Article

Planning as the ideology of (neoliberal) space

Michael Gunder
University of Auckland, New Zealand

Abstract

This article briefly reviews the history and concept of ideology, largely as articulated by exponents of the Frankfurt School, and considers the impact that this has had on historical planning theory and practice, culminating in Habermasian derived communicative planning theory. It then considers the role of ideology in a post-Marxist world and argues for the value of Žižekian critique for understanding planning's contemporary role of ideologically defining the use of neoliberal space.

Introduction

> Planning does not, and cannot, transcend the social and property relations of capitalist society, but is contained within and is a reflection of those same relations. (Scott and Roweis, 1977: 1118)

> The commitment to the ideology of harmony within the capitalist social order remains the still point upon which the gyrations of planning ideology turn. (Harvey, 1978: 231)

This article calls for a return to ideological critique in planning theory, but rather than traditional critique predicated primarily on Marx or Gramsci, it argues for a critique predicated on the psychoanalytical thought of Lacan, as developed by his followers, culminating in the work of Slavoj Žižek. This article explores how ideas come to structure and direct society. It suggests how ideas gain ideological traction to become our sublime ideals of a better future. Planning as a form of urban policy formulation and analysis is largely normative in the shaping of its ideas and values (Campbell, 2006). Accordingly, this article argues that planning is inherently ideological, because ideology

Corresponding author:

Michael Gunder, School of Architecture and Planning, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New Zealand
Email: m.gunder@auckland.ac.nz

constitutes our chosen and dominant belief, or value, systems. These in turn, shape what we want, what is important, and hence our planning objectives and goals (Fagence, 1983; Foley, 1960; Gunder and Hillier, 2009; Kramer, 1975; Reade, 1987). Urban, regional, or spatial planning is specifically about making choices about how we use land – it's about governing space (Cowell and Owen, 2006). Planning is the ideology of how we define and use space.

This article will briefly review the history and concept of ideology, largely as articulated by exponents of the Frankfurt School, and consider the impact that this has had on historical planning theory and practice, culminating in Habermas's (1984, 1987) communicative rationality and Habermasian-derived collaborative, or communicative, planning theory and its resultant contemporary planning practices (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995). It will then touch on the role of ideology in post-structuralism and related contemporary discourses. The latter part of the article will focus on a definition of ideology derived from Lacan and his followers, culminating in the work of Slavoj Žižek (1989, 1993, 1997, 2006a, 2008), and from this perspective demonstrate how planning policy practice is largely deployed as a mechanism that shapes our identifications with, and of, space. The article will argue for the value of Žižekian-derived ideological critique for understanding planning's contemporary and evolving role of defining the use of space and that this is a space currently dominated by the values and logic of global capitalism: neoliberalism.

'The doctrine of Neoliberalism is in many ways the reassertion of a classical liberal economic argument: society functions better under a market logic than any other logic, especially a state-directed one' (Purcell, 2009: 141). Neoliberalism has become the successful *ideological* project of hegemony or dominance (Purcell, 2009) that 'required both politically and economically the construction of a neoliberal market-based populist culture of differentiated consumerism and individual libertarianism' (Harvey, 2005: 42). As Žižek (1999: 55) observes,

> nobody seriously considers possible alternatives to capitalism any longer . . . as if liberal capitalism is the "real" that will somehow survive under conditions of global ecological catastrophe . . . [We] can thus categorically assert the existence of ideology *qua* generative matrix that regulates the relationship between visible and non-visible, between imaginable and non-imaginable.

In other words, this neoliberal ideology regulates essentially everything! In this light, Purcell (2009: 142) declares that the logic of neoliberalism under globalization 'has come more and more to occupy a hegemonic position in urban policy'. For neoliberalism 'accords to the state an active role in securing markets, in producing the subjects of and conditions for markets, although it does not think the state should – at least ideally – intervene in the activities of the market' (Dean, 2008: 48). Roy (2006: 13) rhetorically asks if it is 'possible to disassociate the "innocent professional"' – that is unbiased, or value-free, planning practitioners and policy drafters – 'from the political regimes in which they work' and responds that it is 'perhaps necessary to see through what Harvey (2003: 210) calls the "liberal ruse of empire"'.

Phrased in a more traditional manner, this is a call by Roy for ideological critique, or in poststructuralist parlance: deconstruction. But prior to a critical engagement with ideological deconstruction of contemporary planning practice, this article first will consider the history of the concept of ideology and its implications for planning.

A brief history of ideology focused on the Frankfurt School[1] (and its implications for planning)

Ideology originally meant the 'science of ideas' and was first coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1797 (Fine and Sandstrom, 1993), but this meaning was largely lost by the start of the 20th century (Fischer, 2009). Traditional Marxist definitions of ideology are largely predicated on Marx and Engel's (1970 [1845]) *The German Ideology.* Their work defines two different definitions,

> both of which are still common: (a) a relatively neutral sense in which ideology refers to any abstract or symbolic meaning system used to explain (or justify) social, economic, or political realities; and (b) a pejorative sense in which ideology denotes a web of ideas that are distorted, contrary to reality, and subject to 'false consciousness'. (Jost, 2006: 652, emphasis removed)

For Marx and Engels ideology 'was a sublimation – in its various guises such as morality, religion, and metaphysics – of material life' so that the 'ideas of the ruling class were the ruling ideas' (Freeden, 2003: 5–6).

The work of Antonio Gramsci (1971 [1929–1935]) built on this Marxist tradition primarily through developing the concept of hegemony, how dominant beliefs come to engage with and accommodate wider society and its popular thinking. Gramsci's work had significant impact on Althusser and Laclau (which will be engaged with later in this article) (Freeden, 2003), and is still actively deployed in Neo-Gramscian ideological critique (for example, the planning related work of Pauline McGuirk, 2005, 2007).

This Marxist critique was also engaged with in Mannheim's (1991 [1929]) *Ideology and Utopia.* Mannheim attempted 'to distinguish between forms of thought that lag behind the times (ideology) and forms of thought that prefigure the future (utopia)', that is, ideological thought is conceived as 'serving the preservation of the existing order' (Fischer, 2009: 350) and utopian thought seeks 'to change the situation that exists' (Mannheim, 1991: 36). Yet, for Mannheim (1991: 36) both ideological and most utopian thought is predicated on hiding 'certain aspects of reality' so as to be 'incapable of correctly diagnosing [the] existing condition of society'. In response, to this false collective consciousness, Mannheim (1980 [1940]) invented 'the idea of democratic social planning' which was to be lead by 'a small minority of uprooted intellectuals who had somehow escaped the confining visions of prevailing ideologies and were thus free to project utopian futures for society' (Friedmann and Hudson, 1974: 6). Of course, this function of societal guidance by wise and knowledgeable planners lay as a core to John Friedmann's (1973, 1987) transactive planning theory of the latter part of the last century. Yet, some liberal critics considered Mannheim's utopian thought itself highly ideological in its imposition on society of specific aspirational beliefs for a better world (Ashcraft, 1981).[2]

Prior to Mannheim's move to the University of London in 1935 to avoid Nazi persecution, he was a member of the Frankfurt School (Stanley and Holtzmann, 2007). However, the Marxist nature of the School also sat largely at odds with Mannheim's position (Ashcraft, 1981). With attacks on Mannheim's concept of ideology coming from Horkheimer (1993 [1930]), Adorno (1973a [1953–54]) and Marcuse (1990 [1929]), all of whom argued for a more nuanced concept of ideology predicated on the material or, in Adorno's case, an ideology of identity, rather than the idealist or metaphysical consciousness, or intellectual spirit, necessary for Mannheim's utopian thought[3] (considered by most to be just another dimension of ideology) to transform the world (Fischer, 2009).

These are positions on ideology that Horkheimer (1985) and Adorno (1973b) advanced further in post-war critiques of reason, liberalism, positivism, technological and mass media Western ideologies. Similarly, Marcuse (1955) drew on a fusion of Marx and Freud to enunciate the importance of Freud's pleasure principle for a utopian prescription for societal transformation. This prescription for enjoyment, which the article will return to in a later section, was predicated on the abolition of alienated labour and exploitation, replaced by non-instrumental technology and a 're-eroticization, or sensuous revival, of human beings' so as to turn the alienation of instrumental labour into sensuous and artistic play (Zilbersheid, 2008: 418; 2009). Marcuse's (1991 [1964]) most influential work was his critique of 1960s US 'one-dimensional culture', which he contended was a society predicated on an instrumental ideological manipulation of 'value-free' facts that was 'highly conformist, conciliatory and repressive since it is easily modulated by the market' (da Silva and Livio, 2005: 222).

According to Marcuse this was a world where 'the capacity to discern complex truths that are constituted through an interplay between facts and values is lost, and related complex ideas like The Good are closed out of the picture in deference to the technologically rational truth of a one-dimensional world of facts' (Farrell, 2008: 79). This is the world of rational scientific management; the world of the value-free and uncritical planner rationally applying unbiased facts – the only one truth – to instrumentally ascertain the best means to the preordained end. This is an end, or ideal, which, at least for Andreas Faludi (1973: 37), must be the pursuit of capitalist and other human *growth* goals, where the role of 'ideological critique has relatively little to contribute to the essential rôle of planning as making decisions'.

Like Faludi (1973), the later Frankfurt School, dominated by Habermas, argued that ideology and its critique has little, or no, relevance. For Habermas (1987: 196), ideology is at an end in late modernity, because '[c]ulture loses just those formal properties that enable it to take on ideological functions'. Via 'a process which Habermas describes as the rationalization of the lifeworld, modern culture has supposedly become incapable of tolerating ideological distortions' (Cook, 2000: 68). Habermas (1984, 1987) argued that socio-economic sub-systems of validity replace ideology in late capitalism via a colonizing commodification and bureaucratization of the lifeworld. Rather than deploying ideological critique against a fusion of complex and conflicting validity spheres, Habermas argues that this colonization process needs to be engaged with via communicative reason.

This is a communicative reason that gave rise to communicative and collaborative planning theory and practice (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995). This is a planning approach that 'has gained widespread acceptance among planning scholars and practitioners' (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007: 284; see also Bickerstaff and Walker, 2005), so

that 'the ideas of both communicative and collaborative planning occupy an extremely hegemonic position in planning theory' (Purcell, 2009: 148). It is poignant that this is a theory and practice largely derived from Habermas who claims that ideology and the need for ideological critique has ended.

Communicative and collaborative planning as facilitating neoliberal ideology

Collaborative planning purports to be an interactive process of community focused participatory governance, ideally predicated on social justice and consensual community agreement, with an objective to enhance the qualities of space and territories (Healey, 2003). Both collaborative planning and its comparable US counterpart, communicative planning, draw 'on Habermas' discourse ethics and the concept of communicative rationality as a normative principle with which to evaluate and challenge the qualities of interactive practices' (Healey, 2003: 106). In pursuit of this communicative ideal, while acknowledging inherent impediments to attainment, 'researchers on communicative processes in the planning field are exploring the conditions in which processes with the qualities of comprehensibility, sincerity, legitimacy and truth, as well other qualities, such as openness, inclusivity, reflexivity and creativity, seem likely to arise' (Healey, 2003: 110). Communicative planning is, accordingly, an ideal of planning process predicated on attempting to achieve undistorted, open, community-based consultation culminating in unforced consensual agreement of all participating actors, prior to the commencement of any agreed social or spatial action.

It is difficult to fault communicative planning as a desirable ideal of democratically determined local planning and community empowerment. Yet, the evidence suggests that collaborative, or communicative planning, has largely been captured, or has simply been intentionally deployed, to obscure and facilitate the dominant ideology of contemporary market forces (Purcell, 2009). Rather than achieving its desirous ideal, much contemporary public participation premised on Habermasian principles of discourse ethics 'can be interpreted as part of a system of domination rather than [one of] emancipation' (Bickerstaff and Walker, 2005: 2140).

As collaborative planning has been deployed within the UK, and elsewhere, with a promised focus on ensuring local community inclusion; this has, at best, resulted in an 'inclusion' that largely depoliticized conflict, neutralized dissent, and legitimized the values of both government and private sector pro-development interests (Baeten, 2009; Jackson, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2007; Taylor, 2009; Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2001; Žižek, 2006c). In this regard, 'communities are now supposed to unite and fight for scarce regeneration [or other] resources, leave ''old'' antagonisms behind and become reasonable, rational, sensible, communicative, responsible agents with smooth relations with central government and its funding bodies' (Baeten, 2009: 247). A failure to play this consensual game, with its focus on the local and the particular of a specific community's needs and wants results in exclusion and a loss of any voice from this 'beneficial' process. By particularizing and making locally contestable what have traditionally been universal demands of class based equity and fairness, politics/antagonism is negated and scope for ideological deconstruction and class, or other struggle, defused, marginalized, or simply outright ignored (she's 'old' Labour – bless her), in what Rancière (1999) would call a

post-democratic state of policing governance. Collaborative, or communicative, planning plays a central role as a core agent of this policing function via its facilitation and subsequent legitimization (often in a planning policy document, development consent, or plan) of this community consultation process. It is example of the pernicious and insidious nature of planning in need of renewed ideological critique, a critique that Habermas (1987: 196) has dismissed, as ideology is past its 'sell-by-date'.

Bengs (2005) argues that planning theory, and hence spatial planning, is simply ideology facilitating the governance motives of neoliberal globalization, with the concept of 'bottom-up' communicative planning being deployed to especially empower key stakeholders in articulating their wants and hegemonically achieving them. For Bengs (2005) planning is solution driven not problem defining, which he claims is the domain of theory. Accordingly, Bengs contends 'that the main function of communicative planning theory is to lubricate the neo-liberal economy, and in particular the workings of the real estate market' (Sager, 2005: 1).

In regards to Habermasian predicated communicative planning, Roy (2006: 21) asks:

> Can mediation be radical practice if it is inside the system? Can mediation always break the spell of ideology if it is inevitably contaminated? Can mediation expose the liberal ruses of empire if it is beholden to the liberal ideal of ethical communication?

Indeed, Brand and Gaffikin (2007: 288, emphasis in original) observe that communicative or collaborative planning is 'characterized by certain ideological assumptions that reflect its purveyor's idea of how the world *ought* to be'. For them, while communicative planning holds 'firm to distributional values, it is disposed to a "new realism" about what works amid structural shifts in economy and society, including new partnerships between state and market' (p. 288). In doing so 'collaborative planning tries to [naively] dispense with power plays altogether by [attempting to remove] the distortions that Foucault and Lukes detected as embodied in almost every aspect of discourses, in formal routines, informal practices and physical structures' (p. 288). Further, 'with its typical focus on the immediate and local, collaborative planning often understates the pervasive influence of globalisation' (p. 289). So much so that communicative or 'collaborative planning is sometimes even understood and marketed as an accomplice of globalization' (p. 289).

Purcell (2009) argues that communicative planning acts as a mechanism to assist the legitimization of neoliberal market logics and competitive agendas. It is ideology at its most insidious and hegemonic.

> What the neoliberal project requires are decision-making practices that are widely accepted as 'democratic' but that do not (or cannot) fundamentally challenge existing relations of power. Communicative planning, insofar as it is rooted in communicative action, is just such a decision-making practice. (Purcell, 2009: 141)

Communicative or collaborative planning practice strives to be socially inclusive. In response, Miraftab (2009: 32) calls for an insurgent planning and 'radical planning practices that respond to neoliberal specifics of dominance through inclusion'. Alternatively, Irazábal (2009: 127), drawing on regime theory calls for '[r]enewed attention to this role for *Ideologiekrittik*, or the critique of ideology', in collaborative or communicative planning,

so that it can more fully engage with power, knowledge, subjectivity and space. Of course, Hillier (2003) demonstrated, drawing on Lacan, that the Habermasian fallacy of communicative planning as consensus-formation can never be achieved in language because language is always incomplete and predicated on misrecognition and lack, not to mention driven by undefinable agonism that resides outside of symbolic representation, or imagination, in what Lacan terms the Real.[4]

What then of Foucault (and Deleuze)?

For Foucault, ideology is neither negative nor positive, ideology is coexistent with knowledge as practised; it is the use of ideology which determines its positivity or negativity for social purposes (Sholle, 1988). Foucault (1980: 131) argues that every 'society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true', and genealogy is the tool through which we can examine this truth and see 'how we govern ourselves and others through its production' (McCarthy, 1990: 443). This regime of truth is beyond simple ideology critique, for Foucault (1980: 133) the 'political question . . . is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself'. Accordingly, Foucault admonishes us to move on from a concept of ideology, or hegemony, as it still maintains the concept of sovereignty, be it a sovereignty of the people, an idea, or that of government (Doxiadis, 1997). Foucault argues for a move away from a legitimizing source of power. This is an argument consistent with that of Deleuze (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983) to do away with the societal shaping hegemony, or power, of transcendental ideals (Smith, 2007; Wood, 2009).

I agree with the desires of Foucault and Deleuze to do away with the striating nature of authority – sovereign, religious or undefined sublime ideal – to shape societal action and direction. To that end I support the research regime of Hillier (2005, 2007, 2008) to propose a Deleuzian-derived multiplanar theory of spatial planning and governance. But, and this is a big *but*, we still reside in a global culture steeped in transcendent ideals of a better world, a world shaped by ideology, and I would suggest that we will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Further, for Žižek (1999: 66), Foucault's abandonment 'of the problematic of ideology entails a fatal weakness', for Foucault's theorizing cannot explain the 'concrete mechanism of the emergence' of power; that is, he cannot bridge 'the abyss that separates micro-procedures from the spectre of Power' itself and its very materialization of causal effect within the world. That is, Foucault fails to 'theorize the generative principle of sociosymbolic formations' (Vighi and Feldner, 2007: 142). Hence, an engagement with striating ideology is crucial to engaging with an understanding of contemporary spatial planning, governance and wider society as to what hegemonically defines THE accepted truth. Indeed, McCarthy (1990) actually attributes Foucault's genealogical project of discourse analysis to this very ideological agenda, even though Foucault disavows himself from the very act of ideological critique.

A new understanding of ideology

To facilitate this needed critique, I suggest, requires a new understanding of ideology; one that is facilitated by the work of Lacan and his influence on Althusser, Laclau and Mouffe, and which is perhaps best articulated in the contemporary work of Slavoj Žižek. Frederic

Jameson (2003: 37) observes that we may attribute to Lacan 'the first new and as yet insufficiently developed concept of the nature of ideology since Marx'. This is an ideological perspective derived from a psychoanalytical understanding of lack, desire and identification, which 'thanks to the consistent efforts of social theorists like Althusser, Žižek, and Laclau, who, beginning in the 1960s, have amply demonstrated the centrality of a psychoanalytical orientation in the analysis of ideology' (Stavrakakis, 2009: 153). For Lacan 'by conceptualizing subjectivity in terms of lack . . . subjectivity becomes the space where a whole "politics" of *identification* takes place' so that '[l]ack stimulates *desire* and thus necessitates the constitution of every identity through processes of identification with socially available objects of identification such as political *ideologies*, patterns of consumption, and social roles' (Stavrakakis, 2009: 151, emphasis in original).

Drawing on Lacan's follower Louis Althusser, Jameson (2003: 37–8) states that ideology is 'the "representation" of the Imaginary relationships of individuals to their Real conditions of existence', so that the individual constructs an 'indispensible mapping fantasy or narrative by which the individual subject invents a "lived" relationship with collective systems'. Accordingly:

> Althusser insists that ideology exists as real only as it is performed and enacted. It consists of the 'existing modes of representation by which our experience is organized' (Smith 1984, 10). Ideology is our *lived* experience in the world. We practice ideology when we use the stock of concepts it provides us with to make our way in the world. (Lewis, 2005: 459, emphasis in original)

Althusser (2008: 16 [1971]), influenced by both Gramsci and Lacan, 'declared that "ideology is eternal"', it always has and always will exist, for human imagination requires ideology to engage with the world and that it is materialized 'in social practices, or the institutions he called social apparatuses' (Freeden, 2003: 27). For Althusser, the very human subject is construed 'as an ideological effect rather than [as] a self-constituting agent' (Stavrakakis, 2009: 152). Accordingly, 'ideology is a social process of address, or interpellations (i.e., rather than existing as a body of ideas, ideology structures positions for the acceptance or rejections of ideas)' (Sholle, 1988: 22). 'Althusser's theory of ideology . . . did not centre on the content of ideas or systems of belief but on the unconscious categories by which the material circumstances were represented and interpreted' (Vighi and Feldner, 2007: 144). In this regard, 'the facilitating role played by planning in the hegemonic project of the state' is to normalize and internalize the dominant logic of the state 'in the minds and bodies of citizens', so that planning is 'integral to [Foucault's] governmentality[5] and is an important [after Althusser] ideological state apparatus' (Law-Yone, 2007: 319–20). This is an apparatus that partially constructs the subjects constituting a society. But 'this construction is never complete; this social conditioning is never total, and social and political structures are ultimately unable to fully determine identity to the extent that, as Lacan has repeatedly highlighted, it is not only the subject that is lacking: the socio-symbolic framework of reality is also incomplete' so that the relationship between social reality, society and the subject 'can be theorized only as a function of political identification within a horizon of ontological impossibility' (Stavrakakis, 2009: 152). Beyond Althusser's theory of ideology as interpellation and imagination,

Žižek and Laclau draw on Lacan to add the role of 'lack' to the theory of ideology, so that the lacking 'empty subjectivity has to be regarded as the cause of ideological effects for which a theory of the imagination alone cannot account' (Pfaller, 2003: 379).

The concept of lack is central to Lacan (2006), for it is lack that constitutes desire and fundamentally provides 'the ontological underpinnings of human existence' (Ruti, 2008: 485). The work of Laclau (and Mouffe) builds on this concept to further explain the mechanisms of hegemony in dominant ideologies. Gunder and Hillier (2009: 24) suggested 'that the political or technical deployment of a ''lack'' or ''deficiency'' is a powerful planning and political trope for response and action, [as] who would wish to live in a ''deficient'' city lacking in *safety, competitiveness, sustainability* or some other shortfall?' As illustrated by Laclau (1996, 2000, 2005) the identification of a lack: such as a lack of *security* or, perhaps, a lack of *economic competitiveness* and the subsequent ideological articulation of its resolution, provides an emotive and powerful political tool for the implementation and desirous materialization of public planning policy (Stavrakakis, 2007a).

Žižek (2000) takes this position further. For Žižek (1989: 45),

> [i]deology is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportable reality; in its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our 'reality' itself: an 'illusion' which structures our effective, real social relations and thereby masks some insupportable, real, impossible kernel (conceptualized by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe as 'antagonism').

Phased more simply, Žižek deploys 'Lacanian psychoanalytical theory to contend that the horror of contemplating the unknowable leads people to weave imaginary webs, or fantasies, of what they claim can be known, and to fabricate harmonies where antagonisms reign' (Freeden, 2003: 111). Further, planning acts as a key state apparatus in facilitating this ideological task by harmoniously articulating how populations should enjoyably use their settlements, spaces and environments when seeking a better future.

For Žižek, ideology is more than just a discursive formation, for 'only the explicit ideological text can be deemed as discursive (the protective layers of symbolic fantasies), while the implicit and most profound core of ideology . . . is anchored in the Real qua non-discursive kernel of jouissance[6]' (enjoyment) (Vighi and Feldner, 2007: 153). For Žižek (1989) it is this 'extra, irrational nugget of enjoyment that attaches the subject to a formation' and allows it to become a *Sublime Object of Ideology* (Dean, 2008: 51–2). In this regard,

> far from confining itself to a descriptive account of ideological procedures, Žižek's ideological critique encourages us to embrace a more complex and sophisticated understanding of agency that calls into question, as a necessary prerequisite to our critical engagement with the world, our very unconscious attachment to the symbolic framework demarcating our subjectivity. (Vighi and Feldner, 2009: 290)

Indeed, '[a]n ideology is really "holding us" only when we do not feel any opposition between it and reality – that is, when the ideology succeeds in determining the mode of

our everyday experience of reality itself'; ultimately, '[a]n ideology really succeeds when even the facts which at first sight contradict it start to function as arguments in its favour' (Žižek, 1989: 49). Central to contemporary neoliberalism is the role of enjoyment, whereas 55 years ago Marcuse (1955) argued that enjoyment was the mechanism to traverse liberal market domination, this very concept is now the focus for the contemporary neoliberal dogma that 'you must enjoy' (Žižek, 2006a: 188)! Indeed, the 'injunction, the "ideological interpellation," proper to global capitalism is no longer that of the sacrificial devotion to a Cause, but, in contrast to previous modes of ideological interpellation, the reference to an obscure Unnameable: ENJOY! – in all its modes' (Žižek, 2007: 16).

For Žižek (1989: 125, emphasis in original) there are:

two complementary procedures of the 'criticism of ideology':

one is discursive, the 'symptomal reading' of the ideological text bringing about the 'deconstruction' of the spontaneous experience of its meaning – that is, demonstrating how a given ideological field is a result of a montage of heterogeneous 'floating signifiers' of their totalization through the intervention of certain 'nodal points';

the other aims at extracting the kernel of *enjoyment*, at articulating the way in which – beyond the field of meaning but at the same time internal to it – an ideology implies, manipulates, produces a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fantasy.

Žižek's conceptualizes ideology psychoanalytically 'as a radically split domain, or rather an elusive kind of knowledge divided between its explicit manifestation (a rationally constructed and linguistically transparent set of ideas) and its uncanny "appearance beyond appearance" (an unthinkable, unrepresentable and unmediated nucleus of disavowed enjoyment)' (Vighi and Feldner, 2007: 145). Further, Žižek 'undermines the parameters of critical theory "as we know it", for he shifts the object of critical analysis onto what has hitherto been regarded as *the* non-ideological field par excellence; the obscure realm of enjoyment (the Lacanian *jouissance*)' (Vighi and Feldner, 2007: 146, emphasis in original).

For Žižek (2006a: 188) neoliberal ideology and globalization particularly has this second element – *enjoyment* – as a guiding principle of interpellation, but without necessarily directly constituting any specific 'ideological narrative proper'. Rather this is construed in the Real of capitalism itself, which underwrites all interrelationships, that is, it acts as the generative matrix of neoliberal social reality (Dean, 2008; Žižek, 2006a). Accordingly, Žižek argues that the 'more we pride ourselves on being "free thinkers in a free world"', 'the more we blindly submit ourselves to the merciless superegoic command ("Enjoy!") which binds us to the logic of the market' (Vighi and Feldner, 2007: 146).

'Ideology, then, would connote all our attempts to manage subjective lack and the "lack in the Other" through (discursive and fantasmatic) articulations of reality promising fullness, integration, and harmony' (Stavrakakis, 2009: 160). Under neoliberalism's global capitalism these are pledges 'elevated to central parameters of the social bond' and include '[p]rograms that promise to restore order, upgrade the urban environment and facilitate consumptive flows' (Stavrakakis, 2007b: 144). Ideological critique,

following Žižek, would be a deconstruction of these ideological discourses and their fantasy components of enjoyment. In the case of a spatial plan or urban policy, its key terms (often master signifiers), constitute promises such as those of 'liveability', 'sustainability', and/or place identification and life opportunities of a 'globally competitive city'. A central fantasy of this ideology, which is seldom 'advanced as part of a conscious and deliberative propaganda campaign' as it 'informs a sense of the "obvious," the "taken for granted"', is the delusion that planners and their '"technocratic" solutions' 'are able to calm every crisis, resolve in an impartial manner every antagonism, satisfy all social grievances and abort political explosions' (Stavrakakis, 2007b: 144). Hence, one dimension of this enjoyment-inducing fantasy comes from the resultant sense of security, harmony and certitude towards the future, induced by the promise of the resolution of the identified deficiency, which the plan or expert's policy prescription appears to provide: for we all desire to live in a well planned, liveable, sustainable and globally competitive city, for the alternative would be unthinkable[7] (Gunder and Hillier, 2009)!

Contemporary planning spatial ideology draws on competitive market logics (economic growth, globally competitive cities, etc.) maintaining the status quo of existing globalization combined with an ideology of utopian transcendent ideals of sustainability, progress and betterment. These striate the contemporary structures, or ideology, of neoliberal space. Marcuse's (1955) anti-capitalist emancipatory utopia of pleasurable play has now been captured by the ideology of capitalist globalization; where consumption now lies at the very heart of enjoyment. Planning, both communicative and instrumental, has a central role to play in this neoliberal formulation.

Pløger (2008: 52) observed that '[i]t was through the city that societies developed ideas about how to discipline life through space'. Planning disciplines city life in a manner consistent with neoliberal market logics. Now it is argued that economic development 'is driven by cities' ability to attract creative people, rather than traditional factor endowments, which will, in turn, attract investment and stimulate economic growth' (Boland, 2007: 1022). Hence we must plan our cities to accommodate the needs of footloose talented knowledge workers and the inward social and financial capital that they bring, for Florida (2002: 744) asserts that 'talent is a key intermediate variable in attracting high-technology industries and generating higher regional incomes'. This must be done even if it overlooks the needs of the city's indigenous population; similarly, the environment must be cared for, provided economic development can maintain eminence and sustainable development is the means both can be achieved (Gunder, 2006; Gunder and Hillier, 2007, 2009; Kipfer and Keil, 2002; McGuirk, 2005). Planning provides the discipline for life in urban spaces to achieve the ends of our dominant market logics. Planning is the ideology of contemporary neoliberal space.

Conclusion

Freeden (2003: 112) contends that under Lacan a 'new generation of critics of ideology has been born'; ones which offer that there are '[n]o utopias, no solutions, only the awareness that we move from one make-believe world to another and that, perhaps we can aim at least for the make-believe that does not fundamentally dehumanize those who hold it'. What is crucial is not to take any fact, or any truth, or norm, or any framework at its face value, for all may be constructed. All may be a component of ideology.

Planning has always had an ideological component (Foley, 1960; Gunder and Hillier, 2009; Harvey, 1978; Reade, 1987). This article has argued that this ideological component largely reflects the dominant ideology of the time, which in much of the world continues to be defined by the evolving capitalist market. During the third quarter of the last century, the rational scientific management of space reflected the one-dimensional positivism of instrumental planning posited by Faludi's (1973) planning theory. In more recent years, the reintroduction of values into planning via 'ideologically freed' communicative planning theory facilitated its very hegemonic capture by the neoliberal supporting state. 'Nodal points' of planning concern emerged as unquestioned planning deficiencies requiring resolution: global competiveness, sustainable development and 'appropriate' urban design that facilitated the attraction of talent to globally ranked world cities, all became topics of collaborative planning discourse that sought to promise fantasies of harmony, security and above all – enjoyment – within the cities and populations for which planning provides both hope and discipline.

But what will occur in the future? What new ideological positions are evolving for planning as 'recovery' from the current global economic recession takes global capitalism onto new twists and ideological turns? What will be the future ideology of space and will it continue to be articulated by the planning discipline? I suggest that ideological critique may continue to be central to understanding this evolving process.

Notes

1. The Frankfurt School was a loose body of scholars that sought to transform Kant's critique of reason by 'shifting the level of analysis to social practice', drawing on Marxist and Freudian theory to advance a rationality beyond that of mere instrumentality (McCarthy, 1990: 441; also Hoy, 1986).
2. Especially Hayek (1969 [1944]), whose arguments for the efficiency of economic market preferences laid the grounds for the eventual emergence of Neoliberalism (Dean, 2008).
3. Also see the work of Paul Ricoeur (1986), who locates the concepts of ideology and utopia within a common framework, which 'uncovers a more profound role for ideology within the social imaginary: as integration/identity' in a manner to act 'as escape and as an imaginative way to shatter the present order represented in the prevailing ideology' (Langdridge, 2006: 647). Others, including Ernst Bloch (see Gunder and Hillier, 2007) and Roland Barthes (1972), have also written about ideological and utopian thought that this article's length constraints precludes engagement with.
4. 'For Lacan the Real, at its most radical, has to be totally de-substantialized. It is not an external thing that resists being caught in the symbolic network, but the fissure within the symbolic network itself . . . for Lacan the Real – the Thing – is not so much the inert presence that curves symbolic space (introduces gaps and inconsistencies in it), but, rather, an effect of these gaps and inconsistencies' (Žižek, 2006b: 72–3).
5. 'Governmentality is a mentality of governance and management on the part of the state to set standards of normality for populations co-variant with a mentality of self-governance of individuals in society to conform appropriately to what is expected of them as responsible citizens: ie, to act normally' (Gunder and Hillier, 2009: 6).

6. *Jouissance* is a dimension of enjoyment that extends beyond mere pleasantness, so that drawing on Jacques Lacan, Žižek 'views *jouissance* as an excessive, intense pleasure pain, as that "something extra" for the sake of which we do what otherwise seems irrational, counter-productive or even wrong . . . [an] excess beyond the useful and measurable that transforms something or someone into an object of our desire' (Dean, 2008: 51).

7. Of course, truly effective ideology engages in advance with the failure of the fantasy to deliver, as '[u]nconscious fantasy *locates* the object of satisfaction as somehow *still in the picture* – still there, *not yet* lost', so that the unconscious tends to *constructively* shape '"reality" by guiding the way the subject historically weaves (and symptomatically distorts) the denials of loss into the fabric of its "reality"' (MacCannell, 2007: 171, emphasis in original). Žižek (1989, 1993, 1997) often refers to this ideological trope, at least its conscious dimensions, as 'the theft of our enjoyment'. Here the concept of scapegoat plays an important ideological role in suggesting that our enjoyment might be regained, but only as a state of future potential, if we maintain the prevailing ideology by being resolute in 'our war against: terrorism, illegal immigrants and/or troubling non-believers', or whoever and whatever, constitutes the necessary ideologically shaped struggle against some identified and accordingly, stigmatized, enjoyment-thieving enemy (see Allmendinger and Gunder, 2005; Gunder and Hillier, 2009).

References

Adorno T (1973a) Contributions to the theory of ideology. In: Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (ed.) *Aspects of Sociology*. London: Heinemann.

Adorno T (1973b) *Negative Dialectics*. New York: Seabury Press.

Allmendinger P, Gunder M (2005) Applying Lacanian insight and a dash of Derridean deconstruction to planning's 'dark side'. *Planning Theory* 4(1): 87–112.

Althusser L (2008 [1971]) *On Ideology*. London: Verso.

Ashcraft R (1981) Political theory and political action in Karl Mannheim's thought: Reflections upon *Ideology and Utopia* and its critics. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23(1): 23–50.

Baeten G (2009) Regenerating the South Bank: Reworking community and the emergence of post-political regeneration. In: Imrie R et al. (eds) *Regenerating* London. London: Routledge, 237–253.

Barthes R (1972) *Mythologies*. New York: Hill and Wang.

Bengs C (2005) Planning theory for the naïve? *European Journal of Spatial Development*, available at: http://www.nordregio.se/EJSD/-ISSN 1650–9544 (accessed 2 September 2009).

Bickerstaff K, Walker G (2005) Shared visions, unholy alliances: Power, governance and deliberative processes in local transport planning. *Urban Studies* 42(12): 2123–2144.

Boland P (2007) Unpacking the theory-policy interface of local economic development: An analysis of Cardiff and Liverpool. *Urban Studies* 44(5/6): 1019–1039.

Brand R, Gaffikin F (2007) Collaborative planning in an uncollaborative world. *Planning Theory* 6(3): 282–313.

Campbell H (2006) Just planning: The art of situated ethical judgment. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 26(1): 92–106.

Cook D (2000) Critical stratagems in Adorno and Habermas: Theories of ideology and the ideology of theory. *Historical Materialism* 6(1): 67–87.

Cowell R, Owens S (2006) Governing space: Planning reform and the politics of sustainability. *Environment and Planning C* 24(3): 403–421.

da Silva N, Livio D (2005) The postmodern re-codification of perversion: On the production of consumer behaviour and its libidinal grammar. *International Forum of Psychoanalysis* 14(3): 217–223.

Deleuze G, Guattari F (1983) *Anti-Oedipus*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Dean J (2008) Enjoying neoliberalism. *Cultural Politics* 4(1): 47–72.

Doxiadis K (1997) Foucault and the three-headed king: State, ideology and theory as targets of critique. *Economy and Society* 26(4): 518–545.

Fagence M (1983) Ideological fundamentalism in town planning – An exploratory appraisal. *The Environmentalist* 3(1): 17–27.

Faludi A (1973) The rationale of planning theory. In: Faludi A (ed.) *A Reader in Planning Theory*. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 35–53.

Farrell K (2008) The politics of science and sustainable development: Marcuse's new science in the 21st century. *Capitalism Nature Socialism* 19(4): 68–83.

Fine G, Sandstrom K (1993) Ideology in action: A pragmatic approach to a contested concept. *Sociological Theory* 11(1): 21–38.

Fischer A (2009) Settling accounts with the sociology of knowledge: The Frankfurt School, Mannheim, and the Marxist critique of ideology qua mental labor. *South Atlantic Quarterly* 108(2): 331–363.

Florida R (2002) The economic geography of talent. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92(4): 743–755.

Foley D (1960) British town planning: One ideology or three? *The British Journal of Sociology* 11(3): 211–231.

Forester J (1989) *Planning in the Face of Power*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Foucault M (1980) *Power/Knowledge*. New York: Pantheon.

Freeden M (2003) *Ideology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Friedmann J (1973) *Retracking America*. Garden City, NY: Anchor.

Friedmann J, Hudson B (1974) Knowledge and action: A guide to planning theory. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 40(1): 2–16.

Friedmann J (1987) *Planning in the Public Domain*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gramsci A (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.

Gunder M (2006) Sustainability: Planning's saving grace or road to perdition? *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 26(2*)*: 208–221.

Gunder M, Hillier J (2007) Planning as urban therapeutic. *Environment and Planning: A* 39(2): 467–486.

Gunder M, Hillier J (2009) *Planning in Ten Words or Less*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Habermas J (1984) *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas J (1987) *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Harvey D (1978) On planning the ideology of planning. In: Burchell R, Sternlieb G (eds) *Planning Theory in the 1980s*. New Brunswick: CUPR, 213–233.

Harvey D (2003) *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harvey D (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hayek F (1969) *The Road to Serfdom*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Healey P (1997) *Collaborative Planning*. London: Macmillan Press.

Healey P (2003) *Collaborative Planning* in perspective. *Planning Theory* 2(2): 101–123.

Hillier J (2003) 'Agon'izing over consensus – Why Habermasian ideals cannot be 'real'. *Planning Theory* 2(1): 37–59.

Hillier J (2005) Straddling the post-structuralist abyss: Between transcendence and immanence? *Planning Theory* 4(3): 271–299.

Hillier J (2007) *Stretching Beyond the Horizon*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Hillier J (2008) Plan(e) speaking: A multiplanar theory of spatial planning. *Planning Theory* 7(1): 24–50.

Horkheimer M (1985) *Eclipse of Reason*. New York: Continuum.

Horkheimer M (1993) A new concept of ideology? In: *Between Philosophy and Social Science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 129–150.

Hoy DC (1986) Power, repression, progress: Foucault, Lukes, and the Frankfurt School. In: *Foucault: A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 123–147.

Innes J (1995) Planning theory's emerging paradigm: Communicative action and interactive practice. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 14(3): 183–190.

Irazábal C (2009) Realizing planning's emancipatory promise: Learning from regime theory to strengthen communicative action. *Planning Theory* 8(2): 115–139.

Jackson J (2009) Neo-liberal or third way? What planners from Glasgow, Melbourne and Toronto say. *Urban Policy and Research* 27(4): 397–417.

Jameson F (2003) Imaginary and symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, psychoanalytic criticism, and the problem of the subject. In: Žižek S (ed.) *Jacques Lacan: Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory*, *Volume III*. London: Routledge, 3–43.

Jost J (2006) The end of the end of ideology. *American Psychologist* 61(7): 651–670.

Kipfer S, Keil R (2002) Toronto Inc? Planning the competitive city in the new Toronto. *Antipode* 32(2): 227–264.

Kramer F (1975) Policy analysis as ideology. *Public Administration Review* 35(5): 509–517.

Lacan J (2006) *Ecrits*. London: Norton.

Laclau E (1996) *Emancipation(s)*. London: Verso.

Laclau E (2000) Identity and hegemony. In: Butler J, Laclau E, and Žižek S (eds) *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality.* London: Verso, 44–89.

Laclau E (2005) *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.

Langdridge D (2006) Ideology and utopia: Social psychology and the social imagination of Paul Ricoeur. *Theory and Psychology* 16(5): 641–659.

Law-Yone H (2007) Another planning theory? Rewriting the meta-narrative. *Planning Theory* 6(3): 315–326.

Lewis W (2005) Knowledge versus 'knowledge': Louis Althusser on the autonomy of science and philosophy from ideology. *Rethinking Marxism* 17(3): 455–470.

MacCannell J (2007) The city at the 'end of history'. In: BAVO (ed.) *Urban Politics Now*. Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 162–180.

Mannheim K (1980 [1940]) *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Mannheim K (1991 [1929]) *Ideology and Utopia*. London: Routledge.

Marcuse H (1955) *Eros and Civilization*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Marcuse H (1990 [1929]) The sociological method and the problem of truth. In: Meja V, Stehr N (eds) *Knowledge and Politics*. London: Routledge, 129–139.

Marcuse H (1991 [1964]) *One Dimensional Man*. London: Routledge.

Marx K, Engels F (1970) *The German Ideology*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

McCarthy T (1990) The critique of impure reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School. *Political Theory* 18(3): 437–469.

McGuirk P (2005) Neoliberalist planning? Re-thinking and re-casting Sydney's metropolitan planning. *Geographical Research* 43(1): 59–70.

McGuirk P (2007) The political construction of the city-region: Notes from Sydney. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 31(1): 179–187.

Miraftab F (2009) Insurgent planning: Situating radical planning in the Global South. *Planning Theory* 8(1): 32–50.

Pfaller R (2003) Negation and its reliabilities: An empty subject for ideology. In: Žižek S (ed.) *Jacques Lacan: Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory*, *Volume III*. London: Routledge, 376–393.

Pløger J (2008) Foucault's *dispositif* and the city. *Planning Theory* 7(1): 51–70.

Purcell M (2009) Resisting neoliberalization: Communicative planning or counter-hegemonic movements. *Planning Theory* 8(2): 140–165.

Rancière J (1999) *Dis-agreement.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Reade E (1987) *British Town and Country Planning*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Ricoeur P (1986) *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Roy A (2006) Praxis in the time of empire. *Planning Theory* 5(1): 7–29.

Ruti M (2008) The fall of fantasies: A Lacanian reading of lack. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 56(2): 483–508.

Sager T (2005) Communicative planners as naïve mandarins of the neo-liberal state? *European Journal of Spatial Development*, available at: http://www.nordregio.se/EJSD/-ISSN 1650–9544 (accessed 2 September 2009).

Scott A, Roweis S (1977) Urban planning in theory and practice: A reappraisal. *Environment and Planning: A* 9(10): 1097–1119.

Sholle D (1988) Critical studies: From the theory of ideology to power/knowledge. *Critical Studies in Mass Communications* 5(1): 16–41.

Smith D (2007) Deleuze and the question of desire: Towards an immanent theory of ethics. *Parrhesia* 2: 66–78.

Smith S (1984) *Reading Althusser*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Stanley W, Holtzmann R (2007) Perspectives and unity: Karl Mannheim. *Educational Theory* 19(3): 271–287.

Stavrakakis Y (2007a) *The Lacanian Left*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Stavrakakis Y (2007b) Antinomies of space: From the representation of politics to a topology of the political. In: BAVO (ed.) *Urban Politics Now*. Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 142–161.

Stavrakakis Y (2009) Psychoanalysis and ideology: Comments on R.D. Hinshelwood. *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society* 14(2): 149–163.

Swyngedouw E (2007) The post-political city. In: BAVO (ed.) *Urban Politics Now*. Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 58–76.

Taylor N (2009) Tensions and contradictions left and right: The predictable disappointments of planning under New Labour in historical perspective. *Planning Practice and Research* 24(1): 57–70.

Tiesdell S, Allmendinger P (2001) Neighbourhood regeneration and New Labour's third way. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 19(6): 903–926.

Vighi F, Feldner H (2007) Ideology critique or discourse analysis? Zizek against Foucault. *European Journal of Political Theory* 6(2): 141–159.

Vighi F, Feldner H (2009) Pathological attachments: Slavoj Žižek on anticapitalism and liberal democracy. *Rethinking Marxism* 21(2): 290–297.

Wood S (2009) Desiring Docklands: Deleuze and urban planning discourse. *Planning Theory* 8(2): 191–216.

Zilbersheid U (2008) The utopia of Herbert Marcuse part 1. *Critique* 36(3): 403–419.

Zilbersheid U (2009) The utopia of Herbert Marcuse part 2. *Critique* 37(1): 81–98.

Žižek S (1989) *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso.

Žižek S (1993) *Tarrying with the Negative*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Žižek S (1997) *The Plague of Fantasies*. London: Verso.

Žižek S (1999) The spectre of ideology. In: Wright E, Wright E (eds) *The Žižek Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 53–86.

Žižek S (2000) Holding the place. In: Butler J, Laclau E, and Žižek S (eds) *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*. London: Verso, 308–329.

Žižek S (2006a) *The Parallax View*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Žižek S (2006b) *How to Read Lacan*. London: Norton.

Žižek S (2006c) Afterword. In: Rancière J (ed.) *The Politics of Aesthetics*. London: Continuum.

Žižek S (2007) Some politically incorrect reflections on urban violence in Paris and New Orleans and related manners. In: BAVO (ed.) *Urban Politics Now*. Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 12–29.

Žižek S (2008) *In Defence of Lost Causes*. London: Verso.

Author Biography

Michael Gunder is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Architecture and Planning, University of Auckland, New Zealand. His research interests lie in poststructuralist planning theory. He has recently published *Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning* (with Jean Hillier, Ashgate, 2009).