Toward a Unifying Model of Identification With Groups: Integrating Theoretical Perspectives

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Building on the contributions of diverse theoretical approaches, the authors present a multidimensional model of group identification. Integrating conceptions from the social identity perspective with those from research on individualism–collectivism, nationalism–patriotism, and identification with organizations, we propose four conceptually distinct modes of identification: importance (how much I view the group as part of who I am), commitment (how much I want to benefit the group), superiority (how much I view my group as superior to other groups), and deference (how much I honor, revere, and submit to the group's norms, symbols, and leaders). We present an instrument for assessing the four modes of identification and review initial empirical findings that validate the proposed model and show its utility in understanding antecedents and consequences of identification.

Keywords: *group processes; self; identity; social identity*

The acute problems encountered in reconciling ethnopolitical conflicts have evoked renewed interest in the links between individuals and their groups. Yet, there are contrasting views of the very nature of such identification. Some view identification with groups as a personal disposition that is relatively stable and personality based (e.g., Baughn & Yaprak, 1996; Realo, Allik, & Vadi, 1997; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Others view it as highly dependent on the social context (e.g., Turner, 1999; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Some hold that identification is largely the product of motivational factors (e.g., Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998). Others attribute it primarily to "cold" perceptual processes (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Most recent conceptualizations of identification emphasize its multidimensional nature. However, there is little agreement on what these dimensions are (e.g., see Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Ellemers, Kortekaas,

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& Ouwerkerk, 1999; J. W. Jackson & Smith, 1999; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989).

Some of this complexity reflects the wide variety of disciplines interested in identification with groups. Social psychologists are interested in identification with all groups, even artificial ones (e.g., Gaertner & Insko, 2000). Cross-cultural psychologists focus mainly on the tendency to extend the sense of self to include groups (e.g., Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). Political scientists examine identification with political parties and are interested in patriotism versus nationalism (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Organizational researchers focus on the attachment of workers to organizations (e.g., Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994).

In this article, we discuss identification with relatively large social categories in which identification is largely symbolic rather than based on interpersonal relationships (see Brewer, 2001; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995; Lickel et al., 2000). We first review several central theoretical perspectives that offer conceptualizations of identification. We then propose four distinct modes of identification that capture the essence of these conceptualizations. Finally, we present an instrument for assessing the four modes and review preliminary empirical findings.

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF GROUP IDENTIFICATION: INTEGRATING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Choice of Theoretical Perspectives

From the large variety of theoretical perspectives that examine identification, we chose to limit the scope of this review to two literatures that study identification as a general concept that transcends a specific group and to two literatures that focus on specific identities. We include in the review only perspectives that view identification as a multidimensional concept. The two general literatures we chose are the social identity perspective (social identity theory and self-categorization theory) and individual-level collectivism. The social identity perspective has been the main context for studying identification with large social categories. It is the dominant paradigm in the area. This perspective has contributed to many areas of intra- and intergroup processes, such as ingroup favoritism, responses to status hierarchies within and between groups, and stereotyping (reviewed in Brown, 2000; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Turner, 1999). Integrating the theories and findings of the social identity perspective with other lines of research can contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature of identification with groups and help reveal multiple modes of identification.

In choosing a second "general theory," we sought one that would help uncover dimensions that may not be included in the dominant paradigm, one as different as possible from the social identity perspective. Research on individual-level collectivism fits this description. It differs from the social identity perspective in its assumptions about the nature of identity, in the methods it typically uses to assess identification, and often (but not always) in the researchers who conduct the studies.

Choosing two theoretical perspectives with multidimensional conceptualizations of specific identities posed a greater challenge because many fields of research study specific social identities. Notable examples are patriotism and nationalism, gender studies, ethnicity, religiosity, and organizational psychology. We sought perspectives that have generated extensive research, that relate to important identities, and that are relevant to almost all people yet differ substantially from one another. Studies of national and organizational identities meet these criteria. They are relevant to large segments of society and have generated extensive research. Moreover, identification with nations and organizations has important consequences. These two identities differ in that membership in a nation is usually ascribed and lifelong, whereas membership in a work organization is achieved and often temporary. Research based on these two perspectives overlaps very little.

Our analysis follows several steps. First, we identify the points on which there is general consensus within each perspective. For each perspective, we ask, What dimensions of identification are widely recognized by researchers within it? This enables us to map commonalities and differences in the conceptualizations of identification across the four major perspectives (Panels A-D of Table 1). Based on this analysis, we proceed to a second step: We propose an integrative model that captures the dimensions generally recognized in at least one of the perspectives covered. Third, we return to the literature of each perspective and examine the extent to which our integrative multidimensional model encompasses it (see Table 2).

Step 1: A Review of the Consensual Dimensions in Each of the Four Perspectives

The social identity perspective has been described extensively (e.g., Brown, 2000; Hogg, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1999). General summaries of work on nationalism–patriotism (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1993; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Staub, 2000), individualism–collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), and organizational identity (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Riketta, 2005) are also available. We compare these perspectives with regard to their typologies of dimensions of identification.

TABLE 1: Basic Conceptualizations of Identification From Four Theoretical Perspectives

	Structure of Identification
A. Social identity perspective	Three components: cognitive, affective, and evaluative
B. Collectivism	Two unrelated dimensions: horizontal and vertical
C. Patriotism–nationalism	Three main dimensions: emotional commitment, submission to group's leaders and norms, and belief in group superiority
D. Organizations	Two main dimensions: cognitive and affective
E. Proposed model	Four modes: importance, commitment, superiority, and deference

The Social Identity Perspective

According to the social identity perspective, identification is a process of depersonalization "whereby people come to perceive themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities" (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). Through collective identities, individuals become connected to others by virtue of their common attachment to the group rather than their personal relationships. Studies conducted within the social identity perspective examine both experimental minimal groups and natural groups. It is often implied that the theoretical formulations of this perspective generalize to all social categories. Thus, conclusions derived from studying a particular social identity may be generalized to other social categories or groups.

Tajfel (1978) defined social identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a group together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership" (p. 63). This definition has been interpreted as made up of three aspects: cognitive, evaluative, and affective. Studies that examine the structure of identification conclude that identification is indeed multidimensional (e.g., Cameron, 2004; Ellemers et al., 1999; Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Crook, 1989; J. W. Jackson, 2002). What these dimensions are, however, varies across studies. Most specify a cognitive and an affective dimension, but there is less agreement with regard to the additional dimensions of identification (Step 3 details these additional dimensions).

Individualism–Collectivism

The term *individualism–collectivism* originally referred to differences between cultures (e.g., Hofstede, 1980). Subsequent research has often treated individualism–collectivism as an individual-level variable (also referred to as allocentrism–idiocentrism; Triandis, 1995). Our analysis refers to this latter level. Work on individual-level individualism–collectivism typically studies the tendency to identify with groups in general rather than with a particular group. For example, references to "my group," in the items in Yamaguchi's (1994) collectivism scale, can be understood as referring to any group (e.g., "I do things my way regardless of what my group members expect me to do"). Scales that mention specific groups (e.g., Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995) compute collectivism scores across items that refer to different groups (family, relatives, parents, neighbors, coworkers, others), thereby measuring identification with groups in general.[1] This contrasts with studies in the social identity theory (SIT) framework that focus on identification with specific ingroups, for example, people who undergo body piercing (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001), university students (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 2001), or one's national group (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999).

Triandis (1995) described collectivism as

> a social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives (family, co-workers, tribe, nation); are primarily motivated by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectives; are willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal goals; and emphasize their connectedness to the members of these collectives. (p. 2)

A recurrent issue with regard to the structure of individualism–collectivism is whether it represents two dimensions or one bipolar dimension. Items designed to measure individualism sometimes fail to show strong negative correlations with items designed to measure collectivism (e.g., Rhee, Uleman, & Lee, 1996). Moreover, confirmatory factor analyses reveal that models of individualism–collectivism as separate dimensions have better fit indices than models that treat it as a single, bipolar dimension (e.g., Rhee et al., 1996). Because collectivism more directly concerns identification with groups, we focus on the collectivism component in this research.

Triandis and Gelfand (1998) distinguished two types of collectivism: horizontal versus vertical. Both types of collectivists identify strongly with groups. They differ, however, in the nature of their identification. Whereas *vertical collectivists* emphasize submitting to the authority of the group and its leaders, *horizontal collectivists* see themselves as similar to others and emphasize common goals, interdependence, and sociability, but do not emphasize submitting to authority (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Subsequent studies have verified the distinction between individual-level horizontal and vertical collectivism (e.g., Soh & Leong, 2002).

Nationalism–Patriotism

Unlike the previous two perspectives, nationalism and patriotism research concerns identification with a single group, the nation. This perspective does not aspire to generalize to identification with other groups. Adorno, Frenkel, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) were among the first to examine the meaning and dimensions of identifying with a nation. They distinguished between *pseudo-patriotism*, defined as "blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups" (p. 107), and *genuine patriotism*, defined simply as love of country. Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) suggested a distinction between *patriotism*, defined as a feeling of attachment to one's nation, and *nationalism*, defined as a view that one's nation is superior and should be dominant.

Staub (1997) proposed a further refinement. He distinguished *blind patriotism*—rigid and inflexible attachment to country, characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism; *constructive patriotism*—attachment to country characterized by "critical loyalty," and *conventional patriotism*—affective attachment to one's nation. Duckitt (1989) proposed a conception of identification with one's nation similar to blind patriotism. He suggested that individuals express the intensity of their emotional identification with a group by emphasizing conformity with group norms, respect and unconditional obedience to group leaders, and intolerance toward persons who do not conform to group norms.

Identification With Organizations

Like the research on nationalism–patriotism, studies of identification with organizations concern a single type of group, the work organization. Until recently, studies of employees' relationships to their organizations focused mainly on organizational commitment. They measured emotional attachment to the organization, feelings of loyalty toward it, and willingness to contribute to it (Meyer & Allen, 1997; Mowday, 1998; Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986; see review in Riketta, 2005). Many recent studies of organizational identification draw on the SIT perspective. These studies define identification with the organization as the extent to which organizational membership is central to one's identity. Thus, they adopt a cognitive view of identification with the organization (e.g., Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Scott, Corman, & Cheney, 1998; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, Monden, & de Lima, 2002). Some researchers also refer to an affective aspect of identification with organizations (e.g., Dutton et al., 1994; Wiesenfeld, Raghuram, & Garud, 1999), resulting in a multidimensional conceptualization of organizational identification.

In sum, all four perspectives view identification as a multidimensional construct. They differ, however, in the number and content of dimensions. Although there is some overlap in the dimensions proposed by each perspective, each specifies a unique combination of dimensions, and none includes all the dimensions mentioned by the other perspectives (see Table 1). In the next step, we present a unified model that integrates the dimensions of identification specified by the perspectives reviewed. The unified model yields a more complete and adequate conceptualization of identification with groups using a relatively small number of dimensions.

Step 2: Integrating the Different Perspectives—Four Modes of Identification

Panel E of Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the proposed model. Integrating the four perspectives discussed above, we suggest that identification with groups includes four correlated yet distinguishable modes. We next define each of the four modes and describe their roots in past literature.

Importance: How much I view the group as a part of who I am. One mode of identification is to perceive the group as an important part of one's self-definition. Individuals who identify in this sense tend to define themselves in terms of the group, to think of group members as "we" rather than "they," and to perceive group membership as an important part of who they are. This mode of identification has a strong cognitive emphasis: It refers to how individuals construe their self-concept. However, it may have affective implications as well because, if group membership is internalized into the self-concept, group successes and failures are felt as if they are one's own.

Research from the social identity perspective (and organizational research that draws on it) typically emphasizes this mode of identification. It follows directly from Tajfel's definition of social identity and is consistent with the emphasis on the cognitive aspects of identity in self-categorization theory (e.g., Turner et al., 1987). This mode also captures an element of Triandis's definition of collectivism noted above ("closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives"). It is especially related to horizontal collectivism, which refers to shared goals and a sense of similarity to other group members.

Commitment: How much I want to benefit the group. Identification through commitment refers to a desire to contribute to the welfare of the group. This mode of identification entails feeling positive affect toward the

group that is expressed in willingness to contribute to it even at personal cost.

This mode of identification is inherent in most definitions of patriotism (see Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989, for a review). Studies from the social identity perspective also frequently emphasize it because, like the importance mode, it is closely linked to Tajfel's definition of social identity (e.g., Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries, & Wilke, 1988).[2] This mode of identification also captures a key element in Triandis's definition of collectivism ("willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal goals"). Commitment refers, in particular, to horizontal collectivism. Finally, this mode is central to organizational research, especially to studies on organizational commitment (e.g., Meyer & Allen, 1997; Mowday, 1998; Mowday et al., 1979).

Superiority: How much I view my group as superior to other groups. A third mode of identification is to perceive the ingroup as better and more worthy than other groups. This mode has an explicit comparative aspect because it contrasts attitudes toward one's ingroup with those toward other groups. Individuals who identify in this sense compare their group to other salient groups and think that their group is better.

The superiority mode of identification is at the core of nationalism: Perception that one's own nation is better than other nations is most often interpreted as an expression of nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001). Constructs linked to superiority also play a central role in SIT. SIT postulates that people are motivated to maintain or bolster a positive image of the self and that identification with groups is caused primarily by this motivation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) proposed the concept of collective self-esteem to describe one's judgments of how good one's social groups are. In addition, viewing one's ingroup as superior to another group (i.e., ingroup favoritism) is considered—under certain conditions—as a possible consequence of identification with a group (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Although superiority has received considerable attention in research stemming from the SIT perspective, there is no consensus on whether to view it as a mode of identification, per se (e.g., Mummendey, 1995).

Deference: How much I honor, revere, and submit to the group's norms, symbols, and leaders. Identification can also be manifested in deference toward the central symbols of the group and its leadership (Duckitt, 1989). An individual who identifies in this sense believes that group members should comply with all the group's rules and regulations, regardless of the reasonableness of specific rules; should defer to the leader's guidance; and should reject any criticism of the group.

This mode of identification is central to vertical collectivism. Vertical collectivists believe that group members should subordinate themselves to the group, its symbols, its traditions, and its leaders and should take their place in the hierarchical group structure (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Deference is also central to blind patriotism, which emphasizes acceptance and respect for everything the nation and its leaders demand or stand for. Deference conflicts with constructive patriotism, because the latter encourages questioning and even criticizing ingroup doctrines and actions in order to change the ingroup for the better (Staub, 1997). In contrast, in the SIT perspective, adherence to groups' norms is considered a consequence of identification rather than identification, per se. For example, studies stemming from SIT examined links between strength of identification and attitudes toward people who deviate from the group's norm (Hutchison & Abrams, 2003).

Step 3: Back to the Four Perspectives—Mapping Multidimensional Models of Identification

We located eight multidimensional models drawing on SIT (see Table 2). They all include dimensions compatible with the importance mode. All but one include dimensions compatible with the commitment mode: The commitment-related dimensions refer either to feelings of positive affect toward the group or to willingness to contribute to the group—two aspects that are part of the proposed commitment mode. There is no consensus among the models drawing on SIT with regard to other dimensions. Some models (three out of eight) include an evaluative aspect, compatible with the superiority mode. None of the models include a dimension compatible with the deference mode. Finally, specific models include additional, idiosyncratic dimensions.

There are fewer models grounded in the other perspectives. The two multidimensional models of collectivism (see Panel B of Table 2) include dimensions that are compatible only with the commitment and deference modes of identification. The three models of identification with the nation (i.e., those drawing on nationalism–patriotism; see Panel C of Table 2) all include a dimension compatible with the commitment mode. Two include a dimension compatible with superiority, and the third includes a dimension compatible with deference. Finally, we located four multidimensional models of identification with the organization (Panel D of Table 2). These models largely adopt the SIT perspective. Accordingly, all four include a dimension of importance, three include a dimension of commitment, one a dimension expressing the superiority mode, and none a dimension expressing the deference mode. The last column of Table 2 presents additional dimensions. These dimensions are idiosyncratic, in the sense that they did not recur across multiple models.

(text continues on p. 290)

TABLE 2: Multidimensional Models of Group Identification

Dimension of the Proposed Integrative Model	*Type of Article*	*Importance: The Perception of the Group as an Important Part of One's Self-Definition*	*Commitment: The Desire to Contribute to the Welfare of the Group*	*Superiority: The Perception of the Ingroup as Better and More Worthy Than Other Groups*	*Deference: The Deference Felt for the Central Symbols of the Group*	*Additional Dimensions*
A. Models drawing on social identity theory						
Ashmore, Deaux,& McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004	Conceptual review	**Self-categorization:** identifying self as a member of, or categorizing self in terms of, a particular social grouping; **importance (explicit and implicit):** the degree of importance of a particular group membership to the individual's overall self-concept; **interconnection of self and others:** the degree to which people merge their sense of self and the group	**Attachment/affective commitment:** a sense of emotional involvement with or affiliative orientation toward the group	**Evaluation (public):** favoritism judgment that one perceives others, such as the general public, to hold about one's social category		**Social embeddedness:** the degree to which a particular collective identity is embedded in the person's everyday ongoing social relationships; **content and meaning:** 1. self-attributed characteristics—the extent to which traits and dispositions that are associated with a social category are endorsed as self-descriptive by a member of that category; 2. **ideology**—beliefs about a group's experience, history, and position in society; 3. **narrative**—the internally represented story that the person has developed concerning self and the social category in question; **behavioral involvement:** the degree to which the person engages in actions that directly implicate the collective identity category in question; **interdependence/ mutual fate:** perception of the commonalities in the way group members are treated in society; **evaluation (private):** evaluations made by people about their own identities
Cameron, 2004	Empirical	**Cognitive centrality:** the frequency with which the group comes to mind; the subjective importance of the group to self-definition	**Ingroup ties:** perceptions of similarity, bond, and belongingness with other group members			**Ingroup affect:** the positivity of feelings associated with membership in the group

(continued)

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Deaux, 1996	Conceptual review	**Cognitive aspects of identification:** the process of categorization and the creation of meaningful identity	Review of multiple aspects of affective identification			
Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999	Empirical	**Self-categorization:** the inclusion of the self in the group, or self-definition as a group member	**Commitment:** the desire of group members to continue their membership	**Group self-esteem:** the evaluative consequences of group membership		
Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Crook, 1989	Empirical	**Cognitive aspect:** cognitions of belonging, association, or being linked to the group	**Emotional aspect:** emotional or affective aspect of membership in the group			**Individual/group aspect:** feelings revolving around the opposition between individual need and group dynamics
J. W. Jackson, 2002	Empirical	**Self-categorization:** identification of the self as an ingroup member; perceptions of intragroup similarity and intergroup dissimilarity; seeing the self as a prototypical ingroup member	**Affective ties:** a sense of unity, solidarity, and togetherness; having an emotional reaction in response to an ingroup event; and enjoying working with ingroup members	**Attraction to the ingroup-evaluative dimension:** the value attached to being a member of the ingroup and favorable evaluations of the ingroup		
J. W. Jackson & Smith, 1999	Empirical	**Depersonalization:** thinking of the self more in terms of a group member and less in terms of a unique individual	**Attraction to the ingroup:** positive affect toward the ingroup			**Interdependency beliefs or common fate:** the future well-being of the self and the ingroup are bound together; **perception of the intergroup context:** the extent to which an outgroup is salient and perceived to have competitive rather than cooperative relations with the ingroup
Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992	Empirical	**Importance to identity:** the importance of one's social group memberships to one's self-concept		**Private collective self-esteem:** one's personal judgments of how good one's social groups are;		**Membership esteem:** individuals' judgments of how good or worthy they are as members of their social groups

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				Public collective self-esteem: one's judgments of how other people evaluate one's social groups		
B. Individual-level collectivism						
C. L. Jackson, Colquitt, Wesson, & Zapata-Phelan, 2006	Empirical		**Concern:** being motivated by a concern for the well-being of the ingroup and its members		**Norm acceptance:** focus on compliance with the norms and rules of the ingroup to foster harmony within the collective; **goal priority:** actions are guided by the consideration of ingroup's interests	**Preference:** collectivists emphasize relationships with ingroup members and prefer to exist within the bounds of the ingroup; they are affiliative by nature and believe that collective efforts are superior to individual ones; **reliance:** a belief that one person's responsibility is the responsibility of the entire ingroup
Triandis & Gelfand, 1998	Empirical		**Horizontal collectivism:** people see themselves as being similar to others and emphasize common goals with others; interdependence and sociability, but they do not submit easily to authority		**Vertical collectivism:** people emphasize the integrity of the ingroup, are willing to sacrifice their personal goals for the sake of ingroup goals, and support competitions of their ingroups with outgroup; if ingroup authorities want them to act in ways that benefit the ingroup but are	

(continued)

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					extremely distaste ful to them, they submit to the will of the authorities	
C. Nationalism–patriotism						
De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003	Empirical		**Patriotism:** attachment to the nation, its institutions, and its founding principles	**Nationalism:** belief in national superiority and dominance		
Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989	Empirical		**Patriotism:** the degree of attachment to the nation	**Nationalism:** a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance		**Internationalism:** international sharing and welfare, empathy for the people of other countries
Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999	Empirical		**Constructive patriotism:** patriotism based in critical loyalty and desire for positive change		**Blind patriotism:** patriotism based in unconditional positive evaluation and unquestioning allegiance	
D. Organizations						
Edwards, 2005	Conceptual review	**Cognitive identification:** self-categorization, value and goal sharing	**Affective identification:** emotional attachment, belonging, and membership			
Meal & Tetrick, 1992	Empirical	**Perceived shared experience:** the perception that one shares the experiences, successes, and failures of the focal organization and that these success and failures apply to and reflect on the self as				

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Dimension of the Proposed Integrative Model	*Type of Article*	*Importance: The Perception of the Group as an Important Part of One's Self-Definition*	*Commitment: The Desire to Contribute to the Welfare of the Group*	*Superiority: The Perception of the Ingroup as Better and More Worthy Than Other Groups*	*Deference: The Deference Felt for the Central Symbols of the Group*	*Additional Dimensions*
		they reflect on the organization; **perceived shared characters:** the perception that one shares the attributes and characters of prototypical group members				
Riketta, 2005	Empirical (meta-analysis)	**Cognitive:** the organizational member has cognitively linked his or her organizational membership to his or her self-concept	**Affective:** the organizational member has emotionally linked his or her organizational membership to his or her self-concept			
van Dick, Wagner, Stellmacher, & Christ, 2004	Empirical	**Cognitive dimension:** the knowledge of being a member of a certain group	**Affective dimension:** emotional attachment to the group; behavioral dimension: readiness to stand for the group and to behave in a way that is supportive of the group	**Evaluative dimension:** the value connotation assigned to that group from inside and/or outside		

STRUCTURE OF IDENTIFICATION WITH GROUPS

Measuring the Four Modes of Identification

We developed a 16-item questionnaire designed to measure each of the four modes of identification with reference to any large social category (see the appendix). In preliminary studies, we adapted this questionnaire to measure identification with two specific groups, the nation and one's work organization. These two groups are especially suitable to serve as an initial test of the model. Both are large social categories in which the links among individuals are symbolic rather than based on frequent face-to-face interaction. In addition, both categories are relevant, even central, to most adults.

The identification questionnaire was developed in Hebrew, translated to English, and back-translated to Hebrew. Respondents indicated their agreement with each of the 16 statements on a 7-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (7). Exemplary items for each mode of identification are as follows: "Belonging to this group is an important part of my identity" (importance); "I am strongly committed to this group" (commitment); "Compared to other groups of its kind, this group is especially good" (superiority); and "There is usually a good reason for any rule or regulation that the group's leadership proposes" (deference).

Examining the Structure of Identification: The Case of Identification With the Nation

We first examined identification with the United States among 382 volunteers recruited from prospective jurors who were awaiting possible empanelling at an urban municipal courthouse (66% female; mean age = 42.1; 54% White, 39% African American) and 102 university students (42% female; mean age = 19.4; 80% White, 6% African American). We tested our model with two types of confirmatory procedures: confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and similarity structure analysis (SSA).

Confirmatory factor analyses. CFAs using maximum-likelihood estimation (with AMOS 5.0) tested the adequacy of the four-factor model depicted in Figure 1. The four large ovals are latent factors representing each of the four modes of identification. The rectangles represent single items from the identification questionnaire. The single-headed arrows indicate that four identification items are postulated to load on each latent factor. The small circles, labeled e1, e2, and so on, represent the unique variance of each item, not associated with its corresponding latent factor. This variance reflects measurement error and/or the effect of unmeasured influences. The double-headed arrows linking the latent factors indicate that we expect correlations among the modes of identification. Indeed, we expect strong intercorrelations because all four modes reflect a shared underlying construct of identification with a group. Finally, the model permits each item to load on only one latent factor. We set one loading for each latent factor to 1 to identify the model, and we fixed the path coefficient from the error terms (small circles) to the observed measures at 1 to establish a metric.

We used three measures of fit to evaluate the fit between the theoretical model and the empirical data: (a) the ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom (Hoelter, 1983); (b) the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), and (c) the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990).

The four-factor model that represents our theorizing yielded the following fit indices (CMIN = minimum sample discrepancy): CMIN/df = 3.11 (χ^2 = 304.46, df = 98), CFI = .94, and RMSEA = .066. All three indices indicate that the proposed model adequately fits the sample covariance matrices. We compared this model with two plausible alternative models: a one-factor model in which all 16 items load on a single general identification factor, and a two-factor model that collapses importance and commitment into one factor and superiority and deference into a second factor. We chose this alternative two-factor model because of the conceptual similarity of the pairs of constructs. Importance and commitment both refer to involvement of self with the group. Superiority and deference both refer to positive evaluations of the group's attributes. The one-factor model yielded the following fit indices: CMIN/df = 5.56 (χ^2 = 578.37, df = 104), CFI = .87, and RMSEA = .097. All the fit indices for the one-factor model were poorer than those for the four-factor model. The two-factor model yielded the following fit indices: CMIN/df = 3.63 (χ^2 = 374.323, df = 103), CFI = .93, and RMSEA = .074. Here, too, all the fit indices for the two-factor model were poorer than those for the four-factor model.

Similarity structure analysis. SSA is a multidimensional scaling technique that provides spatial representations of the relations among variables (e.g., the identity items), based on the order of their interrelations. The more highly correlated a pair of items, the closer these two items are located in the space. The space can be partitioned into regions that include items with similar meanings. When SSA is used to compare an observed mapping of items with a hypothesized mapping derived from theory, it serves as a confirmatory procedure (Shye & Elizur, 1994). We hypothesized that the items that measure each of the four modes of identification would emerge in distinct regions of the spatial map that are separable from the regions that represent the other modes.



Figure 1 Four-factor model of identification.



Figure 2 Similarity structure analysis (SSA) map of items that measure identification with the United States.

Figure 2 presents a two-dimensional SSA map of the 16 items. The coefficient of alienation of this map is .12, indicating that the spatial configuration reproduces the correlation matrix adequately (Guttman, 1968). The configuration clearly corresponds to the hypothesized structure. The items that represent each of the four modes are located in four distinct regions of the map. The importance and commitment regions are closer to each other than any other pair of regions. This reflects the high correlation between these two modes of identification in this sample.

As expected, the different modes of identification with groups correlated substantially with one another. Correlations ranged from .55 to .79. Importance and commitment correlated most highly (.79). This reinforces the view that the cognitive and affective involvement of the self with the ingroup are intertwined, although, as we have seen from the CFA and SSA, they can be distinguished. The correlation between the deference and commitment modes was weakest (.55).

In sum, the data for identification with America support the conceptual model of four distinct yet positively related modes of identification with groups. The two-factor model yielded relatively good results too, reflecting the fact that identification could be conceptualized as made up of two intercorrelated modes: attachment to the group and positive evaluation of the group's attributes. The fact that both the two-factor and the four-factor models represent the data well (with the latter being somewhat better) suggests that both could apply depending on the context.

Generalizability of the model for nations. As a first test of the robustness of the four factors of identification model, we examined identification with another nation, Israel. This study included two groups of Israeli students. One group responded during the period of ongoing peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in 2000. The other responded in late 2001, several months after the renewal of hostilities. Thus, this study compared the structure of identification with the same nation in different political contexts. The first group included 216 Israeli college students (64% female; mean age = 23.4). The second group included 259 Israeli college students (49% female; mean age = 23.2) and 76 senior high school students (49% female; mean age = 17.3). Data from college students come from a larger project (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006).

Confirmatory factor analyses. We used multigroup CFA to test the model. One group included those who

responded before the renewal of violent hostilities ("before"), and the second group included those who responded after peace negotiations broke down and hostilities erupted ("after"). The multigroup test of the hypothesized four-factor model yielded the following fit indices: CMIN/*df* = 2.73 (χ^2 = 535.06, *df* = 196), CFI = .92, and RMSEA = .057. The three indices indicate that the proposed model adequately fits the sample covariance matrices.

We compared this model to the alternative one- and two-factor models. The one-factor model yielded the following fit indices: CMIN/*df* = 4.85 (χ^2 = 1008.78, *df* = 208), CFI = .799, and RMSEA = .085. The two-factor model yielded the following fit indices: CMIN/*df* = 3.53 (χ^2 = 726.37, *df* = 206), CFI = .87, and RMSEA = .069. Thus, the alternative models fit the data more poorly than the four-factor model.

Equivalence of the model across samples. Having determined that the four-factor model provides an adequate fit, we examined its cross-sample generalizability. We evaluated the equivalence of factor loadings and factor covariances across the two samples.

We first carried out an omnibus test that required all item-to-factor loadings to be invariant across the two samples. This model yielded a χ^2 = 549.11 (*df* = 208). The difference between this model and the unconstrained four-factor model was not significant, χ^2 difference = 14.05 (*df* = 12), *p* = .30. This indicates that requiring factor loadings to be the same in both groups did not diminish the model fit. Next, we imposed the added constraint that the covariances among the four latent factors be equivalent across the two samples. This yielded a χ^2 = 560.47 (*df* = 214) that did not differ significantly from the preceding model, χ^2 difference = 11.37 (*df* = 6), *p* = .08. Thus, it is appropriate to consider all factor loadings and factor covariances to be invariant across the two groups. In the final model, all factor loadings in both groups were statistically significant (*p* < .001). The standardized loadings ranged from .44 to .91 in the before sample, and from .54 to .91 in the after sample.

Similarity structure analysis. Figure 3 presents a two-dimensional SSA map of the 16 items.[3] The coefficient of alienation of this map is .15. Again, the configuration clearly corresponds to the hypothesized structure: The items that represent each of the four modes are located in distinct regions of the map. Here, too, the importance and commitment regions are closer to each other than any other pair of regions, reflecting the high correlation between the two.

As in the American sample, the different modes of identification correlated substantially with one another, reflecting their representation of the shared construct of identification with groups. Correlations ranged from .39 to .76 in the before sample and from .43 to .77 in the after sample. Again, importance and commitment correlated most strongly (.76 and .77, respectively).



Figure 3 Similarity structure analysis (SSA) map of items that measure identification with Israel.

Examining the Structure of Identification: The Case of Identification With Organizations

We next assessed the applicability of the identification model to identification with work organizations. Three samples of working adults completed the identification measure. The first included 210 Israeli adults (62% female; mean age = 38.6) who work in a variety of organizations, all employing 80 people or more. The second sample included 78 employees in a communication company (56% female; mean age = 36.4). The third sample included 405 young adults (60% female; mean age = 19.6) serving in the military.

Confirmatory factor analyses. We tested the adequacy of the proposed four-factor model in a multigroup CFA for the three samples in this study. The test of the model yielded the following fit indices: CMIN/*df* = 2.87 (χ^2 = 849.65, *df* = 296), CFI = .92, and RMSEA = .052.

In sum, findings support the four-mode model of identification with groups both in the national and the organizational contexts. Having established the distinctiveness of the four modes of identification, we next discuss how the four modes operate. We refer to the type of groups to which they apply, introduce the concept of

homogeneous and heterogeneous profiles of identification, and provide examples of the functional properties of the model. We then discuss how the model contributes to understanding the very nature of identification: Is it personality based or is it determined by the social context? We conclude by presenting some implications of the model for expanding and refining theory.

APPLICABILITY OF THE FOUR-MODE MODEL TO VARIOUS GROUPS: THE ROLE OF ENTITATIVITY

Do the four modes of identification apply to all groups? Are there groups for which some modes are meaningless? We reason that this depends on the entitativity of the group. Entitativity refers to "the extent to which a group is perceived as being a coherent unit in which the members of the group are bonded together in some fashion" (Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001, p. 131). Groups that are low on entitativity are perceived as having short duration, no common goals or outcomes, low similarity between their members, and high permeability. We reason that the four modes of identification are meaningful to large social categories, provided that they are sufficiently entitative to enable their members to think of them as groups. But beyond this level of entitativity, the four modes are meaningful in all social categories, even those without a formal hierarchy or explicit norms.

A mere collection of individuals cannot elicit importance identification: To view a group as an important part of one's identity, it is essential to perceive a distinction between "us" and "them," between those who are members of one's group and those who are not. Some entitativity is also required to elicit commitment identification: A distinction between us and them is required for people to desire to contribute to their group. These arguments received some support in studies indicating that people view entitative groups as more important to their identity (Lickel et al., 2000) and that raising the entitativity of a group results in higher importance and commitment (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003).

Superiority identification also requires some entitativity of the group: It is impossible to think that one's group is better than other groups unless some group characteristics are recognized. One must attribute some positive characteristics to a group that distinguish it from other groups to achieve a sense of group superiority. Moreover, when everyone can join or leave the group at any time, superiority identification is meaningless. Deference to group symbols and authorities is also meaningless in a group that is perceived as a loose association of individuals. To express deference, one has to have some conception of norms that guide the behavior of group members and of symbols that unify and represent it.

But beyond the minimal entitativity that distinguishes between a random aggregation of people and a group, all four modes of identification can develop in any group. Extensive research on minimal groups indicates that the mere recognition that one belongs to a social category, even one that is based on random assignment, suffices to produce ingroup identification (for a review, see Hogg & Abrams, 2003). Members of artificial groups created for experimental purposes, with neither a history, nor a future, nor meaningful interaction with other group members, may still perceive their group as better than other groups (superiority mode; e.g., Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993; Vanbeselaere, 1993). An arbitrary distinction between us and them also suffices to elicit commitment: Once group members recognize boundaries for their group, they are more willing to contribute a portion of their property to ingroup rather than outgroup members (e.g., Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000).

Of special interest is the case of deference identification, which refers to reverence and submission to group norms, symbols, and leaders. We reason that deference identification, too, is possible even in the absence of long-lasting norms and formal leaders. Group norms develop very soon after the creation of groups, even when the groups are clearly artificial and temporary (e.g., in an experimental context; see Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). Norms concerning the proper behavior of group members exist even in groups lacking a formal hierarchy and formal rules, such as gender. A woman who strongly identifies with her gender may respect the symbols of this social category and defer to its norms—as she perceives them—even when there are no formal leaders to enforce them.

HETEROGENEOUS VERSUS HOMOGENEOUS PROFILES OF IDENTIFICATION

Our model implies that one could conceptualize individuals' identification with a group in terms of profiles. A profile is made up of one's level of identification on each of the four modes. People vary in how homogeneous or heterogeneous their identification profiles are. Individuals with a homogeneous identification profile express similar levels of identification across the four modes. If they are highly (not) identified on the importance mode, they are also highly (not) identified on the commitment, superiority, and deference modes. Comparing the extent of identification with a group of individuals with homogeneous profiles is, therefore, straightforward: One identification score suffices to capture the extent of their identification.

Many people, however, have heterogeneous identification profiles. That is, they identify highly on some modes but not on others. The contribution of considering

the four modes together is most apparent when analyzing heterogeneous profiles. Heterogeneous profiles indicate that people differ not only in the extent of their identification but also in the meaning of their identification. Two people might have similar overall levels of identification, but if one identifies highly on the superiority mode and weakly on the commitment mode, and the other has the opposite profile, their identification has different meanings. The first person's identification is expressed in thinking that his or her group is superior to other groups, and the other's identification is expressed in affective attachment to the group and in a desire to contribute to it. It is, thus, meaningless to compare the extent of their identification and to claim that one is more identified than the other. We can meaningfully compare the levels of identification of people with heterogeneous profiles only if one identifies more strongly than the other on one or more modes of identification and they are equal on the other modes.

The difficulty in comparing the extent of identification of people with heterogeneous identification profiles was apparent in the 1988 presidential elections in the United States. The patriotism of the Democratic presidential candidate, Michael Dukakis, was questioned because he "vetoed a bill designed to require teachers in public schools to lead their students in the pledge of allegiance" (Sullivan, Fried, & Dietz, 1992, p. 200). The perception of such a bill as representing patriotism is consistent with deference identification. It is irrelevant, however, to the other modes of identification. The view of Michael Dukakis as a patriot thus depends on the mode of identification one focuses on. A focus on deference may lead to questioning his patriotism, whereas a focus on superiority, importance, or commitment will not.

Heterogeneous profiles may lead to intragroup discord. Citizens may disagree about which person is more strongly identified with the country, one who defends the sanctity of national symbols or one who is committed to contribute to the welfare of the country. Similarly, employees of a firm may disagree about who identifies more with their organization, employees for whom their membership in the firm is central to their identity or those who believe the firm is the best of its kind. Such disagreement may be a source of conflict among group members and may impair group functioning. But, conflict is not an inevitable outcome of heterogeneous profiles of identification. Group members may accept multiple ways to be highly identified. Groups that attribute legitimacy to different modes of identification are likely to be more tolerant of members who deviate from the prototypical profile of identification.

The complex implications of heterogeneous profiles of identification are also apparent in the case of individuals' efforts to improve their group. Groups benefit when members initiate behavior aimed at improving group functioning (e.g., West & Farr, 1990). Group members who are highly committed are more likely to invest in benefiting the group. But, the types of action they initiate may depend on the other modes of identification.

Consider the case of a high school teacher who is highly committed to the school where he teaches. His high commitment to the school is likely to lead him to invest in helping to improve it. If his high commitment is combined with high superiority, the teacher is likely to invest in enhancing the school's relative performance in academics or sports. He might support raising admission standards, lowering tolerance for failures, or hiring an outstanding football coach. If his high commitment is combined with low superiority, however, he might invest in improving the welfare of all group members. He might engage in helping weak students and arranging home visits to teachers and students who are sick. Such efforts are unlikely to raise the school's relative status. They are, therefore, unlikely to attract a teacher who strongly identifies in both the commitment and superiority modes.

The expression of commitment identification might also vary depending on one's level of deference identification. A highly committed teacher who is low on deference would not hesitate to promote reforms in school policies that she believes will make the school a more pleasant environment for everyone. She would show little concern for changes in the structure, norms, and conventions of school life that the reforms will bring. If her high commitment is combined with high deference, however, she would probably not welcome such reforms. In sum, the interaction between different modes of identification with a group can yield very different group-relevant actions and attitudes.

MULTIPLE MODES AND MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

So far, the theoretical discussion has focused on identification with a single group. Individuals, however, hold multiple identities linked to the various groups to which they simultaneously belong. These multiple ingroups generate a complex puzzle of partially overlapping social identities.

An individual's subjective representation of the interrelationships among his or her multiple group identities is defined as *social identity complexity* (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Social identity complexity is greater to the extent that individuals perceive the groups of which they are simultaneously members as different from one another. When the perceived overlap among multiple ingroups is high, one's identity structure is relatively simple, because

the various group identities can converge into a single, encompassing identification. When the perceived overlap is partial or minimal, the associated identity structure is more complex. Thus, individuals differ in the complexity of their representations of the relations among their multiple identities (Roccas & Brewer, 2002).

The complexity of one's social identity is likely to have implications for how the four modes of identification operate. For people with simple identity structures that encompass multiple groups as if they were one, the same profile of identification should be found across the groups. A person high on deference for one group is likely to be high on deference for the other groups; one low on commitment to one group is likely to be low on commitment to the other groups as well.

People who recognize that their multiple ingroups differ on important attributes will perceive little overlap among them. This might lead to a different profile of identification with each group. Thus, a person might be highly deferential to his or her religious group but not to his or her nation, and highly committed to nation but not to religious group.

Of particular interest are biculturals. Biculturals vary in the extent to which they perceive their cultural identities as compatible (Benet-Martinez & Haritatos, 2005; Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002). Biculturals with high identity integration perceive their two identities as largely complementary. In contrast, those with low identity integration perceive the two cultural identities as incompatible; they prefer to keep them separate and to switch between the two identities in different social contexts. High identity integration permits high identification with both cultural groups in all four identification modes. The case of low identity integration is more complex. On one hand, the perceived incompatibility between the two cultures may be due to opposition between the normative and value emphasis of the groups. If so, low identity integration is an obstacle to showing high deference identification with both groups. On the other hand, biculturals may identify equally with both groups in the importance, commitment, and superiority modes, regardless of their identity integration. Even when the two groups are perceived as highly different, a bicultural person may attribute high importance to both groups as part of his or her identity, he or she may believe both are highly worthy and superior to many other cultural groups, and he or she may feel highly committed to both.

SITUATION AND PERSONALITY EFFECTS

Is identification a product of stable personal characteristics or of the immediate social context? Viewing identification as a consequence of stable personal characteristics puts the spotlight on distinguishing among individuals. Viewing identification as a product of the social context puts the spotlight on distinguishing among situations. These are quite different views of the very nature of identification, each with different implications. Viewing identification as context dependent means that one can affect identification and its consequences by structuring the environment. Thus, for example, business organizations may increase employees' identification and their readiness for organizational citizenship behaviors by changing work conditions. In contrast, viewing identification as personality based suggests optimizing identification with the organization by using selection procedures that recruit people who are most likely to identify with groups.

The social identity perspective emphasizes the effect of situational variables on identification. It holds that contextual cues can lead to changes in identification from moment to moment by changing the relative salience of different social categorizations (e.g., Turner et al., 1994). This emphasis on the effect of context on identification may be due to the assumption that stable differences in identification are unlikely. Thus, Turner (1999) asserts, "The mistake is to think that identification expresses some kind of fixed and stable self structure or personality trait which is chronically salient and directly expressed independently of the social meaning of the situation" (p. 23). Other theoreticians note that some identities (e.g., race and gender) are chronically accessible and, thus, are enduring and remain relatively stable over time (e.g., Hogg, Abrams, Otten, & Hinkle, 2004). However, there is little emphasis on possible individual differences in the chronic accessibility of identities, and there is little interest in possible relations of chronic accessibility with personality. A similar approach characterizes most research on organizational identification (e.g., van Knippenberg et al., 2002; Wiesenfeld et al., 1999).

In contrast, researchers typically view individual-level collectivism as a stable personality dimension. This is particularly evident in studies that relate individual differences in collectivism to other stable tendencies (e.g., Hui & Candice, 1994; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). For example, Realo et al. (1997) found that collectivism correlates positively with the Big Five trait of agreeableness and negatively with openness. Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, and Sugimori (1995) reported that collectivism correlates with a tendency to affiliate, sensitivity to rejection, and less need for uniqueness.

Studies within the nationalism–patriotism framework also focus on stable individual differences in identification. Studies examining patriotism or nationalism typically measure rather than manipulate the extent of identification with one's nation. They relate identification with

one's nation to other stable tendencies. Nationalism, for example, has been found to correlate with authoritarianism, whereas patriotism does not correlate with this personality variable (Baughn & Yaprak, 1996). Blind and constructive patriotism have also been related to stable personality orientations. Schatz and Staub (1997) found that constructive patriotism related positively and blind patriotism negatively to a prosocial value orientation and to feelings of empathy.

In sum, theoretical perspectives that focus on the cognitive aspect of identification (i.e., the social identity perspective) tend to emphasize contextual influences. In contrast, those that focus on deference to the group (the collectivism and patriotism–nationalism perspectives) emphasize stable individual differences (see Table 1). To us, it seems more likely that context and personality complement each other in their effects on identification. Consistent with SIT, we recognize the important role of the social context in identification. Like the patriotism–nationalism and the collectivism perspectives, we posit that stable individual characteristics influence identification with groups as well.

Context and Identification

We theorize that the four modes of identification differ in their susceptibility to the social context. Moreover, different contextual variables are likely to affect each of the four modes. The importance mode refers to the centrality of a social identity in one's self-concept; it has a strong cognitive aspect. This mode is, therefore, likely to be influenced by factors that affect the way people perceive the group. The importance mode also directly addresses the construal of the self. This mode is, therefore, also likely to be affected by contextual factors that influence the way people define their self and identity.

Past research examined how identification is affected by factors that change the way people represent the characteristics of their ingroup. For example, Pickett, Silver, and Brewer (2002) showed that changes in the level of inclusiveness of a social category affect identification. Castano et al. (2003) demonstrated that manipulations that raise the entitativity of a group increase identification with it, presumably because this facilitates self-definition based on group characteristics. Other studies show that manipulating group success also influences identification, presumably because this affects the sense of self-worth derived from identification (see review in Ellemers & Barret, 2001).

The importance mode is also likely to change following more permanent, robust changes in the social context, when new social identities are formed. This may occur when personal circumstances change. Thus, for example, individuals are likely to modify the importance they attribute to their groups when they immigrate to another culture, grow up, retire, or start a new job. Change in importance may also happen following changes in the external environment, such as a change in the political structure of the country, the outbreak of a war, or the merger of two companies. Amiot, de la Sablonierre, Terry, and Smith (2007) suggest that changes in the social context facilitate a four-stage process of identity development. Throughout the different stages of this process, identification with both existing and new groups is modified. They suggest that at the anticipatory categorization stage, individuals tend to project their identification with a current group onto their anticipatory new group. Then, at the categorization stage, when change actually occurs, individuals recognize that the two groups differ and tend to identify mainly with their original group. Later, at the compartmentalization stage, both groups become an important part of the person's identity, depending on the specific context. In the final integration stage, individuals recognize their multiple identities as simultaneously important. We reason that such changes in the structure of identification apply primarily to the importance mode of identification. This is congruent with the emphasis that Amiot et al. (2007) put on cognitive processes: Their model focuses on the way changes in the environment facilitate mental reorganization of social identities.

Do contextual factors affect other modes of identification as well? We suggest that different contextual factors affect the other three modes. Next, we briefly discuss contextual effects on each of these modes of identification.

Commitment. The commitment mode refers to the desire to contribute to the welfare of the group. It entails a genuine concern for the group's welfare and expresses an altruistic motivation to benefit the group. We base our reasoning with regard to the situational factors most likely to increase commitment identification on research into altruism. Among the many factors that facilitate altruistic behavior, the factor most relevant to relations between individuals and groups is the extent to which the recipient of help is perceived as deserving or in need. People are more motivated to help when their help is perceived to be necessary (e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 1996; see also a review in Piliavin & Charng, 1990). We, therefore, expect situational factors that increase the extent to which the group is perceived as needing one's help to enhance commitment identification. Such factors include threatening situations that endanger the group and evidence indicating that one's contribution is especially critical to the group.

Superiority. The superiority mode has an explicit comparative aspect: It refers to thinking that the group is

better than other groups. It is expressed in such beliefs as "other groups can learn a lot from us" and "we are better than other groups." This mode is, therefore, likely to be particularly influenced by information comparing the ingroup favorably or unfavorably with other groups. The most obvious contextual factor is perceptions of group social status: The higher the perceived status of a group, the more superiority identification group members are likely to exhibit. Research based on SIT consistently reveals a positive correlation between group status and perception of the group as superior to an outgroup on specific dimensions (see meta-analysis in Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001). We, therefore, expect that the objective status of the ingroup will affect superiority identification.

The immediate social context can have profound effects on the perception of group status. The particular outgroup that is momentarily salient and the dimensions on which the group is compared with others affect the perceived status of a group. Contextual factors that raise the saliency of characteristics on which the group has low status are likely to decrease superiority identification; contextual factors that raise the saliency of characteristics on which the group has high status are likely to increase superiority identification. Similarly, superiority identification is likely to decrease when the immediate context makes outgroups with high status more salient and to increase when the context makes outgroups with low status more salient.

Deference. The deference mode refers to idealization of and submission to central symbols of the group. We reason that this mode of identification is the least susceptible to contextual factors (see below). Nonetheless, deference may increase following threats to the integrity of a group's image and symbols. Several studies indicate that desecration of group symbols, such as burning the national flag, often yields intolerant reactions (e.g., Haidt, Roller, & Dias, 1993). Similarly, people tend to react negatively toward ingroup members who pose a threat to the integrity of the group image by deviating from important group norms (black sheep effect; see Marques & Paez, 1994, for a review). We suggest that such threats may lead not only to intolerance but also to attributing higher value to the ideal image of the group (i.e., higher deference).

In sum, we theorize that each of the four modes of identification is likely to be affected by specifiable aspects of the social context. Furthermore, the four modes are likely to differ in their susceptibility to the social context. The importance mode is the most and the deference mode the least susceptible to contextual effects.

Finally, we distinguish between two types of contextual factors, those likely to affect the importance mode only and those likely to affect the importance mode in conjunction with a different mode. The importance mode is distinctive in that it refers to the centrality of a social identity in one's self-concept. Thus, the importance mode can be affected by any contextual factor that affects the way people construe their self and identity, even when there is no explicit reference to a group. In contrast, the contextual factors hypothesized to affect the importance mode in conjunction with any of the other modes relate to changes in the way people think about their group.

Sagiv, Roccas, and Hazan (2008) report a series of three experiments designed to test differential effects of contextual factors on the four modes of identification. The first two studies focused on the importance mode, which we consider to be the most susceptible to contextual changes. They tested the hypothesis that factors that influence self-perception, even with no explicit reference to a group, affect the importance mode. Specifically, they examined how saliency of values affects identification with a nation in the importance mode.

Values are meaning systems that organize individuals' perception of the social world and their relations with it. Thus, manipulating the accessibility of values affects the way people conceptualize their identity. Sagiv et al. (2008) examined a value dimension that contrasts conservation with openness to change (Schwartz, 1992). Conservation values emphasize self-restriction, order, and resistance to change, whereas openness-to-change values emphasize independence of thought and action and readiness for new experiences. Thinking about conservation values directs attention to one's membership in encompassing groups that offer protection and provide a stable environment. In contrast, thinking about openness values focuses one on expressing and pursuing one's unique interests and goals, independently of any encompassing group that might implicitly constrain one's freedom. Therefore, Sagiv et al. (2008) hypothesized that when conservation (versus openness) values are rendered highly accessible, the importance mode of identification with the nation should increase. Moreover, they hypothesized that increasing the accessibility of values will affect the importance mode more than the other three modes, because this manipulation is designed to affect one's self-concept but not the perception of group characteristics.

They tested this hypothesis in two studies that differed in the manipulation used to raise accessibility of values. In the first study, the manipulation related explicitly to people's self-concept: Values were made accessible by asking participants to describe themselves in terms of values. The manipulation was designed to induce participants to temporarily think that they attribute high importance to conservation or to openness values, instead of measuring individual differences

in the endorsement of these values (see Roccas, 2003a). The second study manipulated value accessibility more implicitly: Participants engaged in the task of assigning hypothetical students to two-person dorm rooms based on information they received describing the students. The descriptions reflected either conservation or openness-to-change values (in the experimental conditions) or irrelevant information (in the control group).

Both studies examined the effect of the saliency of conservation versus openness-to-change values on identification with the nation. Findings of both studies supported the hypothesis. The situational manipulation of value accessibility influenced the importance mode of identification more than the other three modes. Participants in the conservation conditions rated their national identity as a more important part of their self-concept than participants in the openness-to-change conditions did. In contrast, the situational manipulation of value accessibility did not affect the superiority and deference modes in either study. It affected the commitment mode only in the second study. In both studies, planned contrasts confirmed that value saliency had a stronger effect on the importance mode than on the other three modes.

Taken together, the two studies support our reasoning that the importance mode, unlike the other modes, may be affected by changes in self-construal. Thus, people may change the extent to which they attribute importance to a group even in response to information that is unrelated to group characteristics.

The superiority mode. Above, we suggested a variety of conditions that may affect each of the other three modes of identification. In a third empirical study, Sagiv et al. (2008) took a first step in this direction by examining one factor that we hypothesized to affect the superiority mode of identification, the perceived status of a group.

Past research based on the social identity perspective showed that people often identify more with high status than with low status groups (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Roccas, 2003b). Drawing on this literature, Sagiv et al. (2008) hypothesized that an experimental manipulation that raises the perceived status of a group would increase superiority identification, because the essence of the superiority mode is the evaluation of how good the group is relative to other groups. They further hypothesized that a status manipulation would affect importance identification as well because, as detailed above, the importance mode is susceptible to changes in the context that affect the perception of the group.

In contrast, they expected the manipulation of perceived group status to have no effect on the commitment and deference modes. Commitment refers to willingness to contribute to the group. Contextual factors that affect construal of group status are not directly relevant to the need or desirability of commitment. The deference mode is also not likely to change following such a manipulation because, as noted above, it is the least susceptible to contextual changes.

Participants (Sagiv et al., 2008; Study 3) were university students randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups: high status, low status, and control. To manipulate high perceived status, the researchers asked participants to write one factor that makes their university a highly successful and renowned institution with high standing in the academic world. The low status condition had to be more subtle, because the researchers wished to manipulate perceived low status without inducing participants to engage in negative thoughts about their university. They asked participants to write about their university's contribution to Israeli society. This manipulation was intended (and succeeded) to induce students to write about the open admission policy of the university. A policy of low admission threshold is known to be related to low status (Roccas, 2003b). This manipulation, therefore, served to create the low status condition in the study. Following the status manipulation, participants reported their identification with their university. Participants in a control group received only the identification questionnaire.

As expected, the status manipulation influenced the superiority and the importance modes more than the other two modes: Superiority was higher for participants in the high status than in the low status condition, with participants in the control group falling in between. The manipulation of status also influenced the importance mode: Participants in the high status condition rated their university identity as a more important part of their self-concept than did participants in the low status condition. Participants in the control group were, again, in between. For the commitment and the deference modes of identification, consistent with expectations, the planned contrasts between the two status conditions were not significant (Sagiv et al., 2008).

In sum, these preliminary findings support our claim that contextual factors have differential effects on the four modes of identification. Manipulating the saliency of values—a factor that affects the way people conceptualize their identity—influenced mainly the importance mode. Manipulating a group's status—a factor relevant to comparison across groups—affected the superiority and the importance modes more than the commitment and deference modes.

Social groups and institutions such as nations, business organizations, religious groups, and the military often view raising the identification of group members as desirable. But, what exactly do these groups wish to raise? Is it the importance members attribute to their group membership? Their deference to the group's symbols?

Their commitment to the group and willingness to contribute to it? Or their perception of the group as superior? Our findings indicate that the four modes of identification differ in their susceptibility to various contextual factors. A factor that raises identification in one mode may or may not raise it in another mode.

Personality and Identification

Contextual effects on identification do not preclude effects of personality. Personality affects the arousal of motivations, the attention and interpretation of contextual cues, and the way in which people weigh their general goals and preferences. Personality is, therefore, likely to be an important factor in determining identification with groups. We do not suggest, however, that identification is a trait by itself. Rather, we suggest that identification is affected by the conjunction of group characteristics and personality. Finding consistent, theory-driven relationships between personality variables and identification with groups would support the contention that identification reflects, at least in part, stable individual differences.

We propose that the four modes of identification vary in the extent to which they are determined by stable personality traits. We also propose that different traits are likely to relate to each of the four modes. The deference mode refers to the extent to which a person honors the group's symbols and leaders and submits to their authority. We drew this mode of identification mainly from conceptualizations of individual-level vertical collectivism, which focus on the general tendency to subordinate to groups and to willingly accept one's place in the group's hierarchical structure (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Indeed, deference to authorities is generally considered to be a stable individual tendency (e.g., John & Robins, 1994; Koestner & Losier, 1996). Accordingly, we reasoned above that this mode is the least susceptible to contextual changes. For the same reasons, the deference mode is likely to relate more to personality than the other modes and to be the most stable mode across situations and social contexts.

When looking for stable individual differences related to identification in general, and to deference in particular, the concept of authoritarianism naturally comes to mind. Despite conceptual and methodological criticism (e.g., Christie, 1991; Duckitt, 2000), measures of authoritarianism consistently relate to prejudice, discrimination, and intolerance (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988, 1994). Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) includes authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism; it reflects a high degree of submission to authorities and adherence to societal conventions (Altemeyer, 1981). Altemeyer (1994) suggested that "high right-wing authoritarians place greater value upon their group memberships than most people do" (p. 136). Moreover, they "believe strongly in submission to established authorities and the social norms these authorities endorse" (Altemeyer, 1998, p. 48). This belief is likely to lead individuals to defer to national symbols and authorities as expressed in the deference mode.

Subsequent research confirms a positive correlation between authoritarianism and identification with the nation (e.g., Blank, 2003; Burris, Branscombe, & Jackson, 2000; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Ray & Furnham, 1984). This positive correlation is robust and consistent across different measures of personality and of identification. We hypothesize that this stable individual characteristic correlates positively with all four modes of identification, but it correlates most strongly with the deference mode. The relations to personality characteristics of the other modes depend on the compatibility between the personality trait and the specific mode of identification. We next discuss personality characteristics we expect to be most related to superiority and commitment.

Superiority. The superiority mode of identification entails perceiving one's ingroup as better than other groups. This mode has an explicit comparative aspect: The ingroup is compared with other groups and is perceived as superior. This mode is, therefore, likely to relate to stable individual characteristics that indicate sensitivity to status and a preference for hierarchical relationships. The most relevant individual characteristic is social dominance orientation (SDO), "the degree to which individuals desire and support group-based hierarchy and the domination of 'inferior' groups by 'superior' groups" (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 48). SDO thus refers to an individual's tendency to categorize social groups as superior versus inferior and to favor opinions, attitudes, and policies that maintain social inequality (for a different view of SDO, see Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003). Previous research found that SDO correlates positively with prejudice and various forms of intergroup aggression (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and with identification with the nation (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998). These studies did not distinguish between different modes of identification. We hypothesize that SDO is related to the deference and the superiority modes more than to the other modes of identification.

C*ommitment*. The commitment mode expresses genuine attachment to the group and an altruistic desire to contribute to its welfare. To date, there is no agreed-on measure of altruism *toward the group* as a personality characteristic. We, therefore, base our theorizing on the

general five-factor model of personality traits (Goldberg, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1997). Agreeableness is the trait most closely associated with altruism (e.g., Carlo, Okun, Knight, & de Guzman, 2005; Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997). Individuals high on agreeableness are good-natured, gentle, cooperative, and altruistic. Individuals low on this trait tend to be ruthless, suspicious, uncooperative, and inflexible (Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991). Agreeableness is likely to lead to a sense of attachment to the group and to selfless willingness to contribute to it, attributes of the commitment mode of identification. We, therefore, expect commitment identification to correlate most positively with the agreeableness trait.

Importance. This mode refers to the centrality of the group in one's identity. In contrast to the other three modes, importance does not refer to any distinctive content (intergroup hierarchy, altruism, or intragroup hierarchy). Therefore, it is unlikely to relate distinctively to any specific personality characteristic. However, because identification in general relates to personality, we expect some association with the importance mode as well.

To examine the hypothesis that the deference mode relates to personality more than the other modes and is, thus, the most stable mode across situations and social contexts, Sagiv et al. (2008) studied patterns of identification with multiple groups. They reasoned that if identification is completely context-specific, then there is no reason to expect individuals who identify highly with one group to identify highly with other, different groups. They, therefore, argued that positive correlations between identification with two different groups would point to a common personality factor underlying identification with groups.

Sagiv et al. (2008) tested the hypothesis that the correlations between measures of deference identification with two groups are higher than the correlations between the measures of the other three modes of identification in the same groups. They examined this hypothesis three times: University business students rated their identification with Israel and with their university department, Israeli soldiers doing mandatory military service reported their identification with the military and with their former high school, and soldiers of Ethiopian ethnic background reported their identification with the military and with their ethnic group. All cases entailed identification with large groups that preclude acquaintanceship among all group members. Moreover, the groups varied on important characteristics: groups in which membership is ascribed versus voluntary, groups in which membership is limited to a few years versus lifelong, groups with a clear hierarchy and roles versus no clearly defined hierarchy and roles, minority versus dominant groups in the society.

Findings across all three samples supported the research hypothesis: The correlation between deference to Israel and deference to the business school (Sample 1, r = .37) was stronger than the correlations for the other modes (r = .14, .05, and .20 for superiority, commitment, and importance, respectively; correlation differences significant for all but importance). The correlation between deference to the military and deference to one's high school (Sample 2, r = .44) was significantly stronger than the correlations for the other modes (r = .25, .16, and .19 for superiority, commitment, and importance, respectively). Finally, the correlation between deference to the military and deference to the Ethiopian ethnic group (Sample 3, r = .47) was significantly stronger than the other three correlations (r = .18, .26, and .30 for superiority, commitment, and importance, respectively). Taken together, these findings are consistent with our contention that the deference mode is more related to stable personal characteristics than are the other three modes.

Identification, RWA, and SDO. Eidelson and Jayawickreme (2007) examined the relations of RWA and SDO to the four modes of identification as part of two surveys of American students. Participants in both studies completed a series of self-report questionnaires, including identification with the nation, RWA, and SDO.

Consistent with our reasoning, RWA correlated most positively with deference identification (r = .59 in one sample and .47 in the other), followed by the superiority mode (.43 and .35, respectively), the importance mode (.40 and .18), and the commitment mode (.33 and .22). In both samples, the correlations with the deference mode were significantly stronger than for all other modes. The findings for SDO were also consistent with our expectations. SDO correlated most positively with the superiority mode (r = .51 and .38), followed by the deference mode (.37 and .36), the importance mode (.25 and .21), and the commitment mode (.17 and .19). The correlations with the superiority mode were significantly stronger than for all other modes in the first sample and for all but deference in the second.

In sum, identification correlated positively with two trait-like attributes, RWA and SDO, providing additional support for the idea that identification is partly based on personality. Moreover, RWA correlated more strongly with the deference mode and SDO correlated most strongly with the superiority mode, supporting the distinctiveness of the four modes of identification.

Identification and the five-factor model. Sagiv et al. (2008) provide further support for our claims concerning differential relations of the four modes of identification with personality. They correlated identification with the

five-factor model of personality traits in two samples. Participants in the first sample (university and high school students) completed a series of surveys, including Saucier's (1994) mini-markers measure of traits and our measure of identification with the nation. As expected, agreeableness correlated positively and significantly with the commitment mode (r = .21). The correlations of agreeableness with each of the other three modes of identification were significantly weaker (all below .10 and not significant). In addition, openness to experience correlated negatively and significantly with the deference mode of identification (r = –.20) and neuroticism correlated negatively with the commitment and deference modes (r = –.18 and –.21, respectively). None of the other correlations was significant.

Their second sample included Israeli soldiers who completed the same trait questionnaire and were asked about their identification with the army. Again, as expected, agreeableness correlated positively and significantly with the commitment mode (r = .35). In this sample, agreeableness also correlated positively, but to a lesser extent, with the other three modes (.29, .20, and .20 for importance, superiority, and deference, respectively). The only other significant correlation that emerged in both samples was the negative correlation between commitment and neuroticism. In addition, conscientiousness correlated positively with all but the superiority mode (.19, .15, and .15 for commitment, importance, and deference, respectively).

The patterns of correlations between personality traits and the four modes of identification are only partly consistent. Whereas findings with regard to agreeableness, neuroticism, and extraversion are consistent across the samples, findings differed for conscientiousness and openness to experience. The negative correlation between openness and identification with the nation is consistent with the nature of this trait. Whereas individuals high on openness to experience tend to be intellectual, nonconforming, and open-minded, those who score low on this trait tend to be conventional, down-to-earth, and rigid. They "follow the rules they were taught, including obedience to authority" (McCrae, 1996, p. 326). Similarly, the positive relations between conscientiousness and identification with an organization reflect the nature of this trait. Individuals high in conscientiousness tend to be careful, thorough, responsible, organized, and scrupulous, whereas those low on this dimension tend to be irresponsible, disorganized, and unscrupulous.

The fact that these correlations were inconsistent across the two types of groups—a national group and an organization—may indicate that relations between traits and identification depend, in part, on the nature of the group in question. Difference between the populations studied (university and high school students versus soldiers) may also explain the inconsistency. The negative correlations with neuroticism were surprising. Why would individuals who are more anxious, depressed, angry, and insecure be less willing to contribute to their nation and feel less respect for its leaders or symbols? Sagiv et al. (2008) raise the possibility that the insecurity and anxiety inherent in neuroticism limit the extent to which individuals can attach themselves to others, especially to the extent that they are willing to contribute to them.

The findings reviewed above are consistent with our reasoning that the deference mode is the most stable and the least susceptible to contextual changes. As hypothesized, the correlations between deference identification with two groups were stronger than such correlations for other modes, reflecting a stable tendency to defer to groups in general. Deference also correlated positively with SDO and especially with RWA. It is important to note, however, that despite their substantial intercorrelations, deference identification and RWA are conceptually and empirically distinct constructs. This was demonstrated in a study that examined relations of attitudes toward behavior that deviates from group norms to RWA and to the four modes of identification (Sagiv et al., 2008). The authors studied relations of RWA and of identification with Israel to attitudes toward conscientious objectors to military service—a counternormative behavior in Israeli society. Both deference and RWA correlated positively with intolerance toward conscientious objectors. Critically, however, in a hierarchical regression, deference identification explained 6% of the variance above and beyond the variance explained by RWA (7%). This underscores the distinctiveness of the constructs.

Interim conclusions. Taken together, the full set of findings with regard to context and personality contribute to resolving the controversy concerning whether identification with a group is a stable, trait-like disposition or whether it depends on situational cues. Both sides of the debate have merit. Identification is indeed responsive to situational cues. At the same time, identification is correlated with stable personality traits. The issue of the nature of identification, as situational or personality based, has been pivotal in the literature. These findings make clear that an either/or view is inappropriate. But, we have only begun to address this issue. Comprehensive research on the nature of identification would entail examining simultaneously multiple personal attributes and multiple types of groups in multiple social contexts.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED MODEL

Distinguishing different modes of identification can contribute to the development of theories of group

processes in three main ways. First, by expanding current models that do not distinguish the four modes of identification, it can promote systematic generation of new, testable hypotheses. We illustrate this below in our discussion of strategies for improving intergroup relations. Second, distinguishing modes of identification can refine the theorizing of current models by pointing to the modes of identification most relevant in specific theoretical contexts. We illustrate this below in our discussion of contribution to groups. Finally, distinguishing modes of identification is crucial for understanding cases in which the different modes have opposing effects. In such cases, distinguishing modes of identification provides an integrative model that can reveal suppression effects. We illustrate this in our discussion of group-based guilt.

Expanding Existing Models: Strategies for Improving Intergroup Relations

Research grounded in the social identity perspective has inspired several theoretical models that view group identity as a crucial vehicle for improving intergroup relations (e.g., Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Miller, Brewer, & Edwards, 1985; see Brown, 2000, for a review). These models emphasize the cognitive aspect of identification. They investigate how changing the salience of group categorization can improve intergroup relations.

Adopting our multidimensional view of identification may expand these models. Consider, for example, the common group identity model (Gaertner et al., 1993). This model proposes that inducing members of two groups to perceive themselves as members of a single, more inclusive group improves intergroup relations. We postulate that inductions based on contextual changes in the salience of group memberships are most likely to succeed among individuals with a heterogeneous profile who strongly identify with their group in the importance mode but do not identify in the other modes. Changes in group boundaries may have profound consequences for the norms and symbols of the group. This may be unwelcome for people who strongly identify in the deference mode. People who identify strongly in the commitment mode may also resist increasing group inclusiveness. They may feel that it is important to limit the size of the group so they can help their ingroup effectively and not be called on to expand their obligations and spread their aid too widely (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). Finally, people high on superiority may resist increasing group inclusiveness because this might dilute the superiority of their exclusive ingroup.

Thus, adopting a multidimensional view of identification provides a theoretical framework for generating additional strategies to induce individuals to identify with the single, more inclusive group. Enriching the inclusive identity with group symbols and leadership might appeal more effectively to people who are strongly identified in the deference mode, emphasizing the extraordinary moral worth of the inclusive group might appeal more effectively to those who strongly identify in the superiority mode, and portraying the inclusive group in ways that make it an attractive object of love and support might appeal more effectively to people who strongly identify in the commitment mode.

Refining Existing Models: Identification and Contribution to the Group

Halevy, Sagiv, Roccas, and Litvin (2008) examined links between identification and contributions to the ingroup. They reasoned that the commitment mode is the only one that entails pure concern for the group's welfare (i.e., reflects altruistic motivation for group enhancement) and should therefore lead directly to contributing to the group. Although the importance, superiority, and deference modes may also correlate with contribution, the contribution they motivate is more instrumental (e.g., to enhance own self-concept or status). Thus, although all four modes of identification are likely to correlate with contribution to the group, the commitment mode should have the strongest correlation.

Three studies examined the distinctive effect of commitment on contribution. The first created minimal groups in a laboratory setting. Participants received a sum of money that they could either keep for themselves or contribute to the group. The game was structured so that the decision to contribute benefited the ingroup, but each group member's personal interest favored withholding contribution. All four modes of identification correlated positively with contribution. However, after controlling expectations concerning the behavior of fellow ingroup members, only the commitment mode predicted contribution significantly.

In the second study, employees of various organizations reported the extent to which they engaged in such extra-role activities as working overtime, volunteering to participate in organizational activities, and helping coworkers. They also responded to the identification questionnaire. All four modes of identification predicted the extra-role behaviors. As expected, the correlation with the commitment mode was the strongest. Moreover, a hierarchical regression revealed that the commitment mode predicted the extra-role activities above and beyond the other three modes (Halevy et al., 2008).

Participants in the third study reported their identification with the nation. After completing questionnaires about leisure activities, they were informed that various volunteer organizations were seeking students

to undertake community work. Those interested in volunteering were asked to write their phone number for the researchers to forward to the organizations. Of the four modes of identification, only the commitment mode significantly predicted volunteering.

In sum, distinguishing among the four modes of identification reveals that it is the commitment mode that relates most strongly to progroup behavior. This refines the theoretical links between identification and contribution to groups.

Integrating Modes of Identification: The Case of Group-Based Guilt

Negative group-based emotions provide an example of the utility of integrating the different modes of identification. Roccas et al. (2006) studied the links between identification and guilt resulting from moral transgressions committed by one's ingroup. They suggested that the relationship between identification and group-based guilt presents an inherent contradiction. On one hand, only people highly identified with their group should be susceptible to feeling morally implicated in the group's transgressions. Thus, one might expect group-based guilt to relate positively to identification. On the other hand, people who identify with a group are motivated to derive a positive social identity from their group membership and to protect this positive identity. When confronted with information that reflects negatively on their group, they should reinterpret this information. According to this line of reasoning, identification with a group should lead to legitimizing the group's actions and consequently should relate negatively to people's feelings of group-based guilt. In sum, identification should simultaneously correlate positively and negatively with feelings of group-based guilt.

Distinguishing different modes of identification can resolve this paradox. Roccas et al. (2006) distinguished *attachment*, a combination of importance and commitment, from *glorification*, a combination of superiority and deference. They examined cognitive and emotional reactions to descriptions of historical incidents in which the ingroup harmed members of another group. They found that the two broad modes of identification had opposing relations with guilt. The more people glorified the group, the less group-based guilt they felt. Attachment to the group did not correlate with group-based guilt, seemingly having no effect. However, when glorification was controlled, attachment correlated positively with feelings of guilt. Thus, glorification suppressed the effect of attachment. By examining multiple modes of identification simultaneously, it was possible to disentangle the distinctive, opposing effect of each.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The theoretical analyses and research findings reviewed here provide a strong foundation for a comprehensive multidimensional model of group identification. This model has the potential for broad application. Until now, the empirical tests of the model have mainly been directed at validating the distinctiveness of the four modes. The research reviewed supports our reasoning with regard to differential effects of context and personality on the different modes and with regard to some distinctive consequences of the four modes. In further research, it is important to examine how taking all four modes of identification into account helps to improve the understanding and prediction of intragroup and intergroup behavior.

Group identification is linked to the most laudable of human endeavors (e.g., heroic self-sacrifice to benefit others) but also to the most condemnable (e.g., brutal ethnic cleansing and genocide). We anticipate that the critical underpinnings of, and distinctions between, beneficial "ingroup love" and destructive "outgroup hate" (Brewer, 1999) lie, at least in part, in explicating the interplay between the importance, commitment, superiority, and deference modes of group identification. We are hopeful that the preliminary work described here, including the development of a psychometrically valid scale for the multidimensional assessment of group identification, will prove to be a valuable contribution in this direction.

APPENDIX
THE MEASURE OF IDENTIFICATION WITH GROUPS

1. I feel strongly affiliated with this group.
2. Other groups can learn a lot from us.
3. Belonging to this group is an important part of my identity.
4. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the group leaders.
5. I am glad to contribute to this group.
6. Compared to other groups of this kind, this group is particularly good.
7. It is important to me that I view myself as a member of this group.
8. All group members should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leaders of the group.
9. I am strongly committed to this group.
10. Relative to other groups, we are a very moral group.
11. It is important to me that others see me as a member of this group.
12. It is disloyal to criticize this group.

(continued)

APPENDIX (continued)

13. I like to help this group.
14. This group is better than other groups in all respects.
15. When I talk about the group members, I usually say "we" rather than "they."
16. There is usually a good reason for every rule and regulation that the group leaders propose.

NOTE: Importance: items 3, 7, 11, 15; Commitment: items 1, 5, 9, 13; Superiority: items 2, 6, 10, 14; Deference: items 4, 8, 12, 16.

NOTES

1. Some researchers suggest that the extent of individualism–collectivism does depend on the group in question. They argue that the inclusiveness of the group to which items refer or the extent to which contact with group members is voluntary influences individualism–collectivism scores (e.g., Hui & Candice, 1994; Realo, Allik, & Vadi, 1997; Rhee, Uleman, & Lee, 1996).

2. Note, however, that affective commitment is sometimes viewed as a consequence rather than a component of identification (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; van Vugt & de Cremer, 1999).

3. Figure 3 is the similarity structure analysis map of the "before" sample. The map of the "after" sample has the same structure with one exception. Item 2 emerged in the deference region instead of the superiority region.

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