

SUFFICIENCY AND INFLUENCE¹

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Consider two competing models M_1 and M_2 for the same data analysis. Assume that the conclusions from both models are posteriors $p_1(\theta|Y)$ and $p_2(\theta|Y)$ of some inferential target θ given the data Y . The unknowns θ may be parameters with identical interpretations in both models. Under mild conditions, the difference between the two conclusions is reducible to a one dimensional summary $h(\theta)$ for any two models. The result has implications for Bayesian diagnostics and sensitivity analysis. The role of Bayesian and classical robustness is discussed. Applications of influence sufficiency to case and prior influence are illustrated, with emphasis on the influence of different priors and calculation of Bayes factors.

1. Introduction. I'd like to start with a brief discussion of influential and outlying observations, influential and outlying assumptions, and classical and Bayesian robustness.

An observation is influential if the conclusion changes in an important manner when the observation's likelihood contribution changes. Outliers are observations whose responses differ from what is predicted by the model. Outliers need not be influential (consider either a model with t errors or regression through the origin) and influential observations need not be outliers; consider an observation in linear regression with leverage $h_i \approx 1$. As the number of observations increases, with all other aspects of the model held fixed, we can usually expect the influence of individual observations to become small.

Observations are not the only things in an analysis that can be influential. Assumptions such as linearity, normality, constant variance or smoothness contribute strongly to the likelihood. An assumption is influential if the conclusion changes when the assumption is relaxed. An assumption is outlying if the data support a relaxation of the assumption.

Classically, robustness has meant that within a range around a particular model, the derivatives of an inference (usually narrowly defined as a point estimate) with respect to various inputs are 'small'. Usually only the response variables are considered as inputs. Consider for example a model where real valued observations y_i are independent and identically distributed (iid) with density $f(y_i - \mu)$ given a location parameter μ . A global change to the inputs y_i such as adding a constant c to all observations usually changes

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the final point estimate $\tilde{\mu}$ by c . The fact that the derivatives $g(y_i) = \partial\tilde{\mu}/\partial y_i$ are small, implies that with enough small changes, the model ‘breaks’, that is, with enough cumulative changes to the inputs, the derivatives $g(y_i)$ will be highly non-linear, and can be arbitrarily large.

Consider a thought experiment where all observations y_i are increased smoothly by an amount c one observation at a time in turn, starting with the largest observation and ending with the smallest observation. All changes are cumulative. Depending on the chosen estimator $\tilde{\theta}$ the derivatives $g(y_i)$ will vary from slightly negative values to 1. The problem with robust estimators of μ is that for some data sets, small perturbations can have $g(y_i) = 1$, $g(y_i) < 0$, or even $g(y_i) > 1$. Examples of negative $g(y_i)$ occur in the location model with t errors; $g(y_i) = 1$ occurs when $\tilde{\mu}$ is the median, and the number of observations is odd; $g(y_i) > 1$ occurs in nonlinear normal models (St. Laurent and Cook 1992). The normal model $y_i \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$ with $\tilde{\theta} = \hat{\theta}$ is often criticized because $g(y_i) = n^{-1}$ for all data sets and observations. I suspect that when using a flat prior, the normal model gives the smallest possible maximum value of $g(y_i) = n^{-1}$.

From a Bayesian perspective, the classical definition of robustness can be incorporated into an analysis thru choice of robust likelihoods. See for example, Ramsay and Novick (1980). This is done through a priori beliefs and a posteriori data selection amongst models for the sampling density and not a blind requirement that models should be robust in the classical sense.

Bayesian robustness has historically studied the sensitivity to the prior of a point estimate, Bayes factor or posterior. We take sets of priors and investigate the possible ranges of the posterior or point estimate. This is beginning to change, as researchers (for example Lavine 1991a, 1991b) realize that the prior is often not the main source of information in a model, rather, the likelihood contributes substantially more to conclusions. Another problem with Bayesian robustness is that the perturbation sets are not necessarily chosen for their a priori plausibility and support by the data. If the most influential priors are not plausible a posteriori and usually they are not, then it is unclear if we should be interested in their influence a posteriori. Further, in regression and other complex models with available substantive information, prior influence has not been extensively studied. Two examples are Carlin, Kass, Lerch and Huguenard (1992) and Greenhouse and Wasserman (1995). The example in this paper illustrates aspects of prior influence in a linear regression setup.

A Bayesian jointly models data Y and unknown parameters θ by model M_1 where $p_1(\theta, Y) = p_1(\theta)f_1(Y|\theta) = p_1(\theta|Y)f_1(Y)$. Alternatively, a competing model M_2 is proposed with $p_2(\theta, Y)$ and corresponding prior $p_2(\theta)$, sampling $f_2(Y|\theta)$, posterior $p(\theta|Y)$ and prior predictive $f_2(Y)$ distributions. The parameter θ must have the same interpretation under both models. Here

I assume that M_1 is the current model under consideration, while model M_2 is a modified version of M_1 , the result of a change in assumptions. Which model should be preferred? Model M_1 will be used for inference if the sensitivity analysis identifies no problems with the current model. Several means of choosing between the two models are possible. Influence analysis advises on whether the conclusion of our analysis changes when the assumptions change. Model M_2 must be considered only if it leads to different conclusions from M_1 , and if the data support M_2 over M_1 (Weiss 1995).

The next section describes an idea in influence analysis which is both pretty and powerful. The value of the idea is its use in developing procedures for assessing posterior influence and data support and in providing computational algorithms. Calculation results are emphasized, and a new method of calculating the Bayes factor and L_1 divergence between M_1 and M_2 is given.

2. Sufficient Perturbation Functions. While the base material for this section is Weiss (1995), different aspects are emphasized, and several new methods are presented, especially in section 2.4. Consider the joint priors $p_1(\theta, Y)$ and $p_2(\theta, Y)$, the assumptions of the analysis given models M_1 and M_2 respectively. Define

$$(1) \quad \tau^*(\theta, Y) = \frac{p_2(\theta, Y)}{p_1(\theta, Y)}$$

The function $\tau^* = \tau^*(\theta, Y)$ is the function that multiplies the assumptions of M_1 to produce the assumptions from M_2 . It mathematically embodies the change of assumptions in going from M_1 to M_2 . Thinking of M_2 as a modification or perturbation of M_1 , then define τ^* as the perturbation function that changes $p_1(\theta, Y)$ into $p_2(\theta, Y)$. Kass, Tierney and Kadane (1989) introduced the idea of perturbation functions and Weiss (1995) has expanded on the idea.

A posteriori we have

$$(2) \quad \tau(\theta, Y) = \frac{\tau^*(\theta, Y)}{E_1[\tau^*(\theta, Y)|Y]} = \frac{p_2(\theta|Y)}{p_1(\theta|Y)}$$

where $E_j[g(\theta)|Y] = \int g(\theta)p_j(\theta|Y)d\theta$, for $j = 1, 2$, and

$$(3) \quad E_1[\tau^*(\theta, Y)|Y] = B_{21} = \frac{f_2(Y)}{f_1(Y)}$$

is the Bayes factor in favor of M_2 and M_1 , assuming that it is well defined. If $\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2)$, $p_j(\theta) = p_j(\theta_1)p_j(\theta_2)$, and $p_j(\theta_1)$ are both proper, then if $p_j(\theta_2)$ are the same, even if improper, the Bayes factor is well defined as the Bayes

factor where $p_j(\theta_2)$ are equal and proper but vague in the sense that the posteriors $p_j(\theta|Y)$ do not change.

2.1. Examples of perturbation functions.

2.1.1. *Case deletion.* What happens when we delete case i from the sample? The perturbation function is $\tau_{1i} \propto f_{2i}(y_i) * [f(y_i|\theta, x_i)]^{-1}$ is proportional to the inverse sampling distribution of y_i given the parameters θ and covariates x_i and where $f_{2i}(y_i)$ is a new sampling density for y_i which does not depend on θ .

2.1.2. *Prior Perturbation.* Changing the prior from $p_1(\theta)$ to $p_2(\theta)$ gives $\tau_p^* \propto p_2(\theta)/p_1(\theta)$.

2.1.3. *Likelihood perturbation.* Changing the sampling density from $f_1(Y|\theta)$ to $f_2(Y|\theta)$ gives $\tau_L^* \propto f_2(Y|\theta)/f_1(Y|\theta)$.

2.1.4. *Covariate and response perturbation.* We can also perturb responses y_i to $y_i + \delta_i$ or perturb covariates x_i or sets of responses or covariates. Changing y_i is useful when the observations are uncertain in ways not accounted for by the sampling density. This happens with rounding, if imputed values are substituted for actual observed values or if censoring times are substituted for unobserved responses. The presence of errors in variables can suggest that the x_i 's should be perturbed.

2.1.5. *Combinations.* If a set of individual perturbations are of interest, it is probable that combinations of the perturbations are also of interest. Virtually no work has occurred in this area. It appears to be an area where the tools of experimental design could usefully be applied; as with multiple case influence, combinatorial explosion problems can occur.

2.2. *Sufficiency.* If M_1 and M_2 both provide joint distributions for data Y and parameters θ , then model M_2 can be arrived at as a perturbation of M_1 , provided only that the ratio $\tau^*(\theta, Y)$ is finite everywhere. That is, the joint prior of M_2 should have a density relative to the joint prior of M_1 .

The perturbation τ or τ^* contains in a real sense all of the influence of the change from M_1 to M_2 . In particular, given τ , there is no further influence on θ due to switching from M_1 to M_2 . To see this, change variables from θ to τ, ρ where ρ is chosen to make the change of variables one-to-one and measurable. Then (Weiss 1995)

$$(4) \quad p_1(\rho|\tau, Y) = p_2(\rho|\tau, Y)$$

The posterior of ρ given τ is the same under both models M_1 and M_2 . The

proof is

$$(5) \quad \tau = \frac{p_2(\theta|Y)}{p_1(\theta|Y)} = \frac{p_2(\tau|Y)p_2(\rho|\tau, Y)}{p_1(\tau|Y)p_1(\rho|\tau, Y)}.$$

Now in (5) multiply leftmost and rightmost formulae by $p_1(\rho|\tau, Y)$ and integrate with respect to ρ . This gives

$$(6) \quad \tau = \frac{p_2(\tau|Y)}{p_1(\tau|Y)}.$$

Dividing (5) by equation (6) gives (4).

The updating of $p_1(\tau|Y)$ to $p_2(\tau|Y)$ is simple, since by (6), the ratio is proportional to τ . Thus, given a histogram of samples from $p_1(\tau|Y)$, or a plot of the density, we have a substantial amount of information about the effects of the perturbation. The beauty of the perturbation function is that τ is a univariate function of θ : by investigating a univariate marginal $p_1(\tau|Y)$ of $p_1(\theta|Y)$, many of the consequences of perturbing M_1 to M_2 can be explored; in particular we need not explore the high dimensional posteriors $p_1(\theta|Y)$ and $p_2(\theta|Y)$, since all conditionals $p_j(\rho|\tau, Y)$ are equal.

The function $\tau = \tau(\theta, Y)$, generally a function of the data and the parameters, can be called a sufficient perturbation function due to the results above. Conditional on τ , there is no further influence due to changing from M_1 to M_2 . Unconditionally, further influence of the perturbation on a function $\beta = \beta(\theta)$ of interest is due to the influence on $p_1(\tau|Y)$ and any posterior association between τ and β . If τ is a function of β , then β is also a sufficient perturbation function for the perturbation from M_1 to M_2 . We distinguish β from τ by calling τ , or any 1-1 measurable function of τ a minimally sufficient perturbation.

2.3. Summarizing Influence. Two different approaches for summarizing influence are numerical and graphical. The numerical approach summarizes the differences between $p_1(\theta|Y)$ and $p_2(\theta|Y)$ by a numerical summary of the differences. Discussions of these summaries are often couched in the form of which summary is best, but a scalar summary is not required, and multiple summaries should be considered. On the other hand, most analysts don't want to wade through tons of influence statistics.

One approach is to summarize the influence through the change in posterior expectation of some quantity of interest. Another popular approach for summarizing the difference between $p_1(\beta(\theta)|Y)$ and $p_2(\beta(\theta)|Y)$ is a divergence measure

$$D_{\beta(\theta)}(g) = \int g \left(\frac{p_2(\beta(\theta)|Y)}{p_1(\beta(\theta)|Y)} \right) p_1(\beta(\theta)|Y) d\theta,$$

where $g(a)$ is convex and $g(1) = 0$. (See Csiszár 1967, Weiss and Cook 1992, and Weiss 1995.) By (5) and (6),

$$(7) \quad D_\theta(g) = D_\tau(g),$$

and by convexity of g ,

$$(8) \quad D_\theta(g) \geq D_{\beta(\theta)}(g) \geq 0$$

(Weiss 1995). Various measures that have been proposed are the L_1 norm with $g_L(a) = .5|a - 1|$, the several Kullback divergences, such as K with $g_K(a) = -a \log(a)$; functions of Hellinger distance (Geisser 1993) with $g_p(a) = |a^{1/p} - 1|^p$, $p \geq 1$ and the χ^2 divergence with $g_{\chi^2}(a) = (a - 1)^2$. In my experience, the choice of divergence does not matter for ranking different perturbations especially in regards to case deletion, however, some divergences are easier to interpret. From Weiss (1995), χ^2 divergence is the square of the Kass, Tierney, and Kadane (1989) maximum standardized change (MSC) and the L_1 is the maximum difference between M_1 and M_2 in posterior probability content of any interval. Kullback divergence with $g_K(a)$ is often recommended because closed form computations are sometimes possible, and because of the optimality identified by Bernardo (1979; 1985).

A graphical approach to influence summarization is a compact way of displaying many numerical influence statistics. The primary goal of influence analysis is to understand the difference between $p_1(\theta|Y)$ and $p_2(\theta|Y)$. A graphical approach plots these two posteriors and inspects them directly. When θ is a scalar, this is straightforward. When $p_j(\theta|Y)$ is more than 1 or 2 dimensional, this is hard. One way of easing the problem is to inspect marginal posteriors, but by (8) these often underestimate global influence and often drastically. Define a posterior influence plot as a plot of $p_1(\theta|Y)$ and $p_2(\theta|Y)$ or of the marginals $p_j(\beta|Y)$ of β . The sufficient perturbation comes into play here. Consider inspecting a plot of $p_1(\tau|Y)$ and $p_2(\tau|Y)$. If we consider that influence is properly summarized by a divergence measure, then this plot loses nothing over inspecting $p_1(\theta|Y)$ and $p_2(\theta|Y)$ since the $D_\tau(g) = D_\theta(g)$. If β is a non-minimal sufficient perturbation function, we can also inspect $p_1(\beta|Y)$ and $p_2(\beta|Y)$ without missing any influence. If β is easier than τ to interpret, its posterior influence plot may be preferable to the posterior influence plot using τ . When a not necessarily sufficient parameter β is of particular interest in an analysis, then one should inspect $p_1(\beta|Y)$ and $p_2(\beta|Y)$ to investigate influence. This also obviates the need for choosing a summary influence statistic.

2.4. *Computations.* For a single sample $\theta^{(l)}$ with $l = 1, \dots, L$ from $p_1(\theta|Y)$ one can use

$$(9) \quad \hat{B}_{21} = \hat{E}_1[\tau^*(\theta, Y)] = L^{-1} \sum \tau^*(\theta^{(l)}),$$

by (3) to estimate B_{21} (Weiss 1995) and to calculate $D_\theta(g)$,

$$(10) \quad \hat{D}_\theta(g) = L^{-1} \sum_{l=1}^L g \left(\frac{\tau^*(\theta^{(l)}, Y)}{\hat{B}_{12}} \right),$$

by (7) to estimate influence functions of the perturbation from M_1 to M_2 (Weiss 1995). To calculate the change in posterior expectation of β , one can use

$$(11) \quad E_2[\beta|Y] - E_1[\beta|Y] = \text{Cov}_1[\beta, \tau|Y].$$

In principle, one can produce a posterior influence plot of $p_1(\tau|Y)$ and $p_2(\tau|Y)$ by approximating a sample from $p_2(\tau|Y)$ by reweighting $\theta^{(l)}$ by $\tau(\theta^{(l)})$. This and the results (9), (10), and (11) are importance sampling-type calculations. Samples from one density ($p_1(\theta|Y)$) are used to learn about a second density ($p_2(\theta|Y)$). Importance sampling can be used in theory to explore any posterior with the same support as $p_1(\theta|Y)$, provided that one can integrate arbitrary functions of θ given M_1 . In practice, importance sampling generally only works if the importance density $p_1(\theta|Y)$ is close to the alternative density, $p_2(\theta|Y)$ and if special conditions are met by the density ratio τ . Influential perturbations are unlikely to meet these special conditions and the caveat of integrating arbitrary functions is very strong and virtually never met in practice.

The above calculations are the direct result of sufficiency. An alternate application of sufficiency uses samples from both $p_j(\theta|Y)$ is to form estimates $\hat{p}_j(\tau^*|Y)$ using kernel density or other form of semiparametric estimate. These two posteriors are one dimensional, and the curse of dimensionality should be avoidable. One can then compute influence diagnostics numerically using one dimensional Riemann integration $d\tau$ applying (7), Assuming proper priors one can compute B_{12} using

$$(12) \quad \hat{B}_{21} = \frac{\hat{p}_1(\tau^*|Y)\tau^*}{\hat{p}_2(\tau^*|Y)}.$$

Any value of τ^* can be used, provided that both densities are accurately estimated at that point. The log scale is often easier to work with. Since the Jacobian cancels, the posterior of any monotone transformation of τ^* could be used in place of $p_j(\tau^*|Y)$. The difference in posterior expectations $E_2[\beta|Y] - E_1[\beta|Y]$ is estimated by separately estimating the expectations using the two samples.

Inspection of the densities $\hat{p}_j(\tau^*|Y)$ can shed light on the accuracy of these various calculational formulae, as illustrated in the example.

3. Housing Data. This data set was collected to predict the *COST* of rehabilitating housing in St. Paul, Minnesota, USA. The prediction is

to be based on the average ratings of external parts of the house, *EAVES*, *WINDOWS* and *YARD* by three inexpensive sidewalk surveyors. Ratings of *EAVES* and *WINDOWS* are integer valued from 1 to 6, and *YARD* is rated either 2 or 5. Lower ratings indicate houses in better condition. The data is given in table 1. The *COST* in kilodollars is estimated by an expensive building contractor who must enter the house. Let *COST* y_i be modeled $y_i = x_i^t \beta + \epsilon_i$ with *COST* y_i , x_i a 4-vector of covariates, a one followed by the average *EAVES*, *WINDOWS*, and *YARD* ratings, coefficients $\beta = (\beta_j)$, $j = 0, 1, 2, 3$ and errors $\epsilon_i | \sigma^2 \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ a priori given σ^2 independent and identically distributed (iid).

Three priors are used with this example. All three have $p(\beta, \sigma^2) = p(\beta)p(\sigma^2)$ with $p(\sigma^2) \propto \sigma^{-2}$. The first prior is a version of the hierarchical model selection prior of George and McCulloch (1993). Consider the prior $p(\beta_j | \delta_j) \sim N(0, V_0 W^{\delta_j})$, $j = 1, 2, 3$, $\delta_j \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\pi_0)$. For the housing data set I selected $\pi_0 = .7$, $V_0 = .25$, and $W = 16$. Because of the scaling of the X 's it was felt that the same prior might reasonably be used for all three coefficients. The prior for the intercept assumed $\beta_0 \sim N(0, V_0 W)$. This prior is called the model selection (MS) prior.

The second prior, the flat (F) prior, used the noninformative prior $p(\beta, \sigma) \propto c\sigma^{-2}$. The choice of constant c is important for calculating Bayes' factors, and I used the volume of the smallest rectangular region with sides parallel to the coordinate axes that covered all 2000 samples from the posterior, the side lengths were rounded up slightly. Since all three priors for σ^2 are improper, the volume for σ^2 was not included. The appropriate normalizing constant was $(137024)^{-1}$.

The third prior was a proper informative (I) prior for β based on data taken 7 years previously. The prior data has sample size 39, where one outlier was deleted from the earlier analysis. The costs were inflated by a factor so that the means of the earlier sample (without case deletion) and the current sample are the same. The necessary statistics are given in table 2. The prior is the posterior t distribution $p(\beta | Y_{\text{old}})$ based on an uninformative prior with $p(\beta, \sigma^2) \propto \sigma^{-2}$.

All calculations were based on samples of size 2000 from the three posteriors based on the three priors. The posteriors will be named MS, F, and I posteriors after the priors.

4. Case Influence Analysis. This section discusses case diagnostics and the influence of the three priors on the case diagnostics. A priori, I expected that use of a proper prior would reduce case influence, and increase outlier statistics over a noninformative prior.

The sufficient perturbation for case deletion is independent of the prior.

In normal linear regression it is $\tau_i(\theta) = \tau_i(x_i^t\beta, \sigma^2) = \text{CPO}_i/f(y_i|\theta)$

$$(2\pi\sigma^2)^{1/2} \exp\left(-.5\sigma^{-2}(y_i - x_i^t\beta)^2\right) \text{CPO}_i$$

where $\text{CPO}_i = (E[(f(y_i|\beta, \sigma^2)^{-1}|Y)]^{-1})^{-1}$ is the conditional predictive ordinate (Geisser 1993, p. 108).

Table 3 gives three case statistics for each of the three priors. Column 1 is the case number, columns 2-4 give CPO_i , columns 5-7 give the L_1 divergence case statistic $.5 \int |p(\theta|Y) - p(\theta|Y_{(i)})| d\theta$ where $Y_{(i)}$ denotes the case deleted sample; and columns 8-10 give the diagnostic $P(|\epsilon_i| > 2\sigma|Y)$; the posterior probability that $|\epsilon_i|$ is larger than $2 * \sigma$, proposed as an outlier statistic by Chaloner and Brant (CB) (1988). A value of .00 indicates a number less than .01 after rounding, but not originally equal to 0. The diagnostics based on the MS posterior are in columns 2, 5, and 8; based on the F posterior in columns 3, 6 and 9; and based on the I posterior in columns 4, 7, and 10. As expected, the L_1 case influence statistics are smaller for the proper priors. However, the CB outlier statistics are smaller with the *MS* and *I* priors in 9 out of the 10 cases with a non-zero value in the flat prior. The exception is the most outlying case. The conditional predictive ordinates are comparable among the three models, except for the noticeable changes for the two most outlying cases, which are less outlying with the *MS* and *I* posteriors.

5. Prior Influence. There are three priors, so influence can be assessed in the context of switching between any two of them. I discuss marginal influence followed by the global affects of switching between priors and the data support of the priors.

There is less influence on individual parameters than on the full posterior by (8). The marginals based on the MS prior are particularly deceptive, since the multivariate posterior has lumps of probability close to coordinate axes. However, individual coefficients are interpretable, and their posteriors are one dimensional summaries of $p(\beta, \sigma|Y)$. Figure 1 shows the marginals of the intercept, coefficients of *EAVES*, *WINDOWS* and *YARD*; and σ . The solid curves are the MS marginals, the dashed curves are I marginals and the dotted curves are the F marginals. As might be expected, the F marginals are less peaked and have more variance, and the MS marginals have bumps near zero. The plot labeled *Mean Cost* is the posterior estimated cost to rehabilitate an average house with *EAVES*, *WINDOWS* and *YARD* coefficients of 2.47, 2.41, and 2.22 respectively; the average ratings of the 40 + 22 houses in the prior and current samples. Table 4 summarizes these plots with the L_1 norm between the various marginals and the posterior means and standard deviations. Rather surprising is the amount of influence on the intercept, which approaches the influence on the joint posterior, given in the line labeled 'posterior'. Also surprisingly, plausible values of σ decrease slightly

with the MS and I priors.

The global effect of switching priors is substantial. For switching between any two priors, the L_1 between posteriors is approximately .5, as listed in table 4. This was calculated using a 1-d numerical integration of kernel density estimates of $p_1(\tau|Y)$ and $p_2(\tau|Y)$. These densities are plotted in Figure 2's left hand column (LHC). The solid, dashed and dotted densities are from the MS, I and F posteriors respectively. The choice of kernel density estimator mattered by .02 in the second digit. The importance sampling equality (9) gives two answers, depending on which sample is used. Of these six calculations, two for each pair of priors, four roughly agreed with the table figures, and two, both involving the MS prior, differed by .2. From the LHC of Figure 2, we see that comparing MS and F posteriors, the F posterior can be reweighted to give the MS posterior but not vice-versa. The F posterior's reweighted L_1 was .49, while the MS posterior's reweighted posterior calculation gave .29, a drastic underestimate. Inspecting the MS and I posteriors suggest that neither should work well for estimating under the other. The L_1 calculations were .72 (MS) and .48 (I). Comparing the F and I priors gave L_1 values of .55 (F) and .49 (I), not too terrible, given that the plot suggests that the I posterior should work ok, while the F might not.

The data have a strong preference for the model selection prior. The Bayes factor in favor of the MS prior is around 150 over the flat prior, and around 170000 over the informative prior. These Bayes factors were calculated using formula (12). Table 4 gives median calculations using a range of τ^* values, plotted in the right hand column of Figure 2. If calculations were perfect, each of these figures should be a straight line across at the actual value of the Bayes factor. Clearly numerical problems still abound. The last three rows of table 4 gives the Bayes factor calculations. The calculations range by a factor of roughly two. The last row uses the second of the listed densities, the next to last uses the first of the listed posteriors. It was quite surprising that the data preferred the MS prior to the I prior, which was based on real data.

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Point #	Cost	Eaves	Windows	Yards
1	15.783	3.00	2.00	2
2	12.570	1.66	2.33	3
3	19.600	3.33	2.33	2
4	8.206	1.66	1.66	2
5	15.333	2.33	2.33	5
6	14.955	5.00	3.00	2
7	13.710	4.33	3.00	2
8	11.388	2.33	2.33	3
9	4.802	1.33	1.66	2
10	12.547	3.00	2.66	2
11	13.677	3.00	3.33	2
12	9.683	1.33	2.33	2
13	16.798	2.66	3.00	4
14	25.615	3.00	3.33	4
15	15.734	3.00	3.00	2
16	13.510	3.00	3.00	2
17	13.855	3.33	3.00	2
18	3.986	2.33	1.66	2
19	5.997	2.33	2.00	2
20	9.778	2.00	2.66	2
21	18.108	1.00	1.00	2
22	10.152	2.00	3.00	2

Table 1: Housing data; *Eaves*; *Windows*; and *Yards*; ratings are truncated at 2 decimal points, but all computations carried 5 digits.

	intercept	eaves	windows	yards
$\hat{\beta}_0$	-3.3697	0.9522	2.4878	3.5082
$x^t x$	39.000	92.8333	93.6666	81.6666
	92.8333	270.9166	255.3888	219.9722
	93.6666	255.3888	255.4444	217.7222
	81.6666	219.9722	217.7222	202.6111

Table 2: Prior $\hat{\beta}$, row 1, and $X^t X$ matrix, rows 2-5, The prior residual sum of squares is 1674.3726.

Case # Model	CPO			L_1			CB		
	MS	F	I	MS	F	I	MS	F	I
1	.056	.055	.054	.10	.14	.11	0	0.00	0
2	.081	.083	.080	.08	.08	.08	0	0	0
3	.023	.022	.025	.20	.27	.19	0.09	0.12	0.07
4	.079	.077	.080	.07	.09	.07	0	0	0
5	.054	.033	.035	.19	.37	.29	0.01	0.05	0.04
6	.070	.059	.067	.12	.19	.12	0	0.01	0.00
7	.074	.070	.071	.10	.12	.09	0	0.00	0
8	.073	.071	.068	.08	.08	.08	0	0	0
9	.051	.046	.056	.10	.18	.09	0.00	0.01	0.00
10	.083	.084	.082	.08	.09	.07	0	0	0
11	.080	.080	.080	.08	.09	.08	0	0	0
12	.081	.080	.081	.08	.09	.07	0	0	0
13	.079	.076	.071	.09	.10	.10	0	0	0
14	.014	.0097	.029	.30	.49	.25	0.26	0.25	0.06
15	.069	.070	.074	.08	.10	.07	0	0	0
16	.082	.083	.082	.08	.08	.07	0	0	0
17	.082	.083	.082	.08	.08	.07	0	0	0
18	.026	.019	.029	.19	.29	.19	0.07	0.17	0.05
19	.044	.040	.046	.09	.15	.09	0.00	0.01	0.00
20	.077	.078	.076	.08	.09	.08	0	0	0
21	.0030	.00061	.0013	.45	.74	.58	0.72	0.69	.78
22	.074	.073	.071	.09	.11	.09	0	0	0

Table 3: Case diagnostics. CPO, L_1 influence statistic, and Chaloner and Brant outlier statistic $P(|\epsilon_i| > 2\sigma)$. Posteriors MS, model selection; F, flat, and I, informative. A value .00 indicates a value greater than 0 but less than .01 after rounding.

model(s) parameter	L_1			mean			sd		
	MS/F	MS/I	F/I	MS	F	I	MS	F	I
intercept	.48	.50	.35	.85	.19	-2.09	1.784	5.44	2.73
eaves	.20	.05	.17	1.41	1.65	1.46	1.04	1.60	1.11
windows	.28	.19	.24	1.31	1.09	1.91	1.34	2.43	1.62
yards	.17	.26	.20	2.09	2.41	2.83	0.99	1.37	.97
sigma	.19	.04	.17	4.69	5.16	4.72	.91	1.17	.86
mean cost	.10	.16	.21	12.1	12.3	12.4	.96	1.18	.75
posterior	.50	.56	.49						
BF (2)	150	170000	2500						
BF-1 (1)	130	220000	2300						
BF-2 (1)	180	370000	2800						

Table 4: Influence on parameter posteriors, estimates, and sd's; joint influence on the posterior. The last three lines give estimated Bayes factors in favor of the first model against the second model using (12) BF (2) and (9) (BF-j (1)).




Figure 1: Marginal Posteriors. Solid: MS prior; Dashed: I prior; Dotted: F prior.




Figure 2: Comparing MS, F and I Priors. Left column: posterior influence plots; Right: Bayes factors in favor of second prior using (12), as a function of $\log \tau^*$. Row 1: MS and F; Row 2: MS and I; Row 3: F and I.