolution of the control of the CPSU continued and accelerated. The forcefulness of the rush to independence by the Baltic States exacerbated Gorbachev's security dilemma and the "pot boiled over."

---

<sup>20</sup> *Soyuz* was largely reactionary and demanded "a curb on the anti-socialist forces" as a counter to the rapidly accelerating defections to Soviet rule. *The Gorbachev Foundation*.  
<http://www.mikhailgorbachev.org/>

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* 2.

Gorbachev responded with force in Lithuania at the demand of the republic's conservatives.<sup>22</sup> The ensuing bloodshed, however, only signaled the depth of Lithuanian commitment to independence from the USSR. With Latvia and Estonia closely watching the situation, Gorbachev was explicitly reminded of his previous statements about open political processes being allowed to flourish. When the Lithuanian declaration of Independence came in March of 1990, it was the clarion call for regional action. The response of the Red Army at the behest of *Soyuz* marked the active challenge of the Baltic States not only to CPSU authority but to the political credibility of the man who had set it all in motion. Gorbachev's authority never fully recovered from this series of events. The unraveling of Soviet domination gained irreversible momentum. An abortive, but casualty-causing, attempt by the Red Army to depose lawful authority in Lithuania "at the request" of a self-appointed Committee of National Salvation "dealt a body blow" to Gorbachev's authority; both sides made their demands but Gorbachev did not offer a clear evaluation of those events.<sup>23</sup> Gorbachev was becoming the victim of the very processes that he had unleashed. Caught in the middle between the progressive forces on the left and the reactionary forces on the right, he lost moral authority with both. Rapidly becoming known as the man who was losing control, this visionary began to realize that indeed, he could not finesse and control all the variables that now faced him. A master of public relations and political manipulations in a system from which he

---

<sup>22</sup> George H. W. Bush alleged in *Power and Purpose: US Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War* in Chapter 2, "George H. W. Bush and Soviet Regime Change," that Gorbachev intimated to him that he had yielded to the Soviet military to intervene in Lithuania as a tactical ploy to see how the situation would develop and to buy time while keeping the conservatives placated. James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul. *Power and Purpose: US Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2003), 28.

<sup>23</sup> See *The Gorbachev Foundation* report in the biographical sketch of Mikhail Gorbachev on page 3. <http://www.mikhailgorbachev.org/> The timeline of Gorbachev's career.

had developed and matured, his efforts to advance an economically and politically evolved socialism were floundering on the opportunity the satellites countries sensed were at hand. The Republics of the Soviet Union had stirred under the same impulses. A kind of bandwagon effect ensued. With every challenge to the authority of the CPSU and the USSR itself, Gorbachev's legitimacy was challenged and undermined in spite of his progressive reforms.

The endemic nationalities question, coupled with labor unrest, satellite liberation, clandestine interference from the West, internecine Party strife, internal political disorientation in both the conservative and democratic wings of the government, combined to overwhelm Gorbachev and his progressive cadre, the ruling troika. Yeltsin's strategic moves toward complete dissolution of the Soviet Union provided the last set of dynamics to push the socialist-communist experiment into the "dustbin of history."

*The Social-political factors that led to the Coup Attempt in 1991*

When Gorbachev threatened to resign as General Secretary in June 1991, it sent panic throughout the CPSU. The conservatives responded to his threats by approving his new policy statement as a pre-cursor to the new Union Treaty.<sup>24</sup> The signing of the Novo-Ogaryovo Document was scheduled for August 20, 1991. This new document would bring to fruition Gorbachev's efforts, under extreme urgency and pressure, to save the Soviet Union from dismemberment and ensuing chaos. His vision for a new Union involved maintaining the geopolitical sanctity of the USSR but with new freedoms, both socio-economic and political. It was not Gorbachev's goal to create a western style

---

<sup>24</sup> "Timeline." *The Gorbachev Foundation*. <http://www.mikhailgorbachev.org/>.



democracy. Rather, true to his doctrinaire roots, reformulate and revitalize a new socialist union that updated and upgraded the aspirations of the people while decentralizing control by the Center.

The reactionary forces of the military, KGB, party apparatchiks and CPSU, felt that if they did not act when they did, all would be lost. Gorbachev had to be stopped before the Union Treaty could be signed. This same faction of hardliners had resisted the reformist programs of Gorbachev from the beginning but they had, individually and as a group, survived the political pruning process that Gorbachev was the master of. The unforeseen circumstance that ensued was the acceleration of the breakup of the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup>

The Bush Administration took the official stance of watch and wait. Soviet foreign policy seemed benign and accommodating at this point, even in retreat. Gorbachev's overtures for demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy, though treated with extreme skepticism by Washington, seemed to resonate with George Bush. Bush's relations with Gorbachev were still the guidepost by which the American government officially operated. However, CIA overtures toward Boris Yeltsin had been ongoing for some time.<sup>26</sup> "Riding both horses" as a strategy offered a variety of options to

---

<sup>25</sup> Archie Brown and Lilia Shevtsova, ed. *Gorbachev, Yeltsin & Putin: Political Leadership in Russia's Transition* (Washington D C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001) 3-5. Archie Brown, in the introduction, describes this process in detail as an unintended consequence of this series of monumental events that set in motion the end of the communist revolution in Russia under the auspices of the CPSU.

<sup>26</sup> The descriptions of this official and unofficial dual-track policy of cooperation with Gorbachev's policies and courting of Yeltsin as a possible successor to the struggling Gorbachev are recounted in Goldgeier and McFaul's book *Power and Purpose: U. S. Policy toward Russia After the Cold War*. See pages 47, 53 and 58.

contingency planning in an unscripted play with potentially volatile repercussions.<sup>27</sup>

Officially the Bush administration quietly made policy statements of non-interference.

Bush, the apparent advocate of self-determination, wanted the situation to play out. The CIA and Department of Defense (DoD) were pursuing the end of the USSR as a prime objective even if that meant using NGO's as cover organizations to promote Yeltsin's agenda while assisting him in ending the reign of Gorbachev.

Considering that G. H. W. Bush had been Director of Central Intelligence, it does not seem illogical that he might orchestrate such a dual-track policy as president, a declaratory policy for public consumption and a covert strategy simultaneously. While there is no explicit linkage for this assessment, the political objectives are obvious. The role of the American nongovernmental actors such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) as well as the International Republican Institute (IRI), was to assist regime change while the official policy of the Bush administration was non-interference.<sup>28</sup>

There is further support for this line of supposition. Invitations to Washington (as well as the quiet "Moscow Nights" Yeltsin visit to CIA in Miami)<sup>29</sup> before the August coup attempt against Gorbachev, indicate that both leaders were being evaluated for the coming post-Soviet transition. There existed a certain problematic set of variables. If

---

<sup>27</sup> I was a guest speaker at the US Air Command Staff College just after the coup and was asked to analyze and make a presentation of Gorbachev's prospects for survival in view of his weakened position after the coup attempt. During the drama and confusion in the early days after the coup, it appeared to me that Gorbachev had survived, Yeltsin was his faithful ally and that things were returning to some measure of control in Moscow. Only later did we learn that this was the beginning of the end for Gorbachev, the USSR itself and the CPSU. Yeltsin's complicity in the marginalizing of Gorbachev only became evident in the months following the coup attempt.

<sup>28</sup> Goldgeier and McFaul See discussion on pages 29-31 of Chapter One, "George H. W. Bush and Soviet Regime Change." from *Power and Purpose*.

<sup>29</sup> CIA sources classified.

Gorbachev was able to stem the reactionary forces gathering strength against him, the open declaratory policy of the Bush Administration could be further enhanced. If, on the other hand, complete dissolution of the CPSU and possibly the USSR itself could be leveraged, Yeltsin appeared to be the appropriate transition choice. A democrat with the self-proclaimed objectives of eliminating Soviet Communism would certainly be preferable to a revamping of socialism and one-man rule even if by an enlightened neo-socialist.

The continuing social and political dislocations that Gorbachev's dichotomous strategies caused, lent credibility to the right-wing forces clamoring for restoration of the State functions. Gorbachev's abilities to inspire the populations of the satellites as well as the Soviet Republics were waning fast. Glasnost had produced a pronounced increase in the ability of the media, print and visual. It served to catalyze nationalism, not reinvigorate a moribund system that failed to inspire a return to benign socialism. Perestroika was an abject failure largely because the command system and its economic and political patrons obstructed virtually every move on the part of Yakovlev, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze to implement market or hybrid market mechanisms.

Without being able to point to successes in these areas, Gorbachev's arguments for a return to socialism in any form were less and less motivational. The people felt confused and disoriented. As bad as things had become, the people still had pride as citizens of a superpower. With less food on the table, increasing political chaos, divisions on a massive scale and with no guarantees for a better future, the appeal of restoration of the USSR as it was held more sway for many citizens. Of course, those vested in the Soviet CPSU were holding on to power. They had already witnessed

Gorbachev's vacillations and his relentless pursuit of those who opposed him in the bureaucracy.

Gorbachev was arguably strongest in the foreign policy arena. Before assuming the position of Secretary General of the Soviet Union in 1985, Gorbachev had been laying the groundwork for the new thinking in foreign policy with frequent visits to European capitals where he openly stated that Soviet Russia was about to embark on a new area of accommodation and cooperation with the West. He delighted foreign heads of state and dignitaries with his eloquence and his charm, and was dubbed by many as the new Soviet "Prince of Peace."

The United States was more reserved in its reactions to this sophisticated new Soviet man. Their resistance to his political charm faded as well in the coming years. Gorbachev's "offensive of smiles" was met with skepticism, but with hope that this new generational leader would enhance at least a new era of détente.<sup>30</sup> His stated objectives, quite explicit for an incoming Party Chairman, were presented in his five and a half hour speech to the Twenty Seventh Congress meeting of the CPSU. Here he declared that there was to follow a new era of Soviet internal and external policies. The era of stagnation and bureaucratic inertia was to be replaced by the introduction of bold new initiatives. These initiatives were *perestroika* (economic restructuring), *glasnost* (openness) and the *New Thinking* (demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy.) The corruption endemic to the former administrations of the gerontocracy, Brezhnev and

---

<sup>30</sup> Gorbachev appeared in every western newspaper as a new hope in superpower relations. In the Cold War years Soviet duplicity and propaganda had created a general western mistrust of policy statements and "innovations." There seemed to be an aura about Gorbachev that this could, indeed, be the "new Soviet Man." Margaret Thatcher, known for her tough anti-Soviet positions, was admittedly charmed by the new approach of a vital, young, charismatic Soviet leader who appeared to be progressive, well educated, and out of step with the dark Soviet past steeped in Cold War polemics and doctrinaire Soviet communism. She allegedly replied to inquiries about Gorbachev that he was a man "we could do business with."

Chernenko, in particular, had perpetuated a patronage system for the apparatchiks and functionaries of the CPSU and had resulted in an elitist and lethargic political-economic system that was bankrupting the Soviet Union.

The *New Thinking* was a product of the troika of Mikhail Gorbachev, Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze with precursors from other earlier reform-minded political thinkers. Gorbachev's stamp prevailed and permeated the new approach to Soviet foreign policy orientation. The xenophobic socialist history of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union which isolated and insulated it from the world political economy and normalized international relations, was also depriving it of the benefits of economic and political globalization; being an integrated member of the western institutions, or at the very least, a peaceful co-existing beneficiary of the largesse of those institutions, served Russian national interests as well. Yet, Russian traditional isolation continued under communism. Gorbachev came to believe that if the Soviet Union could bring itself to come out of its protective shell by first demilitarizing its foreign policy, the world political community would find the prospects of co-existence with the USSR more appealing and less threatening and that economic, political, and social cooperation would then be possible on a global basis.<sup>31</sup> This would enhance peace prospects for the entire global community as well as relieve the enormous economic pressures on the Soviet Union to compete with the West, particularly the dynamic super power that was the United States.

The "Westerners," as they were called, wanted détente and interaction with the West while the nationalist Statists adhered to the Brezhnev-era doctrine of the benefits of

---

<sup>31</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev. *Gorbachev: On My Country and the World*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 187-190.

the “correlation of forces” philosophy; zero-sum politics and opportunist détente would serve the imperial objectives of communism-socialism more than any altruistic ideas Gorbachev was envisioning.<sup>32</sup>

The status quo maintenance attempts of the Party were finally overcome with Gorbachev’s rise to power as General Secretary after Chernenko’s death in 1985. Knowing that he would soon ascend to power, Gorbachev’s laying the groundwork for his programs began before his arrival in the Kremlin. The first repudiation of old policies was the exposure of political leaders to criticism and scrutiny from which they had carefully insulated themselves in the past.

Gorbachev enlisted the people as political allies by rewarding them with more open expression and a proliferation of newspapers (other than the government paper *Pravda*.) This created quite a stir among the people who were used to tightly controlled public opinion and fear among the vested communist interests who were used to insularity and protection from the closely-knit patronage class.

The economic principle of accountability and cost efficiency, along with more worker control and direct involvement in decision-making by the workers themselves, provided the incentive for higher productivity in all phases of economic life; precluded were the corrupt practices of report padding and local managerial pacification and deceptions of the controlling ministries.<sup>33</sup> In regard to foreign policy Gorbachev introduced a truly revolutionary concept. He proposed that the Soviet Union lead the

---

<sup>32</sup> Tsygankov. *Russia’s Foreign Policy*: 31-53 Chapter 2 provides a very comprehensive discussion of the impacts of this critical Gorbachevian initiative.

<sup>33</sup> Terry Simmons. *Glasnost, Perestroika and the New Thinking: Implications for Soviet Foreign Policy*. (Master’s Thesis, University of South Florida, 1989). 21-24.

way, even unilaterally in the beginning, to demilitarization of foreign policy through voluntary disarmament!

The Soviet Union had competed with the United States post-haste following WWII to narrow the nuclear arms superiority upon which the United States relied so heavily to counter Soviet superiority in conventional weapons and the strength of the Red Army. The arms race that followed focused international attention on the superpower rivalry for decades. Gorbachev alarmed his own government when he announced that the military and foreign policy stance of the USSR would be reoriented towards peaceful disengagement from the arms race. Gorbachev began to retreat from support of Afghanistan and Cuba. He began to engage all adversaries in a *constructive dialogue* toward integration of the Soviet empire into the international political community.

His opening statement at the Twenty-Seventh Congress in February, 1986, reflected the context of his general philosophy regarding continuity with the past while embarking on a new area of progressive change.

It is our task to conceptualize broadly in Lenin's style, the times we are living in, and to work out a realistic, thoroughly weighed, program of action that will organically blend the grandeur of our aims, with the realism of our capabilities, and the party's plans with the hopes and inspirations of every person.<sup>34</sup>

Gorbachev's new initiatives of *glasnost*, *perestroika* and *the new thinking* promised vast changes in the Soviet Union. The results were dramatic: Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, revision of Soviet patronage in the Third World by withdrawal of logistical

---

<sup>34</sup> See Gorbachev's speech delivered to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress. FBIS Files (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), 1986. He astounded the rank and file with his radical changes proposing that the xenophobic Soviet nation begin an integration process on all fronts with the West. Gorbachev, however, ever the true socialist, tried to introduce this radical new direction by portraying the changes as evolutionary after Lenin rather than revolutionary, threatening the Soviet political and economic structures. His declarations were treated with skepticism in the West and with measured alarm in the East.

support for “wars of liberation,” unilateral Soviet troop withdrawals worldwide, as well as rhetorical encouragement from Gorbachev and his team for nationalism in Soviet spheres of influence, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, to name a few.

Scholarship in this field of international relations (IR) had been centered on the Cold War and then the transition period following that 50-year conflict-dynamic. Since September 11, 2001, there has arguably appeared a new phase of analysis. The precursors from Soviet communism-socialism to the new democratic reformism are examined in depth by an American world authority. Michael McFaul’s book, *Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin* as well as his more recent book co-authored with James M. Goldgeier, *Power and Purpose: US Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War* serve as detailed and well documented evidence of the vacillating political track of domestic Russian politics and foreign policy stimulations from the United States in particular.<sup>35</sup>

McFaul, a consummate Cold War and Russian transition specialist and Goldgeier, known for his work on NATO and Russian-European relations both Soviet-era and post-cold war, have had and still enjoy, tremendous access to the political principals and authoritative observers and analysts close to the action. McFaul, in particular, has conducted countless real-time on-site interviews with Soviet and Russian personalities who have had direct impacts on the political, economic and security relations both domestic and foreign. Michael McFaul’s book, recounts the vain efforts of Mikhail Gorbachev to reconstitute the USSR under the reorganization of the proposed Union Treaty and Yeltsin’s efforts to present his case for democracy in Russia through the

---

<sup>35</sup> Michael McFaul. *Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001) 85-88.



Democratic Russia party in a concerted effort to defeat Gorbachev's efforts to retain socialist rule.<sup>36</sup>

Yeltsin, as argued by Archie Brown, saw an opportunity to be seen as the democratic savior of the faltering Gorbachev reforms through his passionate display of support of Gorbachev ending the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev in August of 1991; at the same time, amidst various alleged intrigues possibly perpetuated by Gorbachev himself and others, including Yeltsin, Yeltsin began to take advantage of the increasing apathy and disappointment surrounding Gorbachev to supplant him.<sup>37</sup>

The subsequent political intrigues and maneuverings of Yeltsin and Gorbachev became unforeseen variables constituting the introductory elements of the passing of Gorbachev's remarkable epic as that led to the demise of the CPSU and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Yeltsin took the baton of Soviet-Russian transition at the Belovezhkaya Accords, formalizing the end of the USSR and initiating the Russian experiment with democratic pluralism and parliamentary government.<sup>38</sup> This *fait accompli* resulted in Gorbachev's political demise and propelled Boris Yeltsin to center stage and the subsequent establishment of the first Russian republic from 1991-1993.

---

<sup>36</sup> McFaul. *Russia's Unfinished Revolution*, 88. "If Gorbachev wanted to revise and revitalize socialism, Yeltsin and Democratic Russia eventually called for the abandonment of socialism altogether." See page 88 for this discussion of Gorbachev's stymied efforts to sustain the Union under the socialist rubric.

<sup>37</sup> Archie Brown, introduction to *Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin: Political Leadership in Russia's Transition*. Ed. Archie Brown and Lilia Shevtsova. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001) 4. Brown assesses the failure of Gorbachev to get the Union Treaty approved in a desperate attempt to save the polity that was the USSR in a renewed political-socialist commonwealth format and Yeltsin's clandestine intrigues to defeat Gorbachev's efforts in a move to replace him. In addition for an excellent discussion of these still mysterious circumstance and intrigue, see Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova's account of these days in *Boris Yeltsin, A political biography* in "Gorbachev vs. Gorbachev," August 12-21, 1991 See Part Three, page 243.

<sup>38</sup> Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, 38.

The transition elements of Boris Yeltsin's ascendancy to power as the president of the new Russian Federation, complicated by the coup attempt in August of 1991, was clouded in an atmosphere of suspicion. Was Yeltsin Gorbachev's political savior or was he somehow implicated in the coup and as a result, compromised Gorbachev by dissolving the USSR and any hopes of revitalizing the Union Treaty? Gorbachev had rescued Yeltsin's career by bringing him back to Moscow from political oblivion. Had Yeltsin turned opportunist at his chance to seize power? It is at this juncture that Gorbachev and socialism-communism ended in Russia and the larger than life Boris Yeltsin took control of a revolutionary democratic reformism that changed Russian and world history. Although Yeltsin "saved" Gorbachev, Gorbachev has vehemently claimed that Yeltsin, in complicity with others, supplanted his authority at this point and Gorbachev was never able to recover.<sup>39</sup>

President George H. W. Bush appeared to be tentative in his declaratory policy stances regarding the aftermath of the coup attempt. Openly, he still backed the General Secretary while at the same time Boris Yeltsin was increasingly courted by Central Intelligence Agency and other "advocacy groups" in the United States.<sup>40</sup> Considering that the President had earlier been the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), it may not

---

<sup>39</sup> In Mikhail Gorbachev's book *Conversations with Gorbachev, on Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism*, (he commiserates with his co-author and long-time friend Zdenek Mlynar about the circumstances surrounding that August day in 1991. His claims center around a covert attempt orchestrated by KGB head Kravchuk and Yeltsin to arrange this coup from behind the scenes with Yeltsin appearing suddenly out of the confusion to "rescue" him, all-the-while operating with the clear intention of pushing Gorbachev out of the way. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) See Gorbachev's recollections, 123-130

<sup>40</sup> Goldgeier and McFaul. *Power and Purpose*. See 29- 30 for the discussion of this topic under the subtitle, "The Role of American Non-governmental Actors in Promoting Regime Change." Actual CIA involvement remains classified.

be too far a stretch to characterize this as a two-track policy managed by the White House rather than the alleged separate policy tracks implied by the White House.

According to Goldgeier and McFaul's account . . .

If Bush and the top officials in his administration did not speak about or actively promote democracy in the Soviet Union, other U. S. actors did. Less constrained by the international regime respecting state sovereignty, American nongovernmental organizations were more aggressive in recognizing the supporting Russia's opposition movement. For instance, American groups such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the AFL-CIO established working relationships with and provided limited financial assistance to leaders and organizations of Russia's opposition groups well before international recognition of Russia. The AFL-CIO gave assistance to striking coal miners in 1989 and again in 1991 and later helped to establish the Independent Miner's Union in Russia.<sup>41</sup>

There are clear indications in this discussion of a policy of "riding both horses" by the American government as the power struggle developed between the struggling Gorbachev, who could never be counted out, and the haphazard but charismatic democrat Boris Yeltsin, who, in spite of his lack of statesmanship, seemed to be riding the Russian democratic nationalist wave.<sup>42</sup> The fact that Yeltsin, just weeks before the August coup attempt, had been invited to the United States, to confer with elements of the American government, arouses suspicion that there were elements of collusion between him and the Bush administration.<sup>43</sup>

George Breslauer, in his chapter "Evaluating Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders" in *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin, Political Leadership in Russia's Transition*, has listed a

---

<sup>41</sup> Goldgeier, *Power and Purpose*, 29.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, 32.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, 33.

number of factors that characterized the reformism and resulting changes under Gorbachev:

If the past is our baseline and if we postpone the problem of determining Gorbachev's distinctive contribution to the outcome, it is easy to sum up what changed under Gorbachev.

We witnessed:

- (1) desacralization of the Brezhnevite political-economic order in the eyes of the mass public, including the official principles and mindset that underpinned it: the leading role of the Communist Party; the 'community of peoples'; the Planned Economy; pride in the system's achievements; optimism about state socialism's potential; commitment to 'class struggle' abroad; and a national-security phobia that justified a repressive, militarized regime;
- (2) a sharp reduction in the power of constituencies that were pillars of the Brezhnevite political order; party officials, ministers, and the military, in particular.
- (3) legitimization in principle of movement in the direction of a market-driven economic order, a multiparty system, and the transformation of a unitary state into a democratic-federal state;
- (4) changes in politics and structure that: greatly decentralized political initiative; created more open and competitive public-political arena, including parliaments based on competitive, secret ballot elections; all but disenfranchised the nomenklatura; and swept radical majorities into power in the governmental councils of major cities;
- (5) dismantling of much of the command economy and the emergence of a nascent private sector ('cooperatives');
- (6) introduction of civil liberties with respect to dissent, emigration, the media, travel, religion, and association;
- (7) a vast opening of the country to Western political, cultural, and economic influences;
- (8) elimination of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, reduction of Soviet military capabilities, retrenchment in Third World policy, and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and

(9) changes in foreign policy that brought an end to the Cold War.”<sup>44</sup>

Yeltsin’s duplicity in this difficult transition period is best understood in terms of opportunism guided by the United States as well as the increasingly unpredictable events that were sweeping both men up in the whirlwind. For the first time, events could no longer be controlled from the top. The command system had failed. Political machinations had failed. Revisionism was failing. The Organs of the USSR were no longer functioning. Boris Yeltsin, with tacit encouragement from the West was able to surface from the confusion in command of a whole new set of variables.

Gorbachev’s time had elapsed and the new dynamics he had unleashed swept him away; Boris Yeltsin seized the opportunity to benefit from Gorbachev’s ideological adventurism and reformist fervor. It is perhaps an understatement to say that without Gorbachev’s vision of the future the Soviet Union may have trudged on. Yeltsin inherited the *unintended consequences* of a truly visionary and courageous entrepreneur in revisionist socialism. It would be Yeltsin’s daunting task to pick up the pieces and move the imploding Russian state forward into the un-chartered waters of pluralism and representative democracy while maintaining the integrity of the proud heritage of the Russian empire. Yeltsin, although highly criticized, was also a victim of the multiple negative impacts that Gorbachev could not reverse. Perhaps his efforts at stemming civil war and open revolution are his badge of courage. History may judge Boris Yeltsin as a tragic-comedic figure but his ability to “keep things together” cannot be questioned.

---

<sup>44</sup> George Breslauer, “Evaluating Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders” in *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition*. 52, 53

Until the actual rejection of Gorbachev's attempt to get the Union Treaty passed, no one could say definitively and for absolute certain, how events would play out, though the direction of disintegration and coming collapse seemed imminent after the coup attempt the previous summer. Until December 1991, there was no clear direction in Soviet politics. It was not certain if Gorbachev would again pull off the impossible against all odds and resurrect his reformist programs or if his star was falling and Boris Yeltsin's was rising.

It seems logical that the United States would back both leaders until it could see a clear directionality. Gorbachev's Union Treaty concept was emphatically rejected by Yeltsin's Russia and the respective Soviet republics. Gorbachev, the CPSU and socialism were finished. The regime of communist rule through socialist command system faded into the past and a new democratic pluralism emerged. Gorbachev, with all his tenacity, could no longer hang on. His credibility was gone and though he continued to carp from the sidelines for some time to come, he was never a major player again in Russian politics.

The message was clear. A reformulation of socialism was not the answer to Russian problems. The Russian people and all the subjugated peoples of the Soviet empire had had enough of business as usual. They all wanted the same thing, to leave the socialist-communist experiment behind. Ironically, it was the leader of Russia and Moscow itself that lead the way after the brave example set by the Baltic countries. The gross repudiation of the past, even in a sophisticated new package, ended command socialism and ushered in a new willingness to experiment with democratic representative government.

This in turn, signaled the international political community, that Russia and the newly freed satellites and republics, would set courses toward integration at all levels with the European Union, Japan, China and the United States. The xenophobic past of the USSR would be abandoned and integration with the international community both in political economy and foreign policy relations would be pursued. Internally, parliamentary governments would be formulated to represent the people, not to suppress them. Again, with a large measure of irony, *Moscow*, under Boris Yeltsin, would lead the way. Boris Yeltsin, raised and vilified within the Party, would be the guiding spirit of this massive conversion from mass repression to open democratic process. Yeltsin, however, can be seen as reactive and somewhat duplicitous in his new allegiances to democracy as practiced in the West. When the geopolitical threat of NATO expansion to the Russian borders approached, he reverted back to Soviet era rhetoric and bluster, a solid indication of the psychological recidivism extant in Russian foreign policy under duress.

*Why did Gorbachev fail?*

For many years after Gorbachev's descent from power and the implosion of the Soviet Union, this was the primary question transition analysts addressed. Gorbachev's fantastic start as a dynamic new Soviet leader marked the beginning of a new era in Soviet politics and particularly Soviet foreign policy. Archie Brown posits:

Whatever the shortcomings of the Russian political system today, it would be impossible to find anyone who predicted in 1985 that within less than five years Russia would be experiencing contested elections and freedom of speech. Sixteen years after the coming to power of Gorbachev, the liberty introduced during his years in power still, in the main, survives. Russian leaders have come to recognize competitive elections and a variety of freedoms as a necessary means for legitimizing their authority.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup> Brown, Introduction of *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin*, 5.

Brown further asserted . . .

Gorbachev's boldness in curtailing the power of the party apparatus, accelerating by the introduction of contested elections, undermined not only his own institutional base but also the structure that had played a huge part in holding together the multinational Soviet state.<sup>46</sup>

Brown submits that Gorbachev's efforts . . .

to allow federal forms to acquire federal substance-with the nominal authority of the component parts of the federation no longer filtered through, and constrained by, the single, centralized, ruling party-was to make the task of keeping all fifteen Soviet republics within the same political and legal space a Sisyphean challenge. In the end, the attempt to maintain this union on the basis of a looser federation or even a confederation, and the effort to maintain by persuasion the territorial integrity of a state that had hitherto known only authoritarian or totalitarian rule, turned out to be a bridge too far even for such an exceptionally skilled bridge-builder as Gorbachev.<sup>47</sup>

Though he was himself a consummate product of the Soviet system of communist socialism, Gorbachev was also a progressive visionary. Given Gorbachev's stellar rise through all the stages of party development and his early membership in the Supreme Soviet in 1970 and to the Central Committee in 1974 and full membership in the Politburo by 1980, his status as the succession protégé of KGB Chief and General Secretary Yuri Andropov, were cardinal signposts that would mark him as a conservative apparatchik.<sup>48</sup> However, despite his doctrinaire credentials, Gorbachev evolved politically toward multifaceted reformism. He realized that the Soviet Union was headed for disaster after the malaise of the Brezhnev-Chernenko years.

---

<sup>46</sup> Brown, Introduction of *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin*, 6.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

<sup>48</sup> Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, President of the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies, *Gorbachev Foundation*. <http://www.mikhailgorbachev.org/>.



This fact inspired Mikhail Gorbachev to abruptly address the reality that without drastic and immediate change to the moribund Soviet system, political-social-economic competition with the West, particularly the United States, was fruitless. This was most apparent at strategic levels. The only real competitive edge ever enjoyed by the Soviet Union had been in the area of strategic military forces, particularly in nuclear arms. The Soviet economy had never been a real sustained match for the western democracies, particularly the economic powerhouse represented by America. In this respect, the eventual demise of the Soviet economy was, indeed, problematic. Advantages in “throw weight” of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and the strength of Soviet overarching correction of forces were far eclipsed by the strength of the military-industrial complex of the United States in a prolonged attrition contest. The 8-10 percent GNP expenditure ratio by the United States could be sustained by the American government, albeit not without some stress on the American economy as reflected by the increasingly alarming federal deficit. The corresponding real-term GNP expenditure ratio of the USSR was approaching the 30-40 percent range. This number could not be sustained in the medium to long term by the Soviet government.

A case has therefore been made that Reagan’s strategy to pressurize the Soviet economy by a vast increase in American GNP spending on American conventional and strategic nuclear forces, especially the European deployment of the Pershing II IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) system, was a highly effective Cold War strategy. To “bust the Russian bank” became the American goal to win the Cold War. The growing lack of utility for both the USSR and the United States of WMD (weapons of

mass destruction) made this American strategy to outspend the Russians a viable strategy however rhetorical and propagandistic the outcome actually was.

In the end, however, caught between the revanchism of the Soviet conservatives and the progressive democrats led by Yeltsin, Gorbachev became *his own victim*.<sup>49</sup> Is it accurate and realistic, however, to give Gorbachev this historical “pass?” In this discussion thus far, Gorbachev has been described as a consummate political strategist. He has also been, in derogatory terms, described as a fool, even a traitor. Closer examination of the developing circumstances surrounding his eventual failure to bring his reforms to fruition and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, reveal, however, that he took enormous calculated risks both professional and personal. In the taking of those risks he had, no doubt, a sense of confidence bolstered by his early successes, especially on the foreign policy front. This appeared to be Gorbachev’s historical moment.

At every critical juncture, Gorbachev gambled that the forward momentum he had established would carry him through any transitional crises. This belief held true until the difficulties with the conservative bloc *Soyuz* forced him to bargain from a position of weakness rather than strength to which he had grown accustomed.

The Americans, in particular, had challenged the credibility of Soviet foreign policy initiatives during this crucial period. They were largely unconvinced that Gorbachev’s reforms were anything but an effort to set the ailing Soviet state on a more stable course rather than a real move toward democratic reforms and true reciprocity with the West. It was largely believed by western analysts that when Gorbachev eventually came under pressure from his own conservative and even progressive domestic

---

<sup>49</sup> Archie Brown, “Transformational Leaders Compared: Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin,” in *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin*, 12.

constituencies that his deeds would belie his words. This appeared to be exactly what was taking place when Gorbachev yielded to the conservatives in the repressions he acquiesced to in Lithuania.

Further, Gorbachev began vacillating in his policy orientation in a serpentine balancing act that only served to undermine his rhetorical statements that the socialist movement as a whole was updating and reformulating Soviet rule both at the Center and the periphery in the empire. Wanting to end the Cold War struggle, the clandestine agents of the western powers as well as the nationalism of the satellites and the republics, were aiding and even colluding in those efforts. These forces coincided to create an irresistible front that even the wily Gorbachev could no longer control.

Gorbachev is credited with initiating change that led to the evolution of pluralism in late Soviet rule and in earlier transition government. This statement must carry the caveat that pluralism in this hybrid illiberal Russian version of democracy meant loosening of the power mechanisms of the state. In relative terms, pluralism after glasnost, perestroika and the new thinking, was highly symbolic and less factual than in the immediate post CPSU days; in the early Yeltsin era, pluralism meant parliamentary rule through the *Duma* and an explosion of political parties, particularly *Democratic Russia*. The vote had arrived. The interests of the state, however, were still paramount. Russian democracy was illiberal at best and would continue to be so through Vladimir Putin's administrations a decade later.

In retrospect and in relative terms, democracy and pluralism did not yet coalesce around the individual citizen. That claim can still be made today under the Putin government. Representative democracy still eludes Russian conceptualization as the

tradition of vertical controls from a strongly symbolic Center continues in the Russian national psyche and in the formulations that concentrate ultimate power around a strongman and a cult of personality.

“Historically, only revolutions from below have accomplished more in a shorter period of time.”<sup>50</sup> Gorbachev’s social and political revolution from above was eclipsed by a massive populist revolution from below that subsumed Gorbachev’s neo-socialist federation efforts and doomed him to the political margins. More importantly, perhaps, Gorbachev’s initiatives changed the basis for international relations as a whole.

It must be considered that Yeltsin and then Putin have utilized many of the dynamics that Gorbachev introduced into Russian foreign policy. Glasnost opened the possibilities of domestic and foreign dialogue. Yeltsin, though rejecting Gorbachev’s socialism, utilized Gorbachev’s applications of the *New Thinking* to establish constructive dialogue and business and political channels with the West and particularly the Americans, opening up the opportunities of a newly integrated Russian eco-political age, accentuated, of course, by the strength of the newly dynamic petro-dollar economy. Despite the sea change of ideological reform from a command system to a capitalist one, there exists a transitional quality that can be traced among the three leaders, a uniquely Russian quality.

Eventually, the nationalist successes of the Baltic States, the strength of the miners’ strikes in the 1989 Kuzbass region and later, in 1990, in Donetsk,<sup>51</sup> the lack of

---

<sup>50</sup> Brown, *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin*, 53

<sup>51</sup> Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*. A vivid description of the revolution from below that catalyzed real change in the Republics and upset Gorbachev’s plans to revitalize socialism exclusively from above. The miners’ strikes captured the imaginations of the working classes and catapulted and accelerated real grass-roots changes in the economy and in the ruling apparatus.

success in the Soviet-orchestrated resistance movement to the American-NATO led expansion Mikhail Gorbachev had opened Pandora's Box. As the pieces began to fall, acceleration took over and the generalized rebellion against the rule and legitimacy of the Soviet Union through the CPSU became increasingly irresistible.

Gorbachev, until the coup in August, 1991, was a master of political manipulations and even while his fortunes faded, it appeared he might pull off his federated neo-socialism concepts after all. With the coup attempt in August, however, his political standing began to seriously crumble beneath him as forces raging against him took more concrete form. With the confusion about the real factors of the coup still largely unrevealed, the outcome, at least, is identifiable. Though Yeltsin ostensibly "saved" Gorbachev, Gorbachev has vehemently claimed that Yeltsin, in complicity with others, supplanted his authority at this point and Gorbachev was never able to recover.<sup>52</sup>

President George H. W. Bush appeared to be tentative in his declaratory policy stances regarding the aftermath of the coup attempt. Openly, he still backed the General Secretary while at the same time the previously discounted Boris Yeltsin was increasingly courted by the Central Intelligence Agency and other "advocacy groups" in the United States.<sup>53</sup> Considering that the President had earlier been the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), it may not be too far a stretch to characterize this as a two-track policy managed by the White House rather than the alleged separate policy tracks implied by the White House.

---

<sup>52</sup> Gorbachev, *Conversations with Gorbachev*. 123-130.

<sup>53</sup> Goldgeie, *Power and Purpose*. See pages 29 and 30 for the discussion of this topic under the subtitle, "The Role of American Non-governmental Actors in Promoting Regime Change."

This fact inspired Mikhail Gorbachev to abruptly address the reality that without drastic and immediate change to the moribund Soviet system, political-social-economic competition with the West, particularly the United States, was fruitless. This was most apparent at strategic levels. The only real competitive edge ever enjoyed by the Soviet Union had been in the area of strategic military forces, particularly in nuclear arms. The Soviet economy had never been a real sustained match for the western democracies, particularly the economic powerhouse represented by America. In this respect, the eventual demise of the Soviet economy was, indeed, problematic. Advantages in “throw weight” of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and the strength of Soviet overarching correction of forces were far eclipsed by the strength of the military-industrial complex of the United States in a prolonged attrition contest. The 8-10 percent GNP expenditure ratio by the United States could be sustained by the American government, albeit not without some stress on the American economy as reflected by the increasingly alarming federal deficit. The corresponding real-term GNP expenditure ratio of the USSR was approaching the 30-40 percent range. This number could not be sustained in the medium to long term by the Soviet government.

A case has therefore been made that Reagan’s strategy to pressurize the Soviet economy by a vast increase in American GNP spending on American conventional and strategic nuclear forces, especially the European deployment of the Pershing II IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) system, was a highly effective Cold War strategy. To “bust the Russian bank” became the American goal to win the Cold War. The growing lack of utility for both the USSR and the United States of WMD (weapons of

mass destruction) made this American strategy to outspend the Russians a viable strategy however rhetorical and propagandistic the outcome actually was.

In the end, however, caught between the revanchism of the Soviet Right and the progressive democrats led by Yeltsin on the Left, Gorbachev became *his own victim*.<sup>54</sup> Is it accurate and realistic, however, to give Gorbachev this historical “pass?” In this discussion thus far, Gorbachev has been described as a consummate political strategist. He has been, in dissection terms, described as a fool, even a traitor. Closer examination of the developing circumstances surrounding his eventual failure to bring his reforms to fruition and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, reveal, however, that he took enormous calculated risks. In the taking of those risks he had, no doubt, a sense of confidence bolstered by his early successes, especially on the foreign policy front. This appeared to be Gorbachev’s historical moment.

*Glasnost* and *perestroika* were targeted at domestic reformism essentially. These were tools to revitalize the Russian people and their lackluster economic structures. The socio-economic factors that these two reform initiatives engaged were necessary to make the Soviet economy viable and the multinational empire more socially cohesive. They were met by skepticism but with some optimism.

It was Gorbachev’s *new thinking*, formulated largely by his theoretician Alexander Yakovlev that revolutionized Soviet foreign policy. The *new thinking* was received with much skepticism and wariness by the western democracies. Soviet foreign policy experts had, after-all, in various guises, used many sophisticated deceptions in the Cold War struggle with the United States, in their policies based on *Realpolitik*. The

---

<sup>54</sup> Brown, *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin*, 12.

confrontation-détente cycle experience with Andre Gromyko and the foreign policy apparatchiks was rife with examples of Soviet duplicity in their single-minded efforts to realize their foreign policy objectives. The most vivid example, perhaps, could be found in Soviet maneuvering regarding the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

Following the traumatic, balance-changing, American strategic defeat in Vietnam, Russian boldness belied their détente posturing with a rapid expansion of offensive imperialist expansion into the Third World. Leonid Brezhnev, until the cronyism and corruption of his later days set in, was riding a strong wave of expanding Soviet prestige and power at the general expense of the geopolitical and psychologically retreating American superpower.

Given the assumption that both competing superpowers practiced realism in their foreign policy goals, it should have been expected that the zero-sum game played by both state actors at this historic juncture, would predicate this move by the USSR. When the Soviet Union began to suffer the same *Vietnam syndrome* in Afghanistan, Gorbachev arguably employed a defensive realist strategy of rational state actor and reverted to the defensive technique of moderating Soviet foreign policy aggressiveness; he offered the unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan by Russian forces in 1990 as a strategic concession when in fact, it was a dire national security necessity for him.<sup>55</sup>

American political analysts were therefore, wary and challenging as Gorbachev began his messianic overtures that the international bipolar struggle should be recast in terms of total demilitarization of international foreign policy initiatives on diplomatic trust and mutually reinforcing principles of reciprocity. Policy unilateralism on the part

---

<sup>55</sup> Jerry Hough. *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1986), 167.



of Gorbachev's government in the emasculation of Warsaw Pact forces and strategic nuclear forces, coupled with vast reduction in the correlation of Soviet conventional forces, were viewed early on by the Americans and others as merely another example of the Russian practice of deception and disinformation.

A general political response of tracking Soviet declaratory policy and contrasting it with actual Russian deeds was used to verify the credibility of Gorbachev's new thinking declarations. In terms of Soviet Cold War foreign policy declarations, many twists and turns had been endured by the West and the United States.

Roger Kanet, a long time Soviet and Russian observer, analyst and consultant, has viewed the *new thinking* as the implementation by Gorbachev of a stream of political thought that can be traced through many Russian analysts and Soviet apparatchiks from the 1970's and later. By 1985 and 1986, with Gorbachev's official arrival as the General Secretary of the Soviet Union, the *new thinking* was introduced as a new approach by the Soviet Union to the problems of lack of international integration of the USSR with the capitalist West. The economic and psychological burdens of supporting wars of liberation in the Third World, the tremendous financial burdens of the arms race with the Americans, and the lack of progress of Third World client-states, in their efforts to embrace socialism-communism successfully without substantial subsidies from the Soviet Union, prompted Gorbachev to reorient Soviet foreign policy. Karen Brutents and Evgenyi Primakov had, in the 1970's pointed to the real economic progress of the capitalist developing countries and by contrast, the failure of the clients of the Soviet Union to make such progress.<sup>56</sup> Kanet's argument is that Gorbachev entered office

---

<sup>56</sup> Roger E. Kanet, "Reassessing Soviet Doctrine: New Priorities and Perspectives," in *The Limits of Soviet Power in the Developing World: Thermidor in the Revolutionary Struggle*, (MacMillan Press, 1989), 401.

knowing that the Soviet Union needed to abandon Brezhnev's policies of militarism and third world expansion and that integration with the West and its institutions was the correct strategy for the Soviet Union to reverse the stagnation that was stalling the Soviet economy. Gorbachev further realized that the Soviet Union could not win the arms race with the United States and that it needed to cooperate with the West instead of trying to supplanting it. In a bold revolutionary statement, Gorbachev stated: "The threat of nuclear war hanging over the world induces one to reevaluate the basic concept of the activities of the entire communist movement."<sup>57</sup>

Coupled with glasnost (openness), perestroika (restructuring), *the new thinking* was at first regarded as just sloganeering and the usual noises of reformism being used by a new Soviet leader to consolidate power and place his personal stamp on Soviet political history. With arrival of Brutents, Primakov, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze and Ponomarev, Gorbachev began to implement his programs and replace Brezhnev-era cronies.<sup>58</sup> In contrast to other analysts, in particular the American Cold War hawks, those seeing Soviet duplicity in the new thinking, and recalcitrant Russian irredentists, it appears that this progressive interpretation is much more comprehensive and in tune with the actual variables of this revolutionary period that resulted in dramatic change.

Tired of the protracted Cold War struggle with many logistical problems draining the Soviet economy and Russian political energies throughout the far flung empire, this foreign policy gambit was viewed by many in the West as a deception campaign and that

---

<sup>57</sup> Kanet, *Reassessing Soviet Doctrine*. This quote was used by Kanet in his publication to emphasize the stark reality that Gorbachev was serious about *new thinking* to the point of demilitarizing Soviet foreign policy in spite of the stark fact that it was antithetical to Soviet past ideology. 402.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, 403.

Gorbachev was indeed a wolf in sheep's clothing. Though there was a generalized skepticism about Gorbachev's true intentions in the United States and Canada, there was an increasingly warm audience arising in Western Europe. Claims of a new Soviet propaganda campaign were voiced by American analysts.

Previous massive peace demonstrations in England, France, and Germany, before the arrival of Gorbachev, resisting the American led NATO deployment of Pershing II, were attributed to a masterfully orchestrated effort by the KGB and Soviet agents provocateur throughout Europe as a counteroffensive to the deployment.<sup>59</sup> Though the revelations of the involvement of the Soviet propaganda machine's efforts came later, there was always suspicion by the American intelligence community that the KGB was colluding with the western communist parties to dissuade the western European NATO countries to allow deployment of the Pershing II system on their respective soils, by stirring up their populations against the deployment.

Later, as Gorbachev charmed the leaders of those same democracies, Soviet strategic foreign policy initiatives proceeded. This two-track Russian foreign policy mechanism was the familiar oscillation cycle of the détente-confrontation pattern. Overt and covert policies co-existed both in the American and Soviet foreign policy approaches to the bipolar relationship. As Gorbachev's policy declarations evolved and widened, the American foreign policy establishment became more wary at the depth and audacity of the bold new initiatives. Weary of the Cold War and with the eventual slowdown of the

---

<sup>59</sup> See the discussion of the Soviet deployment of SS-20's in the Warsaw Pact countries and the responding NATO deployment of the Pershing II system in western Europe of Richard Crockett's book, *The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991*: Chapter 11, "Détente Under Pressure," 1973-1981(London: Routledge, 1995) 270-271.

Reagan war rhetoric, the international community welcomed Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives.

The first real window of opportunity to move toward a final concluding phase of the bipolar Cold War struggle appeared to be on the horizon. Although disillusioned many times before by the Soviets and their self-serving foreign policy machinations, western diplomats and strategic analysts began to detect concrete moves by Gorbachev moving toward a new and comprehensive venue of genuine rapprochement with the United States and the NATO alliance. The American diplomatic community was forced to pay more acute attention to the diplomatic strategic initiatives under Gorbachev's new banner, *The New Thinking*. The skeptics in American began to fade and the boldness of Gorbachev's initiatives proceeded. Indeed, Jack Matlock, the long-time American ambassador to the Soviet Union, observed that Gorbachev was indeed in trouble, as the Soviet conservatives turned on Gorbachev in April of 1991<sup>60</sup>. Matlock saw the coming danger to Gorbachev:

Gorbachev's next test came the day after the Nine Plus One declaration was signed, at the plenary session of the Communist Party Central Committee. For weeks, rumors had been rife that hard times in the Party would utilize the session to lambaste perestroika and Gorbachev personally; some provincial first secretaries were bragging openly that Gorbachev would be forced out of his Party post as the first step to removing him from the presidency. Nevertheless, the Supreme Soviet approval of Pavlov's 'anti-crisis program,' and particularly the signing of the Nine Plus One declaration strengthened Gorbachev's position. The declaration was published the very morning the Central Committee convened, and at first glance it appeared a political breakthrough to unity. Only gradually did some of its implications set in.<sup>61</sup>

---

<sup>60</sup> Jack Matlock. *Autopsy On An Empire: The American Ambassador's Secret Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. (New York: Random House, 1995) 513.

<sup>61</sup> Matlock. *Autopsy On An Empire*, 513.

Spending more and more political capital, Gorbachev's credibility increased as the audacity of his political expenditures accelerated. As the resistance to his initiatives increased in the Soviet Union, coupled with the increased velocity of the nationalism of the independence movements in the Baltics and then the Republics, skepticism returned to western, particularly American analysis. As Boris Yeltsin's momentum began to eclipse Gorbachev's initiatives, American political analysts foresaw trouble on the horizon for Gorbachev.

Nonetheless, the George H.W. Bush administration publicly backed Gorbachev's efforts to formulate a more benign and partially homogenized neo-socialism while clandestinely nurturing the democratic political revolution from below of Boris Yeltsin. Gorbachev had demonstrated time and again his ability to orchestrate and manage the various elements of his domestic audience while simultaneously wooing his foreign adversaries. All the way up to the final blow in December 1991, Gorbachev could not be *officially* discounted by the United States. After all, the reputation and performance track of Boris Yeltsin was still a largely unqualified and certainly an opaque histrionic at this juncture of interstate diplomatic relations between the American and Soviet governments.

Gorbachev's legacy will be one that will no doubt gain in perspective as time moves on. His reflections in his writings and his activities with the Gorbachev Foundation and his world-wide public speaking tours serve to facilitate a larger understanding, his own and that of political and history observers, of his influences upon international relations and the political economy of both the Soviet Union and the post-cold War Russian beneficiaries. That the influences are profound cannot be in serious

question. Whether Gorbachev served as an evolutionary gatekeeper, a social-political Merlin, or as a Draconian agent of demise to a struggling empire is still an open question.

Gorbachev is trying to influence that historical judgment with revisionist zeal. A list of his actual political accomplishments seems in order at this point in this analysis. Though the subject and theoretical achievements of this unique Soviet statesman are still largely in play, his factual accomplishments are now a matter of record: In 1985-1988 Gorbachev carried out drastic changes in the USSR's foreign policy.

Already at the 27<sup>th</sup> CPSU congress in 1986 he proclaimed his plans to build a world without nuclear weapons by 2000. Though he did not continue in office to see that process through, the stated objective was a radical departure from Soviet strategic fighting doctrine and a revolutionary departure from the confrontational engagement of Soviet and Warsaw Pact foreign policy postures. From 1985 through 1988, Gorbachev had five meetings with US President Ronald Reagan in Malta. At these meetings, Gorbachev's unilateral declarations of Soviet intentions to implement the change of direction in doctrinaire Soviet strategic thinking was revealed in his *new thinking* policies and perhaps most shocking of all, his declarations that the Soviet Union would no longer view the United States as its military adversary, proclaimed that a new era of Soviet-American relations had indeed arrived.<sup>62</sup> Jack Matlock details Gorbachev and Shevardnadze's new instructions to Soviet "new thinking" diplomats world-wide to "persuade" Western diplomats of the validity of the new reforms.<sup>63</sup> His pioneering efforts to remove Soviet political barriers to German reunification, along with his actions

---

<sup>62</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev. *Gorbachev Foundation*.

<sup>63</sup> Matlock, *Autopsy On An Empire*. 94.

to stimulate more political freedoms in Eastern Europe, resulted in a changed post-WWII map of Europe. This set of actions alone has had far reaching consequences for the geopolitical regions of eastern and western Europe, the reunification of the Continent as a cogent confederated polity under the new formulation known as the European Union, and a regional political economy that has grown to rival the robust GNP of the United States itself. These factors alone are truly revolutionary in scope, changing the very quality of international relations itself. The international political community itself has been dramatically altered as a result of the actions that Gorbachev began under the rubrics of glasnost, perestroika and particularly for purposes of this discussion, *the new thinking*.

The gridlock that had perpetuated itself under the xenophobic political isolation of the USSR gave way to an opened vista of political and eco-social opportunity. Indeed, every tectonic political plate, welded shut and ossified by the harsh constraints perpetuated by the Cold War, were released into renewed motion by the programs that Gorbachev loosed. For example, though long-term Soviet-Russian political client relationships are clearly still identifiable in the Middle East and some neo-Marxist Less Developed Countries (LDC's), those same countries and regions have reoriented themselves toward nationalism and full integration into the international political economy created by the new political constructs and the realities of globalization. Russia and the Russian Federation have devolved into the very circumstance that the implosion of the Soviet empire precipitated. Russia has reinvented itself politically under Vladimir Putin's direction, paradoxically resulting in a new regionalism in his approach. Gorbachev clearly served as the agent of change, the precursor himself, for the post-cold War transitional variables that developed as a result of the dramatic change of direction

of Russia since the implosion of the CPSU, communism, socialism and the command economy. The USSR's first parliamentary elections with alternative candidates took place in 1989, a full two years before the setting of the Soviet sun. This caused the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to cease to be the only agent of political action in the Soviet Union. Though this fact hardly constituted true pluralism in the Soviet system, it did serve to loosen the absolute hold and political sanctity of the almighty CPSU.

Glasnost made the peoples of the Soviet Union aware of the possibilities that this action portended. Driven by Gorbachev's boldness while at the helm of the Empire, the people began to push from below for actual changes in their oppressed lives.

The Interregional Deputies Group (MDG) came into being at the congress, demanding a legislative abolition of the Communist Party's monopoly on power, and a liberalization of the economy.<sup>64</sup>

In the stated thesis position of the author in *Glasnost, Perestroika and the New Thinking: Implications for Soviet Foreign Policy*, Simmons stated that the most singularly identifiable catalyst for systemic change first appeared in the Baltic states and later in the Republics of the USSR, to include Russia itself.<sup>65</sup>

It is a contention of the present research that this crack in Gorbachev's armor encouraged liberating satellite nationalism and Republic political emancipation, the political Right and the Progressive Left into action. There was no retreat as all these factors coalesced to undermine Gorbachev's political viability and, perhaps most importantly, his ability to inspire a reformulation of socialism under a new governing

---

<sup>64</sup> Again, see the discussion of Gorbachev's achievements in his biographical sketch presented by the Gorbachev Foundation.

<sup>65</sup> Simmons, *Glasnost, Perestroika and The New Thinking*. This research maintained that SYOUZ was the construct that caused Gorbachev to flinch and precipitated his credibility gap that spiraled into the unraveling of the entire system, to shortly include the USSR.



construct. After all, the high water mark of Gorbachev's credentials as a genuine reformer lay in his ability to thwart the machinery of the apparatchiks and the Soviet political elite. The repressions he allowed in Lithuania served to transform that image back into the stature of the stereotypical power-maintaining Soviet strongman. The nationalistic fervor that Gorbachev himself had created now engulfed him. Boris Yeltsin took serious notice of Gorbachev's difficulties.

Yeltsin's alleged duplicity in this difficult transition period is best understood in terms of opportunism guided by the United States as well as the increasingly unpredictable events that were sweeping both men up in the whirlwind. For the first time, events could no longer be controlled from the top. The command system had failed. Political machinations had failed. Revisionism was failing. The Organs of the USSR were no longer functioning. Boris Yeltsin, with tacit encouragement from the West was able to surface from the confusion in command of a whole new set of variables.

Gorbachev's time had elapsed and the new dynamics he had unleashed swept him away; Boris Yeltsin seized the opportunity to benefit from Gorbachev's ideological adventurism and reformist fervor. It is perhaps an understatement to say that without Gorbachev's vision of the future the Soviet Union may have trudged on. Yeltsin inherited the unintended consequences of a truly visionary and courageous entrepreneur in revisionist socialism. It would be Yeltsin's daunting task to pick up the pieces and move the imploding Russian state forward into the un-chartered waters of pluralism and representative democracy while maintaining the integrity of the proud heritage of the Russian empire.

*The New Thinking Re-examined*

Of the three reform components, Gorbachev's *New Thinking* was the most dynamic and the least understood both by the West, particularly the United States, as well as his own domestic audience. Essentially, the new thinking *demilitarized* Soviet foreign policy; this action was antithetical to Soviet power as the military might of the USSR was what constituted it as a superpower. With the power of Soviet military fully intact why would a Soviet premier, *any Soviet General Secretary, voluntarily and often unilaterally diminish that power?* What were Gorbachev's motives? What did he know that others did not understand? According to Gorbachev and his reinvestigation of *Thermidor*, retrogressive political analysis, was antithetical to the traditional view that revolutions started from below, instigated by the people.<sup>66</sup>

Gorbachev took a unique view of this analysis by stating:

Marx's formula that revolutions are the locomotives of history was very much in vogue for a long time and remains so even today. Nevertheless this formula is worth rethinking. Have revolutions really been the locomotives of forward or upward movement by society? Or have they been extreme solutions to situations in which the ruling powers were incapable of solving problems that had come to a head while the masses were no longer able to endure the existing situation? Revolutions have undeniably been the sources of great change in the life of society. But they have also been very costly. Revolutions have been referred to as festivals of the oppressed and exploited masses. But haven't these same masses suffered great losses as a result of revolutions? Moreover, revolutions have often been followed by retrogressive movements.<sup>67</sup>

And, in Gorbachev's case, an era ended on December 31, 1991. Soviet socialism in the form of the CPSU died. Boris Yeltsin's time had come. He would try western-style

---

<sup>66</sup> Gorbachev. *Gorbachev: On My Country*, 11.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

democracy. Gorbachev's reforms had made that possible, however unlikely it appeared at the time.

*Who was Boris Yeltsin?*

Boris Yeltsin, decimated and then revived by Mikhail Gorbachev, was the Lazarus of Party politics.<sup>68</sup> It was Gorbachev who summoned Yeltsin from Sverdlovsk to take over the top Moscow job; Yeltsin was Gorbachev's only personal choice.<sup>69</sup> Described as a bumbling, base, unpolished Party apparatchik, resurrected from the political dead by Gorbachev, it is truly an historical irony that this construction engineer and social misfit was to become the democratic leader of post-communist Russia. In sharp contrast to the suave and sophisticated lawyer who served as his mentor, as well as tormentor, Yeltsin seemed ill suited to take the reins of a floundering giant like the Russian state, especially at a dramatic crossroads that was the end of the socialist-communist era.

While re-assigned to Moscow by Gorbachev, Yeltsin became popular in the face of Gorbachev's failing reform programs, particularly perestroika. Muscovites, in particular, were frustrated with the continuing lack of consumer goods and services despite Gorbachev's grandiose pronouncements of better times ahead. Irritating Gorbachev and embarrassing him, Gorbachev belittled and ridiculed Yeltsin in retaliation at the Party meetings. Yeltsin received his final humiliation when Gorbachev had him brought from his hospital bed to a Party Plenum in Moscow in 1987 after Yeltsin's previous series of anti-Party inflammatory speeches, and castigated him severely;

---

<sup>68</sup> Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, *Boris Yeltsin, A Political Biography*, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Son's, 1992), Introduction, 13-28

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, 32.

benefactor turned to persecutor. Gorbachev questioned Yeltsin relentlessly while Yeltsin was in heart-attack recovery. The Gorbachev-Yeltsin political symbiosis and fraternalism died that day.<sup>70</sup> Yeltsin quit the Party and began to move to replace it and Gorbachev.

During the coup attempt against Gorbachev in August of 1991, Yeltsin too was a target of the revanchist plotters. By August 19, 1991, Yeltsin had been identified as co-enemy or enemy #2 by the conspirators, who vowed to reverse the dangerous reforms of Gorbachev and the false promises of Yeltsin's democratic visions. Nothing short of a re-establishment of communist authority through the legitimate vehicle of the state, the CPSU, was acceptable. A showdown was inevitable between Yeltsin and the conspirators, Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky, and Vladimir Usov as well as Boris Pugo, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev and Nikolai Kruchina.<sup>71</sup>

The famous speech on top of the Russian tank, the symbol of Yeltsin's bravery and stature as the new leader of a Russian democratic state, was the death knoll for the past and Gorbachev's visions as well as those who wanted to deny the risks of evolutionary government. Yeltsin became the symbol of the promise of the future, albeit with grave apprehension and suspicion of both the apparatchiks and the people themselves. "Yeltsin began to be mythologized as the People's Defender, Advocate and Hero." It makes no difference what was true and what was not; the important thing was that the Yeltsin myth was being born, while Gorbachev became the butt of an increasing

---

<sup>70</sup> Solovyov, *Boris Yeltsin*, 68-69.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, 19.

number of jokes.<sup>72</sup> Yeltsin's ultimate betrayal of Gorbachev became a largely pragmatic issue as it may be viewed that Gorbachev himself planted the seeds of his own demise. The apparent opportunism of Boris Yeltsin seems a bitter pill for Gorbachev even as he witnessed the irreversibility of the events that culminated in his removal as head of the Russian state. When Yeltsin banned the CPSU on November 6, 1991, Gorbachev's demise was consummated and his betrayal by Yeltsin, in his eyes, was complete.<sup>73</sup>

The United States leadership received news of the abrogated coup with relief. Many questions remained however, for American analysts, about the immediate Russian future. Several diplomatic tracks, both overt and covert, were launched in order to closely monitor and indeed, manage when possible, the subsequent events and post-coup intrigues during this transition period. When the CPSU was officially disbanded and Gorbachev was finally marginalized, the emerging role of Boris Yeltsin began to surface. The American government, romancing Yeltsin while succoring Gorbachev before this declaration, now clearly could throw their sponsorship weight fully to Yeltsin. Notwithstanding the pending resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev, American diplomacy, if not fully visible, landed full force upon the Yeltsin camp.

Regardless of the actual purity of Yeltsin's democratic credentials and the perceptions of the international political community and increasingly the Russian people, were that Yeltsin was the now legitimate leader of the Russian state. The socialist experiment, with its champion reformer Gorbachev and the revanchist communist past

---

<sup>72</sup> Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, *Boris Yeltsin: A Political Biography*. While doing Yeltsin's political biography almost in real time, Solovyov and Klepikova none-the-less captured the general aura surrounding these heady and remarkable days and the images of a rebirth of the nation at a crucial juncture in Russian political history. The dark days that followed this episode attest to the extreme difficulties that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin would face before the dissolution of the USSR a few months later.

<sup>73</sup> Gorbachev, *Conversations with Gorbachev*. 123.

were now officially history. Though stormy times lay ahead and the ghosts of the past continued to raise their heads, a clear line of demarcation had been crossed. Lenin, Stalin and the Cold War became an historical dynamic and communism and the socialist experiment an anachronism.

Disorientation and confusion accompanied the Yeltsin inaugural honeymoon. As the new transition democrat, where was the new Moses of the Russian people leading them? The future of Russia's new democratic pluralism was anything but clear. How would Yeltsin reconcile the past with an uncertain future? How would a people accustomed to strict political, economic, and social controls, approach and understand the vagaries of democratic institutions and concepts? How could Yeltsin be trusted? Why should the former enemy, the United States, be viewed, as a conquering nation and as a rehabilitative assistant in Russia's time of extreme vulnerability? In the zero-sum realism practiced by both adversaries for over 40 years, how could the two now asymmetric powers do business within the accommodation parameters of the new emerging world order? Further, what were the motives of the now unipolar United States? Why should they practice benevolent world leadership? How was President Bill Clinton different from the American *Cold War warriors* the Soviet Union had faced in the previous decades? All of these questions were viewed as legitimate and logical. Boris Yeltsin had few clear answers.

Yeltsin himself eloquently expresses his feelings of doubt in his book *Midnight*

*Diaries:*

Russia's transformation over the past decade has been as profound as it has been troubled. As Russia's first democratically elected president, I was responsible for steering my country through these turbulent years. The greatest challenge was to dismantle a vast one-party totalitarian state

and turn it into a democracy with a market economy. Did we succeed? We made much progress, but, as the saying goes, 'Rome was not built in a day.' One thing I know for sure, there will be no going back.<sup>74</sup>

Though the jury is still out on Yeltsin's last statement, in the administration under Vladimir Putin, *technically* Russia remains a democracy, if a qualified illiberal democracy, still.

Russian foreign policy during both Yeltsin administrations remained reactive, reflexive, defensive and contradictory. Considering the magnitude of the transition tasks he was facing, his legacy may possibly be historically judged in sharp contrast to the vicissitudes of the multiple variables that defied cohesive management, particularly in the first year after the demise of the CPSU and the USSR itself. Yeltsin was a strong man despite his debilitating personal habits and was stubbornly resistant to the intrigues and political machinations of both his own elitist coalitions as well as external pressures from the West, particularly the articulate Bill Clinton and Strobe Talbot.

Andrei Tsygankov assesses Clinton's impacts on Yeltsin and post-CPSU Russia in the following ways:

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many hoped for Russia to leave its past behind and to emerge as a market democracy, with special relationships to Western nations. The reality proved different and Russia's modernization thus far has not really entailed Westernization.<sup>75</sup>

Gaidar's shock therapy was a formulation from the Clinton White House which pressurized the economic transition for Yeltsin.<sup>76</sup> Clinton's persistent efforts to pressure the reluctant US Congress for substantial funding to catalyze a Russian reorientation to a

---

<sup>74</sup> Boris Yeltsin, *Midnight Diaries*, BBS Public Affairs, (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2000), Cover.

<sup>75</sup> Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*, 186.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, 186.

market economy had the dual effects of disillusioning American politicians while Yeltsin's reforms floundered and his foreign policy retreated to traditional Soviet era positions.<sup>77</sup> American foreign policy emphasis remained strategic and centered around arms control and neo-containment.<sup>78</sup> Recent debates concerning Putin's efforts to defy America's perceived expansionism, particularly in regards to expanded NATO missions in Afghanistan and in the FSU republics, are directly traceable to Yeltsin's concerns in the early transition days.

Yeltsin found it insulting and domestically hard to defend NATO expansion to the Russian borders in Eastern Europe and EU proposed expansion in parallel. The continuity of that American sponsored expansionism bedeviled Yeltsin's intensive efforts at re-securing the traditional Russian spheres of influence and a reinvigorated Russian foreign policy stance. Vladimir Putin continues to agonize to find countermeasures a decade later, especially American geo-political measures to establish influence in Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and elsewhere, in particular, areas surrounding the oil and gas deposits contiguous to the Caspian Sea. In conjunction with the American proposals for anti-ballistic missile systems in Poland and Czech Republic, Yeltsin's original fears of American neo-containment ring true indeed.<sup>79</sup>

In typical Russian fashion, Lt. Gen Igor Khovrov, the commander of Russia's strategic bomber force, said March 5, 2007, that his forces were fully able to overwhelm and disrupt and/or destroy the proposed ABM deployment system proposed by the

---

<sup>77</sup> Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*, 187

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Peter Zeihan, "The New Logic for Ballistic Missile Defense," Geopolitical Intelligence Report March 7, 2007. See <http://www.stratfor.com>.



Americans.<sup>80</sup> To bolster these remarks, Col. Gen. Nikolai Solotsov left little doubt that Moscow would target the U. S. BMD sites with the Strategic Rocket Forces at his command.<sup>81</sup> Though declaratory statements by the Bush administration justify the new strategic deployments as protective strategies against the potential attacks of Korea and Iran, Putin, like Yeltsin, fears a concentrated effort by the United States to limit the prerogatives of Russian foreign policy re-establishment. Efforts to mollify Russian fears are based in the military logic of new post-Cold War realities according to American analysts.

The polar projections of an ICBM is key to understanding American logic. With current technology, any system would be twitchy at best . . . so for best results, the United States is seeking a layered network.<sup>82</sup>

Again, according to American military analysts cited by Zeihan:

Any missile launched from Iran and bound for the continental United States, would have to fly over central Europe . . . which is why the United States has pending agreements to set up an interceptor base in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic.”<sup>83</sup>

Any Korean missile, according to Zeihan’s report, would have to fly over Alaska and a Russian attack, flying over the North Pole, would not be adequately covered in that attack corridor, therefore further necessitating this American strategic initiative.<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>80</sup> Zeihan, “The New Logic for Ballistic Missile Defense,” 3

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, 7.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, 7.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

Putin, the hand-picked protégé of Boris Yeltsin, is indeed facing the same and indeed, vastly expanded foreign policy concerns of what Russian leaders perceive as geopolitical re-containment of Russian foreign policy by the American global hegemon.<sup>85</sup> These current foreign policy issues will be analyzed in depth in Chapter 3. The echo of the past from Boris Yeltsin, however, is increasingly audible and throws new light on the perceptions of the maligned and discredited post-cold War president who felt that American motives regarding his country were highly suspect even then. Indeed, it would seem counterintuitive to assume that, though Bill Clinton appeared as a foreign policy moderate with his benign pronouncements to help Russia join the world's mainstream political economy, American global vision also entailed curbing endemic Russian appetites for empire building.

In Chapter Two, Yeltsin's efforts to resist the American expansionist geopolitical pressures on Russian borders as well as the Near Abroad and FSU, along with resisting the revanchism and irredentism within the Russian state itself, curtailed and restricted Russian foreign policy to the corridors of accommodation and deference to the American straight jacket. Nowhere was this new set of paradigms more manifest than in the propaganda value of criticisms of Russian treatment of Chechnya. Within the dichotomy of Russia's new proposed nationalistic pluralism and renewed efforts to reconstruct and re-consolidate Russian power, the Americans and the West were presented with a very

---

<sup>85</sup> In context of American statements that the United States is merely expanding its abilities to counter the potential rogue nuclear threats of proliferating Islamic terrorist states, Putin, similarly to Yeltsin, deeply mistrusts American motives in the areas of BMD and establishing and maintaining American military bases that surround Russia. See "Russia's Upcoming Military Doctrine," 26 February, 2007, in PINR (Power and Interest News Report) by Dr. Marcel de Haas, pps 1-5. <http://www.pinr.com/report>.

large club indeed with which to beat a recalcitrant Russian leader already struggling with image problems both within the new Russian state and in international political eyes.

Since Russia's foreign policy continued developing in post-cold War terms, Yeltsin's foreign policy stances and perceptions are gaining historical perspective in a revisionist sense. It increasingly appears that, despite the slights suffered by Yeltsin during his reign from 1991-1999, Yeltsin wasn't wrong about the United States containing Russia in the foreign policy field, if for nothing else, to keep Russia out of its way and to protect American hegemonic unilateralism.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin pushed the Russian state into modern times, sometimes on purpose and sometimes by accident. Yeltsin's foreign policies, or lack thereof, were complicated by Russian recalcitrance over the Chechen problem. It is to that story this analysis turns in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER II

### BORIS YELTSIN: CHECHNYA AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Boris Yeltsin struggled with Chechnya while wrestling to solve a multitude of other post-communist problems after 1991. Perceptions internally, among the republics and internationally, were critical concerning a successful transition of Russia from a socialist orientation to the vagaries of democratic reform. The revanchist communist elements of the immediate post-CSPU disarray looked for any opportunity to reverse Yeltsin's reforms.

With Yeltsin's October 19, 1991 address on Russian television about the lawless and reckless adventurism of Chechen leaders in their unauthorized rhetoric about Chechen independence, Boris Yeltsin' seized the political initiative.<sup>86</sup> His tough stance enhanced his image as the new leader who, though moving Russia through uncharted waters, at least was maintaining order in a manner recognizable to nervous citizens. After the "giveaways" of Mikhail Gorbachev, Yeltsin at least appeared to be in control; reeling Chechnya back into the fold would assure citizen and apparatchik alike that Russia would maintain its traditional spheres of influence regardless of its new identity. It would further announce to the world and particularly the United States that though humbled and embarrassed, the Russian state was still viable and should be accorded its due as a global power.

---

<sup>86</sup> Carlotta Gall and Thomas deWaal, *Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus*, (New York and London: New York University Press, 1998), 98.

Yeltsin's tactics were met with contempt by Hussein Mahkmadov, one of Dudayev's deputies, as the "last belch of the Russian empire."<sup>87</sup> Chaotic Chechen elections followed with shouts of "Marsho" in the air.<sup>88</sup> Independence was declared on November 1, 1991. With Dudayev as president, Yeltsin was faced with the difficult decision as how to react to this rebellion in such a manner as not to discredit his previous acknowledgements of the rights of post-Soviet peoples to aspire to democratic freedoms.

Through Ruslan Khasbulotov's declaration that the elections for Chechen independence were illegal, Russian-Chechen conflict was guaranteed. As Gorbachev was still nominally in power, this affront to Yeltsin's growing authority was pivotal as a palpable threat to his credibility. Gorbachev, after all, had planted the seeds for this model of nationalist rebellion. If Yeltsin were to eclipse Gorbachev and his plans for a revamped socialism in a new treaty wide construct, it was essential that he supplant his authority with decisive action. Though dichotomous by appearance, it was Yeltsin's unenviable task to appear strong yet not a hypocrite in dealing with nationalism while maintaining unity and order in the traditional Russian state. The Russian people as well as opportunist revanchist communist elements and Gorbachev himself, would be strongly influenced by a faltering Boris Yeltsin in this cardinal decision.<sup>89</sup> Though Chechen independence did temporarily and nominally materialize, it was dysfunctional from the start as Dudayev did not practice state building. It remains elusive in Putin's second

---

<sup>87</sup> Gall, *Chechnya*, 98.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, 99. "Marcho" is *freedom* in Chechen.

<sup>89</sup> A consensus seems evident in this assertion. Authors from all points on the political spectrum revisionists and democrats alike, appear to agree that this was and remains a test of foreign policy cohesion and authority on the persistent nationalities issue. A thorn in the side of both Yeltsin and Putin, Chechen rebellion is central to Russian maintenance at the borders and the construct of empire of the traditional Russian state to include the Near Abroad.

term. It appears that full recovery of the Russian image of control of the FSU areas and traditional spheres of influence is not yet achievable, thereby hampering Moscow's claims that they have resurrected Russian foreign policy and re-entered the international arena as a great power.

As the new Russian federated state was weak and fully pre-occupied with internal cohesion issues, Chechnya was largely out of Yeltsin's focus. Not until the complicated uncoupling of Russian troops, logistical considerations, supplies and overlapping administrative issues with Moscow could actual independence be realized. Political subversion, lack of leadership by Dudayev, and the failure of the new Chechen government to consolidate power caused Chechnya to remain in the Russian orbit. With the pre-text of assisting in the Ingush-Ossetia conflict, Chechen quasi-independence was threatened by Yeltsin. Political maneuvers forestalled the conflict until 1994. However, upon critical analysis, Chechnya never fully escaped the Russian traditional empire though it remains an embarrassment for the Putin administration. After fifteen years of military action and political intrigue, Chechen resilience and persistence still plague the international perceptions of the efficacy and cohesion of Russian foreign policy.

Yeltsin had survived the White House putsch of 1993 and was in a far more advantageous political position to deal with Grozny in 1994. On his European flank Yeltsin struggled with neo-containment by NATO and the United States. Therefore, re-establishing Russian borderlands made an important political statement. Correcting Chechnya offered that counterweight at a time when Yeltsin enjoyed more internal solidarity but stubborn foreign policy perceptions remained that he was being bullied by the Americans.

Endless American criticisms concerning Moscow's obvious attempts to maneuver Grozny back into the Russian fold were resented throughout Russia. American diplomacy had "push-pull" features. Cooperation in NATO expansion was coupled with muted criticisms of Russian military actions in Chechnya; lack of cooperation by Yeltsin in acquiescing to NATO expansion caused an increase in the volume of criticism regarding Chechnya and recalcitrant Russian foreign policy.

Yeltsin had successfully dispatched Khasbulotov and subsequently enjoyed the unimpeded ability to make all decisions from the Kremlin. Russian military forces ended Chechen independence late in 1994 and Boris Yeltsin re-established himself as the legitimate arbiter of Russian foreign policy affairs both internally, throughout the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States. He finally gained recognition, however begrudging, that he was in charge of Russian state affairs both domestically and internationally. The opportunity costs of that position came at a high price. American opprobrium became torrential and has fluctuated in intensity through current Russian-American relations late into the American struggle in Iraq.<sup>90</sup>

Russian-American relations have tracked along at least at three different levels since the transition from Gorbachev to Yeltsin and subsequently Putin. The declaratory political discourse between the two nations has tracked at the rhetorical level, the bilateral and the international levels; a good barometer of the state of push-pull intensity endemic to that relationship is visible and audible in regards to Chechnya. During positive periods of Russian-American relations, Washington has accorded united front support for the foreign policy stances of the successive Russian presidents as a quid pro quo for Russian

---

<sup>90</sup> Matthew Evangelista. *The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go The Way Of The Soviet Union?* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; 2002). 144-5.

cooperation in the war on international terrorism. During times of stress, American diplomacy changes to charges of condemnation for Russian's stubborn containment of Chechen aspirations for independence. This cycle has been consistent and undulates as well along the democratic reformism of the Russian leaders, particularly Vladimir Putin's use of vertical controls to silence or discourage active political opposition to his single-minded objectives regarding re-establishing order in his own house.

As Putin prepared for succession at the approaching end of his second and last administration, both his legacy and smoothness of continuity and his hard work in realizing his goals of reconstitution of the traditional Russian state were at stake. As with Boris Yeltsin, Chechen tenacity and the cooperative overlap features of cooperation at the strategic level with George Bush and the United States on the war on terrorism, continue to hamper and dictate terms to the foreign policy establishment. Putin appears as determined as Yeltsin was to win in this protracted struggle. After all, much of the reason Putin was originally elected and supported by the departing Yeltsin, was a firm commitment to solving the Chechen problem<sup>91</sup> To maintain that continuity and momentum, it appears problematic that this albatross of Chechen persistence coupled with the necessity of strategic cooperation with the Americans on terrorism, specifically Chechen jihadist contributions to the larger Islamic asymmetric struggles against the regional hegemony of Israel, supported by the global hegemony of the United States, put Chechnya squarely at the center of Russian foreign policy issues. Whoever succeeds Putin will also inherit a systemic problem also inherited from Yeltsin, what to do with the

---

<sup>91</sup> Refer to Ingmar Oldberg's work "Foreign Policy Priorities under Putin," from Chapter 1 of *Russia's Great Power Ambitions and Policy under Putin*, 7. He refers to Jacob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen, eds., *Russia as a Great Power, Dimensions of Security under Putin*, (London: Routledge, 2005), 307.



post-CPSU issue of negotiating the Gordian knot of the original nationalities problem. Essentially the problem remains the same. How does Russia accord the promise of democracy and pluralistic cooperation and yet retain allegiance to the traditional Russian construct of loyalty to the Realm?

Yeltsin vacillated between rages against Chechnya after the 1994 invasion and pacification after the de facto Russian standoff on the field of battle. Russian audiences of the ghastly TV war were exhausted with the calamity of it all, the needless excesses by both sides and the unrealized accomplishments of either side. Harkening back to the need for a “small victorious war” that resulted in a resounding defeat for Russia in the 1905 war with Japan, Yeltsin was maneuvered into the same logic in Chechnya. When Oleg Lobov, the Secretary of the Kremlin Security Council, urged Yeltsin that such a war would help solve the nationalities question and post-cold War independence initiatives, Yeltsin succumbed to the logic.<sup>92</sup> Mikhail Bursokov, Yeltsin’s head of the counter-intelligence service, remarked, “Are we afraid of the West?”<sup>93</sup> The West had largely ignored Chechnya and treated it as an ‘internal matter of Russia’ which is one reason the war was allowed to go on as long as it did.<sup>94</sup>

Gall and de Waal assert that their account of the Chechen war reflects the impotency of Russian foreign policy in the context of Russia’s failure to make the transition to democracy.<sup>95</sup> They hold Boris Yeltsin largely responsible for the failure to treat the Chechen issue with a better sense of dignity and respect for the Chechen people

---

<sup>92</sup> Gall. *Chechnya*. xii.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid*, xii.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid*, xii.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid*, xiii.

and the very principles of self-determination espoused by Yeltsin himself, the very symbol of the new age of independence for FSU space.

Were the Americans not watching this situation in the early Yeltsin days? After the cessation of hostilities in January 1997 when Chechnya again moved toward de facto independence and Yeltsin revealed a softened political stance on the issue, America did not step forward to recognize Chechnya, a necessary and crucial step to put Moscow on notice that it was time for the Russian government to let Chechnya go.<sup>96</sup> Such a move would have solved several issues. Russia and Yeltsin, in particular, would finally appear as enlightened Russian leaders not leaning on clutching revanchist policies of the Soviet era, possible winning allegiance from an independent Chechnya in the spirit of the Commonwealth of Independent States construct. It might also have created the strong perception in international political circles that Russia was finally leaving the tutelage-dependency syndrome of post-cold War relations with the United States; if Yeltsin could appear to be independent of Washington's influences, he might have garnered respect and assumed a larger degree of autonomy for Russian foreign policy making.

An opportunity being missed, Yeltsin handed off the Chechen problem and related foreign policy issues to Vladimir Putin. The temporary power vacuum created by international as well as Russian inaction resulted in a misguided Islamic incursion into Dagestan, seen as a provocation that could not be ignored by Yeltsin and then Putin. Although Russian troops readily halted the incursion into Dagestan, their effort to impose control over Chechen territory got bogged down.<sup>97</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup> Gall. *Chechnya*. 368.

<sup>97</sup> Evangelista. *The Chechen Wars*.

Chechen independence remains elusive and continues to pollute images of Russian political largesse at a time when strongman images of Soviet era machinations are poisoning whatever détente existed at the macro level with the United States and the Bush administration after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. However, consistent with Putin's efforts to resurrect the Russian state, Chechnya being "back in the fold" while enjoying some elements of regional autonomy, may serve the larger purposes of Russian foreign policy to break away from American influences and realize a truly independent post-cold War identity.

In the transition process from Yeltsin to Putin and in regards to Chechnya in particular, a recent article from the *New Yorker* magazine by Michael Specter, entitled, "Kremlin Inc. Why are Vladimir Putin's opponents dying?" sheds light on the factors involved in Yeltsin's choice of Putin. According to Specter, "A few months before Putin became President in 2000, there was a battle for control of Parliament, and, by implication, the government, as Russia prepared for the end of the Yeltsin administration. One group was backed by the Kremlin and the other by former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and the extraordinarily powerful mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov. The outcome was determined wholly by television coverage. Most newspapers lost what influence they had had. Channel 1, the main state network, unleashed a barrage of biased, defamatory reports that destroyed Primakov in less than two months."<sup>98</sup> He notes that by 1996, though Yeltsin's popularity had fallen to single digits, he was re-elected through the efforts of the media, the oligarchs and those in the Duma opposed to the return of communism and that this lesson did not escape Putin who used the press

---

<sup>98</sup> Michael Specter, "Letter from Moscow, Kremlin, Inc., Why are Vladimir Putin's opponents dying?" *The New Yorker*, January 29, 2007, 55.

notoriously during his two administrations<sup>99</sup> Putin simultaneously protected the Yeltsin “family” through his influence against those forces aiming to prosecute him for allegations of fraud and abuse of presidential power. This protected Yeltsin as well as advancing Putin toward succession.

Indeed, allegations that the choice of Putin was largely predicated by his hawkish views on Chechnya and his alleged, though never proven, instigation, if not outright execution, of the Moscow apartment bombings which caused hundreds of casualties, and using the press as he had seen done by Yeltsin advocates earlier, assiduously blaming Chechen separatists and terrorists, provided the necessary credentials for Putin’s rise to power.<sup>100</sup> The Second Chechen War soon started, with more restrictions being progressively put on journalist’s access to the war. Putin had learned well what the press could do against and for government.

Anna Politkovskaya, the real focus of Specter’s article, suffered the ultimate impact of the new policy by being recently assassinated. Writing about the Second Chechen War in 1999, she had suffered threats, harassment and intermittent surveillance from Russian intelligence. Finally, by 2004, on-site press access was practically non-existent and Russian stability had reasserted itself in Chechnya.

The American foreign policy establishment still uses the Chechnya card when it is expedient to pressure Putin for moving away from democratic reforms. However, with

---

<sup>99</sup> Specter, “Letter from Moscow,” 55.

<sup>100</sup> Michael Specter’s lengthy article in the *New Yorker*, *Kremlin, Inc* addresses the issue that Yeltsin era politics and the ways the state could intimidate and coerce the media as a tool of government policy, had as much to do with the selection of Putin as his demeanor, obvious opposition to Chechen independence, and his suitability to replace an aging and discredited Yeltsin with a more tradition-rich stereotypical Russian strongman. Chechnya provided that focus and the emergence of Putin as a new Russian leader who would finally solve the dichotomous nationalities/independence movements problems in the new political environment emerging after the chaos and corruption of the Yeltsin years.

renewed Russian stridency in its international relations, this “stick” has largely lost its effectiveness. Surging oil dollars, tight Kremlin control over the Russian Federation and its governors, increased effectiveness of the FSB, and a generally effective assault on dissidents and the press, have put Putin in unchallengeable command. Yeltsin foresaw these inclinations in Putin in late 1990’s and his visions have been largely borne out, starting with Chechnya.

*The Balkans and Yeltsin*

Still working in tandem with Bill Clinton on post-Cold War transition issues, Boris Yeltsin found NATO expansion politically linked to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, as well as the Chechen problem. As Clinton’s involvement became increasingly aggressive in regards to Kosovo, Yeltsin again became politically compromised domestically by his apparent abandonment of the Serbs and the ever-increasing perception that he was showing undue subservience to American foreign policy. The long-standing fraternal relationship with his Slavic brothers in Serbia was being severely challenged at the same time that NATO was taking unprecedented liberties in Russia’s traditional backyard. Richard Sakwa characterizes this perception in the following passage from his book *Russian Politics and Society*:

One of the greatest challenges to Russia’s liberal foreign policy towards the conflict arose over policy in the former Yugoslavia. Russia followed U.N. policy in Bosnia despite the condemnation by the opposition who insisted that Yeltsin had ‘betrayed’ its traditional ally by failing to use its veto in the Security Council to block ant-Serbian resolutions.<sup>101</sup>

Sakwa posed the following highly relevant question:

The Yugoslav wars forcefully raised the dilemma in Russian foreign policy: Would alliance with the West (the Atlanticist approach) take

---

<sup>101</sup> Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, 369.

precedence over Russia's traditional great power interests in the Balkans based on notions of pan-Slavism and commonality of religion and ethnicity?"<sup>102</sup>

According to Sakwa, Kozyrev rejected this sentiment out of hand and pursued the larger considerations of the European post-cold War context in the realities now facing integrationist Russian foreign policies that abandoned Cold War thinking.<sup>103</sup> Yeltsin was faced with multiple foreign policy fronts and the uncomfortable problem of keeping irredentist domestic audiences at bay; this was the period loaded with the most challenging sets of domestic and foreign policy issues for Yeltsin.

During these trying times, with the new democratic experiment clearly on the line, Yeltsin was fighting for his political survival as well as his personal well-being. His new country was fighting to pick up the pieces from the implosion of the Soviet Union and the many economic and political false starts of experimental democratic reforms and transitions from a command society based on diktat to pluralism and political decentralization and disarray. The hawks in the United States hoped Yeltsin would continue to preside over the devolution of the Russian state while Clinton and the progressive American liberals saw hope in a general Russian re-orientation within the international political community aided by a benign American hegemon.

Though Chechnya by the mid 1990's had settled into an ugly groove, it became only a public relations ritual for the Americans as well as the Russians. Meanwhile, in the post-Soviet political environment, President Clinton enlisted an old associate of his to advise him on Russian reconstruction. Strobe Talbot had a fine working knowledge of

---

<sup>102</sup> Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, 369.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

Russian history and Soviet political histrionics. Clinton felt he could help the struggling Yeltsin government to implement democratic reform while helping Clinton to ward off the American hawks who preferred to finish Russia off or re-contain them as much as possible to prevent their re-emergence on the world scene either in the near or distant future.<sup>104</sup>

Bill Clinton engaged Yeltsin over the problem of Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milosevic began the systematic repression of the Bosnian aspirations for independence by agitating for a Greater Serbia.<sup>105</sup> President Clinton had convinced the United Nations that NATO air strikes were absolutely necessary and prudent to stop the ethnic cleansing and genocide on the ground in Bosnia.<sup>106</sup> Boris Yeltsin accepted this NATO solution with grave misgivings for several reasons: (1) There existed a long-standing relationship, both political, with Slavic Serbia, (2) There was already domestic political pressure on Yeltsin to stop accommodating NATO; the perception was that Yeltsin was aiding and abetting the arch enemy, NATO, against a previous client state, and (3) In full anticipation of an election defeat for Yeltsin and a Russian return to former greatness with the anticipated Zyuganov government, allied geopolitical gains via NATO military action might be hard to reverse. Yeltsin carefully maneuvered through this political minefield by objecting vigorously about NATO moves to his domestic audience while tacitly agreeing with the obvious necessity to stabilize the disintegration in the former

---

<sup>104</sup> William Clinton. *My Life* (New York: Random House, 2004), 507.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*, 509.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid*, 518.

Yugoslavia. Though Marshall Tito had created a de facto autonomy there Russian interests were ideological, “fraternal,” and pragmatic.

Further aggravating the foreign policy situation, on 24 March, 1999, NATO air strikes commenced for seventy-eight days, provoking a rupture in Russian’s relations with the West.<sup>107</sup> Only Yeltsin’s dismissal of Yevgeny Primakov solved the twin problems of severe Russian displeasure with Yeltsin over the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the perception that Yeltsin had literally stood by and allowed it to happen, and Yeltsin’s looming impeachment.<sup>108</sup> The time for Yeltsin to reach for help had arrived and that helped came in the man Vladimir Putin.<sup>109</sup>

Foreign policy under Boris Yeltsin was chaotic and full of political intrigue. As a succession of prime ministers and foreign ministers discovered, their utility was to serve as counter-point to Yeltsin’s grand designs and “parlor politics.”<sup>110</sup> Upon Primakov’s departure and Putin’s arrival, even with the designation as heir apparent to the Russian state, he was accorded little prerogative or respect:

The fifth premier in two years, Vladimir Putin was soon transformed from a reticent official (he had worked sixteen years in the security apparatus) into a relatively independent political figure.<sup>111</sup>

Putin was surrounded by transitional functionaries such as Viktor Kalyuzhnyi and Vladimir Rushailo, part of the ubiquitous ‘family’ Yeltsin team members; Putin soon

---

<sup>107</sup> Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, 119.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, 119.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, 121.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, 121.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, 120.



eclipsed them and marginalized them in his meteoric rise to the top.<sup>112</sup> According to Sakwa, Putin's facilitated rise, at the behest of Boris Yeltsin at best and with his tacit approval at worst, were attributable to four factors: The Kremlin lent its entire weight to the succession scenario. The renewed war in Chechnya became popular, unlike the first war in 1994-1996. Putin's growing image as an uncompromising 'iron chancellor' following the four bombings in Moscow and Volgograd, attributed to Chechen terrorists, along with Shamil Basaev's invasions of Dagestan, propelled Putin into higher and higher responsibilities. Thirdly, Putin transformed the Prime Minister's office into a quasi-presidential post. Lastly, Putin's growing image of strength and sober judgment, restoring Russia's national dignity by adopting neither a subservient posture toward the West but rather, based on real Russian needs, pushed him over the "finish line" of succession politics.<sup>113</sup> Sakwa attributes this set of accomplishments to: "In short, Putin's rise was based on a mixture of systemic and personal issues."<sup>114</sup>

Yeltsin was ready to retire to the sidelines and let the obviously capable Putin take over. Considering the trials and tribulations he had endured and miraculously overcome since his speech on the tank and accession to power almost 10 years prior, history may cast Boris Yeltsin as the man with enough gusto to outmaneuver the cerebral Gorbachev, arguably his apparatchik mentor, sustain a fledgling democracy against extreme and persistent revanchist and irredentist forces, engage the conquering West in the reformulation of global power under the auspices of H. W. Bush's declarations of a new

---

<sup>112</sup> Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, 120.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, 121.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, 121.

world order, resist NATO expansion, at least rhetorically, overcome immense internal economic and political pressures and catastrophic meltdowns to get to the point of being able to pass the baton of power to Putin.

Russian foreign policy during these tumultuous years vacillated between accommodation with the West, particularly the United States, and initiatives with NATO and the co-expanding European Union, and a contentious claim by the Russian leadership that Russia was and would always be a vital international player. With vestiges of a once proud superpower state, such as retention of high profile nuclear capabilities, geopolitical relevance both to Europe as well as Asia, a federated state and a construct to compliment it in the form of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a weakened but proud space still arguably in firm orbit around the *Rus*, rose like the fabled Russian phoenix to reassert herself onto the world stage.<sup>115</sup> Some degree of American and European reciprocity has to be acknowledged here; indeed no moves to crush Russia at its weakest post-war humiliation and vulnerabilities, both military and eco-political, were consummated. Even the hawks' calls for "running the beast into the ground" were not heeded. Indeed, as the new oil-inspired recovery of the political economy of Russia accelerates, Russia may become an indispensable nation in the new variable set of international energy politics.

If Putin can diversify the economy in time to avoid the market vagaries of energy pricing, obviate the need for political expediency as witnessed by increasingly repressive measures against dissent, and systemically consolidate Russian power in an integrationist

---

<sup>115</sup> Suzanne Massie. *Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia*. (Blue Hill, Maine: Heart Tree Press, 1980) 13-19. In Russian literary tradition, the story of the rise of the Phoenix bird from the ashes has appeared in different venues; repetitive invasions throughout Russian history have produced this psychological resilience and philosophical necessity for a perseverance creed. Each Russian defeat has been met with determined resurrections and is part of the national Russian political culture today that sustains the "Thousand Year Empire."

modality with the capitalist nations of the globalized world political economy, the roughly hewn steps of Boris Yeltsin may be viewed as precursors to a new-born Russian phoenix, devoid of the vertical controls from its xenophobic past, a past of fear of external enemies and would-be conquerors and internal strife from unfocused power struggles under different social systems both traditional and experimental.

Mikhail Gorbachev's public persona was one of a progressive socialist even though his mentor, Yuri Andropov, was a dark state security apparatchik. Mikhail Gorbachev had resurrected Boris Yeltsin from the political scrap heap repeatedly as his mentor before castigating him in 1987 in Moscow for challenging the Party and him and his programs. Boris Yeltsin, discredited and under attack from the Duma in 1999, selected Vladimir Putin to accelerate Russian transition from a discredited third rate ex-superpower to a returning power to be reckoned with in world politics. However, without Boris Yeltsin and in spite of his crude personality and limited political abilities, theoretically the Russian state just might have continued to devolve into decentralized slivers on the largest landmass on earth.

American foreign policy was realigning itself to the post-cold War realities of downsizing its military and reassessing its newfound place in the world as the remaining superpower. Indeed, the United States began to fully realize the enormity of the experience of contesting Soviet power for decades and what losing that oppositional pressure would mean. The Otherness of a menacing communist colossus was gone, or was it? The new Russia still had its full complement of nuclear weapons, though its battle readiness was diminishing rapidly. Diplomatic engagement with the new Yeltsin government was a delicate during transition; should the Americans force the FSU into

complete submission through military intimidation and discursive diplomacy or just take the *Peace Dividend* and watch as the new Russian Federation muddled through?

President Bush allowed the Russians just enough time to catch their breath while he strategized two major objectives: (1) help the Russians during this period of severe re-adjustment to the post communist era through economic assistance and democratic advisors, (2) restrict their strategic abilities to wage nuclear as well as conventional war with their decimated but arguably re-buildable forces. Rhetorically, how could Bush and Clinton welcome Russia into democracy and yet maintain neo-containment of them, especially now that American political prerogatives would accelerate dramatically in a new unipolar world?

Strobe Talbot was selected as Clinton's personal political advisor on Russia because of his language fluency and established Russian diplomatic contacts and general recognition by Russian politicians which made him a highly logical choice to serve as co-engineer and liaison officer for these delicate tasks of reassuring and helping the Russians while simultaneously preventing them from reorganizing as a global threat again.<sup>116</sup> One of Talbot's first initiatives was to coordinate U.S.-Russian Bi-national Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation in 1993.<sup>117</sup> Working with Vice President Al Gore and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomydin, Talbot felt this construct would guarantee continual meetings between him, the American executive and Russian leadership, thereby

---

<sup>116</sup> Clinton. *My Life*, 136-137.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid*, 106.

maintaining control at the top during the difficult initial years of American-Russian post-cold War cooperation and engagement.<sup>118</sup>

The key domestic factors that interfaced between American and Russian foreign policies in this highly charged new atmosphere revolved around trust. Did the Americans trust this new Russian leader who seemed to be bigger than life? Did the Russians trust Bush in the waning days of his administration and who was this liberal newcomer, William Clinton? Americans, Europeans, and certainly Europeans were joyful and immensely relieved that the potential for devastating nuclear war was being diminished before their eyes but who could predict the short range goals of both the United States and the new Russian leaders? What long range plans could be projected by the Russian government when leadership variables on both sides and internationally were yet unknown? Would the West press its advantage and bottle up and humiliated the new Russian government to make sure of their subservient position in the new order, or would they accommodate the huge Russian need for development subsidies and credits in the international markets? Finally, was Boris Yeltsin up to the mark as a statesman in the new relationships between the former superpowers and the European Union, China, and the rest of the international political community? Would he and the Russian people be treated with respect or would they suffer the indignities associated with the devolution of the USSR? Academic interpretations and responses to these questions vary along the political spectrum.

Just as importantly, would the new Russia itself survive internally with the old command system being dismantled and a whole new system of pluralism, elections,

---

<sup>118</sup> Clinton. *My Life*, 137.

representation of the citizens, and a demilitarized foreign policy being put into place? All of these new formats and procedures were foreign and identified with the former enemies of Soviet communism. With a political ethos steeped in *Realpolitik* how could the average Russian citizen be made to understand a system that allowed participation and dissent? The Russian transition experience was staggering and complicated psychologically, socially and in conception. Joy of liberation from oppression gave way to forebodings of the unknown. Distrust led many to pine for the past rather than the anxieties of the unknown. Boris Yeltsin himself had not had time to demonstrate clarity of purpose, and indeed could be seen as sharing in the confusion, disorientation and mistrust of the new experiences in democratic reform government.

Boris Yeltsin faced many domestic problems in addition to the problems of Chechnya and unrest in the Caucasus in general. He had to grapple with the shock therapy of Yegor Gaidar, inspired by Strobe Talbot and the Americans who felt “diving right in” was much better than incremental economic and political stages that ran the risk of reversal. He had to manage the forces of corruption and opportunism generated by criminal elements in the new society as well as the oligarchs who took wholesale advantage of the new lack of traditional Soviet-era restraints on the command economy. The embryonic terrorism generated by the Chechen wars coupled with the surge toward nationalism especially in the Islamic transition states along the Russian transition zone. This further destabilized the Near Abroad and the Borderlands.<sup>119</sup>

A tumultuous first administration was followed by a harrowing near collapse of his government in the days leading up to the 1996 election. With everyone, literally

---

<sup>119</sup> Yeltsin, *Midnight Diaries*, ix-xxvii.

everyone, expecting a magic conversion to capitalism and democracy, and immediate benchmarks measuring that successful conversion, Yeltsin was pre-destined for failure. Yet, once again, he survived the extreme vagaries and ravages of a task so monumental in scope amidst so much uncertainty, with so little internal cohesion or unified purpose, that it is truly miraculous he survived at all.

In addition to these factors Yeltsin's endemic and debilitating alcoholism, legion even by Russian cultural standards, a bipolar personality that projected failure and success simultaneously, cast him in a light that did not inspire confidence in a people accustomed to decisive leadership with little or no debate.<sup>120</sup> His daughter, Tanya, alluded often to these demonstrations of her father's volatility and psychological instability, particularly after his heart attack in 1995 whereupon Yeltsin reached out to her in desperation to help him in crucial affairs of state.<sup>121</sup> This mixture of personality exhibited by Yeltsin was palpable enough to keep adversaries wary and close advisors on guard. In addition to his possible bipolar episodes, Yeltsin was an astute apparatchik with a proven record of success in pitting groups and individuals against each other.

Yeltsin could inspire with his personal magnetism and charisma but one could never forget that he rose from the ash heap of Soviet political intrigue more than once to

---

<sup>120</sup>While running the risk of a psychoanalytic profile of a major political figure, I have assessed certain well-known factors in the explosiveness of Yeltsin's personality coupled with his depressive features catalyzed by alcoholism. Bipolar condition, previously known as manic-depression, is a condition that has six categories according to the *DSM-IV-TR of the American Psychiatric Association*, Arlington, Va. 2000, page 184. The category which appears most relevant to Yeltsin's personality as recorded through bibliographical and autobiographical as well as political sources presents as follows: "**296.5x, Bipolar I Disorder**; A. Currently (or most recently) in a Major Depressive Episode. B. There has previously been at least one Manic Episode or Mixed Episode. C. The mood episodes in Criteria A and B are not better accounted for by Schizoaffective Disorder and are not superimposed on Schizophrenia, Schizophreniform Disorder, Delusional Disorder, or Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified." This rapid cycling disorder was most evident when Yeltsin came under multiple stressors such as meetings concerning Chechnya.

<sup>121</sup> Yeltsin, *Midnight Diaries*, 15.

assert himself onto center stage and accomplish great things. Whether delivering a harangue in the Duma or supplicating himself to American statesmen, Boris Yeltsin had immense political skills and presence. A bumbling, even embarrassing figure in public at times, Yeltsin could command the public and his political supporting casts when needed.

Russian foreign policy suffered from lack of firm objectives and lack of clarity in pursuing what objectives seemed obtainable. Yeltsin orchestrated foreign policy in reactionary and irrational fits and starts while maintaining a long view for the future. IR (International Relations) analysts from all over the world have evaluated the two Yeltsin administrations as confused and rudderless and Russian foreign policy as without discernible purpose or direction. The confusion of the Yeltsin years should not, however, distort the fact that Yeltsin “muddled through.” The Russian Federation, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and a hybrid democracy did emerge through the confusion to survive, avoiding total devolution and setting the table for the more pragmatic politics of a younger, more disciplined man in Vladimir Putin.

Add the massive infusion of petro dollars, natural gas revenues and new Russian domestic solidarity in such matters as Chechnya and securing the Russian Near Abroad and borderlands, as well as the *opportunity* of Putin to first bandwagon with the hegemonic United States and then step out stridently and with new found authority against the unilateralist and negative international image of the global hegemon losing its moral authority with its continuing problems in Iraq.<sup>122</sup>

As long as the Bush administration remains absolutely committed to propping up the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki or a

---

<sup>122</sup> James D. Fearon. “U.S. Can’t Win Iraq’s Civil War.” *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 86 Number 2 March/April, 2007. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007). 2



similarly configured successor, the US government will have limited leverage with almost all of the relevant parties.<sup>123</sup>

He further asserts that:

By contrast, by moving away from absolute commitment—for example, by beginning to shift US combat troops out of the central theaters –would increase U.S diplomatic and military leverage on almost all fronts.<sup>124</sup>

Fearon believes the three ethnic and religious sects that are the Kurds in the north, Sunnis in Central Iraq and the Shiites in the South and cohabiting Baghdad, are headed to de facto partition; the process can be speeded up and facilitated by the now discredited Bush administration not-with-standing the “surge” of American troops or this reality will emerge after increased and protracted violence and bloodshed.<sup>125</sup>

Yeltsin did not have the advantages existing in the international environment that Putin enjoys today; indeed, Putin enjoys these comparative advantages because Yeltsin hung on during the difficult transition days which are arguably ending with the sunset of the Putin presidency in 2008.

### *Conclusions*

Boris Yeltsin forced the demise of Mikhail Gorbachev. He denied Gorbachev the opportunity to resurrect the Soviet Union as a revamped socialist state devoid of the Communist Party. He forced the new Russian state to leave socialism-communism behind with its central command political economy and to embrace democratic reform and capitalism. Following the reforms of Gorbachev in foreign policy, he de-militarized the foreign policy of the Russian state during the immediate transition years though he

---

<sup>123</sup> Fearon. “U.S. Can’t Win,” 3.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid, 4- 5.

did maintain rough strategic parity with the United States and the West in the early years after the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

Yeltsin reorganized the machinery of the state to serve the people, not a political party with absolute power that only served itself. Though Yeltsin, like any other political leader, sought his own self-preservation, his overall objective was to embark on a new course for the Russian Federation. He ventured into uncharted waters with “shock therapy” and the wholesale dismantling of CPSU and its political vestiges. He agreed to gradual downsizing of the ex-Soviet military machine, both the Red Army and the strategic rocket forces; warheads were removed and destroyed and silos were filled. The aggressive foreign policy that had supported fraternal socialist states such as Cuba was gone. The lock on the Eastern European countries was no more and the Soviet Republics were freed and repatriated through the CIS.

By contrast, Chechnya was denied its freedom, Grozny was unmercifully destroyed and thousands of both Chechen and Russian lives were lost. The Russian people were subjected to Chechen-sponsored terrorism while NATO defeated their Serbian brothers. The Russian people were intimidated and feared the advance of NATO and the Americans right up to their borders blurring Russian traditional borderlands and security. Yeltsin appeared drunk at state functions and suffered several heart attacks which embarrassed and saddened the people of the new Russia.

The Russian mafia became so prevalent in the everyday life of the new Russia that the identity of the legitimate Russian government became blurred. National civil authority became so corrupt and ineffective that both domestic and international audiences became afraid that Russia itself would devolve as a legitimate state into

gangster capitalism reminiscent of the American Wild West. People like Paul Klebnikov, who exposed the wholesale takeover of the Russian economy by the rogue forces of the oligarchs and the criminal underground that came to be known as the Russian mafia, were later persecuted and assassinated.<sup>126</sup> During the Putin years the increase of political journalists being gunned down and otherwise liquidated accelerated. On July 9, 2004, Paul Klebnikov, the founding editor of the Russian edition of *Forbes*—who had made powerful enemies by investigating corruption among Russian business tycoons—was shot dead as he left his Moscow office.<sup>127</sup> He had previously named Boris Berezovsky as the Godfather of the Kremlin in December, 1996 and went on to describe the wholesale corruption of the Russian business sector as Yeltsin appeared to look the other way. Many unexplained political murders have been recorded in Russia alarming western observers.<sup>128</sup> Is Putin relapsing back to his KGB days while serving in Boris Yeltsin's security services? Did Yeltsin's toleration of the Russian mafia, allegedly made up of oligarchs with lots of money and former KGB agents, provide Putin with tacit approval for such activities?

All of these elements have in sum served to describe and survey the Yeltsin years. There seems to be an academic consensus that the Yeltsin years were chaotic, reactionary, and without real direction. Chechnya and other nationalities type questions were a distraction and an impediment to an integrationist foreign policy for the Yeltsin team. Vacillating from benign neglect to reactionary violence when the Chechen

---

<sup>126</sup> Specter, "Kremlin, Inc.," 52.

<sup>127</sup> Paul Klebnikov, *Godfather of the Kremlin, the Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism*, (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2000), Introduction, 1.

<sup>128</sup> Specter, "Kremlin, Inc.," 53.

challenged the sovereignty of the Russian state, Russian-American relations seemed to gravitate on international issues that were peripheral to both nations. The political fallout from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, as well as of whom to repatriate in the old clientele system of the Soviet empire, guaranteeing confusion and lack of cohesion internally in the new Russia.

The Yeltsin years will be subject to historical revisionism due to the fact that they will be closely associated with the results that Vladimir Putin attains by the end of his second administration in 2008. There is a corollary factor in that Putin was selected by Yeltsin for the very reason that he appeared able in his skill-set to bring to fruition what Yeltsin was not able to do. The key variable has been the influx of massive amounts of income from natural gas and oil revenues. Much can be done when a country has the means to do it. Conversely, Yeltsin's failures to "jump start" a new democratic reform economy under the tutelage of Gaidar with the assistance of Strobe Talbot, was due to lack of capital as well as the confidence levels of foreign investment.

The credibility gap that Yeltsin's poor personal image engendered as well as fears of key elements such as the criminal syndicates in Russia during Yeltsin's time, denied him the opportunity to advance his agendas both internal and external. By contrast, Putin, by using some of his draconian training at KGB, winnowed out these elements, putting strongly enforced codes upon the oligarchs and rogue financial and political elements in the government and business complex. It is, however, arguable that Yeltsin served as a rough precursor for Putin in that the country could simply have disappeared by the time Putin arrived on the scene. In the following chapter, the transfer of power from Yeltsin to Putin will be examined.

Putin was the hand-chosen successor of Boris Yeltsin. The mechanics of that transfer have been somewhat obscure in detail. The results of that transfer of power have become increasingly evident, however, and have provided insight into the Yeltsin years. Roger Kanet has pointed out that Putin faces what Yeltsin faced in the beginning of the Russian transition to a fully integrated international economy: the Russian comeback or re-emergence is one dimensional and therefore, precarious, in that it is almost completely based on the oil and gas sectors of the economy.<sup>129</sup> He further contends that to realize the foreign policy goals of both Yeltsin and Putin that Russia become a fully integrated member of the international community; it must have depth of integration both internally and externally and be able to compete in the international political economy based on a diversified eco-political system.<sup>130</sup> In addition, Kanet and his collaborators believe the Russian “soft power” is also missing from the recovery mix; Russian reemergence cannot be based solely on military projection, polite acceptance to the western “clubs” and EU-Russian détente but rather a more sophisticated mixture of economic integration and constructivist societal cohesion within the larger strategic context.<sup>131</sup>

The massive size and scope of the current post-Soviet era of Russian political and economic affairs could not possibly have occurred within the short time period from 1991 on when a startling demarcation in political history took place. It was much larger than one man. Two men have carried forward the visionary reformism of Mikhail Gorbachev and the end of the socialist experiment of the previous seventy years. Yeltsin and Putin

---

<sup>129</sup> Roger Kanet, *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power*. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007) 1-3.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid, 1-3

have created an illiberal democracy Russian style. Given the thousand year imperial history of the *Rus* it might appear impossible to reverse that histrionic in the short generational span since the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In psychological and cultural terms alone, the Russian experience, like that of other nations, continues. What is unique in the Russian experience, however, is the resilience evident in the people and its leaders and their dogged determination to be part of the larger world scene. Compared to two-hundred year old America, the Russians as a people have a proven track record of adaptability and survivability. In that lies true Russian greatness.

A comparison of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin might be made with Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. After the trying foreign policy years that the United States experienced under the Carter presidency, with the confusion of dual foreign policy advisors in Zbigniew Brzezinski and Bert Lance and the debacle of the overthrow of the Shah with the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini and subsequent capture of American embassy personnel for 444 days, Ronald Reagan was swept into the White House upon a cloud of euphoric promises of America's return to dominant power. Similarly, Vladimir Putin was selected as the succession-iron man, in Russian fashion, to step into the shoes of the discredited and struggling Boris Yeltsin.

The perceptions in both cases are largely illusory. Both Yeltsin and Carter offered to their respective publics characteristics appropriate for the times. Carter was upright, highly moral and compassionate after the disgrace of Watergate. Yeltsin was the refreshing and courageous face of a new era in Russian history that had led inexorably to a dead end in the modern world. Both were "rescued" by strongmen when factors both

internal and external, served to marginalize them. Both served as necessary precursors for the men who followed.

The *neorealism* of the Bush administration and the *neo-realpolitik* of Putin's emerging strategy in Russian foreign policy, serve as counterpoint to Clinton's interdependence global internationalism and Yeltsin's efforts to democratize Russia and bring it into the modern world of globalization.

Putin, the ultimate pragmatist, has shown a determination to avoid ideological approaches to government and concentrated on rejuvenation and correcting the foreign policy orientation of Russia. I argue that without his ideologically centered predecessors, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, there would not have been the bedrock necessary for Putin to afford to operate in his chosen paradigm. It is also possible that when Putin finally does vacate power, his successor, whether it be Medvedev or someone else, will benefit from Putin's dynamic and practical methods to continue to propel the recovered Russian state as it regains its rightful place in global affairs. The key variable may be, perhaps, the continued gift that a rapidly expanding petro economy affords. If the bubble bursts, it is highly unpredictable how that would affect Russian fortunes and future policy directions under an untested leader.

## CHAPTER III

### THE ARRIVAL OF VLADIMIR PUTIN: NEW BLOOD, CONTINUING DOMESTIC CONSOLIDATION PROBLEMS AND FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES

Vladimir Putin, the heir to the Russian state in 1999, received his bequest at the hands of Boris Yeltsin. Largely unknown to Russian foreign policy specialists in the United States beforehand, Putin had been hand-picked but was virtually unknown. Although this episode in Russian politics has not received much critical examination, it is important to establish the succession politics surrounding Putin's selection for a variety of reasons, the primary reason being that he came to the Kremlin with minimal fanfare and a spotty legend.

Notwithstanding the fact that Putin had been a KGB officer assigned to Dresden, Germany, and that he had quickly risen through the St. Petersburg political hierarchy, not much background or public relations buildup announced his arrival. It is a given that having been a clandestine operator for State Security, there would not necessarily be a complete dossier available, at least to the public. However, in a political move as significant as his taking over the reins of the Russian state it would be more apropos, perhaps, that a major new player be introduced to the world with at least the customary diplomatic wrappings, unless, of course, anonymity suited a larger purpose.

Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko posit that Putin was selected largely to solve the seemingly intractable problem of Chechnya. In their words,

The first war in Chechnya (1994-1996) truly broke the back of Boris Yeltsin's presidency. The second one (1999 to the present) governed the Kremlin's choice of a successor to Yeltsin and provided a political springboard for Vladimir Putin. By the end of his first presidential term,



however, the lingering conflict had become a liability that threatened to mar Putin's political legacy."<sup>132</sup>

After Putin's meteoric rise through the governing structure in St. Petersburg, Boris Yeltsin let no real obstacles stand in Putin's way to continue to receive the overt and covert assistance of the Yeltsin "family" to ascend to the top and finally the presidency. It would seem not to be much of a reach to conclude that, in regard to Yeltsin's apparent impotence in the Chechnya issue, that Vladimir Putin had something special to offer Russia in solving this consistently aggravating national problem. Again, with no open legend to accompany Yeltsin's apparently arbitrary support of Putin, Putin must have had a reputation as an effective KGB operative to instill such faith in Yeltsin. If strength of character motivated Yeltsin's choice of Putin, it appears he selected wisely based on Putin's iron resolve in his political agenda to "set Russia right."<sup>133</sup>

Putin was commonly regarded as an unremarkable careerist without previous political sponsorship prior to Yeltsin's acquisition of him, hardly a worthy successor to the presidency of Russia, though his skills demonstrated in St. Petersburg did single him out as exceptionally gifted in political infighting and his loyalty to Sobchak was noted.<sup>134</sup>

Chechnya represented the nightmare potential of the unraveling of the Russian Federation by way of Chechen sponsored Islamic expansion throughout the Northern

---

<sup>132</sup> Dmitri Trenin, Aleksei Malashenko and Anatol Lieven, *Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia*. (Washington D C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) 1.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, 10-11.

<sup>134</sup> Timothy J. Colton and McFaul, Michael, *Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: the Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000*. (Washington D C: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 172-173. Putin had a long history with his professor-mentor turned politician. In Putin's style and role as a support type, he protected and sacrificed for him. Putin became Anatolii Sobchak's de facto campaign manager in the 1996 elections. Putin quickly learned the political game and how those seeking power needed loyalty, a quality that had served Putin well in the past and would again in the near future in Moscow for Yeltsin.

Caucasus according to the paranoid Kremlin. Putin's potential and declarations to bring that process to a halt propelled him into the limelight. Though sparse declarations by Yeltsin himself are readily available, it appears logical that Putin's sponsorship by the Yeltsin "family" hierarchy in St. Petersburg was designed to propel Putin to the top.<sup>135</sup> *This scenario has been implicit and not explicit to this point.* Putin did have a reputation, however, as someone who bypassed the bureaucracy to get things done. "Russia's first president lifted Putin from the inner sanctum of the bureaucracy to its summit in a chain of appointments in 1998 and 1999."<sup>136</sup> According to Colton and McFaul, Valentine Yumashev, Yeltsin's Chief of Staff, sold Yeltsin on Putin's talents and promise in the summer of 1998, when Putin was deputy head of the presidential administration for relations with the regions.<sup>137</sup> The fact that he appeared largely unobstructed in his efforts attests to both invisible and palpable sponsorship from on high as well as Putin's determination and organizational abilities, perhaps earmarked by his innovative audacity to operate "outside of the box."

The expansion of Islamic independence and nationalism in the Caucasus was exemplified by the August 1999 Chechen incursion into Dagestan to which the Russian government felt the urgency to rebuff.<sup>138</sup> The second Chechen campaign saw two other phenomena: the rise to power of a group of officers and the establishment of army

---

<sup>135</sup> Colton, *Popular Choice and Managed Democracy*, 175.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid*, 175.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid*, 175.

<sup>138</sup> Trenin, *Russia's Relentless Frontier*, 101. The authors repeatedly reinforce the thinking and fears of the Yeltsin government concerning the Caucasus as a whole; desperately trying to hold on to the Russian near abroad and traditional borderlands at a highly disheveled period in post-transition government, fear of the total unraveling of the federation was palpable. Given the debilitation of Yeltsin by that time, ghosts of the quickness with which the USSR dissolved, stirred panic.

generals as representatives of centralized power in the regions working in the security services.<sup>139</sup> Chechnya remained the center of this concern as its ability to withstand Russian political intrigue and military pressure was reminiscent of the struggles in Afghanistan years before, widely regarded as a strong catalyst that contributed to the dismemberment of the USSR.<sup>140</sup> In the words of Trenin, Mareshenko and Levin, “Chechnya has entered Russia.”<sup>141</sup> Vladimir Putin stated at the time that

“I had already decided that my career might be over but that my mission, my historical mission-and this will sound lofty, but it’s true-consists of resolving the situation in the North Caucasus...I have a little time, two, three, maybe four months-to bang hell out of those bandits. Then they can get rid of me.”

-- Vladimir Putin, March, 2000<sup>142</sup>

Yet again the question presents itself: Why not find a good military commander to solve the problems in the Caucasus? Why transfer total presidential power based on that issue alone? If the strength of the Yeltsin-Putin bond was indeed that strong, why is it not more visible? Given that Putin initiated solving the Chechen problem while prime minister, there still remains the valid question of why transfer total power to Putin? After all, Putin’s entire career was in covert intelligence. Even when he rose through the ranks in St. Petersburg, he ended up becoming the head of the FSB nationally, the first civilian director rather than the offered rank of general.<sup>143</sup> Putin said yes to the assignment even

---

<sup>139</sup> Trenin, *Russia’s Relentless Frontier*, 103-104.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid, 13-14.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, 14.

<sup>142</sup> Quote is from Vladimir Putin in Evangelista’s *The Chechen Wars*. 63.

<sup>143</sup> Vladimir Putin. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2000) 133.

though he claims his heart wasn't in it.<sup>144</sup> The significance of turning down executive military rank, however, is telling. With Putin's background, a careerist with humble but acceptable proletariat origins, such a symbolic attainment might have been psychologically gratifying. Yeltsin presumably continued to groom his increasingly visible protégé, though the usual succession fanfare was largely absent.

Putin continued on his high-speed track from the 1998 promotion as Director of *Federalnaya Shluzhba Besopasnosti* (Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB) to his 1999 selection as the post of Prime Minister, ascending to the foot of the Russian presidency. Putin showed the independent streak and audacity in his declaration in his decision to leave the ranks of the apparatchiks that military rank would bestow upon him and the new propensity to eclipse those structural bonds in an exploration of the possible in the volatile but challenging political world. This bold new world was post-Soviet and therefore, precarious in a new and possibly hostile environment. It was a bold new step for a man steeped in the most restrictive of environments, the Soviet-Russian security organs where individualism was regarded with severe disdain.

It would be satisfying to deduce that Yeltsin's quiet encouragement and support of Putin's bold moves in his rise to the top eliminated the usual cautions and obstacles that audacious political behavior induced. However, absent such a visible track, it is quite possible that Putin was selected *because* of these personality traits. A bold man with solid credentials who also showed a flair for good timing and innovation, coupled with a daunting dedication to cause, would be an appropriate antidote to the confusion and lack of confidence that increasingly hampered a floundering Russian state under

---

<sup>144</sup> Putin. *First Person*, 133.

Boris Yeltsin. Indeed, if past is prologue, Putin's strengths witnessed through his second administration bore out those personality traits and disciplined choices; Putin's dedication to the resurrection of the imperial Russian state with its established traditions as a serious world class geopolitical actor, and his propensity to re-establish the discipline he had developed within the security services of the USSR and the Russian Federation, began to firmly establish Putin as a traditional Russian strongman with traditional Russian goals to reestablish Russian power.

Lilia Shevtsova has characterized Putin's ascension to power as:

The role of the leader in this transformation has been huge because of the way power has remained personified in Russia. Any leader in Russia, where change and reform are always carried out from the top down, would be faced with a dramatic choice: either preserve stability at the risk of bringing society to stagnation or degradation, or make a break with the past, never being certain whether the people will support such a break and not knowing how it will turn out.<sup>145</sup>

This persistent dichotomy has characterized and plagued Soviet to Russian transition politics from Gorbachev to Yeltsin and Putin.

The vertical controls endemic to the ruling heads of Russia from the time of Peter the Great through the socialist experiment that was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Boris Yeltsin in the hybrid democratic transition period, are clearly identifiable. That linkage makes an impression of return to the past given the political uncertainties of the post-Soviet transition and the vagaries of Yeltsin's zigzags in the new political environment from 1991-2000, especially in regards to traditional Soviet-Russian foreign policy behavior.

---

<sup>145</sup> Lilia Shevtsova, "From Yeltsin to Putin: The Evolution of Presidential Power." in *Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin*. 67

The new stridency in Russian domestic political controls, coupled with a new clarity of purpose in foreign policy direction, particularly in response to the hegemonic diplomacy of the United States, has ushered in concerns by the Americans of a cold peace, Cold War II, and/or a new arms competition. The obvious political duplicity of the unipolar militarism of the Bush Doctrine after 9/11, a unifying American-Russian catalyst right after the attacks, has now come to serve as an opportunity for Moscow, resurgent due to a high-powered new petro-economy, to swing to the opposite pole in balancing the power of the United States. With veto power intact in the U. N. Security Council, Putin now offers the international community an alternative to American diktat. Despite western efforts to defuse this new tension, especially in light of the vulnerable and waning Bush administration, Putin appears to have validated his original credentials as the “right man for the job” image, bolstering Yeltsin’s historical credibility and vision in his choice of Putin in 1999.<sup>146</sup>

In consideration of Yeltsin’s propensity to promote and fire prime ministers in rapid succession in the mid to late 1990’s, his selection of Putin seems logical. Balancing continually against the resurgent and recalcitrant Duma, Yeltsin used one of his favorite and important tactics. He hired and fired prime ministers in rapid cycle to keep the Duma off balance in their maneuverings to unseat him. Lilia Shevtsova, in chapter 2 of her book *Putin’s Russia*, offers the explanation that:

Putin proved he could be loyal and faithful and showed that allegiance to bosses and friends was extremely important to him. He followed the rules and could be relied on.<sup>147</sup>

---

<sup>146</sup> *The New York Times*. Posted 1 April 2007, by Joska Fischer. “Missiles, oil, and Europe re-divided.” Editorial. <http://nytimes.com>.

<sup>147</sup> Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin’s Russia*. (Washington D C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 31.

After Putin managed to move to Moscow, and unexpectedly jumped up the career ladder, when Yeltsin appointed him director of the FSB, he demonstrated his loyalty to his former boss repeatedly by completing all tasks assigned to him in an efficient manner, which resulted in his gaining Yeltsin's trust and further quick promotion to Prime Minister, the stepping stone to the presidency.<sup>148</sup> Yeltsin had his man and there was no further need to hire and fire rapidly to keep Duma forces off balance.

After the rapid successions of Yevgeny Primakov to Sergei Stepashin, Putin could also potentially be headed toward Yeltsin's "rotating door."<sup>149</sup> As a safeguard, Putin, though selected, could be discarded up to the last if necessary. Yeltsin was locked in daily combat with the resurgent Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov who wished to revitalize the Party to marginalize and isolate Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin's counter-strategy to this effort was to promote Russian old hands to the position of Prime Minister and then to fire them after they had completed their designated tasks, indeed, before they could gain political power in their own right.

According to Shevtsova:

Putin appeared on the national stage unexpectedly. The political class, as well as the public, was surprised to see him, but everyone was so exhausted by the moves leading up to this that the new holder of the prime minister's office roused no opposition. He was seen as just one more premier in a long line, most likely an accidental figure. No one realized this was the true heir.<sup>150</sup>

---

<sup>148</sup> Shevtsova, *Putin's Russia*, 31.

<sup>149</sup> "Change of Priorities Drives Change of Russian Government," Staff Writer. August 10, 1999. <http://www.stratfor.com/>

<sup>150</sup> Shevtsova. *Putin's Russia*, 30.

Yeltsin's obvious alternative choice to Putin would have been the talented and experience rich Anatoly Chubais but he chose Putin instead. Ilukhin commented upon Yeltsin's selection of Vladimir Putin as the choice for the next prime minister. He stated that "there was little guarantee that Putin would be around the following January."<sup>151</sup>

In a televised address on August 9, 1999, Yeltsin fired Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin and his entire cabinet, marking the fourth time in 18 months Yeltsin had replaced his prime minister as an obvious tactic to keep new blood flowing into the Yeltsin camp and reinforcing the pattern that Yeltsin had established to successfully keep forces that might consolidate against him pitted against one another.<sup>152</sup> Deemed "unreasonable" by the Yabloko Party deputy head, Yeltsin's rapid successions and "shakeups" were a destabilizing tactic of a "leader who is ill and not capable of doing his job."<sup>153</sup> Yeltsin's tactics were viewed thus: The . . .

rotating door in Yeltsin's government is a calculated tool of governance. Yeltsin had such abysmally low levels of popular and Duma support that he developed a strategy of surrogate governance. First, Yeltsin constantly keeps potential opponents from all ends of the political spectrum but particularly from his own entourage divided and bickering amongst themselves. Then, depending on the task at hand, he dips into the seething pool and pulls out a prime minister appropriate for the job. He uses that prime minister's strengths, charisma, and political chips to achieve the task at hand, and proceeds to dump him. This not only serves to stunt the careers of rising stars-as many observers have pointed out-but also clears the way for the person appropriate for the next task.<sup>154</sup>

---

<sup>151</sup> This observation by Ilukhin is reported by stratfor.com in the report/analysis of August 10, 1999 regarding the imminent choice of Vladimir Putin to be Yeltsin's next Prime Minister after only serving a year as the Director of the FSB. "Change of Priorities Drives Change of Russian Government." Staff. <http://www.startfor.com/>.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid, 2.



Baker and Glasser, in their book *Kremlin Rising*, describe the decisive Putin loyalty test as follows: Alluding to the political sabotage that Putin used to defend the Yeltsin family against the intrigues of Yuri Skuratov's attempts to compile evidence against Boris Yeltsin on charges of improper use of government funds to decorate Kremlin offices, they say:

Putin had once again accomplished his mission of protecting a benefactor. Probably no other moment was as important in Putin's rise. Council chief to his FSB title despite Putin's inexperience in foreign affairs, and the coterie in the Kremlin began whispering that perhaps Putin could be a successor they could trust."<sup>155</sup>

Within weeks, Yeltsin rewarded him by adding the post of Kremlin Security. Boris Yeltsin portrayed Putin somewhat differently from the others. Although all of Putin's predecessors received acclaim as they arrived in the position of prime minister, Putin's arrival had a tone of reverence and seriousness. Yeltsin remarked that, by replacing Stepashin who could hardly be faulted for his performance in that position, it was none the less time for a new dynamic leadership in the critical position that would probably lead to the presidency. Yeltsin stated:

I am convinced Putin will serve the nation well while working in this high post, and Russians will be able to appraise Putin's human and business qualities. I trust him. I also want everyone who goes to the presidential polls in July 2000 to make their choice to trust him too.<sup>156</sup>

The economy Yeltsin left behind was in the grip of a tiny group of profiteers, who had seized the country's major assets in a racket-so called loans for shares-devised by one

---

<sup>155</sup> Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, *Kremlin Rising, Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution*, (Washington DC: Potomac Books, Inc, 2007), 50. In an old intelligence operative trick, Putin allegedly arranged for the prosecutor to be filmed in a compromising sexual situation, a charged that stuck and ruined his career, thereby removing him as a threat to the Yeltsin family and cementing Putin's future.

<sup>156</sup> "Change of Priorities Drives Change of Russian Government," August 10, 1999. 2-3. <http://www.stratfor.com>.

of its beneficiaries, Vladimir Potanin, imposed by Chubais, for the benefit of the Yeltsin family.<sup>157</sup> The leading and emerging oligarchs from this “arrangement” patronized Yeltsin’s choice of transition to Putin; Putin’s first act was to grant Yeltsin immunity from prosecution, also looking after the Yeltsin entourage.<sup>158</sup>

One constant seems to be personified power.<sup>159</sup> From the days of the tsars through Russian elections and Vladimir Putin, there remains a common thread of personified power rather than institutionalized power. Experiments with Russia’s democratic reforms are, in essence, catalytic dynamics to *aid* a monarchical leader.<sup>160</sup>

*After Putin’s Arrival*

Putin attacked Chechnya with vigor. He made a strong stance on the Chechen issue to bolster his bid for power, initiating pre-emptive measures even before his transition to the presidency. He painted a picture of runaway Islamic expansion into the Russian Near Abroad. He forecast disaster if Russia did not reverse Islamic led Chechen adventurism in traditional Russian space. In the words of General Alexander Lebed, the former commander of Russia’s Fourteenth Army in Moldova’s Trans-Dniester region:

We have succeeded in ending the war in Chechnya through hard talks and compromises, so as to end the slaughter of our soldiers and the civilian population. But the terms we had agreed upon to end the war were not observed. They were breached first by forces in Chechnya that had turned war and violence into a lucrative business. . . Then those forces, with external support, contrived to unleash a new armed adventure in August of

---

<sup>157</sup> See Perry Anderson’s review in the *London Review of Books*, “Russia’s Managed Democracy.” Thursday, 25 January, 2007. 3.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>159</sup> Brown and Shevtsova, *Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin*, 67.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid, 67.

1999, this time in Dagestan—another senseless war, more senseless loses.”<sup>161</sup>

After the bitterness of the first Chechen defeat of Russia, this prospect was well received by the Russian people. He sustained Yeltsin’s basic policies and completed a successful transition by and large but did not compromise on Chechnya. He did not institute sweeping changes immediately such as some Soviet-Russian Secretaries and Presidents of the past had done. This appears to have been a conscious effort on the part of Putin to validate Yeltsin’s choice of him as the next president of Russia and to take away the potency of his past and potential political opponents to discredit or supplant him early on. Putin strove to assure the Russian people that Yeltsin had made the right choice in selecting him. His early efforts to project strength in his dealings with both Chechnya, particularly in his strong military reactions to Chechen militarism regarding Dagestan, as well as neutralizing a runaway Duma bent on the returning Russia to the old paths of socialism and communism, established confidence in the Russian people. A return of strength and dignity to the beleaguered office of president under Yeltsin was welcomed with open arms by the Russian people who needed reassurances that they would be rewarded for their loyalty to the reemerging Russian state.

A rumor persisted that Putin, in order to provide an excuse to offer his urgent assistance in the Chechen problem, purposely used his connections at the FSB to blame Chechen rebels and terrorists for the FSB’s bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow. Hundreds were killed.<sup>162</sup> However, these allegations smacked of a smear campaign by

---

<sup>161</sup> Valery Tishkov, with a forward by Mikhail Gorbachev. *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society*. (Berkeley, California, London: University of California Press, 2004). 185.

<sup>162</sup> Evangelista. *The Chechen Wars*. 82-83.

those opposing Putin's rise to power, as Putin's selection by Yeltsin to take over as acting president six months before the scheduled elections in early 2000, resulted in the upset of the seemingly unstoppable drive of Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Luzkov to end the domination of Yeltsin's relatives and cronies.<sup>163</sup> Allegations that the Kremlin orchestrated these attacks persisted but never gained good traction due to the public's apparent faith in the installation of Putin and his promises to arrest the Chechen adventurism that continued to embarrass Boris Yeltsin. Putin's immediate successes quieted conspiratorial musings and boosted Putin's popularity to mute the accusations.<sup>164</sup>

In contrast to the pathetic caricature that Yeltsin had become, Putin served as a shot in the proverbial arm. Faith in a new, young, dynamic leader, was bolstered by his early successes. His skimpy personal legend and lack of fanfare arriving at the head of the Russian leadership may have been deliberate in an effort to provide a narrower profile for opposition attack. Image and performance, accentuated by sharp contrast to Yeltsin, provided all that was necessary to deflate Primakov and others, perhaps Chubais, in their efforts to derail Yeltsin's choice. Putin's time had come.

In June 2000, Putin appointed Mufti Akhmad-Khadzhi Kadyrov to head the administration of the Chechen Republic.<sup>165</sup> This action sealed the determination of

---

<sup>163</sup> Trenin, *Russia's Restless Frontier*, 35.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid, 37.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid, in Chapter 2, "A Chronicle of an Unfinished Conflict," the authors assert that Putin's early military successes in 1999-2000 and his acumen at state-building measures insured his successes, though relative, and bolstered his image as a leader who got things done and really solved problems, a refreshing contrast to the impotence of his mentor in foreign policy affairs as well as consolidation of domestic powers sorely lacking in the Yeltsin administrations. 36.

Russia under the new leadership of Vladimir Putin, to end the Chechen goal of true independence and acting as a spearhead for Islamic rebellion in the Caucasus.<sup>166</sup>

Many observers believed that the appointment of Kadyrov (who gave up his clerical status shortly thereafter) was a strong and efficient move by Moscow . . . bringing life back to normal in Chechnya.<sup>167</sup>

This move to Ramzon Kadyrov, did, however, usher in severe human rights violations.

In 2007, with Putin's service to the State nearing its end, Chechnya has been largely pacified and brought back into the Russian fold, although Chechen dreams of total independence persist. However, the Chechen problem is viewed as being "manageable" under Putin's rule instead of engendering panic and dismay in Russia as it did during Yeltsin's times. Russia had gained control of most Chechen territory, except for the impenetrable mountain strongholds that would indefinitely shelter the tenacious guerilla fighters.<sup>168</sup> It must be concluded, however, that Washington's *War on Terror* and macro-level strategic and tactical cooperation with Moscow has changed the polemics of that situation dramatically. The quid pro quo of American-Russian cooperation on international terrorism has provided political cover for Putin to operate in the Northern Caucasus with relative impunity. However, tragic events such as the cold-blooded murder of Anna Polikskaya in 2006, Chechnya policy critic and Putin detractor, remind all that Chechnya still skews Russian politics by tarnishing Russian accomplishments.<sup>169</sup>

As the cyclical downswing in Russian-American relations is occurring with the reemergence of the Russian state, Chechnya will no doubt resurface in the rhetorical

---

<sup>166</sup> Trenin. *Russia's Restless Frontier*, 36.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid, 35.

<sup>168</sup> Evangelista. *The Chechen Wars*. 85.

<sup>169</sup> Tishkov. *Chechnya*. 185.

attacks by the Americans regarding Moscow's stifling of independence and gross human rights violations that are the stock of American discursive foreign policy polemics when the relations of the two nations have moved from relative harmony at the macro level and descended to the tactical opprobrium of the combative side of the foreign policy cycle. The misfortunes of the Americans and the reinvigoration of Russian foreign policy boosted by robust economics seem to be the lowest common denominator for these changes.

As the immediacy of the Chechen problem began to fade, Putin, as the long line of predecessors before him, continued to consolidate his domestic power base. His accelerating popularity with both the Russian people and Americans was given a momentous boost with the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States at the hands of al Qaeda and the supporting Taliban; Putin saw an opportunity in lending rhetorical and psychological support, as well as tactical support with base deals in Central Asia, to the Americans during their most severe hour of distress and need. Counterintuitive on its surface, Putin's magnanimous display of sympathy and offers of logistical aid and support to George Bush after 9/11 dramatically changed the diplomatic environment both countries found themselves in.

The Americans were desperate to respond to the indignity visited upon the United States by Osama bin Laden; Putin offered Russian assistance. Though Putin's logistical aid was essentially rebuffed, the American leadership used this symbolic offer of aid by Russia, to usher in a new partnership with Putin's government. In exchange, America offered Putin new legitimacy in Russian efforts to integrate into the western-modeled international political community. In addition, American criticisms of Putin's brutal

campaign in Chechnya became muted. In addition, of course, Putin agreed and acquiesced in the placing of American forces in Central Asia in FSU space, as part of the global cooperative “war on terror.”

Images of a new level of American-Russian cooperative relations were reinforced by alleged close personal chemistry between Bush and Putin during visits by Putin to Bush’s ranch in Texas and royal red-carpet state dinners for Bush in St. Petersburg. It is interesting to note that Yeltsin professed to the same personal identity and bonding with Bill Clinton and Strobe Talbot. Gorbachev had Reagan and H. W. Bush as cohorts to end the diabolical Cold War. In the confrontation-détente cycle endemic to Russian-American relations, this factor emerges as a recurrent theme. In an atmosphere of long-standing mistrust between Americans and Russians perhaps this is the “glue” that serves to improve strained relations during the “down cycle” periods in the long standing relationship. It appears to turn on trust, a psychological staple necessary for both foreign policy institutions, both Russian and American.

Although Putin was described by some as the “default” candidate for the Yeltsin family due to the bankruptcy of viable old hand choices, Putin validated himself and thereby, Yeltsin’s judgment in his selection.<sup>170</sup> Throughout his two terms he has demonstrated resolve and dedication to champion the reemergence of the Russian state. Holding popularity consistently around 70 percent, Putin consistently has offered limited concessions to many groups while simultaneously increasing his grip on power. The budget of the FSB has increased threefold during Putin’s reign and over 50 percent of the

---

<sup>170</sup> Richard Rose and Neil Munro, *Elections Without Order: Russia’s Challenge to Vladimir Putin*. (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 96.

significant positions in his government have been assigned to security personnel.<sup>171</sup> Putin has offered order, leadership and discipline, above all, discipline. Russia's re-emergence comes with the unapologetic approach of a man who has an understanding that action must supersede theory and labels. However, Putin has also begun to shed the mantle of accommodation with Washington as the continuing expansion of the Russian petro-economy has largely obviated the former dire Russian need for western, especially American largesse and political patronage.

Foreign policy challenges will mount now that Putin has declared his total independence from Washington. Though he has made policy declarations since America's unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003, none have had the potency of his recent unequivocal stands in opposition to American foreign policy initiatives. In Munich, early in 2007, his reactions to the Bush administration's proposals for an ABM system in Poland with supporting radar in the Czech Republic made clear that Russia is forging a new independence from the past fifteen years of "protective custody."<sup>172</sup> U. S. Department of Defense Secretary Robert Gates, upon pressing top Russian officials for cooperation on the American missile project, received the following reply from new Russian defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov:

The Russian position with respect to this issue remains unchanged; we do believe that deploying all the strategic elements of the ballistic missile defenses is a destabilizing factor that may have a great impact upon global and regional security.<sup>173</sup>

---

<sup>171</sup> Perry Anderson. *Russia's Managed Democracy*, 5.

<sup>172</sup> "Russia Cool to US Call for Cooperation on Missile Defense." Thom Shanker, *New York Times*, Tuesday, April 24, 2007. International Section, A6.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid*, A6.



A move like this by the Americans just a few years ago might be met with volatile rhetoric but the current re-emerging strength of Russian foreign policy is fundamentally more resolute and lacks the political tones of earlier times when Russia felt dependent on the American government for just about everything. Putin definitely appears far less reluctant than in the recent past to ruffle Washington feathers and putting both the Americans and all international observers on notice that blind compliance with Washington's foreign policy proposals and, indeed, discursive diplomacy, are past tense. American responses to Putin's new stridency have been largely patronizing in tone as if to conclude that Putin's remarks and reactions are for Russian domestic consumption and therefore, largely theater. With each passing month of firm Russian foreign policy resistance to Washington's maneuvers, concern appears to be mounting in Washington that American-Russian relations are at best in a downturn, and at worst degenerating into a new cold war or cold peace.

Noting that Putin is hedging against a down cycle in energy economics by bolstering substantial reserves and infrastructure changes in the current Russian economy, Russia's emerging financial health and corresponding independence in international relations, although Russian gas and oil constitute only about a third of Russian exports, are forcing policy changes from both the Americans and Europeans. Both the Americans and Europeans have become much more reactive and defensive in their individual and collective reactions to Putin's new frankness and boldness in his reinvigorated and crystallizing foreign policy reactions to the West. Thanks to high

energy prices, the chaotic conditions that prevailed across Russia in the early 1990's have given way to several years of 6.5 percent annual growth and a trillion dollar economy.<sup>174</sup>

Indeed, Vladimir Putin's recent declaration that Russia will suspend the NATO CFE Treaty if negotiations over the US deployment of missiles in Poland do not soon produce more satisfactory results, was first met by diplomatic opprobrium by U S Secretary Rice and Defense Minister Bob Gates, and now growing indignations from both the Americans and Europeans as Putin's seriousness regarding the matter appear genuine.<sup>175</sup> Many Europeans, of course, oppose the intended site as a new provocation in American-European-Russian relations and do not flatly accept the American explanation of the need of the system. As the seriousness of the diplomatic breach become more evident and the effects more widespread, Russians, Europeans, and Americans find themselves quickly moving toward a more confrontational phase of their respective foreign relations with one another and in international relations as a whole. Putin continues to express grave concerns that Washington's real reasons to erect a missile shield in former FSU territories is to re-contain the expanding offensive capabilities of the Russian missile regiments, recently augmented and updated by technological advances; the American official position that it is purely a defensive strategic measure to ward off a potential rogue attack by Iran, has found no credibility with the Putin foreign policy establishment.

---

<sup>174</sup>Yuliya Tymoshenko. "Containing Russia." *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2007. 1 Foreign Affairs online reader service: <http://foreignaffairs.org/>. (accessed July 6, 2008).

<sup>175</sup>"Putin Is Suspending Treaty with NATO on Forces in Europe," *New York Times*, Friday, April 27, 2007. A6.

Why has Putin begun to shift gears from strategic accommodation and cooperation with the Bush administration to open disengagement and rhetorical wrangling with them? Is it the relative change in positions of both the Bush government and Putin's return to strength in Russian foreign affairs? Is it a combination of factors which emboldens Vladimir Putin to accelerate toward Russian goals of reemergence as a world power?

Russian security experts consider the current unipolar world order with U. S. dominance unacceptable for Russia (although it has not been openly mentioned as an external threat to Russia's security); for this reason Russia always says that the role of the U. N. must be strengthened. Perceived foreign threats also include military build-ups that change the balance near the borders of Russia and its allies, anti-Russian policies of certain neighboring governments and the U S withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty announced by the George W. Bush Administration.<sup>176</sup>

America is obviously weakened due to its failures in Iraq and specifically, Republican Party failure at the American mid-term elections in November, 2006. Does Putin sense an opportunity to return to multilateralism in its relations with the West, especially with a re-oriented American foreign policy if the American Democrats come to power in 2008? A return to multipolarity and the balancing of American power have been continually expressed in foreign policy statements of the Russian government.

Putin has realized that regardless of who is in the American White House, the new independence that vast Russian oil and gas revenues have afforded him dictates a new assertiveness in Russian foreign policy. Russian responses to the neo-realism of the Bush Doctrine, a formidable constraining force since 2001, now wanes as an effective American tool in the American foreign policy arsenal, to include the all-encompassing

---

<sup>176</sup> Vladimir Rukavishnikov. "Preserving Inherited Geopolitics Through Emergent Global and European Realities," in *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power*. 18.

“War on Terror.” Supplication to the United States, as during the stark reconstruction days of Yeltsin’s administrations during the 1990’s, is no longer necessary. The strategic quid pro quo, always skewed in favor of the Americans, no longer serves Russian goals and purposes. America paid lip service regarding Russia’s desires to reinvigorate their foreign policy but Russia was largely patronized and ignored by the West and America in particular; Putin has changed that situation dramatically. Indeed, American diplomatic measures are appearing to be more and more what they really are: neo-containment measures of new Russian expansion and power consolidation.

Although no one denies that Russia still needs western cooperation, those needs are far less acute now that the Americans are losing some of their “hegemonic grip.” With European energy dependency on Russia rapidly approaching critical proportions, Russian influence on EU affairs has also increased dramatically. With this newfound muscularity, Russia has moved to insulate itself from the oil-bust syndrome by capitalizing its infrastructure assets. Indeed, Russia now possesses the third largest hard-currency reserves in the world, and its stock market is booming; Russia has paid most of its Yeltsin era debts and has a fully convertible ruble.<sup>177</sup>

The pragmatic strategic thinking of Vladimir Putin after almost eight years of successful power consolidation and economic expansion are creating a new set of dynamics in the world today. Russia is increasingly very active in the new international relations. As American power fades, as has been the history of all vast empires approaching over-reach, new regional hegemonies and significant world powers will push into the vacating vacuum created by the receding American world empire. The signs of

---

<sup>177</sup> Tymoshenko, “Containing Russia”.

that process are becoming increasingly visible as first the American voter, then the shunned international organizations and treaty partners, begin to breathe the less oppressive air of a humbled American hegemon who is correcting course toward the realities of globalization and true economic and political interdependence.

*New Russian-American Relations*

The visible foreign policy shift of the American government to a return to multilateralism is increasingly evident in regard to the war in Iraq. The Iraq Study group recommended a return to diplomatic regional problem solving in Iraq. In the Executive Summary it was stated:

No country in the region will benefit in the long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting stability.<sup>178</sup>

Though Bush largely ignored the Study Group's recommendations in the beginning, lack of success on the ground has since compelled more traditional diplomatic approaches.

The Study Group, including contributing foreign policy experts such as Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson, overwhelmingly recommended the inclusion of Iraq's regional neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Iran and others get involved to solve this regional problem. The Group also stated unequivocally that a military solution alone was not a realistic solution and that continuing Bush administration strategies to force a solution were not viable.<sup>179</sup>

---

<sup>178</sup> James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs. *The Iraq Study Group :The Way Forward-A New Approach*. (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 2006), xiv.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid, ix to xviii.

Although this realm of American-Russian relations will be more comprehensively addressed in chapters 5 and 6, the pre-cursors for that developmental sequence are appropriately introduced here as a groundwork for those later events.

As the political legacy of Boris Yeltsin will come into increasing focus with the passing of time and the “balance sheet “ of his life is more carefully assessed, it does appear at this juncture that his evaluation was correct that Vladimir Putin, one of many possibilities, was the right selection. This is borne out by the fact that the Russian state did not regress nor implode and that Yeltsin’s faith in Putin was justified as the Russian State has made a tremendous recovery and is indeed, re-emerging into its traditional great power position in the world. History is already being kind to Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin has actually enhanced his image as the politically correct choice that Yeltsin made.

Prophetically, nothing breeds success like success.

In view of the relative weakness of the lame duck American president George W. Bush, Putin senses that this is the appropriate time to exercise more Russian independence in foreign policy. In regards to oil policy, this translates to increased export duties and fees for not only the FSU clients but to the West as well, particularly natural gas to Germany. Chancellor Merkel, the last president of the European Union, began to maneuver against Russia’s policies in order to obviate control over EU energy policy decisions regarding the European Union.

Germany held an energy summit for the European Union in May 2007, in which Merkel extended her energy plans outside of Europe to potential non-Russian partners such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.<sup>180</sup> As far as Russia’s continuing foreign policy

---

<sup>180</sup> “France’s presidential election will herald the end of Guallism,” *Second Quarter Forecast 2007, The Maneuvering Before the Storm*, April 2007, 8. [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com).

track, stewarding reemergence will still be dependent on Russia's continuing financial muscularity and expansion. With no let up in sight in world oil pricing, hitting all time highs in 2008, Putin continues to feel very comfortable indeed preparing the way for Dimitry Medvedev. "The time for Putin's consolidation over the Russian economy to be complete is drawing near. Economically Putin is on track."<sup>181</sup>

The two state-owned energy companies-oil giant Rosneft and natural gas giant Gazprom-have made significant moves against foreign competition, particularly as illustrated by Gazprom's takeover of Sakhalin-2.<sup>182</sup> Moscow continued to make huge steps in energy consolidation in 2007, gaining momentum as the 2008 elections neared; consolidation of shipbuilding, banking, and uranium will accompany this growth and diversification, ensuring protection against an oil revenue decline. As has been forecasted, Moscow will continue its influence expansion outside its borders now that its foreign policy is slipping its former restraints. Though Putin will remain prudent and cautious in the months to come, the present trajectory of Russian foreign policy appears to be accelerating in scope, dedication, and independence from outside actors, particularly the United States. Russia continues to attempt to recapture its dominance over FSU space, especially in Central Asia. Recent events in Georgia validate Putin's original declarations during his second administration.<sup>183</sup>

---

<sup>181</sup> "France's presidential election will herald the end of Gualism," [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com), 14.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid*, 14.

<sup>183</sup> See Putin's formulation of the "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation." In Igor S. Ivanov's *The New Russian Diplomacy*. (Washington DC: The Nixon Center and Brookings Institution Press, 2008.) 165.

Former post-cold-war security concerns and terrorism cooperation with the United States, led to encroachment in the traditional Near Abroad by the United States in Russia's evolving view. Strategically, especially in energy policy surrounding Caspian oil, Putin is reclaiming areas conceded as legitimate geopolitical to the Americans in the immediate post 9/11 accommodations with the Bush administration.

Russia's economy depends to a substantial degree on the economic and political stability of the CIS states and also with individual states. The Soviet-designed and built network of oil and gas pipelines has enabled Russia to create an oil monopoly and ensure the dependence of the Central Asian and the South Caucasus states on Russia.<sup>184</sup>

This "push-back" is the bedrock of the new aggressive Russian foreign policy.

As America's woes increase with the debacle in Iraq and weakened American resolve and focus regarding its relations with Russia expand, Putin has a clear field to re-assert Russian foreign policy prerogatives and initiatives that reflect Russian national interests and not an accommodating reactionary stance toward Washington's hegemonic international control. This set of prodigious circumstances will give the re-emerging Russian state the room to breathe that it has longed for since the reins of power passed from Yeltsin to Putin in late 1999. Putin can prepare for the succession politics that are already beginning to intensify and affect his decision-making as he has passed the presidency on to Dimitry Medvedev while he maintains power as Prime Minister of Russia.

As American foreign policy sputters and seeks to find new direction after the debacle in Iraq, Russia should find itself in a particularly advantageous position with regard to the United States. American involvement in Iraq and the larger Middle East

---

<sup>184</sup> Kanet. *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power*. 175



guarantees continued pre-occupation in that arena while the “second tier” players regain their strength and composure, including Russia. The United States will most certainly reorient its international relations to a new degree of multilateralism now that the neo-realism of the Bush Doctrine has been exposed as the abject failure that it is.

Russian foreign policy will be based on Russian nationalism and will pursue Russian foreign policy goals despite American efforts to re-contain it during its re-emergence as Nygren has described. The recent Russian military campaign in Georgia is evidence that American concerns are no longer paramount in Russia’s foreign policy considerations. Nygren states that Putin is now in the role of mediator in Georgian internal affairs.<sup>185</sup>

---

<sup>185</sup> Bertil Nygren. “Putin’s Attempts to Subjugate Georgia: From Sabre-Rattling to the Power of the Purse,” in *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power*. 107.

## CHAPTER IV

### SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: GEORGE W. BUSH AND VLADIMIR PUTIN - NEW POSSIBILITIES

Of the many emergency calls received by President George W. Bush after the 9/11 attack, the first was from an old American adversary, a perennial political adversary, Russia. In a special irony, Russian President Vladimir Putin, the current representative of a long line of ideological and military Russian foes, offered consolations, friendship and assistance of every kind.<sup>186</sup> In an unfettered and unqualified offer, President Putin extended his hand and an olive branch to the American president. Putin was fully aware of the gravity and vastness of the grave insult suffered by America on that day. Vladimir Putin's gesture was unique. This set the stage for a novel engagement between the new leaders of America and Russia. A new chapter of American-Russian relations had arrived.

With those words and his readiness to become the United States' ally with no strings attached, Putin brought about a new phase in relations between Russia and the United States.<sup>187</sup>

At that time, this was a good diplomatic position for Putin to take in that Russia's foreign policy options were limited by extensive logistical and financial problems in the Putin government.

During the early days of the new Bush administration, new and old frictions alike were evident between Washington and Moscow. Still struggling through the transition years from communism to a new experiment with democracy, Russia's growth pains permeated the relationship between the two countries. With Putin's arrival after Yeltsin's

---

<sup>186</sup> Shevtsova. *Putin's Russia*, 204-05.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid*, 205.

abrupt and unexpected *retirement*, many points of contention immediately surfaced and were exacerbated by the simple fact that the two new leaders, getting their respective “sea legs,” were testing each other’s strengths and vulnerabilities. Both Putin and Bush had strong legacies from the past to revisit and re-evaluate. The strategic relationship of the two countries in regard to nuclear armament treaties and treaty protocols of all kinds were being seriously re-evaluated for relevant content and viability in the new post-Cold War transition environment and the “new world order” still being determined. Relations between the two countries had become so strained at the time that all hotline contact between the two had been suspended as witnessed by the fact that Bush had expelled Russian diplomats in March of 2001.<sup>188</sup> Putin abruptly changed all that and contacted President Bush immediately.<sup>189</sup> What is far less reported and understood is the emergency call Putin made on September 9, 2001, just two days before the attacks on the United States. Putin delivered a warning to Bush about the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud which had just taken place in Afghanistan. Putin warned Bush that something bigger seemed afoot.<sup>190</sup>

Russian intelligence had extensive experience with Massoud in Afghanistan and knew that his assassination likely was part of a larger plan. Putin related to his staff that Bush did not fully understand the connection between Massoud’s assassination and al Qaeda.

Barely two days later everything became clear when hijacked airplanes smashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United

---

<sup>188</sup> Shevtsova. *Putin’s Russia*, 205

<sup>189</sup> Ibid, 205.

<sup>190</sup> Peter Baker and Susan Glasser. *Kremlin Rising*. 121.

States, part of a carefully orchestrated operation presaged by the murder of Massoud.<sup>191</sup>

In killing him, the leader of the Afghan Northern Alliance, Al Qaeda had eliminated its most dangerous enemy in their home base and the most formidable ally a vengeful United States could have wanted in seeking retribution inside Afghanistan.<sup>192</sup> Putin then told Defense Minister Ivanov to cancel the ongoing Russian military exercises in the Pacific so that the Americans would not be distracted during their hour of need. Bush later commented that Russia's warnings about Osama bin Laden's efforts to train Chechen fighters to then return to open warfare against the Russians in Chechnya did not seem to have relevance at the time for the Americans.<sup>193</sup> Putin went on Russian national TV and characterized the strikes against the United States as follows: "This is a blatant challenge to humanity," he said. "Russia has firsthand knowledge of what terrorism is. We know exactly how the people of New York feel."<sup>194</sup>

In the absolute chaos and disbelief that followed those days and weeks after the terrorist attacks on the United States, America could have asked for anything it wanted from its traditional allies. Now, it was getting sincere offers of help and deep-felt sympathies even from its traditional foes. Vladimir Putin's offer of all types of assistance, was met with some skepticism, of course. That skepticism was based in the never-ending vacillations of American-Russian historic political relations that had twisted and turned so many times since the advent of the socialist revolution in 1917, the Long

---

<sup>191</sup> Shevtsova, 122.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid, 122.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid, 122-123.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid, 123.

Telegram from George Kennan setting the Cold War into place and of course, the Cold War itself.<sup>195</sup> Many believe that the principles behind Kennan's policy of "containment" are still applicable today—and see a new Cold War, this time against Vladimir Putin's resurgent Russia, in the offing.<sup>196</sup> Post-cold War transition politics has reflected a tendency along that trajectory pre and post 9/11.

The post-communist, post-Cold War transition period was marked by much mutual distrust between the Russians and the Americans. Russia feared NATO expansion into traditional Russian areas of influence while the United States feared a re-emergence of Russian power and dominance, challenging American hegemony in the new world order and re-establishing bipolarity in international relations. 9/11, while an obvious tragedy for the Americans, offered a silver lining for Russian foreign policy relations with the United States. It opened up the possibility for Putin and Russia to break out of the foreign policy strait-jacket that had plagued Boris Yeltsin; Russia could largely level the playing field by making common cause with the Americans on a truly international front, the war on terrorism. With a common purpose so large and so globally encompassing, the Russians and Americans could pave over many political issues and subsume them into a higher relevancy, a macro-level strategic relevancy that could usher in a whole new precept to international relations itself. The potential was and is unlimited.

NATO invoked Article 5 and America and George Bush could have requested help from anyone and everyone and gotten it. At this important nexus, George Bush

---

<sup>195</sup> George Kennan. *Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy*. (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993) 1-11.

<sup>196</sup> Tymoshenko. "Containing Russia." 69.

created a singular diplomatic error that has marred American foreign policy and tarnished the American Republican administration's image ever since. The Americans would go it alone and further, put everyone, friend and foe alike, on notice that *from this point forward*, every country was either for or against the United States in their counter-offensive against terrorism. This arrogance and abrasiveness was met with a variety of reactions around the world. Traditional American allies were stunned and put off. Others were quickly "categorized" in camps of the "Coalition of the Willing" or "The Axis of Evil." Those who were not sure where they stood with the Americans were told they had better make up their minds because in the words of George Bush, "you are either with us or against us."<sup>197</sup>

Radical legislation was quickly passed by the American congress declaring the Bush administration's determination to attack the Taliban and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The Patriot Act was passed to enhance the intelligence, law-enforcement, and military capabilities of the United States government to go on the offensive against the perceived perpetrators of the attacks on American soil and to reorganize the American bureaucracy to more effectively defend the homeland.<sup>198</sup> In addition, the Patriot Act abrogated many traditional American rights of its citizens. The Department of Homeland Security was quickly created. In addition, a new formalized neo-realism emerged in the

---

<sup>197</sup>Bush, George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" The White House, <http://whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html>, (accessed July 6, 2008). Bush stated or paraphrased this phraseology so many times and in so many venues that it stuck as the calling card of the new American foreign policy mantra and indeed became associated with the general tenets of the Bush Doctrine as his address to West Point delineated in 2002.

<sup>198</sup> HR 3162, *An Act to Deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes*, was passed on October 24, 2001, changing the way American government operates and the foreign and domestic policy philosophy of the American foreign policy establishment for the foreseeable future. The Patriot Act codified extended government powers and precipitated a severe challenge to civil rights and due process.

foreign policy program called the Bush Doctrine. It had two major tenets: (1) the principle of pre-emption replaced the traditional defensive, reactive, military doctrine of American foreign policy; if a threat to American national security was perceived, the American government would attack before being attacked to eliminate that threat. (2) the doctrine of democratic evangelism, or “spreading the faith” would serve as the ideological prong to the new doctrine, the spreading of democratic government throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East, regardless of the fact that democracy was a foreign governing concept in that region and contrary to the tribalism of that pan-cultural tradition in that part of the world as well as theocratic Islam itself.

It was largely expected, of course, that the Americans would counter-attack in Afghanistan. The campaign began in the fall of 2001 and the defeat of the Taliban government was achieved quickly though Bin Laden was not apprehended. The state was garrisoned and the world applauded. A justified counterpunch had been swiftly and effectively delivered by the most formidable military power on earth. Following on the heels of the escalating attacks on American interests preceding September 11, 2001, the Americans pursued “international terrorism” while simultaneously defining it.

The “War on Terror” was born and George W. Bush was leading the charge, enlisting a “Coalition of the Willing” in an international crusade to rid the world of immoral terrorism and its state sponsors and attacking the new phenomenon of asymmetrical warfare as employed by the NGO-type polities represented by such organizations as Hamas, Hezbollah and of course, al Qaeda. Vladimir Putin joined that coalition. He sensed a new and important venue for Russian-American relations and a way out of the foreign policy impasse that preceded the terrorist attacks. After the

departure of Boris Yeltsin from the Russian government as well as the American Democrats under Bill Clinton, the new Bush team was led by policy advisors Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice. George Bush was tutored by Rice who had been the consummate *cold warrior* for the president's father George H. W. Bush at the end of the Cold War. As he had virtually no foreign policy experience, Bush followed the lead and attitudes of his senior staff, recycled cronies and "retreads" from previous republican administrations.

Anything done by the previous democratic administration under Clinton was debunked, discredited and reversed at every opportunity regardless of merit but purely on partisan grounds; a move toward the Bush Doctrine's proclaimed neo-realism was embraced. In the Bush administration's collective eyes, Russia was part of that "axis of evil" and Rumsfeld said so.<sup>199</sup> Putin, as an ex KGB operative and the recent head of the KGB successor FSB, could not be trusted and his statements of solidarity with the United States regarding terrorism and common cause were highly suspect, not commanding serious attention or considerations.

Richard Clark, held over from the Clinton White House as the "counterterrorism czar" because of his extensive reputation as an expert in the field, tried desperately to get the incoming Republican team's attention regarding al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, but was virtually ignored by Condoleezza Rice, his new boss. According to Clark he was denied, for months preceding 9/11, from even making his case to Bush who gave the impression that they had never heard of al Qaeda and who focused incessantly on Iraq even before the national emergency of 9/11 forced their attention to shift to bin Laden

---

<sup>199</sup> Again see Baker and Glasser in their 2007 publication of *Kremlin Rising*, 125-126 for the mind-set of the new republican administration taking power from the democrats in 2001.



and Afghanistan.<sup>200</sup> Vladimir Putin got the same impression on September 9, 2001; that the Americans were just not listening. America suffered dearly for that inattention and lack of concern. Putin had warned the United States repeatedly.<sup>201</sup> Clark and many others had tried to help. The Bush administration had other issues pending.

Terrorism became a stark reality for Americans on September 11, 2001, and for the first time *on such a scale*, Americans became afraid and insecure inside their own borders. The preceding attacks on American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and the attack on an American naval vessel, the USN Cole, in Aden harbor, Yemen, still had a surreal quality of being unassociated with American security. 9/11 brought the reality home. America would never be the same again. In the words of Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul, shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks:

It remains unclear just what the world will look like once the dust settles. Already allegiances are shifting, U. S. troops are redeploying, and policymakers are rapidly rewriting their agendas. But, as we enter a new and undefined era, it is becoming increasingly evident that, just as America's competition with the Soviet Union defined the second half of the last century, so will its new relationship with Russia help determine the contours of the new one.<sup>202</sup>

After all, Russia was no stranger to Islamic militancy in its struggles with its Islamic Republics during the reign of the USSR and subsequently with Chechnya and Dagestan when Putin came to power.<sup>203</sup> Common cause was plausible, and as a practical matter served to unite the two countries at least rhetorically, for a while.

---

<sup>200</sup> Richard A. Clark. *Against All Enemies, Inside America's War on Terror*. (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Free Press, 2004) ix-xiii.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>202</sup> Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul. "America's Real Russian Allies," *Foreign Affairs*. Council on Foreign Relations, New York. November/December 2001, 46.

<sup>203</sup> Evangelista. *The Chechen Wars*. 2.

Though Putin endured the loud calls for caution from his staff regarding dealing with America by opening former Russian space to US forces and for being overly generous to them in sharing intelligence and logistical support; he prevailed in his reasoning that his initiatives to accommodate and support American anti-terrorism measures, were worth the effort and afforded the opportunity to establish new relations based on common problems.<sup>204</sup> Osama bin Laden, after all, was no friend to Russia either. Russian military advisors and the general staff had the most severe reservations about the *modus Vivendi* that developed between Russia and the United States, reasoning that the Americans could not be trusted in the long run not to take advantage of that degree of access to former and current Russian space. However, Putin appears to have had broad support for his surprising initiatives first with the Russian people, his overwhelming popularity with them overriding the resistance of his own military. The Russian people seemed to identify with the new politics of democracy while the holdover apparatchiks continued to resist change. According to Colton and McFaul: “Now is the time for the United States to redouble its efforts to promote democracy within the borders of its former adversary.”<sup>205</sup>

The opportunity for genuine reciprocity and cooperation presented itself in an otherwise distressing package; the stark reality of the dangers to the international political system brought about by terrorism overrode many of the previous barriers that had hampered better American-Russian relations during the transition years after the Cold

---

<sup>204</sup> Shevtsova. *Putin's Russia*, 206.

<sup>205</sup> Colton. “America’s Real Russian Allies.” 47.

War. Still, Vladimir Putin's penchant for decisive action and the tendency to use vertical controls reminded Russia observers that, Russian democracy is illiberal at this point in the democratic experiment and, with Putin's immense popularity, portends to remain so. Perhaps, as Colton and McFaul posit, this reflects a traditional value set of the Russian psyche itself and historical experience; the people are accustomed to strong leadership and decision-making from the imperial top and they expect it while the experiment with democratic government remains a novel add-on.<sup>206</sup> In 2001, after the tragedy of the terrorist attacks, it was much easier, especially after such generous support offered by Russia, to evaluate Russian democracy in these tones:

In light of all the difficulties bedeviling the development of democratic institutions in Russia, this level of support for democratic values and practices is encouraging. Having been generally antidemocratic and antiliberal for centuries on end, Russian culture seems finally to have undergone an important transformation.<sup>207</sup>

The dichotomy between a wish for strongman type rule as well as a willingness to open the country to democratic reforms has persisted in Russian history. Mikhail Gorbachev had provided that example.

The Bush administration has consistently chided Vladimir Putin to pursue more democratic goals, while Putin has restored momentum to Russian recovery as an important international player. Despite the Russian brutality in Chechnya, Putin's disdain for and control of the Russian media, his restraint of the oligarchs, pressure tactics on Europe through political leveraging of gas and oil, reconstitution of the Russian military-industrial complex, Russian resistance to NATO programs to include American

---

<sup>206</sup> Colton. "America's Real Russian Allies" 51.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid, 54.

ABM proposals, and balancing of American hegemonic power in general, the American-Russian relationship has progressed. This represents an upgrade since the waning days of the Yeltsin administration and the first year and a half of Putin's first administration. As is emblematic in Russian-American relations, however, the competitive nature of that relationship remains and perpetuates the confrontation-détente cycle. Vladimir Rukavishnikov offers that:

The likely outcome of the U. S.-Russia disagreement concerning developments in the Middle East is unclear. Misunderstanding between the USA and the Russian Federation concerning the Iranian nuclear program should be mentioned while we are on the subject. One may try to trace the present-day Russian diplomatic activity back to the past, ie, Soviet policy in the Middle East. This means there are clouds on the horizon: Russia with its nostalgia for its former superpower status, for one; the European ambition for participating in the Middle East game, for another. Some suggest that China as the potential superpower of the 21<sup>st</sup> century could be a third. In combination with one another and with Islamic fundamentalism and the widespread anti-American mood in the Muslim world that feeds terrorist networks, such a grand alliance against U. S. hegemony could pose a serious geostrategic threat to American interests in the post-Bush world, which Russia might use for its inherited geopolitical advantage."<sup>208</sup>

Rukavishnikov interprets that the Cold War continues past the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, that *endemic problems persist* rather than reappear in what some analysts have termed a new cold war.<sup>209</sup> He states that neo-containment of the reemerging Russia is, in fact, a continuation of the cold war containment of the Soviet era continued today.<sup>210</sup>

---

<sup>208</sup> Vladimir Rukavishnikov. "Choices for Russia: Preserving Inherited Geopolitics." in *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power*, 59.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid, 59.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid .

The détente that emerged after the tragic events of 9/11 largely has not endured and the reemergence of Russian power and status has returned American-Russian relations to many of the harsh features evident before 9/11. Both Bush and Putin offered friendly photo-ops to reassure the international political community that although the two countries compete, they are still moving together toward Russian democracy and common cause in the fight against international terrorism.<sup>211</sup> This general pattern of competition, tension, confrontation, finding eventual commons ground, and periods of cool to warm détente, can be observed through Gorbachev's rule, Yeltsin's presidency and now Putin's administration; it is an endemic cycle in Russian-American political relations and appears to be systemically inevitable if not always predictable.

The most encouraging by-product is that each cycle produces some concrete and enduring progress, though this is not always easy to identify. Russia, the European Union and America have indeed sustained common cause in the fight to counter international lawlessness as symbolized through terrorism. The Russia-NATO Treaty of 2002 has ameliorated many concerns of the Russian government concerning the NATO mission and general expansion eastward to Russian borders, a major contention in Yeltsin's days, until the 2006 American announcement of plans to establish an ABM system in Poland and The Czech Republic. Control of Russian nuclear materials, though a strategic containment concern, has been successful in general terms to date. Cultural

---

<sup>211</sup> Putin's recent visit to the Bush family vacation compound in Maine was such an opportunity. After several months of "bad press" it was obviously time to defuse growing tensions between the Americans and Russians in the international arena. In an effort to reassure international observers of the continued sanctity of the Putin-Bush relationship, this short but well covered media event obviously was intended to relay that, no matter the shrillness of the rhetorical exchanges, particularly the Russian shrillness, the macro-level strategic relationship is still in tact. No real problems were ironed out but the carefully scripted event served to create the perception that certainly "things are surely not as bad as portrayed by the press at the Kennebunkport *lobsterfest* summit."

exchanges abound with many Russian and Ukrainian students attending universities and living in the United States and Canada assimilating western education and culture.

Energy politics, despite accusations of extremely politically motivated pressure tactics being employed by Russia toward Germany, Belarus and others, are generally cooperative between Russia and the United States such as early shipments of Caspian oil to Houston as an early attempt at oil-sharing cooperation between the two states. On these fronts and many others, the contrast of current versus previous decades is sharp. G-8 membership and United Nations cooperative politics, though contentious and sometimes divisive, are still progressive in many areas such as arms control and environmental initiatives. There has been more on the positive side of the balance sheet than on the negative side in comparative terms since 9/11.

Putin, after his arrival in 2000, had already expressed the only real option that he saw for Russia's return to relevance in the international community. After exploring the possibilities of partnering with both China and India and rejection by both, and after deflecting conservative calls for Russia to return to her xenophobic past by staying aloof and independent, Putin was already pursuing integration with the West.<sup>212</sup>

The last alternative is what might be called 'Fortress Russia.' Unlike the others, it is very much within Russian control. It is the option that Russian politicians cite regularly especially when all else seems unavailing. Out of frustration more than preference, they imagine Russia standing on its own, eschewing alliances other than with former Soviet republics, marshaling its own resources to defend its most vital interests and focusing on enhancing relations with regions close to Russia and essential to those vital interests.<sup>213</sup>

---

<sup>212</sup> Robert Legvold. "Russia's Rudderless Strategy." New York: *Foreign Affairs*. September/October 2001) 65.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid*, 65.

Legvold further states that Putin could operate under the premise of “Fortress Russia” if no other options were available but that Putin is a realist and a pragmatic leader. He knows Russia’s best option remains integration with the capitalist West and its institutions.<sup>214</sup> While embracing the concepts of democratic capitalism, traditional Russian ruling mechanisms are slow to change. Notwithstanding the fact that not even a generation has passed since the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with its command economy and ideological isolation, the measurable progress of Russia toward plurality in government is actually quite remarkable although it is yet highly illiberal.

Although American hegemony has been the primary post-cold War obstacle in Russian eyes, Putin realizes that, in the new world order, it is a fact and must be dealt with realistically and not in a Russian fantasy state of “what was and what could be” as expressed in the Russian media. 9/11, tragic as it was for the Americans, was not a time to rejoice at the sight of the world’s most dominant power being humbled but rather a precipitous opportunity to change the rules of engagement and to strike a new deal with the Americans. Putin must be recognized for his agility and his visionary zeal to seize the opportunity. Post 9/11 relations have theoretically advanced the cause of world peace though Russia’s new muscularity and American impotence in foreign affairs have exacerbated old tensions.

Both the United States and Russia under Putin have had a common enemy in terrorism, particularly by al Qaeda. The tensions of the Cold War were created by a bilateral ideological struggle, as well as an armed power struggle, between two

---

<sup>214</sup> Legvold. “Russia’s Rudderless Strategy,” 65.

superpowers. The new threat environment has added another dimension, the struggle of cooperating nation states against non-traditional, NGO type polities who practice asymmetrical warfare in the name of Islamic fundamentalism. Globalization and loss of absolute sovereignty by the state actor has changed international politics. Al Qaeda represents a struggle of the dispossessed and the non-aligned against the nation state. Groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah act as irregular forces whose asymmetrical combat tactics are aimed at the international state system itself. Russians and Americans both are the targets of these groups; the *mujahideen* against the Russians in Afghanistan and now the jihadists against the Americans in Afghanistan proceed from this general premise. However, both the Russians and Americans can close ranks on this common enemy and still pursue their respective national interests. The difference is that much of the action against the common enemy of terrorism is taking place in the FSU (Former Soviet Union) and Russian Near Abroad, as well as within the United States.

With much residual suspicion and fear since the loss of Russian superpower status as the Soviet Union, this represents a serious geopolitical imbalance. Fear of a neo-containment by the West, especially if Russian democratic reforms stall, is palpable. The aggressive actions of NATO expansion promoted by the United States, feeds Russian angst in this regard. The generosity of Putin's allowances to let America into Georgia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian republics to train their forces and to establish bases under the banner of fighting global terrorism, also leave Russia with the foreboding sense of encroachment as Russia reemerges and wishes to reestablish its foreign policy. Why, Russians ask, does the American military resist leaving the FSU areas? In Putin's thinking, the answer is obvious:



The strategy of unilateral action can destabilize the international situation, provoke tensions and an arms race, and exacerbate the contradictions between states and national and religious strife. The use of force-based methods in circumvention of the existing international legal mechanisms is incapable of removing the deep-seated socioeconomic, ethnic, and other contradictions that underlie conflicts, and other contradictions that underlie conflicts, and only undermines the foundations of the rule of law.”<sup>215</sup>

Putin, in virtually all of his foreign policy speeches and conferences referenced the lack of responsibility demonstrated by the American administration to the tenets and principles of international law. He deplored the new tendency of the Bush administration to abrogate treaties and precedents set by former American leaders which cast the United States as unilateralists and violators of the United Nations guidelines in particular. In his Munich Speech in 2007, he “took off the diplomatic gloves.” He repeatedly lambasted the United States on a variety of issues stemming from their new unilateralism:

Simultaneously, the so-called flexible frontline American bases have up to five thousand men in each. It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly enforce the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all. I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at that time that: the fact that we are not ready to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee. Where are those guarantees?<sup>216</sup>

---

<sup>215</sup> Ivanov. *The New Russian Diplomacy*. 165-194.

<sup>216</sup> Vladimir Putin. “Full Text of Putin’s Speech in Munich: Speech at the 43<sup>rd</sup> Munich Conference on Security Policy.” As reported by the Washington Post 02/10/2007. 5. <http://www.wakeupfromyourslumber.com/node/646>.

Putin went on throwing down the gauntlet in particularly blunt language; his anger was extremely apparent. He resurrected old grievances as well as new concerns, especially the perceived continued threat against Russia of American plans to install a star-wars type ABM system in Poland and the Czech Republic, which he claimed were thinly veiled threats to the Russian Federation. After threatening to vacate the OSCE agreement, he concluded with a telling remark as to the new direction of Russian foreign policy, especially in light of the American unilateralism Russia was witnessing: “

In conclusion I would like to note the following. We very often-I very often-hear appeals by our partners, including our European partners, to the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs. In connection with this I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is hardly necessary to incite us to do so. Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are well aware of how the world has changed and we have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential. And of course we would like to interact with responsible partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all.”<sup>217</sup>

The recent American proposal to put a radar tracking station in the Czech Republic and an anti-ballistic missile intercept system in Poland represents a real geopolitical containment threat to Russia. Putin’s recent counterproposals relocating that system in Azerbaijan at Russian expense (and control) represents a return to strategic aspects of the Cold War. The alleged enemy is now a nuclear Iran and a potentially dangerous North Korea. However, Russia fears that it will also serve as a sentry at the door of a reemerging potent Russia.

---

<sup>217</sup> Putin, “Full Text of Putin’s Speech in Munich,” 7.

Putin realized that by *bandwagoning* with the Americans in the war on terrorism, Moscow could fulfill one of its primary foreign policy goals, to join western societies in common cause which would ostensibly make Russia, “one of us.”<sup>218</sup> Being accepted by western clubs, cooperatives and “polite international society” would bring Russia out of diplomatic isolation and pave the way for its re-ascendance to the world stage.

If there is a change to a more progressive American administration in 2009, Russia should be in a much stronger position to act in concert with renewed American diplomatic overtures to a return of American diplomacy to the traditional paths of its efforts to reintegrate the United States into a more balanced and nuanced approach to international relations and diplomatic protocols as has characterized American foreign policy in the past. Depending on the extent done by the Bush administration and the time it takes to repair it and depending on Putin-Medvedev’s continued success in moving Russia forward dependent on the continued vitality of their petro-recovery,

Vladimir Putin is determined that Russia will “break out” onto the world political scene with all due haste as the opportunity affords itself. The current opportunity lies in Russia’s return to financial health and the difficulties that the American government faces due to its growing isolation in Iraq. Just as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, afforded Putin the chance to help and befriend the United States and therefore, “join the international democratic clubs,” the current difficulties of the flagging Bush administration afford Putin the opportunity to take advantage of this situation just as

---

<sup>218</sup> The work of John J. Mearsheimer is instructive here. As another “offensive realist” akin to Christopher Layne, his theories on the phenomena of *bandwagoning* are appropriate. For a thorough treatment of this subject, see *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 2001), Balancing, according to Mearsheimer, can be a powerful tool to manipulate the power of a dominant state such as the United States.

economic fortune is smiling on Russia. Both are opportunities and as a pragmatic politician not necessarily oriented to ideology, Putin must seek to maximize Russia's national interests.

As the second Bush administration winds down and is readjusting its foreign policy rhetoric and general approaches to international relations, if not by design but by necessity promulgated by its foreign policy reversals, Vladimir Putin, ever the pragmatist, seeks to substantiate the recent gains in Russian economic and political support he has begun to muster. The recent resignation of Igor S. Ivanov, a long-serving Russian diplomat, who served as secretary of the National Security Council, a powerful security and foreign policy advisory group in the Russian government, was Russia's foreign minister from 1998 until 2004.<sup>219</sup>

He oversaw a policy of toughening Moscow's position on Iran's nuclear program, bringing Russia's stance more in line with that of the United States. His influence was waning recently; Russia's *Vedomosti* newspaper suggested in an article that linked his departure to an internal restructuring, rather than change of policy on Iran. It said Mr. Ivanov's offer to resign may signal Mr. Putin's intention to boost the importance of the Security Council in Russian politics by putting a more influential figure in the job.<sup>220</sup>

Putin appears to be strengthening geopolitical and foreign policy gains before his departure as president in 2008 and his assumption of the position of Prime Minister.

Given the protocol aspects of the Bush-Putin relationship, the macro-level strategic accommodation between the United States and Russia may continue, however sticking points and areas of increasing tension begin to multiply. Both lame duck

---

<sup>219</sup> "Russia: Security Council Official Resigns." International section of *the New York Times*, Tuesday, July 10, 2007. A11

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid*, A11.

presidents, George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, have much invested in the continuation of the strategic relationship based on the undeniable common ground that both countries remain the premier nuclear powers in the world today. Even with the obvious tactical and strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States in command and control functions, Russian modernization, particularly in its missile regiments, cannot be easily ignored. Secondly, Russia is a voting member of the United Nations Security Council, a position Putin obviously wants to strengthen. Thirdly, the international threat of militant Islam and jihadist non-governmental organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda, continue to cause both governments to close ranks in a united front. Nuclear proliferation issues also demand the common attention of the two governments as this potent threat appears more and more likely to be the next vehicle that the terrorists will pursue to maximize their goals to attain political goals through asymmetrical warfare against both a superpower and a reemerging great power.

In a seminal American study/workshop addressing nuclear terrorism, called “The Day After,” American nuclear and defense experts predicted that the next significant terrorist attack against the United States will be nuclear. Using elements of game theory, American analysts suggest an Islamic terrorist organization, likely al Qaeda due to their experience and global reach, will carry out this attack against a major American city. That city will likely be Washington D C.<sup>221</sup> Implicit in the findings of the workshop is the argument that the terrorists would obtain nuclear materials from a Russian source,

---

<sup>221</sup> Ashton B. Carter, Michael M. May, and William J. Perry. A Report Based on a Workshop Hosted by The Preventative Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities, Ashton B. Carter and William Perry, Co-Directors. Date of Workshop April 19, 2007. This workshop was stimulated by the Nunn-Lugar Program in 2005 as part of the Testimony Before the 9/11 Public Project of June 27, 2005. It addressed the basic analytical questions: “The Day After an Attack: What Would We Wish We Had Done?” Also: “Why Aren’t We Doing It Now?”

perhaps using an Islamic middle-man such as Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan. This scenario assumes that there is enough of a security concern with the current protection of post-cold War Russian stockpiles to warrant using Russia as the likely source of a nuclear materials breach.<sup>222</sup> Russian security experts assure the West and particularly the United States that all Russian nuclear source materials have long been secured under Vladimir Putin's presidency.

After 9/11, prevention has become paramount in preparations of the Department of Homeland Security. Many Homeland Security exercises address the nuclear scenario with individual American state security affiliates.<sup>223</sup> If such a disaster were ever to occur, the political consequences would be global. American-Russian cooperation would be paramount to control escalation and further proliferation. It would quickly move from an American security issue to a global security issue. The Russians and Americans, being the primary nuclear powers in the world today, should be, as it is in their common respective strategic interests, front-line in their coordinated responses to an assault of this magnitude. Again, common interests will spur continued common cause and coordination at least at the macro-level. The "fly in the ointment," as usual, is based in Russian fears of American unilateralism as represented by the ABM problem as well as traditional American fears of Russian imperialism.

---

<sup>222</sup> Carter, Report from the Preventative Defense Project, 4.

<sup>223</sup> A recent exercise of this type was described to me by one of my students in my course, "Disaster and Terrorism Awareness," taught in Indianapolis in Spring of 2007. A homeland security specialist and military officer, he described in broad terms how state, federal and local jurisdictions coordinated their first responders and strategic assets in an exercise in Spring of 2007 held in the state of Indiana. This course was offered under the auspices of a Homeland Security grant through Ivy Tech Community College in Lawrence/Fort Benjamin Harrison Campus.

It is unfortunate that the United States and Putin's Russia cannot facilitate the competitive-cooperative nature of their relationship in a more constructive fashion over the long run. Subtract the dire consequences of 9/11 and terrorism itself and what remains on the negotiating list is the long-term relationship, nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The arms race sustained the Cold War. The potential new arms race has become the focus of the latest friction between the two countries. "Global Net," the American anti-missile shield capability world-wide, threatens Russia with isolation, strategic targeting and neo-containment by a genuine *hegemonic nuclear superpower*. This is where the United States has the starkest advantage over Russia as Putin runs full speed to catch up after virtually 20 years of falling behind in the technological race to modernize their strategic defenses. Most important is the technological gap but the quantities gap is also immense.

The very posture of the American government's nuclear policy under the Bush administration appears to many experts to be "out of balance" and indeed, inappropriate for the political situation in the world today.<sup>224</sup> During the Cold War, *Mutually Assured Destruction* (MAD) prevailed as American war-fighting doctrine in response to the Soviet Union's superior first strike capabilities due to their heavier "throw weight" advantage. If a first strike were guaranteed to be responded to with total a counter- force response, surely the Soviet Union would not see the rationale for launching such a massive attack if its own *destruction* were *assured*. This quid pro quo allegedly kept the relative peace for over forty years and restricted the Americans and Soviets to *Low*

---

<sup>224</sup> John Deutch. "Rethinking Nuclear Strategy." *Foreign Affairs*. January/February 2005. New York. 49-60. John Deutch is Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council and Director of Central Intelligence during the Clinton administration and as Undersecretary of Energy during the Carter Administration.

*Intensity Wars* and fierce competitions for ideological allegiances throughout the Third World. “The collapse of the Soviet Union was a dramatic geopolitical shift that should have led to major changes in the nuclear posture of the United States.”<sup>225</sup> Deutch further concluded that: “Unfortunately, the current US nuclear posture does not reflect this shift.”<sup>226</sup> Deutch advocates that the nuclear arsenal of the United States is nearly totally unnecessary given its overwhelming conventional arsenals to sustain strategic hegemonic superiority in the world today.<sup>227</sup>

The logical conclusion of this argument is that the United States is in fact aggravating proliferation by its insistence on maintaining commanding nuclear inventory leads in quantity and in the continuing questionable development of new generations of nuclear weapons. Russia feels that it is in a defensive position in this situation. Russia cannot interpret the events of September 11, 2001 with the need for this military excess by the United States. In fact, Putin interprets Bush’s stubborn expansion of and improvement of all American strategic weapons as a hegemonic smokescreen to extend *pax Americana* indefinitely. The Bush Doctrine sustains Putin’s suspicions.<sup>228</sup>

Common cause over 9/11 is breaking down largely due to this scenario: The United States is continuing to extend its military capabilities under the guise of the severe threat of international terrorism, especially by al Qaeda. President Bush’s political rhetoric has become one-dimensional and totally predictable as he constantly uses fear of

---

<sup>225</sup> Deutch. “Rethinking Nuclear Strategy”, 40.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid, 49.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid, 50.

<sup>228</sup> See Bush’s address at Westpoint in 2002 declaring America’s intention to maintain strategic superiority in the world.



a renewed terrorist attack like 9/11 against the United States. Putin is trying to keep the détente generated by the “War on Terror” alive because he knows his relationship with the United States is absolutely critical for the future of Russia. However, given the increasing polemic and geopolitical shift from American unilateralism to a new multipolarity resulting from balancing against the United States, a shift the Americans cannot seem to restrain due largely to the quagmire in Iraq, Russia is accelerating its own recovery from the confusion and malaise of the transition years especially after Boris Yeltsin. They are gradually retrenching and withdrawing logistical tactical support for the Americans and especially George W. Bush who is under siege politically both in his own country and internationally for most of his policies both domestic and foreign. Smiles and fishing in Maine do not obviate the obvious signs of dissention and chaos in the Russian-American complicated and long-standing relationship.

Russia’s reactions to Bush’s foreign policy since 9/11 have been largely collaborative based on the discussions in this chapter about common interests. Perennial problems have also been partially addressed. These include nuclear proliferation, perceived geopolitical infringements on the Russian FSU and Near Abroad to include the breakup of Yugoslavia, current ABM issues, as well as American complaints regarding Russian democratic reforms or the lack thereof. Human rights abuses by the Russian Army are always an American focus of attention with Russian allegations of Chechen terrorist activities as a rebuttal. A new arms competition has complicated matters as well. Before the second Putin administration, Russia merely tried to survive. Since then, a windfall of massively increased petro-dollar revenues in the last 5-7 years has propelled

the Russian economy and revived foreign policy back onto the world stage from the edge of disaster.

Russia has increased its political leverage on Europe and therefore the European Union to the point that Germany and others are in danger of being suborned to Russian energy pressures from Moscow. Russian foreign policy is beginning to weigh heavily upon EU politics and thereby American politics by proxy.

Putin waits for the inevitable change in American foreign policy in 2009 with a new American administration. Both men have legacies to shape and confirm that will affect the directions of their respective foreign policy establishments. Before 9/11, it looked like business as usual between the Americans and the Russians. Reacting to Putin's apparent lack of democratic credentials and his penchant for control from the top, America basically tolerated and ignored Russia while casting a cynical eye on Vladimir Putin who periodically represented a throwback to former Soviet strongman times with his State Security credentials.

The Treaty of Moscow in 2002 was a mere appeasement tossed to Putin as a way to placate Russia's complaints of being treated with general disdain as strategically irrelevant by the United States. It did not really break any new ground except to give Washington even more wiggle room to abrogate previous missile treaties. America's goal was then and is now of course, to negate residual Russian nuclear power and to provide for "Global Net," American ABM capabilities world-wide.

*And the Russian Side?*

Yuliya Tymoshenko, the former Ukrainian prime minister, as well as the current prime minister, has recently made astute observations about Russia:

Those questions are all the more vexing because Russia is usually judged on the basis of speculation about its intentions rather than on the basis of its actions. In the aftermath of communism's collapse, it was assumed that Russia's imperial ambitions had vanished—and that foreign policy toward Russia could be conducted as if former diplomatic considerations did not apply. Yet they must apply, for Russia straddles the world's geopolitical heartland and is heir to a remorseless imperial tradition.<sup>229</sup>

Discounting her potential Ukrainian angst against Russia, her analysis offers balance to the Russian-American equation and gives pause and insight into the potential “dark side” of Vladimir Putin to raise the Russian phoenix once more from the ashes returning it to regional hegemony.

Tymoshenko's list of “proofs” that Putin is steering Russia back to regional hegemony at the least follow in the “Russian Janus” section of her Foreign Affairs article “Containing Russia”: (1) Russia's petro-revival has propelled Russia's annual GDP to 6.5 percent annually, and a trillion dollar economy, (2) political competition has been neutralized, (3) news outlets and unfriendly journalists now fear retribution in opposition, (4) Russian oligarchs, such as the exiled Boris Berezovsky, no longer represent a threat to the current regime.<sup>230</sup> Kremlin cronies have replaced elected regional governors, and Russia's parliament, the Duma, has been emasculated as part of the Kremlin's drive to monopolize all state power.<sup>231</sup> Finally, according to Tymoshenko:

The backgrounds of the people who make up Putin's government have something to do with this orientation. A study of 1,016 leading figures in Putin's regime—department heads of the president's administration, cabinet members, parliamentary deputies, heads of federal units, and heads of regional executive and legislative branches—conducted by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, director of Moscow's Center for the Study of Elites,

---

<sup>229</sup> Tymoshenko. “Containing Russia.”, 69.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid, 70.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid, 70.

found that 26 percent at some point served in the KGB or one of its successor agencies Kryshtanovskaya argues that a closer look at these biographies—examining gaps in resumes, odd career paths, or service in KGB affiliates—suggests that 78 percent of the top people in Putin’s regime can be considered ex—KGB.<sup>232</sup>

She suggests that these facts altogether rule out any possibility of Vladimir Putin’s reign as president of Russia as anything but a repeat of Soviet-era authoritarianism. When suggesting that Putin’s turn to the United States after 9/11 was a turn toward democracy, she reminds us that Putin’s diplomatic initiatives of making common cause with the Americans in the name of fighting the common enemy, global terrorism, does not preclude the fact that Russia is a democracy in name only. She further asserts that:

In the past 15 years, the response to Russian actions by the United States and Europe has been driven by their perceptions of Russian reform. Western policy seems to be based on the premise that peaceful evolution can be ensured by democracy and by concentrating Russia’s energies on developing a market economy.<sup>233</sup>

Tymoshenko’s analysis represents a sharp contrast to American liberal thought that Russia is just taking longer to implement democratic reforms because of the necessity to stabilize the government, the economy and the foreign policy sectors of a Russian government still trying to join western forums while not abdicating any Russian sovereignty to the United States. Another prominent democratic Russian analyst, in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, July 12, 2007, Sergey Karaganov, sees other contrasts. Reacting to the “color revolutions” in particular, Karaganov believes the Kremlin is defeating all such liberal democratic experiments with ‘authoritarian democracy.’ He posits that the real

---

<sup>232</sup> Tymoshenko. “Containing Russia”, 70-72.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid, 75.

contest between Russia and the West, particularly the United States is between liberal democracy and authoritarian capitalism.<sup>234</sup>

Represented by what he terms “The New Era” (NE), he describes the current political situation between Putin’s government and the West, particularly America, as follows:

In recent months Russia has been definitely removed from the list of democratic powers and declared a completely authoritarian power. That would be altogether distressing if the list of democracies did not include among others, even more politically backward states with extremely repressive regimes that, however, are distinguished by their willingness to follow in the wake of the United States or other old Western states. But the very write--off of Russia is an important indicator.<sup>235</sup>

It appears that the admittedly semi-authoritarian Russian regime is being blackmailed by the Americans as retribution for going its own way. While Russia was essentially characterized as a developing democracy under an enlightened leader who undoubtedly would make more liberal course corrections after stability in Russia was secured, is now a typical Russian imperialist strongman reverting to the expansionist authoritarian past. Since beating the Russians after the implosion of the USSR in 1991 with this psychological stick and offering only conditional carrots, it appears, albeit buoyed with massive petro-dollar revenues, a tactic that is having less and less effect on Putin and reemerging Russia. The potential for détente and peaceful cooperation is being seriously challenged by the new hard-hitting realism being exhibited by both sides. Competition and now ideology again, are overtaking a relative period of peace during the post-cold-War transition. This is a consistent pattern in American-Russian relations from

---

<sup>234</sup> Sergey Karaganov, dean of the Department of World Economics and World Politics at the State University—Higher School of Economics. Moscow. July 12, 2007. “A New Era is Beginning.” 1.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid, 1

pre-Cold War days through the current period. It appears that there are only limited venues available for compatibility between the two countries; history has made this statement axiomatic.

*Russian sticks and carrots since 9/11*

Cooperation with the West, particularly the United States since 9/11, has been accompanied by Putin's relentless drive toward his national goals to resurrect Russian cohesion and organization to the severely dysfunctional Russian state bequeathed to him by the hapless Boris Yeltsin. Reflecting his security training and mental toughness developed by his practice of the martial arts, Putin has been true to his goals and has not yielded to domestic or foreign pressure. His use of the "energy weapon" as characterized by the West, presupposes malevolence on the part of Putin. It has been a long time since Russia has had anything to use to its advantage rather than the vague and largely discredited nuclear threat and the U.N. Security Council veto. Struggling to keep the Russian state from devolving would appear a genuine enough concern to use any and all means to right a floundering ship. To put the Russian house back in order in view of the absolute disaster represented by the collapse of the Communist Party and the command economy, not to mention the economic and political infrastructure of a huge country. It could be stated that Yeltsin's judgment to select Putin because of his determination were well founded and will be reviewed as his best judgment politically after all. Putin has done all Yeltsin asked with the important exception of continuing along the path of liberal democratic reform. Given that Yeltsin himself had essentially abandoned that course as well within three years of this first administration, Putin remains the

appropriate *pragmatic choice* for post Yeltsin succession and *state-building*, the most crucial element missing from Yeltsin's achievements.

The carrots for repatriation to the Russian sphere of influence have been harder to identify. Restoring order to sub-economies and private enterprises threatened by transition era anarchy might be considered a carrot albeit a not always welcome one. Moscow and the regions have largely managed, since the tragic Beslan episode, to contain the Islamic fundamentalist threat, further stabilizing the Near Abroad and the FSU.<sup>236</sup> Therefore, the essentially defunct Commonwealth of Independent States, initially a loose confederation at best, shows signs of life as a viable organization again.

Again, according to Karaganov:

The most obvious external reason for the advent of the new era (NE), is Moscow's increased willingness to and ability to defend its interests as it understands them now, which was especially unpleasant for the political classes of the countries of the traditional West because they had developed the bad habit of considering Russia to be weak and weak-willed.<sup>237</sup>

Putin's cooperation after 9/11 was seen by many Americans as opportunism. It was seen as a genuine attempt to erase decades of animosity and to create a new political landscape for the Russians and Americans to initiate something unique missing in the past. It was seen, however, by many Americans as a desperate move by Putin to revitalize Russian foreign policy from a position of weakness and therefore was an *American opportunity* to further marginalize Russian foreign policy efforts to reconstruct

---

<sup>236</sup> Beslan, a school in North Ossetia, was seized by Chechyan forces under the command of Shamil Basayev, a separatist. In the days that followed, hundreds of adults and children were killed, adding to a year of terrorism in Russia filled with terrorist atrocities.

<sup>237</sup> Sergey Karaganov. "Authoritarian Capitalism vs. Liberal Democracy Seen as New Era Signal." *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, Moscow, July 12, 2007. 3.

Russia's status as a returning global power, a situation that the Bush administration has already stated it definitely does not want.<sup>238</sup>

De facto neo-containment of Russia was an apparent *fait accompli* for the Americans during the 1990's. That has, of course changed under Vladimir Putin. In Central Asia, where the Americans had gotten footholds during the transition period after 1991, efforts to discourage American adventurism and interference in FSU republics have been stubbornly installed. Russians feel that the American attempt to contain them again in a post-cold War political environment is a desperate attempt to both maintain American global hegemony, already a disputed notion among international relations specialists, and a revealing look at the unfortunate tenets of the Bush Doctrine, discredited already by its failures in the Middle East and around the world. Moreover, the declared intentions of the ABM missile proposals for Poland and the Czech Republic loses even more credibility as the American efforts of Russian re-containment surface and become plain for all to see.

As the world moves toward intensified energy politics and growing energy dependence, those with it are empowered and those without it or with limited supplies become dependent. This changing dynamic is revolutionizing the world along geopolitical and economic deterministic lines. Ideological-based arguments such as democratic evangelism, a main tenet of the Bush Doctrine, are becoming increasingly irrelevant. If the non-democratic Middle East and the illiberal Russian state collectivize their energy reserves along with lawless regimes like Hugo Chavez in paramilitary Venezuela and Islamic Indonesia, the prospects for democratic conversion world-wide

---

<sup>238</sup> Daniel Treisman. "How Different is Putin's Russia?" *Foreign Affairs*. Nov/Dec (New York, 2002). 67.



lose their potency. It is largely due to this basic evolutionary economic factor that America has resorted to protracted military struggles in oil-rich lands such as Iraq. Using democratic evangelism as diplomatic cover, American interests are much more about world-wide energy control than “spreading the faith.”<sup>239</sup>

There is a rivalry between the traditional West and the energy-producing countries for control over energy resources. And between the models of liberal democratic capitalism and authoritarian capitalism. And that is against the background of the fact that Russia is still involved in three fractures—between radical Islam and Christian civilization, between the rich and the poor, and between Europe and Asia.<sup>240</sup>

The threat to all states that globalization brings, increasingly to their sovereignty and independence of political and economic actions, is affecting institutions and countries alike. The NGO’s, non-governmental organizations, as well as the transnational corporations (TNC’s), create politics of their own that often disregard the established traditional rules, and therefore governments, of the nation-states. James Rosenau has written about the transformation of “international relations” becoming *postinternational politics*:

The very notion of “international relations” seems obsolete in the face of an apparent trend in which more and more of the interactions that sustain world politics unfold without the direct involvement of nations or states.”<sup>241</sup>

NGO’s and individuals are an important part of the new politics. Economic loyalties to corporations and non-governmental organizations often outweigh loyalties to countries;

---

<sup>239</sup> Again, see Karaganov, page 8 where he characterizes the American attack on Iraq as while rationalized as a spread of democracy by ridding Iraq of Hussein, in reality caused the strengthening of Iraqi resolve not to abdicate Iraq to become an American oil terminal in the Middle East.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>241</sup> James Rosenau. “Previewing Postinternational Politics” from “Turbulence in World Politics.” *Global Politics In a Changing World*. Third Edition, Richard W. Mansbach and Edward Rhodes, eds. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006). 21.

indeed citizenship itself is under attack.<sup>242</sup> The hegemonic United States and the former superpower Russia are the supreme examples of the nation-states maximized in its capabilities. The respective struggles of these immense polities are suffering from the effects of globalization and the reduction of statehood.

Meanwhile, the basis for Russian-American cooperation is being damaged by the peripheral issues arising from Putin's new foreign policy stridency and American reluctance to cede any political ground to Putin on strategic issues. These polarities have been epitomized by the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008.

Putin is already being vilified in the American press due to his "lack of cooperation" on defense issues and for his lack of determination to steer his country toward liberal democracy. Though the strategic, macro-level chemistry between Bush and Putin is ostensibly still intact, the increasingly vitriolic rhetorical exchanges between Moscow and Washington are threatening to derail the whole post 9/11 détente and terminate what reserves of good will that might still exist between the two governments.

MSNBC reported from the recent article in *Newsweek*, by Owen Matthews:

Putin: From US Ally to Global Tyrant. George Bush stood with his hand on Vladimir Putin's shoulder. It was November 2001, and the two leaders had just enjoyed Texas steaks personally barbequed by Bush at his family ranch, before heading to Crawford High School to address an audience of students. 'It's my honor to welcome a new style of leader,' Bush said as he introduced the Russian president: 'A reformer, a man who loves his country as much as I love mine.' Putin had been the first foreign leader to call in the hours after 9/11 to offer support in the War on Terror, recalled Bush.<sup>243</sup>

---

<sup>242</sup> Rosenau. "Previewing Postinternational Politics", 21.

<sup>243</sup> "Putin: From US Ally to Global Tyrant," by Owen Matthews of *Newsweek Magazine*, July 23, 2007 issue, as reported online by MSNBC and *Newsweek International*. [www.msnbc.msn.com](http://www.msnbc.msn.com), 1.

Putin replied that Bush had bravely defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan in short order and he pledged continuing Russian cooperation against international terrorism.<sup>244</sup>

“Russian President Vladimir Putin was supposed to be a pro-American reformer.

So what went wrong?”

The new Putin, in the words of his adviser General Gennady Troshev, former commander of the Russian Army in Chechnya, is a ‘different person—tough, stern, harsh with those who dare to doubt his orders.’<sup>245</sup>

At the bottom of Putin’s list of sins (already enumerated earlier), is the most damning summation:

Moscow also began a root-and-branch rethink of Russia’s relationship to the United States. ‘Putin’s illusions about America were shattered,’ says political scientist Vyacheslav Nikinov, a regular Kremlin advisor, following a policy review following the color revolutions. ‘No matter how much Russia supported the U.S., Washington still retained the same, essentially hostile attitude.’ Since then, fears of Western encirclement have only increased as NATO makes overtures to Georgia and Ukraine and plans to station antimissile batteries in Poland and the Czech Republic.’<sup>246</sup>

The article continues to paint Putin in dark negativity for balancing against the United States with rogue states and its traditional enemies as well as ascribing to him dark intentions of exploiting current difficulties that the United States is having due to its lack of progress in Iraq and the Middle East in general. In an apparent counter diplomatic offensive, he has courted new alliance possibilities as well as new cartelism potentialities with traditional American allies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In the words of a senior western diplomat, Putin, who insisted on remarks off the record, “It’s about saying:

---

<sup>244</sup> Matthews, “Putin: From US Ally to Global Tyrant” 1.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid, 2.

‘We’re back, you can’t push us around anymore.’”<sup>247</sup> With United Nations veto power intact, Russia feels confident it can stymie American initiatives anywhere in the world. As American unilateralism and the Bush Doctrine fade in Bush’s lame duck presidency, Putin no longer fears Bush’s abilities to “punish” Russia for going its own way.

Perhaps even more contentious than the American position in Iraq is the potential for war in Iran. Russian-Iranian cooperation on nuclear issues frustrates American efforts to fully implement sanctions there. Certainly during the Cold War, Russian support of Iran as well as the Palestinian Liberation Organization under Yassir Arafat, and Egypt under Gamal Nassar, and Syria, as well as others, set the stage for a contest of allegiances solicited by both countries. Russian logistical support for Iranian nuclear development has long roots. While Russia adheres to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran, it does not preclude the peaceful use of nuclear energy to generate electrical power in Iran. The unconditional opposition to Iranian acquisition of nuclear power by the United States, puts Moscow and Washington at odds once again. Washington still needs Russian support in the United Nations Security Council to implement its sanctions on Iran.<sup>248</sup>

At stake for Putin of course, is the long-term relationship with the United States. At risk is a cherished goal of membership in the polite clubs of the West, led by the United States. There is already growing sentiment to deny Russian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) due to its lack of identity as a democratic potential member. Putin has worked for many years to integrate into the western forums and it

---

<sup>247</sup> Matthews, “Putin: From US Ally to Global Tyrant” 2.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid, 2.

would be a blow to Russia and him personally not to attain those goals after so much concentrated effort.

American diplomatic losses only enhance the opportunities of the Russian foreign policy establishment to step into the void and power vacuum. Ironically, had the Bush administration followed the advice of its allies and Vladimir Putin himself to make genuine common cause to stabilize international relations right after September 11, 2001, the immense problems of Iraq and a newly destabilized Middle East and current growing problems between the United States and the Russian Federation would likely not have arisen.

In Chapter 5, “The American Hegemon and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-emption,” the continued decline of American foreign policy will reveal the failures of the Bush Doctrine and its guiding principle of pre-emptive warfare. 9/11 created an American deviation from its traditional rules of engagement through the extraordinary circumstances born of the attacks on the American ruling superstructure- financial, military and political. Decapitation was the objective: Paralyze the nation’s financial, district, its military headquarters, and its political leadership. Though the last objective failed to materialize, the disarray that followed the attacks was just as devastating.

Though America had suffered sneak attacks before, specifically the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941, it was never exclusively against an unarmed civilian population or by a group rather than a nation-state. Due largely to the audacity of the attacks that day, extreme responses followed. Those responses were described in this chapter. Their manifestations in response to the terrorist threat will be examined in Chapter 5. If terror and a change of political structure were the objectives of Osama bin

Laden and al Qaeda that day, it became evident in multiple ways that he and his jihadist group were successful. Never again has America treated asymmetrical warfare by terrorist groups with the disregard that it showed the world before September 11, 2001 and that Richard Clark warned against.

As the inevitable apathy engendered by passing time sets in, as it does eventually after all disasters, Americans secretly fear that it could happen again. The most troubling question could be: "If we get bin Laden, will it then end?" Russia shares that fear even as they disagree with the Bush administration's general approach to international relations; Putin was right in 2001 when he said bin Laden's outrageous act was a crime against all humanity. The United States and Russia would be wise to continue their coordinated security vigilance and strategic cooperation against the new enemy of the organized nation-state.

Regardless of differences on many issues, some growingly acute, the security of the world's governing units is still the nation-state although those firm definitions are fading. Cooperation among them in a collective fashion against anarchy and theocracy as well as ideology based on asymmetrical warfare and guerilla tactics is very necessary as the world evolves. The United Nations has sought to address the issues that germinate grievances such as those growing in the Islamic world of fundamentalism. Doctrines such as the Bush Doctrine are increasingly anachronistic in an interdependent world.

Russian-American relations continue to revolve around primary and secondary issues. Nuclear weapons, non-proliferation, common ground on terrorism will ensure that the two countries will remain strategically engaged. Continued integration of Russia's

dynamic new petro-economy will guarantee that Putin and Medvedev will be involved in global relations and with the United States for the indefinite future.

## CHAPTER V THE AMERICAN HEGEMON AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE OF PRE-EMPTION

This chapter sets the stage for a new direction in the strategic American-Russian relationship. The United States was severely diminished by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Russia has been reemerging as a global power with the aid of a strong leader and a dynamic petro economy. The American foreign policy debacle being witnessed in Iraq has catalyzed Russian foreign policy efforts to rejuvenate their efforts to regain the integrity of Russian space both politically and economically.

Ignoring diplomatic globalism and the inevitable process of global interdependence, America has made the classic mistake of empire, over-reach. The mounting evidence of necessary course correction by the United States is more visible every day as the continuing lack of progress in Iraq remains constant. While continuing the practice of unilateralism, the re-invigorated U. S. State Department is quietly seeking, largely through traditional back channels, to establish working relationships with some of Iraq's neighbors to find a regional solution to what is, in fact, a regional problem. As stated repeatedly in the Iraq Study Group's conclusions, a military solution is not viable in this classic contest of asymmetrical guerilla warfare. General Patraeus, as he took command of the new "surge" in Iraq testified before Congress that Iraq could not be solved in military terms but by a political solution. As the extreme violence continues and the American troop reinforcements engage in security sweeps, President Bush appeals to an increasingly resistant Democratic Congress, to send a funding bill to him without timelines or benchmarks. As reports like the following continue to flow daily out of Iraq, the logic of continuing military action fades:



The American and Iraq security plan is now in its 11<sup>th</sup> week, but car bombs have remained a lethal problem that so far has defeated the intense efforts of the American and Iraqi military to halt them, partly by blocking access to areas with heavy traffic.<sup>249</sup>

Reports of this nature are a daily staple in the professional journals and top-line dailies. The repeated stories represent a mosaic but an accurate depiction of the struggle in Iraq. As the struggle continues and perpetuates, the attrition factors multiply. With the cost of American operations in Iraq surpassing \$500 billion, American fiscal policy has evolved into an exclusively singular enterprise; few other budget considerations are being entertained in Washington as all eyes are on the war. Foreign governments and their representatives all over the world are complaining that it is nearly impossible to get the attention of the American government on anything else but the war in Iraq and regionally related issues such as the covert struggle with Iran and its accompanying hostile rhetoric. Almost all news out of Washington relates to the war, related issues in the larger Middle East, and the vortex of political problems spinning around Iraq and Iran as related to that quagmire. The inevitable comparisons to Vietnam are mounting and the isolation of George Bush continues. In comparison to the first major foreign policy failure the size of Vietnam, this misbegotten and ill-conceived military adventure in the Middle East, is rapidly showing signs of escalating to another American tragedy.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the neo-realism of the Bush Doctrine is sorely out of touch in a truly globalized world. In the words of Jacob English:

Failure of the American intervention will arguably have a long-term negative impact on U. S. influence and interests and economic well-being. The erosion of American power is also likely to have a damaging effect on

---

<sup>249</sup> Alissa J. Rubin. "Market Attack Tops a Deadly Day in Iraq" *The New York Times*. A14, Monday, May 7, 2007.

U. S. allies, Arab and Israeli, as Iran and Syria and Muslim extremists gain the upper hand in shaping the region to their liking.<sup>250</sup>

English continues his analysis of the reasons behind the American invasion of Iraq in 2003:

The importance of reliable, accessible, and affordable oil to fuel the U. S. and Western economies prompts many in the Arab world, including Iran, to conclude that the 2003 war was not just about terrorism. The war reinforces the widely held view that the central issue of the U. S. invasion was control of Iraqi oil, since it has been proven that there were no ties between the Saddam Hussein regime and terrorist organizations.<sup>251</sup>

As the post-invasion documentation of American duplicity multiplies, the Russian interest in its former client state of Iraq remains muted. However, coupled with the new irritants of missile deployment by the Americans in Poland and the new support radars in the Czech Republic, Vladimir Putin watches the Middle East and its potential to further counter-balance American global power and reach, with intense interest. Russian overtures to Saudi Arabia to form a new Russian-Saudi petro cartel will serve two purposes: (1) to drive a wedge between Riyadh and Washington and (2) to further alienate Washington's efforts to monopolize politics in the larger Middle East. Putin is no doubt aware that the American economy is constantly under threat of recession due to increased oil prices. With 2008 prices rapidly approaching the \$140 a barrel mark, the American and Western economies as well, are under strain with recession a distinct possibility. Combined with American problems with Iraq, Putin now has the space and opportunity needed to maneuver in his foreign policy objectives. Those objectives are

---

<sup>250</sup> Jacob English, "Middle East" in *From Superpower to Besieged Global Power: Restoring World Order After the Failure of the Bush Doctrine*, Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, editors. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008) 222.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid, 229.

becoming clearer as time moves on. Putin wants to operate independently from Washington and is determined to break the dependency cycle of Russian post-cold War transition foreign policy restraints dictated by American hegemonic constraints regarding Russia and her potential return to prominence.

Putin and Russia will benefit from American problems at home and internationally by making the United States more cooperative and less dictatorial in their policies. With increasing petro-diplomacy from Moscow on such key players as Germany, allegedly approaching 80 percent energy dependent on Russia, diplomatic foreign policy initiatives from Moscow obviously will carry much more weight.<sup>252</sup>

Indeed, western reactions to Putin's new stridency are illustrated by such reactions as the news that the American congress has decided to "slow" the ABM missile proposal for Poland and the Czech Republic.<sup>253</sup> Putin vehemently and repeatedly expressed concerns, coupled with European concerns of both alienating Russia and creating the polemics of a new arms race and possible new cold war, have coincided with the new role of an American Democratic congress that is slowing and examining all Bush initiatives.<sup>254</sup> The reasons offered for this reaction by the American Democratic Party is skepticism of the stated need for this strategic move and of course, negative Russian and European reactions to it.

Looking past this lame duck president and the strong potential for a dramatic shift in American foreign policy under a likely more progressive and multilateralist

---

<sup>252</sup> Tymoshenko, "Containing Russia."

<sup>253</sup> Thom Shanker. "House Panel Considering Cuts In Budget for Missile Defense." *New York Times*. Thursday, May 10, 2007. A5.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid*, A5.

administration under a probable Democratic administration in 2009, all military actions conceptualized under the rubric of the Bush Doctrine and its doctrinaire unilateralism are being met with hostility from Russia, resistance in Europe and determined skepticism in the American Congress. Ostensibly serving as a protective shield against potential future missile launches on the United States by a nuclear Iran, Putin views this potential strategic deployment as a threat and re-containment of the newly emerging Russian State.

Putin's reactions increased in tempo and shrillness, first in Munich late in 2006 and at the Russian State of the Union address at the Kremlin on May 10, 2007, describing, the provocations of the Bush administration, as being the new strategic challenge. Putin called for a moratorium on the implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, which has been "the foundation of Europe's post-war security."<sup>255</sup> In his address, full of pomp and ceremony and an extensive parade, Putin emphasized the prior glories of the Red Army and its victory over the Hitler war machine. He also linked past to present by emphasizing Russia's return to prominence in the international arena and un-questionably set a new tone which does not seek the approval of the United States, in Russian foreign policy.<sup>256</sup>

#### *Putin Declares a New Russian Path*

As each month passes, Putin has put the Americans on notice that Russia will no longer conduct its foreign policy in reaction to American strategic doctrine or its diplomatic vagaries and vicissitudes. Reminding Washington of its re-emergence as a global political actor, weak American diplomatic responses ring increasingly hollow as

---

<sup>255</sup> "Geopolitical Diary: Putin's New Old Russia." Stratfor.com April 27, 2007. 1. <http://www.stratfor.com/>

<sup>256</sup> Ibid, 1.

the hegemony of the United States begins to unravel. Counter-balancing by China, India, Europe and now Russia increase in volume and intensity; Vladimir Putin has set the stage for a renewed seriousness necessary in dealing with Russia. The days of dismissing Russian claims to its imperial past are rapidly losing strength. Putin senses this principle at work and is seizing the momentum.

Much as Putin, the realist, seized the opportunity to reach an accommodation with the United States after 9/11 out of expediency, he has now seized the initiative to break free of over 10 years of ill-founded American diplomacy. At the highest macro level, Russia still needs Washington and cooperation from all the major political actors including the EU and China. Russia no longer needs the “approval” of the others, particularly the all pervasive foreign policy domination of the United States, which in Putin’s view, has humiliated Russia’s efforts to return to prominence in international relations by taking liberties and license in the FSU, the Near Abroad of the Russian Federation and interfering in Russian global outreach initiatives in a thinly veiled re-containment of Russian efforts to re-emerge.<sup>257</sup>

The Bush Doctrine, though rapidly becoming an anachronism, basically states two things: (1) the United States will neutralize any *potential foreign* enemy before that enemy can strike the U. S. or damage its national security interests, and (2) will “spread the faith” through *democratic evangelism* or conversion to democracy. Most of Russia’s prior and present clientele would be targets of the first and objects of the second tenets of the Bush Doctrine. The ideology of American foreign policy under Bush and the pragmatism of Russian re-emergence to the world stage are diametrically opposed.

---

<sup>257</sup> “Geopolitical Diary: Putin’s New Old Russia.” Stratfor.com, 1.

Reinforced with new petro-might, Putin has accurately judged the emerging vulnerabilities of the United States. The bankruptcy of American foreign policy due to the careless handling of its traditional allies in the Atlantic relationship, the world-wide disapproval of the Bush administration's war calculus in Iraq, its misguided continuing saber-rattling and bluster vis-à-vis Iran, its tolerance of scandal after scandal affecting American image abroad, such as the Paul Wolfowitz embarrassment at the World Bank, and the relentless pursuits of an enraged American congress after six years of determined Republican party neglect of the principles of oversight and rule by executive fiat, have sharpened Putin's critical thinking as to the validity of a new opportunity for Russia to break free of almost two decades of transition-era domination by the Americans.

As succinctly stated by Roger Kanet:

What is implied by the terms 'superpower' and 'hegemon'-notions that gained increasingly concrete meaning as the conferences and concrete exchanges among participants developed-is a power that could impose its preferences by eliciting the cooperation of other states and actors, by coercion or consent. This notion of superpower and hegemonic influence implies therefore, that the United States would always prevail over resistant factors and actors because of its overwhelming dominance.<sup>258</sup>

As one of the two editors and as a chapter contributor and authority in the field, his remarks concerning U. S. and the disconnect between American declarations of hegemony and the actual performance evidence to the contrary, are exemplified in the Middle East and neglect of critical arena such as South America. It became extremely poignant when viewing the President's recent tour de force throughout South America. The protests were so large and so loud that security for him was extreme. The fact that the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, personally orchestrated much of the negative

---

<sup>258</sup> Kanet, "American Strategy for Global Order" in *From Superpower to Besieged Global Power*. 384.

press before Bush's arrivals at several capitals, particularly Brazil and Argentina as well as Columbia, shows the breadth and depth of massive mistrust of American motives around the world and particularly American neglect during the past seven years by the Bush administration in Latin America.

According to Kanet:

The editors now conclude that both for reasons of conceptual accuracy and of policy making effectiveness, the United States is doubtless a global power but not a super-power or hegemon.<sup>259</sup>

Kanet further asserts that although American military power has no equal, even this fact does not sustain American claims to global hegemony, as witnessed by its inability to date to locate and arrest or kill Osama Bin Laden, its inability to sustain the initial American victory in Afghanistan by restraining a Taliban comeback, or obviously its inability to pacify Iraq both militarily and in state-building terms.<sup>260</sup> “The limitations of the effective exercise of U. S. power are too great to permit it to function as a hegemon or imperial power”.<sup>261</sup> Further, the editors posit that America has complicated and largely failed to adapt its overall security problems by pursuing self-defeating national security policies regardless of some recent trends to selectively adopt adaptive tones to some aspects of their overall approach, their basic unilateralism still pervades the application of American foreign policy, resulting in counter-balancing strategies of both foe and ally alike simply to obviate American initiatives.

---

<sup>259</sup> Kanet, “American Strategy for Global Order,” 339.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid, 339.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid, 339.

The “either you are with us or you are against us” belligerence of the first Bush administration, unfortunately, remain the bedrock approach of American foreign policy. Vladimir Putin endured that arrogance when Russia was weak and really couldn’t resist American unilateralism, but now that there is an opportunity to break into the open, largely due to American difficulties world-wide, he has progressively moved to more stridency in identifying Russian national interests and resisting American domination of their perspective of what the relationship between Washington and Moscow should be.

*Balancing Is Not New*

In pragmatic terms, this emerging dynamic regarding resistance to American domination in international relations was inevitable. Balancing against a dominating world power is an old strategy used many times in the past. According to Christopher Layne, a self-described defensive realist,

U. S. hegemony is a double-edge sword. In other words, U. S. power is a paradox. On the one hand, U. S. primacy is acknowledged as the most important factor in maintaining global and regional stability . . . but, if not for the existing security framework provided by bilateral and multilateral alliance commitments borne by the United States, the world could, or perhaps would, be a more perilous place.<sup>262</sup>

“On the flip side of the coin, many—indeed most—of the contributors evince resentment at the magnitude of U. S. power and fear how Washington exercises that power.”<sup>263</sup>

History is replete with examples with this phenomenon. Though there no longer exists the bipolar competition of the Cold War, Russia, though strategically and globally cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism, is the new center of a ad hoc multipolar coalition that is rising to balance out already flagging American hegemonic

---

<sup>262</sup> Christopher Layne. “Offshore Balancing Revisited.” *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2002. 233-248.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid*, 234.



power. The United Nations Security Council largely negates U. S. power when Russia leads “no” votes on global issues formulated and advocated by American foreign policy makers; Russia often leads the way in dissent for France, Germany and China. As an example of the balancing against American power, Chris Layne further stated:

Under the administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, the overriding aim of U. S. grand strategy has been to ensure that the United States maintains its lofty geopolitical perch by preventing the rise of the new great powers (or the re-emergence of old ones, such as Russia).<sup>264</sup>

Even at the apparent nadir of *Pax Americana*, the restrictive logistics and historical extraneous intervening variables that mark empire over-reach appear to be at work in the American case as well.<sup>265</sup> Though America will continue to dominate the world in the foreseeable future, American diktat is already losing its applicability in a politically and economically globalized world.

Perhaps the time has come for the United States to recalibrate its diplomatic tactics with Russia as well. As 9/11 begins to fade, American justifications couched in terms of “the War on Terror” for its coercive foreign policy, are losing both their persuasion and moral power

In review of the stage-setting event that was realized with the advent of September 11, 2001, Chapter 4 has examined the detail of the macro-level strategic relationship that developed between the United States and Russia at the outset of the relationship between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin. As described earlier, both

---

<sup>264</sup> Layne. “Offshore Balancing Revisited.”, 237.

<sup>265</sup> Paul Kennedy. *The Rise and Fall of the World’s Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. (New York: First Vintage Books, Random House, 1989) Kennedy describes logistical over-reach, logistical decay, psychological atrophy and balancing by smaller, less powerful nations that eventually obviate power of even the world’s most imposing empire such as Rome, Germany, the Soviet Union and now America.

men seized upon the opportunity as a chance to break new ground. Though Bush's motives seem rooted in further suppression of Russian efforts to revive its aspirations to return to great power status, he knew he could not completely ignore Russia's presence on the U. N. Security Council as well as their rising prominence in world-wide petro-politics. Indeed, in the field of energy politics, Bush saw a chance to extend the transnational power of the oil majors, especially Exxon-Mobile based in Houston, Texas, where a American-Russian cooperative was possible with Caspian Sea oil exploration and pipeline politics.

American foreign policy has a long and varied history. It has evolved from a defensive realism strategy in its offshore foreign policy, maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the fledgling United States after the American Revolutionary War when the survival of the country was still at risk and still in doubt.<sup>266</sup> Defensive realism equated to survival. Robert Gilpin, a prominent defensive realist, has recognized *neo-realism* as a rebirth of the defensive self-interest, often manifested in offshore balancing, to protect the interests of the state in an anarchic international system predicated on survival in a modern post-cold War system.<sup>267</sup>

The Monroe Doctrine, declared in 1823, was basically a defensive measure to keep Europeans out of the Americas and to get the Russians out of the American west coast.<sup>268</sup> It perpetuated that defensive strategy and survived, though severely tested, until 1898 when America became an offshore, international, imperial power with the defeat of

---

<sup>266</sup> John J. Mearshimer. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.) 2001. 19.

<sup>267</sup> Dunne. *Globalization of World Politics*. 144-145.

<sup>268</sup> Robert D. Schulzinger. *US Diplomacy Since 1900*, fourth edition. (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3.

Spain in the Spanish-American War.<sup>269</sup> The acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands in 1897 was soon followed by wartime acquisitions of Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines in the “Splendid Little War,” against Spain.<sup>270</sup> By defeating Spain in Cuba, the United States obtained extensive overseas possessions and laid the foundations for an American empire. Notwithstanding the American penchant for “Manifest Destiny” and dramatic acquisitions and expansion to many geographical borders of North America, America began to look beyond its own continental shores and became more involved in international affairs as a competing international power.<sup>271</sup> Chris Layne describes this two-pronged but clearly identifiable distinction as, the recurring theme of Open Door as represented U. S. expansionism or America’s search for opportunity. He states:

After fulfilling its manifest destiny by expanding across the North American Continent, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century, with its rising relative economic power pushing it rapidly toward great power status, the United States began to expand abroad.<sup>272</sup>

The United States has continued to add to its global empire ever since. Where actual acquisitions have not occurred, American influence is nonetheless clearly evident, particularly in the Pacific after World War II. The distinction drawn here is that America was defensive in its foreign policy while expanding within its Manifest Destiny mantra and became an extra-regional offshore imperial power when it actually began to

---

<sup>269</sup> Schulzinger. *US Diplomacy Since 1900*, 3.

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

<sup>271</sup> Robert Kagan. *Dangerous Nation: America’s Place in the World from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century*. (New York: Knoff, 2006) There is a clear distinction between the acquisition by treaty, purchase or force, and expansionist, exceptionalism. American continental development helped define the United States of America itself as a nation and then it debarked into offshore imperialism after its first overseas acquisitions following the Spanish-American War. See “The Expansionist ‘Mission’” discussion on pages 12-13 of “The First Imperialists.”

<sup>272</sup> Layne. *The Peace of Illusions*. 33.

accumulate a foreign, *non-continental empire*. While Kagan and Layne substantially agree that the United States was expansionist from the very beginning, this distinction between onshore and offshore delineations is obvious and distinctive.

Politicians have fallen into two main groups regarding the expansionist American role in the world. They embraced it vigorously or they opposed it vigorously. The former were often labeled *imperialists* while the latter became known as *isolationists*. American foreign policy has flowed from those two competing themes. One significant individual, Andrew Carnegie, felt that the seizure of territory by the United States marked a departure from the traditions of republican rule.<sup>273</sup> Foreign involvements could only bring entanglements that would jeopardize the geopolitical sovereign gains realized by an inward-looking policy that would solidify and consolidate the new national contours of the United States. He and others tried to block the annexation of the Philippines whereas President McKinley expressed what came to be the “white man’s burden” mentality that it was the destiny of America to conquer, liberate and Christianize as much of the world as possible.

These competing philosophies can be traced and identified in American foreign policy today. In general, American foreign policy has been reactive and defensive by and large in its post-continental definitional development. Even when war seemed imminent such as in Europe in both World War I and World War II, the United States had to be attacked before mounting a counter-attack. The infamous example of this posture is the sneak attack by carrier forces of the Japanese Imperial Navy on December 7, 1941, which officially brought the United States into World War II.

---

<sup>273</sup> Schulzinger. *US Diplomacy Since 1900*, 3.

Though both German and Japanese provocations preceding this date were strong, America had to be physically *attacked and then it reacted to those attacks*. Even the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, were *reacted to after the fact*. The previous terrorist attacks on the two US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania along with the attack on the American warship USN Cole, did not provoke a sustained US military response.<sup>274</sup> Even with the emergency passing of the Patriot Act, however, and the immediate invasion of Afghanistan and the Taliban and al Qaeda, the counter-attacks were *announced in advance* by the United States. This practice followed an American principle of maintaining a reactive and defensive foreign policy stance. The Bush Doctrine, under George W. Bush, changed that guiding principle and rhetorical declaratory policy. Written in its most fundamental form shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Bush first used the phraseology: “You are either with us or you are with the terrorists.”<sup>275</sup> “Either you stand with civilization and good (us) or with barbarism and evil (them). Choose and to those nations that choose wrongly, beware.”<sup>276</sup> Though the philosophy behind the doctrine existed well before 9/11, it did not become *official* American declaratory policy until after that cardinal event.

The *Bush Doctrine* formally came into political parlance as a result of the policy response outlined in the National Security Strategy text of the National Security Council of the United States after he outlined it at the graduation ceremony at West Point in June 2002. The Bush administration response was to not only 9/11 but to potentially

---

<sup>274</sup> Strobe Talbott. *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*. (New York: Random House, 2002) 277.

<sup>275</sup> Michael Hirsh. “Bush and the World.” *Foreign Affairs*, New York. September/October 2002. 18-19.

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid*, 19.

dangerous countries such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, designated the “Axis of Evil.”<sup>277</sup> Made public for the first time in an official document, this document became the pillar of foreign policy for the Bush administration. The US Department of State argued against the new principles contained in the Bush Doctrine, particularly of preventive warfare through preemption and a continuation of existing traditional foreign policy means and method. The Bush administration argued that a policy of pre-emptive war in cases where the U. S. or its allies are threatened by terrorists or by rogue states that are engaged in the production of weapons of mass destruction are legitimate targets for American military action *before* an attack can be launched against either the U. S., its allies or US national interests.<sup>278</sup>

#### *Bush Declares War*

This express language, allegedly composed by the President himself, amounts to a declaration of war. It had roots, however, as early as 1997-98, as Cheney, Rumsfeld and other neocons moved to unilateralism in American security concepts. 9/11 gave this group the opportunity to employ this radical philosophy through the Bush Doctrine. It essentially puts *everyone* on notice that they must cooperate with the United States in its pursuit of terrorism or pay the price. Therefore, as a matter of new procedures, if American intelligence identifies a potential threat, according to the Bush Doctrine, it becomes a legitimate target of attack *before it can attack* the United States. This is a policy of preventive warfare through preemptive strike.

---

<sup>277</sup> “Bush Doctrine.” *The National Security Strategy of the United States* by President George W. Bush, Sept., 2002. U. S. Government Documents. The White House. Bush originally espoused his new doctrine at the graduation ceremonies at West Point in June 2002.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid*, 1-5.

This is a radicalization of the traditions of American foreign policy philosophy and practices and sharply demarcates a past era of American diplomatic *rules of engagement* with a Machiavellian new war-oriented premise. That premise is that the United States is *right in its policies* and *justified to take action* whether or not it meets the approval of other nations or the international political community, to include the United Nations. Though historical isolated incidents of pre-emption can be found in American military history, the Bush Doctrine represents the first *doctrinal* usage of pre-emption as the guiding principle of the American foreign policy establishment, even to point of ignoring, negating, or outright violation of treaties and international conventions and protocols that had been the guideposts of American policy for its entire history.

This radicalization was essentially established by one man, George W. Bush, without explicit authority, without committee conferencing, without consensus, domestic or international. Using Unitary Executive Theory as a guideline, Bush, backed by his *neocoon* cadre, felt his authority as Commander and Chief negated the need for Congressional interference in national security affairs.<sup>279</sup> Was he justified? Has the Bush Doctrine been effective? Will it continue as an instrument of American power in world affairs? These issues will be addressed in this chapter. According to a Edward A. Kolodziej, a security expert from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,

Most now agree that the Bush Doctrine of unilateral pre-emptive war/preventive war to defeat terrorism, stop nuclear proliferation, and democratize global politics, starting with Afghanistan and Iraq, is bankrupt.<sup>280</sup>

---

<sup>279</sup> Charlie Savage. *Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Sovereignty*. (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2007) 64.

<sup>280</sup> Edward A. Kolodziej. "Getting Beyond the Bush Doctrine," Occasional Paper 5 (Center for Global Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 2006).

As the countries of the world have reacted to these radical declarations, the emotional and analytical responses have been mixed.

The target of preventive war must have several characteristics: 1. It must be virtually defenseless. 2. It must be important enough to be worth the trouble. 3. There must be a way to portray it as the ultimate evil and an imminent threat to our survival. Iraq qualified on all counts.<sup>281</sup>

Vladimir Putin reacted immediately to 9/11 and offered Russian assistance, hoping to make common cause with Bush against active international terrorism that was also plaguing Russia. Germany and France resisted the arrogance of Bush unilateralism, particularly in its application in the unilateral American invasion of Iraq that followed in 2003. The United Nations called American unilateral actions, particularly military actions, a serious breach of international law regardless of the extreme provocations of 9/11 and appealed to the Bush administration to return to the time-honored practices of international consortium and international law under the auspices of the United Nations, an international organization proposed and organized by the United States after World War II.

The international political community lent moral and logistical support to the invasion of Afghanistan and viewed it as a just war of retaliation against al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden who had committed the most heinous violation of international law by launching a devastating sneak attack against American soil and civilians in the United States. Putin had called it a crime against all humanity. The zealotry of the rhetorical harsh language coming out of Washington was largely overlooked as a justified response by a proud but wounded nation. The initial American victory over al Qaeda, Osama bin

---

<sup>281</sup> Norm Chomsky. *Hegemony or Survival, America's Quest for Global Dominance*. (New York: A Metropolitan/Owl Book, 2003), 17.



Laden and the supporting Taliban in Afghanistan was applauded around the world.

When the American focus quickly shifted to Iraq, American motives became suspect and American arrogance toward its traditional allies, more resented.<sup>282</sup>

While Bush talks of defending civilization, his administration seems almost uniformly to dismiss most of the civilities and practices that other nations would identify with a common civilization.<sup>283</sup>

Written in the fall of 2002 when the fog of the terrorist attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan were just coming into focus, the seeds of the misguided utility of American unilateralism, as witnessed by the keen abrasiveness of the Bush Doctrine, were being seen for what they actually represented. Michael Hirsh captured the essence of the drastic change in direction of American foreign policy at the hands of George W. Bush and his supporting staff in Washington. His analysis stands as the Bush Doctrine is being gradually dismantled around the world as unworkable, ill-advised and unjustified in an interdependent and increasingly globalized world:

The United States faces a tradeoff of time-honored American ideals: to preserve the most central of its founding principles, freedom, it must give up one of its founding myths, that of a people apart. America is now, ineluctably, part of the global community of its own making.<sup>284</sup>

Kolodziej adds to the analysis:

---

<sup>282</sup> I was fortunate, as a graduate student at the University of Miami, to be introduced to Chris Patton, the European Union's Minister of External Affairs. He gave a short speech to perhaps 150 professors, students and dignitaries at UM and asked us if we could account for the harshness of the American government, particularly Bush himself, in refusing help from the European Union, or indeed, why he had eschewed using Article 5 of the NATO Charter, to enlist the united help of the European nations against al Qaeda. He expressed the British sympathy felt for the American nation but was puzzled by the lack of apparent appreciation of the Bush administration regarding offers of European help. I was asked by his press secretary for my interpretation, as an American, of this situation and replied that it was basically an inflamed response without adequate reasoning but that I believed the American responses would become more measured, nuanced and reasoned as time healed the wounds of 9/11. I am better informed today, of course.

<sup>283</sup> Michael Hirsh. "Bush and the World." *Foreign Affairs*. New York. September/October 2002. 20.

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid*, 32.

Jettisoning the Bush Doctrine will require discarding this triumphalist conceit. Creating a new global order unilaterally is beyond the reach of the United States, or any state, within a world of multiplying and increasingly interdependent but diffused and decentralized centers of power, state and non-state, which will have a say in how the world is governed-or not.<sup>285</sup>

The dichotomous nature of a foreign policy approach which goes against American traditional principles of active engagement with the other political actors in the international political community is apparent in the level of tension and acrimony generated by the dramatic lack of American cooperation and coordination on world problems. Balancing strategies, led by Vladimir Putin and Russian allies, are actively countervailing American hegemonic diplomatic initiatives around the world. Another persistent variable is exemplified by Strobe Talbot's remark that: ". . . al Qaeda might just be the ultimate NGO."<sup>286</sup> 9/11 indeed proved that serious warfare could be conducted against the world's only remaining superpower by a group that could be described as a non-governmental organization using asymmetrical warfare and guerilla tactics which act for only one purpose---to bring about political change.<sup>287</sup>

The Bush Doctrine has put the American foreign policy establishment at substantial disadvantage world-wide while the American Department of Defense maintains its aggressive operations throughout the world, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Provoking Iran with psychological warfare tactics and discursive rhetorical

---

<sup>285</sup> Kolodziej. "Getting Beyond the Bush Doctrine."

<sup>286</sup> As quoted in the Hirsh *Foreign Affairs* article "Bush and the World." September/October, 2002. 32.

<sup>287</sup> Witness the fact that the 2004 Madrid train bombings had the immediate political effect of forcing the incumbent government to essentially abdicate to a socialist, opposition party within a couple of weeks of the deadly terrorist attack as a direct result of those attacks. With the expenditure of a relatively small amount of capital and blood, a major political change was precipitated, the installation of that party as the new government as a direct cause of fear from terrorist reprisals.

language, the Bush administration appears to be seriously planning for a possible pre-emptive attack against Iran, citing the fact that Iran is helping insurgents in Iraq, particularly al Qaeda. The potential Iranian threat of nuclear weapons development, an all-too familiar theme used in the public relations build-up before the American invasion of Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein's use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) both in the Middle East theatre and potentially against the United States and its western allies, is being used again as a rationale for aggressive action through pre-emptive warfare.

Indeed, the American STRATCOM strategies such as the American Strategic Command's *Global Strike with Nuclear Weapons*, scenario, calls for the direct attack of 10,000 targets in Iran within hours of direct orders from George W. Bush.<sup>288</sup> Allegedly formulated versions have been updated since the hostage takeover crisis of 1979 when the Revolutionary Guard, university students then, took over the American Embassy and over a year of captivity ensued as the Carter administration was frustrated with an abortive rescue attempt and general impotency in the situation. Ronald Reagan was "swept" into office largely as a result of the widely held perceptions, both foreign and domestic, that Carter was not up to the challenge of getting the American diplomats out.

Bush's people defend their country's aggressiveness toward international terrorism and the need for America to defend its national interests around the world and to protect the American Homeland itself. They claim that as the war on terror is progressively more successful that American soft power will become more evident. They also claim, however, that the terrorism threat will always be with us and that, therefore,

---

<sup>288</sup> Dr. Dan Plesch and Martin Butcher. "Considering a war with Iran: A discussion paper on WMD in the Middle East." SOAS. University of London, September 2007. 5-6.

the United States cannot risk relaxing its new trigger-edged stance around the world. In other words, the United States has been forced into its current posture and cannot relent.

The proactive forces of the Pentagon and the Department of Defense, however, following the philosophy and policies of the administration neo-cons, posit that the new American force projections and willingness to step into virtually any world arena or country, regardless of sovereignty, present the Bush Doctrine as a necessary calculus addressing the state of continuous war between the forces of good and evil. It projects the traditional American foreign policy objective that democratic and pluralistic government, as practiced in the United States and the western democracies, as inevitable as well as desirable throughout the world, regardless of cultural and the political histories of other countries.<sup>289</sup>

Rove's vision had a certain abstract conceptual logic to it, much like the administration's plan to spread democracy by force in the Middle East. If you could invade and pacify Iraq, and Afghanistan, the thinking went, democracy could spread across the region.<sup>290</sup>

Using the self-righteous rationale that the United States has a moral justification, especially after 9/11, to protect itself and to save the world from despotism, myopic policies have been put into place that have guaranteed that the United States is despised around the world both among adversaries and more quietly, among traditional allies. America is no longer seen as the "indispensable nation" or the time-honored "beacon of light" for the oppressed.<sup>291</sup> James Dobbins has stated: "Beginning in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, most other nations in the Western Hemisphere have adopted political systems modeled

---

<sup>289</sup> Joshua Green, "The Rove Presidency." *The Atlantic*, September, 2007. 56.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid, 56.

<sup>291</sup> James Dobbins. "Who Lost Iraq?" *Foreign Affairs*. New York, September/October 2007. 72

however imperfectly, on the United States' system.”<sup>292</sup> The second major tenet of the Bush Doctrine, the spread of democracy, has now lost its appeal to aspiring nations that no longer trust the United States and specifically the Bush administration's motives. American foreign policy motives have fallen to suspicion and hatred for apparent American desires for total global domination. It is feared and loathed for its unquenchable thirst for power and its cultural and political bigotry. Immigrants are persistently and increasingly denied both equal treatment and due process. Others, ostensibly detained for “suspicious activities,” are denied their basic human rights as established by any number of international protocols and treaties.

Add to these the list policies such as surveillance of *anyone*, foreign or domestic subjects, secret CIA prisons, illegal renditions from third-party countries, illegal detentions by the United States around the world under the clearly illegal and unprecedented rationale of the Bush Doctrine; lack of accommodation by the Bush administration executive branch for congressional oversight and the absolute abuse of presidential power by illegal use of executive orders, denial of due process of both US citizens and other branches of American government itself, it is clear to see that the Bush Doctrine has alienated American domestic audiences as well as world political opinion.<sup>293</sup>

Although, in reality, many of these exposed American practices were used in the past, especially activities of the intelligence agencies such as the Central Intelligence

---

<sup>292</sup> Dobbins. “Who Lost Iraq?”, 72.

<sup>293</sup> See Ben Wizer. “ACLU Supreme Court Breakfast, 9/27/2007.” The American press has been extremely vocal on this subject as well as the American Civil Liberties Union.(ACLU) ever since the numerous stories of NSA illegal wire tapping in contravention of the FISA Court and the ACLU's various suits to attempt to get the Bush administration to conform to due process oversight guidelines and statutory commitments. <http://www.aclu.org/scotus/index.html>.

Agency, their actions were primarily *covert* and absolutely not a part of *declaratory policy*. The Bush Doctrine has not only brought those previously clandestine activities into the glaring light of day, they have become part of established official *policy* for the relentless Bush administration and its unadorned triumphalism. This boisterous and unsophisticated approach to American foreign policy has changed its character from a respected professionalism into an embarrassment for the American foreign policy establishment world-wide as foreign governments question why America has turned from accepted practices and normative behaviors of bilateralism, multilateralism and international law.

The massive rejection of the Bush Doctrine and the whole policy approach of the Bush administration can be directly traced to the change of political parties in the American mid-term elections of 2006. George Bush's infamous declaration that combat operations were over after the original invasion in the spring of 2003, as he triumphantly arrived on an American aircraft carrier in a fighter jet dressed in combat aviation gear, has been followed by four tortuous years of Iraqi insurgency and an abysmal failure of Bush's policies to achieve the stated goals of the administration in the Middle East as a whole and in Iraq in particular.

American casualties have risen precipitously as a guerilla war of attrition has evolved into an Iraqi civil war. As disillusionment has manifested itself with Bush foreign policy, the international political community and the majority American electorate itself, hold their collective breath that Bush's second presidential term will expire before his administration can do any more lasting damage both to the international political system as a whole but to the American image abroad as well. As in the case of

Iraq, however, the familiar drumbeat for military action against Iran increases in tempo: “Iran: US charges mount against it.”<sup>294</sup> Bush continues to agitate against Iran in 2008, using the same “drumbeat” of WMD, rejected by his own intelligence community, as causative.

Referring again to the Plesch-Butcher Report, Bush is attempting to continue the Bush Doctrine into the future as he appears determined to use Iraq, though far from stabilized, as a beachhead to continue several invasions of key Islamic countries in the Middle East: General Wesley Clark stated that he became aware of the Bush administration’s instructions concerning the overthrow of the Iranian regime in September, 2001 stating he held the order in his hand at the Pentagon:

I got this down from upstairs, meaning the Secretary of Defense’s office: This is a memo that describes how we’re going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and finishing off Iran.<sup>295</sup>

The Bush administration, citing undeclared intelligence sources, claims that Iran is guilty of infiltrating intelligence and special operations personnel into Iraq in a concerted effort to aid al Qaeda and insurgent Iraqi forces to destabilize Iraq further and to kill U. S. military personnel in an effort to expedite the American departure from Iraq and to extend Iranian-Shiite influence on the Shiite Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki. Add to that the accusation by the Bush administration that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and must be interdicted, by military force if necessary, to deny Tehran dominance in the region. After freezing Iranian assets on a massive level, pressuring other nations to curtail trade with Iran, and declaring Iran’s Revolutionary

---

<sup>294</sup> “The US Case Against Iran.” *The Christian Science Monitor*, Friday, August 24, 2007, 1-5.

<sup>295</sup> Plesch. “Considering a war with Iran.” 6.

Guards a terrorist organization, Trita Parsi has asked in her latest publication, *Treacherous Alliance: Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.*: “The question is: Are you serious about diplomacy or is diplomacy just a show?”<sup>296</sup> With two US naval battle groups in the Persian Gulf, the intimidating show of force begs Iranian military response so that justification for a U. S. invasion is available at a moment’s notice. Vladimir Putin has approached this issue of non-proliferation of a potential nuclear weapons program by tacitly supporting the United States in its efforts to isolate Iran through the United Nations Security Council’s first two rounds of economic and political sanctions, while bilateral efforts by Putin to negotiate with Iranian leadership, has bypassed Washington, much to their chagrin. Iran has maintained its strategic relationship with Russia although it has experienced Russian tactical slow down on its work on the Bushehr reactor while openly defying American efforts to destabilize Iran by calling for regime change. Putin has declined to further tighten the economic noose around Tehran’s stubborn resistance to American efforts to isolate Iran. This scenario with Iran is clearly symbolic of the current state of Russian-American relations at present; Russia will no longer follow the American political lead blindly. Putin will continue to act in Russian national interests, not Washington’s.

In his visit to Tehran on October 15-16, 2007, Putin made it clear with this Caspian Sea summit that violence in the area, including Iran, should not be tolerated by the United States. This is a clear signal that Putin is against American military intervention in the area, particularly against Iran.<sup>297</sup>

---

<sup>296</sup> Plesch. “Considering a war with Iran” 5.

<sup>297</sup> Stratfor.com “Iran: the Real Agenda Behind Putin’s Visit.” October 15, 2007. <http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/print.php?storyid+296830>.



This scenario is almost identical to the actions of the Bush administration before the invasion of Iraq when alleged “unimpeachable evidence” existed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and therefore, under the corollaries of the Bush Doctrine, must be attacked preemptively before he could use them, regionally and, indeed, against the United States itself.<sup>298</sup> With the invasion of Iran, the Bush Doctrine would be complete. The *Axis of Evil* would be neutralized and the world, and specifically the Middle East, could start reorienting and reorganizing itself toward democratic government per the American exemplary model. Since the third member of this “axis,” North Korea, has been pacified and is allegedly giving up its nuclear weapons program, the Bush Doctrine would have met all its declared objectives before George Bush leaves office in 2008. Indeed, President George W. Bush seems adamant and obsessed that these goals be met. John McCain, the presumptive Republican nominee for the presidency in 2009, appears to agree with Bush foreign policy tenets, though he has attempted to distance himself from the President himself. There is intense and growing pressure both domestically and internationally to abandon the Bush Doctrine as a misguided and dangerously unrealistic American approach to American foreign policy and international relations.<sup>299</sup> Lavrov states:

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, delay in solving accumulated problems carries devastating consequences for all nations. One sure lesson is that unilateral responses, consisting primarily of using force, result in stalemates and broken china everywhere. The current catalogue of unresolved crises—Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Darfur, North Korea—is a testament to that. Genuine security will only be achieved through establishing normal relations and

<sup>298</sup> Dobbins, “Who Lost Iraq?” 64.

<sup>299</sup> Segey Lavrov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. “The Limits of Force.” from “Containing Russia: Back to the Future?” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department as cited July 19, 2007 at <http://www.mid.ru/brp-4nsf/e>. 4.

engaging in dialogue. German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier hit the right note when he counseled that today's world should be based on cooperation rather than military deterrence.<sup>300</sup>

With Iranian intransigence to American pressure, pending failure in Iraq, and an unending potential reversal of North Korea's tentative and highly conditional agreement to curtail nuclear armament, the Bush Doctrine has failed to attain democratic evangelism or benefits of preemptive warfare as a doctrine, the two main tenets of the Bush Doctrine. Political analysts around the world are asking the logical question: "How long will it take to undo the damage of the ill-conceived Bush Doctrine after Bush leaves office?" Ed Kolodziej stated in his Occasional Paper 5 for the Center for Global Studies at the University of Illinois in 2006 that:

In cutting the United States down to the still formidable size as a global power, ample hard and soft power remains, or can be rehabilitated, to shape the world to favor American interests and those of free people everywhere. These guidelines for the effective projection of American power are apt. First, scrap the Bush Doctrine and superpower presumptions and scale U. S. security interests and aims to its real or potential power.<sup>301</sup>

He posits that it is vital to restore American economic and political credibility and an American return to respect for the rule of law, both national and international.<sup>302</sup>

Russia and China are already leading the way, though not directly challenging the United States and its foreign policy shaped by the Bush Doctrine, through erosion of those policies. The all-consuming American struggle to pacify and stabilize Iraq has allowed a broad coalition led by Vladimir Putin, to balance against American perceived

---

<sup>300</sup> Dobbins, "Who Lost Iraq." 4.

<sup>301</sup> Ed Kolodziej, "American Power and Global Order" in *From Superpower to Besieged Global Power*. 3-4.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid, 4.

global hegemony.<sup>303</sup> The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, developed from the Shanghai Five, originated from the endeavor by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to strengthen confidence building and disarmament in the border regions in 1996 and 1997.<sup>304</sup> This organization has provided a unified effort at balancing the American efforts to influence geopolitical events in Central and Southwest Asia. Putin has largely orchestrated the SCO's efforts to serve to blunt American foreign policy objectives in the region, an effort to assure that regional actors are not trumped by the United States.

Dilip Hiro describes the American debacle in Iraq as:

A classic example of an imperialist power, brimming with hubris, over-extending itself. To the relief of many, in the US and elsewhere, the Iraq fiasco has demonstrated the striking limitations of power for the globe's highest tech' most destructive military machine.<sup>305</sup>

In Iraq, Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to two U. S. presidents, concedes in a recent op-ed, "We are being wrestled to a draw by opponents who are not even an organized state adversary."<sup>306</sup>

Again, the disastrous military misadventure in Iraq, guided by the Bush Doctrine, has led the United States into an unprecedented failure in international relations. The Bush Doctrine, with its entire lack of touch with international political realities, is a failure in every respect even outside of the Iraq and Iran dimensions. Invasion of yet

---

<sup>303</sup> Dilip Hiro, "The World's Sole Superpower in Fast Decline." Tomdispatch.com <http://www.alternet.org/story/60-60489/> 1-5.

<sup>304</sup> Shanghai Cooperation Council. 1/7/2004. "Origin of the SCO." 1- 4. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm>.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid, 1.

other countries under the doctrine's tenets, would only further exacerbate a failed policy begotten through an unfortunate combination of American injury sustained by 9/11 and American misreading of its presumed abilities to dictate policy to the world political community with its falsely presumed pre-ordained role as the remaining superpower after the Cold War, a concept still under extreme definitional scrutiny.

*Democratic Peace Theory?*

The Bush Doctrine's applicability as the new embodiment of American foreign policy has been largely based on notions that, since the end of the Cold War, America has concentrated on a working philosophy that is anchored by democratic peace theory. The theory posits that democracies rarely make war on one another, therefore, democratic government is desirable not only for the United States but will guarantee that if other governments, regardless of their respective political histories or cultural heritages, will convert to democracy, there will be less war in the world and far more peace. This theoretical, post-cold War approach, a throwback to Wilsonianism, has guaranteed that the United States will lead the way for that international vanguard. With no credible military opponents of any concern, involuntary conversion is also viable in the eyes of the American political forces behind this notion of American leadership as a force for democratic evangelism. The dominant neoconservative group in the Republican Party in the United States has encapsulated these concepts, conceived of before 9/11 but supremely enhanced by the terrorist attacks as proof positive of the validity of the theory, radicalizing traditional liberal American foreign policy philosophies and practices. In the words of Andrew A. Michta,

We emerged from the Cold War with no peer competitor, no immediate security threats, and a feeling of unprecedented power. That sense of a

preponderant America liberated from its Soviet counterweight translated into a newly assertive foreign policy and a new impatience with the complexities of world affairs.<sup>307</sup>

Democratic peace theory holds that democracies do not make war upon each other.<sup>308</sup> Though many constructivists view the theory as not fully developed and does not address many elements of social and political theory, it is regarded as a working formula for explaining the relative periods of peace that have accompanied cooperation between democracies.<sup>309</sup> It serves as both an operating base and as a contradiction to the Bush Doctrine. Other political theorists such as Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, feel that democratic peace theory often does not allow for the fact that democratic states, until they reach maturity, susceptible to warfare.<sup>310</sup>

Using the Bush Doctrine as the vehicle, the Bush administration has characterized its foreign policy as one based on permanent war against terrorism and that that policy would be the country's primary national security goal.<sup>311</sup> If actuated into the indefinite future, such a working formulation would guarantee that the United States would remain on a permanent war footing and would change the traditional American foreign policy modus operandi to one of a radicalized and alienating conversion society bent on dominating the world through "democratic" domination. On its face, given the growing realities of globalization, a reorientation of many societies toward their own cultural

---

<sup>307</sup> Andrew A. Michta, "Democracy Delusion, the misconception that values won the Cold War." *The American Conservative*. August 27, 2007. 25.

<sup>308</sup> Dunne. *Globalization of World Politics*, 171.

<sup>309</sup> Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press., 1999), 68 226-227.

<sup>310</sup> Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and War." *Foreign Affairs*. May/June 1995. 1

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid*, 26.

identities, and offshore balancing by Russia and others, this *pax Americana*, sculpted around a false and dichotomous hypocrisy, cannot survive.

Counterbalancing the notions of the neo-conservatives and the American Right, are American political forces embodied by the Democratic Party which asserted themselves forcefully in the American mid-term elections in November, 2006. Citing the need to return America to a more traditional domestic and foreign policy track, the Democrats are in a fierce struggle with the lame duck president George Bush, and the waning forces of the American Republican Party. Barak Obama, the presumptive nominee of the Democratic Party, has repeatedly stated his position that he intends “to talk to our enemies as well as our friends,” in an effort to demilitarize American foreign policy relations.<sup>312</sup> The results of that political struggle will be realized in the next presidential American elections on November 7, 2008. American foreign policy could be continued along the same path as it currently is under George Bush under another republican president or dramatically reoriented by a democratic president who might gradually reorient it toward more traditional American practices before the advent of this administration and its unrealistic and untenable foreign policy. The international political community will be strongly affected by these events, either way.

Terrorism remains a strong feature of international relations and will have to be engaged by any American leadership team. Both the American Right and Left view that prospect as a constant in any foreign policy formulations.<sup>313</sup> However, the philosophical

---

<sup>312</sup> This point was vividly made by Obama in his speech of June 3, 2008, in Minnesota to contrast himself with John McCain’s foreign policy stance that enemies only understand American military power, the major component of the Bush Doctrine.

<sup>313</sup> In viewing the proceedings surrounding the Crocker-Patraeus Report on C-Span on September 11, 2007, many reinforcing statements to this affect were expressed, particularly by Joe Biden and Senator Lugar, senior members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and from opposing sides of the aisle.

necessities perceived by the conservatives to evangelize every nation to democracy seem doomed to failure. Condoleezza Rice has suppressed her democratic evangelizing in the Middle East in the past 12 months, no doubt as instructed by the President, as the pragmatic problems presented by the lack of progress in Iraq, the intransigence of Hamas in Gaza and Fatah's impotency in the West Bank, as well as Hezbollah's ability to continue to gain strength in resisting the Israeli government, dictate that she stick to the key issues at hand; none of the major players in the Middle East has shown any inclination whatsoever, to scrap their respective government and NGO charters to embrace the mistrusted and misunderstood concepts of American-style democratic government. As stated by Andrew Michta:

The unlimited scope of global war on terror was matched by its equally striking conceptual confusion, with the conflict cast as an epic existential struggle between freedom and 'Islamofacism.'<sup>314</sup>

Simplistic thinking in an extremely sophisticated international political environment has proven extremely counterproductive for the Bush administration as illustrated by the Bush Doctrine.

What did command respect globally was US firepower, military strength and technological evolution in military affairs. Though many nations, many of whom have been traditional American allies, have *resented* George Bush and the arrogance of American military power, the coercive tactics of the Bush administration have guaranteed a measure of international cooperation with American initiatives nonetheless.

---

<sup>314</sup> Michta. "Democracy Delusion". 26.

Vladimir Putin's cooperation with the Bush administration, though genuine enough in its sincerity after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, has largely been a product of de facto Russian political accommodation and an example of American pressure on many foreign policies to fall into line with American global interests. Until the recent Russian economic and political revival in the second Putin administration, Russian foreign policy, particularly under Boris Yeltsin, amounted to virtual Russian vassalage to the United States. The carrots of acceptance into the western clubs and inducements for economic and political integration into the world political economy, combined with the dire financial straits Russia found itself in before the current global energy bonanza, guaranteed that Putin would not dare go his own way as he is endeavoring to do in the last few years. Using the politics of personal chemistry with George Bush as a codeword for compliance and strategic cooperation, Putin accepted the arrangement as a temporary necessity to gain political aggrandizements with the American government and to bide his time to do exactly what he is doing in better Russian circumstances, taking advantage of current American misfortunes in order to promote Russian national and international interests and to challenge the fading super-power status of the United States. This afforded Putin breathing room with regards to his prosecution of the Second Chechen War as well as American cooperation with a plethora of economic and political issues important to the new Putin administration.

The blueprint of the Bush Doctrine remains the same. The intransigence of George W. Bush has been illustrated for all to see in his stubborn resistance to American public will and to increasing logistical as well as international diplomatic pressures. The political pressures to reformulate strategy in Iraq do not reveal the true story of the Bush



administration's programs to radicalize the Arab world through very secretive provisions of military planning which include subversion of Arab governments and invasion if necessary. Yielding ground as little and as begrudgingly as possible, the Bush administration appears to be determined to perpetuate non-stop warfare in the Middle East as revealed in its war-fighting doctrines. Bush's repeated language about his refusal to downsize, withdraw, or announce withdrawal or troop reduction timelines have been repeated almost weekly in his policy statements to both the press and the domestic and international political communities in his speeches, communiqués and statements to the American congress.<sup>315</sup>

The arrogance of power that has betrayed traditional American values, perpetuated in the name of defense after 9/11, has become unrealistic and abominable for all those who have held the image of a magnanimous and traditionally humane America. Instead of using the vast reservoirs of soft power available to the United States, the hard power of American militarism has distorted traditional American practices. In the words of Joseph S. Nye, Jr.: "I am not alone in warning against the dangers of a foreign policy that combines unilateralism, arrogance, and parochialism."<sup>316</sup> Nye further asserts:

In fact, the real challenges to our power are coming on cat's feet in the middle of the night, and ironically, our desire to go it alone may ultimately weaken us. The contemporary information revolution and its attendant brand of globalization are transforming and shrinking our world. At the beginning of this new century, these two forces have increased American power, including our attractive 'soft power'.<sup>317</sup>

---

<sup>315</sup> Sources for this assertion range from direct quotes by Bush himself and by his foreign policy team in almost every venue. Reference any number of passages from the international section of the New York Times read daily by this researcher.

<sup>316</sup> Joseph Nye, Jr. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). xii.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid*, viii.

The current problem lies with the fact that the Bush Doctrine ignores and tramples usage of this powerful tool in the American foreign policy arsenal, which distorts hard power tactics and relegates American diplomacy to the ranks of amateurs such as the Bush administration. The persuasion power of the positive imagery of America as the benevolent global hegemon, though true American hegemony remains an illusion, has been traditionally very powerful. Most of that soft power has been wasted by the current American regime in a self-justified rationale of discursive diplomacy and military intimidation and political diktat. While challenges to American hard power, or military might and technological superiority, make the United States supreme in its capabilities to project power globally, its current difficulties subduing the insurgency in Iraq testify to the fact that military supremacy is often not enough. The Soviet Union learned that in Afghanistan, America learned it in Viet Nam and George Bush is learning the same hard lesson in the Middle East, especially in Iraq.

#### *The End for Bush?*

With the American *neocons* at the helm, the lame duck presidency of George W. Bush appears an anachronism. Despite the general appeal of democratic peace theory, used selectively in the Bush Doctrine, the hypocrisy of American aggressive militarism belies American intentions and rather, makes the United States appear in a harsher light.

Bill Clinton had been criticized for his approach to the immediate post-cold War period. Wishing to cash in the huge “peace dividend,” not having to spend billions of dollars on world-wide defenses against communism and Soviet nuclear threats, putting that tremendous capital to use in the American economy, he was accused of not taking advantage of the de facto American victory to finish off the former Soviet Union (FSU)

and to enhance rather than downsize American military might. Sentiment in the Pentagon vacillated between those who welcomed the stand-down relief of a relaxed defense posture afforded by the end of the Cold War against the dangers of curtailing military expansion. The majority of the military establishment, however, felt Clinton went too far in a familiar American practice of relaxing after a prolonged political-military struggle and opening a window of opportunity for those who sought to take advantage of that relaxed posture.

Many felt Clinton opened the door to encourage terrorism by his post-cold War actions, specifically down-sizing the military. Richard Clark, the counter-terrorism advisor held over from the Clinton administration, tried in vain to focus attention of the jihadist movement and the direct threats of Osama bin Laden, but no one in the new Bush administration was listening!<sup>318</sup> Bent on reversing and/or ignoring virtually all programs from the previous administration, the security gap left by the incoming Bush administration opened up the opportunity for this devastating attack on the United States.<sup>319</sup>

With foreign threats much reduced and, indeed difficult to identify, terrorism as a phenomenon crept into the picture. The power vacuum partially created by the imploded USSR, gave rise to non-government-organizations (NGO's) such as al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, al Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood and others.<sup>320</sup> Without specific state sponsorship and with agendas pertaining to ideas and rebellion as political objectives, a

---

<sup>318</sup> Clark, *Against All Enemies*, 35-37.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid, 38.

<sup>320</sup> Jonathan R. White. "Hezbollah and Changing Group Structures and the Metamorphosis of Terrorism." *Terrorism and Homeland Security*, 5<sup>th</sup> Edition. (United States and Australia: Thompson and Wadsworth, 2006), 33.

*new international* enemy evolved onto the traditional nation-state scene. Only one united geopolitical rallying point existed for most if not all of these organizations, the eradication of Israel, sponsored and supported by the hated military hegemonic power, the United States. Whereas terrorism, as an asymmetrical political and military form of political expression, had existed for many years, the potency of those often coordinated groups increased exponentially after the terrorist attacks of al Qaeda and 9/11 and the clumsy and impotent responses of American administrations.

It can be successfully argued that the disruption to the American government and society at large after 9/11, has offered the various jihadist groups hope for political gains of significance from a shocked United States well into the future. The frustrated American efforts in Iraq and the larger Middle East attest to the effectiveness of terrorist tactics to keep the United States as well as Russia and the European democracies guessing and off-balance, which in itself is a major victory. By setting the international political agenda and keeping the United States in a defensive and reactive mode, the initiative belongs to al Qaeda and those groups seeking to level the playing field.

According to such conservative think tanks as the Nixon Center, the strength of the insurgency in Iraq since 2004, has derailed the Bush Doctrine and forced the Bush administration back into the diplomacy of the past, that of the previous American foreign policy approaches of re-approaching the United Nations for diplomatic assistance, utilizing NATO forces in not yet pacified Afghanistan, appealing for international donors to carry the financial burdens of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and taking a definite turn away from the unilateralist approach of the ineffective Bush doctrine and returning to multilateral approaches so vilified by the Bush team after the early resistance of the

central European powers and the United Nations itself before the unilateral adventurism of the United States in the invasion of Iraq.<sup>321</sup> Just as damning to the other major tenet of the Bush Doctrine, according to the Wright article, have been the responses of the Arab communities affected by the radical Bush approach.

When the Iraq war began, the president's Iraq policy rested on four broad principles: The United States should act preemptively to prevent strikes on American targets; Washington should be willing to act unilaterally, or with a select coalition, when the United Nations or the Allies balk; Iraq was the next cornerstone in the global war on terrorism; and, Baghdad's transformation into a new democracy would spark region wide change.<sup>322</sup> Wright further states:

But these central planks of Bush Doctrine have been tainted by spiraling violence, limited reconstruction, failure to find weapons of mass destruction or prove Iraq's ties to al Qaeda, and mounting Arab disillusionment with U. S. leadership.<sup>323</sup>

This further illustrates the bankruptcy of the Bush Doctrine, not only in the Middle East but in Latin America and all over the world.

Until the summer of 2007, just before the Patraeus-Crocker summary to Congress on Iraq, the president used Viet Nam as an example of failed American policies of the past. Loathe to refer to that war before then, he attempted to portray America's loss of Vietnam to the North Vietnamese communists as a failure to persevere and that leaving Iraq prematurely would result in the same humiliating defeat for the United States. He insisted in speeches in the United States and abroad that allowing the democrats in

---

<sup>321</sup>Robin Wright, "Iraq Occupation Erodes Bush Doctrine." *Washington Post*, June 28, 2004. 1. <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.

<sup>322</sup>Ibid, 1.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid, 1.

Congress to start troop withdrawals would lead to defeat in Iraq, failure of US foreign policy in the Middle East, and a clear invitation to al Qaeda, to “follow us home.”<sup>324</sup>

The Bush Doctrine itself is no longer mentioned *per se* and the democratic evangelism portion of the doctrine has been totally abandoned.

### *Summary and Conclusions*

This chapter has defined the Bush Doctrine and given multiple examples of how it was conceived and used by the Bush administration since its official announcement at West Point in 2002. Its main tenets: (1) Unilateralism and preventive warfare and (2) democratic evangelism, have been explained and amplified. Its formulation, allegedly but feloniously a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been explored. The track record of the Bush Doctrine has been presented as a foreign policy failure by multiple political analysts both domestic and foreign.

The persistence of the Bush administration to employ this abortive foreign policy concept has alienated the international political community, sown extreme discord into American political unity, and has undermined the credibility of American wisdom and competence to an extent unknown in its political history, and finally, thrown the cherished balance of powers system of American government into severe disarray. The absolute disregard of George Bush and his team of *neocons*<sup>325</sup> for a balanced and reactive

---

<sup>324</sup> In media coverage all week during September 1 through September 9, Bush made speeches in Kansas City, Nevada, Iraq itself and Australia, to name a few, to pre-condition the Patraeus-Crocker report of September 15, 2007. His message has consistently been of upbeat evaluations of limited military accomplishments in Iraq with absolutely no political progress by the Iraqi government repackaged in a plea to continue the military campaign in Iraq based on larger regional considerations.

<sup>325</sup> Neocons are neo-conservatives who are well represented in the Bush administration whose governing philosophy is maintain American military supremacy at any costs and to deny the opposition Democratic Party access to both information and decision-making power in the American government, by their own manifestos and announcements.

global American foreign policy has destroyed due process and the principles of congressional oversight. The arrogance of this administration to govern through executive privilege, signing statements, secrecy and covert activities unprecedented since the time of Richard Nixon, has endangered the very structure of American representative democracy itself. The power of government has been fully employed in an attempt to stifle the legislative branch of government with absolutely no regard for the expressed will of the American people themselves. George Bush and the Republican Party have severely endangered American democracy through their blatant disregard for traditional *due process* in American government.<sup>326</sup> Not since the abuses of Watergate under Richard Nixon has the United States been in such danger of subversion of democratic process. It has distorted all branches of government, even defense.

The penalty for dissent has been punishment of generals who disagreed with the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and his successor Robert Gates, through demotions and forced retirements and forced resignations of officials who have defied Bush policies. American citizens have been severely intimidated and abused for their political expressions, both public and private, that challenge Bush and programs such as the Bush Doctrine, the Patriot Act, warrantless spying on Americans by the National Security Agency (NSA); the Democratic Party has been relentlessly described as unpatriotic at best and as traitors at worst for daring to oppose the Bush programs.<sup>327</sup>

The names on the list of departing Bush administration officials represent an obvious repudiation of Bush policies. An uninterrupted parade of political defections,

---

<sup>326</sup> Savage. *Takeover*. 138.

<sup>327</sup> *Ibid*, 178-181.

ruined political careers, denial of due process at every level, and actual violations of federal and states laws have been rampant in the Bush administrations. The massive collusion between Wall Street and K Street has combined with the protection of the Republican Party to create a dangerous political climate in America, one that if not severely curtailed, endangers American democracy itself. With George W. Bush at the helm in the last months of an ineffectual and damaging two administrations, many analysts are evaluating how long it will take to “unwind the damage,” created in this extended period of the abuses perpetuated since Bush’s election in 2000.

The argument of this chapter is that American foreign policy and political reactions to it around the world reinforce the overall bankruptcy of Bush’s policies. Representing the American elite and multinational energy constituencies, it is a relationship that has demonstrable spillover effects and manifestations world-wide. The headquarters of the largest oil conglomerate in the world, Exxon-Mobile, is in Houston, Texas, not in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The U.S.-based multinational corporation has been colluding with the Bush administration in a symbiotic political-economic relationship that perpetuated price-fixing monopolies around the world. The Carlyle Group, headed by George Herbert Walker Bush, has been at the head of the American senior partnership of the world-wide oil consortium. The global environment, as well as individual nation-state sovereignty to include American democratic sovereignty, have been compromised by the globalizing effects of this collusion and monotheistic group.<sup>328</sup>

The Bush Doctrine has served this effort to subdue governments and economies to the will of the American-based multinational corporations serving the American and

---

<sup>328</sup> “Mideast Terror War Adds Urgency To Carlyle Group Controversy.” *Judicial Watch*. April 1, 2002. 1-2. <http://www.judicialwatch.org/>.



international elites. 9/11 became the perfect rationale for instituting an incontestable doctrine of aggression for vast American global expansion. Who, after-all, could contest the right of a wounded global power to take world-wide revenge on a chimera-like enemy called “international terrorism”? Not even Vladimir Putin, until recently.

Osama bin Laden is still at large. Afghanistan is again half occupied by the resilient Taliban; the heavy lifting combat role has shifted to NATO forces. The only justified reason for an American war, the Taliban’s support for al Qaeda, still rages.<sup>329</sup> The war in Iraq is far from over and cannot be designated as a likely and eventual US victory regardless of the cheerleading of George Bush. The Middle East is as volatile as ever with no clear victories in Lebanon or the creation of a Palestinian state.

To claim the success for the Bush Doctrine in the face of all this evidence to the contrary puts George Bush and his government in the clear light of a political cadre operating in the delusional twilight of failure on a colossal scale. The grand vision and ensuing grand strategy of this misguided group of ultra-conservative politicians has regressed constructive American foreign policy back years.

Most absurdly in this scenario of failure looms the preposterous proposition that the United States, under the leadership of this president, plans *imminent* invasion of yet another important country in the Middle East, Iran. Complaining about the severe overstretch of the United States Army and Marines, and indeed, talking about a draft to raise new manpower, Bush continues to threaten and intimidate Iran. His case for invasion lies on the same shaky ground that his war against Iraq did, the alleged development of weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear weapons and Iranian

---

<sup>329</sup>Peter Grier and Faye Sowers. “Al Qaeda: often foiled, still global.” *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston. September 11, 2007. 1 and 10.

help and support of al Qaeda and radical Shiism in Iraq, none of which have been substantiated beyond question. According to Joe Biden:

It is obvious that a pre-determined grand strategy has forced all reason to the periphery and these pre-ordained goals and targets are paramount in the Bush Doctrine and are being pursued regardless of price.<sup>330</sup>

That those prices are enormous in terms of blood and treasure as well as political capital, both domestic and international, have not deterred the Bush team from their relentless and irrational pursuits and goals.

The general acknowledgement that a military victory is impossible in Iraq and that a political solution is nowhere in sight, the Bush Doctrine marches on in the form of yet another possibly irrational, illegal, potentially disastrous invasion of yet another sovereign country, further exacerbating world tensions and hatred for the United States.

A resurgent Russia, an exploding eco-military giant in China, and a competing democracy in India, are beginning to form the outlines of a balancing coalition to offset the would-be military hegemonic powers of the United States. In strategic terms, it is only a matter of time before overstretch is reached by the United States.<sup>331</sup> With the American presidential elections looming, predictably imminent disaster on foreign policy fronts for Bush and his doctrine inevitable, and George Bush's tenure nearing conclusion, new American policies based upon the interdependent realities at work in the globalization of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, are destined to overtake this disastrous military recklessness that has so severely destabilized the world today. Potentially, the American

---

<sup>330</sup> "Biden: Patraeus 'Dead Flat Wrong' on Iraq" MSNBC reporting the Associated Press story on September 9, 2007. 1 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com>.

<sup>331</sup> Layne. *The Peace of Illusions*. 159.

Congress may unite on both sides of the aisle as they eventually did over the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and begin a serious reduction of the war effort.

Even if a substantial troop draw-down begins in 2008, it will take months to redeploy American forces. Such a decision, however, barring a foolhardy invasion of Iran, might usher in a new American foreign policy approach and effectively serve as the death knell for the defunct Bush Doctrine. According to presidential hopeful Joe Biden: “This president has no plan—how to win and how to leave,”<sup>332</sup> Meanwhile, Russia advances its agenda while the United States is not really looking. Russian-American relations continue to suffer due to the Bush administration’s preoccupation with Iraq and the Middle East. Putin is practicing *Realpolitik* by picking up what opportunities American misfortune has laid at his feet.

In an effort to balance against the global *military* hegemon that is the United States, Putin is taking advantage of the increasing overreach of the American empire to re-establish Russian regional hegemony with the Russian energy weapon, the high politics of the United Nations Security Council veto power, and regional strategic cooperation of others who are *bandwagoning* with the Russian reemergence as a global power.<sup>333</sup>

This chapter has identified points of cleavage and tension in the Bush-Putin post 9/11 relationship as well as the need to continue strategic goals assessment and cooperation. It represents a high point, perhaps a neo-détente, after a stressful transition

---

<sup>332</sup> “Biden: Patraeus ‘Dead Flat Wrong’ on Iraq”. Associated Press.

<sup>333</sup> The concept of *bandwagoning* is an IR (international relations) jargon term describing “jumping on board” with others, support for a position or policy, usually reflecting reciprocity of symbiosis to which benefit is derived from unity.

from Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton to George Bush and Vladimir Putin. It also represents the post-cold War changes that have created new paradigms for the relationship in post-cold War modern times.

Chapter 6 will explore the argument that the European Union and the Russian Federation in Putin's second term are making substantial progress, albeit not without sticking points and extreme competition, toward stabilizing relations in the international political community. In an effort to counter the American Open Door policies of the past, Russian-EU cooperation to balance against the United States are identifiable as well as palpable. Contentious energy politics notwithstanding, the EU and Russia are finding accommodation through mutual interest in a changing international environment, an environment that is increasingly witnessing the degrading of American global power.

EU-Russian cooperation against the Bush administration is highly variegated, perhaps not even coordinated in a purposeful manner. Its by-products, however, have produced a tension that is perceivable and have application for Russian foreign policy in its attempts to integrate with Europe and to isolate the United States. It is to that theory this dissertation turns in the next chapter.

Though there is no overwhelming evidence that all EU and indeed, NATO countries are united in their relationships or strategies with the United States, Christopher Layne proposes that there is evidence of off-shore balancing against the traditional American grand strategy policy toward Europe, the Open Door. The *supranationalism* of the European Union strongly implies some political unity and purpose though the nascent nationalism of each European country is clearly a disparate set of factors in those relationships and approaches to the United States.

It is part of the argument of this dissertation that Putin has identified and pursued a sophisticated strategy to integrate Russian and EU diplomatic efforts to obviate and deflect American continued efforts to keep Europe under American economic and political control; American is attempting at the same time sustaining neo-containment objectives against a resurgent Russia.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE UNITED NATIONS AND AMERICAN UNILATERALISM: RUSSIA JOINS “OLD EUROPE”

The Russian Federation has maintained international political relevance and expanding legitimacy via its membership as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council during the vicissitudes and savage vagaries of the hostile post-Cold War international political environment.<sup>334</sup> Igor S. Ivanov, then Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, cited the veto power it exercises often stymies unilateralist maneuvers by the United States and the West. The relative foreign policy disadvantages suffered by Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 came as a result of incoherence in Yeltsin’s foreign policy positions as well as organizational confusion in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Citing the doctrine of the new *Foreign Policy Concept*, this past confusion has been eliminated through this effective mechanism, making Moscow and Russian foreign policy impossible to ignore or effectively deter.<sup>335</sup> Enhanced by Putin’s pragmatism as well as the logistical advantages of the new petro-economy, the MFA has re-established solidarity in Russia’s foreign policy programs.

The unilateral invasion of Iraq by American military forces was vigorously opposed by Putin for many reasons, the most important one being that it destabilized international relations in the region and threatened Russian national security interests. He opposed the American initiative in concert with France, Germany and China. Only when Bush ignored the U.N. pronouncement that the United States was breaking international law and began to prosecute the war did Putin realize that opposition was no longer

---

<sup>334</sup> Ivanov. *The New Russian Diplomacy*. 167-181.

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid*, 167-170.

effective. Only by stepping outside of the institutional straightjacket presented by the U.N. was the United States able to negate and render ineffective the moves of Putin, China, and France, to contain America. The very organization promoted to maintain global peace was being jettisoned by its founder for geopolitical antithetical purposes.

The United States had promoted the idea of the United Nations during World War II and touted its existence as a way to avoid further world wars. In 1944-45, in Dumbarton Oaks, Washington DC and San Francisco, California, the United States sponsored the U.N. as the international political framework for the future.<sup>336</sup> With the essential failure of Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations after the end of World War I, the United Nations appeared to be proposed based more on a philosophy of common global efforts for security cooperation rather than the abstract and altruistic Wilsonian democratic ideals that doomed the League, in an effort to avoid further wars.

The concept of binding world institution mandates in an anarchic self-help international political environment was based on the principles and guidelines of international law and served as the bedrock for international relations for the post-war nations' platform to promote democratic reformism worldwide as an alternative to the closed systems of despotism and communism.<sup>337</sup>

Garnering votes and persuading various political alliances toward American political goals were important diplomatic tools for the United States in the pursuit of its international goals and national interests world-wide. The legitimacy that the United Nations offered as the arbiter of international law offset the dominance of the United

---

<sup>336</sup> Edward C. Luck, U.N. *Security Council: Practice and Promise*. Editor Thomas G. Weiss. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006) 1-12.

<sup>337</sup> *Ibid*, 11-12.

States in international relations and “leveled the playing field” for the other Great Powers. The United Nations Security Council became an elite club of the following nations: The United States, Russia, France, Great Britain and China. These Big Five nations had veto power over major United Nations decisions. Though the Security Council would expand to fifteen members, only the Big Five could exercise veto power. They are referred to as the permanent members of the United Nations. All votes have to have the approval of all five members. Therefore, one dissenting nation could defeat any measure introduced by the others. The mandate of the Security Council is based upon four operating principles: peace operations, military enforcement, sanctions, and empowering partners.<sup>338</sup> In order to steer the actions of the organization, the Security Council became the sanctioning body which served to guide it and protect the sanctity of the organization as a whole from the ravages and vagaries of state sovereignty imperatives.

Throughout the Cold War as well as during the pre-expansion period to include many non-aligned states, the United States used the United Nations as a sounding board and organizing tool to both formulate and to condition its foreign policy. Since it had endorsed the organization based on a growing body of international law, it was implicit that the U.N.’s lead nation would follow its prescriptive normative guidelines and norms. That operational guideline created enormous stress for the United States as it became ever more evident after 1945 that the United States aspired to become the global hegemonic military power and therefore, the world’s policeman.

---

<sup>338</sup> Luck, U.N. *Security Council*, 13.



By 1989, with the impending implosion of Soviet Russia and its supporting political bloc the Warsaw Pact, America felt fettered by the very organization it had fostered and birthed. Finally exasperated with the *multilateralism* and diplomatic protocols of the U.N., the United States accelerated the exercise of *unilateral* diplomacy outside of the United Nations; with its determined invasion of Iraq in 2003 justifying its new direction in terms of national security interests in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States by al Qaeda in 2001, the United Nations and the United States were on a collision course. The United Nation was guided by the principals of collective institutionalized security based on international law while the Bush administration felt entitled by notions of hegemony, that international law was not in America's interests any longer; the Bush administration felt that the United Nations was being used to interfere with America's legitimate global security interests and was, therefore, no longer necessary to advance American national interests.

#### *America Goes It Alone*

The Bush Doctrine denied the effectiveness of the national security strictures of the United Nations as well as international law and based its new offensive foreign policy on the twin tenets of *preventive warfare* and *democratic evangelism* as tools of American foreign policy. This prevented the United Nations from exercising effective dissuasion of American initiatives and policy flexibility. International law had changed, according to the Bush administration, to favor renegade nations and terrorist groups ensconced in NGO-like structures throughout the world and particularly in the Middle East. The United Nations of course, could not compel the Great nations to comply with international law since it is normative in terms of enforcement. The Bush administration

felt the time had come to throw off the restrictive bonds of the very institution the United States had initiated and nurtured during and after the Second World War.<sup>339</sup> Citing sovereignty issues and national security interests of the United States, the United Nations could not be depended upon to right the ills represented by 9/11 and the perceived threat of weapons of mass destructions and Saddam Hussein. The hypocrisy of the Bush administration's unilateralist approach became evident; if the United Nations and the guidelines of international law did not suit the policy direction of the United States, it was no longer a valid institution. The U.N. was not effective according to the Bush administration.

The United States re-embarked on a sovereignty-based course in a new burst of independent action, eschewing multilateralism and collective security embodied by the United Nations via an extensive network of cooperative agreements for over 60 years, utilizing bilateralism to bypass the institutionalism of the U.N. Citing the failure of Saddam Hussein to meet the U.N. Resolutions regarding inspectors looking for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Bush administration chose unilateralism justified by 9/11 and the self-proclaimed "war on terror" as justification for military action instead of multilateral institutional problem-solving under the United Nations. This radicalization, of course, shocked the U.N. members who expected the founder of the United Nations to adhere to both international law and the normative behavior expected of it.

---

<sup>339</sup> Luck, *U.N. Security Council*. 129. Bush claimed the United Nations and the Security Council, in particular, had lost its relevance when it would not condone the American invasion of Iraq based on the search for WMD that the Bush administration claimed the UNSCOM inspectors had not searched hard enough for.

According to Ramesh Thakur:

Reasons for failure of the world community to support the Iraq War included deep doubts over the justification for going to war; anxiety about the human toll, uncontrollable course and incalculable consequences of war in a volatile and already inflamed region; and profound skepticism about the US capacity to stay engaged-politically, economically and militarily-for the years of reconstruction required after a war.<sup>340</sup>

A consensus U. N. position, individual reactions varied from shock to muted understanding of the American position as a consequential psychological of frustration concerning 9/11. Even with the excuse of the 9/11 disaster, America was not expected to implement unilateralism although it had been contemplated by American *neocons* for quite a long time *before the terrorist attacks* (see previous chapter).

The reaction of Vladimir Putin and the Russian government was one of loud condemnation of American unilateralism regarding the Baathist government in Iraq. The Russian clientele relationship was at stake in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, harkening back to the Cold War. After the sharp denial of permission, via the U.N. Security Council in 1990-1991, for the American military to secure Baghdad and arrest Saddam Hussein, the Russian government was consistent in its declaratory policy regarding Iraq in 2003, as the American led “Coalition of the Willing” side-stepped U.N. measures short of war. The United States was loudly reminded by Putin that they were stepping outside of international law and due process established by the U.N. Security Council and that the United States was in danger of becoming a renegade nation that no longer honored the rule of law in the conduct of its foreign policy and international relations.

---

<sup>336</sup>Ramesh Thakur. *The United Nations: Peace and Security*. (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 223.

The first of two fundamental reasons that Russia could and would not support the American approach to Iraq in 2002-2003, was that Russian intelligence had come to the conclusion that Saddam Hussein was not a genuine strategic threat in that there was no evidence for anything but negligible amounts of WMD and no nuclear weapons at all.<sup>341</sup> In addition, and as a matter of policy regarding the United States, any hegemonic American foreign policy move was unacceptable to Putin and the Russian foreign policy elite in principle because it undermined the bedrock international relations approach of the Russian government's multilateralism imbedded in the institutionalism of international law through the United Nations and collective security resulting in the balancing of American global power.<sup>342</sup> Further, according to Shevtsova,

It is obvious that the Kremlin also feared unexpected consequences in its region from war in Iraq. As events later showed, Putin's doubts regarding the consequences of the American scenario in Iraq were justified.<sup>343</sup>

The global war on terrorism is a policy concern for Russia, as well as the United States. Their respective foreign policy prescriptions have points of cohesion as well as points of divergence. A general containment of militant Islam is a practical goal for both countries. The military hegemony of the United States is antithetical for the foreign policy establishment in Russia in that American hegemony and unilateralism are systemically destructive forces in a Russia-friendly multi-polar world. American hegemonic diplomacy is to be countered where-ever and when-ever possible as a matter of routine balancing of the United States. Regarding the Middle East in general and Iraq

---

<sup>341</sup> Shevtsova. *Putin's Russia*, 267.

<sup>342</sup> Ibid, 267.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid, 267.

in particular, Russian motives in maintaining positive relations in that crucial area were vital and strategic as well as historic. They are access to warm-water ports, a longtime Russian goal, and of course maintaining a gateway to Middle East oil and their supporting regimes as a complement both politically and practically to Russian strategic needs; Iraq, Iran, and increasingly Saudi Arabia, represent policy fronts that are effective geopolitical tools in effective offshore balancing of American efforts to monopolize the oil of the region as well as the political domination of the key regimes in the area.

As described by Christopher Layne, the Open Door (American hegemonic access) must be maintained at all costs in order to condition and maintain American extra-regional hegemony in the strategically vital areas of the world.<sup>344</sup> In his words: “First, it similarly seeks to promote the political and economic Open Doors abroad.”<sup>345</sup>

Curtailment of access to vital areas such as Iraq and Iran would deny true global hegemony to the United States. Russia must counter that Open Door approach in order to successfully balance American power. American military power assures that Open Door access; hence, the American invasion and subsequent sacrifices of blood and treasure in the area have been spent. Russian cooperation with the United States was advantageous to the Putin government right after 9/11. Russia gained substantially from the destruction of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime.<sup>346</sup>

The invasion of Iraq, however, changed the strategic situation dramatically. The Russian government viewed the Bush administration’s unilateralism and lack of restraint

---

<sup>344</sup> Layne. *The Peace of Illusions*. 159.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid, 159.

<sup>346</sup> Paul J. Sanders, “The US and Russia after Iraq, rebuilding a realistic relationship.” Menlo Park, California: *Hoover Institution*, Stanford University. June-July 2003. 4- 5.

with alarm. Multilateralism was, of course, the Russian defense against the hegemonic military power of the United States. Without the veto power of the U.N. Security Council, Russia could exercise little sanction power against the Americans. Russian persuasion power diminished rapidly as it was forced to join “Old Europe”, i.e., Germany and France in particular, in its generalized protests of American independent, unfettered military action in Iraq.

In other words, the competing pressure points of Russian-American friction have returned with vigor. Though some positive rhetorical statements still occasionally emanate through respective American and Russian spokesmen, the spirit of cooperation temporarily expressed after 9/11 is basically dead. In its place are expressions of fear of a full return to a cold war or at minimum, a cold peace. Only strategic euphemisms and platitudes at the high politics level find any audience at all, internationally or domestically for either country. It is Vladimir Putin who has thrown down the gauntlet.

Once again, this pattern is familiar in its repetition and self-righteous polemics by both sides. The down-cycle repeats and follows the up-cycles in a clearly identifiable détente-confrontation continuum that supersedes Soviet-American and Russian-American micro-level relations. The historic bedrock distrust by both societies is endemic to their international and bilateral relations; the “I told you so,” never seems to be fully out of the picture regardless of what part of the cycle the two countries are in at any given time. It doesn't take much to reignite the historical lack of trust endemic in the relationship.

Since the C. F. E. Treaty is considered to be the key element of the post-Cold War military balance in Europe, Russia's decision has been greeted with worries and irritation by the United States and by N.A.T.O. Moreover, commentators in Europe, the United States, and Russia, have

repeatedly evoked the specter of a ‘new Cold War’ between N.A.T.O and Russia.<sup>347</sup>

Coupled with the coordinated balancing of the Putin government against the United States in Iraq, Russian-American relations have hit an all-time historic low judging from the negativity in the world press and the political posturing by both the American and Russian governments.

### *Russia Joins “Old Europe”*

The phrase “Old Europe” gained usage in the Bush White House largely through Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. When the White House failed to enlist Germany, France, Russia, China and others in the “Coalition of the Willing” in the 2002 buildup toward an invasion of Iraq, a disclaimer of sorts, with negative overtones, was employed as a public relations slap at those countries that would not go along with what they saw as a serious breach of international law and a violation of the United Nations Charter and due process. As part of that slur, the older, established democracies were denigrated by casting them as “old news” in a new political order in Europe while the new EU and NATO members in the former eastern bloc were touted as being where the real political future of Europe lies, casting Germany and France, in particular, as irrelevant. With the White House fully behind the EU-NATO expansion east toward Russian borders, especially the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, a diplomatic assault against “Old Europe” served to both alienate, punish and marginalize unwilling members of the central and western European bloc that was obstructing the Bush administration’s goals of bypassing U. N. Resolutions to initiate unilateral military

---

<sup>347</sup> Dr. Federico Bordonaro. “The Implications of the C. F. E. Treaty.” *PINR*. 14 November, 2007. 2. <http://www.pinr.com>

moves without substantial international resistance. Germany, France and Russia “obstructed” Washington’s goals and therefore, were denigrated in the international press. By contrast, Spain, Britain and others supported the American position though their populations often did not. Although all were members of NATO, there was not cohesion regarding Bush’s decision to move into Iraq. Spain paid the price for its decision to join the Americans when al Qaeda bombed trains in Spain in 2004.

Moscow has not concealed its preoccupations about NATO’s enlargement toward areas that are of particular strategic importance to Russia, namely the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus.<sup>348</sup> Implicit in this understanding is American political pressure to maintain the cleavage between NATO decision-making and the political initiatives of the European Union.

Politically, Russia has found common ground with Germany and France, notwithstanding recent elections of more right leaning governments with Merkel and Sarkozy. The recent EU condemnations of Russia’s actions in Georgia have strained that dynamic. It is still to Russia’s advantage to vote with France in the Security Council as well as with China, as a counter-balancing move against the United States. The newer European states, after-all, were once Soviet satellites who were lured by the West away from the Russians at the end of the Cold War. Their collective fate appears to be tied to the double expansion of the European Union and NATO, which are antithetical to a reemergence of Russian imperial power. Balancing, a strategy used throughout history to offset the political power of a hegemonic or pseudo-hegemonic nation, has been employed by an undeclared coalition of NATO partners with the tacit and at times,

---

<sup>348</sup> Bordonaro. “The Implications of the C. F. E. Treaty.”, 4.



explicit aid of Russia.<sup>349</sup> To establish a Russian-EU cooperative, the reasons for NATO's continuation as an organization must be reversed. Layne concludes that, by balancing American hegemonic attempts to keep the EU and Russia from cooperating against NATO, the Russian-EU goal of independence from Washington will continue to be frustrated. In his words:

The reason that U S troops have remained in Europe after the Cold War (albeit now in significantly reduced numbers)—and that NATO is still in business—is because the Soviet Union's containment was never the driving force behind America's post-World War II commitment to Europe.<sup>350</sup>

The ultimate foreign policy key for Putin's Russia lies, of course, with manipulation of the status quo. France is key to Russian moves in the U.N. Security Council. The U.N. itself is key itself in keeping Washington honest even over the protests of the Bush administration that the U.N. is no longer effective. After the debacle in Iraq, the fading Bush administration has had to re-enter international diplomacy again through the U.N. gate as well as regional overtures for group solutions, particularly in regards to stabilization of Iraq and negotiations with Iran. Despite Washington's attempts to create the impression that Iraq will soon enter into "mop up" operations, nothing has been actually settled in a geopolitical sense. The Maliki government in Baghdad has not yet found answers to fundamental questions such as de facto partition of the Iraqi state into three sub-divisions along sectarian lines, nor has it found ways to agree on economic zones or how to distribute Iraqi oil revenues. By Spring of 2008

---

<sup>349</sup> See the works of offensive and defensive realist Robert Gilpin, John Mearsheimer, and Christopher Layne for the evolution of this school of realism/neo-realism. Though defensive realism has become an unfocused term, its implications are still clearly visible in their respective works, particularly Gilpin.

<sup>350</sup> Christopher Layne. "Its Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-Up in Transatlantic Relations." *International Politics*, vol 45, no.3 (2008) 4.

American troop levels were virtually the same as the year before. Even though Bush will leave office at the end of 2008, he is negotiating without congressional approval, for the maintenance of 50 US bases to remain in Iraq even after he leaves office.<sup>351</sup> Congress watches closely.

Putin has attempted to capitalize on this lack of strategic progress to open still more opportunities for Russian foreign policy while Washington bleeds.

Washington also needs to take into consideration that the European Union, and Germany in particular, consider good diplomatic relations with Moscow to be a strategic priority because of Europe's increasing energy dependence on Moscow and because of Europe's needs of stabilizing the western Balkans region (where Moscow supports Serbia's rigid stance on Kosovo) and the wider Black Sea region (where the Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh 'frozen conflicts' all strongly depend upon Moscow's willingness to engage in diplomatic cooperation).<sup>352</sup>

Moscow's decision to impose a moratorium on the CFE Treaty must be understood in a broader framework. From an international and geo-strategic point of view, Moscow's move suggest that Russia is determined to bring the United States and NATO to the negotiation table as it thinks that the Western strategic position has weakened in the last five to six years.<sup>353</sup>

In conjunction with a concerted balancing strategy with the Shanghai Cooperation Group, this tactical set of applications has good utility. In the larger view, according to Tom Casier: "The enlarged European Union (EU) now borders several former Soviet

---

<sup>351</sup> "U.S. Negotiates for permanent bases in Iraq." *New York Time*, Friday, 13 June, 2008. A7.

<sup>352</sup> *PINR* report on CFE Moratorium, page 5. <http://by118w.bay118.mail.live.com/mail>

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid*, 6.

Republics and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)''<sup>354</sup> The EU now plays an enhanced and vital role in the regional security of the region of Eastern Europe in conjunction with strategic goals of integration with Russia as well as the CIS countries also bordering Russia itself in Kaliningrad and near St. Petersburg. This evolving coordination and integration addresses the new realities of not only the post-Cold War world but indeed, of the post-Cold War transition period itself. According to Igor Ivanov, Russian foreign policy is anchored to Russian politics:

Arguments about our relationship to European civilization always reflect the ongoing debates involving European interdependence, Russia's direct national character, and Russia's historical path of development.<sup>355</sup>

Gorbachev's calls in the late 1980's and early 1990's for Russia to join Europe in "Our Common European Home" was followed thematically by Yeltsin and Putin alike into the current political realities.<sup>356</sup> Despite the efforts of the Bush administration, especially Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to restrain and inhibit unification efforts between the European Union and both its eastern and western members through derisive diplomatic initiatives to delineate "Old Europe" from "New Europe," where US patronage along NATO political lines lies, the EU and Russia are finding common ground regionally among themselves and CIS members.<sup>357</sup> According to Shevtsova:

Pundits speculated that growing cooperation between Russia and Europe could lead to an alliance between Europe and Russia on a variety of

---

<sup>354</sup> Tom Casier. *The Clash of Integration Processes?* "The Shadow Effect of the Enlarged EU on Its Eastern Neighbors." Chapter 4 of *The CIS, The EU and Russia, The Challenges of Integration*. Edited by Katlijn Malfliet, Lien Verpoest and Evgeny Vinokurov. Senior Series Editor Roger E. Kanet. (Hampshire, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 73.

<sup>355</sup> Ivanov. *The New Russian Diplomacy*, 92.

<sup>356</sup> Gorbachev. *On My Country*, 196.

<sup>357</sup> Layne. *The Peace of Illusions*, 193.

international issues where their positions differed from that of the United States, for instance on missile defense.<sup>358</sup>

Again, this American strategy serves many purposes, not the least to offset and balance American efforts to maintain the Open Door in Europe as a whole and to assert American power over European-Russian political accommodation.<sup>359</sup> According to Layne, the Open Door is vital to American security interests world-wide and critically in post-cold-War Europe, where American investments have been fundamental in establishing American economic and political dominance since World War II.<sup>360</sup> Both Russia and the European Union realize that American domination of European affairs since World War II through NATO must be countered by opposing the principle of the Open Door which ascribes to total economic and political access to all the member countries of the EU. NATO has been the chosen vehicle in keeping the Door open.

According to Casier:

The structural partnership between the EU and Russia is underpinned by a number of mutual economic and political strategic interests. On the EU's side, the strategic interests are reflected in the European Security Strategy, which puts forward two core objectives. One is to create stability around the enlarged Union. The other one is effective multilateralism. To create stability across its new eastern borders, cooperation with the Russian Federation is totally unavoidable.<sup>361</sup>

He further states that:

When it comes to multilateralism, the EU and Russia are pretty much on the same line. While Putin has largely followed the pragmatic policy line

---

<sup>358</sup> Shevtsova. *Putin's Russia*, 210.

<sup>359</sup> Bobo Lo. *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*. The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Chatham House. (Oxford, U.K: Blackwell Publishing 2003 and 2005), 102.

<sup>360</sup> Layne. *The Peace of Illusions*, 71-75.

<sup>361</sup> Tom Casier. *The CIS, The EU and Russia*. (New York: Palgrave and MacMillan, 2007), 83.

of Primakov, he changed the emphasis from multipolarity to multilateralism.<sup>362</sup>

In order to take advantage of the disarray in American foreign policy practices under the departing Bush administration and to embrace the likely return of the United States to a more traditional foreign policy role in 2009 with the likely arrival of a more liberal democratic government, the EU and Russia alike must present a united multilateral front to break the cycle of Open Door American hegemony in European affairs (now EU-Russian-CIS affairs) perpetuated by America's temporary u-turn to unilateralism from the failed Bush Doctrine. According to Kanet, the momentum of American unilateralism will be hard to divert. Even while the obvious repudiation of the Bush Doctrine appears to be at hand, the national security argument and "uniqueness" psyche of the American foreign policy establishment's traditional approach to Europe maintains momentum precludes sudden, radical changes, perhaps only gradual moderation and course corrections.<sup>363</sup>

After the potential roll-back of the structural damage to international affairs propagated by the misguided Bush foreign policy team as led by the military, the twin sub-doctrines of pre-emptive warfare and democratic evangelism may be gradually reformulated and a more realistic and diplomatically nuanced foreign policy prescriptive may take its place, gradual as that process may be. Military power, the only truly hegemonic feature of American empire, will be employed as a component of overall American hard and soft power. International cooperation and multilateral

---

<sup>362</sup> Ibid, 83.

<sup>363</sup> Roger E. Kanet, "A New US Approach to Europe? The Transatlantic Relationship after Bush." *International Politics*. May 2008

institutionalism will return to international relations, along with cooperative nation-building and the rule of international law.

With increasing common interests between the EU and Russia, particularly in the energy sector, the symbiosis created by that economic dynamic and the positive reciprocity embodied in that mutual support, will enable Russia to more fully repatriate former Russian space as represented by the CIS and alleviate angst over perceived encroachment by the United States and NATO in its borderlands and traditional areas of influence. Without EU support, the Putin government was facing a more determined effort by Washington to take advantage of Russian political and economic isolation while it wooed the former republics and suborned Russian attempts to repatriate its CIS members. Russian-EU cooperation, despite its competitive energy politics, is a useful diplomatic tool to obviate American Open Door hegemonic attempts to continue to dominate Europe as a whole. Although intra-EU-Russian frictions certainly continue, such as the frictions with Estonia, EU support for Ukraine, and the complaints over Russian human rights abuses, the macro-level strategic cooperation between Moscow and Brussels, has certainly begun to bear diplomatic fruit in balancing the Americans on the continent of Europe.

With the European Euro gaining in value against the falling dollar, the loss of creditability of American foreign policy and the general features of empire overstretch increasingly visible, the European Union has enhanced its economic and security sanctity greatly by inducing Russian cooperation in strategic affairs. One must be cautious, however, not to overdraw the case that the Russia-EU efforts to deflate and obfuscate American initiatives are one dimensional; balancing is a byproduct rather than a cohesive

cooperative effort to blunt American political initiatives on the continent of Europe. The *supranationalism* that has served the EU so well in its development continues to serve it well in its attempts not to be swept up in the American hegemonic orbit. By requiring all members of the EU, “old” and “new” alike, to cooperate and share burdens, a powerful common front has served to effectively blunt American efforts to dominate the scene in Europe and European Russia.

According to Roy Allison: “Euro-enthusiasts expected Europe to develop a political and military potential somewhat independent from the US and NATO and argued that Russian interaction with the emerging EU military structures would hopefully push NATO into the background.”<sup>364</sup>

Allison warns, however, that there is much psychological resistance to the notion of a European army as it is antithetical to the premise of the Schumann Declaration and the concept of *supranationalism*.<sup>365</sup>

Moscow’s tactical and strategic political moves against Washington appear to be designed to frustrate and slow down American initiatives in both traditional NATO western countries as well as stall European countries as well in their accelerating EU-NATO co-expansionism to the east right up to the Russian borders. By disengaging in agreements that previously served as confidence-building measures during and right after the Cold War, Russia is putting the United States on formal notice that it intends to resist further NATO and American expansion into territories that Russia is trying to return to the Kremlin orbit. Allison further suggests that Russia and the EU continue to have a

---

<sup>364</sup> Roy Allison. *Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe*. (London: Chatham House. Blackwell Publishing. 2006), 74.

<sup>365</sup> *Ibid*, 75.

common geopolitical security interest in limiting US unilateral power.<sup>366</sup> Again, current American foreign policy problems have afforded Vladimir Putin a distinct window of opportunity to deflect and interfere with Washington's primary expansion strategy into eastern Europe and elements of the FSU as well as forestalling NATO expansion into the cooperating Baltic nations.

Reminiscent of the strategies of the Cold War and the familiar east-west struggles over winning the loyalty of European nations in general, Putin is causing tension in the United States by virtue of the fact that he is becoming much more strident in his policy declarations to pursue Russian foreign policy objectives instead of accommodating Washington reflective of Russian foreign policy behavior of the last few years. His most recent actions have threatened the high politics of the global war on terror which served to create a new American-Russian diplomatic bridge until recently. Putin is now setting policy independent of Washington.

On a second significant policy front, Putin is forging a separate strategy in the Middle East. Separate from issues stemming from Iraq, a Russian Middle East peace negotiation in competition with the American game plan has emerged in response to the recent mini-summit in Annapolis, Maryland.

Not to be outshined by the United States, the Russian government has been busy forging Middle East peace negotiations of its own, particularly between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights. Though Iran is already nervous at the thought of Syria coming to terms with Israel, the mullahs in Tehran can be somewhat assured that the Russians have not really set their sights on a comprehensive peace agreement. Instead, Moscow is playing its own crafty game of diplomacy to sabotage Washington's efforts at Annapolis.<sup>367</sup>

---

<sup>366</sup> Allison. *Putin's Russia*, 76.

<sup>367</sup> Stratfor.com. "Russia: A Wrench in US Plans for the Middle East." 11/29/07, 1-4. <http://by118w.bay118.mail.live.com/mail/ReadMessageLight.aspx?>



It does not even appear necessary that Putin offer something concrete as an alternative to American strategies and political initiatives. He has perceived that ill-will toward the Americans is pervasive, especially against the Bush administration, and that Russian efforts to slow down American diplomacy are enough to entice political actors in Europe as well as the Middle East, a strategy to impede American hegemony and its export to strategic locations that challenge Russian national interests. For example, by delaying tactics in the United Nations Security Council regarding Russia's half-hearted cooperation with Washington's efforts to intimidate Tehran through increasingly strict sanctions, the Bush administration has had to put on hold bolder moves toward Iran despite extensive saber-rattling similar to the drumbeat for war in the pre-invasion demonizing of Iraq. Despite increasingly harsh rhetoric by both Bush and Cheney, a military invasion looks less and less likely as there is little or no support for it anywhere, especially in America outside of *Neocoon* circles.

For all this diplomatic maneuvering, the Russians are not exactly sincere in their efforts to bring about peace in the Middle East. Rather, the Russians intend to shift the track set by Washington at the Annapolis conference toward much thornier issues—involving players the United States wants to avoid.<sup>368</sup>

Creating ever-increasing roadblocks, difficulties and obstacles for American diplomacy is at the heart of the balancing strategy of the Putin government.

Russia is strategically bending US efforts at Annapolis out of shape—all under the aegis of progress, of course. The Russian calculus is simple: shift the track toward 'negotiations' that are certain to lead nowhere.<sup>369</sup>

---

<sup>368</sup> Stratfor.com. 11/29/07. "Russia: A Wrench in US Plans for the Middle East." 2. <http://by118w.bay118.mail.live.com/mail/>

<sup>369</sup> Ibid, 2.

Adding to Washington's domestic and foreign policy distractions during the lame-duck impotency of the Bush administration's last year in office, appears to an effective strategy in both confusing issues and neutering American efforts to solidify geopolitical gains for the outgoing American administration. These Russian political moves also impart a more subtle message both in Europe and the Middle East. That is that Russia is back and must be taken seriously on the world stage.<sup>370</sup>

The European Union has supplied credibility to Russia's counter-hegemonic efforts against the United States; congruity exists between Russia and the EU in this common purpose. Finally, it seems apparent that the Russian strategy, shared in principles of multipolarity by the European Union, *though not always effective or explicit*, is to throw a wrench into US plans to create a new world order in the region. The extra-regional Open Door explained by Layne has outlived its purpose and utility for the EU expanding countries of "Old Europe" and the efforts of the American government to divide and conquer EU-Russian concert has been countered by a common offshore balancing strategy. The EU has a GDP comparable in range to the United States and Russia's economy is booming in an apparent never-ending petro-dollar windfall.<sup>371</sup> The overall effect of this combination of factors is to complicate Washington's traditional policies of European dominance. A caveat, however, is in order. EU-Russian cooperation is largely opportunistic and must not be portrayed as a concerted joint effort. There is also EU-American cooperation and Russian-American cooperation on

<sup>370</sup> Edward Lucas. *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West*. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 1-18.

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid*, 87.

diversified issues both at the level of high politics and low politics. European interests, in particular, are multi-faceted and sourced in varied EU countries.

Problems do, of course exist, for both the EU and Russia in this symbiotic relationship vis-à-vis the United States. In particular, the Lithuanian oil dispute threatens the relationship between the EU and Russia.<sup>372</sup> The three Baltic countries, aspiring to maintain a defensive wedge between themselves and Russian influence, both economic and political, are following the lead of the United States in their efforts to escape Russian geopolitical pressures. Russian tactics have included not fixing the rupture of the Druzhba pipeline in July of 2006 which supplied oil to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.<sup>373</sup> “Vilnius is still feeling the ramifications of the economic dispute that turned political and has been paying to have its oil expensively shipped from Russia.”<sup>374</sup> Similar tactics against other EU member states has strained EU-Russia relations though their common strategic cause against American domination basically remains in place. Competition in the international oil sector, particularly Caspian oil and its diversified pipeline networks strategy, especially by Russia, points up the political complications in the various attempts by EU nations and others to resist the power tactics being used by Moscow to establish unfair economic and therefore, political leverage over them individually and as a bloc.<sup>375</sup>

---

<sup>372</sup> Stratfor.com. “Global Market Brief: Russia’s Tattered Ties to the EU.” 11/15/07. Pages 1-6. <http://by118w.bay118.mail.live.com/mail/ReadMessageLight.aspx?>

<sup>373</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>374</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>375</sup> Zeyno Baran. “Oil, Oligarchs, and Opportunity: Energy From Central Asia to Europe.” Report to Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. *New York Times*, June 12, 2008. 13.

Polish resistance to EU-Russian tacit cooperation in an attempt to balance American power, has been consistent and influential. The Americans have taken advantage of strong traditional ties with Poland that harken back to the Cold War struggle against the Soviets when Pope John Paul aided American attempts to support Solidarity and Lech Walesa, a key strategy to unwind the Soviet empire in eastern Europe. Poland, after all, has been chosen as a site for the proposed American ABM station which Moscow is resisting so strongly. Polish resistance has also been substantial though not firm depending on the “benefit” package from the United States.

*The Multidimensional Strategic Relationship*

The apparent dichotomy that has persisted in Russian-American relations in regard to the European Union and NATO expansion is that there is a macro-strategic relationship that the American government and Vladimir Putin have sought to maintain. Although the tacit strategy of Russia, and indeed the European Union, has been to balance American traditional domination of the Continent, as well as post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, the United States has acted as though this is not unexpected and is a manageable set of problems. There are obvious divisions and cross purposes contained within the EU itself regarding relations with both the United States and Russia so a completely orchestrated EU-Russia anti-American concert is not explicit. The national interests of each country are reflected in their policy statements concerning EU-Russian-American relations.

The United States and Russia are united in their common struggle against militant Islam and the spread of terrorism, at least at the broad policy level. Neither of these actors wish to alienate themselves or isolate themselves from the critical aspects of

international relations in the infinitely more complex world posed by the new Islamic militancy.

In addition, non-proliferation and world stability unite these political actors at the highest levels while they fiercely compete at the state-to-state levels. With the relentless reemergence of Russia under the leadership of Putin, the European Union as well as the United States has realized they should and indeed, must, accommodate Russia's return to prominence; Russia has always reconstituted itself throughout its history due largely to its geopolitical presence and size in continental Europe. Since the visionary Peter the Great turned to Europe for economic, political and cultural orientation and emulation, Russian leaders, whether or not always acknowledged, have sought to ingratiate Russia with European cultural heritage and political common purposes in pursuit of a quasi-unity. As a practical matter, what really lies to the north and the east of Russia? Moscow has always been involved in European affairs at some level. America was superimposed on that canvas as a result largely of the two world wars and the competition of the two Superpowers in the Cold War. Otherwise, there is a distinct cultural and geo-political tie to Europe. That relationship has become increasingly strategic in common cause to balance the would-be hegemony of the United States.

Gorbachev's call for a "common European home," part of his New Thinking, reflected the loss of efforts to orient the latter Soviet Union and Russia away from Stalinist Soviet indoctrination.<sup>376</sup> Further, early suspicions of the EEC (European Economic Community), the fore-runner of the European Union dissipated as well.<sup>377</sup>

---

<sup>376</sup> Baran. "Oil, Oligarchs, and Opportunity," 2.

<sup>377</sup> Ibid, 2

Many believed, at the end of the Cold War, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, viewed as an American political instrument of the Cold War, had lost its utility and purpose. When the Americans expanded NATO despite this assumption, the Europeans as well as the Russians, realized that the real American purpose was to perpetuate control over European affairs and to maintain American economic as well as political influence not only in European affairs but in Russia's foreign policy as well. According to Layne, this is still represented as a strategy of the American Open Door. He asserts, however, that the multilateralism sought by both the EU as well as Russia, is appropriate to the current dynamics at work in a world that is engaging multilateral institutionalism as a rebuff to American hegemonic empire.<sup>378</sup>

Again, according to Light and Allison:

At first, no one gave much thought to the role that Russia would play in the new European order. When both the EU and NATO began to plan enlargement, however, it became apparent that a necessary and important subsidiary of the process for both organizations was defining a new relationship with Russia—a relationship which, while not extending membership to either, would ensure that Russia did not obstruct their expansion. This need to engage Russia gave rise to particular challenges after Finland joined the EU in 1995 and the first wave of NATO enlargement took place in 1999, since the expanding Euro-Atlantic community now reached the borders of the Russian Federation. Russians found themselves outsiders in the advancing process of EU and NATO enlargement, and it was far from clear how and whether these organizations could devise the means to promote greater Russian inclusion in European affairs and prevent the entrenchment of new political dividing lines along the eastern borders of the EU and NATO zones.<sup>379</sup>

---

<sup>378</sup> Layne. *The Peace of Illusions*, 159-192.

<sup>379</sup> Light and Allison. Chapter 1 "The place of Europe in Russian foreign policy," from *Putin's Russia and the Enlarged Europe*. (Oxford, U. K. and Malden Massachusetts: Chatham House. Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 3.

Yeltsin struggled with Clinton and Putin has struggled with George Bush on the issue of American sponsored expansions into traditional areas of Russian influence. While the United States was enjoying its day in the sun during the dark days that followed the demise of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, the specter of loss of the borderlands and traditional Russian space was far more frightening to Moscow as Russian resistance to that process seemed anemic at best. Since the window of opportunity has opened for Putin in his second term to reverse American gains at Moscow's expense, due to the American quagmire in the Middle East and loss of cooperative diplomacy world-wide, Russia is beginning to reverse the tide with Washington, though the United States continues to pursue a determined strategy to maintain control in Europe. If Russia is indeed a part of that Europe, new or old, it becomes subject to those same American pressures.

Due largely to these dynamics: "Russian decision-makers tend to see Russia's interactions with the EU, as well as with NATO, in their shared neighborhood, in geopolitical and security terms."<sup>380</sup> Now that both the United States and the European Union have made concerted efforts to placate Russian fears of encroachment and the Russian Federation has become more proactive in its attempts to counterbalance both EU and American expansion issues, the time has come for the CIS countries to be introduced into a total security equation.

Vladimir Rukavishnikov describes the emerging EU-Russian relationship as one that seeks to find common strategic ground on a new premise: "Russians refer to NATO

---

<sup>380</sup> Light, *Putin's Russia*, 3.

*expansion*, while America talked about *joining NATO*.”<sup>381</sup> In Russian, expansion connotes threat and intrusion into Russia’s traditional areas of influence. To replace this atmospheric, Russia wishes to feel comfortable within European security frameworks as being part of it. Closer strategic cooperation between Moscow and Brussels comes at the expense and diplomatic pre-emption of the American-NATO relationship. Putin has continually referred to the new Russian-European strategic partnership in his state speeches; this serves to drive a political wedge between Brussels and Washington and to create new opportunities for Brussels and Moscow. This constitutes a new policy front for Moscow in its emerging independent foreign policy.

Shevtsova has described the new EU-Russian political relationship thus: Russia and Europe have already forged multiple links. Cooperation in the energy field has been the most productive. The European Union continued to be the destination for Russian energy exports, its countries buying 53 percent of oil exports and 62 percent of natural gas exports. The volume of trade with the Union constituted 48 percent of all Russian trade.<sup>382</sup>

Trade relations have evolved to security relations; the Americans are losing their competitive edge in this new calculus. Security guarantees from the proximate Russians with common cause are offering an increasingly attractive alternative to the ever-increasing anachronism of the American Open Door.

By finally integrating the CIS members into those security considerations and arrangements, a tighter total cohesion is being webbed in the increasingly interdependent

---

<sup>381</sup> Vladimir Rukavishnikov. *Russia, Re-emerging Great Power*. See Chapter 3: “Choices for Russia: Preserving Inherited Geopolitics Through Emergent Global and European Realities.” (New York: Palgrave and MacMillan, 2007), 1.

<sup>382</sup> Shevtsova. *Putin’s Russia*, 209.



spaces that in reality, constitute a wider Europe now, albeit a Russian Europe, reflecting the new political realities of the extensive region.

It is argued that Russian integration politics within the post-Soviet space in the 2000's can be divided into two periods that approximately coincide with the first and the beginning of the second of Putin's terms in power. The first period has shown the gradual move toward towards a greater role of economic considerations, which is based on the desire to defend national economic interests. The beginning of the second period of Putin's presidency has demonstrated the reassertion of the old paradigms. Considerations for reasserting the Russian zone of influence on the post-Soviet space are gaining ground at the expense of the pragmatic spirit of the benefit/cost calculations. It is argued further that that Russia employs a wide variety of means to push the CIS states toward integration. Russia is ready to pay a high price while hoping that integration will pay off threefold-by asserting Russia's leading role in the post-Soviet space and increasing its weight in the global arena.<sup>383</sup>

The most successful strategy possible to counteract the American Open Door is to employ a ready-made multilateral-based offshore balancing strategy that will negate and blunt American initiatives to maintain control in Europe and Russia as well. Integration efforts by the EU and Russia will serve to unite and protect EU interests, Russian interests and their common interests which are being undermined by American grand strategy. The CIS efforts to flesh out that well integrated strategy will serve as a bulwark against countervailing strategies that will divide and conquer the various components of this growing federated attempt to unify and codify while serving as a common shield against American military-based hegemonic efforts to continue to steer Europe in all its constituent parts in the direction(s) that will benefit the American empire, not the EU-Russia-CIS polity that is emerging as a single coherent political unit.

---

<sup>383</sup> Roger E. Kanet, ed. *The CIS, The EU and Russia, The Challenges of Integration*. (Hampshire, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 5.

Powered by a dynamic petro-economy, Russia now has the “horsepower” to reinvigorate itself; the EU is already a member of the international political economy and clubs of the West and has now found reasons to assist Russia into those institutions and clubs by proxy if not through explicit membership requiring the stamp of approval of the United States. With Russia’s surging economy and the EU’s solidity as a potent independent world-class federation and a GDP competitive with the United States, the dynamics of the Cold War are indeed becoming increasingly anachronistic. Perhaps the spearhead of American attempts to maintain the status quo in Europe through NATO, will become a relic as well.

A de facto balancing is already occurring as the American voice in Europe is being largely deflected by the effects of EU-Russian cooperation. With the return of Russian defenses to effective levels and EU efforts to maintain a Rapid Reaction Force, the Continent no longer needs the American policeman. However, EU-Russian relations are still restricted in scope by global strategic considerations; Russia is a premier nuclear power and has the ability to project power globally, a strategic requisite for superpower status. The European Union’s base philosophy has been and is rooted in the staunch belief that offensive military capabilities are a blasphemy to its founding creed. The original Schuman Declaration was a concept of a way to avoid further warfare in Europe.<sup>384</sup> As related by McCormick:

After discussions with Monnet and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Schumann took these ideas a step further at a press conference on May 9, 1950 (a date now widely seen as marking the birth of the idea of a united Europe). In what later became known as the Schuman Declaration he argued that Europe could not be built at once or according

---

<sup>384</sup> John McCormick. *The European Union: Politics and Policies*. Second Edition. (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1999), 47.

to a single plan but only through concrete achievements. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of age-old opposition of France and Germany. . . .With this aim in view, the French government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe.<sup>385</sup>

Monnet and Schuman's convictions that demilitarization of Europe and establishment of a *supranational* federation with the express purpose of conducting civil affairs stripped of the ability to wage disastrous warfare, was absolutely key to a peaceful Europe. There is no doubt that that belief sustains in Brussels today. Therefore, cooperation with a super-militarized country with an imperial past such as Russia has its political limitations.

Arguably the American military is hegemonic in that it is far superior to any other military in the world today. Even with the reconstitution of the Russian military under Putin, it will be many years before any semblance of equity or parity is again reached between the United States and Russia. Though total hegemony by the United States is a myth, in reality the American military does reign supreme. The EU undoubtedly does not want to experience the Cold War in reverse, protected by the Russians against the United States. It does not want to undo the founding premise of the Schuman Declaration. Therefore it must avoid the strategic pitfalls of finding itself in the middle of a renewed Russian-American arms race or a pseudo-superpower competition. Though this scenario is decidedly future tense, if possible at all, the EU must maintain its security arrangements with the proximate Russians at one level and its culturally cohesive strategic-level global strategic relations with the United States and its power-proxy NATO at the same time.

---

<sup>385</sup> McCormick. *The European Union*, 48.

The future of international relations may again move in the direction of adherence to the growing body of international law through the international institutionalism represented within the comprehensive guidelines of the United Nations, a premise well documented by Russian policy stances.<sup>386</sup> Notwithstanding the angst and current illegitimate status of many of the NGO-type terrorist organizations practicing asymmetrical politics and warfare, the U.N. Security Council decides the substantive decisions in the world community today. The 800 pound gorilla in the room must be acknowledged but if Paul Kennedy's thesis of empire overreach holds water and if Chris Layne is correct in his prescriptions for multilateral institutionalism, the United States will, by necessity, course correct in its delusional pursuit of total world-wide hegemony increasingly negated in an interdependent world.

Putin, as Prime Minister, has stayed engaged in the day-to-day operations of the Russian government in 2008, the policy elites and the Duma, must ultimately decide if their re-emergence into global prominence once more will be tempered by these current realities of global interdependence. Will they too be seduced by the temptations of global hegemony or rather the illusions of it? Or will they truly integrate not only with the European Union and the western institutions and clubs or maintain their traditional historic goals of a Russian empire, resurrected once again but with the waning remnants of the American empire?

Considering the hurt pride, the disillusionment, the bitter disappointment and shame of falling from the pinnacle of power since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it would be a sore temptation to seek revenge and ring in a triumphal new representation

---

<sup>386</sup> Ivanov. *The New Russian Diplomacy*. See Appendix for Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 165-181.

of Russian pride in a revitalized and potent Russian space. After a very close encounter with the collapse of the Russian state, reviving Russian pride, led by the strongman Vladimir Putin, is in the finest Russian tradition. Seeing the sun set on American would-be hegemony and watching the rising Phoenix of Russian vitality again, would no doubt be very satisfying to Russians who have experienced the relative deprivation of losing super-status world-wide. The increasing loss of the notion of superpower hegemony by the United States will surely enhance Russian images of a substantial return to the world stage out of the shadow of American influences. Witness the recent events in Georgia.

There is of course, much that must transpire in the present before future concepts of international relations can be seriously contemplated. There is a basic decision that must be made in the near future in Moscow. Will the largely non-ideological progress made under Putin in a largely illiberal democratic environment, sustain both the policy elites and Russian citizens into the future philosophically? If the past is prologue, the United States and Russia will continue their contentious and competitive relationship which cycles from the positive to the negative in a continuing pattern of push-pull politics.

Tracking the Soviet Union-Russian transition from Gorbachev, who tried to reform communism into a new modern governmental instrument, through Yeltsin who desperately tried to keep the Russian Federation from dissolving into oblivion, and Putin, who, selected as designated savior of Russia by the hapless Yeltsin, Putin has stubbornly and single-mindedly forced Russian resurgence through non-ideological practical measures bolstered by a fortunate new petro-dollar windfall economy. The Russian political ethos has evolved into a system that has no immediate need of western

democracy and functions quite well under a quasi-authoritarian system that Russians can identify with and who, indeed, hold sacred. That system is based on strong identity with a *Russian* type father figure.<sup>387</sup> The latest incarnation is a man called Vladimir Putin.

The gate to success and a reemerging Russia is in the recruitment of political organizations such as the European Union who also wish to offset American power although their respective reasons may well come from divergent interests and varied political histories.

According to Breslauer, Putin has achieved much but now encounters the future without a clearly defined mission beyond re-establishing Russian territorial integrities and integration with the western institutions and the EU.

Judicial reform, civil service reform, the tempering of systemic corruption, and the development of civil society, are realms in which little progress has been made or absolute regression has taken place since 1999. The implication is that the state may now be muscle bound, not just strong, and that the excessive strength could stymie the judicial, administrative, and political development required to prevent stagnation or another economic crash.<sup>388</sup>

In addition, there is little food for the soul other than recovery and the pride of taking its rightful place at the table of nations. There is no clearly identifiable ideological mission other than to continue to consolidate power and to dictate its own terms in Russian foreign policy and military affairs. There is no socialism, no communism, and no real capitalism. There is only the determined effort to recover Russian pride and power. This new posture can be characterized as nationalism.

---

<sup>388</sup> George W. Breslauer. "Regimes of Political Consolidation: the Putin Presidency in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Perspectives" from *Leading Russia, Putin in Perspective, Essays in Honour of Archie Brown*. Edited by Alex Pravda., (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 55.

The next chapter of this dissertation, chapter 7, will engage the comprehensive question: “Russian Foreign Policy: Return to the Past?” There and in “Conclusions and Pre-Cursors for Further Research,” (Chapter 8) this basic issue will be examined. Where is Russia headed, who will be in the lead, and will an ideological mission evolve after the sustained drive to recovery reaches fruition? Will the illiberal and totally pragmatic democracy now evident in Russia morph into a hybrid democratic state Russian style, or will it regress in terms of democratic reform or even return to the authoritarian past of the Soviet era? The KGB-FSB pragmatism of Vladimir Putin has sustained the recovery. His *siloviki* cadre *are running* the new Russian state. Is that the necessary and desired formula for the future, particularly in view of Russian integration into the European Union and other western venues and clubs? Will offshore balancing sustain the Russian re-emergence as well as engagement in the international political economy? Is there clear evidence of a coordinated Russian-EU effort to balance the power of the United States? How will Russian hard and soft power be formulated in an effective Russian foreign policy and how will that affect Russian-American relations? All these questions will be addressed in the last two chapters.

## CHAPTER VII

### RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: RETURN TO THE PAST? A NEW NATIONALISM?

*Russia has been and remains a great power, and its policy toward the outside world should correspond to that status.*

*Russia is both Europe and Asia and this geopolitical location continues to play a tremendous role in formulation of its foreign policy.... Geopolitical values are constants that cannot be abolished by historical developments. \_\_\_Yevgeny Primakov<sup>389</sup>*

As described in earlier chapters, Mikhail Gorbachev began the Soviet transition in foreign policy with his reform programs *glasnost*, *perestroika* and the *New Thinking*. Although all three, openness, economic restructuring, and demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy, had antecedents, it was not until the reality of the scrapping of the Soviet Communist Party and the dissolution of USSR itself was upon him, that Gorbachev realized the extent of the *unintended consequences* that he had unleashed through the application of his reforms. This chapter begins a summary analysis of these related events.

Gorbachev made a valiant effort to reign in the runaway forces that were leading to the collapse of the Soviet communist state but realized that he had far underestimated the strength of the various nationalist movements and the energetic dedication of the Republics to steer their own destinies without the all-pervasive Soviet state apparatus.

I cannot leave unexamined the conservatives' position on the question of preserving the Union. To the inexperienced it might seem that they were ardent defenders of the Union. Outwardly they spoke in its defense, and their group in the parliament was even called Soyuz (Union). But what kind of Union did they advocate? They spoke in favor of preserving the old Union and did not wish to see it reformed in any way. They

---

<sup>389</sup> Tsygankov. *Russia's Foreign Policy*, 91.



represented forced interested in preserving the old order from the days before perestroika.<sup>390</sup>

With the coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, despite Yeltsin's showmanship and ability to turn back the perpetrators, the die was cast on the future of the USSR and communism as well as Gorbachev himself. The proposal for a revamped socialism under a federated structure represented by the Union Treaty in 1991 no longer appealed to the rank and file Republics nor to the common Soviet-Russian citizen.

Boris Yeltsin was able to marshal democratic nationalist forces and to marginalize Gorbachev, ushering in an aura of inevitability about the end of the socialist-communist experiment. His program of "shock therapy" was a revolution of its own. Though many were disoriented, disillusioned and anxious about the future, Yeltsin was able to turn back the White House revolt of 1993 and deny a return to the past by those opposed to Yeltn. Yeltsin muddled through eight years of chaos and continual near-catastrophes that threatened the very existence of the Russian Federation. Russian foreign policy was defensive, reactive and ineffective during Yeltsin's reign.

Turning to a KGB officer for help, Yeltsin was desperate to pass the baton to Vladimir Putin, groomed by Yeltsin as a man who could re-install discipline into the sputtering and potentially devolving Russian system. The installation of Putin as head of the FSB and then prime minister established the necessary primary steps to power in the Russian tradition. Putin reacted to initial resistance to his ascension to power by immediately launching a new action to retrieve recalcitrant Chechnya back into the Russian Federation orbit.

---

<sup>390</sup> Gorbachev. *Gorbachev: On My Country*, 287.

Putin's first term as president was spent consolidating his personal power in typical Russian fashion and in reorganizing the traditional Russian state back to an orientation toward Moscow, the Center. He talked about restoring Russian pride and power. As he re-federalized the Russian Federation, marginalizing the oligarchs and reactionaries, neutering the independence of the governors of the Republics, the Russian people heralded him as the best example of the no-nonsense Russian strongman in the best of Russian traditional history. Putin, with the winds of a revitalized petro-economy at his back, revitalized vital sectors of the economy; foreign policy independence resurfaced and a new era of Russian stridency entered Russian external initiatives and policies.

In Putin's second term, with his popularity soaring, he turned away from democratic reformism that was not in the best interests of the Russian governing traditions. He utilized the renewed power of the state to suppress dissent, control the media and election process, and to intimidate and neutralize those who would oppose the reconsolidation of the State. A de facto illiberal democracy has appeared for which no one is willing to apologize. Pointing to a new *Russian version* of capitalism, Putin enjoys immense support from virtually all sectors of the economy and ruling *siloviki* elite. His "dictatorship of law" has helped him to declare "a guided democracy."<sup>391</sup>

By ignoring the American-led criterion for democracy, Putin has declared a uniquely Russian way of conducting his country's affairs. This serves to free up Russian political initiatives and freedoms. Emboldened by a dynamic petro-economy, the Russian Federation is slipping the moorings of the Yeltsin-Washington dependency

---

<sup>391</sup> Neil Melvin, "Putin's Reform of the Russian Federation." *Leading Russia, Putin in Perspective. Essays in Honor of Archie Brown*, Edited by Alex Pravda. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 206.

years. Russia has given international notice that it has resurfaced and is ready for action on *Russian terms*.

Dmitri Trenin has described Russia's re-emergence in definitive language:

Western talk on democracy and values is essentially hollow and is used to put American or European interests at an advantage and Russia at a disadvantage. Western powers routinely use double standards in approaching similar situations, depending on their particular interests. Compare the attitudes taken by the West toward the Belarusian versus the Turkman regimes, or to the war in Chechnya versus Turkey's operations against the Kurdish rebels, and the 'frozen conflicts' in Kosovo versus those in the former Soviet Union: Moldova/Transnistria, Georgia/Abkhazia, Georgia/South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>392</sup>

Trenin further states:

In dealing with the United States, Russia should make sure all American promises are in writing and so legally binding. Moscow should never rely on Washington's good will. US interests do not equal humanity's interests, so every concession to the United States requires reciprocity. In dealing with the Europeans, the Russians should reach out to the key countries with the strongest interest in Russia, such as Germany, France, and Italy, and prevent the 'new Europeans' from acquiring too much influence over the European Union's common stand toward Russia.<sup>393</sup>

Finally Trenin posits:

Russia's foreign policy continues to evolve. Unless there is a striking reversal in Russian domestic politics, however, the above features are likely to shape the substance and form of Moscow's foreign policy in its early-capitalist, post-imperial stage. Dealing with this Russia is a challenge that requires a fundamental rethinking of US and EU approaches toward Russia. Such rethinking needs to be informed by an analysis of American and European policies since the fall of the Soviet Union.<sup>394</sup>

Rather than an antagonistic or belligerent re-orientation of Russian foreign policy, the new stridency from Moscow represents a conscious effort on the part of Putin and the

---

<sup>392</sup> Dmitri Trenin. *Getting Russia Right*. (Washington and Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007) 76.

<sup>393</sup> Ibid, 76.

<sup>394</sup> Ibid.

his foreign policy team that Russia's former dependency on Washington is counter-productive, unnecessary and demeaning in current international political realities though strategic nuclear accommodations continue with the United States at the highest levels. Besides the obvious need for the United States and the Russian Federation to avoid nuclear conflict and the coterminous goals of both nations to discourage and deter international terrorism, each country has obviously differing national interests.<sup>395</sup> It is implicit in the realist pragmatic that still applies to international relations, that each political actor will pursue its goals in spite of, the political costs to others, regardless of the opportunity costs that they may entail.

Trenin's position is that Russian foreign policy is *evolving* and is neither reactive nor aggressive in its nature. Russian foreign policy is not Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev's foreign policy and Yeltsin's foreign policy were transitional mechanisms reflecting letting go of the past while engaging the future, as uncertain as those periods were. Russian foreign policy is *not a return to the past* but rather, a foreign policy rooted in the pragmatic, non-ideological Russian future and a new Russian nationalism. Describing Putin as a czarist president, Trenin also believes the average Russian citizen "wants to be left alone." Trusting totally in Putin's motives, they want only to raise their standard of living and live with respect. "By taking care of themselves and leaving 'Russia' to the elites for the time being, they are, in fact, building a material foundation for the next step."<sup>396</sup>

---

<sup>395</sup> Trenin. *Getting Russia Right*, 104.

<sup>396</sup> *Ibid*, 105.

*Joining (Polite Company)?*

Acceptance into the western clubs matters still, but is no longer the only objective. Russia is beginning a political decoupling from the international regime mechanisms propagated by the West in general and the United States in particular. Here again, Trenin proposes that if Russia is not welcome by the West, they will turn east and thrive. Cooperation with India, China and the tigers of the Pacific Realm offers ample market opportunities and political sustenance. “Fostering economic interdependence is the best way of creating solid links between Russia, and the European Union and Russia and the United States.”<sup>397</sup>

Finally, Trenin offers a prescription for American-EU-Russian relations, which he views as so inter-related that none can be discussed apart from the other(s):

America and Europe need to look at Russia as an emerging capitalist society, rather than a failed democratic polity. They would understand Russia better if they used the vocabulary of practical economics, rather than of political science.<sup>398</sup>

A theme that emerges from Trenin’s discussion is that there no longer exists an ideological component to Russian foreign policy. Communism and socialism are dead, even as nationalism has replaced ideology. Russia is obviously not a democratic society at this juncture. Even in its illiberal respects, the central driving issues in Russian foreign policy are re-establishment of Moscow as the center of power of the Russian Federation, firm establishment of what Putin calls “a dictatorship of law,” a lessening of dependence at all levels of Russia on foreign governments both in business and foreign policy

---

<sup>397</sup> Trenin. *Getting Russia Right*, 106.

<sup>398</sup> Ibid, 112.

relations, and continued pursuit by Russia for financial and political stability while attempting integration at the macro level with the West.

Central to his discussion, as well as those of other Russian and western analysts, is the cardinal issue of respect for the Russian Federation as a major political actor in the international system today. Russia cannot be ignored without risk. Geopolitically as well as rhetorically, marginalizing a muscular Russia emerging rapidly from the post-Cold War disorientation of the 1990's, risks threats to the compatibility of international forums and directionality. Even beyond the political utility of Russia's energy leverage, a resurgent Russia, historically entrenched in the United Nations through its permanent member status in the Security Council, and history itself, guarantee that Russia's voice will be heard in international relations.

Eventually, Russia will find a new ideological underpinning to restore its lost political soul. After it has regained its financial footing, restored its national pride, and overcome its sense of social isolation, institution-building will restore its shattered cultural heritage. Societies which have overcome the problems of providing for their material needs expand to cultural expression. They seek international reciprocity and cultural exchange. The youth of Russia may emerge educationally and artistically again and reassert themselves onto the international stage. Possibly after Russia has gained full acceptance into the family of nations on all levels, its social confidence will surface as well, thereby enhancing Russian social status as well as general acceptance. The "psychological threat" of Russia will be replaced by accommodations, both cultural and social; Russian political equality will follow as these socio-cultural forces take over.

Putin's ill-received remark that the greatest tragedy of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the fall of the Soviet Union reflects his concern with the enormity of the event as well as Russia's return. Given that a mere generation has passed, the Soviet to Russian transition has been remarkably short-lived and relatively unmarked by political violence. Even if Chechnya is regarded as an internal affair for the Russian Federation, this description is apt.

Lilia Shevtsova, a Putin critic, has interpreted the transitional aspects from Gorbachev to Yeltsin and finally, Putin:

Putin was initially forced to follow a model of leadership bequeathed to him by Yeltsin and the system of 'hybrid power.' This was associated with many of the traditional characteristics of personalized power in Russia: independence of society, separation from reality; opaqueness, mysticism, and charisma; and an autocratic style of rule. But it soon became evident that Putin's image, habits, character, education, views and previous life experience, were beginning to push him towards a different kind of leadership. Yeltsin was a monarch, albeit with Soviet *nomenklatura* habits, while Putin tried to become a manager. He seemed to constantly be seeking a new kind of leadership image—that of a pragmatic leader, a sort of Russia, Inc.<sup>399</sup>

She argues that Putin has allowed himself the trappings of traditional Soviet-Russian power as a way of crystallizing and refining his image. However, his true bent is the development of the *vertical* of power that consolidates the Kremlin's absolute control over the national levers of power. In this respect, both domestically and internationally, he is a product of his environment; his formative years as a servant of the State have defined his actions and methodologies despite his non-ideological disclaimers. His selection of, promotion of, and protection of the *siloviki* (strong ones) a personal cadre with which he has surrounded himself, are the most defining indicators of his ruling

---

<sup>399</sup> Lilia Shevtsova. "Vladimir Putin's Political Choice: Towards Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," in *Leading Russia, Putin in Perspective: Essays in Honor of Archie Brown*. Ed. Alex Pravda. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 232.

philosophy—control. FSB and former KGB officers virtually *are* the government. All others are auxiliary, ancillary, and outside the formal ruling administrative structure. A vivid example of this extreme utility of personnel is the recent mechanism that Putin has put in place regarding the presidential transition to Medvedev(mine)<sup>400</sup>

Shevtsova further contends that:

Under Putin, the ‘party of power’—in the form of United Russia—was deliberately transformed into a Kremlin apparatus sub-department, completely under the president’s control.<sup>401</sup>

This subterfuge allows Putin to stay within the descriptions of a functioning multi-party Russian democracy while, in reality, maintaining tight controls over the election apparatus. While Shevtsova remains critical of Putin in general in his first administration and early in his second, because he has moved away from liberal western-style democracy and toward a “managed authoritarianism,” she does give him due credit for moving Russia forward out of the anarchy and confusion of the Yeltsin years, where devolution loomed increasingly possible.

Vladimir Shlapentokh has viewed the Putin government in terms of a feudal society in that Russian government is now business oriented and organized around business organization principles with everyone serving the business interests of the “managed democracy.”<sup>402</sup>

---

<sup>400</sup> Dimitry Medvedev, with no identifiable affiliation with the intelligence community, has been elected as President. Putin has become the Prime Minister to assure his continued involvement in the leadership of the Russian Federation. This is a transparent and somewhat jaded use of the Putin ruling philosophy to stay within the rules while suborning due process.

<sup>401</sup> Shevtsova, *Leading Russia*, 237.

<sup>402</sup> Vladimir Shlapentokh and Joshua Woods. *Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society: A New Perspective on the Post-Soviet Era*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2007.



Other analysts, such as Andrei Grachev, are more clinical in their evaluations of Putin, especially in his revival of Russian foreign policy. In his words, Russian foreign policy under Putin in his first term was a reactive holdover of the Yeltsin years:

Faced with the disastrous balance sheet of Yeltsin's presidency, he felt obliged to distance himself from the Western world rather than to seek support and financial aid which had political strings attached.<sup>403</sup>

*The New Putin Doctrine*

Describing Putin's growing independence in formulating foreign policy in his second term, he explains the new "Putin Doctrine."<sup>404</sup>

Russia is no longer the 'sick man' of world politics. Over the last four years, Putin has gained considerable personal experience and is no longer dependent on the people and circumstances that propelled him to the Kremlin in 1999. The unchallenged nature of his authority was shown by the impressive victory of the pro-presidential party, United Russia, in the parliamentary elections of December 2003. It was confirmed and highlighted by his triumphant re-election to office in March 2004. One can therefore interpret the current phase in Russian foreign policy as reflecting Putin's conscious and relatively untrammelled choice. This a conclusion reinforced by the considerable narrowing, in recent months, of the embarrassingly wide gap which previously divided the president's foreign and domestic policies. Even in the absence of any official document since the elections setting out the strategic orientation of Russian foreign policy, there are enough elements to identify and assess the essential characteristics of what may be called the Putin Doctrine"<sup>405</sup>

A defining doctrine for the Russian Federation has been missing. Yeltsin's efforts were reactive and defensive, handicapped by a dire lack of funds and the overwhelming dominance of the post-cold War West, particularly the United States. After a decade at least of "muddling through," and Putin's pragmatic embrace of Yeltsin's basic

---

<sup>403</sup> Andrei Grachev, "Putin's Foreign Policy Choices," in *Leading Russia*, 256.

<sup>404</sup> *Ibid*, 262.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid*, 262-263.

approaches during his first term years, he has broken out into the open on his own with a direction uniquely identifiable as uniquely Putin's.

The basic tenets of an identifiable doctrine, the *Putin Doctrine* are now in place.

Grachev identifies these characteristics, albeit with some caveats:

Remarkably, after a decade of dramatic transformations, the new Russia that is emerging seems to be closer to its historical traditions and to some features of the Soviet state than it was at the initial stage of reforms. These features include a return of nationalist sentiments and anti-western reflexes; growing popular support for the authoritarian regime; mistrust of democratic institutions and procedures; and the obvious marginalization of liberal, democratic, and Western-oriented political parties and tendencies. According to Alexey Arbatov, one of the leaders of the liberal Yabloko party, which failed to secure representation in the new Russian parliament, the radically or moderately anti-Western forces that dominate the new State Duma will press the president to move in that direction.<sup>406</sup>

Putin has finally become his own man. He is steering an independent foreign policy course based on the economic successes of recent years, the misfortunes of a misguided and ill-regarded American foreign policy, and a strident statement to the Russian people as well as real and potential allies, that Russia is back on the scene in international relations and fully able to stand on its own two feet. In addition, Putin is increasingly less accommodating and reactive to American policies and becoming much more stringent in his requirements for strategic cooperation, especially with the United States. A clearly identifiable Russian foreign policy wrapped in a strategic Putin Doctrine has delineated Putin from his predecessors, particularly Boris Yeltsin. Intermittent coordination with the Shanghai Cooperation Council, the European Union and the resurgent CIS, have afforded Putin a united political front with which to obviate, obstruct and counter the bullying tactics of the would-be hegemonic United States.

---

<sup>406</sup> Grachev, *Leading Russia*, 263.

Increasingly and finally in the last year of a devastating foreign policy tenure, the Bush administration no longer has the credibility, either domestically or internationally, to counter the Putin Doctrine. Russia's efforts to politically re-engage the FSU and CIS republics/countries, in an effort to free Central and South Asia, as well as the Caucasus and Ukraine from American logistical and political encroachment, are beginning to pay off. Though American efforts to maintain a neo-containment perimeter around Putin's re-emerging Russia are obvious, Putin has turned the tide in the efforts to regain FSU space. Some of the color revolutions are being reversed and old alliances are evolving, creating a more federated CIS and reorientation back toward the Kremlin, although Ukraine and Georgia are resisting Russia's efforts.

Chechnya, Ossetia, and the Northern Caucasus are essentially contained and Kremlin efforts at securing pipeline security are bearing fruit under Putin's second administration. As part of the traditional Russian near Abroad, Russia continues to pursue the working allegiances of those areas surrounding Chechnya for which Yeltsin and Putin have paid a hefty foreign policy price.

Bertil Nygren's, "Putin's Attempts to Subjugate Georgia: From Sabre-Rattling to the Power of the Purse." is from chapter 5 of *Russia: Reemerging Great Power*.<sup>407</sup> It aptly describes the essence of Russian tactics dealing with pipeline politics:

Since the demise of the USSR the South Caucasus has been the most unstable part of Russia's immediate neighborhood, and Georgia has been the most unstable of the 'weak states' in that neighborhood. As a result "hard security" issues are intrinsically linked with "softer" security issues, all of which tend to be linked to the chase for hydro-carbon resources in the Caspian/Caucasus area.

---

<sup>407</sup> Roger E. Kanet, editor. *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power*. (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2007) 107.

On Friday, British newspaper The Financial Times also noted that Russia's resources of oil are much larger than earlier supposed. The article says that, in the flow of negative information concerning Yukos Oil Company, nobody has paid note to a crucial statement it has made. It said that, after the audit carried out by the American company DeGoyle & McNaughton, Yukos has declared an appreciable increase in the proven reserves of oil. The estimate showed the Yukos reserves of hydrocarbons had increased from 11.2 billion to 13 billion barrels of oil equivalent.<sup>408</sup>

With the political accommodation between Putin and Medvedev, the continuity of Russian foreign policy will likely remain intact. The likely vassalage status of Medvedev with Putin as Prime Minister and the head of United Russia, will ensure that Russia maintains its current foreign policy integrity and vertical controls. Medvedev will become the visible face of Putin. Putin will assure the continued *siloviki* dominance of the post-Yeltsin experiment with liberal democracy. As consolidation matures, possible reinstatement of some vestiges of a more liberal democracy may or may not return. Being the security-oriented leader he has always been that variable will remain entirely dependent upon the continued forward progress of the Russian Federation domestically in terms of GDP and expansionist foreign policy.

Dimitri Simes, a long-time advocate of liberal democracy in Russia, nonetheless, asserts that Washington, under the Bush administration, is largely to blame for the direction of Russian-American relations in the second Putin administration and subsequently more confrontational Russian foreign policy. He evaluates the situation thus:

Although Russia's newfound assertiveness and heavy-handed conduct at home and abroad have been major causes of mutual disillusionment, the United States bears considerable responsibility for the slow disintegration of the relationship as well. Moscow's maladies, misdeeds, and mistakes

---

<sup>408</sup> "Russia To Have More Oil and Gas than Expected?" Johnson's Russia List, #6, JRL 8191. April 30, 2004.

are not an alibi for US policymakers, who made fundamental errors in managing Russia's transition from an expansionist communist empire to a more traditional great power. Underlying the United States' mishandling of Russia is the conventional wisdom in Washington, which holds that the Reagan administration won the Cold War largely on its own. But this is not what happened, and it is certainly not the way most Russians view the demise of the Soviet state. Washington's self-congratulatory historical narrative lies at the core of its subsequent failures in dealing with Moscow in the post-Cold War era.<sup>409</sup>

As Putin and Russia have gained many of their post-Yeltsin goals, the need to align themselves with American foreign policy goals has waned. Even the strategic cooperation between Moscow and Washington is fading because of Moscow's newfound independence and determination firmly to establish an independent Russian foreign policy which is proactive as opposed to the earlier allegiance to the United States and particularly, George Bush, in a subordinate arrangement with the Americans. Simes further cautions that repeating the arrogance of American attitudes after the Cold War transition years, could lead to Russian willingness to join other political actors in a concerted effort to slow or obfuscate American initiatives.<sup>410</sup>

In Simes' words:

It would be reckless and shortsighted to push Russia in that direction by repeating errors of the past, rather than working to avoid the dangerous consequences of a renewed Russian-U.S. confrontation. But, ultimately, Moscow will have to make its own decisions. Given the Kremlin's history of poor choices, a clash may come whether Washington likes it or not. And should that happen, the United States must approach this rivalry with greater realism and determination than it displayed in its half-hearted attempts at partnership."<sup>411</sup>

---

<sup>409</sup> Dimitri Simes. "Losing Russia, the Cost of Renewed Confrontation." *Foreign Affairs*. November/December 2007, 37.

<sup>410</sup> Ibid, 52.

<sup>411</sup> Ibid.

In far less flattering terms, Piontkovsky describes Putin as the “patient” in his maniacal tenure as president of Russia after two terms in office.<sup>412</sup> Piontkovsky predicts that the one-dimensional basis of Russia’s new assertiveness in its foreign policy invective towards Washington is based on oil; when oil is no longer sustainable at inflated market prices, the bubble will burst and Russia will once again face isolation, especially after a period of increased tensions with Washington. In his words:

Having sat it out from time to time in his bunker, the patient reassured himself that no orange revolutions were imminent and that the would-be ‘dismemberers of Russia and their henchmen’ were encountering numerous difficulties of their own—the war in Iraq, the London bombings, social unrest in Paris, Hurricane Katrina, the government crisis in Ukraine, etc. He became emboldened and gradually, step by step, progressed from the depressive to the manic phase of his psychosis.<sup>413</sup>

Piontkovsky depicts Putin as exalting in his petro-dollar good fortune and his enhanced ability to thumb his nose at American power in an effort to resurrect the proud history of Russia and of the FSU. He concludes that Putin has become part of owning-governing elite of Russia, a far more limited club than even the Soviet era *nomenklatura*.<sup>414</sup> Finally, he enumerates a laundry list that he and Yabloko, the opposition party to Putin’s United Russia, feel represents the reality of Putin’s leadership, particularly in regards to Russian foreign policy and Russian-American relations:

The Putin regime is leading Russia to ‘demodernization’ and blocking its progress towards the formation of a post-industrial society. ‘Energy Superpower’ is a saccharine euphemism for the less euphonious ‘petro-state;’ the exultant malice of the Putin Brigade and its spin doctors over failures and misfortunes of the West, and their flirtation with enemies of the West, is irresponsible in view of Russia’s national security interests.

---

<sup>412</sup> Andrei Piontkovsky. *Another Look Into Putin’s Soul*. Editor David Satter, (New York: Hudson Institute, 2006), 200.

<sup>413</sup> *Ibid*, 200.

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid*, 200.

In civilizational terms, Russia is part of the Greater West, or rather the 'Greater North;' Russia and the West cannot afford to drift apart in a twenty-first century in which they face numerous existential challenges. This is a question not of geopolitical preferences, but of their very future. And finally, that Putins, Sechins, Bogdanchikovs, Millers, Abromoviches, come and go, but the Russian people remain."<sup>415</sup>

His position is that isolating one individual or episode or era takes away the proper perspective to view Russia-Soviet-Russian foreign policy and both bilateral and international relations. To understand current Russian foreign policy, it is necessary to view in its entirety, in terms of its total history. He makes a case that post-communist Russian foreign policy has been, on the whole and until very recently reactive. This was at first necessary in the 1990's and early 2000's as Russia, both under Yeltsin and Putin, did not have the wherewithal or the resources to chart their own course.

As Dimitri Simes has accurately pointed out, the United States did not so much win the Cold War as to preside over the demise of the Soviet Union. Russia bent, at times almost to the breaking point, but never collapsed. During the turbulent transition years, particularly in Yeltsin's time, survival was often in question, with demographic catastrophe howling at the door, while Russia muddled through. Tsygankov makes the case that Russian foreign policy has been a case of both change and continuity. Comparing and contrasting "Westernizers" and "Statists" he has shown that both those wishing to follow Peter the Great's tradition of emulating and joining the West, have been in constant tension with the Statist of conservative forces wishing to place Russia in its own unique and independent orbit.<sup>416</sup>

---

<sup>415</sup> Piontkovsky. *Another Look Into Putin's Soul*, 201-202.

<sup>416</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

Putin was more closely identified with the Westernizers in his first administration, largely following the lead of his mentor Boris Yeltsin. Breaking free of Yeltsin's heritage in his second administration, Putin now appears to have a foot in each camp; he integrates with the western clubs, courts the European Union in an effort to realize "our European Home," as well as join in an off-shore balancing act with the EU and others regarding the United States, yet re-establishes Russian imperial nationalist power in Russian traditions of the Statists. The strong symbolism of readopting emblems from the Soviet era such as the national anthem, taps into strong Russian national psychological pride and heritage. Putin has further made the point that these actions are not contradictory and or mutually exclusive. The resulting foreign policy since Putin's arrival has been, therefore, dichotomous in nature. Traditional Russian-Soviet-Russian foreign policy has had the underlying linchpin of reflecting its endemic xenophobia defensive nature throughout its history.

Independence of action has been afforded by both problems, the confusion created by a contentious American electorate in a tumultuous American election year, and, of course, the emergence of the new Russian *petro-state*. Able to do for the first time what he would most likely have done had he not inherited a crippled Russian state from a debilitated Boris Yeltsin, Putin has taken complete control through the undisputed construct of Putin's ruling power vertical. His siloviki government has solidified that control and Putin no longer has to pretend he is a democrat.

The new ideology identified by many Russian foreign policy analysts is pragmatism to return pride and power to Russia, solidify control for the sake of order and progress, and to return Russia to her rightful place at the international table of nations.



Vestiges of democracy such as elections are offset by control of both dissent and the press. Putin has declared Russian “democracy, Russian style.” If it does not fit the Western image of a liberal democracy, so be it. His rationale has evolved that the Russian people are not accustomed to the precepts of such a system and do not feel comfortable with it or desire it.

When Putin goes through the motions of democratic reforms, his critics such as the late Anna Politkovskaya, Andrei Piontskovsky, and to some degree Lilia Shevtsova, are shrill in their accusations that he has altered course in the Russian democratic experiment. Allegedly assassinated at the hands of Putin’s FSB, Politkovskaya’s last book was a scathing criticism of Putin entire reign.<sup>417</sup> She was particularly vivid in her descriptions of Russian barbarity in the Chechen war under Putin. Putin defends himself by claiming he has done what is necessary to return Russia to significance once more in the international community. As his strength has increased, he has offered fewer and fewer explanations for his policies and even fewer apologies.<sup>418</sup> He appears to genuinely believe that Russia can never return to communism but that Russia is not, by its history and nature, a democratic state. His consistent popularity ratings at over 70 percent, though suspect as accurate and independent reporting, nonetheless verify his assessment of his people’s job evaluation of him.

Putin’s manipulation of the system, as Prime Minister, in an attempt to retain power through Medvedev, attests that the Russian elite as well as the population in

---

<sup>417</sup> Anna Politkovskaya. *Putin’s Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy*. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004. 230.

<sup>418</sup> Vladimir Putin, “Nothing to Reproach Myself For Over 8 Years of Presidency.” Article in *Itar-Tass*, February 14, 2008, as reported by Johnson’s Russia List #33 on 2-15-08. 16-20.

general, approve of his vision for Russia. They do not seem to care too much that Putin has been accused by the West, and particularly the United States and some members of the European Union, for having *perverted* the democratic experiment, in their collective view, ostensibly set out by his predecessors Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Though he has his critics to be sure, both domestic and foreign, his domestic support is strong. Many obstacles remain, however. While Putin is making common cause with the European Union to balance American hegemony, the European Union is also seeking policy independence from Russia. It is, of course axiomatic, that each international political actor will operate in its own national interest regardless of its bilateral and multilateral relations. Recently the difficult balancing act between Brussels and Moscow was reflected in an analytic article by Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.) titled “The Unraveling of Russia’s Europe Policy.” The author of the article, Peter Zeihan, pointed out that:

Russian President Vladimir Putin and his anointed successor, Dmitri Medvedev, were in Bulgaria on January 17, 2008. The point of the trip was to put the crowning touch on a Russian effort to hook Europe into Moscow’s energy orbit. After a touch of bitter rhetoric about how Russia and Bulgaria were ‘doomed to be partners,’ Putin agreed to grant equal rights to the South Stream natural gas pipeline Moscow hopes to lay through Bulgaria. Yet the tension of the meeting and the concessions that Putin had to make simply to get permission are symptomatic of a broad unraveling of Russian foreign policy toward Europe.<sup>419</sup>

He continues his analysis by stating that: “Russia often has a love-hate relationship with Europe.”<sup>420</sup> Through economic pressure, especially in gas and oil supply to Europe,

---

<sup>419</sup> Peter Zeihan. “The Unraveling of Russia’s Europe Policy.” Reported Jan 22, 2008, in *Geopolitical Intelligence Report*, Stratfor Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 1-7. <http://by118w.bay118.mail.live.com/mail/PrintShell.aspx?>

<sup>420</sup> *Ibid*, 1.

Moscow has tried to leverage political concessions from the EU while simultaneously strategizing with it against the United States in terms of grand strategy. Particularly crucial for the Russian government, is the EU's responses and hopeful cooperation regarding Russian pipeline plans.

Two natural gas lines—Nord Stream, which would run under the Baltic Sea from St. Petersburg to Germany; and the aforementioned South Stream, which would run under the Black Sea from near Novorossiysk to Bulgaria, would increase the European dependency on Russian natural gas from 25 percent to 35 percent of its total consumption.<sup>421</sup>

In political terms, the operative word here is *dependency*. When this type of political relationship evolves, it has the potential, of course to create an asymmetry. In this case, the Europeans are looking for more balance in this aspect of their strategic relationship with the Russians, regardless what other aspects of their total relations with Vladimir Putin are based upon. The Russian strategy is anti-American in essence; indeed, Zeihan posits: “The Kremlin’s Cold War strategy has long been that if the Europeans can be neutralized, the American influence can be purged from Europe.”<sup>422</sup>

In spite of the growing strategy of Russia and the EU regarding balancing American Open Door European dominance, bilateral competition remains strenuous. That competition happens to center around the most prominent current issue, petro-assets. Europe and Japan, critical components of the “West,” are extremely dependent upon oil and natural gas imports; Russia is the most immediate supplier who also shares other strategic considerations with the European Union. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that, though the European Union and Russia are making a degree of common cause

---

<sup>421</sup> Zeihan. “The Unraveling of Russia’s Europe Policy,” 2.

<sup>422</sup> Ibid, 3.

against the American Open Door in Europe, Europe maintains an extremely sophisticated and long-lived security relationship with the United States, technically, through NATO.

Europe is still enjoying the ultimate nuclear umbrella through NATO, especially if Russian foreign policy returns to military confrontation-competition with the United States in a new cold war. The bottom line is that only the United States and Russia can still make war in Europe. Europe would still suffer the consequences of such an aberration. The nascent competition between NATO and the European Union often overshadows their mutual cooperation. Issues of “New Europe” and “Old Europe” tend to mask the dual competitive-cooperation facets among Russia, the United States and Europe as well as the European Union, NATO, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. These aspects are not mutually exclusive; none of the political actors involved here can afford to be arbitrary in their actions or step too far away from the strategic necessities that bind them.

These operational facts cast Vladimir Putin and Russian foreign policy in a current light of coercing its strategic partners to engage in aggressive measures against the United States and American interests in Europe, while also tying the hands of the European Union in bilateral energy relations, limiting EU foreign policy options and suffocating EU relations with its traditional Atlantic partners. Europeans are asking what’s in it for them outside of consistent energy supply. The tension in the EU-Russian bilateral relationship is high and is increasingly confrontational, putting in jeopardy that which both partners have made in their proclaimed grand strategy objectives of offshore balancing of the United States though this strategy is far from unanimous in the EU. A

primary and mutual strategy not long ago, it may be scaled back by the European Union as the EU works toward a more realistic trilateralism among the three primary actors.

*Russia Re-Emerges As A Great Power*

As Roger Kanet has pointed out, Russian foreign policy under Putin has been conceptually centered around Russia's return, or reemergence, to a minimum of Great Power status.<sup>423</sup> Putin's essentially non-ideological methodology in that foreign policy revitalization has centered around a pragmatism that sacrifices democratic reformism in this pursuit. Single-mindedly, Putin has used his "energy weapon" as his primary instrument of Russian foreign policy. One byproduct, an important one to be sure, has been a restoration of Russian national pride. However, the return to the elevated status of Russia through an aggressive foreign policy, especially in Putin's second term, has set Moscow on a new confrontational course with the United States as well as complicating its relations with its European neighbors. It has intimidated and created extreme tensions in the former FSU as well, all in attempt to re-secure traditional Russian dominance in the imperial vestiges of its former empire.

In the final analysis, according to Kanet:

Russia is not fully a Great Power, despite the commitment of its leadership, to reestablishing Russian greatness. Yet, given its military capabilities, especially its nuclear arsenal, and assuming its economy continues to expand as it has over the last five or six years and that the demographic problems do not become too severe, Russia will likely gain significant influence in global affairs. It has already made great gains in reestablishing its role as an important global actor.<sup>424</sup>

---

<sup>423</sup> Kanet. *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power*. 223.

<sup>424</sup> Ibid.

Is current Russian foreign policy a return to the past? Though there is a residual cultural sentiment for Soviet power as well as communism, Putin has shown no inclination to return to it. All of his policies, though steeped in the *power vertical*, preclude a return to the days of the ruling CPSU and its revanchist advocates such as Gennady Zyuganov. Putin has returned Russia to a ruling elite the *siloviki*, his trusted circle of former and current intelligence officers, to direct and maintain control of the State but it is non-ideological in its nature with no ideological proclamations of communism, socialism, or even explicit nationalism or fascism. His descriptions of democratic process are limited to the improved lot of Russian citizens in that they can vote, pay taxes and receive services from the state as well as enjoy the amenities afforded by a booming economy. The only price tag seems to be an unstated fealty to the Russian state and Medvedev-Putin.

There is no attempt to portray Putin's leadership as a manifestation of any democratic pluralism or process. Putin is the Boss regardless of his title and the Siloviki leadership is loyal only to him and themselves in a reflection of the feudal system postulated by Shlapentokh in his book, *Contemporary Russia As A Feudal Society: A New Perspective On the Post Soviet Era*.<sup>425</sup> His policies have concentrated power in the Executive at the express expense of the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government and in particular, the regional governors.<sup>426</sup> At best, the window dressing that serves as a claim of a country practicing a degree of illiberal democracy, serve only

---

<sup>425</sup> See Vladimir Shlapentokh and Joshua Woods postulations in Chapter 10 that the "Personal Relations as a Core Feature of Feudalism," represent the current personality cult or the role of personal relations in politics as practiced by Putin today in Russia in an historically familiar suzerain-vassal relationship. 258.

<sup>426</sup> Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap. "The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want." 2006-07 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. *The Washington Quarterly* Winter, 2006-07. 30:1 83-92.

limited diplomatic function as the price of entry to Western Clubs and as an attempt to ingratiate Russia to Western powers for purposes of integration in the forums of the international political community.

As Putin has pointed out on more than one occasion, Russia is practicing democracy *Russian style*. The existence of the Duma, political parties, the right to vote, the increased rule of law and “due process,” are all pointed to with pride, as Russia’s affirmation of the democratic reformism started by Gorbachev, developed by the democrat Yeltsin, and finally, institutionalized by Putin. The daily practice of Russian government, however, as well as Russian foreign policy tactics, manifest a working philosophy in Russia today, that is largely antithetical to pluralistic government.

Russian foreign policy has indeed, *evolved*. It is definitely familiar in *tactics* to the past though it has been essentially stripped of socialist ideology and is even more pragmatic than it has been in the past, even more than during the expansionist *realpolitik* days of the Soviet Union. According to Bremmer and Charap, however, Putin does not *entirely* have a free hand as has been portrayed by both Russian and Western presses:

With so much authority concentrated in the Kremlin, however, factionalism, personality clashes, and bureaucratic scuffles within its walls are now exponentially more significant in determining policy. The executive’s interventions in the economy exacerbated this internal friction by greatly increasing the possibilities for financial gain available for officials. In other words, Putin’s consolidation of political power partially backfired. The executive branch may have all the authority, but divisions within it have limited the president’s direct control. Although other institutions and the private sector are now largely irrelevant, disputes between the Kremlin factions, rather than directives from the president, often determine major policy outcomes.<sup>427</sup>

---

<sup>427</sup> Bremmer, “The Siloviki in Putin’s Russia”, 84.

As a direct reflection of the managed nature and strict controls of the Russian government by Putin and his siloviki administration, and as a backgrounder to the intelligence-apparatchik nature of those personnel, a full listing of Putin's ruling class is provided in Appendix A at the end of this dissertation. The intelligence backgrounds of these select individuals also served as a solid transitional conduit for Putin as he transitioned from his first administration to consolidation of his second with increased controls.

*Looking into the future*

On the very eve of the 2008 Russian presidential elections, Mikhail Gorbachev, a frequent editorial supporter of Vladimir Putin and his obvious regime accomplishments, levied a severe criticism of recent developments regarding the Russian Central Election Commission.<sup>428</sup> His remarks denounced a system that insulates the Kremlin's inner circle: "Something is wrong with our elections and our electoral system needs a major adjustment."<sup>429</sup> Referring to the recent decision by the Russian government to disallow the candidacy of Mikhail Krasnayov for alleged signatures violations, Gorbachev noted that this reflects the corruption of the system; Gorbachev also asserted that this was an explicit maneuver by Putin to stymie opposition, an unhealthy development for the Russian political system. Moreover, he suggested further changes: "The issue concerning governors' elections should also be raised so that people are able to take a more active part in social and political life."<sup>430</sup>

---

<sup>428</sup> C. J. Chivers. "Gorbachev, Rebuking Putin, Criticizes Russian Elections," *The New York Times*, January 29, 2008. A8.

<sup>429</sup> Ibid, A8.

<sup>430</sup> Ibid.



This response from Gorbachev regarding domestic Russian politics echoes the foreign policy criticisms of analysts like Lilia Shevtsova as well as foreign analytical assessments that Putin is not leading the country toward democracy but rather suffocating the democratic reformism of his two predecessors, especially through his extensive usage of his *siloviki* political cadre. What appears to be missing from the West's reformist analysis is the characterization by both Putin himself and others that the current trajectory that Putin and his ruling elite of power vertical practitioners have taken is that the current political path was both necessary for recovery of the Russian State, the CIS and the FSU, as well as being uniquely *Russian in character*.

Western-style democracy per se, is a foreign concept to the Russian peoples. The current application of "managed democracy," a system with symbols of democracy carefully controlled by an elite group, not a pluralistic ruling body, is probably, at least at this juncture of Russian history, both problematic and inevitable; communist-socialism ruled the land and empire a mere generation in the past. In reality, the fact that there was not a cultural-eco-political implosion of dramatic proportions is quite remarkable in historical terms.

Russian foreign policy is unique in its present form, though recognizable in many of its precepts. It definitely is not a return to the past, but rather, a post-modern variant of its episodic imperialism. It is uniquely Russia. It is realist and opportunist while at once traditional in the Russian ethos. It is pragmatic to a fault. It has been adaptable and resilient, much as has the history of the Russian empire itself. Finally, it has *survived*. Russia has seized the opportunity of taking advantage of a retreating global would-be hegemonic power in an attempt to throw off the final vestiges of containment and neo-

containment. The West, in particular the United States, is reaching classical empire overreach.<sup>431</sup> Russia, having experienced this reality of global overreach in 1991, may be content to reassert itself as a senior partner in a global multilateralism that may represent the new international political reality.

Indeed, if a clearly superior military force such as the world has never seen represented by the United States, has failed to achieve global empire because of the axiomatic shortfalls of imperial overreach described by Kennedy, the pragmatic appeal of a return to multilateral institutionalism on an international scale seems inevitable. It seems hopeful that Vladimir Putin realizes this even in a passive sense; Russian hegemony must become regional if it is realized at all. The days of global empire are no longer practical in a resource-diminishing reality that is the present dominant demographic paradigm in the world today.

In addition to the demographic problems Russia faces in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, such as declining population, the return and spread of diseases such as HIV-aids, tuberculosis and malnutrition, declining longevity especially for Russian men, and plummeting birth rates, drug addiction saps the Russian military and veterans as an unfortunate side effect of the war in Afghanistan. In combination, these problems are potentially lethal and must be addressed by Putin and Medvedev to both rejuvenate Russian health and the national psyche as well.<sup>432</sup>

---

<sup>431</sup> Kennedy. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. His thesis is that all empires eventually overreach and overextend their resources in order to maintain a degree of hegemony. In that attempt to reach hegemony, they inevitably encounter the interdependence of globalization, countervailing forces that limit and negate empire. 1-13.

<sup>432</sup> See Walter Laqueur. *The Last Days of Europe: An Epitaph for an Old Continent*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007)

Without the Gorbachev and Yeltsin historical chapters, Russia may well have either disappeared on the nuclear battlefield, or devolved completely under the relentless demographic pressures of a post-ideological struggle for identity as well as demographic pressures. All three Russian leaders deserve credit for maintaining ultimate stability and general cohesion during their respective tenures as stewards of a massive state metamorphosis.

In a euphemistic sense, the Russian state changed some of its characteristics but never became anything other than the identifiable *Russian* state. That same dynamic historical determinism remains at work today as the Russian Federation, under the stern discipline of one of its native sons, continues that historic march of the Russian people and the clear and positive statement that yes, *Russia matters*. As stated by Primakov, “Russia has been and remains a great power.”<sup>433</sup>

In conclusion, this chapter has summarized Putin’s foreign policy efforts in the new, revitalized Russia, a Russian state absent a guiding ideology such as Gorbachev had and Yeltsin’s desperate attempts to emulate and adopt western democracy. It has attempted to describe his efforts to rescue and stabilize the State both internally and provide a new basis for Russian foreign relations in a continuing attempt to integrate Russia into the modern political economy as well as international social acceptability.

The next and final chapter will make overall conclusions as well as observations in an attempt to contribute to the current debate on the resurrection of Russia and factors indicating likely avenues for further research as Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and the Russian people continue their march toward recovery and prosperity. In light of the

---

<sup>433</sup> This geopolitical reality is clear in his eloquent statement quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

new ruling combination/machination that is Medvedev and Putin together, a new sophistication appears to be evolving. It will be interesting indeed to observe that process. Will Russia be able to sustain the headlong recovery or will the excesses of largesse and venture capitalism reminiscent of the problems in the Saudi Royal Family manifest themselves on Russian soil? Reminiscing about the “good old days” of the Soviet empire continues to resonate in Russia. Is it a longing for status and power? Is conspicuous consumption enough to feed the Russian soul?

Chapter 8 will draw some conclusions based on the research and explore the possibilities for further research. As Primakov proudly pointed out: Russia matters!

## CHAPTER VIII CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES/SUGGETIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Despite appearances of a return of Russia to a managed system of government that could be described as an illiberal democracy through Vladimir Putin and his *siloviki* leadership, the three past leaders of the Russian empire have each served in a unique period of their stewardships. Gorbachev, as the custodian of unintended consequences, set lose the whirlwind that engulfed the Soviet Union and its empire. Yeltsin, having usurped Gorbachev's reformist socialist experiments of *glasnost*, *perestroika* and the *new thinking*, set forth a government modeled on western democracy. While preventing implosion, devolution and civil war, he could not successfully manage the conversion. Putin, ever the pragmatist, has determined that the Russian State not only recovered but is reemerging as a global power. He is not interested in labels of ideology or the approbations of the West. He has accomplished reinstating the Russian state back onto the world stage and successfully stewarding Russian external affairs. He has established a course for a fully independent Russian foreign policy and a strident new non-ideological brand of nationalism.

### *Putin's Accomplishments*

Putin has accomplished much. His combined legacy from Gorbachev and Yeltsin set the stage for him to accomplish much. However, it would be a false assumption to think his path was preordained. Carefully steering the wounded Russian state in the last days of 1999 out of harm's way was no small feat. Putin deserves much credit for preventing disaster in his first term as well as for creating multiple successes in his second term. Not creating a representative democracy along Western guidelines should

not be the absolute measure of his success or failure in his tenure as head of state.

Rather, given the stark circumstances of the end of a decade of total mismanagement and drift under Yeltsin, the fact that he brought order to the internal, and gradually, to the external affairs of the dysfunctional state under Yeltsin, has been a singular achievement.

While many praise Putin and collectively give credit to the three Russian leaders during extremely difficult times, it is also necessary and prudent to point out that the ultimate yardstick of success or failure in this historic transition lies in the future. Where is the Russian state headed? Where will it be in 10 years? Is the continued leadership of the state totally dependent on the discipline of one man? Will the petroleum-based economy be enough to sustain the current recovery of both the financial sector and the superstructure of Russia in a globalized world political economy? Finally, where is the Russian soul? What gods will Russia adopt and follow into the future? If Putin exits the scene, will the recovery sustain itself? Will Dmitry Medvedev endure? Will Russia indeed recover its *Near Abroad*, obviating the threatening color revolutions on its borders, while still integrating into the world international political cooperative? Will it coexist with NATO?

Putin's critics think not. His supporters, however, see an unlimited Russian rainbow stretching into the future riding on an endless river of energy politics. Without a clearly articulated ideology that translates into a self-perpetuating functioning institutionalism, the future of Russia could be tenuous and its progress reversible.

At the beginning of this dissertation questions were posed that now need to be answered. The research has led to many answers and tentative conclusions with many more unanswered at this juncture in Russian political history. Russian bilateral and

multilateral relations have evolved through the progression of the three Russian leaders under examination. Mikhail Gorbachev was a foreign policy master and cast the Soviet Union in a far less sinister light that the West and the United States could embrace. In Margaret Thatcher's famous words "he is a man I think we can do business with."<sup>434</sup> After an initial period of cynicism, the United States began incrementally to acknowledge that Gorbachev appeared sincere in his reformist declarations, though the Bush administration adopted an opportunistic wait and see approach to their relations with Moscow.

As Gorbachev engaged the United States in détente while initiating and intensifying reforms at home, the nationalism smoldering in the Baltics and Central and Eastern Soviet satellites boiled over, finally spilling over to the Russian republics and the Russian state itself. He had lost control and caused the demise of the entire communist-socialist empire. Yeltsin stayed involved in the process until he displaced Gorbachev. With this historical segment it is possible to answer part of the original research question: *Is the present political relationship with the post 9/11 United States the beginning of a new and unique post-cold War relationship, or is it simply a continuation of the familiar confrontation-détente cycle historically endemic to Russian-American relations?*

9/11 marked a diversion in Russian-American relations in that much of the traditional friction of the long-term relationship eased and allowed for a degree of common cause. The "War on Terror" that ensued precipitated a non-nuclear opportunity to go beyond Cold War détente to a new strategic parameter in the relationship. The new

---

<sup>434</sup> Margaret Thatcher was widely quoted in the major Western dailies that led to Gorbachev's coronation as the new "Russian Prince of Peace." *The New York Times*, on December 23, 1984, reported Thatcher's remarks that changed the international image of this unique Russian leader.

dynamic was predicated on a new order of business, stopping the illegal activities of terrorist organizations in their prosecution of asymmetrical warfare against both the US and Russia. With Putin still engaged in the process of putting Russia back on its feet, opposing the Americans was not a good logistical or tactical choice. Now that Russia is regaining its first true foreign policy independence since the early Gorbachev era, Russia, under Putin, does not react to American initiatives the same way. Therefore, the answer to the essential part of the research question is a qualified *no*, because finally, there is no continuing basis for the Russian Federation or the United States to pursue congruent global objectives. On a strategic nuclear level, however, clear macro-level communications and some aspects of cooperation are still clearly indicated by virtue of the fact that both countries still have the ability to attack the other with overwhelming force. The other variable is, of course, that both nations are veto-yielding members of the United Nations Security Council, the last real vestige of international cooperation regarding international relations.

Relations between the two countries, particularly in an age of increasing American unilateralism, effectively placing the United States outside the strictures of international law as represented by international institutions, are rapidly moving to specific state to state issues as their common interests continue to diverge.

Iraq has proven to be the key variable in the unraveling of the historic Gordian knot that has held the United States and the Soviet Union-Russian Federation locked in a complicated geo-political and strategic love-hate relationship. With little socio-cultural cohesion and commonality, it appears inevitable that each would go its own way, with or without the threat of war. With the strident resistance of the German and French



leadership to the American unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003, Russia joined in the loud protest against this serious breach of international law and disturbing break in traditional international protocols observed by American administrations up to this point.<sup>435</sup>

Therefore, the answer to the second question introduced in the abstract of the dissertation can now be answered. *Has the American occupation of Iraq, a perennial Russian client state, derailed the new post 9/11 accommodations between the two countries?* The answer is an unqualified *yes*. This factor is not the only cause of the disintegration of the post- 9/11 cooperation, but it definitely was the final blow.

#### *Where is Russia Headed?*

Other questions presented here now take form. *Where is Russia headed?* The current rising prosperity has fast-forwarded the reemergence of the Russian state dramatically. With the 7<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the world after near bankruptcy in 1998, the contrast is dramatic. Therefore, the partial answer is that Russia will continue to prosper as there does not appear to be an end to the near and mid-term dependence of the world's economies on hydrocarbons. As Russia continues to prosper, it may find itself returning to "superpower" status as the requirements of that term will be increasingly met as the prosperity spreads to all sectors of the Russian economy as it is doing at present. Time seems to be the only variable, especially since Vladimir Putin will continue to strongly influence the Russian government as prime minister in cooperation with his hand- picked successor to the presidency Dmitry Medvedev.<sup>436</sup>

---

<sup>435</sup> Trenin. *Getting Russia Right*, 2.

<sup>436</sup> The transition has occurred in the "democratic elections of May 2008, when Putin stepped down as president of the Russian Federation. Dimitry Medvedev, a long time Putin associate, walked to an easy victory at the head of the only political party of significance, United Russia. Putin was then appointed Prime Minister by Medvedev. Medvedev will essentially be a ceremonial president while Putin continues direction of the country. Though not officially siloviki, Medvedev is accepted by them in his new position

The question of the Russian “soul” is much more problematic. The Russian soul is intertwined with Vladimir Putin’s imagery of a Russia returned to power and status after the debilitating post-cold War years under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. With no identifiable ideology other than Putin’s pragmatic nationalism, no communist-socialism or imperial state mission, no fraternal brotherhood to feed across the world, no clarion call to western democratic pluralistic rule, no political religion to sustain the people, Medvedev’s mission may well be to find some orthodoxy to inspire a people used to worshipping at the feet of a leader serving clearly identifiable idols; Putin has, however, begun to nurture the Russian Orthodox Church and wears a crucifix himself.<sup>437</sup> The apparent dichotomy of a strong symbol from the Godless Soviet state finding religious bearing in his conduct of the state after the fall of communism lends to skepticism that this may be a choreographed effort to unite the country under the missing ideological banner that appears to be absent in the current Russian ethos. That view of course, is skeptical and possibly irrelevant.

Finally, the threat of a color revolution within the Russian Federation itself, as described by Trenin, is certainly possible as witnessed by the unlikely demise of the Russian Soviet Republic in 1991 that nonetheless took place.<sup>438</sup> This possibility seems remote as long as the standard of living enjoyed by Russian citizens continues to rise and

with the ruling arrangement.” See Simon Saradzyan’s article “Putin’s Choice Balances Siloviki.” [www.moscowtimesru/indexes/2003/11/03/01.html](http://www.moscowtimesru/indexes/2003/11/03/01.html).

---

<sup>437</sup> Clive Gillis. “The Story of The Russian Orthodox Church and Its New Convert, President Putin.” *European Institute of Protestant Studies*. 1-4. <http://www.ianpaisley.org>.

<sup>438</sup> Trenin. *Getting Russia Right*, 72.

the transition scheme of a Medvedev-Putin ruling team is successful in perpetuating current forward progress in Russia.

Russian foreign policy has finally coalesced around the *petro-recovery* to become much more muscular and strident and independent and defiant in its triumphalism. Even with the return of the potent adversary, the traditional rivalry with the United States, the *siloviki consortium* has virtually guaranteed a security state without the virulence of an all-encompassing political religion. Strategic cooperation with the United States will continue by necessity but bilateralism between Moscow and Washington will replace international institutionalism derailed by the Bush Doctrine.

According to Layne, too much momentum is in place from the Bush years to dramatically reverse the Bush administration's unilateralism in the near term.<sup>439</sup> In

Layne's words:

Unless it undergoes a Damascene-like intellectual conversion, as long as the present foreign policy elite remains in power the United States will remain wedded to a hegemonic grand strategy. It probably will take a major domestic political realignment-perhaps triggered by setbacks abroad or a severe economic crisis at home-to bring about a change in American grand strategy.<sup>440</sup>

Given that the United States is virtually locked into Iraq for at least another year due to logistical considerations and poor withdrawal options, the first year of a new administration in 2009, will be committed to a course of action not easily reversible in the short term. American foreign policy will therefore be in continued conflict with accelerating Russian foreign policy objectives and the clash of interests will continue.

---

<sup>439</sup> Layne, *The Peace of Illusion*. 201

<sup>440</sup> *Ibid*, 201.

Even on the strategic military front, given that Moscow is steadily upgrading all facets of its military hardware and doctrines while the Americans are still preoccupied in the Middle East, the quid pro quo on the nuclear status-quo may become fluid, especially in light of Washington's expansions into ABM potential deployments in Europe. On the whole, even on strategic issues, formerly supported by both sides, the post 9/11 understandings are unraveling, ushering in an entire new slate with all issues on the table.

Washington's arrogance in its dealing with the transitional Russian Federation is now being confronted with the emerging reality that Moscow will no longer be bullied or neo-contained in Cold War terms. As the pseudo-hegemonic clout of the United States continues to dissipate, Russian aggressiveness will intensify. International support for American foreign policy, already severely damaged by the Bush Doctrine since 9/11, will continue to dwindle as vestiges of American Grand Strategy cling to Bush-era unilateralism.

In historical terms, the Russian leaders from Gorbachev to Putin have not enjoyed the political advantage of America being on the defensive despite its superior military capabilities. Putin, in contrast to both Gorbachev and Yeltsin in particular, who conducted their respective foreign policies toward the United States from a defensive disadvantage, is gaining strength daily as America is stretched and overburdened by logistical and financial problems as well as a swelling reactive electorate disillusioned by the ill-conceived policies of the Bush administration as embodied in the increasingly defunct Bush Doctrine.

Moscow has employed one aspect of its traditional foreign policy that dominates the whole. Multilateralism and off-shore balancing have led it to head a coalition against

the pretences of hegemonic power of the United States under the current Bush administration. As described by Chris Layne and quoted in this research, Russia has unofficially teamed with China and India as well as “Old Europe,” i.e., Germany and France, to offset and obviate American efforts to re-solidify NATO as an instrument of neo-containment of reemerging Russia through the traditional American European policy of the Open Door. In addition, the EU has been tacitly co-opted as a partner in this overall strategy to decouple Europe, and Russia as part of Europe, to the old tethers of the NATO umbrella.

The key element of this comprehensive Russian cooperative approach toward the Americans is that Russian strength is rising while American strength is failing. The Shanghai Cooperation Council provides support in the East while the EU cooperates, though not always willingly, in the West. In the midst of a world energy political paradigm, Russia’s political and economic leverage continues to grow. Previous concerns of the boom-bust cycle in petroleum politics seems unwarranted as oil and natural gas revenues continue to raise at the retail level with oil reaching a record \$140 a barrel in late May 2008.<sup>441</sup> The United States needs more oil and is therefore dependent on the producing nations, and potentially Russia, particularly Caspian oil. Indeed, Bertil Nygren introduced the concepts of the “tap weapon,” “the transit weapon” and the “asset weapon” in assessing Putin’s formidable foreign policy tools to be employed variously depending on who is cooperating or obstructing Russian foreign policy objectives.<sup>442</sup>

---

<sup>441</sup> As reported in the *New York Times*, May 23, 2008, “Italy Plans to Resume Building Atomic Plants.” A6, Europe, most dependent on Russian oil, is seeking alternatives to the rapidly escalating oil market.

<sup>442</sup> Bertil Nygren. “Putin’s use of energy resources with respect to CIS countries.” Paper presented at the International Willennaine Conference, Bucaco, Portugal, 14-16 June, 2007.

Russian foreign policy has utilized this “energy weapon” at all levels to insure its policy goals, not only in its Near Abroad but internationally. By controlling energy from the source, a petro-foreign policy has emerged which, in such an energy dependent international environment, has been quite effective as a set of carrots and sticks.<sup>443</sup>

As Putin continues to tighten the “oil screws” on Europe and potentially the United States, his political leverage increases and his political options multiply. Directing political action as Russia’s prime minister with the tacit approval of the figurehead Medvedev, provides a clear future look over the horizon at the likely trajectory of Russian foreign policy. Expansion of current Russian policy goals appears likely and the costs of pursuit of these goals will continue to be largely at a cost to the United States.

*How Long Will It Take for American Change?*

Unless a drastic change of foreign policy direction takes place in the United States in the near term, America will continue to be at a distinct disadvantage in the contest for not only oil but political influence as well internationally. There is growing doubt that the American economy will continue to dominant the global political economy for the foreseeable future. The weak dollar, extreme American foreign debt, a recession in the United States with world-wide reverberations, military shortfalls becoming critical in light of Bush Doctrine impotence and the continued threat of terrorism and asymmetrical warfare by the militant NGO’s, have destabilized American foreign policy creating power vacuums and windows of opportunity for others, particularly resurgent Russia.

---

<sup>443</sup>Nygren. “Putin’s use of energy resources, 2-17.

As Putin left the presidency of the Russian Federation in May 2008, though he is actually merely changing positions within the Russian government and continues his regime from the office of Prime Minister, he delivered a remarkable summary-departure speech on February 14, 2008. The four hour-plus speech was part “state of the Federation” as well as a transition declaratory mechanism to set policy for Russia under his “departure” from the presidency. Clearly delineating Medvedev’s portfolio as economic and Putin’s as state security and foreign affairs, the speech set the tone and direction for the new Medvedev-Putin government for the future.

While Medvedev called for renewed democratic economic policies and continued cooperation with the United States and the Western institutions, Putin was stridently defending the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States, openly declaring his hostility at American-sponsored political moves in Russia’s traditional spheres of influence, particularly Ukraine and Georgia. In addition, Putin called for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council to annul the recent declaration of independence by Kosovo.

Putin went as far as threatening to target Kosovo, Poland, the Czech Republic, Georgia and Ukraine with Russian missiles, if their aggressive anti-Russian policies were not scrapped. In a good cop, bad cop routine, Medvedev stated that strategic cooperation between the two countries is inevitable.<sup>444</sup> Since then, at his question and answer session at the International Club Valdai on September 14, 2008, he has articulated more cogent foreign policy positions. (See pg. 2) While Putin threatens, Medvedev reassures

---

<sup>444</sup> “Medvedev confirms Moscow to strengthen cooperation with Washington.” Krasnoyarsk, 2/15/08, Interfax, as reported in *Johnson’s Russia List* # 33, Feb. 15, 2008, p 13.  
<http://by118w.bay118.mail.live.com/>

that Russia will continue democratic government and create increased transparency in its political-economic relations with the West.<sup>445</sup> Moscow wants respect and to maintain its relations with the United States and Europe at the same time.

This power move by Putin, using Medvedev as a screen to continue his governance of the Russian Federation is unique. Certainly since the transition from Gorbachev's Soviet Union to Yeltsin's transition governments and Putin's campaign to resurrect the Russian state, the usual declarations of continuing a strategic security venue with the Americans is familiar in the foreign policy cycle of Russian-American relations.

What is new and what is serving as the key variable, is Putin's willingness to strike out on his own to establish an independent Russian foreign policy and an independent course for Russian political economy. This is all based on the new Russian empowerment resulting from a gushing petro-economy. It is also a result of the foreign policy problems of the current American administration.

Putin compromised with the Americans when Russia was weak. He has since become strident and, indeed, bellicose, since his new found economic strength has translated into Russian political strength. His foreign policy has become much more aggressive and less tolerant of American unilateralism and presumptions that Russia will not resist American expansionism into the FSU. This is a robust Russian foreign policy not seen since the heyday of the Soviet Union. The recent counter-invasion by Russian forces in Georgia defeating Georgian repression in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, clearly indicates this determined new Russian resistance to American-sponsored interventions knows as "color revolutions" in the FSU.

---

<sup>445</sup> "Medvedev confirms," 13.



At the same time, it appears safe to evaluate that communism is indeed a social experiment that has “made its way into the dustbin of history.” The whirlwind created by Gorbachev, the early democratic hybrid experiments of Yeltsin with democratic reforms, and Russia reinstallation of the “power vertical,” though not the return of the command economy and despotism of the CPSU, are but chapters in the transition from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation. Though many features of the Russian-American political relationship remain intact, Russia is clearly a new polity operating under an integrative view of the world political economy and a historic determination that Russia be recognized as relevant and, indeed, important in current international relations.

Based on Putin’s “dictatorship of law” and his strong determination to retain Russian federal influence, the future looks bright for Russia as well as fraught with continuing acute competition with the United States. Christopher Layne’s proposition that the offshore balancing strategy of Russia to negate and obviate American grand strategy by leading a coalition of rising eastern partners such as India and China, coupled with a strong eco-political denial of the American hegemonic Open Door policy in Europe with the European Union, portend systemic international sea-changes. Further, Layne’s recommendations that the United States accommodate multilateralism and legalistic international institutionalism appear well-assessed in the globalized politics of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

Further research is strongly indicated in the direction of the debate and struggle between unilateralism and international institutionalism. Will the philosophy that international law should prevail in a globalized world with multiple poles of power prevail, or will the unilateralism and neo-realism of the United States, acting only within

the confines of its national interests, set the new tone and direction in current international relations? How will the non-military *supranationalism* of the European Union stack up against the militarism of the United States as a governing philosophy for future generations? Will Russia succumb to the temptations of returning to imperialism and empire as it rides its petro-bonanza out of despair to renewed superpower status?

As made clear by Edward Kolodziej, Roger Kanet and others, American hegemony is an illusion.<sup>446</sup> With limited options as a superior military power remaining, Kennedy's theory of empire overstretch seems once more validated. American reevaluation of its grand strategy, in light of the failure of the basic precepts of the Bush Doctrine, is absolutely appropriate and realistic.

In view of the primacy of global energy politics and proliferating nuclear weapons and technologies on all fronts, American attitudes of being the "special nation," are curiously anachronistic if not unrealistically romantic and nostalgic. The rising power of China, the expansion of India, and the reemergence of Russia, to name a few, preclude the notion that the United States can run it all and dictate policy to the world.

The Cold War emphatically proved the lack of utility of the use of nuclear weapons. Used only as a status symbol and intimidation device in the current international political environment, their non-use status relegates its proponents to a false sense of security in a truly resource-dependent interdependent world. Globalization is the new reality and world-wide political-eco cooperation is both necessary and appropriate. The United States must reorient itself to this reality. Joseph Nye is correct. The United

---

<sup>446</sup> Kanet. *From Superpower to Beseiged Global Power*. 344-416.

States has proven it can't go it alone!<sup>447</sup> The utility of judicious use of both hard and soft power are being manifestly demonstrated in the current international political environment. A large part of America's strength is inspirational. Diktat in American international affairs is both unseemly, unaccepted and lacks utility. The Bush Doctrine, though largely a reaction to 9/11, was formulated much earlier by those American conservatives who have lost sight of the fact that a benign hegemonic power rallies world opinion instead of alienating it and causing balancing against it. Nye, like Paul Kennedy, used the example of the Roman Empire to illustrate the point that military power is limited in its scope and utility.<sup>448</sup> America, under a neo-realist regime, is learning that hard lesson in the current interdependent globalized political environment.

Research should continue perhaps in the theoretical venue of game theory to point up the validity of the thesis position of this dissertation, that Russian-American relations are the acid test of the idea that international relations are skewed toward pragmatic necessity and far less on ideological orientation in a resource-shrinking world with an exploding population crises and ecological problems of immense proportions. International cooperation among all nations is absolutely necessary; there is no time or need for a new power struggle between the United States and Russia. They must cooperate.

Medvedev is right in his early policy statements regarding the world political economy. The United States and the Russian Federation are still the pre-imminent nuclear world powers regardless of their current disparities. At this lowest common

---

<sup>447</sup> Nye. *The Paradox of American Power*, 1-7.

<sup>448</sup> *Ibid*, 8-14.

denominator, both countries are morally obliged to find solutions, not create, or recreate more problems. It is time to move forward, not backward. A potential Cold War 2 is a misconception, an aberration. Current and future research should engage formulation of this proposition. Solving at the analytical level of political economy will dictate macro-level strategic agenda at the level of high politics. Ideological determinism is largely a vestige of the past whether involving electoral pluralism or consensus centrist politics and a “managed democracy” with a “dictatorship of law.”

If there is a nascent ideological struggle, it is common cause against militant Islam and asymmetrical world-wide Jihad. The competition for the remaining resources of the world now constitutes the dominating paradigm in international relations. Tolerance for varied forms of political, economic and cultural expressions must be explored as tolerance for continued states of war further diminish prospects for peace and survival on a shrinking resource base known as planet earth. Competition for scarce resources has largely displaced ideology as a motivator for political innovation. Perhaps the Russians have it right in that respect. Survival is the only goal worthy of pursuit! Staving off the dire prospects of a nation threatened by disease and discord should be the next Russian goals. A return to respect and status will surely follow as those goals are met.

*Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia*

On August 6, 2008, Georgia President Mikhail Saakashvili sent troops into South Ossetia. The Russian military immediately dispatched air, navy and ground forces into both enclaves to both crush the Georgian efforts and to repatriate the enclaves to Russian protection. They had, earlier, issued Russian passports to the enclaves' citizens, the

majority ethnic Russians or ethnic minorities expressing a desire to be either part of Russia or independent from Georgia with protection from Moscow.<sup>449</sup>

President Dimitry A. Medvedev issued a proclamation of sorts delineating the new Russian foreign policy stance that Russia had a time-honored historical “privileged” sphere of influence in the world and fully intended to protect areas in that sphere.<sup>450</sup>

With the invasion of Georgia and subsequent Russian declarations, of recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence, Russia verified its oft repeated intention to protect its near abroad and to counter U.S.-led NATO color revolutions in these areas, especially Ukraine and Georgia.

The Soviet Union lost superpower status in 1991 but has re-emerged as a Great Power. During the 1990’s, Russia nearly collapsed under the weight of incompetency under Yeltsin and neo-containment strategies of the West, led by the United States. The petro-economy has provided the means and Putin and his siloviki cadres have supplied the leadership. The protective counter-offensive by Russian military forces against Georgia in August 2008 is the most demonstrative manifestation of new Russian stridency and determination to cast off American intimidation of the Russian Federation. There is surely more to come as the two countries continue to compete in the world for influence.

A new “cold war” or a new “cold peace” may be in the early stages. The Medvedev-Putin administration will continue to challenge either a status-quo American administration or a more progressive pro-active foreign policy in the near future.

---

<sup>449</sup> Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Claims Its Sphere of Influence In the World,” *The New York Times*: International Section. Monday, September 8, 2008. A6.

<sup>450</sup> *Ibid*, A6.

Andrei Tsygankov states the Russian case this way, from “The West Needs To Make Up For Past Mistakes On Russia”:

Since the 1990’s, the US idea of cooperating with Russia was to have it as a dependent partner that creates no problems for the execution of US grand plans in the world. While lecturing Russia about importance of abandoning ‘19<sup>th</sup>-Century geopolitical thinking,’ the United States waged war in the Balkans, initiated two rounds of NATO expansion, withdrew from the ABM treaty, established military presence in Central Asia, invaded Iraq, and announced plans to deploy elements of ballistic-missile defense in Eastern Europe. In addition, the Western media increasingly portrayed Russia as a potential enemy, and groups with anti-Russian preferences called on Washington to revoke Russia’s membership in the G\*, ban private investment, and recognize the independence of successionist territories like Chechnya.

In early 2007, the Kremlin warned that such actions were unacceptable and that Russia intended to pursue a more assertive course in relations with the United States. The warning provoked a storm of negative commentaries in the West, yet was largely dismissed as a bluff – after all the Kremlin had been warning about the ‘serious consequences’ of ignoring Russia’s interests for the preceding ten years.

The Kremlin, however, was determined to stop NATO’s expansion and prevent the incorporation of states like Georgia and Ukraine into the Alliance. After the recognition of Kosovo’s independence and the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, Russia strengthened its ties with Georgia’s separatist territories and indicated its readiness to go to war if necessary if provoked by Tbilisi.<sup>451</sup>

The contest for FSU space will continue to exacerbate Russian-American relations as Putin continues to warn others that would participate with the United States, that such efforts will be resisted vigorously. Neo-containment is no longer acceptable to the Russian government. Western, particularly American, attempts to practice these diplomatic tactics risk further deterioration in their relations with a powerfully

---

<sup>451</sup> Andrei Tsygankov. *The West Needs To Make Up For Past Mistakes On Russia*. (Radio Free Europe. Radio Free Liberty, August 27, 2008, Reported September 14, 2008, at [222.rferl.org/articleprintviews/1194339.html](http://222.rferl.org/articleprintviews/1194339.html) 1-2.

reemerging Russian state and risk radical destabilization of the future international cooperation at all levels.

## *Appendix A*

### *Siloviki Personnel and Associates*<sup>452</sup>

The Siloviki are top Kremlin officials with links to military and intelligence agencies. Other supporting biographical data has come from RFE/RFL, providing information to construct the following sketches.<sup>453</sup>

**Sergei Mikhailovich Smirnov** is a Russian security services official. Since 1999, he has served as Chief of the Internal Security Directorate of FSB. From January 5, 2002 to June of 2003, he was Chief of the FSB Directorate of Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast

In 1952 he moved to Leningrad and later became a classmate of Nikolay Patrushev and Boris Gryzlov at the school No. 211. Together with Boris Gryzlov in 1973 he graduated from M.A. Bonch-Bruевич Leningrad Electroengineering Institute of Communications.

Since 1975 he has served in KTG and its successors, mostly in Leningrad/Saint Petersburg. From January 5, 2001, to June 2003, he was the Chief of the Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast FSB Directorate. Since July 2003 he has been a First Deputy Director of FSB, retaining his position after a major reorganization in July 2004.

**Alexander Vasilyevich Bortnikov** is the new Director of the FSB since May 12, 2008. From 1975 to 2004 he worked in KGB and its successors in Leningrad/Saint

---

<sup>452</sup> These brief biographies represent a compilation of data from several sources, including Bremmer and Charap.

<sup>453</sup> Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty@ 2007 RFE/RL, Inc. 1-7.



Petersburg. From June 2003 through March 2004 he was the Chief of the St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast FSB Directorate.

Since February 24, 2004 he has been the Head of the Economic Security Service of FSB and a Deputy Director of FSB. He is also a member of the board of directors of Sovkomflot.

**Viktor Vasilyevich Cherkesov** is a Russian security services official. He graduated from the Law Department of Leningrad State University in 1973. From 1975 to 1991 he worked in Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast Directorate of KGB and prosecuted political dissidents, including members of Democratic Union.

Starting in 1992 and continuing until August of 1998, Cherkesov led the Saint Petersburg Directorate of the MBR/FSK/FSB, successor organizations to the KGB.

From August 1998 to May 2000, he was a First Deputy Director of FSB under Vladimir Putin and Nikolay Patrushev. From May 18, 2000, to March 11, 2003, he was President Vladimir Putin's plenipotentiary envoy to the Northwestern Federal District. Since March 11, 2003, he has been the Chairman of the State Committee for the Control of the Circulation of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances of the Russian Federation (which since March 2004 is known as the Federal Service for the Control of the Circulation of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances).

He has been married twice. His current wife is Natalya Chaplina, Director General of Rosbalt information agency and former Editor-in-Chief of the Sankt Peterburgskiy Chas Pik newspaper.

In early October 2007 several senior officers of the Federal Drug Control Service were arrested by agents of the Federal Security Service, which was considered by

analysts as part of a longtime battle between Viktor Cherkesov, Igor Sechin and other members of Vladimir Putin's inner circle.

On October 9, 2007, an article signed by Cherkesov was published in *Kommersant*, where it was claimed that the Russian Drug Enforcement Administration officials detained on criminal charges earlier that month are the exception rather than the rule, that the turf battle among the secret services could undermine the nation's stability, and that the only scenario for Russia that is both realistic enough and relatively favorable is to continue evolution into a corporatist state ruled by security services officials.

On October 27, 2007, two officers of Russian Drug Enforcement Administration were poisoned to death, which was a part of the power struggle between the clans of Russian siloviks, according to Vladimir Pribylovsky.

The entire political system of Russia today is a struggle of various clans and groups fighting to see that Putin stays in power according to their scenario and not according to the scenario of their competitors.

said economist Mikhail Delyagin.

**Valery Aleksandrovich Golubev** is a Russian Politician and businessman. He is a former Head of the Vasileostrovsky Administrative District of St. Petersburg, former member of the Federation Council of Russia, currently a Deputy CEO Gazprom and the Head of its Department for Construction and Investment.

**Sergi Borisovich Ivanov** is a first deputy prime minister of Russia and former minister of defense. Ivanov is an FSB colonel-general in reserve.

Ivanov served as secretary of the Russian Security Council from November of 1990 through March of 2001, and was an advisor to Presidents Boris Yeltsin and President Vladimir Putin on matters of national security.

From the late 1970s to the late 1990s, Ivanov served in the Russian foreign intelligence service as a specialist in law and foreign languages, both at home and abroad. Ivanov graduated in 1975 from the Department of Philology at Leningrad State University, where he studied English and Swedish, and later completed postgraduate studies in counterintelligence and law in Minsk. He is fluent in English and Swedish as well as speaking Norwegian and some French.

In 1976 he started his service for Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast KGB Directorate, where he became a friend of his colleague Vladimir Putin. In the 1980s, Ivanov served as the Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, working directly under the KGB resident Felix Karasev. In 1981 Ivanov graduated from KGB First Chief Directorate's 101<sup>st</sup> School (now the Andropov Red-Banner Institute).

In August 1998, Vladimir Putin became head of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, and appointed Ivanov his deputy. As deputy director of the Federal Security Service, Ivanov solidified his reputation in Moscow as a competent analyst in matters of domestic and external security. On November 15, 1999, Ivanov was appointed secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, an advisory body charged with formulating presidential directives on national security advisor upon Putin's promotion to the premiership.

As Secretary, Ivanov was responsible for coordinating the daily work of the council, led by the president. But Ivanov's role as secretary was initially unclear to media observers. At the time of his appointment, the Security Council was a relatively new institution. (The council was set up by Yeltsin's tutelage in 1991-1992). Between 1992 and Ivanov's appointment in 1999, Yeltsin used the council as political expediency

dictated, but had not allowed it to emerge as a relatively strong and autonomous institution. Ivanov's predecessors in that post, including Putin, according to Western analysts, were either the second most powerful political figure in Russia or just another functionary lacking close access to the center of state power, depending on their relationship with Yeltsin.

In the mid 1990s, Ivanov became one of the youngest generals in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. From July 1998 through August 1999, Ivanov served as a deputy to Vladimir Putin, then director of the Federal Security Service. In November 1999, Yeltsin appointed Ivanov secretary of the Security Council, a body charged with advising the president on matters of national security. Ivanov became Russia's defense minister, becoming the first civilian to hold that post, in March 2001. That month, Ivanov stepped down as secretary of the Security Council, but remained a member. Ivanov had resigned from military service around a year earlier, and was a civilian while serving as secretary of the Security Council. Putin called the personnel changes in Russia's security structures coinciding with Ivanov's appointment as defense minister "a step toward demilitarizing public life." Putin also stressed Ivanov's responsibility for overseeing military reform as defense minister.

Unsurprisingly to specialists on Russia, Ivanov became bogged down in the sheer difficulty of his duties as defense minister. But despite bureaucratic inertia and corruption in the military, Ivanov did preside over some changes in the form of a shift towards a more professional army. Although Ivanov was not successful in abandoning the draft, he did downsize it.

As defense secretary, Ivanov worked with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to expand Russian-U.S. cooperation against international terrorist threats to both states.

In May 2001, Ivanov was elected chairman of the Council of Commonwealth of Independent States Defense Ministers.

In October 2003, Sergei Ivanov claimed that Russia did not rule out a pre-emptive military strike anywhere in the world if the national interest demands it.

From time to time Ivanov has disconcerted Western audiences with the bluntness of his remarks on international military and political issues, though his political orientation is moderate and generally liberal on economic issues. In a series of public comments on the 2003-2004 elections, for instance, he unequivocally stated his opposition to rolling back the Western-style economic reforms and privatizations of the 1990s.

In 2004, Sergei Ivanov, then acting Defense Minister, pledged state support to the suspects in Chechen leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev's assassination detained in Qatar and declared that their imprisonment was illegal., Later Qatqri prosecutors conclude that the suspects had received the order to eliminate Zelimkhan Yandarbiev from Sergei Ivanov personally.

In November 2005, Ivanov was appointed to the post of deputy prime minister in Mikhail Fredkov's Second Cabinet, with added responsibility for the defense industry and arms exports.

In January 2006, Ivanov received criticism for his downplaying response to the public outcry over a particularly brutal hazing incident at a military base in the Urals,

which involved Andrey Sychyov as a victim, whose legs and genitals were amputated due to the vicious beatings and abuse.

On December 15, 2006, in Moscow, Sergei Ivanov said to foreign correspondents about Alexander Litvinenko, murdered in London in November, which made headlines in the West: “For us, Litvinenko was nothing. We didn’t care what he said and what he wrote on his deathbed.”

On February 15, 2007, Putin elevated Ivanov to the post of first deputy prime minister and relieved him of his duties as defense minister.

Ivanov is widely considered to be a member of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. He was previously seen as the most likely to be nominated Prime Minister following the resignation of Mikhail Fradkov on September 12<sup>th</sup>, 2007.

**Sergey Chemezov** is a Russian businessman and official. From 1983 through 1988 he worked in Dresden, where he got acquainted with Vladimir Putin. In 1996 to 1999 he served as the Chief of the External Economic Relations Department of the Russian Presidential Property Management Directorate. From September 13, 1999 to November 5, 2000, he was the Director General of Promexport. On November 5, 2000, as Promexport and Rosvooruzhenie were merged into Rosoboronexport, he became a First Deputy Director General of it under Andrey Belyaniov. In December 2001, he became a member of the board of directors of Sukhoi Corporation. He was also a member of the board of director of Almaz. Since June 2002, as Almaz Scientific Industrial Corporation and Antey Corporation merged into Almaz-Antey in June 2002, he has been a member of the board of directors of the latter. Since April 28, 2004, he has been the Director General of Rosoboronexport.

**Oleg Safonov** is a Russian official. In 1982 he graduated from the Border Guards High School of the KGB in Moscow and subsequently served for the KBG until 1991. It is sometimes claimed that for some time he served in Dresden together with Vladimir Putin. From 1991 to 1994 he worked under Vladimir Putin in the Committee for the External Relations of the Saint Petersburg Mayor's Office. From November 14, 1996 to October 30, 2007, Safonov was a deputy Interior Minister of Russia, appointed by President Putin. On October 30, 2007, Vladimir Putin appointed him plenipotentiary envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District. Safonov is married to a daughter of Viktor Ivanov.

**Viktor Ivanov** is a Russian politician, businessman, and former KGB officer, who served in the KGB Directorate of Leningrad and its successors in 1977 through 1994. In 1987 through 1988 as a KGB officer, he took part in the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

In December 1990 together with Boris Gryzlov and Valentin Chuykin he founded the small-scale enterprise Blok engaged in various businesses and became its director. In October 1994 he resigned from FSB and was appointed Chief of the Administrative Staff of the Saint Petersburg Mayor Office. In 1999 he succeeded Nikolai Patrushev as the Head of the Internal Security Department of Russia's FSB. Since January 5, 2000, he has been a Deputy Head of the Presidential Staff for personnel appointed by Vladimir Putin. Viktor Ivanov is considered one of Putin's closest allies.

In September 2001, Russia's Prime Minister appointed Ivanov representative of the state in the Boards of Directors of the Antey Corporation and Almaz Scientific Industrial Corporation, developing and producing air defense systems, including S-300.

On November 22, 2001, he was elected Chairman of the Board of Directors of Almaz and initiated the merger of Almaz and Antey. Since June 2002, Ivanov has been the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the result of the merger, OJSC Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern. Since November 4, 2004, he has also been the Chairman of the Board of Directors of JSC Aeroflot airline.

**Andrey Belyaninov** is a Russian businessman and government official. During 1978 through 1991 he worked for the KGB. From 1992 to 1999 he worked as a banker in several Russian banks. From 2000 to 2004 he was the Director General of Rosoboronexport. Since May 12, 2006, he has been the Head of Federal Customs Service of Russia.

**Alexander Geogiyevich Gromov** is a Russian politician. He served in the KGB from 1973 to 1991. As a KGB officer he took part in the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

During January through May of 2000, he was the chairman of the Russian Federal Service for Currency and Export Control. Since February 12, 2001 he has been a first deputy plenipotentiary presidential envoy to the Central Federal District.

**Alexander Grigoryev** is a Russian security services official. From 1975 to 2001 he served in the KGB and its successors. As a KGB officer he also took part in Soviet war in Afghanistan. From August till October of 1998 he led the Economic Security Department of FSB. From October 1, 1998 till January 5, 2001, he was the Chief of the FSB Directorate of Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast and Deputy Director of FSB. During January through July of 2001, he was an advisor to FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev. Since July 19, 2001, he has been the Director General of the State Reserves Agency (Gosrezerv).



**Georgy Poltavchenko** is the current Russian Presidential Envoy to the Central Federal District. He studied at Leningrad Aviation Instrument-Making Institute. After graduation he worked at Lininets Research and Production Association and at the district Komsomol (Young Communists' League) committee in Leningrad. He began service in the KGB in 1979. From 1980 to 1990, he occupied various posts in the KGB, ultimately becoming chief of department, Vyborg directorate, regional department of KGB in Leningrad and the Leningrad region. Georgy was deputy of the Leningrad Regional Council from 1990 to 1993, deputy of Leningrad Regional Council. He was then chief of St Petersburg directorate, Federal Tax Police form 1993 to 1999. He ran for the Leningrad city council unsuccessfully in 1998. From 1999 to 2000, he was plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President in Leningrad Region.

Poltavchenko is seen as a counter balance in the region to Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov by analysts. Many see him as a Silovik and Putin loyalist

**Nikolai Patrushev** is the most recent past Director of the Russian FSB. He was born in Leningrad and graduated from Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute in 1974, where worked as an engineer in his department.

Patrushev started his career at state security organs. After completing the KGB higher educational courses with the USSR Council of Ministers, he began work at counter-intelligence section of the USSR UKGB Leningrad region. Patrushev later transferred to Ministry of State Security, Republic of Karelia in 1992.

Patrushev held an administrative position in the FSB from 1994 to 1998. He became the deputy chief of the president's administration of Russia in 1998. He served

as the deputy director of the department of economic safety FSB of Russia from October 1998, and from 1999 served as the first deputy director of Federal Security Service.

Patrushev was appointed as the director of FSB on August 9, 1999, following a presidential decree by Boris Yeltsin. His predecessor in this post was Vladimir Putin.

Patrushev holds the rank of Russian Army General and a PhD in law. Nikolai Patrushev has been the recipient of numerous national awards: the title of Hero of the Russian Federation, Honor of the Military Merits and 7 other medals.

In January 2007, Patrushev joined expedition of polar explore Arthur Chilingarov, that flew two helicopters to Antarctica and visited South Pole and Amundsen-Scott station.

## Bibliography

- Allison, Roy, Margot Light and Stephan White. *Putin's Russia and the Enlarged Europe*. Oxford and Malden, Massachusetts: Chatham House, Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
- Anderson, Perry. *Russia's Managed Democracy*. London Times Review of Books, January 25, 2007.
- Andrew, Christopher and Vasili Mitrokhin. *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*. New York: Basic Books, The Perseus Group, 1999.
- Arofeyev, Victor. "Looking for Mr. Putin," *World Press Review*, May 2004, 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Edition from *Novye Izvestia*, Moscow, March 18, 2004.
- Art, Robert J. and Kenneth N. Waltz. *The Use of Force, Military Power and International Politics*. 5<sup>th</sup> ed. Lanham, Boulder, New York and London: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 1999.
- Bagby, Wesley M. *America's International Relations Since World War I*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Baker, III., James A. and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese, III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson. *The Iraq Study Group Report*. New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 2006.
- Baker, Peter, and Susan Glasser. *Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and The End of Revolution*. Updated ed. Washington, DC: Potomac Brooks, Inc., 2005.
- Baran, Zeyno. "Oil, Oligarchs and Opportunity: Energy From Central Asia to Europe." Report to Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. *New York Times*, June 12, 2008.
- Baun, Michael J. *An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of European Integration*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.
- Bayliss, John and Steven Smith, eds. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Beloff, Max. *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia: 1929-1941*. Vol 1. London: Oxford University Press, 1949.
- Benis, Phyllis. *Before, US Foreign Policy and the September 11<sup>th</sup> Crisis, After*. Gloucestershire: Arvis Books, Arvis Publishing, Ltd., 2003.

- Beschloss, Michael, R. and Strobe Talbott. *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993.
- Best, Steven and Douglas Kellner. *Postmodern Theory: Critical Investigations*. New York: Guilford Press, 1991.
- “Biden: Petraeus ‘Dead Flat Wrong’ on Iraq” MSNBC reporting the Associated Press story on September 9, 2007. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com>.
- Black, J. L. *Vladimir Putin and the New World Order: Looking East, Looking West?* Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004.
- Bonnell, Victoria and George Breslauer, eds. *Russia In The New Century: Stability or Disorder?* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001.
- Borchardt, Klaus-Dieter. *The ABC of Community Law*. Fifth ed. Luxembourg: Office For the Official Publications of the European Commission, 2000.
- Bordanaro, Dr. Frederico. “The Implications of Russia’s Moratorium of the C. F. E. Treaty.” *PINR*. November 14, 2007. [118w.bay118.mail.live.com/ReadMessageLight.aspx?](http://118w.bay118.mail.live.com/ReadMessageLight.aspx?)
- Bremmer, Ian and Samuel Charap. “The Siloviki in Putin’s Russia: Who They Are and What They Want.” 2006-07 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. *The Washington Quarterly* Winter, 2006-07.
- Breslauer, George W. *Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- “Evaluating Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders in *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin, Political Leadership In Russia’s Transition*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001.
- Bromberg, Elizabeth and Alexander Stubb. *The European Union: How Does It Work?* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Brown, Archie and Lilia Shevtsova, editors. *Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001.
- Brown, Chris. *Understanding International Relations*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower*. New York: Basic Books, Perseus Group, 2007.

- *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*. New York: Basic Books, Perseus Group, 2004.
- Bush, George W. “*The National Security Strategy of the United States*.” The White House, <http://whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html>
- Carter, Ashton B., Michael M. May, and William J. Perry. A Report Based on a Workshop Hosted by The Preventative Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities, Ashton B. Carter and William Perry, Co-Directors. Date of Workshop April 19, 2007.
- “Cash vs. Benefits: Efficiency, or Assault on Russia’s Soul?” International Affairs Section, *New York Times*, Friday, June 18, 2004.
- Casier, Tom. “The Shadow Effect of the Enlarged EU on Its Eastern Neighbors.” in *The CIS, The EU and Russia, The Challenges of Integration*. Edited by Katlijn Malfliet, Lien Verpoest and Evgeny Vinokurov. Senior Series Editor Roger E. Kanet. (Hampshire, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007)
- Chivers, C. J. and Mikhail Gorbachev. “Gorbachev, Rebuking Putin, Criticizes Russian Elections,” *The New York Times*, International Section, January 29, 2008.
- Chomsky, Noam. *Hegemony Or Survival: America’s Quest For Global Dominance*. New York: A Metropolitan/Owl Book, Henry Hold and Company, 2003.
- Clark, Ian. *The Post-Cold War Order: the Spoils of Peace*. Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Clark, Richard A. *Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror*. New York and London: Free Press, 2004.
- Clinton, Bill. *My Life*. New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004.
- Colton, Timothy J. and Michael McFaul. “America’s Real Russian Allies,” *Foreign Affairs*, Council on Foreign Relations. November/December 2001.
- *Popular Choice and Managed Democracy, the Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
- Crockett, Richard. *The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991*. London: Routledge, 1995
- Davis, Scott C. *The Road From Damascus, A Journey Through Syria*. Seattle: Cune Press, 2002.
- Dawisha, Karen and Bruce Parrott, eds. *Conflict, cleavage, and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

- de Haas, Marcel. "Russia's Upcoming Military Doctrine," in PINR (Power and Interest News Report). 26 February, 2007, <http://www.pinr.com/report>
- Desai, Padma. *Conversations on Russia, Reform from Yeltsin to Putin*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Deutch, John. "Rethinking Nuclear Strategy." *Foreign Affairs*. January/February 2005.
- Dinan, Desmond. *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*. 2nd ed. Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1999.
- Dobbins, James. "Who Lost Iraq?" *Foreign Affairs*. September/October 2007.
- Dunne, Tim. "Three liberal responses to globalization." Chapter 8, "Liberalism," of *The Globalization of World Politics*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Edwards, John and Jack Kemp, Chairs. Stephen Sestanovich, Project Director  
Independent Task Force Report No 57. *Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do*. Council on Foreign Affairs. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Documents, March, 2006.
- English, Jacob, "Middle East" in *From Superpower to Beseiged Global Power: Restoring World Order After the Failure of the Bush Doctrine*. Edited by Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, 219-237. University of Georgia Press, 2008.
- English, Robert D. *Russia and the Idea of the West, Gorbachev: Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
- Etzioni, Amitai. *Security First: For a Muscular Foreign Policy*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007.
- European Commission and Communication Service. *How Europeans See Themselves*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001.
- European Union Press and Communication Service. *The European Union and the World*. Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001.
- Evangelista, Matthew. *The Chechen Wars, Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
- Fearon, James D. "U.S. Can't Win Iraq's Civil War." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, Number 2, March/April, 2007.

- Ferry, William E. and Kanet, Roger E., Eds. General Editor: Ronald J. Hill. *Post-Communist States in the World Community, Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
- Fischer, Joska. "Missiles, oil, and Europe re-divided." *The New York Times*. April 1, 2007. <http://nytimes.com>
- Friedman, George. "Week out of Focus: Washington, Iraq and al Qaeda." Stratfor.com Tuesday, July 17, 2007. [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com)
- Gaddis, John Lewis. "Bush and the World, Take 2, Fixing His Grand Strategy." *Foreign Affairs*. Volume 84, No. 1. January-February, 2005 edition.
- . *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- . *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
- Gaidar, Yegor. *State and Evolution: Russia's Search for a Free Market*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003.
- Gall, Carlotta and Thomas de Waal. *Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus*. New York and London: New York University Press, 1998.
- Gillis, Clive. "The Story of The Russian Orthodox Church and Its New Convert, President Putin." *European Institute of Protestant Studies*. <http://www.ianpaisley.org>
- Ginsberg, Roy. *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*. Rowman and Littlefield, 2001.
- Goldgeier, James M. *Not Whether But When: The U. S. Decision to Enlarge NATO*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1999.
- Goldgeier, James M. and Michael McFaul. *Power and Purpose: US Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2003.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail and Mlynar Zdenek. *Conversations with Gorbachev on Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism*. Translated by George Shriver, with a Forward by Archie Brown. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
- . *Gorbachev: On My Country and the World*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

- “The Timeline of Gorbachev’s Career.” *The Gorbachev Foundation*.  
www.geocities.com/capitol Hill/2768/gorbachev.html.
- Green, Joshua. “The Rove Presidency.” *The Atlantic*, September, 2007.
- Grier, Peter and Faye Sowers. “Al Qaeda: Often Foiled, Still Global.” *Christian Science Monitor*. September 11, 2007.
- Gvosdev, Nikolas K. “Putin’s Managed Pluralism. The Sources of Russian Conduct.” *National Interest*, Spring, 2004.
- Haftendorn, Helga, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander, eds. *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Hales, Robert, M.D. and Stuart Yudovsky, M.D. *DSM-IV-T: Quick Reference to the Diagnostic Criteria*, Maryland, VA: American Psychiatric Association Publications, American Psychiatric Association, 2000.
- Harik, Judith Palmer. *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004.
- Hedenskog, Jacob, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmer Oldberg and Christopher Pursiainen, eds. *Russia’s Great Power Ambitions and Policy Under Putin*. London, Routledge, 2005.
- Herspring, Dale R. *The Kremlin and the High Command: Presidential Impact on the Russian Military from Gorbachev to Putin*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2006.
- Hiro, Dilip. “The World’s Sole Superpower in Fast Decline.” Tomdispatch.com  
<http://www.alternet.org/story/60-60489/>.
- Hirsh, Michael. “Bush and the World.” *Foreign Affairs*. September/October 2002.
- Hogan, Michael J. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Hough, Jerry. *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options in 1986*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
- Hurd, Ian. *After Anarchy; Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007.



- Ilukhin. "Change of Priorities Drives Change of Russian Government." Staff. Stratfor.com. August 10, 1999 FSB. <http://www.startfor.com/>.
- Ivanov, Igor S. *The New Russian Diplomacy*. Washington DC: The Nixon Center and Brookings Institution Press, 2008.
- Jentleson, Bruce W. *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2000.
- Jones-Lynn, Sean M. and Steven E. Miller, eds. *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, 5th Reprint. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1999.
- Judah, Tim. *The Serbs, History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 2nd ed. New Haven and London: Yale Nota Bene, Yale University Press, 2000.
- Kagan, Robert. *Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World from It's Earliest Days to the Dawn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*. New York: Knopf and Sons, 2006.
- Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- Kanet, Roger E. "A New US Approach to Europe? The Transatlantic Relationship after Bush." Dept of International Studies, University of Miami, February 1, 2008.
- *From Superpower to Beseiged Global Power: Restoring World Order After the Failure of the Bush Doctrine* Chapter 16, "U. S. Strategy for the Twenty-first Century." University of Georgia Press, 2008
- ed. *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- series editor. Malfliet, Katlyn, Lien Verpoest, and Eugeny Vinokurov, eds. *The CIS, The EU and Russia: The Challenges of Integration*. Studies in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Palgrave McMillan, 2007.
- Karaganov, Sergey. "Authoritarian Capitalism vs. Liberal Democracy Seen as New Era Signal." *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, Moscow, July 12, 2007.
- "A New Era is Beginning." *Higher School of Economics*. Moscow. July 12, 2007.
- Katzensein, Peter J., Robert D. Keohane and Stephan D. Krasner. *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 1999.
- Kennan, George. *Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy*. London and New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993.

- Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: First Vintage Books, Random House, 1989.
- Kepel, Gilles. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2002.
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Klaus, Vaclav. Dr. John C. Goodman, Editor. *On the Road to Democracy*. Dallas, Texas: National Center for Policy Analysis, 2005.
- Klebnikov, Paul. *Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism*. San Diego, New York and London: Harcourt Inc., 2001.
- Kolodziej, Edward A. *Security And International Relations: The Enduring Tension*, Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, 2006.
- Kolodziej, Edward A. and Roger E. Kanet, eds. *From Superpower to Beseiged Global Power: Restoring World Order After the Failure of the Bush Doctrine*. University of Georgia Press, 2008.
- *Coping With Conflict After the Cold War*. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- “Getting Beyond the Bush Doctrine,” Occasional Paper 5, Center for Global Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 2006
- Kramer, Andrew E. “Russia Claims Its Sphere of Influence In the World,” *New York Times*: International Section. Monday, September 8, 2008.
- Krasnoyark. “Medvedev confirms Moscow to strengthen cooperation with Washington.”, *Johnson’s Russia List* # 33, February 15, 2008, <http://by118w.bay118.mail.live.com/>
- Kubalkova, Vendulka, ed. *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*. New York and London: Armonk, 2001.
- Laqueur, Walter. *The Last Days of Europe: An Epitaph for an Old Continent*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007.
- Lavrov, Segey. “The Limits of Force.” from “Containing Russia: Back to the Future?” Information and Press Department as cited July 19, 2007 at <http://www.mid.ru/brp-4nsf/e>.
- Layne, Christopher. “Its Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-Up in Transatlantic Relations.” *International Politics*, vol 45, no.3 (2008).

- “Offshore Balancing Revisited.” *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring, 2002.
- . *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- Legvold, Robert. “Russia’s Rudderless Strategy.” *Foreign Affairs*. Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2001.
- Lieven, Anatol. *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power*. New Edition. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Lieven, Anatol and Dmitri Trenin, eds. *Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003.
- Litvinenko, Alexander and Yuri Felshtinsky. *Blowing Up Russia: The Secret Plot to Bring Back KGB Terror*. New York: Encounter Books, 2007.
- Lo, Bobo. *Vladimir Putin And The Evolution Of Russian Foreign Policy*. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Blackwell Publishing, Chatham House, 2003.
- Lowenthal, Abraham, F. *Partners in Conflict: the United States and Latin America in the 1990’s*. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990.
- Lucas, Edward. *The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.
- Luck, Edward, Edited by Thomas G. White. *U. N. Security Council: Practice and Promise*. New York: Routledge Global Institutions, 2006.
- Lynn-Jones, Sean, M. and Steven E. Miller, eds. *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Mansbach, Richard M., and Edward Rhodes. *Global Politics in a Changing World. A Reader*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2003.
- Marine Corps Institute. MCI 0210C. *Terrorism Awareness For Marines*. Washington Navy Yard, DC: United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Institute, 2005.
- Massie, Suzanne, *Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia*. Blue Hill, Maine: Hart Tree Press, 1980.
- Matlock, Jack F., Jr. *Autopsy On an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. New York: Random House, 1995.

- *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended*. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2005.
- Matthews, Owen. "Putin: From US Ally to Global Tyrant," of *Newsweek Magazine*, July 23, 2007 issue, as reported online by MSNBC and *Newsweek International*. [www.msnbc.msn.com](http://www.msnbc.msn.com).
- McCormick, John. *The European Union: Politics and Policies*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999.
- McFaul, Michael. *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change From Gorbachev to Putin*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001.
- McFaul, Michael, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Rybakov. *Between Dictatorship and Democracy, Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004.
- Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. London and New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001.
- Medvedev, Dimitry. International Club Valdai. The Exhibition Center (GUM), Moscow, reported in Johnson's Russia List 2008. #169-15, September 2008. JRL Homepage: [www.cdi.oprg/russia/johnson/funding](http://www.cdi.oprg/russia/johnson/funding).
- Meier, Andrew. *Chechnya: To the Heart of a Conflict*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2005.
- Michta, Andrew A. "Democracy Delusion, the misconception that values won the Cold War." *The American Conservative*, August 27, 2007.
- "Mideast Terror War Adds Urgency To Carlyle Group Controversy." *Judicial Watch*. April 1, 2002. 1-2. <http://www.judicialwatch.org/>
- Montaigne, Fen. *Broken Empire: After the Fall of the USSR*. Washington, DC: National Geographic Society, 2001.
- Nast, Vali. *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape The Future*. New York, London: W. W., Norton & Co., 2007.
- National Intelligence Estimate. *National Intelligence Council*. US Government Documents. Washington DC, July, 2007.
- Naylor, Thomas H. *The Gorbachev Strategy: Opening the Closed Society*. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988.
- Nelson, Brent F. and Alexander C.G. Stubb, eds. *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*. Boulder and London: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1998.

- Nye, Joseph Jr. *The Paradox of American Power, Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Nygren, Bertil. "Putin's Attempts to Subjugate Georgia: From Sabre-Rattling to the Power of the Purse," *Re-Emerging Great Power*. Edited by Roger Kanet. 107-123. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- Oberdorfer, Don. *From the Cold War to a New Era, The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991*, Updated Ed. John Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- Oliker, Olga. *Russia's Chechen Wars, 1994-2000, Lessons from Urban Combat*. Santa Monica, CA: Arroyo Center, Rand Corporation, 2001.
- Onuf, Nick, Paul Kowert and Vendulka Kubalkova, eds, *International Relations In a Constructed World*. Armonk and New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998.
- Paxton, John. *Leaders of Russia and the Soviet Union, From the Romanov Dynasty to Vladimir Putin*. New York, London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2004.
- Peterson, John and Michael Sheckleton. *The Institution of the European Union*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Petrov, Nikolay. quoted in the Carnegie Moscow Center's July report "Putin's Centrifugal Reform." *Moscow Times* on July 7, 2004.
- Piening, Christopher. *Global Europe, The European Union in World Affairs*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1997.
- Pillar, Paul. *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2001.
- Piontkovsky, Andrei. *Another Look Into Putin's Soul*, David Satter, ed. The Hudson Institute Publications, 2007.
- Plesch, Dr. Dan and Martin Butcher. "Considering a War with Iran: A Discussion Paper on WMD in the Middle East.", SOAS; University of London. September 2007.
- Politkovskaya, Anna. Edited by John Crowfoot. *A Dirty War*. London: Harvell Press: 2001.
- *Putin's Russia, Life In a Failing Democracy*. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Co., 2004.
- Putin, Vladimir. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President*. New York: BBS Public Affairs, 2000.
- "Nothing to Reproach Myself For Over 8 Years of Presidency." Article in *Itar-Tass*, February 14, 2008, as reported by Johnson's Russia List #33 on 2-15-08.

- “Putin Is Suspending Treaty with NATO on Forces in Europe,” International Affairs Section, *New York Times*, Friday, April 27, 2007.
- “Putin’s Choice: A Profile of Dmitry Medvedev.” Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, RFE -RL Sunday, March 23, 2008.
- Radzikhovskiy. “A New Holy Alliance,” *World Press Review*, May 2004 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Edition, from *Rossiskaya Gazeta*.
- Rashid, Ahmed. *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.
- Reid, Anna. *Borderland: A Journey Through the History of Ukraine*. Bolder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000.
- Reid, Robert H. “U.S. Says al Qaeda Leader Arrested in Iraq,” <http://www.apnews.myway.com/article>, (accessed July 18, 2007).
- Remnick, David. *Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia*. New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1998.
- Renshaw-Hayes, Fiona and Helen Wallace. *The Council of Ministers*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
- Rose, Richard, and Neil Munro. *Elections Without Order: Russia’s Challenge to Vladimir Putin*. Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002
- Rostovsky, Mikhail and Alexandr Budby. “Sneaking up Unnoticed.” *World Press Review*, May 4, 2004, 30<sup>th</sup> Edition from *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, March 2, 2004
- “Rove Will Resign As Bush Advisor At End of Month,” *New York Times*. August 14, 2007.
- Rubin, Alissa J. “Market Attack Tops a Deadly Day in Iraq” International Affairs Section, *The New York Times*, Monday, May 7, 2007.
- Rukavishnikov, Vladimir. “Choices for Russia: Preserving Inherited Geopolitics Through Emergent Global and European Realities” in *Russia, Re-Emerging Great Power*. Edited by Roger E. Kanet. 54-80. New York: Palgrave and MacMillan, 2006.
- “Russia: Security Council Official Resigns.” International Affairs Section, *New York Times*, Tuesday, July 10, 2007.
- “Russia To Have More Oil and Gas Than Expected.” Johnson’s Russia List # 6 JRL 8191, April 30, 2004.
- “Russian Prince of Peace.” *The New York Times*, December 23, 1984.

- Sakwa, Richard. *Russian Politics and Society*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Sanders, Paul J. "The U. S. and Russia After Iraq, rebuilding a realistic relationship." *Hoover Institution*, Stanford University. June-July 2003.
- Saradzyan, Simon. "Putin's Choice Balances Siloviki." *The Moscow Times*, [www.moscowtimesru/indexes/2003/11/03/01.html](http://www.moscowtimesru/indexes/2003/11/03/01.html)
- Savage, Charlie. *Takeover, The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy*. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2007.
- Schmemmann, Serge. *When the Wall Came Down, The Berlin Wall and the Fall of Soviet Communism*. Kingfisher, Boston: A New York Times Book 2006.
- Schulinger, Robert, D. *U. S. Diplomacy Since 1900*. 4<sup>th</sup> Ed. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Shanghai Cooperation Council. 1/7/2004. "Origin of the SCO." <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm>
- Shanker, Thom "House Panel Considering Cuts In Budget for Missile Defense." International Affairs Section, *New York Times*, May 10, 2007.
- "Russia Cool to US Call for Cooperation on Missile Defense." International Section, *New York Times*, Tuesday, April 24, 2007.
- Shawn, Eric. *The U. N. Exposed, How the United Nations Sabotages America's Security and Fails the World*. New York: Sentinel. The Penguin Group, 2006.
- Shevtsova, Lilia. Edited by Alex Pravda. *Leading Russia, Putin in Perspective: Essays in Honor of Archie Brown*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 2005.
- *Putin's Russia*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003, 2005.
- Shields, Charles J. *Vladimir Putin*. New York, Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2007.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir and Joshua Ward. *Contemporary Russia As A Feudal Society. A New Perspective On The Post Soviet Era*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Skockpol, Theda. *States & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis on France, Russia & China*. Cambridge, U.K., London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Simes, Dimitri. "Losing Russia, the Cost of Renewed Confrontation." *Foreign Affairs*. November/December 2007.

- Simmons, Terry W. *Glasnost, Perestroika and the New Thinking: Implications for Soviet Foreign Policy*. Master's Thesis. University of South Florida, 1989.
- Solovyov, Vladimir and Elena Klepikova. *Boris Yeltsin: A Political Bibliography*. New York: G. P. Putnum's Son's, 1992.
- Specter, Michael. *Kremlin, Incorporated, from A Letter from Moscow, Why are Vladimir Putin's Opponents Dying?* New Yorker Magazine.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor. *The Revenge of the Past, Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993.
- Suskind, Ron. *The One Percent Doctrine, Deep Inside America's Pursuit of its Enemies Since 9/11*. New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 2006.
- Stratfor.com. "Change of Priorities Drives Change of Russian Government," August 10, 1999. [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com).
- Stratfor.com. "France's Presidential Election Will Herald the End of Guallism," *Second Quarter Forecast 2007: The Maneuvering Before the Storm*, April, 2007. [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com).
- Stratfor.com. "Geopolitical Diary: Putin's New Old Russia." April 27, 2007. [http://www.stratfor.com/.](http://www.stratfor.com/)
- Stratfor.com. "Global Market Brief: Russia's Tattered Ties to the EU." November 15, 2007. <http://by118w.bay118.mail.live.com/mail/ReadMessageLight.aspx?>
- Stratfor.com. "Iran: the Real Agenda Behind Putin's Visit." October 15, 2007. <http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/print.php?storyid+296830>
- Stratfor.com. "Russia: A Wrench in US Plans for the Middle East." November 29, 2007, <http://by118w.bay118.mail.live.com/mail/ReadMessageLight.aspx?>
- Stratfor.com. "Russia: Using Missile Defense as a Geopolitical Lever." June 13, 2007, <http://www.stratfor.com>.
- Tabor, Nathan. *The Beast on the East River, The U. N. Threat to America's Sovereignty and Security*. Nashville: Nelson Current, 2006.
- Takeyh, Ray. "The New New World Order." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol 86 No 2. March/April, 2007.
- Talbott, Strobe. *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*. New York: Random House, 2002.



- Tellus, Ashley J., Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, Melissa McPherson, Jerry M. Sollinger, . *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age: Analyst's Handbook*. Santa Monica, California: Arroyo Center, Rand Corp., 2000.
- Thakur, Ramesh. *The United Nations: Peace and Security*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University, 2006.
- The Russian General Staff, Edited and Translated by Lester M. Grau and Michael A. Gress. *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
- Thom, Francois. *Moscow's 'New Thinking' as an Instrument of Foreign Policy*. Mackenzie Paper No. 4, 1987. Toronto, Canada: The Mackenzie Institute for the Study of Terrorism, Revolution, Revolution and Propaganda.
- Tishkov, Valery. Forward by Mikhail S. Gorbachev. *Chechnya: Life In a War-Torn Society*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2004.
- Treisman, Daniel. "How Different is Putin's Russia?" *Foreign Affairs*. Nov/Dec, New York, 2002.
- Trenin, Dmitri. *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*. Washington, DC and Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002.
- *Getting Russia Right*. Washington and Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007.
- Trenin, Dmitri, Aleksei V. Malashenko, and Anatol Lieven. *Russia's Restless Frontier, The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004.
- Tsygankov, Andrei P. *Pathways After Empire: National Identity and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-Soviet World*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001.
- *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity In National Identity*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006.
- "The West Needs to Make Up For Past Mistakes On Russia" *Radio Free Europe*. Radio Free Liberty, August 27, 2008, Reported September 14, 2008 at [www.rferl.org/articleprinting/1194339.html](http://www.rferl.org/articleprinting/1194339.html)
- Tymoshenko, Yuliya. "Containing Russia" from "The Russian Janus" *Foreign Affairs* online reader service May/June 2007, <http://foreignaffairs.org/>. (accessed July 6, 2008).
- "The US Case Against Iran." *The Christian Science Monitor*, Friday, August 24, 2007.

- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the State and War, A theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979.
- Webster, William, H. *Russian Organized Crime and Corruption*, a CSIS Task Force Report, Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2000.
- Wegren, Stephen, K. Editor. *Russia's Policy Challenges, Security, Stability, and Development*. New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003.
- Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Westad, Odd, Arne. *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*. London: Frank Cross, 2000.
- White, Jonathan R. *Terrorism and Homeland Security*. 5<sup>th</sup> Ed. Australia, U.S.A: Thompson & Wadsworth, 2006.
- White, Stephan, Graeme Gill, and Darrell Slider. *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future*. (sic) Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Wizer, Ben. "ACLU Supreme Court Breakfast, 9/27/2007." <http://www.aclu.org/scotus/index.html>.
- Woodward, Bob. *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.
- Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and The Road to 9/11*. New York: Alfred Knopf, 2006.
- Wright, Robin. "Iraq Occupation Erodes Bush Doctrine." *Washington Post*, June 28, 2004. <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.
- Yeltsin, Boris. *Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries*. New York: BBS, Public Affairs, 2000.
- *The Struggle for Russia*. New York: Belka Publishing Company, Times Books, Random House, 1995.
- Yeltsin, Boris and the Soviet Leadership. *Putsch, The Diary: Three Days That Collapsed the Empire*. Contributors: Alexander Avelichev, Andre Vinogradov, Gleb Pavlovsky, and G. Yanayev. Oakville, New York and London: Mosaic Press, Progress Publishers, 1992.
- Zeihan, Peter. "The New Logic for Ballistic Missile Defense," Geopolitical Intelligence Report, Stratfor.com March 7, 2007. See <http://www.stratfor.com>

——— “The Unraveling of Russia’s Europe Policy.” Reported January 22, 2008, in *Geopolitical Intelligence Report*, Stratfor Strategic Forecasting, Inc. <http://by118w.bay118.mail.live.com/mail/PrintShell.aspx?>

Zelikow, Philip. *Final Report of the National Commission Report on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: The 9/11 Commission Report*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004.

## VITA

Terry W. Simmons was born in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 31, 1948. The son of Lt. Col. Carl A. Simmons, Terry traveled all over the world as a U.S. Army military dependent. He attended San Diego State University and graduated with a B.A. degree in political science in 1977. Terry graduated from the University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida, in 1989 with an M.A. degree in Strategic Studies and Military Affairs. His career began in consumer finance, the U.S. Army, in Civil Service and now, education. He is presently adjunct professor of political science at IvyTech State College in Indianapolis, Indiana. He teaches American Government, Introduction to International Relations, World Geography, and a terrorism awareness course which he designed.

He was admitted to the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Miami in the Spring of 2002.

Permanent address: 1470 Trumbull Circle, Indianapolis, Indiana 46234.

