A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications

SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ[1]

ABSTRACT

This article presents a theory of seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural value dimensions. This theory permits more finely tuned characterization of cultures than other theories. It is distinctive in deriving the cultural orientations from *a priori* theorizing. It also specifies a coherent, integrated system of relations among the orientations, postulating that they are interdependent rather than orthogonal. Analyses of data from 73 countries, using two different instruments, validate the 7 cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them. Conceptual and empirical comparisons of these orientations with Inglehart's two dimensions clarify similarities and differences. Using the cultural orientations, I generate a worldwide empirical mapping of 76 national cultures that identifies 7 transnational cultural groupings: West European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, South Asian, Confucian influenced, and African and Middle Eastern. I briefly discuss distinctive cultural characteristics of these groupings. I then examine examples of socioeconomic, political, and demographic factors that give rise to national differences on the cultural value dimensions, factors that are themselves reciprocally influenced by culture. Finally, I examine consequences of prevailing cultural value orientations for

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attitudes and behavior (e.g., conventional morality, opposition to immigration, political activism) and argue that culture mediates the effects of major social structural variables on them.

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications

Recent years have seen the emergence of several theories and instruments for mapping and comparing national cultures. Interestingly, the main theories have emerged from different disciplines. Hofstede developed his theory of work values (e.g., 1980, 2001) to make sense of data gathered for purposes of management by IBM. The four and later five dimensions he derived to compare country cultures have been widely applied in the fields of business and management. Inglehart developed his theory of materialism-postmaterialism (e.g., 1977, 1990), which he later refined to include two dimensions (e.g., 1997, Inglehart & Baker, 2000), in order to address issues in political science and sociology about the effects of modernization. My own theory emerged later than these two (Schwartz, 1994b, 1999, 2004) out of my studies of individual differences in value priorities and their effects on attitudes and behavior, a sub-field of social psychology.

This article presents my theory of seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural value dimensions. At the cost of greater complexity than the other theories, this theory permits more finely tuned characterization of cultures. To validate the theory, I present analyses of data from 73 countries, using two different instruments. Conceptual and empirical comparisons of the cultural value orientations with Inglehart's two dimensions clarify their similarities and differences. Using the seven validated cultural orientations, I generate a worldwide map of national cultures that identifies distinctive cultural regions. The article then addresses the question of the antecedents that give rise to national differences on the cultural value dimensions. Finally, it examines some consequences of prevailing cultural value orientations on attitudes and behavior within countries.

The approach presented here is distinctive in deriving the seven cultural orientations from *a priori* theorizing and then testing the fit of these orientations to empirical data. Moreover, the *a priori* theorizing specified a coherent, integrated system of relations among the orientations, which was then tested.

Cultural Orientations – Basic Assumptions

I view culture as the rich complex of meanings, beliefs, practices, symbols, norms, and values prevalent among people in a society. The prevailing

value emphases in a society may be the most central feature of culture (Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 1977; Schwartz, 1999; Weber, 1958; Williams, 1958). These value emphases express shared conceptions of what is good and desirable in the culture, the cultural ideals.

Cultural value emphases shape and justify individual and group beliefs, actions, and goals. Institutional arrangements and policies, norms, and everyday practices express underlying cultural value emphases in societies. For example, a cultural value emphasis on success and ambition may be reflected in and promote highly competitive economic systems, confrontational legal systems, and child-rearing practices that pressure children to achieve.

The preference element in cultural value orientations – values as ideals – promotes coherence among the various aspects of culture. Because prevailing cultural value orientations represent ideals, aspects of culture that are incompatible with them are likely to generate tension and to elicit criticism and pressure to change. In a society whose cultural value orientations emphasize collective responsibility, for example, a firm that fires long-term employees in the interests of profitability is likely to elicit widespread criticism and pressure to change policies. Of course, cultures are not fully coherent. In addition to a dominant culture, subgroups within societies espouse conflicting value emphases. The dominant cultural orientation changes in response to shifting power relations among these subgroups.

But change is slow. Another important feature of cultural value orientations is that they are relatively stable (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, Bardi & Bianchi, 2000). Some researchers argue that elements of culture persist over hundreds of years (e.g., Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Putnam, 1993). Yet, cultural value orientations do change gradually. Societal adaptation to epidemics, technological advances, increasing wealth, contact with other cultures, and other exogenous factors leads to changes in cultural value emphases.

Culture joins with social structure, history, demography, and ecology in complex reciprocal relations that influence every aspect of how we live. But culture is difficult to measure. To reveal the cultural orientations in a society, we could look at the themes of children's stories, at the systems of law, at the ways economic exchange is organized, or at socialization practices. These *in*direct indexes of underlying orientations in the prevailing culture each describe a narrow aspect of the culture. When researchers try to identify culture by studying the literature of a society or its legal, economic, family, or governance systems, what they seek, implicitly or explicitly, are underlying value emphases (Weber, 1958; Williams, 1968). Therefore, studying value emphases directly is an especially efficient way to capture and characterize cultures.

A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations

Cultural value orientations evolve as societies confront basic issues or problems in regulating human activity. People must recognize these problems, plan responses to them, and motivate one another to cope with them. The ways that societies respond to these basic issues or problems can be used to identify dimensions on which cultures may differ from one another. The cultural value orientations at the poles of these dimensions are Weberian ideal-types. I derived value dimensions for comparing cultures by considering three of the critical issues that confront all societies.

The first issue is the nature of the relation or the boundaries between the person and the group: To what extent are people autonomous vs. embedded in their groups? I label the polar locations on this cultural dimension **autonomy** versus **embeddedness**. In autonomy cultures, people are viewed as autonomous, bounded entities. They should cultivate and express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and find meaning in their own uniqueness. There are two types of autonomy: ***Intellectual autonomy*** encourages individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions independently. Examples of important values in such cultures include broadmindedness, curiosity, and creativity. ***Affective autonomy*** encourages individuals to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. Important values include pleasure, exciting life, and varied life.

In cultures with an emphasis on **embeddedness**, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. Meaning in life comes largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals. Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Important values in such cultures are social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, and wisdom.

The second societal problem is to guarantee that people behave in a responsible manner that preserves the social fabric. That is, people must engage in the productive work necessary to maintain society rather than compete destructively or withhold their efforts. People must be induced to consider the welfare of others, to coordinate with them, and thereby manage their unavoidable interdependencies. The polar solution labeled cultural **egalitarianism** seeks to induce people to recognize one another as moral equals who share basic interests as human beings. People are socialized to internalize a commitment to cooperate and to feel concern for everyone's welfare. They are expected to act for the benefit of others

as a matter of choice. Important values in such cultures include equality, social justice, responsibility, help, and honesty.

The polar alternative labeled cultural **hierarchy** relies on hierarchical systems of ascribed roles to insure responsible, productive behavior. It defines the unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources as legitimate. People are socialized to take the hierarchical distribution of roles for granted and to comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles. Values like social power, authority, humility, and wealth are highly important in hierarchical cultures.

The third societal problem is to regulate how people manage their relations to the natural and social world. The cultural response to this problem labeled **harmony** emphasizes fitting into the world as it is, trying to understand and appreciate rather than to change, direct, or to exploit. Important values in harmony cultures include world at peace, unity with nature, and protecting the environment. **Mastery** is the polar cultural response to this problem. It encourages active self-assertion in order to master, direct, and change the natural and social environment to attain group or personal goals. Values such as ambition, success, daring, and competence are especially important in mastery cultures.

In sum, the theory specifies three bipolar dimensions of culture that represent alternative resolutions to each of three problems that confront all societies: **embeddedness** versus **autonomy, hierarchy** versus **egalitarianism**, and **mastery** versus **harmony** (see Figure 1). A societal emphasis on the cultural type at one pole of a dimension typically accompanies a de-emphasis on the polar type, with which it tends to conflict. Thus, as we will see below, American culture tends to emphasize mastery and affective autonomy and to give little emphasis to harmony. And the culture in Singapore emphasizes hierarchy but not egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy.

The cultural value orientations are also interrelated based on compatibility among them. That is, because certain orientations share assumptions, it is easier to affirm and act on them simultaneously in a culture. For example, egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy share the assumption that people can and should take individual responsibility for their actions and make decisions based on their own personal understanding of situations. And high egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy usually appear together, as in Western Europe. Embeddedness and hierarchy share the assumption that a person's roles in and obligations to collectivities are more important than her unique ideas and aspirations. And embeddedness and hierarchy are both high in the Southeast Asian cultures I have studied.

Figure 1
Cultural Dimensions: Prototypical Structure

The shared and opposing assumptions inherent in cultural values yield a coherent circular structure of relations among them. The structure reflects the cultural orientations that are compatible (adjacent in the circle) or incompatible (distant around the circle). This view of cultural dimensions as forming an integrated, non-orthogonal system, distinguishes my approach from others. Hofstede (1980, 2001) conceptualized his dimensions as independent. He assessed them as orthogonal factors. Inglehart (1997) derived his orthogonal dimensions empirically from a factor analysis of nation-level correlations among numerous attitudes and beliefs.

Measuring Cultural Value Orientations

I assume that the average value priorities of societal members point to the underlying cultural emphases to which they are exposed (Schwartz, 2004). Like Hofstede (2001) and Inglehart (1997), I therefore infer the cultural value orientations that characterize societies by averaging the

value priorities of individuals in matched samples from each society. My measurement of value priorities differs from that prevalent in survey research, however. I focus on *basic values*. Consensus regarding how to conceptualize basic values has emerged gradually since the 1950's. It includes six main features (explicated more fully in Schwartz, 2005a):

(1) **Values are beliefs** that are linked inextricably to affect.
(2) **Values refer to desirable goals** that motivate action.
(3) **Values transcend specific actions and situations** (e.g., obedience and honesty are values that are relevant at work or in school, in sports, business, and politics, with family, friends, or strangers). This feature distinguishes values from narrower concepts like norms and attitudes that usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations.
(4) **Values serve as standards or criteria** that guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events.
(5) **Values are ordered by importance** relative to one another to form a system of priorities. This hierarchical feature also distinguishes values from norms and attitudes.
(6) **The *relative* importance of values guides action**. The tradeoff among relevant, competing values is what guides attitudes and behaviors (Schwartz, 1992, 1996; Tetlock, 1986).

Implicitly, most survey researchers hold conceptions of values close to this one. Unlike the method I adopt below, however, many of the *value items* used in survey research are inconsistent with some of these features. The items often refer to specific situations or domains. They do not measure 'basic' values in the sense of values that are relevant across virtually all situations. This affects value priorities. Consider the item 'giving people more say in important government decisions'. Support for or opposition to the *current* government influences the importance respondents attribute to this goal (Israeli data from 1999). The meaning of such items depends on the interaction between people's 'basic' values and the context and domain in which the items are measured.

Researchers often combine responses to items from a number of specific domains in order to infer underlying, trans-situational values (e.g., materialism). But, because situation-specific items are sensitive to prevailing socio-political conditions, the choice of items may still substantially influence both group and individual-level priorities (e.g., Clarke, et al., 1999).

Contrary to features 5 and 6, many survey items do not measure values in terms of importance. Instead, they present attitude or opinion statements and employ agree-disagree, approve-disapprove, or other evaluative response scales. The researcher may then try to infer indirectly the importance of the values presumed to underlie these attitudes or

opinions. But multiple values may underlie any given attitude or opinion. Hence, it is hazardous to infer basic value priorities from responses to specific attitude and opinion items. In order to discover basic values with this approach, one must ask numerous questions across many domains of content. One then searches for underlying consistencies of response that may or may not be present. Such an approach requires many items and may not discern clear sets of basic value priorities.

Inglehart adopted this approach in deriving his two updated dimensions of culture. He describes the tradition/secular-rational dimension, for example, as centrally concerned with orientations toward authority (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). He bases this on five items that load together in a factor analysis (importance of God, importance of obedience and religious faith for children, justifiability of abortion, sense of national pride, and attitude toward respect for authority). The secular/rational pole of this orientation is not measured directly. It is inferred from responses that reject these five items. The two items that load most strongly on this factor both concern religion. The broader meaning of this dimension is inferred from the correlations of the five-item index with various beliefs and attitudes. The meaning of such dimensions, derived by inference from correlations among diverse items rather than clearly defined and operationalized *a priori,* is necessarily loose.

To operationalize the value priorities of individuals, in one set of studies, I used the Schwartz Value Survey that includes 56 or 57 value items (SVS: Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). These abstract items (e.g., social justice, humility, creativity, social order, pleasure, ambition) are each followed in parenthesis by a phrase that further specifies their meaning. Respondents rate the importance of each "as a guiding principle in MY life." Respondents from cultural groups on every inhabited continent have completed the survey, anonymously, in their native language (N > 75,000).[2] This survey is intended to include all the motivationally distinct values likely to be recognized across cultures, a claim for which there is growing evidence (Schwartz, 2005a).

Values whose meanings differ across cultures should not be used in cross-cultural comparison. Otherwise, group differences might reflect the fact that different concepts are measured in each group. Separate multi-dimensional scaling analyses of the value items within each of 66 countries established that 45 of the items have reasonably equivalent meanings in each country (Schwartz, 1994a, 1999; Fontaine, et al., 2005). To test

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[2] I am indebted to over 100 collaborators for their aid in gathering the data.

the theory, I specified in advance a set of three to eight value items expected to represent each of the seven cultural orientations.

Data from representative national samples in 20 countries, gathered as part of the European Social Survey (2002-3), provided a second test of the theory. This survey includes a 21-items short version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz, et al., 2001; Schwartz, 2003, 2005b, 2006) designed to measure basic individual values. Each portrait describes a person's goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For example, "Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She likes to do things in her own original way." Regarding each portrait, respondents answer: "How much like you is this person?" Respondents' own values are inferred from their self-reported similarity to people described implicitly in terms of particular values. Within-country analyses in each country confirmed reasonable meaning equivalence across countries for all 21 items. To test the theory, I specified in advance items expected to represent the cultural orientations.

Empirical Evaluation of the Theory of Cultural Value Orientations

A first assessment of the validity of the seven cultural value orientations and the relations among them used SVS data gathered in 1988-2000. Participants were 80 samples of schoolteachers (k-12) from 58 national groups and 115 samples of college students from 64 national groups, together constituting 67 nations and 70 different cultural groups. Samples from ethnically heterogeneous nations came from the dominant, majority group. Most samples included between 180 and 280 respondents.

For each sample, we computed the mean ratings of the 45 value items and then correlated items across samples. This treats the sample as the unit of analysis. The sample level correlations are statistically independent of the correlations across individuals within any sample. Thus, the analyses are at the sample (country) or culture level, not the individual level. Correlations between the sample means were used in a multidimensional scaling analysis (Borg & Lingoes, 1987; Guttman, 1968) to assess the presence of the seven cultural orientations and the relations among them.

The 2-dimensional projection in Figure 2 portrays the pattern of intercorrelations among values, based on the sample means. Each value item is represented by a point such that the more positive the correlation between any pair of value items the closer they are in the space, and the less positive their correlation the more distant. Comparing Figure 2

with Figure 1 reveals that the observed content and structure of cultural value orientations fully support the theorized content and structure. This analysis clearly discriminates the seven orientations: The value items selected a priori to represent each value orientation are located within a unique wedge-shaped region of the space.[3] Equally important, the regions representing each orientation form the integrated cultural system postulated by the theory: They emanate from the center of the circle, follow the expected order around the circle, and form the poles of the three broad cultural dimensions.

The second assessment of the theory of cultural value orientations used the 21-item PVQ data from the representative national samples of the ESS. To obtain a sufficient number of samples for a reliable Multidimensional Scaling Analysis, we split the 20 countries into 52 cultural groups, each with a minimum of 40 respondents.[4] We computed group means for each item and correlated the items across the groups. Figure 3 presents the two dimensional projection of relations among the items. The observed content and structure of cultural value orientations in this figure again support the theorized content and structure fully. Because the ESS value scale has few items and was not designed to measure cultural orientations, only three or fewer items represent each orientation (except embeddedness with six). Nonetheless, there are seven distinguishable regions representing the seven orientations. The regions follow the expected order around the circle and form the three polar cultural dimensions.

The score for each cultural value orientation in a country is the mean importance rating of the value items that represent it. Prior to computing these scores, we centered each individual respondent's ratings of the value items on his/her mean rating of all of the items. This controls for individual as well as group biases in use of the response scales.[5] In order to increase the reliability of country scores based on the SVS data, I combined the means of the teacher and student samples in the 52 countries in which both types of samples were available. In 21 countries, only either teacher or student data were available. For these countries, I estimated the missing sample means based on regression coefficients gen-

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[3] One item, 'accepting my portion in life,' emerged in the egalitarianism region rather than in the expected harmony region which is adjacent. Its correlations with other items also failed to support an interpretation as a harmony value. We therefore dropped it from the analyses.

[4] My thanks to Ariel Knafo for deriving these ethnic group samples.

[5] Schwartz (1992; 2006) further explains how to perform the scale use correction and why it is necessary.

Figure 2
Cultural Level MDS-195 Samples, 70 Cultural Groups (Coefficient Alienation .18)

Figure 3

Cultural Level MDS-52 Cultural Groups from ESS (coefficient alienation .14)

erated by regressing student and teacher means from the 52 countries where both were available on one another.

For a lower-bound estimate of the adequacy of the combined teacher- and student-based SVS scores for measuring cultural differences among societies, I correlated them with the scores based on 25 representative national or sub-national samples from the ESS. I refer to this as a 'lower-bound' estimate because of a set of methodological factors that would weaken any associations: The ESS scores are each based on very few items, as noted above, the ESS data were gathered an average of seven years later, the ESS and SVS methods of measurement differ greatly and, most important, the ESS countries come only from Europe plus Israel, thereby substantially restricting the range of scores on the cultural orientations. The observed Pearson correlations ranged from .45 (mastery) to .80 (intellectual autonomy), mean .63. In light of the methodological problems that weaken these correlations, this finding provides considerable support for the adequacy of the combined teacher- and student-based SVS scores for capturing cultural differences among whole societies

Contrasting the Inglehart and Schwartz Dimensions

Based on the European and World Value Surveys, Inglehart (e.g., Inglehart & Baker, 2000) extended his earlier work on materialism and post-materialism to propose two value dimensions on which to compare national cultures, tradition vs. secular-rational and survival vs. self-expression. This section discusses conceptual and empirical relations between these dimensions and the cultural orientations presented above.

Inglehart derived scores on the two dimensions for 72 countries, 63 of which overlap with the countries I have studied with the SVS. Correlations between the Inglehart and Schwartz dimensions across these countries provide an empirical basis for assessing their similarities and differences. To further assess relations among the Inglehart and Schwartz dimensions, I used the scores on my dimensions derived from the PVQ21 in the ESS countries. I computed separate scores for East and West Germany because Inglehart has separate scores for these regions. These 21 groups vary less than the 63 countries in the SVS-based analyses both culturally and socially. Should both sets of analyses yield similar results, despite diverse samples and different methods, we can have confidence in their robustness.

The tradition/secular-rational dimension centrally concerns orientations toward authority. It contrasts societies in which religion, nation, and family are highly important with those in which they are not so important. In traditional societies, children's first duty is to their parents

and parents are expected to sacrifice themselves for their children. Male dominance is the norm, absolute standards of morality prevail, and national pride is high. "Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics" (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 25). The five-item index used to measure this dimension correlates highly with these beliefs and attitudes. The two items that load most strongly on the factor, however, both concern religious belief.

This dimension overlaps conceptually with my autonomy/embeddedness dimension. Both concern the degree to which the individual is submerged in all-encompassing structures of tight mutual obligations. Inglehart's description implies that, in traditional societies, people's ties to their religious, national, and family groups are the source of meaning in their lives – a core aspect of embeddedness. The weakening of encompassing structures and of absolute standards in secular-rational societies frees individuals to think, do, and feel more independently – a core aspect of autonomy.

Now consider correlations between the dimensions across 63 countries with the SVS measure of my dimensions and, in parentheses, across the 21 ESS countries with the PVQ21 measure. The tradition/secular-rational dimension correlates .60 (.51) with intellectual autonomy, .53 (.38) with affective autonomy, -.57 (-.33) with embeddedness, and .60 (.41) with the autonomy/embeddedness dimension. As the pairs of correlations indicate, both sets of analyses yield similar pictures.

For a more in-depth examination, I elaborate on the 63-country analysis. The autonomy/embeddedness dimension shares considerable variance (36%) with the tradition/ secular-rational dimension, but they array nations somewhat differently. For example, East Germany ranks in the top 10% of nations on both dimensions and Zimbabwe in the bottom 15%. But Bulgaria, China, and Estonia rank in the top 10% on tradition/ secular-rational but the bottom third on autonomy/embeddedness.

The centrality of religion in the Inglehart index may explain this difference in country locations on the two dimensions. Their high secular-rational rankings may be due to a breakdown of religious faith and absolute standards of traditional morality during decades of communist rule. The autonomy/embeddedness dimension gives less weight to religious faith. It focuses more on how legitimate it is for individuals to cultivate unique ways of thinking, acting, and feeling vs. submerging the self in an encompassing collectivity. The culture in Bulgaria, China, and Estonia may have become quite secular. At the same time, the low scores on autonomy/embeddedness suggest that the culture still stresses finding meaning through ties to the in-group. The two dimensions apparently capture different aspects of the culture in these countries.

The tradition/secular-rational dimension also has some conceptual overlap with the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension. Both concern deference to authority. The emphasis on national pride in traditional societies also expresses a hierarchical orientation, and the preference for male dominance is compatible with hierarchy and opposed to egalitarianism. The overlap is limited, however, because the Inglehart dimension does not relate to the primary focus of egalitarianism/hierarchy. Both egalitarianism and hierarchy seek to preserve the social fabric by promoting responsible behavior that considers the welfare of others. They differ in grounding such behavior in voluntary choice based on internalized commitments (egalitarianism) or in conformity to the obligations and expectations of ascribed roles (hierarchy). The empirical associations reflect little overlap. The tradition/secular-rational dimension correlated -.00 (.22) with egalitarianism, -.32 (-.21) with hierarchy, and .22 (.25) with the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension.

Unexpectedly, given no obvious conceptual overlap, the tradition/secular-rational dimension correlated somewhat positively with the harmony/mastery dimension (.36/.34). Thus, more secular-rational societies are also societies that tend more to emphasize fitting into the natural and social world as it is, trying to understand and appreciate rather than to change or to exploit. The nations with cultures especially high on both harmony and secular-rational orientations are all in Western Europe. These nations have well-to-do, educated, and involved publics. Such publics responded to two devastating wars and to severe ecological crises by developing rationally-based relations of harmony among themselves and with the environment.

Inglehart's second dimension, survival/self-expression, contrasts societies in which people primarily focus on economic and physical security (survival) with societies in which security is high and quality-of-life issues are central (self-expression). In the latter, many people are well educated and work in the services. This demands of them more freedom of judgment, innovation, and autonomous decision-making and equips them with relevant communication and information-processing skills. Trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, political activism, and concern for the environment are high. At the survival pole, people feel threatened by and are intolerant of those who are different (e.g., ethnically or in sexual preference) or who seek cultural change (e.g., women's movements). At the self-expression pole, difference and change are accepted and even seen as enriching, and out-groups are increasingly seen as meriting equal rights.

This dimension also overlaps with the autonomy/embeddedness dimension. They both concern the degree to which individuals should be

encouraged to express their uniqueness and independence in thought, action, and feelings. Empirically, they are substantially associated. Survival/self-expression correlated -.66 (-.65) with embeddedness, .55 (.40) with affective autonomy, .57 (.65) with intellectual autonomy, and .64 (.63) with the autonomy/embeddedness dimension, with which it shares 41% of its variance. These two dimensions array nations quite similarly. For example, Sweden and Denmark rank very high on both dimensions and Uganda and Zimbabwe rank very low. But there are differences. Both Ghana and West Germany are moderate on survival/self-expression, but Ghana is very low on autonomy/embeddedness and West Germany very high.

The egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension also overlaps conceptually with survival/self-expression. The latter pits trust, tolerance, and support for the equal rights of out-groups against low trust, intolerance, and rejection of out-groups as threatening. This closely parallels some aspects of high vs. low egalitarianism. Political activism and opposition to change in accepted roles also conflict with hierarchy, though these elements are less critical. The empirical correlations support these inferences. Survival/self-expression correlated .72 (.63) with egalitarianism, -.41 (-.25) with hierarchy, and .59 (.50) with the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension with which it shares 35% of its variance.

Sweden and Norway are very high on both dimensions and Bulgaria is very low on both. But many nations do not exhibit consistent ranks on the two cultural dimensions. Japan is very low on egalitarianism (vs. hierarchy) but moderately high on self-expression (vs. survival), for example. My dimension emphasizes the idea that Japanese culture organizes relations of interdependency in role-based hierarchical terms. The Inglehart dimension may reflect the consequences for culture of Japanese society's wealth, high level of education, and advanced service economy. Thus, these two dimensions capture different, not necessarily contradictory, aspects of culture.

The contrasting feelings of interpersonal threat vs. trust and the focus on material security vs. environmental protection of the survival/self-expression dimension parallel a low vs. high harmony orientation. Empirically, however, there is no association either with harmony or with the harmony/mastery dimension. Harmony emphasizes fitting into and accepting the social and natural environments rather than changing or using them. Self-expression implies a more activist orientation to people and nature. This may explain the lack of association.

In sum, there is substantial overlap between Inglehart's tradition/secular-rational dimension and my autonomy/embeddedness dimension and between Inglehart's survival/self-expression dimension and both my

autonomy/embeddedness and egalitarianism/hierarchy dimensions. Given the differences in the way the dimensions were derived, in the scales used to measure them, and in the nature of the samples studied, this overlap is striking. It strongly supports the idea that these dimensions capture real, robust aspects of cultural difference.

On the other hand, some nations exhibit substantially divergent rankings on the overlapping dimensions. This makes clear that each dimension also captures unique aspects of culture. Thus, for example, the level of conventional religious commitment in a country appears to influence tradition/secular-rational scores crucially but have much less impact on autonomy/embeddedness scores. In contrast, the cultural emphasis on extended in-group bonds vs. pursuit of individual uniqueness appears to influence autonomy-embeddedness scores more than tradition/secular rational-scores. Moreover, my harmony/mastery dimension apparently taps aspects of culture not measured by the Inglehart dimensions, as evidenced by its low correlations with them. As we will see, harmony/mastery is the only cultural dimension not strongly related to socio-economic development.

Countries as a Cultural Unit

Almost all large, comparative, cross-cultural studies treat countries as their cultural unit. Countries are rarely homogeneous societies with a unified culture. Inferences about national culture may depend on which subgroups are studied. The research on my cultural dimensions with the SVS used country scores from teacher and student samples rather than representative national samples. This makes it especially important to establish that scores derived from different types of samples order countries in the same way on the dimensions. If a meaningful general culture impacts upon varied groups within countries, the order of countries on cultural dimensions should be quite similar whether we measure culture using one type of subsample from the dominant group or another. The same countries should score higher and the same countries lower on each cultural orientation whether the set of samples consists, for example, of older or of younger respondents. I assessed consistency in the relative scores of countries on the seven cultural orientations measured with the SVS, using three types of subsamples.

I first assessed whether younger and older subcultures yield similar relative national scores. I split the teacher samples into those 37 years or younger and those older. There were 55 countries with at least 33 respondents in each age group. The relative national scores, based on these two subgroups, were very similar. Correlations ranged from .96

for embeddedness to .78 for mastery (mean .91). I also compared national scores using male vs. female student subgroups across 64 countries. This yielded similar results: Correlations ranged from .96 for embeddedness to .82 for egalitarianism (mean .90). Finally, I compared national scores based on the teacher vs. the student samples across 53 countries. Correlations ranged from .90 for egalitarianism to .57 for mastery (mean .81). Although still substantial, the somewhat weaker correlations in this last comparison reflect the fact that the samples differed in both age and occupation. This suggests that closely matching the characteristics of the samples from each country is critical when comparing national cultural orientations.

These data demonstrate that the similarity of cultural value orientations within countries, when viewed against the background of cultural distance between countries, is considerable. Taken together, the findings support the view that countries are meaningful cultural units. In comparing national cultures, however, it is important to insure that the samples from different countries are matched on critical characteristics (e.g., all teacher samples, all student samples, or all properly drawn national samples).

Cultural Distinctiveness of World Regions

Both theoretical arguments and empirical analyses suggest that there are culturally distinct world regions (Hofstede, 2001; Huntington, 1993; Inglehart, 1997; Schwartz, 1999). This section examines the locations in cultural space of 76 cultural groups based on the combined teacher and student samples (73 countries, with Israel split into Arabs and Jews, Germany into East and West, and Canada into Anglo and French-speaking national groups). For this purpose, I first standardized the mean importance of all seven cultural orientations within each group. Each group profile therefore reflects the relative importance of each cultural orientation within a national group. Unlike Inglehart's mapping of national cultures on two orthogonal variables (his dimensions), I map them simultaneously on seven variables (my cultural orientations). Mapping locations of the national groups on the seven orientations in a two dimensional space necessarily entails some imprecision. The richness gained in describing cultures largely compensates for the loss of precision because the degree of imprecision is limited (see below).

The 'co-plot' multidimensional scaling technique (Goldreich & Raveh, 1993) maps the cultural distances between groups. It computes a matrix of profile differences between all pairs of groups by summing the absolute differences between the groups on each of the seven value orientations. From this matrix it generates a two-dimensional spatial representation

of the similarities and differences among groups (see Figure 4). It then calculates vectors (optimal regression lines) in the MDS space that show the direction of increasing scores for each of the seven orientations. In Figure 4, I drew the full vector for embeddedness from lower left to upper right and short arrows to indicate the angles of the vectors for the other orientations. These other vectors also extend through the center of gravity of the figure, just above Romania.

The correlation between the actual scores of the cultural groups on an orientation and their locations along the vector that represents the orientation appear in parentheses. The substantial magnitude of these correlations (range .75 to .98) indicates that the locations of most samples provide quite an accurate picture. This is because countries usually exhibit a profile that reflects the coherence of the theoretical structure of cultural dimensions. If the culture of a country emphasizes one polar value orientation, it typically deemphasizes the opposing polar orientation. Moreover, the relative importance of adjacent cultural orientations is usually similar too. For example, Italian culture, compared to all the others, is very high both in egalitarianism and in the adjacent harmony orientation but very low in the opposing hierarchy and adjacent mastery orientations. Chinese culture shows the reverse profile.[6]

Locations of nations along these vectors relative to one another reveal, graphically, the specific ways in which national cultures resemble or differ from one another. For example, the farther a nation toward the upper right, the greater the cultural emphasis on embeddedness relative to other nations and the farther toward the lower left, the less the cultural emphasis on embeddedness. To locate a nation on a cultural orientation, draw a perpendicular line from the position of the nation to the vector for that orientation. Perpendiculars drawn to the embeddedness vector in Figure 4 show that this orientation is especially emphasized in Yemen, less so in Macedonia, and very little in East Germany.

Consider two examples of how Figure 4 represents the cultural profile of a country on all seven cultural orientations. Culture in Sweden (upper left) strongly emphasizes harmony, intellectual autonomy, and egalitarianism and moderately emphasizes affective autonomy. The cultural emphasis on embeddedness is low, and it is very low for mastery and

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[6] Japan presents a striking exception. Seven samples from around Japan reveal an unusual combination of cultural elements. The culture strongly emphasizes hierarchy and harmony but not embeddedness, which is adjacent to them, and it strongly emphasizes intellectual autonomy but not the adjacent egalitarianism. Thus, the location of Japan in the co-plot is necessarily misleading. This unusual combination would not surprise many scholars of Japanese culture (e.g., Benedict, 1974; Matsumoto, 2002). It points to a culture in tension and transition.

Figure 4
Co-Plot Map of 76 National Groups on Seven Cultural Orientations (coefficient alienation .11)

hierarchy. In contrast, in Zimbabwe (lower right), mastery, embeddedness, and hierarchy are highly emphasized, affective autonomy moderately emphasized, and egalitarianism, intellectual autonomy, and harmony receive little cultural emphasis.

The spatial map of the 76 national cultures reveals seven transnational cultural groupings: West European countries (clear circles) to the far left, English-speaking countries in the lower left center (dark circles), Latin American countries in the center (shaded circles), East European countries in the upper center and to the left of Latin America (lightly shaded circles), South Asian countries (shaded circles) in a band to the right, Confucian influenced countries below them to the right (clear circles), and African and Middle Eastern countries (dark circles) to the far right and above. Only nine cultures are located outside of their expected region. Four of these are from the culturally diverse Middle East (Turkey, Greek Cyprus, Israel Arabs, Israel Jews)

The regions show striking parallels with the zones Huntington (1993) suggested and those Hofstede (1980) and Inglehart and Baker (2000) found. Schwartz and Ros (1995) and Schwartz and Bardi (1997) provide initial explanations for the emergence of the English-speaking, West European, and East European cultural profiles. Most regions reflect some geographical proximity. Hence, some of the cultural similarity within regions is doubtless due to diffusion of values, norms, practices, and institutions across national borders (Naroll, 1973). But shared histories, language, religion, level of development, and other factors also play a part. To illustrate the sensitivity of the cultural orientations to such factors, consider the cultures that are not located in their expected regions.

French Canadian culture is apparently closer to West European and particularly French culture than to English speaking Canadian culture, reflecting its historic and linguistic roots. East German culture is close to West German rather than part of the East European region. This probably reflects continued cultural ties from the pre-communist era. Turkish culture is higher on egalitarianism and autonomy and lower on hierarchy and embeddedness than its Middle Eastern Muslim neighbors are. This probably reflects its secular democracy, long history of East European influence, and recent struggles to join the West. Greek Cypriot culture is relatively high in embeddedness and low in autonomy. This may reflect its history of over 1000 years of rule by the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and its Eastern Orthodox religion. Israeli Jewish culture is close to the English-speaking cultures and distant from the surrounding Middle East to which its Arab culture is close. Europeans founded Israel and it has strong political and economic links to the USA. Among the Latin American countries, the populations of Bolivia and Peru were least

exposed to European culture and economically least developed. This probably explains why their cultures are much higher in hierarchy and embeddedness than those of their neighbors. For Japan, see footnote 5.

Next, let us examine the cultural orientations that characterize each distinct cultural region. I base these characterizations on the actual cultural orientation scores because, as noted above, locations on seven variables in two dimensions cannot be perfect. Nonetheless, the locations of regions on the vectors in Figure 4 are quite accurate and highly informative.

West Europe. Corresponding to its location on the left of Figure 4, West European culture emphasizes intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony more than any other region. It is the lowest region on hierarchy and embeddedness. This profile holds even after controlling for national wealth (GDP per capita in 1985). Thus, though West Europe's high economic level may influence its culture, other factors are apparently critical. This cultural profile is fitting for a region of democratic, welfare states where concern for the environment is especially high (cf. Ester, Halman, & Seuren, 1994).

Although when compared with other world regions, West European countries share a broad culture, there is substantial cultural variation within the region too. Consider two examples. Greek culture is the least typical of Western Europe – higher on mastery and lower on intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism than the others are. French and Swiss French cultures display a relatively high hierarchy orientation for Western Europe, together with the usual high affective and intellectual autonomy. They apparently retain a somewhat hierarchical orientation despite their emphasis on autonomy. Detailed analysis of such variations is beyond the scope of this article, but cultural differences within regions are meaningful.

English-Speaking. The culture of the English-speaking region is especially high in affective autonomy and mastery and low in harmony and embeddedness, compared with the rest of the world. It is average in intellectual autonomy, hierarchy, and egalitarianism. The culture in America differs from that in other English-speaking countries by emphasizing mastery and hierarchy more and intellectual autonomy, harmony, and egalitarianism less. This profile points to a cultural orientation that encourages an assertive, pragmatic, entrepreneurial, and even exploitative orientation to the social and natural environment. With the exception of the USA, this region is particularly homogeneous.

Cultural Differences in the 'West'. There is a widespread view of Western culture as individualist. Hence, the differences within the West that the more complex conception of cultural orientations reveals deserve more

detailed explication (see Schwartz & Ross, 1995). Comparisons of 22 West European samples with six United States samples show large and significant differences on six of the seven culture orientations. Egalitarianism, intellectual autonomy, and harmony are higher in Western Europe; mastery, hierarchy, and embeddedness are higher in the United States. Using the term "individualist" to describe either of these cultures distorts the picture these analyses reveal.

Cultural orientations in Western Europe are individualist in one sense: They emphasize intellectual and affective autonomy and de-emphasize hierarchy and embeddedness relative to other cultures in most of the world. But West European priorities contradict conventional views of individualism in another sense: They emphasize egalitarianism and harmony and de-emphasize mastery. That is, this culture calls for selfless concern for the welfare of others and fitting into the natural and social world rather than striving to change it through assertive action. This runs directly counter to what individualism is usually understood to mean.

Cultural emphases in the United States show a different but equally complex pattern: The individualistic aspect of American value orientations is the emphasis on affective autonomy and mastery at the expense of harmony. This combination may be the source of the stereotypical view of American culture as justifying and encouraging egotistic self-advancement. But this is not prototypical individualism because intellectual autonomy is relatively unimportant. Moreover, both hierarchy and embeddedness, the orientations central to collectivism, are high compared with Western Europe. This fits the emphasis on religion, conservative family values, and punitiveness toward deviance in America. The empirical profile is compatible with in-depth analyses of American culture (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1986; Etzioni, 1993).

Confucian. The Confucian-influenced region also exhibits a pragmatic, entrepreneurial orientation. However, this orientation combines a heavy emphasis on hierarchy and mastery with a rejection of egalitarianism and harmony as compared with other regions. This region emphasizes embeddedness more than all the European and American cultures. This cultural profile is consonant with many analyses of Confucian culture (e.g., Bond, 1996). Within-region differences are small except for Japan, which is substantially higher on harmony and intellectual autonomy and lower on embeddedness and hierarchy.

Africa and the Middle East.[7] The cultural groups from sub-Saharan and North Africa and the Muslim Middle East form a broad region that

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[7] I exclude Cyprus, Israeli Jews, and Turkey, which were discussed above.

does not break down into clear sub-regions. These cultures are especially high in embeddedness and low in affective and intellectual autonomy. Thus, they emphasize finding meaning in life largely through social relationships and protecting group solidarity and the traditional order rather than cultivating individual uniqueness. This fits well with the conclusions of studies of the Middle East (e.g., Lewis, 2003) and sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Gyekye, 1997). There is a great deal of variation within the region on all but embeddedness, egalitarianism, and intellectual autonomy.

South Asia. The culture in the South Asian region is particularly high in hierarchy and embeddedness and low in autonomy and egalitarianism. This points to an emphasis on fulfilling one's obligations in a hierarchical system – obeying expectations from those in roles of greater status or authority and expecting humility and obedience from those in inferior roles. As in Africa, here social relationships rather than autonomous pursuits are expected to give meaning to life. With the exception of India's especially high rating on mastery, all the groups are culturally quite homogenous. The variety of dominant religions (Hinduism, Roman Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Methodist Protestantism) in this region does not produce cultural heterogeneity on the basic orientations.

East Europe. The East European cultures are low in embeddedness and hierarchy compared with Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, but higher in these cultural orientations than Western Europe and the Americas. Although the East European cultural groups do form a region in the spatial projection, the cultures in this region vary substantially on hierarchy, mastery, and harmony. A closer look at the map reveals that the Baltic and East-Central states form a sub-region toward the top center and the Balkan and more Eastern states form a sub-region to their right and below.[8] The former are higher in harmony, intellectual autonomy, and egalitarianism and lower in mastery and hierarchy than the Balkan and more Eastern states. The Baltic and East-Central states have stronger historical and trade links to Western Europe, were less penetrated by totalitarian communist rule, and threw it off earlier. This may help account for why their profile is closer to that of Western Europe. In an earlier paper, my colleagues and I inferred from the profile of the East-Central states that their population had largely rejected both the rhetoric and the social organization of communist regimes, while insisting on their intellectual independence (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997; Schwartz, Bardi, & Bianchi, 2000).[9]

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[8] Georgia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are exceptions that require further study.

[9] The finding that East European countries that experienced more invasive communist rule were lower in harmony and higher in mastery undermines our earlier inter-

Latin America. Finally, the culture of the Latin American region is close to the worldwide average in all seven orientations. Moreover, excepting Bolivia and Peru, whose populations have been least exposed to European culture, this region is particularly homogeneous culturally. Some researchers describe Latin American culture as collectivist (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1995). Compared with Western Europe, this seems to be so. Latin America is higher in hierarchy and embeddedness, presumably the main components of collectivism, and lower in intellectual autonomy, presumably the main component of individualism. The opposite is the case, however, when we compare Latin America to Africa and the Middle East, South Asia, and Confucian-influenced cultures. This example highlights the importance of the frame of comparison. The culture of a group may look different when viewed in a worldwide perspective than when inferred from narrower comparisons.

Relations of Culture to Socioeconomic, Political, and Demographic Characteristics

Having seen that national cultural groups and regions of the world differ systematically on the cultural dimensions, two critical questions arise. How do these cultural differences arise? And do they matter? Socioeconomic, political, and demographic factors all impact on culture and, I will argue, are themselves reciprocally influenced by culture. I present analyses for one key variable representing each of these factors – socioeconomic development, level of democracy, and household/family size.

Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann (2003) traced a causal sequence among socioeconomic development, values, and democratization. They argued that socioeconomic development increases individual resources and thereby gives people the means to make choices. Utilizing these means, people cultivate their presumed inherent human desire for choice, giving rise to "mass emancipative values." Pursuit of these values leads to democratization – institutionalizing freedom rights that provide the legal guarantee of choice. Using a measure of emancipative values drawn from the World and European Value Surveys, Welzel, et al. present analyses showing that values indeed mediate the relationship between socioeconomic development and democratization. Their causal argument contradicts views that values impact on socioeconomic development or that democratization influences values. I next examine how well this argument holds when we employ different measures of values and a set of 72 countries, 15 of which do not overlap those they studied.

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pretation of the high harmony scores as reflecting adaptation to life in totalitarian regimes by avoiding trouble and refraining from taking initiatives.

In order to simplify the empirical presentations, I will use the three polar value dimensions formed by the seven cultural orientations rather than the separate orientations. Two of the cultural value dimensions express what Welzel et al. call emancipative values – the dimensions of autonomy versus embeddedness values and of egalitarianism vs. hierarchy values. The first dimension emphasizes autonomous choice and cultivation of individuals' unique ideas and preferences rather than following and preserving traditional and externally imposed ideas and preferences. The second dimension emphasizes voluntary regulation of behavior based on equality rather than regulation of behavior through submission to role expectations built into existing hierarchies.

Socioeconomic Development and Democratization

The top panel of Table 1 presents correlations across 73 countries between four indexes of socioeconomic development and scores on the three value dimensions. The latter are computed by subtracting the score for the second pole from the first (e.g. harmony minus mastery). The values data are largely from the mid-90's.[10] The correlations portray associations with development about 10 and two years earlier, concurrently, and almost 10 years later. The second panel of Table 1 presents correlations with democratization scores from Freedom House (higher scores signify greater civil liberties and political rights) about 10 years earlier, concurrently, and seven years later (Freedom House, various years). As expected, all correlations with the autonomy and egalitarianism dimensions are substantial, whereas those with the harmony vs. mastery dimension are low.

To assess causal relations, I carried out a path analysis in which earlier indexes of democratization predict later indexes and in which development might affect democratization either directly or through values. Following Welzel, et al., I measured development with the Vanhanen (1997) 'index of power resources' for 1993. This index includes measures of material and intellectual resources and the complexity of the occupational system. This makes it better than a pure economic index for measuring individual resources. Because the 1995 index of democratization is included in Figure 5a to predict the 2002 index, paths from other predictors signify effects on *change* in the level of democratization. Figure 5a reveals that cultural emphases on autonomy and on egalitar-

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[10] Combining values data from somewhat different points in time poses little problem because value change at the national level on these dimensions is very slow (see Schwartz, Bardi, & Bianchi, 2000).

Table 1

Correlations of Cultural Value Dimensions with Socioeconomic Development
Democratization, and Household Size

|	N	Autonomy minus Embeddedness	Egalitarianism minus Hierarchy	Harmony minus Mastery
Socioeconomic Development				
1985 GDPpc	73	.58**	.42**	.27*
1995 GDPpc	73	.73**	.46**	.19
1993 Index of Power Resources	72	.78**	.58**	.14
2004 GNIpc	73	.75**	.53**	.20
Democratization				
1985 Freedom House Index	73	.58**	.46**	.03
1995 Freedom House Index	73	.71**	.52**	.36**
2002 Freedom House Index	73	.70**	.57**	.38**
Household Size				
1985 Average Family Size	73	-.70**	-.61**	-.41**
2001 Average Household Size	73	-.75**	-.36**	-.32**

**p<.01, *p<.05, 2-tailed
Notes: GDPpc=Gross Domestic Product per Capita, from the World Bank; GNIpc=Gross National
Income per Capita, from the World Bank; Average Household/Family Size=from the Encyclopaedia
Britannica Almanac

ianism values both predict increases in democratization. Earlier devel-
opment affects these cultural values and they, in turn, fully mediate the
effects of development on increasing democratization. Democratization
in 1985 does not predict later cultural values over and above the effects
of development.

The path analysis clearly supports the Welzel, et al. causal argument.
For them, development influences values which, in turn, influence change
in democracy levels. Here, development influences change in democracy
levels only insofar as it affects autonomy and egalitarian values, not
directly. Support for this causal sequence derives from a different set of
cultural values than those studied by Welzel, et al. and from a some-
what different set of countries and of years. The current analysis fur-
ther demonstrates that the prior level of democracy has no impact on
cultural values, once development is controlled. However, this analysis
does not test whether cultural values have a reciprocal influence on
socioeconomic development. The path analysis in Figure 5b addresses
this issue.

Because no Vanhanen index of individual resources is available for
the years after 1993, I chose the latest, best, available index of socio-
economic development for this analysis – gross national income per capita

Figure 5a

Causal model predicting change in democracy with socioeconomic level and cultural values across 73 countries

Notes: Broken arrows indicate nonsignificant paths. ** p<.01, * p<.05.

Figure 5b

Causal model predicting change in socioeconomic level with democracy and cultural values across 73 countries

Notes: Broken arrows indicate nonsignificant paths. ** p<.01, * p<.05.

in 2004. Figure 5b reveals that neither democracy nor egalitarianism values in 1995 predict change in socioeconomic development from 1993 to 2004. However, autonomy values significantly predict the change. Thus, this dimension of cultural values reciprocally influences socioeconomic development. I cannot estimate the relative strength of these reciprocal influences because we lack earlier measures of the cultural values. Nonetheless, with the caveat that the earlier and later measures of socioeconomic development differed, this analysis provides evidence that contradicts the Welzel, et al. unidirectional view of relations between values and development.

Family/Household Size

The demographic characteristic I examine is average family/household size in a country. Researchers have largely overlooked the importance of this variable as a determinant and consequence of culture. The third panel in Table 1 reports the correlations of the cultural value dimensions with average family size in 1985 and with average household size in 2001.[11] The negative correlations indicate that the larger the average family or household, the greater the cultural emphasis on embeddedness, hierarchy, and mastery values.

At the country level, cultural value orientations relate strongly to family size. The size of people's *own* family, however, does not relate to their own personal values. How does this happen? The key is societal norms for managing family relations. Societal norms reflect what is required and possible in order for the *typical* family to function smoothly. These norms reflect the prototypical size and composition of households. They specify how to organize families, raise children, and regulate interaction. Families largely conform to these norms, so variation in the size of particular families has less impact on its members.

How might family/household size influence culture? Where the typical household is large, it is crucial for behavior to be predictable. This requires high levels of social control from above. Emphasizing obedience to authority, conformity to norms, and fulfilling role obligations unquestioningly is functional. If family members view themselves as inseparable parts of a family collectivity and identify with its interests, even large families can run smoothly. These family practices and norms foster cultural embeddedness and hierarchy in the society. Large families are incompatible with cultural autonomy and egalitarianism. The demands

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[11] Data are from the Encyclopaedia Britannica Almanac. The date (1985, 2001) is the median of about a 5 year period for which the data were reported.

of coordination in large families preclude treating each member as a unique individual with equal rights. They discourage permitting each family member to make decisions autonomously and to pursue his or her own ideas, interests, and desires. A greater need for pragmatic problem solving in larger families may account for the somewhat stronger emphasis on mastery values.

The preceding explains the possible causal influence of family/household size on cultural value orientations. The influence of cultural values on family/household size is also likely to contribute to the correlations. Autonomy values, in particular, encourage having few children so that each can develop his or her unique abilities and interests. Autonomy and egalitarianism values encourage and justify women's pursuit of meaningful non-family roles. This too reduces the number of children. Embeddedness values promote commitment to the in-group. They sanctify group continuity and, hence, having many children to promote it. Autonomy values sanctify individual choice. They justify weighing children against alternative paths for achieving personal meaning in life, such as careers.

The path analysis in Figure 6 examines possible causal relations among culture, average household/family size, and socioeconomic level. For many countries, I found no statistics for average household size that antedated the mid-90's measurement of culture or for average family size that post-dated this period. Examination of concurrent measures of average household and family size for 60 countries around 1983 reveals that they correlated highly (.87).[12] I therefore used household and family size as proxies for one another in the analysis.

Starting on the left in Figure 6, we see that greater socioeconomic resources (Individual Resources 1980) lead to smaller families (Family Size 1985), but family size does not appear to affect change in socioeconomic level (Individual Resources 1993). Next, the figure reveals a substantial influence of family size on all three cultural value dimensions, over and above the direct effects of socioeconomic resources. Larger families in a country induce less cultural emphasis on harmony, egalitarianism, and autonomy values, whereas greater socioeconomic resources lead to more emphasis on autonomy and egalitarianism but do not affect harmony vs. mastery. Moreover, family size apparently mediates some of the effect of socioeconomic resources on cultural values (indirect paths from Individual Resources 1980 through Family Size 1985).[13] Clearly, family size is important in the development of culture.

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[12] Household size data are from Kurian (1984) and family size data from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica Almanac* 1985.

[13] Direct paths from Individual Resources 1980 to the three cultural dimensions are left out of the figure to avoid clutter. None is significant.

Figure 6
Causal model predicting change in average household/family size with socioeconomic level and cultural values across 73 countries

Notes: Broken arrows indicate nonsignificant paths. ** p<.01, * p<.05.

The right half of Figure 6 reveals that all three cultural value dimensions predict change in household size. Moreover, two dimensions, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy and autonomy vs. embeddedness, fully mediate relations of socioeconomic resources to change in household size. Thus, increasing socioeconomic level appears to promote a drop in the size of households only insofar as it leads to change in cultural values. The three cultural value dimensions also partially mediate effects of earlier family size on later household size. To the extent that smaller families and rising resources increase autonomy values, they promote a decrease in household size. To the extent that smaller families increase harmony values, they also promote decreasing household size, though this effect is weak.

The above findings parallel the zero-order correlations; but the path from egalitarianism to household size reverses the correlation. Although smaller families promote a cultural emphasis on egalitarianism vs. hierarchy values, a cultural emphasis on egalitarianism values contributes to maintaining larger households over time. In other words, an emphasis on hierarchy values promotes a reduction in household size. This effect holds even when the other two value dimensions are not included as predictors.

One speculative interpretation is that both formal and informal normative influence on families is greater in societies whose culture emphasizes hierarchy values. If governments seek to raise productivity through increasing women's participation in the workforce, they are likely to generate societal norms that oppose large families. Such norms may reduce family size more effectively in cultures high in hierarchy. Congruent with this interpretation, the greatest reductions in household size have occurred in China, with its formal anti-natalist policies, and in the East Asian "Tigers" which have rapidly moved toward market economies and whose culture is highly hierarchical.

Consequences of Cultural Value Orientations

Finally, we consider some consequences of national differences in the cultural value orientations. We examine how culture relates to women's position in society, to a selection of social attitudes held by societal members, and to important social behaviors.

Women's Equality

The equality of women and their opportunities for autonomous decision-making is one domain in which cultural orientations are likely to influence

practices. Women should have greater independence to develop their own capabilities and follow their own preferences if the culture emphasizes autonomy rather than embeddedness. Similarly, cultures that emphasize egalitarian rather than hierarchical, role-based regulation of interdependence and work are likely to promote greater equality. A cultural preference for harmonious relations in contrast to assertive mastery might also enhance women's equality, because women around the world value benevolence more and power less than men (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).

Women's equality and autonomy are greater in wealthier and more economically developed countries (e.g., Apodaca, 1998). Doubtless, some of this association is direct. Material and intellectual resources free individuals – men and especially women – from some of their dependence on the support of their families, enabling them to strike out on their own and to demand more equal opportunities. However, the prevailing cultural orientations may mediate the impact of increased individual resources that accompanies national wealth. Cultural orientations may legitimize and facilitate but also delegitimize and inhibit the pursuit of equality. This can occur through informal or formal sanctions experienced in everyday interaction and through encounters with the structures, practices, and regulations of societal institutions that are grounded in and justified by the cultural orientations.

To assess possible mediation by culture, I first correlated both individual resources and the cultural value dimensions with several indicators of women's equality. I then examined relations of individual resources with these indicators, controlling the effects of culture. This reveals whether cultural mediation substantially shrinks the association with resources. Ratings of women's equality in 69 countries in four domains – social, health, education, and employment – in 1988 (Population Crisis Committee, 1988) served as one set of indicators. The Vanhanen country scores for power resources in 1993 indexed availability of resources to individuals. The data on the cultural dimensions and resources post-date the equality data by five to six years on average. However, this should have little effect on the associations: The cultural orientations demonstrate considerable stability (Schwartz, Bardi, & Bianchi, 2000), and analyses using gross domestic product per capita in 1985 to index country wealth yielded essentially the same results.

The top panel of Table 2 shows the correlations of the three cultural value dimensions and individual resources with the five indicators of women's equality. All three cultural dimensions as well as individual resources correlate significantly with the overall average and with most sub-categories of equality. Autonomy vs. embeddedness has the strongest

associations, followed by individual resources, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy, and harmony vs. mastery. All correlations are in the expected direction. The last row of the panel reveals the effect of introducing the three cultural value dimensions as mediators. Clearly supporting cultural mediation, the variance in the overall index of women's equality accounted for by individual resources shrinks 80%, when culture is controlled. Interestingly, though culture mediates resource effects in all four domains, mediation is smallest (50% reduction) for employment equality, the domain most directly concerned with producing wealth.

The bottom panel of Table 2 examines cultural mediation of two other indicators of women's equality and autonomy, the percent of ministerial positions filled by women in national parliaments in 1994-98 (United Nations Women Watch, 1999) and the percent of married women aged 19-45 who used any method of contraception in 1990-97 (United Nations Population Division, 1998). Cultural value dimensions and individual resources correlated substantially with both indicators, as expected. The more socio-economically developed the country and the more its culture emphasized autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony values, the more political equality and sexual autonomy women enjoyed. Culture partially mediated the relation of resources to women's attainment of ministerial positions, reducing the variance explained by 70%. It fully mediated the relation of resources to contraception use, reducing the variance explained by 97%. Here too, the main mediator was the cultural emphasis on autonomy vs. embeddedness values.

Social Attitudes

To examine relations of cultural value emphases to the social attitudes of societal members, I drew on data from the 2000 wave of the World Value Survey (Inglehart, et al., 2004). Table 3 presents correlations of the cultural value dimensions with selected attitudes concerning qualities important for children to learn, conventional morality, competition, and tolerance for out-group members. It also presents correlations of these variables with indexes of country levels of wealth and democratization from the same period. To assess the extent to which cultural values mediate effects of wealth and democracy on attitudes, it presents partial correlations controlling the cultural values in parentheses.

People in countries with cultures high in embeddedness and low in autonomy choose obedience and hard work, but reject imagination, as especially important for children. The chosen qualities promote conforming and contributing to the group in traditional ways, the rejected quality would threaten tradition by generating potentially disruptive, orig-

Table 2
Culture and Women's Equality: Correlations and Mediation of the Effects of
Country Wealth

		Women's Equality in 1988				
	N	Social	Health	Educational	Employment	Average
Autonomy vs. Embeddedness	66	.58**	.76**	.70**	.42**	.73**
Egalitarianism vs. Hierarchy	66	.31*	.39**	.45**	.13	.39**
Harmony vs. Mastery	66	.35**	.23	.18	.25*	.31**
Individual Resources 1993	65	.48**	.66**	.67**	.50**	.68**
Individual Resources 1995 controlling culture	65	.09	.21	.27*	.35**	.30*

	N	% Ministers who are Women 1994-98	N	% Married Women 19-45 who use Contraception 1990-97
Autonomy vs. Embeddedness	70	.51**	53	.76**
Egalitarianism vs. Hierarchy	70	.54**	53	.26*
Harmony vs. Mastery	70	.26*	53	.11
Individual Resources 1993	70	.63**	52	.64**
Individual Resources 1995 controlling culture	70	.34**	52	.20

**p<.01, *p<.05, 2-tailed.

inal ideas. Countries whose culture emphasizes hierarchy and mastery
also view hard work – critical to insure fulfilling role obligations faith-
fully and struggling persistently to master reality – as especially impor-
tant. Obedience does not relate significantly to the egalitarianism/hierarchy
dimension, but it does go with a cultural hierarchy orientation as one
might expect. Only harmony/mastery, but neither national culture, nor
wealth, nor democracy predicts the importance of unselfishness. A mas-
tery orientation may legitimize selfishness because it justifies self-asser-
tion in order to get ahead.

People in countries whose culture emphasizes embeddedness, hierar-
chy, and mastery consider unconditional respect for parents and religion
more important and they more strongly oppose behavior that threatens
traditional family and sexual mores compared to people in countries

Table 3

Cultural Values and Social Attitudes: Correlations and Mediation of Democracy and Economic Level Effects by Culture (Partialed)

Social Attitude	N	Autonomy vs. Embeddedness	Egalitarianism vs. Hierarchy	Harmony vs. Mastery	Democracy 1995 Freedom House	Economic Level GDPpc 1995
% who select as an especially desirable quality for children to learn						
Obedience	58	-.52**	-.14	-.21	-.45** (-.17)^	-.41** (-.10)
Hard Work	58	-.53**	-.57**	-.27*	-.41** (-.05)	-.62** (-.37**)
Imagination	58	.48**	.24	-.04	.29* (-.05)	.56** (.33*)
Unselfishness	58	.03	-.05	-.30*	-.05 (-.04)	.11 (.11)
% who agree that:						
Must respect parents regardless of qualities & faults	57	-.77**	-.57**	-.40**	-.64** (-.11)	-.71** (-.32*)
Religion very important in life	59	-.71**	-.32*	-.42**	-.57** (-.13)	-.48** (.01)
Homosexuality never justifiable	59	-.75**	-.63**	-.39**	-.79** (-.48**)	-.75** (-.41**)
Abortion never justifiable	60	-.58**	-.36**	-.41**	-.48** (-.06)	-.38** (.07)
Divorce never justifiable	60	-.63**	-.50**	-.42**	-.49** (.04)	-.46** (.08)
Competition is good	52	-.21	-.32*	-.29*	-.40** (-.30*)	-.14 (.05)
*% who say would **not** like as neighbor:*						
Immigrants/foreign workers	55	-.56**	-.45**	-.23	-.43** (.00)	-.40** (.08)
People with a criminal record	55	-.43**	-.44**	-.30*	-.21 (.27)	-.57** (-.39**)

^ Correlations in parentheses are controlled for country scores on the three cultural value dimensions. **$p<.01$, *$p<.05$, 2-tailed.

where autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony values prevail. These findings are congruent with the fact that the two attitudes express conformity to expectations of authorities and extended kin-groups but thwart innovative, unconventional behavior that expresses individual preferences, and they reject new realities. People are more likely to view competition as good if they live in countries with cultures that emphasize hierarchy and mastery. Both these cultural orientations justify the differential distribution of resources to which competition is directed, whereas their opposing poles, egalitarianism and harmony, call for cooperative regulation of interdependence.

Readiness to accept immigrants, foreign workers, or people with criminal records as neighbors is lower in cultures that emphasize embeddedness and hierarchy as opposed to autonomy and egalitarianism. In such cultures, people are more likely to fear exposure to values, beliefs, norms, practices, traditions, etc., that differ from their own. Such exposure challenges and endangers the values, beliefs, etc. they cherish and might undermine the established hierarchical structure of roles they assume to be necessary for the smooth functioning of their society. A cultural emphasis on harmony values, which encourages tolerance, also correlates with acceptance of those with criminal records significantly and of immigrants weakly.

Table 3 indicates that national level of democracy correlates significantly with 10 of the 12 social attitudes, as does national economic level. Does culture mediate these associations? I take a reduction of at least 60% in the variance that a structural variable explains to indicate substantial mediation. Using this criterion, the partial correlations in Table 3 reveal that culture substantially mediates the effects of each structural variable for nine of the 10 attitudes it predicts. Culture does not mediate the tendency to approve of competition more where democracy is lower, and it shrinks by only 47% the association of lower national wealth with rejection of neighbors who have a criminal record. These findings suggest that social structural variables may affect individuals' attitudes largely through their effects on the cultural orientations that prevail in the society.[14]

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[14] Although less plausible, one might suggest that cultural orientations influence individuals' attitudes largely through their effects on the social structural variables. Applying the same criterion of a reduction of at least 60% in the explained variance, this time partialing culture on the structural variables, reveals that democracy and economic level substantially mediate the effects of autonomy vs. embeddedness for only two of the 10 attitudes it predicts, of egalitarianism vs. hierarchy for four of the nine attitudes it predicts, and of harmony vs. mastery for none of the nine attitudes it predicts (partial correlations available from the author).

Attitudes and Behavior in the European Social Survey

Thus far, we have examined relations of cultural orientations to the attitudes and behavior of societal members using culture scores based on the SVS. As discussed above, the human values items in the European Social Survey (ESS) also provide scores for these orientations. These scores are based on few items and the heterogeneity and number of countries in the ESS data set is limited. However, studying relations of the cultural value orientations to attitudes and behavior in the representative national samples of the ESS can shed light on the robustness of the cultural value theory.

Here, I examine relations of the cultural value orientations to one attitude (opposition to immigration) and two types of behavior (membership in voluntary organizations and political activism). I also present relations of social structural variables to the attitude and behaviors and assess the extent to which culture mediates these relations. In Schwartz (2006), I present more elaborate analyses of the relations of culture to these and other attitudes and behavior, using hierarchical linear modeling to take both individual level (e.g., age, education, personal values) and country level variables into account simultaneously.

Table 4 presents correlations with the seven cultural orientations, with measures of country wealth (gross domestic product per capita in 1999) and average annual inflation between 1990 and 1999 from the ESS macro-data file, and with average household size in 2001. The index of democracy varies insufficiently across these countries to merit inclusion.

Three ESS items measured opposition to accepting 'other' immigrants – those of a different race/ethnic group, from poorer European, and poorer non-European countries. A summary index of these items revealed great variation in levels of opposition across countries.[15] Column 1 in Table 4 reveals that opposition to 'other' immigrants correlates negatively with intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and country economic level, and positively with inflation and household size. The two cultural orientations emphasize openness to and tolerance for what is new and different as well as treating others as moral equals. As such, they encourage acceptance of immigrants and militate against opposing them. To assess mediation of structural effects by culture, I partialed on these two cultural orientations. The partial correlations in parentheses suggest full mediation of structural effects.

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[15] I included only the 15 West European countries in this analysis, because immigration to East Europe and to Israel has different meanings.

Table 4
Correlations of Cultural Value Orientations with Selected Attitudes and Behavior
across European Social Survey Countries and Mediation of Structural Effects

Cultural Value Orientation	N	Opposition to 'Other' Immigrants	Membership in Voluntary Organizations	Political Activism
		15	18	20
Embeddedness		.49	-.76**	-.63**
Intellectual Autonomy		-.63*	.79**	.84**
Affective Autonomy		-.33	.42	.40
Hierarchy		.33	-.26	-.48*
Egalitarianism		-.68**	.60**	.78**
Harmony		-.23	.06	.17
Mastery		.19	.07	-.18
GDPpc 1999		-.56* (.12)[A]	.54* (.31)	.53* (.39)
Inflation 1990-99		.69** (.12)	-.56* (-.06)	-.68** (-.19)
Household Size 2001		.45 (-.04)	-.73** (-.39)	-.68** (-.20)

** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$, 2-tailed.
Notes: [A]Correlation partialed for intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism cultural orientations.

Consider next membership in voluntary organizations, a core aspect of social capital (e.g., Putnam, 2000). The number of memberships in 12 types of organizations (e.g., sports, humanitarian, labor, religious) indexed this variable in the ESS. Column 2 of Table 4 reports correlations with membership. Three cultural orientations and all three structural variables predicted country differences. Greater intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and country wealth go with joining voluntary organizations. Cultural embeddedness, higher inflation, and larger households accompany lower membership.

Intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism both entail a cultural view of individuals as independent actors with rights and responsibilities to express these interests through voluntary action. This would encourage joining voluntary organizations. In contrast, cultural embeddedness may discourage unnecessary involvement with people outside the broad in-group; it emphasizes loyalty and devotion to the in-group instead. Such a cultural atmosphere would not support membership in voluntary groups in the wider society. After partialing on intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism, the variance explained by GDPpc, by inflation, and by household size all shrink by at least 60%, suggesting substantial mediation by culture.

As a final example, consider political activism. This was measured as the number of politically relevant, legal acts that respondents reported performing in the 12 past months out of nine (e.g., contacting a politician,

participating in a public demonstration, boycotting a product). Intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism predicted greater political activism (column 3 of Table 4), whereas the opposing cultural orientations, embeddedness and hierarchy predicted less activism. Political activism necessitates taking initiatives, expressing views that may oppose conventional practices or expectations, often promoting causes that go beyond in-group self-interest (e.g., protecting the weak or the environment). Such action fits a cultural atmosphere that encourages autonomous thought, individual responsibility, and cooperative work, but it violates a cultural atmosphere focused on preserving the status quo and the authoritative social order.

All three structural variables also correlated significantly with political activism. The cultural orientations of intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism mediated the strong negative effects of inflation and large households on political activism, but not the enhancing effect of country wealth. The three sets of findings in Table 4 suggest, with only one exception, that country wealth, inflation, and household size influence these important attitudes and behaviors largely through their influence on the prevailing cultural value orientations.[16]

The findings with the ESS data together with those reported earlier for combined teacher and student samples across many nations demonstrate that the cultural orientations have robust effects even when measured with different instruments, in different types of samples, and across a wide variety of countries. It is often more convenient to work with the three cultural dimensions, as reported in Tables 1-3. However, the correlations of the single cultural orientations in Table 4 show that doing so may sometimes obscure meaningful information. The orientations that constitute the poles of each dimension correlate in opposing directions in almost every case, but the strength of the correlations can vary considerably. For all three examples in Table 4, egalitarianism has much stronger correlations than hierarchy, its opposing pole. Moreover, the correlations of intellectual autonomy are much stronger than those of affective autonomy, the orientation with which it combines to form the autonomy pole of the autonomy/embeddedness dimension. These patterns doubtless reflect the particular topics of study. It is therefore worthwhile, in each case, to examine whether combining cultural orientations to form dimensions loses important information.

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[16] Here too, one might speculate that the two cultural orientations influence individuals' attitudes and behavior largely through their effects on the social structural variables. Controlling for all three structural variables, the variance explained by the two key cultural values shrinks substantially in five of the six cases. However, the partial correlations for egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy are larger than those for the structural variables in 15 of 18 comparisons (2 values × 3 structural variables × 3 dependent variables).

Conclusions

This article presented a theory of seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural value dimensions. Although it is more complex than other dimensional theories of cultural variation, this theory permits more finely tuned characterizations of cultures. Analyses of data from 73 countries using one instrument and from 20 countries using another demonstrate the validity of the seven cultural orientations. Equally important, the analyses showed that these orientations form an integrated circular structure that captures their theorized compatibilities and oppositions. This yields three broad dimensions (Figure 1).

The analyses demonstrated that all three cultural dimensions contribute uniquely to the explanation of important social phenomena. The autonomy/embeddedness and egalitarianism/hierarchy dimensions often showed a similar pattern of positive or negative associations. This reflects the positions of their component orientations, as adjacent or opposed, in the circular structure of cultural orientations. The harmony/mastery dimension exhibited a different pattern of associations. It correlated least strongly with indicators of socio-economic development. Its correlations with the attitudes and behavior studied here were also weaker, perhaps because this article focused on variables related to development. On the other hand, measurement of harmony and mastery may be problematic. The aspects of culture that the harmony/mastery dimension captures may be especially distinctive. It added a unique element to our understanding of attitudes toward unselfishness and competition.

The most striking finding when comparing the mapping of national cultures in the research based on the Hofstede, Inglehart, and Schwartz approaches is that they identify such similar cultural regions around the world. At least two of the three approaches, and usually all three, identify African, Confucian, East-Central European (ex-communist), English-Speaking, Latin American, South Asian, and West European regions. This is amazing, considering how different the approaches are. They differ in their basic cultural constructs, in their methods of measurement (work values and attitudes; beliefs, preferences, and judgments on a range of topics; abstract values or profiles reflecting individuals' important goals), in the types of samples studied (IBM employees, representative national samples, teachers, students), and in their data-gathering periods (from the late '60s into the 21st century).

The emergence of similar cultural regions across approaches affirms the reality of the systematic cultural value differences these approaches tap. The location of similar sets of countries in these regions in the Inglehart and Schwartz mappings also affirms the meaningfulness of countries as cultural units. The substantially similar ordering of countries

on cultural orientations or dimensions, when different sub-samples (e.g., age or gender samples) are used to map countries in both the Schwartz and Inglehart analyses, further supports the idea of national cultures. Nonetheless, it is important to investigate other cultural units, such as ethnic groups, in future research. The research reported here, that used 52 ethnic subgroups from the ESS data as the unit of analysis, demonstrated that discrimination of the seven cultural orientations holds at the ethnic group level and not only at the country level. This enables us to ask questions about cultural differences and similarities among ethnic groups, to compare the impact of nation with that of ethnicity, and to assess the effects of immigration to new countries on the culture of ethnic groups.

The analyses revealed substantial empirical overlap between Inglehart's tradition/secular-rational dimension and my autonomy/embeddedness dimension and between Inglehart's survival/self-expression dimension and both my autonomy/embeddedness and egalitarianism/hierarchy dimensions. Nonetheless, several countries exhibited substantially divergent rankings on each of these overlapping dimensions. Each dimension apparently captures some aspects of culture not captured by the others. For example, the level of conventional religious commitment apparently influences tradition/secular-rational scores strongly but has much less impact on autonomy/embeddedness scores. In contrast, autonomy-embeddedness scores apparently reflect the cultural emphasis on extended in-group bonds vs. pursuit of individual uniqueness more than tradition/secular rational-scores do. This difference between the cultural dimensions accounts for the divergent rankings of ex-communist countries on the two dimensions.

The conceptual and empirical differences between the Schwartz and Inglehart dimensions can be exploited by using them together to derive deeper understandings of particular national cultures. Doing so may also contribute to our understanding of what each dimension and cultural orientation actually taps. We do not yet know what the optimal number of dimensions and orientations is for characterizing and broadly comparing cultures. Nor do we know which dimensions and orientations will be most fruitful. The findings from research using the approach presented here and the World Value Survey suggest, however, that studying basic values is a desirable path to follow. Values are particularly significant dimensions for comparing cultures because they affect so many different aspects of life. But other dimensions of cultural difference may also be important.

The critical value dimensions are unlikely to be orthogonal. They evolve as preferences for resolving basic issues in managing life in society. It is not logical that preferences for resolving one issue are independent

of those for other issues. Cultures that encourage autonomy in individual/ group relations are unlikely to prefer hierarchy for managing human interdependence. Though they are not opposites, autonomy and hierarchy rarely appear together because they presume conflicting views of human nature. Of course, we can derive orthogonal dimensions from data. But in doing so we miss the pull toward coherence in national cultures.

To conclude, I quote an earlier summary of the points on which the approach to cultural dimensions presented here differs from others (Schwartz, 2004, p.73): "(a) It derived the cultural orientations from a priori theorizing rather than post hoc examination of data. (b) It designated a priori the value items that serve as markers for each orientation. (c) It used as measures only items tested for cross-cultural equivalence of meaning. (d) It included a set of items demonstrated to cover the range of values recognized cross-culturally, a step toward ensuring relative comprehensiveness of cultural value dimensions. (e) It specified how the cultural orientations are organized into a coherent system of related dimensions and verified this organization, rather than assuming that orthogonal dimensions best capture cultural reality. (f) It brought empirical evidence that the order of national cultures on each of the orientations is robust across different types of samples from each of a large number of nations around the world [and using different instruments]. These distinctive features increase the promise of this approach for future research."

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